

**U.S. RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN STATES: A STUDY
WITH REFERENCE TO ENERGY RESOURCES GEOPOLITICS
FROM 1991 TO 2012**

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FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
KUALA LUMPUR

2018

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**THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF
PHILOSOPHY, BY RESEARCH**

**FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
KUALA LUMPUR**

2018

DEDICATION

This research is, humbly, dedicated to the disquieting memory of the numerous innocent **ordinary victims** of the Central Asian states (CAS) and the United States of America (USA) who, over the ages, have been the, unfortunate, casualties in elitist-hatched geopolitics, both internal and external. May all those **innocent souls**, regardless of their various convictions, find true peace!

University of Malaya

UNIVERSITI MALAYA

ORIGINAL LITERARY WORK DECLARATION

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Title of Thesis ("This Work"): **U.S. Relations with Central Asian States: A Study with Reference to Energy Resources Geopolitics from 1991 to 2012**

Field of Study: **History**

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ABSTRACT

Though an undefined central asian region has been around historically from time immemorial, the narrowly defined Central Asia (C.A.) of the recent past was a Russian/Soviet construct of early modern vintage. In the aftermath of the Soviet demise, the region stands variously redefined, if only analytically. Hence, the Central Asian region now, as defined by this study, constitutes the states of Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The past two decades or so have witnessed the steady forging and gradual development of relations between these newly independent Central Asian states (CAS) and/or emergent republics of Central Asia (CARs) and the reviving United States of America (U.S.A.). The development of multi-sectoral relations between them betrays a subtle shift from one of apparent reluctance that characterized the early years to one of enthusiastic engagement subsequently.

This study is, therefore, a research attempt to explain the nature of the evolving relations between most of the freed states of a redefined Central Asia (C.A.) and the U.S. and to account for the changes in these relationships, especially but not exclusively from late 1991 when most of these states got their independences from the erstwhile Soviet Union and found themselves, at last, left apparently *free* to develop their own foreign relations. Methodologically, by merely using printed and electronic materials available in the public domain, a number of pertinent variables are considered as likely causes for the development and evolution of these relations. Key among these is the importance of the region's energy resources to the U.S. and by extension to the western countries and their other relatively energy-deficient allies. Other variables seen, in this study, as responsible for the perceived shift in relations include: American intervention in the neighboring states of Central Asia/Caspian; the varied nature of ties the Central Asian states (CAS) themselves maintain with Russia; and the consequent weakness of the U.S. in the broader C.A. convicinity.

The basic objectives of this study then are: first, defining the C.A. region anew; second, accounting for the change in America's relationships with the constituent states of this analytic region and; third, highlighting the primacy of strategic, especially energy resources in the evolution of these ties. It must be mentioned here that the present research, after surveying the region politico-geographically in broad-strokes and anchoring the entire region historically too, deliberately chooses to gloss over the internal factors in the CARs themselves, in order to give due stress to the importance of external events and the regional dynamics of the U.S.-Russian cooperation and competition, especially in regard to energy issues. After all it was these very external factors that were responsible for launching both these freed CARs and the new C.A. region too, as a relatively coherent whole in the international scene. On the whole, this study found that, in the period under review, these relationships between the U.S. and the CAS have indeed evolved and there have been changes in the nature of these ties if not also in the general direction of these relationships.

ABSTRAK

Rantau Asia Tenggara yang tidak mempunyai definisi geografi moden. Rantau Asia Tengah yang belum lagi diterokai mengikut definisi geografi moden telah lama wujud dari sejak zaman pra-sejarah. Rantau ini yang didefinisikan secara sempit kebelakangan ini merupakan suatu konstruk Kesatuan Soviet. Selepas kejatuhan Soviet, secara analitikal, rantau ini diberi pelbagai definisi baharu. Justeru, rantau Asia Tengah hari ini, sebagaimana didefinisikan oleh kajian ini, meliputi negara-negara Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan dan Uzbekistan. Sepanjang dua dekad yang lalu, secara beransur-ansur berlaku perkembangan hubungan antara negara Asia Tengah (Central Asian States; CAS) yang baru merdeka ini dengan negara/Republik Asia Tengah (republics of Central Asia; CARs) dan Amerika Syarikat (AS). Perkembangan hubungan yang pelbagai sektor ini menunjukkan peralihan daripada hubungan yang agak dingin kepada hubungan yang lebih mesra.

Justeru, kajian ini cuba menjelaskan sifat hubungan luar yang berkembang antara negara-negara yang bebas yang ditakrifkan semula sebagai Asia Tengah (CA) dan Amerika Syarikat (A.S.) dengan mengambil kira perubahan dalam hubungan ini terutamanya sejak lewat tahun 1991 apabila kebanyakan negara ini memperoleh kemerdekaan dari Kesatuan Soviet. Kemerdekaan ini membawa kepada kebebasan mereka untuk menjalin hubungan luar. Dari segi metodologi, kajian ini menggunakan bahan atas talian dan bercetak yang terdapat di domain awam. Amat jelas wujud beberapa pembolehubah penting yang harus dipertimbangkan sebagai penyumbang utama kepada perkembangan dan evolusi hubungan ini. Yang paling penting, adalah sumber tenaga rantau ini kepada A.S. dan seterusnya ke negara-negara barat lain dan sekutu mereka yang kekurangan sumber tenaga. Pemboleh ubah lain yang bertanggungjawab dalam perubahan hubungan ini termasuk; campur tangan A.S. di negara-negara jiran AsiaTengah/Caspian; hubungan pelbagai negara Asia Tengah (CAS) dengan Rusia; dan kelemahan A.S. dalam rantau Asia Tengah secara umum.

Objektif asas kajian ini adalah: pertama, memberi definisi baru kepada rantau Asia Tengah. Kedua, menjelaskan perubahan hubungan A.S. dengan negara di rantau ini dan ketiga, menekankan kepentingan strategik terutamanya merujuk kepada sumber tenaga dalam evolusi hubungan luar ini. Harus disebut di sini, setelah meninjau geopolitik dan sejarah rantau ini, kajian ini secara sengaja tidak menjelaskan isu dalaman negara-negara rantau ini supaya dapat memberi penekanan kepada kepentingan peristiwa luar dan dinamika rantau ini yang merujuk kepada kerjasama dan persaingan antara A.S. dan Rusia terutamanya dalam sektor sumber tenaga. Ini kerana, faktor luaran inilah yang membawa kepada pengenalan rantau CARs yang merdeka dan C.A. ke arena antarabangsa. Secara keseluruhan, kajian ini mendapati dalam tempoh perbincangan ini, hubungan antara A.S. dan CAS sebenarnya telah jauh berubah dan perubahan ini dapat dilihat dalam sifat dan hala tuju hubungan ini.

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To Almighty Allah (*S.W.T.*) is due all praise and every *shukr* that can possibly emanate from my humble soul! If not for His Will, Benefactions and Sustenance, this researcher would not be able to commit anything to paper, leave alone to complete the present research work. I believe it is only through His Infinite Mercy, that I have been able to traverse this far in my educational development. Whatever intellectual attainments I can claim to have achieved is due wholly and solely to His Divine Pittance, which I hereby dutifully acknowledge to cherish and for which I gladly remain ever insolvently indebted to Him alone!

Without recording my due thanks to now Dato (then Professor Dr.) Mohammad Redzuan Othman, this research undertaking would not be deemed to be responsibly completed. As my first, willingly chosen, supervisor, he is aware of the genealogical trajectory and is knowledgeable in the circumstances under which this research was undertaken. I owe deep gratitude to him for his welcome, understanding, encouragement, technical supervision and corrections, co-operation, support, and most crucially, perceptive advice and patience throughout the entire protracted duration of this research with its peculiar set of logistical constraints, despite his obviously busy work schedule as the Dean of the Arts and Social Sciences Faculty, University of Malaya (UM). When I had to unintentionally run-in with the Malaysian Immigration Authorities¹ and got stranded temporarily in Singapore, he appeared rather timely at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore to extend a helping hand and an unexpected invitation to a memorable lunch-time banquet too, at a quaint restaurant in old downtown Singapore, subsequently. It is a setback to me, personally, that towards the end of this research he had to leave the services of the UM, to be, happily for him, at the helm of another prestigious and upcoming university; congratulations!

I am and remain most thankful to Madam Professor (then Dr.) Shakila Parween Yacob of the Department of History – UM (Universiti Malaya); my second, dedicated and remaining supervisor for her useful suggestions, critical comments and unrelenting perusal of the work. She had repeatedly slogged through the earlier draft versions of this manuscript, sometimes verbatim, flagging at various points to draw my attention to technical and other discrepancies, obvious or otherwise. In particular, I am grateful for her impeccable translation of my English Abstract in not just appropriate but also in actually discipline-specific literary *Bahasa Melayu* (Malay). Earlier on she *shoo shooed* me off from my propensity to linguistically graze overly on the flowery meadows and possibly miss out reaching the expectantly beckoning scholarly horizon on time! Even at the critical stage of my research she pursued it via telephonic supervision all the way from the eastern seaboard of the U.S., specifically from first, Louisiana then recently, from Maryland too, stirring me up; I have to confess here, from my marathon stupor, through no fault of hers. Though truly inspired from afar in this manner, my own peculiar circumstances had often prevented me from being even more deeply mentored and methodologically-coached directly too by the rest of the highly learned UM faculty.

Materials utilized in this research work have been gathered, over the years, from a number of important libraries across Asia. These libraries include a number of

¹ In fact, much later into my post-*viva voce* period, somewhat similar problems led to my being quite lawfully remanded for two weeks by the Immigration Enforcement Unit at the Sultan Iskandar Immigration Depot, Johor Baharu from 21st June 2017 to 4th July 2017, including for, euphemistically, “partaking” first-hand in some, ironic, “festivities” in captivity, all, as if, thrown in along with a RM2,000 fine too!

separate ones that fall under the Singapore National Library Board System, the Islamia College Library of the University of Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (then N.W.F.P.), Pakistan, the main library of the Bahauddin Zakariya University (Multan, Pakistan), the U.S.I.S. Library (Lahore, Pakistan), the Tun Sri Lanang Library of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor), the University of Malaya Library (Main and City campuses) and the main library of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM). Though, clearly not of the repute and obviously not of the stature of either the LOC, Washington, D.C. or the Lenin Library, Moscow, both of which I have yet to visit, special highlight must be made of: first, the National Library of Singapore, particularly the Lee Kong Chian Reference Library and second, the Tun Sri Lanang Library of the U.K.M. Both these libraries boast excellent facilities for research and I remain thankful to all their highly competent and friendly personnel who never fail to impress me with their ready help whenever approached.

Generally, I have attempted to adopt here the stylistic conventions prescribed by the 2009 *MLA Handbook*² but with important and consistent adaptations that suit first, University of Malaya's dissertation production requirements; second, my specific notational needs; as well as third, to conform to Internet,³ particularly the World Wide Web's, citational specifications; and finally, as afforded by the capabilities of the word-processing facilities at my disposal. In fact, at times these requirements may be contradictory and mutually exclusive. Now to illustrate these points, each time I key in the Afghan city Herat, the auto-correction feature of the computer steps in to "correct" it to Heart! Not that Central Asia is a stranger to things of the heart; in fact, it has always viewed itself as the heart of Asia, if not also the world but when Herat is meant specifically, nothing, not even software, should be allowed to take it to Heart! Next, each time I key in the relevant URLs within angle brackets, as required by the Style Guide, these angle brackets are instantly erased or auto "corrected" the minute I depress the space-bar to type on! All quotations, including especially those extracted from British and other works, have been uniformly rendered into American English in the body of my text. There is a utilitarian motive to this; I find that doing so is simply more practical, though, of course, most modern computer software packages do provide the necessary language switching feature. I have, however, breached the above convention, reluctantly, only in my bibliography in order that all titles, and technical particulars of books and other materials incorporated, largely appear as they really are.

Despite this research being largely a library and electronic-media-based undertaking, I still am indebted, besides to the numerous eminent scholars, elites and more mundane analysts or practitioners whose various works I have either browsed through or referenced herein in the course of this research, to also a number of individuals who, knowingly or unknowingly to them, have been of varying service to its successful completion. In no particular order of significance, I wish to record their names randomly here as follows: Amran bin Adenan, Iqbal Tajik, Qibla Ayaz, Atta ullah Yousaf Zai, Ghulam Mustafa Chaudary, Fayyaz Ahmad, Late Hj. M. J. Namazie, Ishtiaq Hussain Chaudary, Havildar Faryad Ali Awan, Stephen P. Cohen, Alami Musa, Tommy Koh, Idris Rashid Khan Surattee, Said Abdullah, Rozita, Aishah, P. Ramasamy, Hashimah, Late Syed Hussein Alatas, Salmiah, Azlina, Mastura, Roy Anthony Rogers, Zainal Abidin Ibrahim, Dr. Sivachandralingam Sundara Raja, Bukhari Jaon, Walter Russell Mead, Ibrahim Hassan, Rushdi Chia, Charles Simon-Aaron and Mohideen M. Ally. Other helpful souls who are un-named here would not necessarily go soulfully unappreciated in my mind.

²*MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers*, 7thedn. (New York: MLA, 2009).

³Andrew Harnack and Eugene Kleppinger, *Online! : A Reference Guide to Using Internet Sources* (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1997).

I am deeply grateful for all their encouragement, candid suggestions, unsolicited observations, documentary handouts and all sorts of sundry support. If not for all their assistances, intended or otherwise, this work would truly be unsubstantive and certainly colorless. Whatever deficiencies or graver faults that remain are entirely due to my own unreconstructed shortcomings, for which I, hereby, beseech your benign indulgence, if not also deference; and I thank you all very much for that. The outcome and conclusions of this research, it goes without saying, do not necessarily reflect the actual views of the elites or practitioners of any of the countries or governments that are the core subjects of this study.

The enormous sacrifices, abiding motivational counsel and sincere prayers of my late father, the sundry assistances of his numerous dedicated and helpful students and friends, and the rest of my keenly supportive family members are all lovingly recalled at this important juncture in the development of this work. In particular, I wish to and could not thank enough my mother and sister, who despite their tolerant regular exhortations and clearly not knowing the true value of my work, nevertheless rendered invaluable assistances not only in the belated and protracted preparation of this work itself but also culinarily ensuring that I, the researcher, do not either needlessly rework or needfully overwork in my research through any gastronomic malfunctions on account of excessive usage of naughty lentils and chickpeas, especially when unlaced with asafetida, in the meals. I am also most indebted to my younger brother and sister-in-law, who knowing well the real significance of this work, have continually pitched-in with all manner of needful help and contingency supports, without all of which, this research work simply could not have made it this far, let alone seen the dawning intellectual light of my scholarly days!

Hujjathullah s/o M. H. Babu Sahib
25th. January 2018
8th *Jamadir Awal* 1439 *A.H.*
Kuala Lumpur

Post-*viva voce* revision/corrections⁴ completed by: 20th February 2018

⁴ Following the successful completion of my *viva voce*, see Appendix XII, on 7th June 2017 (12th *Ramadhan* 1438 *A.H.*), I had to undertake major revisions mostly as per the various and at times contradictory suggestions of my External and Internal Examiners. In these regards, I wish to record my thanks to all the concerned personnel of the Department of History and the Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences of Universiti Malaya and, in particular, to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hanafi bin Hussin, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Shanthi a/p Thambiah, Emeritus Prof. Dr. Omar Farouk bin Sheikh Ahmad, Prof. Dr. Wahabuddin Ra'ees and, last but not least, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zulkanain bin Abdul Rahman for all their valuable advice and suggestions.. My gratitude to all of them for "simmering" me to success, thanks!

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Abbrev. ; abb.	Abbreviation/s; abbreviated
A.B.	air base
ABC	annual bilateral consultations
ABM; ABMs.	anti-ballistic missile/s
ACG	Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (Azerbaijani offshore oil fields)
A.D.; AD	<i>anno Domini</i>
ADB; As.DB	Asian Development Bank
AEECA	Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia
Af. ; Afg.; Afgn.	Afghan; Afghanistan
Ag	silver
A.H.; AH	<i>anno Hegira</i> (Muslim <i>Hijiri</i> Era starting from 622 CE)
AIDS	acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
AIOC	Azerbaijan International Operating Co.; Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (apc)
aka	also known as
AKTU	Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (republics)
AKT	Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (states)
Al	aluminum
Amb.	ambassador
AMOCO	American Oil Company
Anon.; anon.	anonymous
AOR	area of responsibility (for U.S. forces)
apc	as per context
App.; app.; Append.	appended; appendices; appendix
Ar.; Arm.; Armn.	Armenia/n
Aramco	Arabian American Oil Company
ARCO	Atlantic Richfield Company
AS	Aral-Shymkent (pipeline)
A.S.; A. Sea	Aral Sea
ASEAN; Asean	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASSF	Afghan Security Services Funding
A.S.S.R.; ASSR	Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
a.s.w.	<i>alayhi 's- salatuwa- 's-salam</i>
at. no.	atomic number
at. wt.; at. mass	atomic weight (mass)
Au; Au	<i>aurum</i> (gold)
Az.; Azer. ; Azerb.	Azerbaijan/i
Az.CP	Azerbaijan Communist Party
Az. P. F.	Azerbaijan Popular Front
b; bn.; bil.	billion (one thousand million); billions
b.	born, birth; <i>ibn, bin</i> (apc)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
Bbl; bbl	barrel/s
B.C.; BC	Before Christ
BCE	Before Common Era
Bcm.; bcm	billion cubic meters
BCN	biological, chemical and nuclear (weapons) aka NBC
b/d	barrels per day
BP	British Petroleum
Bpd	barrels (per) day
BPSRWE	<i>B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy</i>
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
B.S.; B. Sea	Black Sea

BTBA	Bukhara-Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty (pipeline)
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (pipeline)
BTE	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzarum (pipeline)
BTUs. ; Btu.	British Thermal Unit/s
C	carbon; coal
c.	<i>circa</i> (about)
C.; C	centigrade
Capt.	captain
CAC	Central Asia-Center (pipelines system)
C.A.	Central Asia/n
CAOP	Central Asian Oil Pipeline
CAR; CARs.	Central Asian Region; Central Asian Republic/s (apc)
CAREC	(ADB's) Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (program)
CARX	Chinese Autonomous Region of Xinjiang
CAS	Central Asian State/s
CASA-1000	Central Asia South Asia-1000 (electricity project)
CAU	Central Asian Union
CC	(Politburo) Central Committee
CD-ROM	compact disk- read only memory
CE	Common Era (wrongly Christian Era, which is better abb. as A. D.)
CEECs.	Central and Eastern European Countries
CENTCOM	(U.S.) Central Command (CentCom.) aka USCENTCOM
CentGas; Cent Gas	Turkmen-Pakistan Pipeline (to be realized as TAPI)
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CENTRASBAT	Central Asian Battalion
Cf.; cf.	confer; compare
Ch.; chap.; chaps.	chapter/s
C.I.A.; CIA	Central Investigation Agency (U.S.)
CIOC	Caspian International Operating Company
C.I.S.; CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (aka Comecon)
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
Co	cobalt
C.P.; CP	Communist Party
CPC	Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
C.P.K.; CPKy.	Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan
CPKz.	Communist Party of Kazakhstan
CPSU	Communist Party (of the) Soviet Union
C.P.T.; CPT	Communist Party of Turkestan
CPTj.	Communist Party of Tajikistan
CPTu.	Communist Party of Turkmenistan
CPU	Communist Party of Uzbekistan
Cr	chromium
CRS	(U.S.) Congressional Research Service
C.S.; C. Sea	Caspian Sea
C.S.C.E.; CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (later OSCE)
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CT	Counter Terrorism (program)
CTR	Cooperative Threat Reduction (program)
Cu	copper
d.	died; death
D.C.; DC	District of Columbia
D.C.I.	Director of Central Intelligence (USA)
DOD	Department of Defense (USA)
DOE	Department of Energy (USA)
DOE-EIA	DOE-Energy Information Administration (Agency)
DOS	Department of State (USA)

DOS-BN	DOS- <i>Background Note</i>
DOS-FOA	DOS-Foreign Operations Assistance (Factsheet)
DOS-FOAA	DOS-Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance (Factsheet)
DOS-USRWKz.	DOS-U.S. Relations with Kazakhstan (Factsheet)
DPT	Democratic Party of Tajikistan
DRA	Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (later ROA)
DSK	Turkmenistan-Iran (pipeline)
E	East; east
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership (and Cooperation) Council
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECO	Economic Cooperation Organization
Ed.; ed.; Eds.; eds.	edited; editor/s
Edn. ; edn.	edition
EEU; EurAsEc	Eurasian Economic Union (community)
EKrUSA	Embassy of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in the USA
EKzUSA	Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
ERAUSA	Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the USA
Esp.; esp.	especially
Est.; est.	estimate; estimates
ETjUSA	Embassy of Tajikistan to the United States of America
ET(U)NC	Eastern Turkestan (Uyghurstan) National Congress
E.U.; EU	European Union
EUCOM	(United States) European Command aka USEUCOM
F.	Fahrenheit
Fe	iron ore
FDI	foreign direct investment/s
FMF	Foreign Military Financing (program)
Fn.; fn.; f.	footnote
FRD	Federal Research Division (LOC, USA)
FREEDOM	Freedom & Reform in Europe, Eurasia for Democracy & Open Market
FSA	FREEDOM Support Act (USA)
FSU	former Soviet Union
FTA	free trade agreement
FTD	Foreign Trade Division (Census Bureau, USA)
G	(natural) gas
G.C.C.; GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	gross domestic product
GOKz.	Government of Kazakhstan
GUAM	Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (sometimes GUUAM)
GWOT	global war on terror
H.C.C.A.	<i>History of Civilizations of Central Asia</i>
H.D.I.; HDI	Human Development Index
HEC	Higher Education Commission (Pakistan)
HEU	highly enriched uranium
Hg; Hg	<i>hydrargyrum</i> (mercury)
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM_s	intercontinental ballistic missile/s
ICG	(E.U.'s) International Crisis Group
IEA	International Energy Agency
IUM	International Islamic University Malaysia
ILP	Islamic Liberation Party (Tajikistan)
IMET	International Military Education and Training (program)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement (of) Uzbekistan
INF	intermediate-range nuclear forces (treaty of 1987)
IOCs.	international oil companies

I.O.s; IOs.	international organization/s
IPAP	(NATO's) Individual Partnership Action Plan
I.P.E.; IPE	international political economy
I.R.; IR	International Relations (academic field); Islamic Republic (polity)
I.R.P.	Islamic Revival Party
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force (in Afghanistan)
ISI	(Pakistan) Inter-Services Intelligence (directorate)
K	<i>kalium</i> ; potassium
K2	Karshi-Khanabad (Uzbek air base); Godwin Austin (peak) (apc)
KA	Karachaganak-Atyrau (pipeline)
Kas. ; Kash.	<i>Kashmir/i</i>
KAZBAT; Kazbat	Kazakh (Peacekeeping) Battalion
KAZBRIG	Kazakh (expanding Peacekeeping Battalion-) Brigade
KCPC	Kazakhstan-China Pipeline
KCS	KazCaspian Shelf (consortium)
KCTS	Kazakhstan-Caspian Transportation System (route)
KGB	Committee for State Security (Soviet/Russia)
KHAD; KhAD	(Afghan Secret Service) State Information Service (later WAD)
KIO	Karachaganak (consortium)
KKK	Korpezhe-Kurt-Kui (pipeline)
KPOC	Karachaganak Petroleum Operating Consortium (aka KIO)
Ky.; Kyr. ; Kyrg.	Kyrgyzstan/i; Kyrgyz Republic
Kz.; Kaz.	Kazakhstan/i
LAS	League of Arab States
LOC	Library of Congress (USA); line of control (as per context)
LPG	liquefied petroleum gas
m;mn.; mil.	million/s
MAD	mutual assured destruction
mbd.	million barrels (per) day
M.C.A.; MCA	Muslim Central Asia/n
MDGs.	millennium development goal/s
MEP	Main Export Pipeline
MFARK	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan
MFN	most favored nation (status)
MIRVs	multiple independent re-entry vehicle/s
MLA	Modern Language Association
MNCs.	multi-national corporations
Mn	manganese
Mong. ; Mongol.	Mongol; Mongolia
MOU	memorandum of understanding
M.S.; M. Sea	Mediterranean Sea
MVD	(Russian)Interior Ministry (police) force (replaces Soviet NKVD)
N	North; north
N.A.; N. Av.; NA	not available
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAOC	Northern Apsheron Operating Company
N. Ap.	not applicable
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCAFP	National Committee on American Foreign Policy
NCOC	North Caspian Operating Company
n. d.	no date/year (mentioned)
NDN	Northern Distribution Network (U.S. launched)
NEP	(Soviet) New Economic Policy
NGO	non-governmental organization/s
NIOC	National Iranian Oil Company
N.I.S.; NIS	newly independent states (ex-Soviet)
NKVD	Peoples' Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet)
NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration (USA)

NNWS	non-nuclear weapons state/s
N. p.; n. p.	no place (mentioned)
N. pub. ; n. pub.	no publisher/s (mentioned)
NSA	National Security Advisor; National Security Agency (USA) apc
NSC	National Security Council (agency, USA); (oil route) apc
N.W.F.P.	North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)
O	oil (petroleum)
ODWR	<i>(The) Oxford Dictionary of World Religions</i>
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
O.E.E.C.	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
O.I.C.; OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OMON	<i>Otryad Mobilniy Osobogo Naznacheniya</i> (a MVD special force)
ONGC	Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (India)
O.P.E.C.; OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation (USA)
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSS	Office of Strategic Services (U.S.A.)
PCV	Peace Corps volunteers (U.S.A.)
PDPA	Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (later <i>Watan</i> Party)
PFP; Pfp; Pfp.	Partnership for Peace (1994 program)
P.G.	Persian Gulf
P.L.	public legislation
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PMC; PMCs.	private military company/ies
P.R.C.; PRC	People's Republic (of) China
PRT; PRTs.	provincial reconstruction teams
PSA	production sharing agreement
PSC; PSCs.	private security company/ies
Pt	platinum group
Qtd.; qtd.	quoted
r.	reigned; rule, ruled (apc)
r.a.a.	<i>radia 'l-Lahu anha</i>
R.A.T.S.	Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (SCO-linked)
R.C.	Roman Catholic
RCD	Regional Cooperation (for) Development
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
REC	Regional Environmental Center (Almaty-based)
Ref.; refs.	refer; references
R.F.; RF	Russian Federation
ROA	Republic of Afghanistan (previously DRA)
Rpt.	reprinted
RRF	rapid reaction force
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
RSIS	Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore)
S	sulphur
s. a.	see also
SALT I; SALT II	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (I or II apc)
SAVAC	Shah's Secret Police; Intelligence and "National" Security Agency
s.a.w.	<i>sallallahu alaihi wasallam</i>
Sb	<i>stibnite</i> ; antimony
SC	Shymkent-Chardzhou (pipeline)
S.C.A.; SCA	Soviet Central Asia
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SCP	South Caucasus Pipeline (aka BTE)
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organization
SLBMs	sea launched ballistic missiles
Sn; Sn	<i>stannum</i> ; tin

SOCAR	State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic
SPC	Strategic Partnership Commission
sp.gr.	specific gravity
SPP	State Partnership Program (U.S.A.)
sq. km.	square kilometer/s
SRI	Silk Road Initiative (U.S.A.)
SSR	Soviet Socialist Republic
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
Statoil	<i>Den Norske Stas Oljeselskap SA</i> (Norway)
STS	Semipalatinsk Test Site (Kazakhstan)
S.W.T.	<i>SUBHANAHU WA-TA'ALA</i>
T	Transneft (pipelines) aka <i>Glavtransnaft</i>
t.; t; tr.; tril.	transited; trillion/s (apc)
TACIS	(EU's) Technical Assistance to the CIS
TAGP	Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline (aka Turkmenistan-China Pipeline)
Tbd.	thousands (of) barrels (per) day
Tj. ;Taj.; Tajk.	Tajik; Tajikistan/i
TAP	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (pipeline superseded by TAPI)
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (pipeline)
TASSR	Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic
TB	tuberculosis
TCGP	Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline
TCO	Tengizchevroil (consortium)
Ti	titanium
TIP; TIPs.	trafficking in person/s
TISA	Transitional Islamic State (of) Afghanistan
TPAO	<i>TurkiyePetrolleriAnonimOrtakligi</i> (Turkish Petroleum Corporation)
TRACECA	(EU's) Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia
Tu.; Turk.; Tkm/n.	Turkmen; Turkmenistan/i
U	uranium
UAS	Uzen-Atyrau-Samara (pipeline)
UGSS	Unified Gas Supply System (Russia-Eurasian pipeline system)
U.K.; UK	United Kingdom
UKM	Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
ULO	Uighur Liberation Organization (Kazakhstan)
U.M.; UM	University (of) Malaya; Universiti Malaya
U.N.; UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCAL	Union Oil Company of California
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization
URL; URLs.	uniform resource locator/s
U.S.; US	United States (of America)
U.S.A.; USA	United States (of) America
USAID	U. S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
U.S.I.S.	United States Information Service
UTO	United Tajik Opposition
U.S.S.R.; USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Uz. ; Uzb.; Uzbk.	Uzbek; Uzbekistan/i
W	wolfram; tungsten
W.B.; WB	World Bank
WKWC	Western Kazakhstan-Western China (pipeline) aka KCPC
WMD; WMDs.	weapon/s (of) mass destruction
wnCSaa.	with non-domain Country Suffixes applied appropriately (for entries)
WOT	war on terror
WTC	World Trade Center (tower/s), New York, USA

WTO	World Trade Organization
WW I; WW II	World War One; World War Two
<i>Xin.</i>	<i>Xinjiang</i> (Sinkiang)
XUAR	Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region
Zn	zinc

Note: Some single-occurrence abb. or acronyms in the main text have not been listed here, for example, DU, GOTm., IWWP, MOX, NBK, PGMs. and SUSI; but these have been elucidated clearly on the spot.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The nature of any political entity is such that, like the very nature of man himself, it, readily, perceives that it was born and destined to seek relationship with others of its kind, usually, upon first encounters. This axiom certainly applies to the remaining superpower¹ the United States of America (hereafter also variously abbreviated as U.S.A., USA or simply as the U.S. or US) in its contemporary encounter with the Central Asian states (hereafter abbreviated as the CAS) - i.e. mainly one of the four clusters² of newly-independent successor states to emerge from the dramatic demise³ of the erstwhile Soviet Union (henceforth referred to also as the U.S.S.R. or USSR) in late December 1991.⁴

¹ This is a term applied to very powerful states and first popularised by W.T.R. Fox in his book entitled: *The Super-Powers*. See W.T.R. Fox, *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union – Their Responsibility for Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944). According to him Super-Power is “great power plus great mobility of power.” Thus, in his times he perceived the existence of a tri-polar system of superpowers. The Second World War saw the exit of Great Britain from this category. The aftermath of Vietnam intervention almost seduced the US out of it too, owing largely to domestic pressure. Fortunately though, its “cut and run” strategy therefrom ensured that its decline was temporary. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union too took its leave from that status after unwittingly sampling an American orchestrated Afghanistan lesson. The, perhaps, resurgence-minded post-Soviet Russian tactical retreat from global power status has left the United States as the sole remaining superpower for now. But its current unipolar moment and joy is already under threat from: China, Europe, Japan, Brazil, India and, yes, would be gradually from Russia too, that is, once it can sort out its mess in Chechnya, Ossetia and Ukraine and rebuild its economy; with all of these powers working earnestly towards ringing-in a, hopefully more satisfactory, multi-polar international system. However, if one employs a purely strategic criterion, the US is likely to remain an unmolested superpower for a longer while, especially, given the seeming disinterest, in this regard of its nearest competitor, if not also currently rival, Russia.

² The Soviet Union fragmented away, physically, that is, into four areal regional clusters, namely: [1] an *European cluster* of new states comprising: the Russian Federation, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine; [2] a *Baltic cluster* comprising: Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia; [3] a *Caucasus cluster* comprising: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and [4] a *Central Asian cluster* comprising: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This cluster concept is significant in that it helps in understanding the propensity of most of these newly-freed states within them to gravitate towards their neighbourhood regional groupings of long independent states, sometimes even aspiring to formally accede to and integrate with their regional political bloc; like the Baltic cluster wanting to blend in with Europe and which aspires eventually to become part of the European Union. Though all 15 of these states are successor states of the USSR, only the Russian Federation has been allowed to inherit the Soviet Union’s Security Council seat and privileges. It must also be noted that excluding the Baltic cluster of states, the Russian Federation has again come together with the remaining three clusters of states to form a peculiar entity called the C.I.S. – perhaps as an outright first step towards the future potential reconstitution of the Union.

³ To the rest of the world the dissolution or disintegration of the USSR was certainly surprising and remarkable but to the involved actors themselves it must have been dramatic, literally that is. Consequently, the scholarly community were left confused initially about the real nature of the change; was it a pre-planned, spontaneous or hijacked-and-gone-awry-mid-way transformation? Hence, they were at a loss as to what to call it. Can they label it a dramatic *collapse*, an *explosion*, perhaps; or is it a more subdued parting of ways, a sober *implosion* instead; or truer yet, a connivingly calibrated *transmutation*. With time the scholarly community appear to have settled for a consensus: less controversially, it is a Soviet *demise* then! For a recent example, see Daniel Treisman, *The Return: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev* (New York and London: Free Press, 2011), p. 1 and *passim*.

⁴ Though the demise of the Soviet Union, as a fact, is not, in itself, disputed, *when* it actually did so, remains controversial. Various dates when this could first have happened have been offered. Was it 1st Dec. 1991, when Ukraine annulled the 1922 treaty; 8th Dec. 1991, when the Slav republics, conspiratorially, formed the C.I.S.; or was it 24th Dec. 1991, when Gorbachev resigned; or was it Christmas Day 1991, when the U.S.S.R., symbolically, dissolved; or alas was it 31st Dec. 1991 when it is commonly acknowledged to have officially ceased to exist? Actually, the Soviet demise was a protracted process that went into *rigor mortis* rapidly only from mid-1991.

The relationship(s) that ensue(s) from these seminal encounters may either spring into ones of love at first sight or linger in a haze of indifference or even dive into the abyss of hatred if not outright hostility. Astonishingly, for these infant Newly-Independent States (abbreviated henceforth as NIS) of Central Asia the initial reception⁹ accorded by the U.S. to them was neither the former nor the latter. In fact the U.S. interest¹⁰ on Soviet albeit Muslim Central Asia (henceforth M.C.A. or MCA) has long been one of suspicion and cynicism towards its communist-led accomplishments¹¹ and this inauspicious predisposition it appears was unfortunately carried forward into the early years of contemporary Central Asian independence too.

This study, of course, is on the subject area of U.S. relations with Central Asian states. Specifically, my thesis topic is “U.S. relations with Central Asian states: A study with reference to energy resources geopolitics from 1991 to 2012”.¹² This topic of research has been a problem to students in the field of international relations.¹³ They have long been accustomed to studying different aspects of bilateral relations between individual states, intra-regional relations, inter-regional relations or mainly, the relations

⁹ Despite the relatively early diplomatic recognitions, the American receptions were rather cool or lukewarm, if not totally cold. It was only since late 1994 that relations with some of them began to pick-up suddenly. See Olivier Roy, *The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations* (London and New York, N.Y.: I.B. Tauris/New York U P, 2000), p. 133.

¹⁰ By way of a refresher, one of the earliest and, I believe, the most remarkable display of modern U.S. interest on the central asian region was on the 1st of May 1960 when First Lieutenant Francis Gary (some sources say it is Harry) Powers of the CIA, but operating under U.S. Air Force high-altitude weather reconnaissance cover, attempted to fly his Incirlik-based U-2B Lockheed from Peshawar Air Base collecting, in Khrushchev's words, “air samples” over the Aral Sea *en route* to the Budoe airfields in Norway. The intruding aerial American was, of course, taken down later, by a Soviet air defence SA-2 surface-to-air missile, further afield nearing the industrial centre of Sverdlovsk in central Russia. Contrary to naïve U.S. early assumptions, all 24 American U-2 overflights of the USSR were successfully tracked by Soviet radars! In these regards, see H. Hanak, *Soviet Foreign Policy since the Death of Stalin* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), pp. 117-119; and N. Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, *Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage* (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1998), pp. 561-563.

¹¹ Examples of these attitudes are replete in Western scholarly works across the decades in general and not merely confined to those of post world war American Sovietologists alone. A relatively recent work that typifies this would be: Gordon B. Smith, *Soviet Politics: Struggling with Change* (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 160 and 179.

¹² Given that the research covers the relationship of a range of countries of the Central Asian region, each having their own foreign policy period, that are staggered (for example, Kazakhstan's first foreign policy period lasts from 1991-2013) and hence lacking convergence, it was felt that the only practical basis for organizing and analyzing them with some degree of uniformity was to adopt the contemporary American presidential term time-frame that could be applied to all the political units studied, uniformly, thus the time-frame is: **1991 to 2012**, generally, starting from George H.W. Bush's term and ending neatly with Barack H. Obama's first term in office and indicating too that there is a continuity thereafter (as may be seen in App. II) but in a term which would not complete itself, at the point of the first submission of this research, i.e. Oct. 2016. And given **the approved topic**, it has to remain at that, though the final Ph.D. submission occurs much later only in 2018.

¹³ Nevertheless, this topic is attractive and important because it concerns the United States, the only superpower of contemporary times and, arguably, the most influential state in the world too, and its budding relations with the emergent Muslim states of an important region of the world; the central asian heartlands of Eurasia; the heartland whose controller, according to Mackinder, would also control the world, hence the overt and covert competition (including for strategic resources), if not also rivalry, among and between the global and regional powers over the core region, as could be visualized in Figure 2. See, for background, Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” *The Geographical Journal* 23.4 (April 1904): 421-444. Rpt. in *The Scope and Methods of Geography and the Geographical Pivot of History*, by Halford J. Mackinder (London: Royal Geographic Society, 1969). Therefore, given this importance and the notable and relative absence of similar works at the PhD level, it is felt that this lacuna must be appropriately addressed, hence this research work.

which major powers, individually, variously or collectively, have with states of well-defined regions of the world.

The twilight of the second millennium A.D., however, saw the political emergence of an entirely “new”¹⁴ potentially geo-political or, more appropriate in this context, politico-geographic region known as Central Asia. Previously, this vast area was an unfathomable, almost mystical, region, politico-geographically speaking; also known historically as the Turkistan region alluding, of course, to its Turkic roots in the medieval, if not also in the ancient, past.¹⁵ In modern times this has been a non-region surrounded on all sides by relatively coherent politico-geographic or geo-political regions like: Europe, “Far-Eastern Russia,” East Asia, South Asia and West Asia. American academics¹⁶ in the past have long fancied the creation of a South-West Asian region¹⁷ there about comprising initially Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and perhaps Turkey or rather specifically “Asian Turkey.” Central Asia, as a prospective region of independent states, was suddenly ejected into the international arena, from under the protective cover of the Soviet politico-economic umbrella, to work out its own relations with the states of its immediate neighborhood and with those of the rest of the international community farther afield.

Actually, the turn of the millennium is witnessing dramatic and sweeping changes on several fronts. Not least are the geo-political transformations underway in the very heart of the New Asia. In particular, the past twenty-one odd years have witnessed the steady forging and gradual development of relations between the newly independent CAS and/or emergent Central Asian Republics (hereafter acronymized as

¹⁴ Note, this region is “new” and not actually *new* because, there already exist a wide body of pre-independence literature on this very region, albeit narrowly defined; my bibliography attests quite adequately to this fact, I believe.

¹⁵ See in this present study, p.404 in Appendix I but also passim.

¹⁶ For examples of their works, see Ch. 5, Fn. (footnote) 11, later in this study.

¹⁷ Given contemporary realities it would continue to remain a mirage. For America now wants to exclude post-Shah Iran from any and every region if possible. Pakistan has been a part of South Asia, though so far with relatively little benefit to it. Afghanistan is now able to look, also perhaps more fruitfully to **Central Asia**, as it historically did, in addition, still to **South Asia**, as it has been for long, for regional attachment; see App. I, p. 412. Turkey has, of course, long been and remains Euro-visioned, despite the irresistible recent lure of its kindred east, for reasons only sensible to its leaders! For a very recent take on this intra-Turkish tension in this context, see Shadi Hamid, *Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam is Reshaping the World* (St. Martin’s P, 2016).

the CARs.) and the resurgent U.S. These developments could be noticed not just in the politico-economic and strategic arena but also in the socio-cultural horizon. Furthermore, this development of relations betrays a subtle shift from one of apparent reluctance that characterized the early years to one of enthusiastic engagement, albeit in starts and fits, subsequently. This study is, accordingly, a research attempt to explain the nature and account for the change in the evolving relations between mainly the freed states of Central Asia (circled but, particularly, those dashed off, in green) and the United States of America (circled in blue) especially from late 1991 when most of these states had their independence from the erstwhile Soviet Union and found themselves, at last, left relatively *free* to be recognized as such and to establish and develop their own foreign relations with the rest of the comity of world nations, including pre-eminently, with the USA, as may be clearly visualized in Map 1.



Map 1: The United States of America and the CAS in the Comity of World States (Political)
 Source: Adapted from the Philip's Essential World Atlas, 2nd edn. , The Royal Geographical Society/IBG
 (London: George Philip, 1999), pp. inside covers.

The Problem Statement

Despite the rapidity with which diplomatic recognition was nevertheless accorded there was significantly a relative paucity of interaction between the concerned sides. Other than some conspicuous “energy” contracts and even lesser commercial contacts between Kazakhstan and the U.S. there seemed to be, at the outset, relatively very little other kind of interactions or relations between the U.S. and the other CARs.

Particularly, in the domain of politics, the relationship between the concerned sides, except, of course, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, lingered between severe dissatisfaction and calculated indifference. This fact can be directly attributed to the differences both in perception and priority of the parties. What is even more significant, however, is that the dawn of foreign-inspired democracy, liberalism and the emergence of sponsor-branded Islam in Central Asia especially around the collapse of the Iron Curtain had ushered in along with it a measured degree of political polarization unprecedented in modern Central Asian historic experience.

This state of affairs naturally led to severe dissatisfaction in the mutual relation between the U.S. and the CARs. This situation typified the immediate pre- and post-independence years when the U.S. was generally perceived to be aiding directly or indirectly the nationalistic, democratic and, to a lesser extent even, the “Islamic” groups both in Afghanistan¹⁸ and by extension also in the fringes of Soviet Central Asia (henceforth S.C.A. or SCA).

These developments gradually and apparently confirmed to the erstwhile Soviets, including, then, the Central Asians, the suspect nature of U.S. intentions towards Soviet Central Asia in particular and the Soviet Union in general. Accordingly, appropriate moves were made by the Central Asians acting in concert under the Soviets

¹⁸ Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years* (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1983), pp. 189-190.

to tackle the U.S. and what were perceived by them, then, as U.S supported groups. These moves included the Central Asian support to the Uzbek warlord Dostum in Afghanistan and Tajikistan's increasing dependence on Uzbek and Russian troops to handle the Islamic/democratic opposition groups and the "rebels."

Furthermore, the Soviet decision in 1986 to withdraw rapidly from Afghanistan triggered the mixed feelings of excitement, hope and insecurity across the Central Asian region. Notwithstanding the relative stability that accrued to the Kabul regime from the "fraternal" presence of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, what Gorbachev's withdrawal decision really meant then was the departure of the power that kept not just Afghanistan but also the larger Central Asian region in relative tranquility and stability for approximately 70 odd years considering that Soviet rule was established across the region only from 1917 though Russian presence, of course, has been around there since very much earlier.¹⁹

Subsequent developments revealed that what the decision significantly also augured was that the region as a whole was beginning to open up in more ways than one. It was especially upon the advent of independence in the region, after the failed August coup and especially after the Belovezh Conspiracy,²⁰ that it dawned in the region that alternative suitors be identified and invited to fill in the Soviet's (or before and since then the Russian's) previous role in the region.

Within the context of the region and of the time period, it was, of course, Iran that has been for some time articulating rather openly its aspiration and readiness to play a role in the changed and fast changing region. For a number of reasons I. R. Iran indeed appears as the power that is capable of filling in for, if not also fulfilling, the previous Soviet role in the region, largely in form and, if only meagerly so, in substance.

¹⁹ As may, readily, be verified in Appendix I, esp. p. 418 but also *passim*.

²⁰ See Chap.4, Fn. (footnote) 7, later.

However, especially with U.S. backing, it increasingly looks that it is Turkey, that is in an agreeable position to play a constructive role in the region and, even more importantly to the U.S., to balance Iranian inroads and to arrest Russian recurrent dreams, notwithstanding it's still strong residual, albeit, transient presence, therein.

However, it was largely after the mid-1990s that U.S. - CARs relations began improving rapidly.²¹ This may be attributable to the fact that most of the CARs had their freedom and independence only from late 1991 onwards. But one needs to remember at this juncture that pre-modern Afghanistan has been an independent entity since the second half of the 18th century since the time of Ahmad Shah Abdali though its independent status had been continually under pressure ever since.²² Furthermore, Azerbaijan,²³ another republic that can easily claim to be a Central Asian republic on a number of grounds, though it is physically separated from the Muslim Central Asian landmass by a huge body of navigable water in the shape of the Caspian Sea, too had been independent for about two years after the October Revolution of 1917 though it was still at that time occupied jointly by Allied and Central Power troops.²⁴

The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, saw the rather rapid recognitions and exchanges of diplomatic representation between all the independent CARs (including Azerbaijan) and the United States excepting, of course, Afghanistan with which it had anyway established full diplomatic links much earlier.²⁵ Other than the key factors of recognition and diplomatic representation there have also been improvements in other areas of links like moral support, trade, investments, defense and security ties, travel, educational ties, technical aid and cultural and intellectual exchanges and, of course,

²¹ See Chaps. 3 and 4 of this study, later.

²² See Appendix I, p.415 and *passim*.

²³ Azerbaijan the ex-Soviet Muslim, geographically Caucasian but socio-culturally and historically Central Asian, state which I have purposefully incorporated into my analytical C.A. region should never be confused with *Azar*baijan the Iranian north-western province that geographically abuts it to the south and south-west but which I have nevertheless found fit, given its well-adapted, if not also cosy, residence within Iran, to exclude from my present analytical area. Annoyingly, for this researcher, the subtle differentiation between Azerbaijan and Azarbaijan is seldom recognised and rarely maintained as such by scholars who, more often than not, confuse the two or, quite conveniently, use them synonymously.

²⁴ See Appendix I, p.431.

²⁵ See Appendix III, p.457.

energy and environmental concerns. The broad categories of relationship into which those diverse ties between the U.S. and the CARs or CAS fall, may for ease of comprehension, be visualized diagrammatically as in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The Broad Categories of Relations between the CAS and the USA - Visualized
Source: Based on this researcher's own considered conception of the relationship.

The overarching problem that remains as the focus of this study is, thus, the United States' relations with the CAS; with how these began, took shape, evolved and, if and when it, changed. Also what role did strategic/energy factors play in the inception and development of these relations? It is with these matters that the later focal chapters concern themselves with.

Research Objectives

The real purpose of this research then is to attempt to discuss and explain the nature of the relationships, including its energy and strategic dimensions, and more importantly to account for the perceived change in the evolving relation between the newly-freed and independent states of Central Asia and the United States especially, though not necessarily and exclusively, as just hinted, from late 1991²⁶ when the bulk of these states had their independence virtually ladled out to them upon the dramatic collapse of

²⁶ As may be discerned in Appendices I and III and discussed in Chaps. 3, 4 and 5 too.

the erstwhile Soviet Union. In particular this study, accordingly, focuses primarily on the following research objectives, which are:

1. To define anew the analytic Central Asian region,²⁷ its constituent units (the CAS/CARs) and identify its discernible politico-geographic parameters, especially, as also informed by its historical²⁸ and geo-political²⁹ realities.
2. To discuss major power, especially U.S. (and, contextually, Soviet/Russian), motivation and interests in the erstwhile Third World, Eastern Europe³⁰ and consider the interests and concerns of the U.S. in the broader Muslim World³¹ too, all regions to which Central Asia could naturally be drawn into; and
3. To examine the evolution and note the change(s), if any, in U.S.-Central Asian relations as also sub-grouped under the AKT states and the AKTU republics³² and to analyze the importance of strategic natural resources – especially energy ones,³³ particularly, in U.S.-Russian interactions with Central Asia.

On the basis of those objectives, this research would later, throughout the study, address broad questions like: which states constitute the Central Asian region? ; What have been the major power, particularly U.S. and Soviet/Russia, motivations and interests in the Third and Muslim Worlds? ; When did U.S. relations with the CAS/CARs begin, why and how did it evolve? ; and What are the importance of strategic/energy resources in U.S./Russian interactions with the CARs? ; though, not necessarily exactly in this order.

Before I proceed further, there is a call to keep in line with academic tradition, which I feel should never be ignored, much less so, with impunity. Therefore, to better grasp in an academic fashion the exact nature of U.S. - CARs relation it is intellectually

²⁷ See pp. 11-13 and Chapter Two (or 2) of this study.

²⁸ See Chap.2, pp. 81-88 and App. I.

²⁹ See especially Chapters Three (or 3), Four (or 4) and Five (or 5).

³⁰ See Chapter Two (or 2), p. 91 on.

³¹ See Chapter Two (or 2), p. 120 on.

³² On the main, see especially, Chaps. 3 and 4, but also Chap. 5.

³³ See Chap. 5 and App. VII, VIII and X.

prudent, in this introduction, to keep in sharp focus at least three preliminary matters. Given the substantive attributes of the topic chosen, for a start, we need to in general reflect on the larger literature concerning big-small states relations. Then logically, we should proceed to survey briefly the overall pattern of U.S. relations with the hitherto Third World³⁴ nations and especially also its relations with the so-called non-aligned states of the socialist and pro-socialist sides.³⁵ I may not be too exhaustive in these areas as what is required, on the basis of the available theoretical literature, is simply the identification of significant features or characteristics in big-small states relationships that would enable one to assess the extent to which these can be seen to fit U.S. behavior *vis-a-vis* generally the Third World, the erstwhile socialist bloc and primarily the CARs.

In doing so I may also be able to discern the similarities or otherwise between U.S. policy or behavior in one area and in another. This sort of comparative analysis is vital to understand the behavior of any state, not to mention that of the sole superpower especially given the strategic resources at the disposal of these republics and the unique geopolitical configuration of their region. And finally, talking about geopolitical configuration³⁶ we need to conceptualize by defining the physical, socio-economic and intangible other characteristics of what we term here as the CAS or CARs. We need also ask the question: can these republics together be deemed a coherent region? ; If so, on what basis? In part, Chapter Two (or 2), which follows, is a clear attempt to bring out that regional coherence.

Incidentally, the study of Central Asia as a distinct region, or a sub-region if you will, predates the current arrival of political independence to the region. To Pierce, for

³⁴ On why this political characterization of the world has suddenly gone abstract and have diminished its relevance, see Andrew Boyd and Joshua Comenetz, *An Atlas of World Affairs* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), chap. 6.

³⁵ See Chapter 2, p. 91 on.

³⁶ Prof. Morgenthau defines the term and subject of geopolitics as “a pseudoscience erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, and hence the fate, of nations. Its basic conception is space.” See Hans Joachim Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 6th ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 178.

example, “there is no comprehensive term for this region in Western usage... ‘Russian Central Asia’ will be used here as the least ambiguous of several alternatives”.³⁷ Over the centuries and right into the new millennium various scholars³⁸ have treated the region separately notwithstanding the differences amidst them in its exact delimitation. Due to this enduring inconsistency, diversity and ambiguity regarding its delimitation in the literature it becomes essential that I too define the areal region of my study. So, seized by the current post-modern spirit, I hereby brazenly break my afore-proposed logical order and method of inquiry to now first define my study region.

Study Region Defined


For the purposes of my present study, therefore, Central Asia – the international politico-geographic region – consists, in my identification, not only the union-republics of ex-Soviet Turkestan,³⁹ Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan but also good old Afghanistan and the Chinese Autonomous Region of Xinjiang (henceforth CARX). Thus, basically, my analytic study region consists of seven independent states and one autonomous territory/area as is clearly conceptualized in Map 2.

The issue of whether Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and the Xinjiang region possess the degree of homogeneity required to support their inclusion within the Central Asian region is a simple one to solve indeed and would reveal itself as we proceed. Both the following Chapter 2 and Appendix I come in handy for this purpose.

³⁷ Richard A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917: A Study in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: U of California P, 1960), p. 5. Scholarly designations applied by Americans and others to this region have not been consistent either in its nomenclature or in its areal specifications. With various meanings the terms Central Asia, High Asia, Inner Asia, Middle Asia, Turan, Russian Turkestan or simply Turkistan have all been alternatively used to label broadly this region. Many other scholarly works listed in the bibliography stand as adequate testimony to these academic flirtations.

³⁸ These scholars and their works are listed in my bibliography.

³⁹ The four union republics of Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan comprised the region known as Soviet Turkestan (meaning: the land of the Turks) to emigres from those areas. See Mustafa Chokayev, “Turkestan and the Soviet Regime,” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (JRCAS)*, XVIII (1931): 403-420.



Map 2: The New States and Entities of the Central Asian Analytic Region

Note: Though *Xinjiang* figures very much as an integral part of the present analytic region, it is nonetheless included here only tangentially, thus India, even lesser than Mongolia, could not meaningfully claim to be an outer regional state of Central Asia, though it definitely is its armshot neighbor. This fact is visualized in a global context, in Figure 2 as well.

Source: Cropped, adapted and composed from *Philip's Essential World Atlas*, 2nd edn, The Royal Geographical Society/IBG (London: George Philip, 1999), pp. 26, 27 and 34.

Regional homogeneity certainly exists because of the high degree of geographical, historical, cultural, ethnic and, not to mention, religious cohesiveness present therein. Allowing for differences in climate and geomorphology owing to the huge areal extent of the region, there is evidently still enough physical, historical and social homogeneity broadly speaking to provide regional cohesiveness.

Though numerous authorities - Soviets and others - have found reasons to exclude all or part of Kazakhstan⁴⁰ from the Central Asian region and not to incorporate too Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang, I for one contend that there are present sufficient historical, ethnic, geographical, and cultural homogeneity (all of which are reasonably dealt with in the Background Chapter coming next) within these seven states and the “province” to merit their delimitation into an unified **analytical**, if not

⁴⁰ Some works of scholars who consider Kazakhstan as part of Soviet Central Asia include: Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism*, 2nd ed., (New York: St. Martin's, 1967), p. xx; and Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (London and New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson/Praeger, 1964), p. 1. The works of some non-western scholars who found it fit to exclude the whole of Kazakhstan from S.C.A. are: Rais Tuzmuhamedov, *How the National Question was Solved in Soviet Central Asia: A Reply to Falsifiers* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973), p. 13; and Devendra Kaushik, *Central Asia in Modern Times: A History from the Early 19th Century* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 13. Certain other scholars in the past whose works have included only the southern parts of Kazakhstan in their conception of S.C.A. include S. P. Suslov, *Physical Geography of Asiatic Russia* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1961) and E. M. Murzaev, *Srednyaya Aziya: Fiziko-Geograficheskaya Kharakteristika* (Moskva: Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Geografiya, 1958).

also a full-fledged, probable **political**, region.⁴¹ A region, in purely geographical terms, by the way, is an earth-space which possesses areal relations, which reflects cohesiveness. Our analytic Central Asian region presented here more than meets this criterion; furthermore it is an overwhelmingly land-locked region too, compacting thereby its cohesiveness, quite unlike a sea-seduced Europe.

Central Asia thus, **analytically**, defined and reckoned, therefore, has an areal spread of 2,468,433 sq. ml.⁴² (6,379,519 sq. km) spanning from west across the Caspian Sea till the fringes of the Georgian, Armenian and Turkish borders with independent Azerbaijan to all the way east across the Central Asian landmass to the very heartlands of China just across its peripheral but biggest province of Xinjiang. The southern limit of contemporary Central Asia is the northern and eastern borders of the Islamic republics of Iran, Pakistan and Indian-held Kashmir. The northern extent of Central Asia lies between 50° and 55° North latitude, an area that loosely corresponds to the northern boundary of present-day independent Kazakhstan.

This vast region is geographically distinguished by mainly three types of terrain, *viz.* the northern steppe, central desert and the southern mountainous country.⁴³ Another distinguishing feature of this region is that collectively all the states and the province of the region are land-locked; the fascinating presence amidst it of the Caspian - the world's biggest inland sea - notwithstanding. Another geopolitical fact that one needs to note is that all these states and areas are riparian too with some states even sharing river boundaries. Precipitation is also sparse across the region with some areas receiving less

⁴¹ To get a good elucidation on the sense of homogeneity or commonality present within a region and its vulnerability to outside forces see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, eds., *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp.5-7.

⁴² See Table 1.

⁴³ For a thorough treatment of the physical geography of Central Asia, see Paul E. Lydolph, *Geography of the U.S.S.R.*, 2nd ed., (New York: John Wiley, 1970), pp. 230-239 and James S. Gregory, *Russian Land Soviet People: A Geographical Approach to the U.S.S.R.* (New York: Pegasus, 1968), pp. 766-770 & 807-815.

than four inches of rain annually. The climate of this region is characteristically continental with winds blowing hot and cold in summers and winters respectively.

The region's cultural geography especially fits my definition of Central Asia. The south-westerly republics of Tajikistan through Afghanistan to Azerbaijan are overwhelmingly of Pak-Irano-Islamic culture and the north-easterly republics of Kazakhstan through Kyrgyzstan to Chinese Xinjiang are largely of the Turko-Mongol strand of Islamic culture. Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in the middle, are quaint admixtures of both. But this is not to recklessly discount the vibrant presence of a significant minority of Russian culture particularly in the seven northern districts of Kazakhstan and in urban locales across the rest of MCA all of which had originally manifested only in the wake of the protracted Russian colonization of those areas under both Tsarist and Soviet dispensations.

Scholars claim that the Central Asian countries' heterogeneous ethnic makeup undermines their nebulous sense of national unity and renders them vulnerable to external manipulation and, it is alleged, even to, domination by neighboring states. This possibility though evidently present appears quite remote to the present researcher given the positive developments that has been happening across the whole region and the instabilities and uncertainties enshrouding its immediate neighborhoods. Though these issues seem to be merely of an esoteric interest in this context, they certainly have practical and strategic implications for the region's political and cultural, or if you will civilizational, evolution and future, to the extent that different countries of the region could be more vulnerable to events and developments emanating from nearer directions.

Looking at the political traditions of the region as evidenced in its history, Central Asia has largely been seen as an arena for empires and tribes. The concept of nation and nation-state, *a l'Europe*, has never existed in the region, claim some

authorities. But a careful scrutiny of the real history would debunk the claims of these so-called authorities. It is a fact of history that virtually independent political entities have continually flourished within the region from deep antiquity to relatively modern times.⁴⁴ Representative examples are the ancient Bactrian Kingdom and in the recent past Azerbaijan, of course, was a clearer example of an independent nation-state during its first republic before it succumbed to external pressure.

The claim that the nation-state concept was not present in the region could be attributable to the misinformed and highly skeptical assumption of western scholars who habitually deem that Islam and nation-states are incompatible. That this is an erroneous assumption is amply borne out by the presence over the centuries of increasingly numerous Muslim national states in the world. What these scholars need to note is that in Islam nations are the legitimate building blocks of the *Ummah* and not some parochial entities anchored in their apocalyptically nationalistic exclusivities. Thus, in present day Central Asia, as also, elsewhere in the Muslim world, Islam and nationalism have *de facto* always been inextricably linked. After all, the Communist purges that took place in SCA periodically, are also tragic testimonies to the vibrant and symbiotic co-existence of both therein, albeit under Soviet-foisted illegality.⁴⁵

The existence of Islam in the region certainly augurs well for the development of civil society in the near future because most of the traits of civil society, as conceived in the West, are, surprisingly, very much intrinsic to Islam. In fact many of the socio-political developments in the future in the region would be perceived as leading to civil society by most of the secularism-bent governments but these very steps would, simultaneously, be understood as leading to *Ummatic* existence, ultimately, by the societies at large themselves. Islamic characteristics, ethno-cultural traits along with its important geopolitical settings and phenomenal natural resources (viewed in an I.P.E.

⁴⁴ See Chap. 2, pp. 83-89 and Appendix I, *passim*.


⁴⁵ See Appendix I, pp.436-437 but also *passim*.

sense) have to varying degrees attracted the disparate interest of all the major regional and international actors. Ironically, the very attention these recently independent CARs yearn from the world have also rendered them vulnerable to systemic influences at both the regional and international levels.

The contiguity of Central Asia to Russia and China, both long-established nuclear powers and big traditional markets, and Pakistan and, if indirectly, India, both latest nuclear neophytes, and potential growing markets and Iran and Turkey, both brotherly markets and vital, albeit, rival alternative export outlets has willy-nilly made C.A. (Central Asia) of increasing interest to these regional and/or global powers besides, pre-eminently, of course, to the United States, the sole remaining superpower and an extra-regional actor with current geo-strategic interests in C.A. and its desperately vulnerable Asian/European energy-deficient and increasingly concerned Middle Eastern energy-abundant allies.

This highly-engaging scenario can be better visualized diagrammatically through my Figure 2 on the Geo-Strategic and Geo-Political milieu of the CARs in a global context. Considering that developments - both positive and negative - in Central Asia would invariably affect the various interests of these well established actors, or powers if you will, they have and would try, unilaterally and at times in concert, to influence the politico-economic, if not also, in the short term, the religio-cultural, evolution of these Central Asian countries and their emergent foreign policies by their terms and channels of engagement and intercourse. As readily apparent in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the behavior of the external actors and/or outer regional powers could exacerbate internal divisions and amplify differences and rivalries across and about the Central Asian region. Excluding the United States, Japan, Germany-led European Union (E.U.), the G.C.C., South Korea, Israel, ASEAN and India all the other

significant powers with high stakes there are regional in character i.e. they all have apparently non-geopolitical physical borders with Central Asia proper.



A-Outer Regional Powers:	B-Core Regional States:	C-Extra Regional Actors:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Turkey • Georgia • Pakistan • China • Russia • Armenia • Iran • OECD 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Afghanistan • Azerbaijan • Kazakhstan • Kyrgyzstan • Tajikistan • Turkmenistan • Uzbekistan • [Xinjiang] 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.S.A. • Japan • India • Israel • E.U. • ASEAN • OPEC • LAS
<p>D - Global Milieu [Transnationalism imbued]</p>	<p>E – Points to the bilateral relationships (also shaded* clearly above) that are analyzed in this study.</p>	

Figure 2: The Geo-Strategic and Geo-Political Milieu of the CARs in a Global Context

Note: *- The **lighter blue shade** given for Xinjiang indicates that though it is analytically part of the C.A. region, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. may, however, have links with it, especially when viewed in an idealistic sense; nonetheless, **it stresses**, thereby, that these possible links are not specifically addressed in this study.

Source: Based on this researcher's own considered, idealism and critical geo-politics-informed I.R. conception.

Nonetheless, the geopolitical situations in which the CARs may find themselves naturally deny them certain options, both political and economic. The vagaries and proclivities of regional and global politics constrain them from adopting behavior that is in their real interest. The recurring Russian urge to reassert themselves in what they now term the “Near Abroad” in general and the American endeavor to contain and isolate Iran and its germinating influence in the region have rendered Central Asian dreams for

further development and finding diverse viable alternative export outlets for their vast resources very difficult, if not actually impossible, at least in the short term.

What I have hinted at here is merely the global milieu in which MCA finds itself in, at birth. Studying in detail each and every relationship possible, geopolitical or otherwise, in this milieu is certainly beyond the scope of my present study. As visually conceptualized and contextualized in the preceding Figure 2 the specific focal relationships I seek to analyze in this study would, of course, be the geo-strategic bilateral ones between the United States of America on the one hand and the various Muslim states of the analytic Central Asian region on the other.

Literature Review

Any cursory review of the available academic literature would reveal the paucity of direct materials on our core analytical problem. Unlike many other topics there are no well-worn classic studies on this exact topic to tap in-depth from. Hence, the urgent need for the present study is instantly underscored. However, materials indirectly pertaining and relevant to the various aspects of our problem are widely available as can be noted in the following literature review and as is even more amply vouched for in the bibliography at the end. The literature on Central Asia as a region and its numerous issues are similarly abundant but materials on the foreign relations of the new states of Central Asia are lamentably but understandably scarce and annoyingly diffused. It is to, precisely, if also modestly, address this yawning need that I have undertaken the present study.

Robert A. Lewis⁴⁶ had given a geographical definition of Soviet Central Asia. But post-Soviet Central Asia is broader and needs to be redefined; hence, resulting in

⁴⁶ Robert A. Lewis, ed., *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia*, Studies of the Harriman Institute Series (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

my present analytic C.A. region. Geoffrey Wheeler,⁴⁷ Richard Pierce,⁴⁸ Edward Allworth,⁴⁹ Devendra Kaushik,⁵⁰ Ram Rahul,⁵¹ Peter Hopkirk⁵² and William Fierman⁵³ have all similarly written well on various aspects of Soviet Central Asia. Shirin Akiner,⁵⁴ Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott,⁵⁵ Dilip Hiro⁵⁶ and Ahmed Rashid⁵⁷ have done equally well for contemporary Central Asia covering loosely similar grounds. It is the edited works of Peter Ferdinand,⁵⁸ Karen Dawisha,⁵⁹ Hafeez Malik⁶⁰ and the authoritative reports of Jim Nichol⁶¹ that, however, are of greater interest and relevance to my work.

Defining the region and discussing its diverse characteristics have certainly left us with disparate data that pleads for scholastic order. This is a plea that could be effectively answered only by placing the same in a more analyzable theoretical framework⁶² that would render possible some interpretive extrapolation for distilling significant relationships. And as is often mentioned good theory ought in practice lead to some optimal interpretation of the relationships delineated in the analytic field of study or so it is said, and for this very reason I shall now offer what I deem to be the pertinent theories.

⁴⁷ Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet...*, op. cit.

⁴⁸ Pierce, *Russian Central Asia...*, op. cit.

⁴⁹ Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule* (New York and London: Columbia U P, 1967).

⁵⁰ Kaushik, *Central Asia in Modern...*, op. cit.

⁵¹ Ram Rahul, *Modern Central Asia* (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House Pvt. Ltd., 1979).

⁵² Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York and Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1992); Peter Hopkirk, *Foreign Devils on...*; Peter Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia* (London: John Murray, 2006).

⁵³ William Fierman, ed., *Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation*, with a foreword by Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (Boulder: Westview, 1991).

⁵⁴ Shirin Akiner, *Central Asia: Transition from Pre-Colonial to Post-Colonial Society, Post-Soviet Central Asia* (London: Tauris Academic, 1998).

⁵⁵ Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1994); Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, eds., *The International Politics of Eurasia Series*, Vols 1-10 (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1994 – 1997).

⁵⁶ Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammed: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (London: HarperCollins, 1994).

⁵⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin, 2008); Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, A World Policy Institute Book (New Haven, CT. and London: Yale U P, 2002).

⁵⁸ Peter Ferdinand, ed., *The New Central Asia and its Neighbours*, RIIA (London: Pinter, 1994).

⁵⁹ Karen Dawisha, ed., *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, vol.10 - The International Politics of Eurasia series (Armonk & London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

⁶⁰ Hafeez Malik, ed., *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects* (New York: St. Martin's, 1994).

⁶¹ Jim Nichol's numerous authoritative CRS reports are listed under primary sources in the bibliography.

⁶² This review rightly situates the present study within the appropriate field of I.R. and the relevant framework of big/small state relations and then moves on to review a few works bearing on U.S.-Central Asian relations but keeping to the **prescribed limits** of the U.M. faculty and, thereby, avoiding it from becoming a more bibliographical work. As the study is, clearly, not a **broad foreign policy analysis** of the CAS, necessitating coverage of their relations with ALL the major powers, it deliberately confines itself to analyzing the US-CAS relationship, especially, as it touches on the energy roles of Russia, primarily and, China and Iran mostly.

Literature and Theories Pertaining to Big Powers / Small States Relations

It used to be the usual case when we survey the behavior of great powers prior to the start of the Cold War that they often and readily resort to coercive strength especially military force to achieve any of their political goals whenever the road of diplomacy proved futile in altering a lesser state's behavior. Thereafter came the loose bipolar international system after the 1940s, under which the stable major powers had difficulty in exacting compliance from the lesser powered allies and more often than not were not in a position to take any disciplinary action against them.⁶³ U.S.-South Korean relations during the Korean War, comes to mind as typifying this sort of situation.⁶⁴

However, it should not be understood from this that weaker states then had absolute political independence. Rather, the presence of two mighty poles in the international system at diametrically opposite ends allowed the lesser states enough room to move about between them. These poles were, of course, occupied by the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the resulting polarization drew the small and weaker states to either one of them for support and protection from the insecurities of the international system. In return these superpowers wanted the loyalty of the smaller states for achieving their various political and strategic objectives and win their support to boost their status in the international community.

As a consequence, the interdependence this engenders, though one-sided often, gave the weaker states at times enough leverage to function independently, on particular issues, from their superpower overlords. The coming of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons with their MAD-based deterrence served to enhance the above-mentioned

⁶³Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World." in *International Political Analysis – Readings*, ed. David Edwards (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

⁶⁴J.D.B. Miller, *The Politics of the Third World* (London: Oxford U P, 1967), p. 64.

relationship to the extent that in order to avoid a direct clash between themselves they especially the superpowers would be forced to adhere to diplomacy and alliances to check and/or counter each other's international position. As a result the weaker states become valuable in the eyes of the superpowers and the superpowers were therefore willing to tolerate the relative independence of the smaller states so long as this does not lead to the defection of these states to the opposite pole or camp and contribute to altering the balance of power then holding regionally or internationally.

It is pertinent to observe here, at least in passing, that scholars writing about the Great Powers and the Cold War such as Barry Rubin⁶⁵ and Bruce Kuniholm⁶⁶ pin the genesis of the Cold War, of the late 1950s and later, to the U.S.-Soviet clashes of late 1940s in the Middle East in general and West Asian periphery of C.A., especially in Iran and Turkey, in particular. In his article on small allies Keohane observes that small states tend "to concentrate on a narrow range of vital interests and ignore almost everything else" and that they often could "take large-scale pattern of international politics for granted, since noting they did could possibly affect them very much".⁶⁷

In studying the Central Asian region and the international relations that its component states undertake it is important to remember what the real subjects of these relationships are. My real subjects here in this study of international relationships are, besides the United States and its important interest groups, the individual component states and territory of this region. These states are by and large considered small or weak states by any definition as per the relevant literature for various reasons. This group of newly-independent Central Asian states is only among the latest in the waves of small

⁶⁵ Barry M. Rubin, *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1947* (London, Cass: Biblio Distribution Centre, 1980).

⁶⁶ Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton U P, 1979).

⁶⁷ Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1971), pp. 162-163.

states⁶⁸ that were spawned off in the wake of each decolonization process that has happened throughout modern history.

This gradual proliferation of what are viewed as small or weak states have led appropriately to the growth of scholarly publications that exclusively focus on them as subjects of special study.⁶⁹ Among the questions addressed by these publications are questions like, what is a small state?, can it be defined?, how to reckon their intangible and tangible sources of power?, and how these could, in turn, assist in classifying states? Also addressed in the light of new international relations concepts that were introduced after the 2nd World War are questions like: Would the external behavior of “small” states be any different than that of “big” or “middle” states?; and could “small” and “middle” states be better dealt with as “weak” states?

Some of these international relations concepts have in turn now in the Post-Cold War situation become if not totally obsolete at least they are in the mercurial descendance like the nonalignment policy that used to be the staple of the small states so also are the perceived powers of the International Organizations appearing to be on the wane and, of course, the International System itself has become a lot less stable and uncertain and links, not to mention, alliances are at best in flux with yet no discernible permanent camps gelling across the political horizon.

While Osgood,⁷⁰ Rothstein⁷¹ and Liska⁷² dwell in depth on the role of small states in alliances and then the role in turn of alliances within the international system others like Vital⁷³ have labored on the problem of definition of states deemed “small” and on whether states so deemed adopt behavior significantly different from those

⁶⁸ Arguably, except for Kazakhstan, *Xinjiang* and Afghanistan all other states/entities of the CAS/CARs region are easily considered as small states, especially when even Botswana is considered a small state by, for example, even the official report of the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat. See World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat, *Small States: Meeting Challenges in the Global Economy*, (Washington, D.C: World Bank, 2000), p.118.

⁶⁹ Peter R. Baehr, “Small States: A tool for analysis?,” *World Politics*, April (1975): pp. 457-461.

⁷⁰ Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins P, 1968).

⁷¹ Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia U P, 1968).

⁷² George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, Studies in International Affairs No.5, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins P, 1968).

⁷³ David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (Oxford: Oxford U P, 1967).

“bigger.” Still others like Handel⁷⁴ strike a prudent and balanced treatment of both aspects while judiciously labeling those states as “weak.”

Generally speaking, the bulk of the works employing small states as their analytical tool grapple with the pervasive problem of defining the term “small state.” A cursory reading of these works reveal that states have largely been labeled “small”, “middle” and “large” rather arbitrarily and in the light of the various criteria utilized to classify them so; lamentably, these otherwise scholarly enterprises become intellectually indefensible. Early works have traditionally looked at the size of the population, though, thankfully, not in the Malthusian spirit, and/or the territorial size. Later works examined their natural resources perhaps under the influence of the geo-strategists and yet others relatively recently have reckoned their national income having, obviously, been bitten by the political-economy bug while the more contemporary works tend to view states sophisticatedly through various socio-economic indices such as the human-development index (H.D.I.).⁷⁵ The Key Data Table 1 on the basic statistics of the Central Asian states and the United States of America loosely reflects these trends.

When comparing these works what becomes clear is that the scholars provide a colorful spectrum of definitions that, to say the least, attempt to deceive other experts and leave the best of the rest confounded. To Hilding Eek, for example, “the term ‘small state’ is a practical, conventional term useful as such but evades definition”.⁷⁶ Robert Rothstein defines it as “a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so”.⁷⁷ I think Kazakhstan’s and

⁷⁴ Michael I. Handel, *Weak States in the International System* (London: Frank Cass, 1990).

⁷⁵ The H.D.I. and its categories of ranking, as conceived by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, Accessed on 15 March 2014 and is available online at this URL: <<http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/>>. See also UNDP, *Central Asian Human Development Report, Bringing Down Barriers* (Bratislava: United Nations Developmental Program, 2005).

⁷⁶ Hilding Eek, “The conception of small states,” in *Small States in International Relations*, eds., August Schgau and Arne Olan Brundtland (New York: Wiley, 1971), p.11.

⁷⁷ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small...* op. cit., p. 29.

Tajikistan's dependence in the near term, albeit temporarily, on Russian and Uzbek power respectively for state or regime protection illustrates this phenomenon fairly.

He mentions three special attributes of any small power: First, such a state craves for foreign assistance; Second, it must be careful not to make any slip in its behavior for its own security is always in the balance, for which reason it usually minds its own business and mostly shy away from global affairs; Third, its very elite recognize that its vulnerabilities cannot be altered. Interestingly, on all these three counts Japan, the U.K., France, Germany and even Israel would not be considered as small states at all, though virtually all the CARs except, perhaps, Kazakhstan would, for they require now Russian and in the future, depending on political developments in Russia, American deterrence for their security.

Rothstein who hails from Johns Hopkins University as does Osgood and Liska, unfortunately, in so defining dumps most, currently about 185 of the 191, U.N. member countries, ranging from Bahrain to Ukraine, into a single category⁷⁸ and as such for all practicality anyone wishing to make a thorough analysis of big-small states' relations would find his definition if not totally meaningless at least completely useless for analyzing state relations. His definition, therefore, based as it is on primarily the defense capability of a state, even in this post-Cold War times with its uncharacteristic proliferation of nuclear and nuclear-possible states, cannot hold much water far less withstand serious inquiry.

Vital being obsessed as he is on classification of small states naturally ignored this strategic importance of small states which, in his view, are invariably weak anyway. He, however, divided world states into loose groups, viz. small, middle and big states. To him economically advanced states having a population between ten to fifteen

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

million, or between twenty to thirty million for underdeveloped states, would be considered small states. Vital, however, feels “these definitions are put forward to make clear the identity of the subject of this study *The Inequality of States*, not with a view to the creation of a precise concept for manipulative analytical purposes”.⁷⁹

Keohane notes a “crucial difference” between Rothstein and Vital “in their conceptions of the role of intangible factors in international politics: attitudes summarized in phrases such as ‘liberalism’ and ‘national self-determination’; international law; the importance to a Great Power of its image; and other culturally based factors that may smooth the path of the small state.”⁸⁰ To Vital the stark essentials of power are to simply put *vital* and no less and therefore, restricts the usefulness of his cogently presented study. “But if clothes do not ‘make the man’ in international politics any more than in personal life, neither does the skeleton alone. Rothstein contends that ‘the status and prestige of Small Powers has risen, while their relative strength in the traditional elements of power has declined ... and their influence has also increased since 1919’”.⁸¹

Still staying with Keohane, he divides states, but, in this case, at the system level of analysis, into four distinct classes. These are: One - “system-determining” states, which have the power to shape the system, through commission or omission,

⁷⁹ Vital, *The Inequality of*, loc. cit.

⁸⁰ Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ dilemmas: Small states in international politics,” *International Organization*, 23 (Spring 1969), p.299.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Table 1 - Key Data and Statistics of the Central Asian States & Entities and of the United States of America

Data Unit/ State	Area (sq. mi.)	Population (2013, July est.)	Official Name	Capital	Type of Govt.	GNI- Per Capita, \$ (2011)	Real GDP- ppp \$ (2012, est.)	Oil Reserves ¹ (bbl.), (2012, est.)	N.G. Reserves ¹ (cu. m.), (2012, est.)	Nuclear Status (2011)	HDI (2011)
AFGHANISTAN	251,827	31,108,077	<i>Jamhuri-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan</i>	Kabul	I.R. (c. g.)	570	33.55b.	870m.	49.55b.	N. Av.	172
AZERBAIJAN	33,436	9,590,159	<i>Azərbaycan Respublikası</i>	Baky ²	(S,P)R.	5,290	98.16b.	7b.	849.5b.	N/S.S.	91
KAZAKHSTAN	1,049,151	17,736,896	<i>Qazaqstan Respublikasy</i>	Astana ³	(S,P)R.	8,200	231.30b.	30b.	2.407t.	M.,F., R. ⁴ &T.	68
KYRGYZSTAN ⁵	76,641	5,548,042	<i>Kyrgyz Respublikasy</i>	Bishkek	(S)R.	900	13.47b.	400m.	5.663b.	M.& F.	126
TAJIKISTAN	55,251	7,910,041	<i>Jumhurii Tojikiston</i>	Dushanbe	R. (c. g.)	780	17.72b.	120m.	5.7b.	M.	127
TURKMENISTAN	188,456	5,113,040	<i>Türkmenistan Respublikasy</i>	Ashgabat	(S,P)R.	4,920	47.55b.	600m.	24.3t.	N/S.S. & M.	102
UZBEKISTAN	172,741	28,661,637	<i>O‘zbekiston Respublikasi</i>	Toshkent ⁶	(S,P)R.	1,500	104.70b.	594m.	1.841t.	M.& F.	115
<i>X.U.A.R., CHINA⁷</i> <i>(Sinkiang)</i>	640,930	21,813,334 (2011, est.)	<i>Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu</i>	Urumchi	A. (r. g.)	N. Ap.	101.70b. (2011)	N.Av.	10.88t. (2001, est.)	M.& T.	N. Ap.
U.S.A.	3,717,797	316,668,567	United States of America	Washington, D.C.	F.R.	48,550	15.66t.	20.68b.	7.716t. (2009, est.)	N.P. ⁸	4

Note: Data: GNI = Gross National Income, GDP-ppp = Gross Domestic Product-Purchasing Power Parity, N.G. = Natural Gas, sq. mi. = square miles, bbl. = barrels, cu. m. = cubic meters, est. = estimate, \$ = 2011 U.S. dollars, m. = million, b. = billion, t. = trillion; Type of Government: I.R. = (aspirational) Islamic Republic, c. g. = coalition government, (S,P)R. = (Secular, Presidential) Republic, (S)R. = (Secular) Republic, R. = Republic, A.(r. g) = Autonomous (regional government), F.R. = (democratic) Federal Republic; Nuclear Status: M. = Mines, F. = Facilities (including milling, tailing and dumping plants or areas), R. = Reactors, T. = Test sites/tunnels, N/S.S. = Nuclear/Seismic Station, N. Av. = Not Available, N. Ap. = Not Applicable, N.P. = Nuclear Power (with full-spectrum facilities); Notes: ¹ Proved Reserves (U.S. only) and Proved and some Probable (for all others); other sources like the *OGJ* provide different reserve estimates, ² More popularly known as Baku, ³ Kazakhstan moved its capital from Almaty in 1997 to the northern central town of Akmola which was subsequently renamed as Astana, ⁴ Kazakhstan is still known to have a number of operating reactor/facilities despite the closure of BN-350 and its strong determination to join the group of the NNWS, ⁵ More formally known as Kyrgyz Republic, ⁶ More commonly spelt as Tashkent, ⁷ Abbreviation for Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Republic, ⁸ A full-fledged Nuclear Power with 9.7% (2010) total installed civil nuclear power capacity in 104 reactors and holding over 604 tonnes of HEU, including those on 7,700 nuclear warheads in deployed and non-deployed weapons including in strategic ones like ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers of the U.S. nuclear triad, i.e. assuming the absence of any outer-space component. Sources: Composed by this researcher from data furnished by C.I.A. and accessed on 20 June 2013 via <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/>>; C.R.S.; D.O.S.; D.O.E.-E.I.A.; Hong Kong Trade Development Council; *The Straits Times* (Singapore); S.N. Kile, "World Nuclear Forces," SIPRI Yearbook 2013; World Bank; *The New York Times 2011 Almanac*, Ed. John W. Wright, Penguin Books, New York: New York Times Co; Penguin Group Inc., 2010; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2003-2004*, Oxford: IISS/Oxford U P, 2003. Various annual versions used too; UNDP at <hdr.undp.org>, accessed on 12 May 2013; and even the researcher's own observation of developments.

such as, in the present international system, the U.S. and the ex-U.S.S.R. too, but in the international system of the recent past; Two - “system-influencing” states that can significantly influence the system but cannot dominate it by themselves, currently these states include the likes of China, Japan, Germany, contemporary Russia and to a lesser extent the U. K. and France; Three - “system-affecting” states that cannot affect the total system alone but could significantly impact upon it by operating within an alliance or a regional grouping, at present countries like Kazakhstan, Ukraine, India, Canada, Australia, Pakistan, Netherlands and even Malaysia would fall within this category; and finally - states that are called “system-ineffectual,” these states are usually weak though not necessarily “small” like Afghanistan, Sudan or Zaire or small though not necessarily “weak” like Switzerland or Singapore and have minimal effect on the international system and often find it expedient to adjust to world reality as it evolves.⁸²

A non-aligned state - a product from the Cold War years - is to Vital a paradigm while to Rothstein it is an aberration. I feel that happily, at both scholars’ relief perhaps, states that were deemed as such have now reverted back to their pre-Cold War incarnation. It is clear that these scholars disagree on various aspects of big-small states’ relations like definition, classification or categorization and the analytical significance of concepts like non-alignment. They agree that technology has helped small states change their power, not just military, *vis-a-vis* the larger states.⁸³

While, Vital disregards intangible factors, like national self-determination and state self image to a state’s external behavior, in his addictive obsession with material means of power; Rothstein, on the other hand, maturely stresses these factors when he observes:

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 296.

⁸³ Vital, *The Inequality of*, op. cit., chap.4; Rothstein, *Alliances and Small*, op. cit., p. 20.

“status and prestige of Small Powers has risen, while their relative strength in the traditional elements of power has actually declined”.⁸⁴ Even while Vital notes that “...great power rivalry – is inherently unstable”,⁸⁵ Rothstein and he invariably agree that great powers’ competition will contribute to small power influence in the international system and help in strengthening their sense of weak security.

All three Johns Hopkins’ scholars Osgood, Rothstein and Liska raised doubts about the future alliance of Asian states while concluding that non-alignment has reached its zenith. Liska for example warned Third World countries that “a free hand might come to mean an empty and unarmed hand...” and on the issue of competition if not hostility between great powers and its benefits for small states he says “small state subsystem would enjoy a maximum of practically attainable autonomy in a multi-power global system combining competition with concert.”⁸⁶

On the matter of small states’ support for international organization Rothstein gives three reasons why they generally do so. First, international organizations plainly treat all states, big and small as equals; second, they accord security to members and; third, they might come in handy⁸⁷ to check the great powers. Most C.A. states’ enthusiasm for accession to various I.O.s testifies to this fact. On the issue of non-alignment Vital, while recommending a policy of independence for small states do warn them that “the price is rising”.⁸⁸ Rothstein, however, states that “alliances have increasingly become instruments designed to achieve non-military goals”⁸⁹ especially for the Small Powers. The “imperatives of immediate security” he writes often propel them to seek strong allies,

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁸⁵ Vital, *The Inequality of*, op. cit., p.123.

⁸⁶ Liska, *Alliances and the Third*, op. cit., p. 44.

⁸⁷ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small*, op. cit., p. 294.

⁸⁸ Vital, *The Inequality of*, op. cit., p. 186.

⁸⁹ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small*, op. cit., p. 262.

sometimes even against their very long term interests. In this regard citing Rumania's actions before World War I he writes that it (Rumania):

...chose to ally with what clearly seemed to be the strongest side. It was a tactic which, though sanctioned by all the canons of traditional diplomacy, merely increased the imbalance of power, a condition detrimental to Rumania's long - range interests.⁹⁰

A pioneer in small states studies Annette Baker Fox finds that small states usually gravitate toward the stronger between any contending great powers and their such behavior can be labeled as "anti -balance of power" and on the other hand big powers usually move to the side of the weaker ones and this action on the part of the big powers is taken to be "pro - balance of power" action.⁹¹

Amongst scholars who see a realistic possibility of an alliance between small states and middle or secondary powers emerging. Liska comes out most strongly when he states that for a growing number of less developed states "selectively disengaged ex-metropolitan powers may be more efficient and more tolerable great-power allies in the search for post-independence stability than superpowers without colonial antecedents...".⁹² I would say Osgood more than agrees with this when he stresses on coherence among small states as a critical factor in their emerging international power in the coming future when he sagely predicts "in two or three decades, this political introversion of new states might lead to loose regional and sub-regional groupings,... within which more coherent patterns of international politics and semi-autonomous balance-of-power systems could emerge."⁹³

Over the preceding decades, of course, the term "balance of power" came to be used in many regions of the world including in Europe, Southwest Asia and not to mention Southeast Asia. Balance of power in these regions often meant the recognition by both

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 295.

⁹¹ Annette B. Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 1959), p. 187.

⁹² Liska, *Alliances and the Third*, op. cit., p. 29.

⁹³ Osgood, *Alliances and American*, op. cit., p. 131.

superpowers, i.e. the U.S. and U. S. S. R., of each other's sphere of influence and keeping the *status quo* that together more often than not served as stabilizing factors. This was also the ostensible reason why the U.S. concentrated on Northern Tier countries like Iran and Turkey on the ex- U. S. S. R.'s southern fringes to apparently contain an expansionist Soviet Union.

But in the post-Cold War world, with a little extension in more or less the same region, now the U.S. faces a dilemma i.e. how can the U.S. increase the Central Asian and the larger region's interest in and goodwill towards itself when it simultaneously formulates, maintains and pursues Russia-centric and Irano-phobic policies across that region and its environs. To the present researcher the current American political antics of simultaneously feigning to be an ostrich trying to escape into tactical isolationism from its traditional Asian allies and pretending to get strategically bullish on the back of the born-again Russian bear instead of, responsibly and fairly, on that of the whole post-Soviet behemoths' are patently preposterous if not also plainly stupid. What I am actually driving at here would be gradually clear as we proceed to latter sections of this thesis, meanwhile, for now my above observation should be taken as it stands.

Alliances are to international politics what oxygen is to men. The former are vital respectively to the latter. Without either the respective subjects usually die. Happily for alliances the end, or precisely the "second end," of the Cold War has put an end, or so it is claimed in the West, to "nonalignment as a foreign policy alternative" in the words of Keohane.⁹⁴ Retrospectively thinking, however, one finds it difficult to agree with Keohane especially in the light of the weak states' on-going experience in this regard. I feel that not only "non-alignment," in all its various manifestations, has weathered the end of the first

⁹⁴ Keohane, "Lilliputians' dilemmas: Small, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

Cold War but it has continued, in practice, to last till the present second so-called “end” of the Cold War too and given the perception of the weak states’ elites its modified relevance would continue well into the near future notwithstanding the apparently “unilateral” scuttling of the Soviet Union and the consequent wishful “end” of the Cold so-called War.

While the contemporary relevance of non-alignment I am sure would continue to be debated by statesmen in the developing countries well into the future, what has always perturbed the minds of political scientists, however, is the quest for a precise definition of alliance. To Liska for example his “extensive conception of alliance” would go “beyond the hard core of an explicit, contractual pledge of military assistance”⁹⁵ while to Osgood a pure definition of alliance is that it is a

... formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obliges one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force.⁹⁶

While Liska superficially and pessimistically views small states’ role in alliance, Osgood on the other hand gives an overly militaristic definition to alliance and dwells deeply on its functions. In Vital’s opinion alliances often result in the undermining of the independence and sovereignty of small states.⁹⁷ On the other hand Keohane and Nye counters that “weak states” will have influence disproportionate to their actual power especially where complex interdependence is concerned.⁹⁸

Talking about complex interdependence especially between a major power and small state(s) the relationships that readily come to mind are that between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in the 1980s; the U.S. and Asean states in the 1990s and somewhat so beyond the 2000s; Russia and Cuba as late as late 1991 and continually also beyond and, of course, the

⁹⁵ Liska, *Alliances and the Third*, op. cit., p. 3.

⁹⁶ Osgood, *Alliances and American*, op. cit., p. 30.

⁹⁷ Vital, *The Inequality of*, op. cit., pp. 184-186.

⁹⁸ Stanley J. Michalak, Jr., “Theoretical perspectives for understanding international interdependence,” *World Politics* Oct. (1979), p. 140.

classic major power-small states standoff would be the U.S.(as braced by the IEA) and O.P.E.C.(as boosted by the OIC) states especially with the Persian Gulf states in the years beyond 1973⁹⁹ till perhaps the Gulf War with Iraq, I believe.

Both Nye and Keohane appear to have based their above conclusions on four assumptions generally speaking. One, having fewer world-wide interests to engage and possessing solid national constituencies, small states could easily focus on genuine issues of real interest to them. Two, whatever matter that arises from interdependence are usually referred to international or regional organizations wherein their leverage to bargain is inevitably strengthened given their institutional structures. Three, the potential for coalition formation within those international organizations tends to lessen the chances of success for big powers. And four, well-established democracies of the West do seldom formulate, pursue and implement coherent and realistic policies and often fail to stand as a monolithic bloc when it comes to bargaining.

The U.S. - China and U.S. - Japan trade problems demonstrate to some extent the vulnerabilities to which the Americans are exposed to. These problems tend to bring home to the various parties respectively of the true nature of interdependence between them. The Arab oil embargo of the 1970s is an even more potent reminder of the vulnerabilities of not just the U.S. but also the whole developed world to the realities of interdependence. The presence of overwhelming diplomatic and military preponderance dramatically failed to serve their cause then and they had to face the resultant economic music, for once. This is one case where South-South co-operation exposed the naked impotence of the usually mighty North. In recent times, Asean proved this situation to be true politically as well when it engaged Myanmar successfully by going deaf to Western urgings, according to the

⁹⁹ Handel, *Weak States in the*, op. cit., p. 217.

Rt. Hon. Prime Minister of Malaysia.¹⁰⁰ An important lesson that CARs' elite would have not lost from any retrospective consideration of the outcome of the Arab-Israel war of 6th October 1973 is the impressive leverage that America was nonetheless able to exercise with both the hostile parties.¹⁰¹ The moral or rather the lesson here is that, intercourse of reasonable depth is feasible even with the lone superpower harboring dreams for hypermacy.

On the diplomatic front, small states, being what they are, usually focus their attention on matters concerning themselves or their immediate neighborhood and do not feel it important to poke their heads into every corner of the world characteristically like what the major powers, habitually, do. Since survival is basically a small state issue, especially in the short term, the leaders of small states, usually, are survival and security minded and this is especially true of newly-independent states trying to consolidate their fresh independence and find their true bearings on the international map. In an anarchic world with major powers in continual competition if not actually in hostility, it is vital that small states are adept at skilful diplomatic maneuvering and manipulation of not just the leadership of the major powers but also of its own public opinion no matter how meek it is relatively speaking.

However, one justifiable fear that bugs the small states is that they fear that to the major powers they are no more than mere chips on the gambling table.¹⁰² Being usually the objects that end up being pushed around in any great power struggle the small states' fear of being seen as helpless pawns in international politics is both understandable and

¹⁰⁰ See Najib Razak, "The Asean Way Won Burma Over," *Wall Street Journal* 3 April 2012. Accessed on 17 July 2015 and is available online at <<http://online.wsj.com/article/>>. On Asean and its quiet diplomacy being a possible model to C.A., see Loro Horta, "Asean, a Model for Central Asia?," *New Straits Times*, 13 June 2014, accessed on 18 Nov. 2017 and available online at <<https://www.nst.com.my>>.

¹⁰¹ On America's leverage in respect of Israel, see Stephen Green, *Living by the Sword: America and Israel in the Middle East 1968-1987* (London: Faber & Faber, 1988).

¹⁰² Fox, *The Power of Small*, op. cit., p. 183.

justified. In this regard Vital stresses the vulnerability of small states to economic coercion and discusses the pros and cons of having close relations with a great power. An interesting hypothesis that he presents is that the greater the great power investments in the small state, the higher are the stakes for the great power, and this will increase the importance of the small state to it, and presumably, continue its commitment.¹⁰³ If Singapore, testifies to this fact, so could states such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

Whatever literature that I have reviewed here so far obviously pushes the assumption that decision-making or external behavior of major powers could be shaped only by other major powers or through its domestic groups. This, of course, is not always the case, for small states too could penetrate a big one as *vice versa*. The power of Israel through its ubiquitous lobbies within the United States is quite well known throughout the whole world. In relatively recent years, thanks to liberal media exposes, the world was able to witness its charming denizens put even seductive pressure on key American foreign policy elite including on the unnaturally accommodating and comely Clinton.

For that matter, it is an established political tradition in the U.S. that groups with relevant interests could readily lobby for even small states. In fact, there are professional consultants and even corporations to do just this. Taking this fact into consideration one can readily say that absolute political independence even in the mighty U.S.A., not to mention elsewhere within the international system, is nothing but a wishful mirage. The success of the Arab oil embargo brought some attention in the literature to small states that are endowed by Providence with the provenance of strategic primary commodities like oil and to the fact that the political and economic power that *that* confers on them. Nonetheless, scholarly attention has so far been scant and narrowly confined to just oil and

¹⁰³ Vital, *The Inequality of*, op. cit., p. 124.

a few other commodities like chromium and uranium. This study is, hence, a modest attempt to partly address this issue.

Major power competition, even in this post-Cold War era, constitutes, I would say, an important variable influencing the relationships between big and small powers. Thus, the actual structure of the international system obtaining at any given time is important to big-small states' relationships. The "hostility" between the superpowers for the past fifty odd years had actually benefited the small states and ironically albeit altruistically, if only by default, the very stability this tension brought to the small states enabled them over the years to build up an influence in international politics that was totally disproportionate to their real strength and power when reckoned by the conventional attributes and means of power like sheer population, territory, military forces and industrial muscles.

Literature on U.S.-Central Asian Relations¹⁰⁴

The works of Dawisha and Malik, in particular, contain a number of relatively pertinent articles by distinguished and learned experts on US relations with the newly independent states (NIS) in general and with Central Asian ones in particular, besides the spot on works of Nichol too. Graham E. Fuller is one such uniquely qualified scholar to expound on US interests in Central Asia. As an American he views Central Asia as a "fabled and obscure" land yet he believes superpower America's national interests therein are few and even then mostly negative.¹⁰⁵ The six main US interests in Central Asian states are according to him:

¹⁰⁴ This literature review was **arranged into sub-sectors** to bring out the relations of its primary aspects to the overall topic, to place the pertinent literature in their vertical sequence and as it pertains to the subject on hand. Please note, that the number of works on U.S.-C.A. relations, briefly examined, was limited to just a few was at the request of the immediate supervisors. Elaborating on each one of the listed work, however, would render this study into a mere bibliographical treatise and has, therefore, been avoided.

¹⁰⁵ Graham E. Fuller, "Central Asia and American National Interests," in *Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects*, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), p. 130. See also Graham E. Fuller, *Central Asia: The New Geopolitics*, (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp, 1992).

- [1] The prevention of the reemergence of Russian radicalism and any relapse of its ideological expansionism vis-à-vis Central Asia. This, *inter alia*, he believes may once again bring the world towards nuclear confrontation;
- [2] To manage outbreaks of civil wars or fragmentation of nations therein;
- [3] To stem nuclear proliferations and spread of other WMDs;
- [4] To prevent the region from succumbing to anti-western forms of political Islam;
- [5] To propel the region towards democracy and human rights; and
- [6] To secure for the US a role in the economic progress and growth of the region, and especially in the development of its strategic resources, including oil.

While we will have to evaluate the veracity of his arguments in light of the developments since, George H. Quester another eminent international affairs expert evaluates, in Dawisha's book, the possible future directions of US policy in reaction to political developments in the newly independent states. He tests three models of the roots of American foreign policy.¹⁰⁶ After stating that events in the NIS had basically caught social scientists unawares he goes on to examine in detail the three main theories that can help predict US policies towards those new countries. In this regard he considers power-politics, liberal and Marxist theories in that order. He concludes that liberal idealism would predominate theories of balance of power and economic factors in American objectives in Eurasia. In recent times we have seen America swing relatively rapidly from isolationism-inclined disinterest in the region to one of hegemony-seeking expansionism across that very region.

¹⁰⁶ George H. Quester, "The Roots of American Goals for Eurasia," in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha, (Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 126.

Considering Afghanistan as very much part of the C.A. region in a strategic geographic sense Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman give in their book, like in my research, a positively prospective analysis of the Afghanistan scene that over zooms too across its peripheries to the north and west in a globalizing sense and to the south and east with a more geopolitical edge, though not totally in the classical sense. It shows how India's politico-economic physical outreach into Afghanistan in Central Asia has to take place via its participation in the Zaranj-Delaram highway that runs through Pathan-strong Nimruz province. For America's part it is involved competitively in the construction of the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat highways¹⁰⁷ clearly aiming to internationalistically connect Afghanistan with Central Asia thereby, but unlike my work he does not examine America's entire role across the whole C.A. region.

Though basically an Anglo work, it has much to say on superpower America's presence under a coalition cover, in small state Afghanistan and, going against the many other largely gloomy analyses elsewhere, theorize on a possible positive outcome of that presence, though with understandable conditional optimism. The work covers the Afghanistan problem and the consequent U.S. intervention and presence in the C.A. vicinity beyond simple geopolitics and more in the vein of critical geopolitics, an approach which my present research too broadly reflect.

Afghanistan's central asian, though largely unarticulated, orientation ostensibly, under U.S. auspices, is never left in doubt, any outcome that works out otherwise may leave Afghanistan vulnerable to clear regional geopolitics, only this time in its detestable classical sense, falling victim to the realpolitik of its regional powers. Lutz Kleveman,¹⁰⁸ looking at

¹⁰⁷ On this, see Toby Dodge and Nicholas Redman, eds., *Afghanistan: To 2015 and Beyond* (London: Routledge; IISS, 2012), p.XIII of its Strategic Geography insert.

¹⁰⁸Lutz Kleveman, *The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in Central Asia* (New York, N.Y.: Atlantic Monthly, 2003).

the larger Central Asian region, takes a no nonsense view of the oil passion there that often leads to politics of extremism, if not also violence, in what he basically views as a Central Asian battleground, unlike my work which treats it more as an arena, though a strategic one. He sees powers like the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, E.U. and the developed rest competing for the hydrocarbons and their export pipelines and routes in and from the new Central Asian region.

Stepping into this fray under an idealism concept, he says are also the transnational energy corporations moved mostly, but not always, by profits and shareholder interests. Though having much less oil than the Middle East, he mentions the leading oil countries of the Caspian region as having over 100 billion barrels of crude oil. Given that the U.S. has long wanted to reduce its import dependence on the OPEC cartel also by diversifying into Central Asia, this has placed the U.S. on course to a high stakes game against the regional energy competitors Russia and Iran and regional energy markets of China, Europe and farther off Japan and India amongst others. Revisiting the Great Game concept of the 19th century he now adds-in modern-day energy geopolitics and, unlike my work which also brings out the cooperative aspects, he actually updates it as a New Great Game in the larger C.A. region and its peripheries, primed more as a power struggle for what is often believed to be, rightly or wrongly, fast diminishing energy resources.

Given the relatively scanty attention of the U.S. on the Central Asian region prior to the independence of the CARs it is unsurprising that analysis of U.S. relations with any state in the Central Asian region had remained largely a black hole in serious academic research. In modern times amongst the first to touch on this crucial aspect of a Central Asian state was Mohammad Khalid Ma'Aroof whose examination of Afghanistan's relations with the United States while may not be the first was, despite its modest size,

certainly quite a comprehensive one that details the background of Afghanistan's relations with the U.S. from the very beginning till well into the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹

Further it also pondered if the U.S. could safeguard Afghanistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty and therethrough help restore Afghanistan's non-Aligned status in the future. While it was an in-depth study of U.S.-Afghanistan relationship till the period of Soviet occupation and like my present work basically a study of the relationship between a small developing state and a superpower it is not a work like mine, given the geopolitical realities then obtaining, that addresses Afghanistan as part of a Central Asian region, like studies that addressed America's ties with the Baltic states, as a region, that were not even independent then.

Despite the C.A. region being in the limelight, particularly, from the implosion of the Soviet Union on, serious academic works on U.S. relations with the entire Central Asian region have been few and far between. One of the contemporary, I believe the latest then, works to appear, dealing with this subject, was the excellent report by Jeffrey Mankoff. Though entitled *The United States and Central Asia after 2014*, thus appearing to be beyond the scope of our research period, it is actually covering most of the key issues dealing with the C.A. region and its relationship with the United States, exactly within our research time-frame. Not only was the work addressing the entire C.A. region but it was also, like my work, dealing with it in the spirit of critical geopolitics, i.e. also looking at the Silk Road¹¹⁰ potential of the C.A. region and America's prospective role in it. The work was not just descriptive and analytical, like my present work, but, unlike my work, it is actually prescriptive if not also normative.

¹⁰⁹ Mohammad Khalid Ma'Aroof, *Afghanistan in World Politics: A Study of Afghan-US Relations* (New Delhi: Gyan, 1987).

¹¹⁰ Jeffrey Mankoff, *The United States and Central Asia after 2014*, A report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia program, Jan. 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2013), pp. 19-21.

It deals with how C.A. has played an important role in the U.S. geo-strategic presence in Afghanistan and reflects on how this role can transform in the years beyond 2014. However, unlike my present research, it does not attempt to **redefine** the re-emerging C.A. region, but rather sticks to the later Soviet definition of Central Asia,¹¹¹ clearly ignoring the collapse of the Soviet order and the corresponding emergence of a new politico-geographic, if not also geopolitical, regional reality. Unlike my work it also does not situate the relationship *vis-à-vis* the larger natural/strategic resources spectrum. However, his work does narrate and hint on Afghanistan's linkages, in contemporary times, with C.A., and their prospective further integrations in the future. In all the various above contexts, we will determine, in this study, where exactly the US is headed, via its relations with the region, in the light of subsequent developments.

Hypotheses Proposed

Anyway, on the basis of my foregoing discussions on big-small power relationships and the brief literature samplings on U.S.-Central Asian states relations, I wish to hereby put forward a number of hypotheses. These are *viz.*: One, as Russia and I. R. Iran become increasingly assertive around the Central Asia region, the more suspicious the CAS/CARs get towards them. Two, the closer the relations become between the U.S. and any or all of the CARs, the more negative the relationships between Russia or Iran and the CAS turn to.

The United States has always been interested in the Central Asia region as are also Russia and Iran though each perhaps for partly different reasons. For Iran it is more because of cultural and linguistic affinity and “brotherly” market if not also religious telepathy; for Russia it is because of colonial hangovers and burdens of comradeship if not

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 1.

merely for its easily accessible resources and dependent markets; and for America it is decisive influence over its strategic resources, primarily energy ones, as much as to nip proliferation potentials in its nuclear, chemical and biological buds, if not also to dam the gush of “Islamic” terrorism and fundamentalism into the CARs. This being so I again formulate two further hypotheses: thus, Three, the more Russia and Iran feel close to CARs, the more the U.S. really wants to influence the CARs; and Four, the weaker the Americans feel their position in Central Asia is, the more they will seek to boost relations with the CARs.

Though I have formulated these hypotheses, the various issues they concern have been continually commented upon in the international media and in scholarly works. My modest attempt here is only to bring the various aspects of the relationship between the U.S. and the CAS/CARs to academic light in a more coherent, if also analytical, way and thereby to seed and provoke hopefully further scholarly inquiries into the subject which may either confirm my assumptions or approximate to a more realistic picture.

Methodology

My study evaluates a couple of developments that I believe have been responsible for the negative or positive change in the relations between America and the Central Asian States either individually or collectively. The Cold War American involvement in Afghanistan and its environs, the civil war in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, American albeit NATO formal interest in Kyrgyzstan, American economic and strategic inroads into Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are some of the developments considered in this study. My study would also include pertinent passages throughout on the evolution or

otherwise of American behavior in the erstwhile Third World and the ex-Socialist Bloc to provide comparison and hopefully identify deviation in American behavior in Central Asia.

This study often, though not always, notes the nature of relationship between America and the CARs before, during and after these developments and events. The *time series method*, inevitably, thus adopted would help in establishing the direct relationship or connection between the independent and dependent variables cited in my hypotheses. Only developments wherein American involvement or concern has been remarkably profound, as aforementioned, are considered in this research study. Being so, these serve as criteria for selecting the independent variables used in the hypothesis. Other developments, deemed less important to U.S. - CARs relations are, however, not necessarily overlooked.

Of the various indicators of relations that are considered in the present study the most important ones would be political recognition, diplomatic representations, bilateral inter-governmental visits, trade, aid, investment flows and finally, a little paradoxically perhaps in this post-Cold War world, defense and security ties. As readily apparent these above indicators are not mentioned here in any order of their significance. Data are gleaned from both primary and secondary¹¹² sources as also are the statistical, tabular and cartographical materials though, of course, some of these latter ones have been specially adapted from their original sources to meet my present needs.

Because of the sensitivities and the secrecies surrounding this problem and its subjects, it has been, reluctantly, decided, especially given the post-September 11 milieu of justifiable suspicions and skepticisms obtaining both in the U.S. and to a lesser extent in the

¹¹² Rather peculiarly, in the field of I.R. what is **not already known** to the broader academic community through secondary works can only **authoritatively come originally** from the idiosyncratic top statesmen and high practitioners, often elites, themselves, and much of which remain confidential for long periods and are embargoed to the public. But when publicly available, these have been sparingly utilized, though those too may subsequently appear in books e.t.c., thus becoming secondary. In the field of politics, **originality** can only be created by politicians, particularly, statesmen and, the minute they do so, it becomes **history**, thereby taking originality away along with it. Students of these phenomena can only, meaningfully, claim originality via their varying presentations of the same.

other countries concerned, to dispense with any direct interviews.¹¹³ However, elites germane to the various aspects of the topic and the region may be “interviewed” indirectly for their pertinent views as recorded and available in the public domain. This includes a study of library materials such as books, journal articles, magazines and newspapers, governmental and United Nations’ reports that are publicly accessible and other, of course, authoritative materials securable over the internet. All possible effort is made to consult the wide body of existing literature that may be in anyway pertinent to the problem.

Such “interviews” with experts or elite like Central Asia area specialist and political commentators both American and indigenous to the core region and its periphery would form part of the corpus of my primary sources. Similarly too would the statements of senior leaders of the region and of America; writings of high officials, both serving and retired, of both sides; and observations of academics from across Asia and the U.S. be so treated. My primary sources would also include publications issued by the various embassies, governmental agencies, and documents and information furnished via the official media medium and channels of the core countries.

Secondary sources would include largely books, executive magazines, specialized journals and occasional papers and bulletins published by mostly non-governmental and non-profit institutions, both American and foreign, excluding, of course, those in the region proper. This regional source exclusion is not because of any paucity of information output therefrom but more because of my personal inaccessibility to the languages in which those invariably are disseminated. Most of the information from the region are published, quite

¹¹³ Financial inadequacy, contemporary political uncertainties and the general international climate of fear ,of alleged Muslim extremism, made the possible and safe conducting of any direct or even indirect interviews, in either the U.S. or any of the CARs and more so in the CAS, especially, given the rather tight security clearance requirements, totally impossible.

lamentably, in either their titular languages or in Russian. If, however, translated versions of these are available, then, they too are utilized.

Now to recapitulate our methodology once again; first of all the problem was broadly stated. The Central Asian region is defined and delineated for the purpose of the current research. Appropriate theories of big power/small states relations are considered. Then applicable hypotheses are advanced. Given that the bulk of the Central Asian states fall under the developing nations category and are therefore loosely akin to Third World states, the interests and motivations of America in the erstwhile Third World would, hence, be reviewed. Effort would be made to trace the American competition with Russia in this arena and how this has shaped its behavior. Then the American economic, political and strategic interests and concerns in Central Asia are surveyed. After this, attempt is made to trace the evolution and change, if any, of American - Central Asian relations. Thereafter, the strategic importance of natural resources, especially energy resources and the resultant U.S. – Russian competition in the Central Asian region is examined. All the above is evaluated and analyzed in the light of recent developments. A number of pertinent variables are considered as likely causes for the development and evolution of these relations. Among these would be the importance of the region's energy resources to the United States and by extension to the western countries and their other relatively energy-deficient allies.

With a view to better assess and understand U.S. - Central Asian relations this research would provide relevant comparative perspective throughout by horizontally considering American relations with other ex-Soviet non-Central Asian states, in particular, and also more generally with other erstwhile Third World and Eastern Bloc countries too. Especially, specific episodes that were crucial for U.S. - Central Asian relations, such as

American involvement in Afghanistan and American support for Turkic minorities in the ex-Soviet space would be considered in the research too.

The present research would strive to prove that while the United States might exploit the openings and opportunities presented in Central Asia either directly or through its proxies, the United States, other than feigning to pivot around parts of the C.A. periphery, has yet to seriously engage Russia in a region of obvious importance not just to Russia. The research would also consider if the presence of energy resources and the need to fully exploit them in the region and the abundance of investment capital and technological excellences in the U.S. create a natural attraction and dependence between the U.S. and the Central Asian states and, if so, would that help the CARs make genuinely independent moves which at times may even be detrimental to both U.S. and Russian interests. In short, this research would prove that; under largely presidential leaderships, multi-sectoral relations have taken place between the lone superpower, the U.S.A. and the Muslim small states of the redefined Central Asian region and that these principally strategic/energy-focused relations have undergone changes in their general nature but not in their upward direction!

Scope

It must be mentioned here that the present research deliberately chooses to largely gloss over the internal factors in the CAS/CARs in order to give due stress to the importance of external events and the dynamics of the U.S. – Russian cooperation and competition especially after the Cold War. After all it was these very external factors that were responsible, in the first place, for launching both these freed CARs and the analytic region, which has emerged as a consequence, as a relatively coherent whole into the international

scene. Thus, for my present purposes, the CAS constitute, specifically, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. Though *Xinjiang* clearly is not viewed as a separate CAS (i.e.: warranting, thereby, a distinct unit and I.R. actor treatment) in this study, it is merely included, tangentially, as part of the analytic C.A. region as duly defined earlier and is treated as such, throughout.

This research aims to define the current conceptual parameters of Central Asia and looks at some of the region’s problems, paradoxes and relations, particularly that with the lone superpower, the US, not only objectively but also with the true sympathy and equanimity expectable only from an outsider to the region and the relationship.¹¹⁴ The research is not an exhaustive historical survey or a comprehensive catalogue of the Central Asia – U.S. relationship, however, but is rather a broad-stroked analysis of it, though still rooted and based inevitably on both those substantive components.

Table 2 – U.S. Presidential Term and Policy/Doctrine

Tenure ¹	Term/s	President	Policy ³
1988-1993	I	George H.W. Bush	Realist “constructive engagement”
1992-2001	I and II	William J. Clinton	Idealist “liberal internationalism”
2000-2009	I and II	George W. Bush	Realist “moral militarism”
2008-2017	I (till 2012) ²	Barack H. Obama	Idealist “strategic reassurance”

Note: 1 - It starts from the elected year to the year when the total presidency ends, usually the in-coming new president assumes the presidential office only in January of the next year; 2 - This study concludes at the end of his first term (i.e.: effectively in 2012), though his entire presidency only formally ends in January 2017, well beyond the research time-frame; 3 – The listed is a **key policy**, bearing on I.R., during their presidency, but those in themselves make up just one in the basket of policies, that fall, usually, under their namesake **doctrines**, e.g.: Bush Doctrine or Obama Doctrine. Note also that the organizing doctrines tend to, often a times, outlast, if not also outlive, the president they are named after; and this may also serve to indicate policy and/or even key personnel continuities.
Source: Prepared by this researcher from DOS, CRS and Wikipedia data.

In this regard, this study, in its focal aspects, basically limits the scrutiny of the U.S.-CAS relationship to those occurring within the U.S. presidential terms listed in Table 2 and also alluded clearly to, earlier in footnote (fn.) 8 of this chapter. But analyzing every

¹¹⁴ If there are Central Asian perspectives out there, then these are not coherently available for all the political units covered. Hence, given this unsatisfactory reality, my basically outsider, **third-party perspective** is yes, largely based on the well established **American perspectives** on these relationships, though not always remaining hostage to their views and priorities. This, in itself, is both the strength and limit of my approach. So, to believe that this is an entirely pro-American perspective would, of course, be wrong!

instance of or trend in the intercourse between America and the CARs, particularly, over that past twenty-one odd years, **i.e.: from Dec. 1991 to 2012**, would be a misdirected effort on my part, thereby unwarrantedly breaching beyond the self-designated scope of my dissertation, and have, therefore, been wisely avoided.

Importance

This research is important because it seeks to fill the gapping void in the study area of U.S bilateral relations with the new Muslim states of Central Asia and may also contribute there through to enrich the broader knowledge area and understanding in and of the field of international relations. Central Asia has long last reappeared in the strategic outlook of the United States and therefore, in that of the rest of the world. Thus this research can also be useful for Malaysia, in terms of the challenges and opportunities arising from these seminal relations, given that Malaysia has long been primarily in the Western camp and has continually taken its diplomatic cues from US leads, in the past and more generally to all Malaysians keen in the fields of international relations and area studies. The research will also be indispensable to anyone whose understanding of Muslim-Western relations thus far has been generally mired in the bitter confines of the Middle Eastern or West Asian experiences thereof.¹¹⁵

Chapterization

Generally, this introductory Chapter One (or 1), being what it is, states the problem at hand and outlines the objectives, and considers appropriately, some of the standard theories and pertinent literature concerning big-power-small-states' relations after clearly defining the

¹¹⁵ More than a hint of this could be caught in the later paragraphs of the last section of Chap. 2.

C.A. region. It moved on to pose a number of hypotheses that would be either proven or refuted in the later chapters. It then described the methodology to be pursued in conducting this research. It draws to a close by stating its scope and then goes on to mention the importance before finishing with this chapterization.

Though the Central Asian region, as defined in this study, began to emerge in the international arena only relatively recently it nevertheless has been an established coherent, if imprecise, region traditionally with a long-running rich regional history as attested to by both part of the next chapter, i.e. Chapter Two (or 2) and Appendix I. Thus, Chapter 2, coming hereafter, not only, *inter alia*, partly accounts for this fact but is also a politico-geographic portrayal of the region as such. It also gives a brief tabulated historical sketch of the region, to be supplemented chronologically and more comprehensively through the later Appendix I, thereby integrating as far as possible the vast body of past literature on it. Overall, this backgrounder politico-geographic chapter, I believe provides the areal and thematic context to the research.

Having had some idea of the region, its coherence and its wide-ranging regional history, this research moves on to overview first the United States' past policy, priority and actual relations with developing states across the world, the broad state-category into which, especially given the present hibernation of the Third World concept, the bulk of the Central Asian states readily fall, which would in later chapters help compare and reveal the nature of United States' relations with the Central Asian states.

Nudging one more level closer to the actual regional focus of this research, the later section of Chapter Two discusses the American involvement in and interactions with the Muslim World, a world to which the Central Asian states naturally belong, by virtue of

their pre-Russian/Soviet traditional religious convictions and protractedly enmeshed history. That section considers the advent and behavior of the United States in that broader, though very heterogeneous, Muslim World.

Having in the previous chapter¹¹⁶ broadly considered the Central Asian analytic region and the United States' motivations and concerns in the world, in particular, first in the developing world and then the United States' various interests and actual behavior in the broader Muslim World, i.e.: the two worlds into which the new Central Asian states would fall, by virtue of their various attributes, Chapters Three and Four (or 3 and 4), two of the three focal ones of this research, examine the United States' relations with the various Central Asian states, divided as they are by these chapters into the AKT states and the AKTU republics; individually, sub-group-wise as well as regionally, and considers the changes, if there are any, in these.¹¹⁷

Chapter Five (or 5), a focal one too,¹¹⁸ pen-ultimately, studies the importance of strategic materials, primarily energy ones, a key issue area in U.S. – Central Asian relations, and the resultant U.S. – Russian collaboration/competition in the Central Asian region and its environs. The chapter looks too at the United States' role in the international energy, particularly, oil trade and considers the literature dealing with it. The chapter also tests the assumption laid-out specifically in hypothesis three which in the context of the subject of this chapter, of course, is that: the more the importance of Central Asian strategic

¹¹⁶ Chapter 2 besides dealing with physical/historical background also touches on political penetration and presence, interest of the major powers, and the USA's importance and strategy in handling the affairs of Central Asia and its periphery before 1991 it thereby, serves as a concise **backgrounder chapter** too. Please note neither Chap. 2 nor the other chapter arrangements referenced earlier in my published article, which itself emerged from this Ph.D. research work, remain in the same form and/or arrangement in this subsequently revised thesis; in this context, please see Hujjathullah M.H. Babu Sahib, "A Concise Interpretive Analysis of U.S.- Kazakhstan Relations, 1991-2013," *Central Asia* (journal), 75 (Winter 2014), p. 39.

¹¹⁷ A close reading of these current sections of Chapter 1 would easily bring out the **compound focuses** of this study and the general treatment, thrust and degree of coverage given throughout to them and their related components.

¹¹⁸ Chapters 3 and 4 do deal with the broad range of relations between the U.S. and the CAS/CARs and also touch, in brief, on their strategic, economic, alliance and balance of power issues, particularly with reference to Russia – the other key geopolitical player in the C.A. region, in passing. Chapter 5 focuses, particularly, on the availability of natural/strategic resources, mainly energy-linked ones, in Central Asia and how the U.S. participates in accessing them. These chapters, basically, represent the **varied focuses** of this study.

resources, especially energy ones, are to the Russians and the Chinese, if not also to the Iranians, the greater would be the urge for the West, particularly the U.S. to want to establish and expand its influence or control in that region and its environs.

Finally, the sixth chapter (or Ch. 6), by way of a conclusion, would record the findings of the research undertakings narrated in the previous chapters, particularly, in the last three substantive focal chapters immediately before that concluding one. Having completed this introductory chapter, with this chapterization, this research, as mentioned earlier, moves on to study the C.A. region, in greater detail, in the first section of Chapter Two (i.e. the backgrounder chapter) that now follows.

University of Malaysia

CHAPTER TWO

A Backgrounder on the Central Asian Analytic Region and American Motivations and Interests in the Third World, Ex-Eastern Bloc, the Muslim World and the Central Asian Convicinity from the Earliest of Times to 2012

Introduction

As I alluded to in the introduction chapter this is basically an investigation on the evolving foreign policy behavior of the American superpower in a relatively new region,¹ of emergent Muslim Central Asian states in a strategic-international context. This, of course, primarily necessitates a focused study on the bilateral relationships that the U.S. strike and maintain with the newly independent member states of this new geo-political region, which logically and, appropriately too, would come in later chapters. But before one, actually, gets there, it is essential that, we must first scrutinize in general, and in greater depth, the various elemental aspects and key structural issues of these relationships and of this entire multi-state analytic region *per se*.

So, before we consider, in the later sections of this chapter, American behavior across the world to discern their possible international behavioral context we here, as a prelude and a sort of wide-ranging survey-cum-review, look at the Central Asian region itself which, of course, is America's *latest* areal and geographical context and which would hence also be a subject of their area studies and foreign policy concerns. Experts, often Americans, have, after all, long asserted that physical, environmental and human factors,

¹ The region as a concept is rigorously espoused by Derwent Whittlesey in his essay entitled: "The Regional Concept and the Regional Method," in *American Geography: Inventory and Prospect*, eds. Preston E. James and Clarence F. Jones (Syracuse: Syracuse U. P., 1954), pp.: 21-68.

comprising both operational and psychological milieu do interact to shape the behavior of states in international relations.²

It is precisely because of an acute appreciation of the fact that milieu-man relationships do influence a state, particularly so a new state's foreign policy outlook and behavior, that the U.S., or any state for that matter, more often than not, makes it a point to comprehensively study foreign states in their various aspects, especially so in those states' immediate regional as well as international contexts. In the U.S., a state itself with very long established and well-developed area studies programs and foreign policy analyses communities, these sort of purposeful in-depth inquiries on other states are often, but not always, carried out under the rubric of area or regional studies. So, in keeping with this widely practiced analytical logic and modus, of academics and researchers, I now attempt to focus on and present the Central Asian region, as I have redefined it in the introductory chapter, in greater depth in my own unique way as never done before.

The Central Asian Analytic Region – A Politico-Geographic Perspective

For someone hovering in outer-space, Central Asia (or the C. A. region) as previously defined by this study, would be immediately recognizable from their orbit (easily so, if that orbit is also geo-stationery and the person observing the region is geographically aware), securely anchored, as it is, to the heart of the Asian continental landmass by the inland, and virtually in-region, Caspian Sea and marginal parts of the Caucasus and Ural mountain ranges flanking in a north-westerly fashion amidst its left side and the crescent of stacked mighty mountain ranges of the Kunlun, Karakoram, Hindu Kush, Pamir, Tien Shan and, somewhat farther, the Altai, in that order from the south-east, especially radiating out

² See, for example, Harold and Margaret Sprout, *Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, 1956).

impressively from the Pamir Knot amidst the region's south-right flank. This view is reflected in Map 3.

The perceiving person need not be a Talgat Musabayev,³ incidentally a native⁴ of that region, to do so. As a very much terrestrial region, Central Asia is held firm in the heart of Asia by an *avant-garde* geographic tripod comprising of, at the south, on either side, by the Iranian or Tibetan plateau and, on the north, by the Siberian great plains and, partially, by the central Russian uplands. Tucking Central Asia in too, from either extreme, are a point of the Anatolian highlands and an intruding cusp of the Caucasus at the west and an entire range of the Mongolian Altai's hugging the flank of Xinjiang at its north-east.




Map 3 – Satellite Map of the Analytic Central Asian Region

Source: Adapted and generated using “Satellite Map,” *3D Globe: Your World in 3D*, CD-ROM, a National Geographic Society product (Cambridgeshire, GB; Omaha, NE: Greenstreet Software, 2005).

³ By the way, unlike Tokhtar Aubakirov, a fellow Kazakh outer-space pioneer, Talgat Musabayev is the first Kazakhstani cosmonaut to commander a space mission to the modular Soviet space station *Mir* (Russian word meaning “peace” and “world”) that until recently orbited the Earth 86,331 times before it was decided to be de-orbited and destroyed after 15 years of its orbital life (1986-2001) on 23rd March 2001 owing, reportedly, to faulty Soviet space workmanship! See Felix Soh, “Talgat Musabayev’s Interview” *The Sunday Times*, 19th March 2006: p. 27.

⁴ Incidentally too, yet another regional native cosmonaut to make it to outer space is Salizhan Shakirovich Sharipov, a Kyrgyztani-Uzbek, for more on him, see < <http://www.astronautix.com/astros/sharipov.htm>>. Other regional natives to make it to outer-space are Musa Manarov, an Azerbaijani and Abdul Ahad Mohmand, an Afghan.

For any others more down to earth and cartograph-savvy, Central Asia is territorially located on the Earth's crust and easily plotted-out, if only geometrically, between its relative location of 29 degrees N to 57 degrees N latitude and 44 degrees E to 97 degrees E longitude, as can be visualized in Map 4.



Map 4 - Grid Map of Central Asia

Note: The longitudes and latitudes within which C.A. falls is shown (in white).

Source: Adapted and generated using "General Map - Globe," *3D Globe: Your World in 3D*, CD-ROM, a National Geographic Society product (Cambridgeshire, GB; Omaha, NE: Greenstreet Software, 2005).

The geo-politicians among them, of course, would view Central Asia as a crucial geopolitical region of eight newly emergent or emerging political states/entities springing up, most conspicuously, amidst such great continental nuclear powers as: a resurgent, capitalizing, if not also democratizing, post-Soviet Russia, on the north and northwest and a marketizing, if not also politically-free, superpower in the making, post-communist China, politically still encompassing Turkic *Sinkiang (Xinjiang)*, on the east and southeast; amidst such major sub-continental nuclear powers as: an Islamically-democratizing but economically underdeveloped and strategically vulnerable Pakistan at the south and

southeast and, indirectly, via the disputed Kashmir state, a professedly-secular but stridently Hindu, industrially developed, hollowly democratic and shallowly marketizing India⁵ further down southeast; amidst a major West Asian aspiring nuclear power like an Islamically-theocratic but industrially developing Iran to the south and southwest.



Map 5 – Central Asian States and Entities (Geo-Political)

Note: The C.A. analytic region constituting diverse separate countries and entities are, in line with Figure 2, highlighted in colors, from its outer regional countries; the geo-political territories and frontiers are similarly identified and the delimited regional maritime boundaries are all displayed in color. Non-state entities like Sinkiang, Tibet and Kashmir are also distinctively, if controversially too, labeled as such by American cartographers themselves.

Source: Cropped and adapted from the *Family Reference Atlas of the World*, National Geographic (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2003).

But, less conspicuously too, it exists amidst a major, but vainly Europe-inclined, regional power as: a militantly secular but largely under a Muslim veneer, democratic and marketizing Turkey, pointedly adjoining the Azerbaijani disjointed autonomous enclave of Nakhichevan on the far south-west; and amidst such Euro-centric Caucasian powers as: a dogmatically Christian, democratic but aggressively hostile Armenia and a pragmatically Christian though very congenial Georgia, both to the west, and complexly north and

⁵ For an amusing portrayal of India's controversy-ridden rise despite the ever present odds, see Edward Luce, *In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India* (New York: Doubleday, 2007).

northwest. The foregoing locational and geopolitical depictions, as may be also visually discerned in Map 5, I reckon, would reasonably answer the natural queries, in average minds, of: “*Where* on the globe is Central Asia?” and “*How* in the world is Central Asia situated, geo-politically, that is?”

One may naturally too want to know now: *what* on earth Central Asia really is? Central Asia, as its very name and location implies, is a completely land-locked politico-geographic world-region occupying a westerly central position on and in the Asian continent that has been relatively isolated and cut-off from the wider world by not just its own rolling steppes and plains, inhospitable deserts and foreboding yet imposing mountain ranges but also politically alienated so by or from most of its surrounding foreign powers.⁶

Non-Soviet Afghanistan too is in a similar situation, given a step-motherly treatment by the major powers and the international community at large; still extremely weak and politically unsure of itself, struggling to recover from the dismal aftermath of Soviet invasion and more than twenty years of Soviet occupation⁷, subsequent civil wars, harsh rule by an internationally under-recognized and much troubled and troubling Taliban regime that was supplanted only by highly security-deficient, haphazard post-Taliban but, apparently, internationally well-endorsed governing set-ups, both transitional and emergent. Even Xinjiang, though it still is very much a non-sovereign autonomous political unit or *zizhiqu* under the firm “protective” control of China, has been given a largely second-class treatment, socio-economically that is, by China in comparison to what it, unfailingly, bestows on its own eastern coastal provinces, both those at the north and south.

⁶ Particularly, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the, now ex-Soviet, Central Asian states, that primarily exists in this position, have been politically-orphaned by the Russian Federation and left to fend for themselves in an uncertain world that has, unfortunately for them, simultaneously abandoned the broader and familiar, if not also comfortable, prior global politico-economic *status quo*. The same predicaments apply to Azerbaijan, another adjacent albeit overseas ex-Soviet state.

⁷ John Fullerton, *The Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan* (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1983).

As I have defined in the introduction chapter and as is obvious from the foregoing, Central Asia, then, is, politico-geographically, a region composed of seven sovereign and independent states and one, potentially geopolitical, autonomous, provincial unit of China that all together, collectively, has the additional common attribute of being both Muslim and ex-Communist besides, of course, being territorially contiguous to one another. Distinctly, therefore, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and the Xinjiang autonomous region all together, cohesively and readily, makes-up our present Central Asian analytic region.⁸

Central Asian countries are effectively landlocked and are sealed off from most of the rest of the world by gargantuan albeit starkly contrasting geographical obstacles as some of the biggest deserts and steppes; mountains and depressions and plateaux, canyons and basins of the world. All of these present enormous physical challenges for the region to meaningfully link physically with its outer environs and, not to mention, with the rest of the world.

Historically, the territories these states represent had rulers who were highly suspicious of foreigners and who worked to limit alien influences even while encouraging trade ties with transient societies and neighboring powers.⁹ During times of Russian preponderance and particularly during the Soviet-era, these countries were steadily and deliberately sealed off from outside contacts and influences.¹⁰ Since their emergence as a separate nation the Americans too, particularly those in the know among them, have had a

⁸ The designation Central Asia, thus, is far more than a mere geographical description of the central region of Asia which, of course, is much, much larger in area and is rightly written of in small cases as: either central asia or central Asia; unlike these latter examples, however, the former is actually a phrasal politico-geographic proper noun, that I employ here specifically to refer to the above eight political units, collectively. And this political international-regional term, accordingly, is properly written with due initial capitals as: Central Asia.





⁹ See Paul Dowswell, *Tales of Real Adventure* (London: Usborne, 1996), p. 52; See also the works of Peter Hopkirk and many others listed in the bibliography.

¹⁰ Though Westerners, Middle Easterners and Far Easterners have a deep-seated interest on this general region, they have largely been kept at bay by Russian/Soviet and Chinese hegemony over the region in the recent past.

long running, if haphazardly, interest on this region even though the average American, or most non-Americans for that matter, would still have some difficulty in locating the region on a world map. For Americans especially Map 6 would globally help them nail in their minds the region and its possible tentative reach by air for them.



Map 6 – Central Asia and the United States – The Lands and their Mutual Reach

-  - States and entities of the C. A. region and the United States of America highlighted
-  - Other continental land masses, relieved as per scale
-  - Capital cities
-  - Tentative main polar air route between Washington, D.C., U.S.A. and Tashkent, Uzbekistan (est. 6,300 statute miles*)

Note: This is an Oblique Azimuthal Equidistant Projection with London as its mathematical center. Incidentally, London was and remains an established midpoint between the U.S. and the Central Asian region and hence offers a particularly attractive perspective suited to the present purposes of this researcher and therefore, is duly adapted and adopted. With the re-opening of Russian airspace in the recent past for facilitating greater polar over-flights between North America and the Asian landmass and world airlines beginning to increasingly use these polar paths over the Arctic Circle, polar projection maps are suddenly relevant and are becoming quite indispensable to the peoples of this jet-flight-dependent-age.

*Distance estimated by this researcher using different CD software sources.

Sources: Adapted from the *Philip's Essential World Atlas*, 2nd edn., The Royal Geographical Society/IBG (London: George Philip, 1999), pp. 2 & 3; *World Guide 1997/98 CD Software Program*, CD-ROM, an Interactive Media Group product (Uppsala, Sweden: Hillco Media Group, 1997).

The relative and imposed isolation of this region has, owing to largely extraneous developments, now come to a rapid end. Continual modern extraneous developments such

as the growth of the Third World, the development of energy crises, the creation of trading blocs, the renewal of great power competition, the Iranian revolution, the reemergence of civilizational tensions,¹¹ and particularly the ascent to and ascendance of Gorbachev to Soviet power and the resultant collapse of the Warsaw Pact¹² and finally the “surprise” demise of the Soviet Union have all, cumulatively, in my reckoning, resulted in the reemergence of Central Asia from its hitherto enforced isolation.

Helping this process and bringing greater world attention to the region, however, are factors and events integral to the region itself like: the Islamic reawakening in Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the consequent infusion of world Mujahidin into Afghanistan and thereafter into Soviet Central Asia, the rekindling of Islamic consciousness within Soviet Central Asia, the infusion of contrabands into Soviet Central Asia, Gorbachev’s decision to quit Afghanistan, the presence of large unexploited strategic materials, particularly energy resources, in Central Asia, the Soviet decision to replace Dinmukhamed Kunaev, a native with a Russian in Kazakhstan, the “pogrom” against the Jews around Andijan, the Uzbek attacks on the Meskhetian Turk minority in Ferghana valley following the insult to an Uzbek woman in Kuvasai and the mutual carnage of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in and around Ozgun, etc.

These transformations are stirring up this, inlandy-remote but now accessible and obviously critical, world region, as their newly-liberated, or more accurately no longer tethered, elites attempt to integrate these socialist heartlands with the 21st century free world. The challenge of radical Islamic aggression in the Muslim regions abandoned by

¹¹ See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations*, Studies in Modern Capitalism (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge U P, 1984); S.C. Malik, *Modern Civilisation: A Crisis of Fragmentation* (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1989); Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1993) and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 1996).

¹² Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” *World Politics* 44 (1991): 7-48.

retreating Communism¹³ has caused deep anxieties and multiple concerns in the United States and among some outer regional powers and has brought the emergent Central Asian societies and states into the vanguard of an ideologically, if not also religiously, induced struggle manifesting within them between the Capitalism seduced ex-Communists and the radicalized Muslim socialists of the region.¹⁴

Though these individual Central Asian political units differ in their exact location, size, terrain, population, social structure, political development, resources-both natural and mineral, industrial capacity and economic development, they do have politico-geographic and developmental problems that are remarkably similar. Each will have to get their socio-economic orientations right. Most must put in place representative, legitimate, viable and sustainable political organization/s within them that can deliver benefits to their populace. Administrative bodies must be specifically trained to interact with the wider globalizing world and not merely to run a modern government.

Their economy, which has long been command-driven and steeped in communist traditions must be responsibly re-organized and developed so that they can smoothly integrate with the legally-ordered, capitalistically-driven world economy otherwise they

¹³ Communism, the ideology, as first conceived by Karl Marx in 1845, stresses on general economic development and a fair distribution of wealth and property ownership among the populace of any society under its sway. The Soviet Union, using its position as a superpower after World War II, first fostered the communist system across the nations of Eastern Europe thereby supplanting the previous hold of Nazism therein, before moving on to attempt likewise elsewhere across the rest of the world. China, a C.A. neighboring power, was also gradually smitten by a holier than thou form of Communism.

¹⁴ Tackling this challenge demands sincerity, tact, change and commitment on the part of both the Central Asians themselves and of the outside powers, including, of course, of the United States. The Central Asian elites need to truly change, especially so because they are, with few exceptions, actually former apparatchiks. They must attempt to be either truly Islamic or truly democratic. Being otherwise means they could look back vainly only to Russia or China for support. Furthermore, even in the eyes of their own peoples their legitimacy would remain questionable. The Central Asian peoples who have long been indoctrinated and accustomed, though initially reluctantly, to Communist ways will have to change even at their own inconvenience. They will have to now unlearn many of what they have been forcefully taught over the last couple of decades and begin to rediscover their much maligned past heritage and identify their own strand of genuine Islam which they had to reluctantly suppress in the recent past without, of course, rashly blundering into any of the varied brands of Islam sweeping rather wildly across their region from without. The leaders but more so the peoples of Central Asia are relatively new to the largely unorchestrated dynamic workings of the free world, operations of the world economy, performances of the international community and even the posturings of the outside Muslim world. These, however, present new problems to them along with the numerous problems intrinsic to their own region, which I shall shortly survey. Anyway, the outside powers, especially the United States, need to help them in these regards. If the region is to participate responsibly and fully in world affairs, as is widely desired, the U.S. needs to welcome and encourage suitably qualified spokespersons of and for the region, who could effectually articulate their various needs and give expression and help convey to the world their deep desires and genuine wants.

may degenerate into their traditional pre-communist production patterns that were rooted in a feudalistic order.¹⁵ Their social system which in the pre-communist past had largely been under the casual purview of their religious and community elders should not be allowed to revert back to that unsatisfactory order but must be responsibly modernized, brought to contemporary world standards and revitalized in every way taking special care not to, even inadvertently, trample on any of their born-again Islamic sentiments, traditions and/or fundamentals which, regardless of what the largely media mis-informed world may perceive, they are themselves trying to rediscover at their own pace after sampling more than two generation of compulsive communist-led atheistic and materialistic diversions.

These Central Asian states are facing multiple problems, that have not only emanated from the changes and transformations imposed on them by their erstwhile geo-strategic regions – i.e.: Soviet Union and Communist China but also from the transforming international system and the uncertain international order or the lack thereof, both of which, unhappily for this emergent region, continues to be in a state of flux. The international community and particularly the U.S., as a leadership-aspiring and world preeminence, if not also dominance-obsessed, super-power, can help them in their plight and smoothen their integration into the world society by enabling them to identify viable political and efficient administrative organizations, making available, multi-laterally as well, the appropriate technical services, according them political and diplomatic recognition, opening trade opportunities and facilitating other exchanges that could attract and energize the region to address and deal effectively with most of the problems these global transformations and their inherited Soviet past inconveniently saddle them with. The problems that this region face are, however, not just limited to international transformation or Soviet legacy-imposed

¹⁵ American scholars are quite alert to these developmental urgencies, see, for example, Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (New York, N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's, 2004).

ones but are also due to factors innate to the region itself, i.e.: region-based and region-specific. It is to these factors, issues and problems that I shall now turn to.



Map 7 - Physical Map of Southern Eurasia Incorporating Central Asia
Source: Cropped and adapted by the researcher from a reputable atlas.

No part of the earth or its crust has been, is or would be static. Geo-dynamism is postulated by the theory of plate tectonics which says that all the continents and oceans forming the crust are all moving and adjusting themselves continually and constantly, however so minutely, over the earth's lithosphere which is composed of at least six giant and a number of smaller tectonic plates which are also moving, albeit extra slowly, as per the pressure exerted by the impalpable magma currents in the asthenosphere. Naturally, the Eurasian continent, of which Asia and definitely Central Asia, as seen in Map 7, are parts of, is not an exception to this disquieting but inevitable fact.¹⁶

¹⁶ The Eurasian continent lies on its namesake giant tectonic plate, principally, but part of it also rests on a part of the giant American plate which starts under eastern Siberia and other parts of it also on a number of smaller plates like the Arabian and Iranian plates which lie below west Asia and, parts of, Central Asia beneath which also moves in, in a subductive motion of up to 3.5 cm per year, the big

In fact, Central Asia, as conceptualized in this study, occupies parts of, at least, three tectonic plates with all three or so of them meeting, roughly beneath the underbelly of this sprawling region. The Indian plate is also dipping-in in a north-easterly direction under the south-westerly straining Eurasian plate there.¹⁷ Furthermore, when we delve into the geological past, during the late Triassic period or during the Neocomian epoch of the Mesozoic era, India – a sub-continent in itself – broke away from one of the binary super-continent, the southern one, i.e.: Gondwanaland and after traversing for millions of years, perhaps in the Tortonian or Messinian ages of the Miocene epoch, collided impactfully with the northern Laurasian super-continent¹⁸ where, it seems, bulk of the vulnerable central asian region happened to be primordially located.

Perhaps, these are the primary underlying geological catastrophes and facts that gave rise to the crescent of upward buckling fold mountain ranges that topographically occupies the region's heart! These mountains and their associated cushioning plateaus are the contemporary manifestations of aeon-old geological, both crustal and lithospheric, volatility and evolution.¹⁹ In fact, millions of years ago the bulk of Central Asia used to be a low-lying, fertile and well-forested region abutting the epicontinental but equatorial Tethys sea, but now after continuous sub-crustal tectonic motions, movements, clashes and catastrophes in the post-tertiary Pleistocene and Holocene epoch it has not only become tropical but also partially a high-raised and barren one. Very significantly, for this research, towards the end of the Jurassic system or period, the warm, shallow but giant Tethys sea

Indian plate. The Iranian plate and part of the Eurasian plate tango, i.e.: glides mostly and dips on occasion, diagonally across most of Central Asia forming a smooth, if somewhat uncertain, kind of transform fault thereunder.

¹⁷ See *Firefly Geography Dictionary* (New York: Firefly Books, 2003), pp. 169-70.

¹⁸ Interestingly, it should not go unobserved that, until the mid-Paleogene Tertiary period the North American and Eurasian paleo-continent were, unbelievable as it is, neighbors within the same Laurasian super-continent! But this conventional understanding of geological fact has been recently challenged by two American geologists, Eldridge Moores and Ian Dalziel who formulate a new theory of continental placement in which North America was not the equatorial neighbor of Eurasia but was of Antarctica instead, that is if one cares to look to pre-Cambrian times, more than a billion years ago; much long before many other scattered fragments coalesced into what we today know as the Eurasian landmass. See "Antarctica and North America: Long Lost Kin?" *National Geographic* December 1991, p. xii.

¹⁹ *Family Reference Atlas of the World* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 2002), pp. 20-21.

began to drain away and evaporate under compressive geological forces leaving behind thick limestone and marine deposits in which some of the world's richest accumulations of oil and gas would form over subsequent periods of the Mesozoic/Cenozoic era but seemingly well before the Pleistocene epoch.²⁰

As hinted earlier the major physical features of the central Asian region owe their origin to the aeon old crustal collusion and continual lithospheric excitements and motions. The region's giant inland seas, many deserts, plateaus and its numerous mountains and valleys, as too those of its immediate neighborhoods, all owe their existence to these geological events and the latest Ice Age. In fact, as far as the mountain ranges of this region are concerned they have had major geological upheavals as recently as during the Pleistocene age, the impact of which is agitating them, however so minutely, even to our present days.

However, what geo-physically dominate this remote oceanless region are, paradoxically, its giant inland seas, big landlocked deserts and basins, sweeping steppes, broad lowlands, high mountain ranges, long glaciers, wide high valleys and ocean-shy mighty rivers. Taking the region in a general sweep one would notice that physically the higher altitudes in Central Asia are largely concentrated at the mid-southern fringes of the region. In particular, it is concentrated at the confluence of the Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang borders.²¹

²⁰ A significant portion of both the larger geographical central asian region and the much smaller political Central Asian region as conceived here are known to geologists as being of mobile terrain, i.e.: land areas susceptible to terrestrial movements and upheavals such as earthquakes and avalanches and the like. In fact, the region has seen some major earthquakes even in the 20th century and, given the tectonic realities, there is no reason to assume that this may not continue to happen in the future. As to be expected of mobile land and submarine areas generally, the central asian geographic region also has some volcanoes, both active and latent ones. All this is, of course, not to sound unduly alarmist. Actually, the region is no more unstable than California is, with which it shares similar latitude, by the way. By the same token, it is certainly far more stable than yet another "Ring of Fire" resident Japan is.

²¹ Generally too the entire region is inclined from the south-easterly high grounds of that area to the north-westerly lowlands ending in the below sea level depressions around the Caspian Sea. Among the exceptions to this general rule would be the high rumps of the Ural and the Caucasus mountain ranges piercing into the region from either the north or the north-west in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, respectively; and the lowlands and depressions running away to the east and north-east of the Tian Shan in Xinjiang.

As is often the case, the central portions of the mountain masses of this region too are the most rugged, jagged and awe-inspiring. It is from these central portions that most of the mountain summits and peaks in the region arise. In these high-crests one may find splendid peaks like the Muztagh, Kongur Shan, Qullai Garmo, Sad Istragh, Pik Pobedy and their respective snow-covered approaches, sparkling like silver epaulets on the shoulders of Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and like pips or stars on those of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. These peaks range from highs of more than 7000 meters to lows of more than 4000 meters.²² Communism and regional instability has kept these peaks embargoed from access by the free world for long in the past. The West and even the Rest could avail the current accessibility to infuse the needed capital to switzerlandizing the natural glories of the entire region, in this respect.

Geographically, the mountainous regions of Central Asia exhibit distinct homogenous regional traits: the Alpine zones, the high mountain bands, the ranging uplands and plateaus and the foothills leading to the other major physical features of Central Asia like deserts, basins, steppes and low plains or even deep lakes. The first geographic classification - the Alpine zones - can be found rather compactly in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and along Xinjiang's borders with all those four republics. Generally the peaks found in these zones range from about 4,600 meters to 7,700 meters in height and arise from a minimum base altitude of at least 3,000 meters.²³

Though, over the century, these imposing mountains have challenged the development of free flowing trade and commerce they have long, until the recent Communist past, been conduits to the romantic and rather limited trade flow through the

²² For authoritative descriptions of these alpine areas, see Col. R. C. F. Schomberg, *Peaks and Plains of Central Asia* (London: M. Hopkinson, 1933) and Nicholas and Nina Shoumatoff, eds., *Around the Roof of the World* (Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1996), pp. 183-189 and especially the chapters therein by Vladimir Ratzek and Anatoly Ovtchinnikov.

²³ *The Illustrated Encyclopedia and Atlas of the Earth* (London: Marshall Cavendish, 1984), pp. 11, 93, 95, 97 and 115.

high mountain passes known famously as the so-called “Silk Trade.”²⁴ In fact, before the opening of the sea trade routes to Europe and beyond and the subsequent but rather recent Communist occupation of Russian and Chinese Turkistan these mountainous regions were among the very few areas in the world where risky but free trade and travel flourished across international frontiers.²⁵

The second geographic classification - the high mountains bands - are swaths of land that shadow and lie adjacent on either sides of or all around the snow-clad alpine areas. These areas are semi-forest covered and are interspersed liberally with valleys with rich flora and fauna. These lower mountainous areas, like similar areas elsewhere in the world, typically act to isolate these amazingly fertile valleys and their inhabitants from not only others of its kind across the isolating mountains themselves but as well as from other areas of the surrounding Central Asian region and in the case of Afghanistan, western Azerbaijan and Xinjiang also from outer regional neighboring countries/territories. The obvious implication of this topographic and social pigeon-holing is, by and large, definitely travel and transportation difficulties. Routes, and lesser still roads, that are lateral for any decent lengths are hard to come by and when present, are usually the result of stupendous civil-engineering accomplishments like the Salang highway in Afghanistan or the Tarim highway²⁶ in the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang.

The third geographic classification - the ranging uplands, plateaux and foothills - generally consists of densely cultivated areas. The central asian region is one of the few regions in the world that has precious little to do with the major oceans that are making up

²⁴ It is a so-called Silk trade because silk formed only a relatively small percentage of the more myriad trade that went on under that rubric. See Judy Bonavia, *The Silk Road: From Xi'an to Kashgar* (Hong Kong: Airphoto International, 2002), pp. 20-21.

²⁵ Physically, these zones too are where most of the mighty rivers of the Central Asian region originate. The Pamir, Pyanj, Naryn, Chu, Aras, Kura, Yarkant, Tarim He, Hotan He are important ones among them in this respect. Most of the valleys of these rivers and their tributaries are occupied by sprinklings of human settlements. The distinctive ecological features of this region include extremely cold winters and short planting seasons. As a consequence, farming in these regions is mostly limited to a single crop per year.

²⁶ Bonavia, *The Silk Road...*, op.cit., pp. 320-21.

more than 70% of Earth's surface. In fact, uniquely for this region, as seen in Map 8, no oceanic waters now touch any border, or rather coast, of any Central Asian country. Yet, abundant sea water is not as alien to the region as fresh water is precious to it. What the region lacks in waters of oceanic proportions it more than makes up for through the presence in its midst of the Caspian and Aral seas, numerous other lakes, oases and mountain glaciers.²⁷



Map 8 – Internal and Nearby Bodies of Navigable Water in and Beyond C.A.

Source: Generated and adapted from “Yahoo-Map of 42.426084,65.695389,” Yahoo (NAVTEQCE InfoSystems, 2009), available at [http://maps.yahoo.com/print?mvt=m&tp=1&stx=&fcat=&frat=&clat=42.426084 &clon=65....](http://maps.yahoo.com/print?mvt=m&tp=1&stx=&fcat=&frat=&clat=42.426084 &clon=65...)

Like peoples everywhere C.A. peoples too are affected by their immediate environments. As elucidated earlier the C.A. landscape consists of a wide range of terrain. Together with the steppes, the coastal and river valley regions, more or less throughout C.A., have relatively mild climate, so also does the mountain valleys having moderate relief but as these humanly conducive areas give way to more rigorous terrains like the inner

²⁷ For a good depiction of the physical-environment of the general central asian region, see V. M. Masson, “The environment” in *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* (henceforth *H.C.C.A.*), vol. I, eds. A.H. Dani and V. M. Masson (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999), pp. 29-44.

uplands, including higher plateaus, forbidding deserts or alpine mountains the conditions for normal human existence become highly restrictive. Not just in the sandy deserts but especially in the alpine mountains the terrain is destitute of flora and this correspondingly also diminishes the fauna in these regions as may bio-physically be visualized in Map 9. In these areas man have been environmentally checked in their economic activities; including in farming and the prospect for making meaningful livelihoods therein has been and is bleak.²⁸



Map 9 – Central Asia Environment (Bio-Physical)

Source: Adapted and generated by the researcher using “Bio-Climatic” in *3D Globe: Your World in 3D*, CD-ROM, a National Geographic Society product (Cambridgeshire, GB; Omaha, NE: Greenstreet Software, 2005).

This is especially so in areas, where altitude is an important environmental factor.

The altitude factor, though not the dominant environmental factor in the C.A. region, is

²⁸Disappearing water bodies, stifled rivers, diminishing ice caps and glaciers, expanding desertification and barren rising altitudes are all key environmental factors, bringing in significant physical changes that, in turn, would affect the lifestyles and responses of the peoples in the C.A. region. The negative effects of each one of these environmental factors are, however, complicated by their exact geo-physical attributes, the nature of their exposure to the rays of the sun, their position vis-à-vis the sun’s path, and, of course, their general physical relief. These factors, singly or collectively, enhance the local differences arising and existing across the Central Asian region.

clearly noticeable in the south-eastern fringes of the C.A. region generally and acutely so in its southern fringes. The terrains in these areas consist of steep contours and affect the whole lifestyle of the inhabitants. Other than the reasonably flat surfaces of the broad Central Asian alluvial valleys, there are few gentle slopes in these mountainous areas of Central Asia.²⁹

Away from these harsh alpine and desert regions the Central Asian peoples have a relatively far easier and laid back lifestyle as the rest of their topography consists of sprawling mountains and plateaux rounded out with gentle and smoothly flowing slopes and/or rolling foothills and sweeping steppes. Central Asian land utilization *vis-a-vis* agricultural activities can be broadly classified into four categories, namely: commercial ranching, nomadic herding, commercial life stocks and grain farming and largely unproductive land.³⁰

The run of history has witnessed the ranging steppes, the sweeping deserts, the broad fertile valleys and the arable foothills of the larger central asian region being peopled by tough, hardy and warrior-like races who have gradually adapted to these sprawling and diversely challenging landforms and uncomfortably extreme climates and made themselves at home in this region. Central Asia as I have defined here is principally a Turko-Iranian realm with Turkic groups dominantly ranging widely across the north of the region from west beyond Azerbaijan to even well beyond Xinjiang in the east and the Iranian groups enjoying a parallel preponderance especially in the southern sectors of this vast region.

²⁹ In general the soils in high Central Asia are badly leached except in the lower valleys where different grains can and is being grown. In these areas cultivation is often done on inclining surfaces; here agrarian work can take longer time and can be more strenuous, given the negative effects of gravity. Gravity also takes its toll on cultivated lands when it gradually erodes soil and crumbles downwards. This feature as also, more often, the untimely meltdown of heavy snow help trigger numerous avalanches, that at times sweep away high-altitude human settlements.

³⁰ In addition three smaller categories of land in the Central Asian region are also used for subsistence agriculture, forestry and hunting. In Central Asia, typically the utilization of land including for natural resource development are three quarters determined by environmental forces beyond man's control but the remaining quarter is affected by man's intervention in nature which in C. A. has, more often than not, happened in grandiose fashion, but at times even destructively so.

Principally, the confederations of the Oguz, Karluk, Seldjuk, Kipcak, Khorazmian, Uighur, Mongol, Hun and lesser Tartars and Byzantines in the northern part and the Persian, Sogdian, Turgesh, Yaghma, Kirkiz, Han, Pashtoon and lesser Greek distinct ethnic elements in the southern part have variously comingled and combined over the centuries to spew and spawn the various currently “distinctly” differentiated Central Asian/Caucasus peoples. Apart from these major racial groups there are many other lesser racial groups too in the region.³¹

Though Westerners consider many of these nationalities as artificial creations, both history and Islam give emerging nationalities due recognition, given that some of the nationalities of the region have recently gained their own independent titular states in this region and that the U.S. is also keen in having ties with them, only having a good understanding of their diversity in unity and their palpable differences will enable the U.S. to shape its relations with them appropriately.

As vouched for by the presence of the various distinctive peoples, across or in different parts of the C.A. region as fore-mentioned, Central Asia has for long, been a sprawling albeit shifting crossroads for different nations, powers, civilizations and in more recent times nation-states. Though the region, given its geo-physical nature, has never been a stranger to foreigners; it being a geo-political arena of deep antiquity, foreigners have off and on been viewed with high suspicion by the dominant people or power of the region at each historic period throughout its recorded history. Those in power in the region or its various parts have often endeavored to keep foreign influences out by tightly monitoring

³¹ The Slavs have physically colonized north and north-eastern Kazakhstan and are also compactly diffused all over the rest of the region. There are Mongolian pockets straddling parts of the Kazakh/Xinjiang border. There are Sinitic groups spattered all across, but dominantly so in, lower northern Xinjiang. There are Tibetic groups in the southern fringes of Xinjiang. Also to be found in the north-eastern fringes of Afghanistan are some Indic groups, as are primarily present across Afghanistan, but who are, however, shunted away, remarkably, here, from the Afghanistan / Pakistan / Xinjiang border by some Iranian and Kyrgyz groups. Furthermore, the metropolitan cities in the Central Asian region are well represented by significant numbers of countless other nationalities.

the in-moving traffic and rigidly controlling their effective borders. This situation has been true continually all through recorded history. Even during Soviet times the situation in the region was generally the same.³²

For informed Americans the entire region is viewed as remote, isolated, risky and mysterious. No one can blame them for this for they have long been faithful imbibers of European literature on the region and merely their adventures therein. Too often, these reveal the problems, mysteries and myths of the region as sojourning Europeans perceive them and obscure the many geopolitical peculiarities of this vast strategic Turkic area stuck as it was between Euro-Asian Communisms and Indo-Iranian Capitalisms in the past and as it is between reforming totalitarianisms, transforming fundamentalisms and re-informing secularisms at the present.³³

Those outer-regional events/effects and their consequent inroads, infiltrations and interactions in Central Asia has raised awareness of the region's strategic location both within and beyond the region. Hence, concern for their continued independence and survival, in the face of those challenges has caused Central Asian states, despite their suspicions, eagerly to open their welcoming doors to far off, extra-regional and, presumably, a safer bet America (USA), even while they cautiously entertain the foreign rest. The geo-physical remoteness and politico-ideological barriers to the region and its consequent isolation over the centuries and decades are irrelevant in contemporary times and further these could no longer guarantee the region against being hostilely infiltrated or

³² See Lee Schwartz, "The Political Geography of Soviet Central Asia: Integrating the Central Asian Frontier" in *Geographic Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia*, ed. Robert A. Lewis (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 66.

³³ However, for the average American who lacks even a basic understanding of the region's geography, peoples, and history, he can be forgiven for imagining the Central Asian region as being the home of relatively backward, unruly, hostile and/or heady Muslim peoples whose lifestyles, despite the inroads made by Soviet-inspired modernism, are still largely anchored, unchangingly, around centuries-old Muslim traditions. Though this characterization is loosely relevant to contemporary Central Asia, the rise of China as a potential superpower, the emergence of Iran as a modern Islamic nation, the tactical retreat of wounded Russia bent on strategic recuperation and the competitive forays of emerging economies like Turkey, India, Pakistan; and of economic giants like Japan, E.U., Korea; and economic upstarts like Singapore and Taiwan into the region, is turning the Central Asian region into a post-Cold War crucible of tottering half-baked democracies, ambivalent liberalisms, naked authoritarianisms and garbed totalitarianism all stewing along in a re-emerging Islamic stock.

otherwise threatened. The vital crossroads between competing civilizations, that Central Asia has again become today, stands vulnerable to assorted outer-regional pressures and challenges. Thus, it is only logical that Central Asian nations long for extra-regional guarantors of their independence, survival and progress though not necessarily at the expense of estranging their outer-regional powers.

As per one of the latest estimate available, the population of Central Asia adds up to well over 127 million³⁴ people. This represents a great increase over the 1970s figures.³⁵ The average population densities in these countries, excluding, those of Azerbaijan, are much less than those in their neighboring powers, except those in Iran and the Russian Federation. Of all Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan is the most sparsely populated and followed closely in this respect by Xinjiang and Turkmenistan. Central Asian urban centers like Tashkent, Kabul, Baku, Urumqi, Almaty, Bishkek, Dushanbe and Samarkand³⁶ are as expected dense population concentrations. This shows that the distribution of population across Central Asian states are rather uneven, and given that there are inadequate communication and particularly transportation links between these widely dispersed spread of the population, the political cohesiveness within Central Asia is bound to be relatively weak.

Over the centuries, the relentlessly nomadic peoples of Central Asia have gradually become semi-nomadic and progressively sedentary too. The dispersed settlement patterns and productive lands across Central Asia include widely scattered colonies or hamlets either ringing the numerous lakes, or are near oases, or are occupying the lower slopes above the cultivation lines along mountain and river valleys. Small settlements of few houses bunched

³⁴ See Table 1.

³⁵ Please check various editions of the *CIA Factbook*.

³⁶ In fact, Samarkand is one of the oldest urban centers of the world, on this, see Sylvain Bensedoun, *Samarcande et la vallée du Zerafshan* (Paris: Anthropos, 1979).

together are found sprinkled across the Central Asian region, in each case isolated widely from one another. It is only in high Central Asia where there is a scarcity of rather flat or level lands for building and cultivation that one can find dwellings clustered to village proportions. Here pastoral farming of livestock such as cattle, sheep, horse, yaks and goats is practiced.³⁷ Having previously considered the geo-physical, socio-anthropological and enviro-locational aspects of Central Asia it is only logical, in a chapter that also deals with the political-geography of Central Asia to move on to a greater analysis of its various politico-geographic aspects such as Central Asia's territorial integrity, demographic diversity, political integrity, economic character and prospects and the region's geo-politics including its politico-economic place and role in the world.

Primarily, the geo-political aspects of the region are the result of the intermeshing of the following key factors: a) Central Asia's geo-physical and geographic environment and socio-cultural characteristics; b) its immediate location between key Eurasian and Asian powers such as Russia, Turkey, China, I. R. Iran and Pakistan; and c) the ever fluid character of the power situation in Asian and World politics including the competitive activism of such major powers like Japan, the Franco-German-led EU and a power-dreaming India besides primarily, in our present case, of course, the ever power-sensitive American super, nay, "hyper power" of the moment. The principal politico-geographic problem in the Central Asian region is the weak nature of the regional territorial organization present therein which arise chiefly from the relatively recent geo-political definition and delineation of territories there and due to the fact that sovereignties are being continually determined by geo-politics as much as, if not more so, by political evolution

³⁷ In high Central Asia too the consistency and effectiveness of political, particularly, government control is severely limited by the harsh physical environment present therein. Bulk of the Central Asian peoples are concentrated in or near the region's various key urban centers or state capitals which are often the nodal points of the region's political and economic life too. The population concentration is particularly heavy along the broad Ferghana Valley whose different parts are shared by the three Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

and/or diplomacy. Various sections of the boundaries of most Central Asian states are rather vaguely defined and some sections of their boundaries are yet to be fully surveyed.³⁸

The residents and occupants of the frontier areas ringing the Central Asian region are largely of the same ethnic stock as of those of Central Asia's adjacent neighboring powers. Thus we find Russians straddling the Kazakhstan-Russia border, the Chinese flowing across the Xinjiang provincial boundaries, the Pathans dominating the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and deep beyond on either side and the Armenians coercively occupying well-across and into Azerbaijan. These bifurcated peoples speak almost identical languages, adhere to similar religions³⁹ and sometimes even the same religious denominations and practice virtually the same cultural traditions as those in the outer regional areas lining the Central Asian region.⁴⁰

Along most of Central Asia's regional borders strong centrifugal forces are working apace. It is only the current weaknesses of the outer regional powers that are putting the damper on any cross-regional attractions. This is not to say that there are no transmigrations taking place across the Central Asian borders. In fact, this is very much present across many sections of the regional borders and even within intra-regional borders. If the Central Asian governments are not strengthened and helped to stay up on their own feet then the vital flows of people, capital, resources and talents out from the Central Asian region may not be stopped especially when globalization infiltrates and sink roots in the region.⁴¹ These

³⁸ Xinjiang for one has sections of its international boundaries disputed and ill-defined. India which desires to be an immediate neighbor of the Central Asian region can only realize that tall dream by resolving its border disputes with China, particularly, along the Xinjiang/Kashmir sector. Further, in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia's frontier regions political control over them has only been loosely exercised.

³⁹ For some insight on this important aspect of the region, see Richard C. Foltz, *Religions of the Silk Road* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999).

⁴⁰ Those outer regional powers and cultures they represent do exude a magnetism that these frontier peoples find attractive. These attractions are bound to increase the more the new governments grappling with power in Central Asian capitals estrange themselves from these peoples owing to their relative lack of power, influence and reach into those outlying fringe areas.

⁴¹ It is, therefore, in the interest of the U. S. that most, if not all, of these vital flows from these areas be and stay reversed so as to politically strengthen the Central Asian capitals so that the territorial integrity and real independence of Central Asia may variously and collectively be safeguarded.

contemporary politico-physical situations of the Central Asian states and the population and urban challenges they face in their immediate environs may be perceivable from Map 10.



Map 10 – Central Asian Republics/Entities in Politico-Relief Milieu

Note: The major cities of the C.A. region and its neighborhood are identified

Source: Cropped and adapted by the researcher from a reputable atlas.

Any political scientist would tell that among the most important factor for a state to exist is the social will of an overwhelming majority of its residents to uphold that effect. In the case of modern nation-states this ought to be particularly so. In newly independent Central Asian states such a social determination is not readily palpable and national identities are still quite vague despite the decades of Soviet mentoring on it. This is not surprising because the Soviet-instilled national consciousness that these peoples have been accustomed to for the past couple of generations have been arbitrarily and unceremoniously jettisoned out of their lives through the uninitiated and unwitting complicity of their elites in a West-inspired Slavic conspiracy: namely, the scuttling of the Soviet Union. As a consequence, these peoples are, ever so slowly, reverting back to their earlier traditional

forms of social allegiance and organization; ones where their tribal and clan loyalties come first and a new national allegiance shaping or rather hazing up somewhat uncertainly only thereafter.⁴²

The presence of numerous languages within most Central Asian states adds to the divisive demographics of the region. This factor is also an obstacle to any attempt by the new national governments to seed any national feelings or foster any national unity. One mitigating factor in this respect in Central Asian states is the happy presence of universal literacy across Central Asia holding out the hope that new nationalisms can in time be learned, nurtured and upheld. The state of health and the level of technological capability of the Central Asian peoples are two other cultural considerations that are also part of the demographic diversity in the region. For a state to remain independent, everyone knows, it has to have healthy, strong and talented people. The peoples of Central Asia are relatively strong but they are not always healthy. Endemic in much of Central Asia are infectious and dietary diseases, the latter often the result of environmental hazards.

The hardworking Central Asian peoples are generally talented but are not adequately skilled from the standpoint of high technology. Though they have been familiar with modern technology for a long time they are fascinated by the higher technologies on offer in the West. They are particularly fascinated by most things American.⁴³ The U. S., therefore, can make a difference in the lives of Central Asians in this respect.

⁴² The blend of geographic characteristics such as vastness, harshness and altitude also combines uniquely in most Central Asian states to favor the perpetuation of local even personality-based identities at the expense of national ones. Vastness of the territory, harshness of the terrain, altitudinal and climatic variations, along with soil qualities too induced differences of social and cultural patterns within the Central Asian states. The local identities thus strengthening, at the expense of national ones, are further accentuated by relatively poor communication and particularly by the poorer transportation links that serve only to hinder freer inter-exchanges and acculturation expected of in new emergent states. Another demographic problem present in the Central Asian states pertains to the population distribution there, particularly its scattered spread and concentrations. In general, the population are quite widely scattered in small settlements and if there are concentrations these are usually found in oases towns across the deserts, along river valleys or along the coasts of the numerous in-land seas and lakes. In mountainous Central Asia, in particular, residents in one settlement or village feel that they have little in common with the settlement across the mountain ridge.

⁴³ Including in American energy-related technologies; for example, a highly talented American and his technology was brought in by the Soviets to tame a runaway inferno at oil-well T37 in north-western Kazakhstan, at which Nazarbaev himself was amazed. Similarly, the Uzbeks have also been variously impressed, on this see Paul Starobin, "Yanks Welcome Here," *BusinessWeek* 29 October 2001, p. 35.

From deep antiquity Central Asian political entities have been both victims and masters of power. Political organization and power are not unknown commodities in Central Asia. Recorded history bears witness to Central Asia or its parts falling victim to external powers and it also chronicles Central Asian powers arising and threatening outer regional neighbors. In recent history, if the Bush Jr. administration was to be believed, even an extra-regional superpower like America, that is virtually at the hemispheric antipodes of Central Asia, had been attacked and is being threatened by political, albeit terroristic, entities operating out of even a feeble and vulnerable Central Asia. In early modern times and subsequently, though, Central Asian states and territories have largely existed as dependencies and protectorates of either one outer regional power or another.⁴⁴

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the political control problems the Central Asian region face are ones that concern matters such as: geographically-imposed socio-political segregation within the states; the primacy of tribal and local loyalties; the relative paucity of communication and transportation links; and the rather weak presence of sentiments of national identity, unity and purpose; all of which variously and together make the task of building political cohesiveness within Central Asian states somewhat difficult.

That the national governments today possess *de jure* control over their territories as either “nation”-state, successor states or as an autonomous region are largely attributable to extraneous factors such as: the current disposition of their immediate/past overlords, the

⁴⁴ Traditions of governing, political organization and political structures are nothing new to Central Asia too. In fact, even governance on the basis of presently existing boundaries and borders too are not entirely new to the region. Afghanistan, as any politically conscious person knows, has been and is a political work-in-progress; actually, a continuing political experiment in types of governance all through its long history as a sovereign, modern independent state of this region. Further, continually it has exercised a great degree of control of its own foreign affairs. It has been a member of the United Nations (U.N.) Organization since 1946; in fact, along with Iceland, Sweden and Thailand it was part of the early wave of accession to this important international political body. As a buffer state, particularly during most Cold war years, it had enjoyed at various periods economic aid from both the U. S.-led free world and the U.S.S.R.-linked totalitarian states. In the case of Xinjiang, at least from the third-quarter of the 20th century, it has largely been an autonomous province of China, and as such it has had much experience and some freedom in its internal administrations. In contemporary times, it functions more like a semi-independent state. Despite this its external affairs are handled totally by or with China. Its economy too is largely dependent on China. It receives virtually all its essential economic aid from China too.

evolving realities of the post-Cold War international system and the competitive character of major power interests in the Central Asian region and in its various attractions.



Map 11 – Political Units of the Central Asian Region

Note: The Sinkiang autonomous, though non-independent unit and its boundaries are clearly depicted here, in a western publication.
Source: Cropped and adapted from “Asia,” *Oxford Atlas of the World*, 19th Edition (London: Philip’s; Octopus, 2012), p. 211.

Whatever the degree of political cohesiveness present or absent in Central Asian states, all of them do, however, possess their own political nucleus, as may be verified in the Political Units Map 11, in the form of their capital cities. Afghanistan famously has its Kabul (latently cantonized, for sure); Azerbaijan its boomtown Baku; the Kazakhs now have their better positioned Astana though the city with the deepest political pedigree there has been and is, of course, Almaty; and even provincial Xinjiang has its Han Chinese dominated Urumqi. The hold and influence of these political hubs progressively decreases, if not vanish totally, as the state frontiers draw away from these cities.⁴⁵ It is, hence,

⁴⁵ In fact, it is precisely for such a fear and, partly, as an attempt to address this political problem that Kazakhstan moved its political capital from the peripheral Almaty to a more central Astana soon upon achieving its independence.

extremely important for most of these freshly independent states to put themselves into the centre, both literally and figuratively, of all aspect of their national political existences, despite the information technological excellences that our age boasts, so that none in the peripheral areas of their respective states feel neglected, denied of vital services and consequently ending up needing to become alienated.

Under the Soviet scheme of things, most of the Central Asian states were left to continue as economies that are largely agricultural. This was the general pattern in Central Asia though most Central Asian states are richly endowed with various minerals and other natural resources, including strategic ones that are essential ingredients for their vital industrialization. Kazakhstan, relatively speaking, is an obvious exception in this regard. The base of the Kazakh economy is much broader than the rest in the region. Central Asia is rich too in various sources of power both of the natural and fossil varieties.

Central Asian states possess many of the prerequisites for rapid industrialization. They have important raw materials, sources of power, high literacy rates, a population thirsty for acquiring technological skill, and sufficient land for industrialization and economic development. It needs only sufficient infusion of capital and help in organizing effective governmental controls of its political and economic spheres. Given strong national wills, sufficient support of the international community and a benign neighborhood the Central Asian states could easily pick themselves-up economically and find their own niche in the world economy.

Coming close on the heels of the basic elements of any state in any region is an essential politico-geographic feature known as the pattern of circulation of immaterial ideas and tangible goods between the peoples of each country and also, by extension, within the

region. In fact, it is exactly through such a circulation, free or otherwise, that a national consciousness is forged and a national identity is, subsequently, built upon it. It is such feelings and other circulatory links that steadily brings out a sense of mutual inter-dependence within the various distinct segments of the general populace and different sectors of a country.

In Central Asian states such feelings and linkages are gradually being re-jigged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The political controls within these states can be made more effective as feelings of connectedness to the infant states are strengthened and all manner of circulatory links are expanded. Without continuing such an effort the dangers of unwittingly perpetuating parochial tribalism, localism and regionalism could not be averted and this would, in turn, inhibit the emergence of a national purpose.⁴⁶

At first glance, the economies of the C. A. countries would appear to be fundamentally agricultural. While this is definitely true, the real picture is gradually changing in the region, for example over the years Kazakhstan has managed to push its agricultural labor sector below the 30% mark. The development of industries of course, dependant on many factors including on the ready availability of and relatively easy access to natural resources and power supplies and as importantly also to the level of technological talent the people possess. Central Asia, of course, possesses an impressive inventory of natural resources.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Expanding road mileage and spread; widening rail networks; increasing air services across and between all important population centers within the state; increasing telecommunication linkages; expanding electronic media services and promoting internet connectivity within the state and across the region would greatly reduce the circulation problem present in the region and help strengthen nationalisms and, indirectly, independences within the region. National integration and consolidation could be achieved much earlier with the increase of all types of communication services. Advanced countries like the United States with much more sophisticated circulation patterns can certainly extend these Central Asian states an experienced helping hand in all these respects.

⁴⁷ However, two limiting factors for the rapid industrialization of the general region are first the still weak transportation network existing across the region and the second the availability of adequate investment capital and the capital goods to pursue it. Communication links, yet another factor which is extremely important for any rapid industrialization, has however been quickly addressed. Similarly, the modern Central Asian states find it extremely important, for a number of reasons, to create a free-market economic system that can satisfy the varying ones of their people, who after the collapse of the Soviet Union, have become aware of the wider sometimes even dizzying range of material goods available in the developed free-world. In the aspect of economic liberalization Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan are ahead of the rest.

It is therefore imperative that these states move to rapidly realize this primary objective. Otherwise, the generally unsatisfactory economic situation obtaining in most of their countries would get more depressed, serving to aggravate existing domestic dissatisfaction and dissensions and perhaps, work to promote national and regional instability. To get a better understanding of the real economic situation in the Central Asian countries, one need to look closer at their agricultural, extractive (which, by the way, is analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Five and Appendices VIII and X later on) and manufacturing industries, and their nascent services sectors. This, of course, would drag us beyond the scope of the present study and had, therefore, been avoided.

Also without unduly digging into Central Asia's prehistory, evidences of which certainly abounds in scholarly archeological⁴⁸ literature on and of the region, we can and should focus here more fruitfully on its recorded history, especially its modern and recent history, albeit in a concise manner given the limits of this primarily politico-geographic perspective that we chose to adopt. Nevertheless, let me begin with a terse mention of deep antiquity. Remains of the classical Neanderthal man, or (more properly) *Homo erectus*, the first hominids roaming the region from some 800,000 years ago, were reported discovered at Tashik-Tash. Their crude artifacts have been identified in the hill north of Tashkent and in the Shakhty grotto of the Pamirs.⁴⁹ *Homo sapiens* of the Neanderthal and *Homo sapiens sapiens* of the Gro-Magnon species have transited leisurely the central asian region on their way out of Africa⁵⁰ to the other continents, with the latter species migrating on right beyond Siberia and even beyond Beringia all the way into the Americas during most of, if not all,

⁴⁸ For example, see A. H. Dani and V. M. Masson, eds., *H.C.C.A.* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999), vol. I, but especially, the separately authored chapters 2 to 5, 7 to 10, 13, 16 and 19; all coming with their own extensive bibliographies.

⁴⁹ See Giles Whittell, *Central Asia: The Practical Handbook* (London: Cadogan Books, 1995), p.46.

⁵⁰ Both the "Out of Africa" model and the Noah's Ark hypothesis advanced by the American anthropologist William W. Howells are, like earlier ones, still highly controversial as these remain quite at variance with the major religious convictions of our world. Though conventional science says proto-human hominid species first appeared on Earth millions of years ago, Adam, the first man (a conscientious and rational being) and Prophet, as religious convictions have it, appeared of earth and on Earth first only between 10,000 to 15,000 years ago, as Christians, in particular, reckon. See *Washington Post*, 29 Dec. 2005.

the Ice Ages.⁵¹ Long after the last Ice Age of c.100,000 BCE, a time when Paleolithic and later Mesolithic cave dwellers burrowed into the Tien Shan and Pamir foothills, came to an end, the receding Siberian ice sheet started off the great Heat Era around c.10,000 BCE that turned the lowlands between the Caspian Sea and the Tien Shan into desert.

Evolutionary theories aside, and though man appeared hundreds of millennia ago⁵² in the central asian region, as vouched for by the archaeological reconstruction of his cave paintings, tools and burials, the earliest evidence of human activity, as unearthed by paleoanthropologists, in the Central Asian region, dates back to about 40,000 BCE. Peter B. Golden lists⁵³ that humans first entered Central Asia around 38,000 BCE. Then too, nomadic tribes like the Altaic nomads, from whom the Huns, Turks and Mongols were descended, have been roaming all over the central asian region and have used it, from even pre-historic times, as crossroads for over 4,000 years. Lapis lazuli, a long-standing natural resource, had been mined in the Afghanistan area since 3,500BCE. There are even entire Central Asian cities like Samarkand that dates back to 2000 BCE. Civilizational items like bronze utensils, equipments, jewelry and even complete irrigation systems in the region were found to date back to between 2000 and 1000 B.C., during the Bronze Age.

Very broadly the region has obviously been the transitional and “interacting” arena, disjointedly that is, of at least three great ancient civilizations, i.e.: the Fertile Crescent⁵⁴ (c. 3000 BCE) located to its west, Indus Valley (2500 BCE) in the near south, and Huang He

⁵¹ Mounir A. Farah and Andrea Berens Karls, *World History: The Human Experience* (New York, N.Y. and Columbus, OH.: Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, 1997), pp. 22, 30 and 35. See also Noel Grove, *National Geographic Atlas of World History* (Washington, D.C.: National Geographic Society, 1997), pp. 18-21; H.A. Davies, *An Outline History of the World* (Hong Kong and Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U P, 1975), p. 1.

⁵² Konstantin Tarnovsky, *Illustrated History of the USSR: A Brief Outline* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1982), p. 10.

⁵³ See Peter B. Golden, *Central Asia in World History* (New York: Oxford U P, 2011).

⁵⁴ Particularly so, the Euphrates Valley, the site of the Sumer Civilization and, more generally, the regional arc wherein Prophet Ibrahim (Abraham) once, famously, sojourned after his trial by Nimrod. Abraham, the founder, among others, of the Jewish nation was born in c.2166 BCE in Mesopotamia. He led his followers, the Jews, to Canaan (Palestine). The Jews who, later in c. 1700 BCE, moved to Egypt, to escape a famine; but there, however, they were subsequently enslaved. Later still, Prophet Musa (Moses) led them out of Egypt in c. 1446 BCE back towards Canaan (the Promised Land) which they alas reached after 40 years of desert wandering. See Farah and Karls, *World History*, op. cit. Over the millennia, these God-chosen, but often wayward, community has, inexplicably, grown sparsely to about 14 million people today, often brilliantly harbouring quite achievable dreams of global domination.

Valley (1700 B.C.) to the far east of the Central Asian region. This prehistoric reality of, the then prospective, “over the horizon” contacts and encounters served as precursors to the inevitable later emergence and development of actual historic links like the Siberian “Gold Route” and later still, most famously, the “Silk Road.”⁵⁵

The Central Asian Afghans, according to Ludwig W. Adamec, believe that they are a people of Ariana⁵⁶ (1,500 BCE), an Indo-Iranian realm centered around Balkh (Zariaspa), later the city of Zoroaster⁵⁷ or Zarathustra, in northern Afghanistan. The Turkic peoples, whose later progenies were to eventually occupy Central Asia, including the entire northern Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Xinjiang, were then, still confined to and largely inhabiting southern Siberia around 1,500 BCE. First millennium B.C. chronicles have been seen and read to mention Sogd, Bactria and Khorasm - key Central Asian sub-regions. In fact, an indigenous political community known as the Khorezm Shakhs emerged in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya during the 7th century B.C.⁵⁸

As far as Central Asia or its various parts are concern, though earlier waves of foreigners like the Aryans,⁵⁹ an Euro-Iranian race originating in the so-called Indo-European lands of the Balkans and southern Russia in the north-west, before 2000-1200 BCE; the Medians between c. 900 to 700 B.C.; the Saka around 800 B.C. and then the

⁵⁵ The term “Silk Road” was first coined by Richthofen, says Foltz. See Foltz, *Religions of the Silk Road*, op. cit.

⁵⁶ Ludwig W. Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, 2nd edn., (Lanham, M.D. and London: Scarecrow, 1997), p.1.

⁵⁷ Zoroaster was commonly believed to have been born in either Azerbaijan or northeast Persia around 1200 BCE. It is believed that after seeing some heavenly visions he managed to convert the king and court of Bactria to his beliefs. Zoroastrianism, the fire-worshipping religion which it is said he founded (c.1000 BCE) initially in the Central Asian region, was the official religion (539-331 B.C.) of the Persian Empire especially from the reign of Cyrus the Great. It was during these times (c. 583-500 B.C.) that the *Avesta* was believed to have been written. Later, Persian armies were responsible for attempting to spread this religion far afield into Greece, Egypt, the broader Middle East, including Central Asia, and even to northern India. Most of the Zoroastrians who held tenaciously to their beliefs, later diasporaed in waves, mainly, to India and the West, as they were often visited by, and encountered, various powerful historical forces. See also Paul Kriwaczek, *In Search of Zarathustra: Across Iran and Central Asia to Find the World's First Prophet* (New York: Vintage, 2004).

⁵⁸ Tarnovsky, *Illustrated History*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁵⁹ For an in-depth portrayal of Aryans and their arrival in the region, see Charles E. de Ujfalvy, *Les aryens au nord et au sud de l'Hindou-Kouch* (Paris: G. Masson, 1896); M. G. Levin, *Europeoid Races of Central Asia and of Adjacent Countries of Iran and the Near East*. 1964.; J. C. Powell-Price, *A History of India: From the Earliest Times to 1939* (London and New York: Thomas Nelson, 1958), chap. II in general and p. 10 specifically.

Assyrians⁶⁰ in 670 B.C. have all prehistorically and tragically invaded it, its recorded history largely began only in the 6th century B.C. during the Achaemenid Empire (600 – 330 B.C.) of Persia, an ancient power which occupied even Azerbaijan between c. 600 and 400 B.C..

This Persian empire, in fact, also held a number of *satrapies* including Khorezm, Sogdiana and Saka in roughly the same areas, in what they, the Persians, call Turan⁶¹ (i.e.: outer Iran), that are currently occupied fully or partially by most of the contemporary Central Asian states and territories. The descendents of the central asian Aryans, namely the Scythians, in fact, gave Cyrus II ‘the Great’ (r.559-530 B.C.), the founder Achaemenid self-styled “King of the World” a hard time (545-540 B.C.) in the region long before a later Persian, Darius I ‘the Great’ (r. 521 - 486 B.C.) used Afghanistan as the gateway to what is today called India around 350 B.C. after acquiring besides others, later satrapies such as Aria, Bactria, Saftagydia, Arachosia and Drangiana enroute.⁶²

Not wanting to overwhelm this basically politico-geographical perspective with a loaded history component, it has been decided to assign the rest of Central Asia’s rich and indispensable history to the Appendices section⁶³ coming later where it will remain integral to this work appropriately cross-referenced throughout to the various chapters of this study. Thus, what suffice here in this section of the chapter is the following Table 3, a tabulated overview sketch of the historic evolution of a redefined Central Asia that captures when and

⁶⁰ In fact in 670 B.C., between the reigns of Sargon II and Ashurbanipal, Azerbaijan or rather specifically the area of its present Nakhichevan enclave was still a part of the long declining Assyrians (2500 BCE – c. 608 B.C.). Their empire, founded by Tiglath Pileser III, conquered the kingdom of Israel in 722 B.C. but ultimately, in its turn, first fell to the alliance of the Medes and the Babylonians after 616 B.C. and then overthrown as a power by the Chaldeans in 612B.C.

⁶¹ Adrienne Lynn Edgar, *Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan* (Princeton, N.J. and Oxford: Princeton U P, 2004); Kemal H. Karpat, “The Role of Turkey and Iran in Incorporating the Former Soviet Republics into the World System” in *The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, ed. Karen Dawisha (Armonk & London: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 168-196.

⁶² For brief surveys of early Persian and Achaemenid times in central asia, see A. Abetekov and H. Yusupov, “Ancient Iranian nomads in western Central Asia” in *H.C.C.A.*, vol. II, eds. Janos Harmatta, B. N. Puri and G. F. Etmedi (Paris: UNESCO, 2000), pp. 23-34; and M.A. Dandamayev, “Media and Achaemenid Iran” in *ibid*, pp. 35-66.

⁶³ This history component of the Appendices Section is available at Appendix I from page 396 to page 454.

where exactly and significantly does the Judeo-Christian West, America and primarily their renegade spinoff, i.e. the United States of America, figure within it.⁶⁴ Adopting such a unique perspective is important, given that the Central Asians have themselves hypothesized about the New World long before most would-be-Americans even discovered it to situate their polity in!

Table 3 - A Tabulated Historic Overview Sketch of C.A. and the U.S.

Year / Period	Happening or Development	Cross-Refs.
38000 BCE	Humans enter the Central Asian region	
3500	Lapis lazuli being mined in Afghanistan area	p.82 and Ch.5, fn. 1
3000 BCE	Farming communities in C.A.	
2000 BC	Ancient irrigation systems	
1800	<i>Jews struggling beyond southwestern C.A.</i>	App. I; s.a., pp.59,137-8
1500	Indo-Iranian realm of Ariana	
1000	Zoroastrianism appears in southwestern C.A.	App. I; s.a., pp.83,290
700	Tribal nomadic alliances	
7 th - 3 rd Century BC	Nomadic Scythians	
500	Polities established in C.A.	
5 th Century BC	Confucianism struggling in China beyond C.A.	p.397
5 th - 3 rd Century BC	Achaemenid rule	
4 th Century BC	Proto-Hinduism held court in southern C.A.	App. I, <i>passim</i> ; s.a.,p.125
328	<i>Alexander in C.A.</i>	p. 396
305	Mauryans “defeat” Seleucids	
300 - 200	Kushans in Bactria	
250BC - 100 BC	<i>Greco-Bactrian rule</i>	App. I, p. 396
247 BC - AD 228	Parthians in western C.A.	
209 BC - 155 BC	Hsiang Nu in eastern C.A.	
202 BC - AD 220	Xinjiang area under Han dynasty	
2 nd - 1 st Century BC	C.A. as key “Silk Road” transit hub	
100 BC - AD 270	P Kushanid empire	
1 st Century BC	R <i>Romans in the Caucasus</i>	p. 398
1 st Century BC	E Buddhism blooming across southeastern C.A.	App. I, p.399 and <i>passim</i>
1 st Century BC	- Huns conquer north-western C.A.	
c. 30 AD	M <i>Crucifixion of Jesus; Christianity begins</i>	p. 398
c. 100 AD	E Azeri independent state	
AD 224 – 651 CE	R Sassanian empire	
AD300 – 1199 CE	I Kazakhstan area under nomads	
c. 350 AD	C Huns invade Persia	
c. 428 – 14 th Century	A <i>Nestorians flourished across pre-Tatar Asia</i>	pp.406 and 408
AD 450 - 567	N Hephthalites lose to Persians &Turks	
AD 476	D <i>Fall of Rome</i> (evolving from c.753 BC on)	p.398
AD 568 – 571 CE	I Persians and Western Turks clash	
581 – 603 CE	Western and Eastern Turks struggle	

⁶⁴ These basically Judaeo, Anglo-American linked, broadly Western-inspired, episodes, events or interactions are highlighted in *italics* throughout the table. And it is mainly these that are selectively cross-referenced, as appropriate, with the rest of the chapters and associated later components of this study. The interactions and moves, deemed geo-political or otherwise, of the other civilizations, including those of the Slavs, are shown in normal typeface.

622 CE /AH 1	S C O V E R Y	Prophet Muhammad's flight to Yathrib	App. I, esp. p. 400/1
642 - 750 CE		Arab waves invade C. A.; waving in Islam too	
CE 8 th - 9 th Century		Nomadic Uiygur and Kyrgyz khanates form	
8 th – 10 th Century		Hindushahis rule Afghan areas	
744 - 840		A dynamic Uighur Shamanistic qaghanate?	
749		Abbasids begin propagating across C.A.	
751		Chinese clash with Arabs and Karluks	
800		<i>Christians conceive universal empire idea</i>	p. 405, fn. 52; cf. 132
821 - 999		Persian Muslim rule including in Tajik area	
850 - 1250		An Uyghur kingdom existed at Khocho	
960		Major conversion of Turks to Islam	p.405
992 - 1212		Qarakhanid rule	
c. 992		<i>Al-Biruni hypothesizes about a New World</i>	p. 404, fn. 44
997 - 1186		Ghaznavid dynasty	
CE 1000		Chinese perfected gunpowder	
1045 - 1200		Seljukid rule	
1100s		Vital Silk routes thrive on	
1130s		Karakitai invasions	p.406
1186		Ghorids succeed Ghaznavids	
1199-1500		Kazakh tribes migrate into C.A. from Siberia	
1218		Genghis Khan invades	
1227-1350		Kurt dynasty around Sarakhs	
1250		Turkistan founded	
1273/4		<i>Marco Polo transits C.A.</i>	p. 408, fn. 68
1370 - 1405		Amir Timur's rule	
1403-1405		<i>Don Clavijo visits Timur in Samarkand</i>	p. 409
1405-1433		Admiral Zheng He's Indian Ocean voyages	
1405 - 1506	Timurid rule in Herat		
CE 15 th Century	Golden Horde begins to splinter		
1410 - 1825	Empires vie for Turkmenistan area		
1451-1468	Kazakh state rapidly breaks off from Uzbeks		
1453	<i>Ottoman Turks capture Constantinople</i>	p. 410	
1462	Russian consolidation begins		
1492	<i>Columbus discovers New World/Americas</i>		
1492	<i>Castile and Aragon expels Muslims and Jews</i>	p. 411; cf. app. I, <i>passim</i>	
1493	<i>The Ottomans allow Jews linguistic freedoms</i>		
1494	A frustrated Babur quits C.A. to move south		
1497	<i>Vasco Da Gama reaches India via cape</i>	p. 411	
1499	Sikhism emerges after Nanak's conversion	Esp. p. 412 & <i>passim</i>	
1500-98	Shaibanid Uzbek khans control Transoxania		
1501 - 1732	Safavid empire		
1502	<i>Europeans take African slaves to Caribbean</i>	p.411	
1504 - 1525	Kabul as capital of Babur's Moghul India		
1506	Timurid dynasty ends in Central Asia		
1520	<i>Magellan transits the Pacific towards Asia</i>	p. 412	
1534	<i>Henry VIII of England breaks with the pope</i>		
1566	Ottomans expand at Safavi expense in Azer.		
16 th Century	Uzbeks flourish at the cost of Tajiks		
1580s	Akbar, the Moghul, attempts to capture Kabul		
1583	Russians "protectively" secure Kazakh areas	p.413 and cf. p.421	
1590-1760	<i>Europeans competing all across the oceans</i>		
1593	Sheibanid Bukharans captured Merv		
1601	Ashtarkhanid rule		
1607	<i>Jamestown, an English settlement in America</i>		
1620	<i>Mayflower pilgrims to America with</i>	p.414	

	P	<i>Puritans</i>	
c. 1620s	E	<i>Vatican sends printing press to Isfahan</i>	
1635 - 1710	R	Jungar khanate harassing the Kazakhs	
1644 - 1914	I	Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty founded in China	
1648	O	Persians take Kandahar	
1683	D	<i>Ottoman Turkey retreats from Vienna</i>	p.414
1715	-	Tibet under control of a Dalai Lama	
1717	-	Russians defeated by Khiva	
1722	P	Afghans besieged Isfahan	
1730	U	Kazakh sought Russian protection	
1735	S	Cobalt and Platinum discovered	p.338, and p.467
1740s	P	Rival Uzbek states emerge post-Nadir Shah	
1747	P	Afghanistan unites under Ahmad Shah	
1750s on		<i>Inventions and Europe in Industrial Revolution</i>	
1758		Chins conquer Eastern Turkistan	
1760s on		<i>Europeans locking-in territories globally</i>	p.416; cf. p. 132
1770s		Afghans cede away areas to Moghuls & Sikhs	
1774		Manganese discovered	
1776		<i>U.S. wins independence</i>	p. 416; s.a.Ch.2, fn.67
1789		Uranium discovered	p. 304
Late 18 th Century		Russians aggressively "Cossack" across C.A.	
1797		Chromium discovered	p.469
1798		<i>Enlisting Persia, Britain checks Afghans</i>	p.416
1803		<i>Louisiana Purchase doubles U.S. size</i>	
1807		Russia and France plan to invade India	
1807		Potassium discovered	
1815		Napoleon defeated	
1818 - 1819		Ranjit Singh seizes Afghan areas in civil war	
1822 - 1847		Kazakh Hordes absorbed by Russia	
1825	S	Aluminum discovered	
1827 - 1840?	I	<i>Harlan swings amidst the Central Asians&Sikhs</i>	p.419 and s.a., p. 161
1828	C	Russia divides Azerbaijan	
1827	E	<i>Crusade revisited around the Aegean</i>	
1830 - 1907	U	<i>Great Game steams on</i>	p. 417 and <i>passim</i>
1832	N	<i>Americas become U.S. backyard via doctrine</i>	
1837	I	<i>Burnes proceeds to C.A. as an "American"</i>	p. 419
1838 - 1842	T	<i>First Anglo-Afghan war</i>	
1839	E	Russia fails to unseat Khan of Khiva	
1842	D	<i>European imperialism in Africa and Asia starts</i>	
1843	S	<i>Wolff, Grand Dervish of America visits Bukhara</i>	p. 420
1840s	A	<i>Revolutions boost Trans-Atlantic migrations</i>	
1844	T	The Bab elaborates Babism	p.420 and fn.108
1845	E	<i>Texas annexed by the U.S.</i>	
1846	S	<i>Amritsar treaty transfers Kashmir to Sikhs</i>	
1847		Azerbaijan drills its first oil well	p.421
1851	I	Kulja agreement between Russia and China	
1853	N	<i>U.S. squadron demands trade with Japan</i>	
1856	D	<i>Persian-Afghan proxy war over Herat</i>	
1857	E	<i>Mughal war of independence from Britain</i>	
1859	P	<i>US discovers oil first at Pennsylvania</i>	p.424
1850s – 1860s	E	Pan-Turkism shadows Russian C.A. expansion	
	N		

1861 - 1865	D	<i>U.S. civil war cuts Russia's cotton supply</i>	p.422
1864 - 1877	E	<i>The Alta Shahar emirate of Kashgar</i>	
1867	N	<i>Russia sells Alaska to the U.S.</i>	p.423
1868	C	<i>Bukhara khanate annexes south Tajik areas</i>	
1869	E	<i>Suez canal opens with Eurasian implications</i>	
1869		<i>Afghan Amir exiles Jamaluddin Afghani</i>	
1872		<i>Commercial Baku oil output revolution</i>	
1872 – 1895	-	<i>Anglo-Russian conventions in the works</i>	p.427
1877		<i>Queen Victoria becomes Empress of India</i>	
1878 - 1881	S	<i>Second Anglo-Afghan war</i>	
1881	U	<i>Geoktepe massacre brings Turkmen into line</i>	
1882 - 1907	S	<i>Two geopolitical alliances form in Europe</i>	
1883	I	<i>Russia occupies Tejed Oasis</i>	
1884/5		<i>Xinjiang made a Chinese province</i>	p.426
1890s.		<i>Russian Jews re-settled in the U.S.</i>	
1895		<i>Britain and Russia conclude their spheres</i>	
1898		<i>Spanish-American war and U.S. imperialism</i>	
1899		<i>Rudyard Kipling offers the U.S. some caution</i>	p.428
c. 1900		<i>Russian Azerbaijan becomes key oil producer</i>	
1900s.		<i>Naturalized Turks in Russia begin to progress</i>	
1905		<i>Russian revolution and reforms</i>	
1908/9		<i>Young Turks emerge</i>	
1910		<i>Dalai Lama flees to British India</i>	
1912		<i>U.S. actively polices its neighborhood</i>	
1912 - 1913		<i>Balkan Wars unfairly trims Turkey</i>	p.430
1913/4 - 1918		<i>World War One; Russia & US amongst Allies</i>	
1914		<i>Black Americans urged to return to Africa</i>	p.430; s.a., p. 423
1914		<i>Panama Canal opens</i>	
1915	I	<i>Mahatma Gandhi arrives in British India</i>	
1916	N	<i>Central Asians revolted against Russians</i>	
1917	T	<i>Britain promises Palestine to Jews</i>	p.429; cf. Ch.2, fn.54
1917	R	<i>Bolshevik revolution starts socialist state</i>	
1918-Jan.	A	<i>Azeri independence follows contact with U.S.</i>	p.433
1918	-	<i>Turkestan ASSR formed in RSFSR</i>	
1918 - 1920	W	<i>Alash Orda's nationalist Kazakh state</i>	
1918 - 1932	O	<i>Basmachi movement</i>	
1919	R	<i>Versailles Peace and League of Nations</i>	p.434
1919 - 1929	L	<i>Third Anglo-Afghan war</i>	
1920	D	<i>Kazakhstan made autonomous republic</i>	
1922	W	<i>Last Ottoman sultan deposed</i>	
1920s	A	<i>Political atheism holding court in C.A.</i>	p.424; cf. pp. 61 and 205
1922-Dec.	R	<i>Soviet Union established (it ceases in 1991)</i>	
1924		<i>C. A. delimited by Russia</i>	
1924	P	<i>Tajikistan made autonomous</i>	
1926	E	<i>Kyrgyzstan made autonomous</i>	
1926 - 1928	R	<i>Arabic switched to Latin</i>	
1929	I	<i>World Depression after Wall Street crash</i>	pp. 437/8
1930s	O	<i>World population races beyond 2Billion</i>	
1934	D	<i>Mao Zedong begins Long March in China</i>	
1934, Aug. 21	-	<i>U.S. formally recognizes Afghanistan</i>	p.163 and p.438
1939 - 1945	I	<i>World War Two (U.S. enters war in 1941)</i>	
1940/1	W	<i>Plutonium discovered</i>	pp.305-7; cf. 304
1940s	W	<i>Race riots across the U.S.</i>	
1941 - 1942	P	<i>Germans reach the Greater Caucasus</i>	

1944		East Turkistan republic created	
1945		<i>U.S. nukes Japan and United Nations begins</i>	p.441
1946		<i>U.S. starts nuclear tests in the Pacific atolls</i>	
1947		<i>Onset of Cold War</i>	
1947		India and Pakistan proclaim independences	
1948		<i>Illegitimate Israel forged on Palestine by UN</i>	pp.137/8 and p.442
1948		<i>Soviet link cut-offs trigger Berlin Airlift</i>	
1949		Communists win Chinese civil war	
1949		<i>NATO formed</i>	p.107 and p.442
1950 - 1953		<i>Korean War; U.S. gets involved in Vietnam</i>	
1953		De-Stalinization gives Central Asians relief	
1954		Slavs naturalize via Kazakh "Virgin Lands"	
1955		Eight E. Europe nations form the Warsaw Pact	
1955		Xinjiang becomes XUAR	p.443
1956		<i>SEATO places Durand Line under treaty area</i>	
1956		<i>Suez Crisis profiles Great Power politics</i>	p.133 and p.443
1957		Russia launches Sputnik	
1959		Dalai Lama flees Tibet	
1959		<i>Baghdad Pact</i>	
1960		<i>Violation of Afghan airspace by U.S. run U2</i>	Ch.1, fn.6
1960		Soviets discover Afghan oil and gas deposits	
1961		<i>Pakistan bombards Afghans with U.S. arms</i>	p.444
1962		Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan confederation?	
1962		<i>U.S. figures in Cuban Missile Crisis</i>	
1964/5		<i>U.S. enters Vietnam war (exits 1975)</i>	
1965		Brezhnev ends autonomy in some republics	
1967		<i>Six-Day War between Arabs and Israelis</i>	p.445
1968		<i>Martin Luther King killed; U.S. cities riot</i>	
1969		<i>U.S. first to land man on the Moon</i>	
1972		<i>Catholic Chronicle in secret Baltic circulation</i>	p.445
1972		<i>Nixon visits China</i>	
1973/4		<i>Arab-Israeli war and oil embargo</i>	pp.32, 128 and p.299
1973		Daud's coup in Afghanistan	
1976		Mao dies and Chinese reforms begin	
1977-9		<i>Sadat makes peace to Israel via U.S. medium</i>	
1978		<i>A Pole becomes Pope</i>	p. 446 and s.a. <i>passim</i>
1978-1979		Soviets invade Afghanistan after coup	
1979 – 1990s		<i>Civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador</i>	
1979		Norak and Toktogul hydroplants in full run	
1980 - 1988		<i>Iraq/Iran war</i>	p. 446; s.a., pp. 122, 145
1982		Aliyev elevated to Soviet Politburo (till 1987)	
1982 - 1985		<i>Israel invades Lebanon</i>	
1983		<i>Hundreds of US Marines killed in Beirut</i>	
1984		<i>Mujahideens receive U.S. aid</i>	Ch. 3, pp.167/8; p.463
1985		Nationalism reemerges under Gorbachev	
1986		USSR launches <i>Mir</i> to orbit 210mi. over Earth	
1986		Protest in Alma-Ata	pp.447/8
1987		<i>INF treaty mandates phased limitations</i>	
1988		<i>Armenian-Azeri clashes</i>	
1988		<i>Geneva Accords signed without Mujis</i>	p.449
1989		Soviet 40 th Army quits Afghan War	

1989		Declaration of sovereignty by Azerbaijan	
1989		<i>Abdullah Azzam dies in Peshawar bomb blast</i>	p.450
1990		Central Asian Union formed in Frunze	
1990		<i>Germany reunited</i>	
1990/1991		<i>Iraq invades Kuwait; Gulf War starts</i>	p. 451; s.a., pp.115/6
1991		C.A. leaders divided over Soviet coup plotters	
1991		Most C.A. states declare independence	Chaps. 3 and 4; p. 453
1991		<i>Osama orders Santos to kill ex-king Zahir Shah</i>	
1992		Bosnia-Herzegovina in chaos	p. 454; s.a., pp.117, 142
1992-1993		CSTO created	
1993		<i>NAFTA ratified; E.U. begins</i>	
1994		Taliban arose after protracted civil war	
1994		<i>Partnership for Peace(Pfp) launched</i>	Chaps. 3 and 4, <i>passim</i>
1994		Russia invades secession-bent Chechnya	
1995		Taliban in symbiosis with Osama	
1995		<i>U.N.'s 50th year; WTO begins</i>	p.116;cf. 405 & p. 132
1995		Kazakhstan-Russia econo-military pact	
1996		IMU founded	
1996		Osama leaves Sudan for Afghanistan	
1997		Taliban declines to extradite Osama to U.S.	p.168; cf. 169
1997		Tajik peace accord	
1998		<i>Al-Qaeda</i> emerges	
1998		South Asian nuclear tests	
1998		<i>U.S. cruise missiles Afghanistan camps</i>	
1999		Russia reinvades Chechnya	
1999		<i>US bans commercial dealings with Taliban</i>	
1999		<i>NATO intervenes in Kosovo</i>	pp.117 and 142
2000		<i>US intervenes in Yemen</i>	
2001		SCO forms	
2001		<i>September 11 terror attacks on U.S. cities</i>	
2001		<i>U.S. "invasion" and ouster of Taliban after 9/11</i>	pp.157,168,176 & 188/9
Since 2001		<i>Protracted Taliban insurgency on NATO</i>	
2002		Uzbeks and Kazakhs settle border dispute	
2002		<i>Tajiks beef border against Al-Qaeda escaping</i>	
2003		<i>Anglo-US intrigues launch Iraq War</i>	Ch. 2, fn. 126; p. 119
2004		TISA becomes Islamic Rep. of Afghanistan	
2005		Bakiyev replaces Akayev in Kyrgyzstan	
2005		<i>Tsunami</i> in Indian Ocean hits South Asia	
2006		<i>US intervenes even in Pakistan</i>	
2007		Gurbanguly assumes office after Niyazov dies	
2007		Nur Bekri placed in office in <i>Xinjiang</i>	App. V
2008		<i>Uzbekistan allows US limited use of Termez</i>	
2009		<i>Al-Qaeda double agent kills CIA agents</i>	
2009		Kyrgyzstan allows Russia a second base	
2010		<i>David Patraeus takes command of US & ISAF</i>	
2010		Roza Otunbayeva as Kyrgyzstan leader	
2011		Arab Spring springs chaotic "reforms"	
2011		<i>U.S. seeds terroristic uprising in Syria</i>	p. 120
2011		<i>Osama killed in Abbottabad by US Seals</i>	pp.167-9, fn. 31; cf. 453
2011		Tajikistan settles border dispute with China	

2012		Taliban opens office in Dubai towards peace	
2012		<i>No renewal of Manas Atambayev tells Putin</i>	
2012		<i>Armenian-Azeri tension flares again</i>	p. 233; cf. 452
2012		<i>C.A. gets slam-dunked as Obama goes lame in U.S.</i>	

Note: The listed happening, episode or development may embrace the entire Central Asian region and/or the United States or may refer to just significant events or issues in or of their parts or adjacent areas. Listed entries, in general, reflect a narrow definition of the **West**, i.e. which excludes the purely Slavic sphere, and a broad definition of the **Americas**. Generally, the periodization adopted in the above Table reflects major American and world systemic and geopolitical changes.

Sources: Adapted, updated and composed from various sources including: Denis Sinor, ed., *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1990), chaps. 1, 5 and 11; Svat Soucek, *A History of Inner Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 2000), chaps. 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 19; David Morgan, *The Mongols* (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 55-64; Peter B. Golden, *Central Asia in World History* (New York: Oxford U P, 2011), pp. 142-6; Sally N. Cummings, *Understanding Central Asia: Politics and contested transformations* (London and N. Y.: Routledge, 2012), pp. 25-7; and BBC Timeline at: <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/>>.

Thus, as we have seen here, without placing these key facts in a comprehensive historical context, though briefly, the mere contemporary study of relations will certainly not fully account for the true nature of U.S.-CAS relations. Of course, to grasp the thesis of this study, the contemporary aspects are certainly inevitable and these would logically be laid out in the later chapters, particularly so in the focal Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

American Motivations in the Erstwhile Third World and the Ex-Eastern Bloc

Having grasped the politico-geographic nature and history of the C.A. region in the previous section, now to understand the actual nature of relations between any two states it is important to consider their interactions across time. But to comprehend the true international behavior of any long established state with a relatively new state or grouping of states, as those in the C.A. region, it is crucial not only to examine the long established state's professed policy and priorities and actual behavior over time but also across politico-geographic regions and, increasingly at present, across cultures and civilizations.

This being so, the chief objects of this section of the chapter would be to quickly overview American relations with other states particularly, though not exclusively, with the grouping of developing states that are generally recognized as those of the erstwhile Third World and with those of the ex-Eastern Bloc too. The significance of this choice is that

these groupings of states have a good admixture of both small states and states that may be deemed middle powers and therefore of particular relevance to my analytic region and its environ which apparently and potentially holds a similar admixture.




Map 12 – Third World and Eastern Bloc

Note: Third World countries are generally all developing countries in Asia, Oceania, Africa and the Americas; Eastern Bloc states generally referred to ex-Socialist states of Eastern Europe, Americas and Asia.

Source: Adapted from the Philip's Essential World Atlas, 2nd edn., The Royal Geographical Society/IBG (London: George Philip, 1999), pp. inside covers.

This sort of analysis I hope would later help reveal the similarities and/or dissimilarities present between American behavior with the selected states and the U.S. behavior with, mainly the newly independent states of the Central Asian region. Together with those from the former grouping of states would be added also insights from some states of the Eastern Bloc particularly those of Eastern Europe, as seen in Map 12, with some of whom the United States (circled in blue) has record of relations extending well into the Soviet period and even earlier.

The Eastern European (circled in pink) experience with the United States would be particularly pertinent not only because the region is contiguous to Russia but also even more than Central Asia (circled in green) it has long been considered to be an arena of Soviet Satellites and therefore like C.A., is well within the Russian sphere of influence, no matter however unwillingly so.⁶⁵ Yet outside observers of contemporary international politics disquietingly note Western enthusiasm to elevate Eastern Europe to the First World via the EU⁶⁶ and ignoring Central Asia as a residual ramp perhaps on a Third World drift without the US offering a likewise helping hand.



Though the United States, as visualized in Map 13, is touted as being amongst the oldest, certainly, the mightiest and thus, presumably, the archetypical or optimal democracy⁶⁷ in the world; astonishingly, when it comes to foreign affairs much akin to the

⁶⁵ See Treisman, *The Return...* op. cit., pp. 316-317.

⁶⁶ See Parag Khanna, *The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order* (New York: Random House, 2008), p. 4.

⁶⁷ Despite declaring independence in 1776, the U.S., perhaps serving as an unwitting model to at least some present C.A. states, never came any closer to being a true democracy till sometime around 1809, i.e. a full generation later, even then; neither even now, in the absolute sense!

situation in the emergent CARs, it is mainly the power-elite in America who determine the nature and direction of its foreign interactions.⁶⁸ In this regard chief among the elite is the President of the United States who in his constitutional role as Commander-in-Chief of the American armed forces is also, by implication, the director-in-chief of foreign affairs.⁶⁹

Perhaps it is in keeping with this fact that every American president, starting with the non-partisan George Washington himself, has both articulated on matters of foreign affairs and tried to foster international relations as they desire it, besides, of course, continuously attempting to promote their political and economic ideals in the world. The "Father of the Country" set the tone for relations with foreign countries, starting his relations with the like of not only well-established nation-states like France and Britain (America's immediate colonial masters) but even with the alleged corsairs of the Barbary States.⁷⁰ It was perhaps in keeping with this pragmatic spirit he did adopt the recognition policy of his Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson:

“We certainly cannot deny to other nations that principle whereupon our government is founded, that every nation has a right to govern itself internally under whatever forms it pleases...”⁷¹

After the seminal polarization of American politics the same Thomas Jefferson who later became president and who was the alleged founder of the present-day Democratic Party sought respect for the U.S. Navy, inexplicably, through attacking Tripoli. Later, true

⁶⁸ During the focal period of this research there have been a number of **leadership and policy changes** in both the U.S. and CAS/CARs and these are accounted for and acknowledged in Chapters 3 and 4. For the various American leaderships and their attitudes before and leading up to the research period, see this chapter and Appendices I, II, IV, V and VI. Appendix II, in particular, shows the overlap of key officials across the various administrations and shows the enduring presence of **oil lobby**-linked elites including Henry Kissinger since 1968.

⁶⁹ Besides being empowered by the Constitution to nominate ambassadors and to make or denounce treaties, with Senate consent, of course, he also may extend or withhold recognition of new governments and establish or sever diplomatic relations with any country. But, most conspicuously, to the world, he serves as the principal national mouth piece of the United States in enunciating its foreign policy. To Americans themselves, he is their final voice on all matters foreign because he is forbidden, especially in these matters, to pass the buck anywhere and is, thus, ultimately responsible. This simple fact was acknowledged officially way back in 1799 by the fourth U. S. Secretary of State John Marshall who served under President John Adams.

⁷⁰ For a brief contextual narration of the nature of U.S. relations with these states, see Richard Hofstadter, William Miller and Daniel Aaron, *The American Republic: Volume One to 1865* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 300-302; Nathaniel Platt and Muriel Jean Drummond, *Our Nation from its Creation: A Great Experiment* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 196-97.

⁷¹ Cited in Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 10th edn. , being an Indian reprint of the 1980 edition published and printed in Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, U.S.A. (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India, 1990), p. 84.

to Democratic Party tradition of asserting U.S. uniqueness in world affairs, he tried to bring sanity to bellicose France and Britain through the Embargo Act though it ended in hurting the United States more than the intended parties. He subsequently had the prudent courage to ditch this erroneous and counter-productive policy by repealing it in 1809 with the Non-Intercourse Act. John Adams the Federalist on whom foreign involvements were popularly believed to be thrust upon, in fact, was proud of his mission to the Netherlands to gain recognition and loan for the United States. Thus, it is clear that all the first three presidents who established the traditions and norms of the American Presidency took pride in dabbling in foreign affairs, regardless of their political persuasions and irrespective of whether they were viewed as strong presidents or otherwise. As John Fitzgerald Kennedy, much later once put it, despite the presidency's ups and downs it will remain "the vital centre of action in our whole scheme of government." Later still even when the jolly Ronald Reagan met the chummy Gorbachev at the White House in Washington, D.C. in December 1987, he did so only as "the sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations," and in total accord with his duties as provided for by the U.S. Constitution, despite the overweening presence of both George H. W. Bush and George P. Shultz. Even recently we witnessed Barack Hussain Obama better executing again this very tradition into the contemporary times. Thus, in this sense, at least, American foreign policy is basically a president-watching enterprise, though a quick look at Figure 3 would, I am sure, graphically situate him at the apex of a broader formal, institutionalized, foreign policy hierarchy. Be this as it may, not all American presidents have been equally enthusiastic about foreign affairs. But usually the ones viewed as strong presidents tend to be foreign policy activists generally and some of them were even regarded by leaders of other countries as world leaders with some even going on to gain the Nobel Prize,⁷² on that score. Among presidents viewed by scholars as effective,

⁷² Incidentally, about 12% of these prize moneys have been drawn from Alfred Nobel's shares in the Nobel Brothers' Petroleum

and, thus, we may also deem, strong, are Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Wilson Reagan.⁷³




Figure 3 – Significant Formal Actors of the American Foreign Policy Community Today

Note: The hierarchy implied by this formal foreign policy pyramid is, of course, not ossified. The line in red indicates the presence of rather secretive semi-formal policy-making configurations even above the NSC level.

Notes: 1 – For the first time in American history, this high office is held by an “American-Black”; 2 – Increasingly, in the history of the US, first in 1997 then in 2005 and again in 2009 this important foreign policy portfolio went, remarkably to women of either main parties; 3 – Traditionally these are the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Labor and increasingly in modern times also the Departments of Commerce and Energy; 4 – Specifically, the US Permanent Representative to the UN and/or key ambassadors; 5 – Since the Vietnam debacle through Iran-contra, 9/11 and now Benghazi, U.S. Congressional interest and oversight on foreign affairs has continually increased. Generally, aggressive or democratic presidents tend to give the lie to Congress over the years; * - These are executive agencies that facilitate and operate in an advisory capacity at this highest foreign policy level; # - The creation and inclusion of both these bodies reflect the contemporary relevance if not also primacy of economics in America.

Source: Adapted by this researcher from The New York Public Library American History Desk Reference, p. 260.

Company in Baku, Azerbaijan.

⁷³ See, for example, J.T. Young, “Clinton in Context,” *World & I*, January 2000.

Other than those fore-mentioned presidents I would also include Andrew Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, (Thomas) Woodrow Wilson, Harry S. Truman, Dwight David Eisenhower, J. F. Kennedy, Richard Milhous Nixon, James Earl “Jimmy” Carter, George H.W. Bush and, one might be surprised, even William J. “Bill” Clinton, notwithstanding all the unorthodox oral antics and unsavoury “traditions” demonstrated in the Oval Office and then so scandalously, if also juristically, uncovered, as effective and/or strong presidents. But elaborating my rationale for considering each of them as strongly effective presidents here would be unnecessary though it is suffice here to say that I would pepper my work throughout with pertinent insights from their presidencies.

Even a cursory study of American history would reveal that their elites, from presidents down through the ranks of their foreign policy community, have tried consistently to foster, advocate or promote American ideals and interests, if not also designs, across the world, as both mutually evolved. When one harks back to the pre-Cold War times, in fact, even at its very infancy, the U.S. has pursued its interest though weakly, but surely. One may recall, in this regard, that George Washington accepted the 1794 Jay treaty of trade relations with Britain even though its provisions were not entirely favorable to the U.S. because it’s primary interest then was, as a relatively new nation, clearly its immediate survival and unimpeded growth and nation-building.⁷⁴

For similar reasons too did he, I believe, advocate “non-entangling alliances” when he warned in his Farewell Address in 1796: “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world” and preached neutrality in foreign affairs, though this meant having to betray his earlier alliance with France. In essence, America’s post-independence pre-disposition towards the outside world has been one of seeking

⁷⁴ Bailey, *A Diplomatic History...*, op. cit., p. 77.

maximum recognition and interaction across it. It was with this spirit that it rapidly established relations with France, Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, and Russia, in other words, the leading trading nations of Europe besides, of course, others elsewhere. This post-independent American behavior could, obviously, not have been lost on the Central Asian leaders, being themselves relatively new students of U.S. history, who upon reluctantly achieving their own independences in the early 1990s were, nonetheless, quick to draw inspirations, perhaps, from that early American example and record.⁷⁵

The American history of the 18th and the 19th centuries were filled largely with revolutions (1784-1819), nation-building activities, hemispheric territorial expansions (1820-1849) and civil conflicts (1850-1869) that these periods are of little direct value for our main purposes here. Nevertheless, even in those periods, President John Tyler, a Whig, opened the Far East to U.S. traders by a treaty with China in 1844. President Millard Fillmore, another Whig authorized a mission to Japan by Commodore Matthew C. Perry in 1852. Furthermore, other than the presidencies of Jackson and Lincoln the other presidencies of these periods were insignificant internationally-speaking and, are, therefore, wisely bypassed in favor of those of the 20th century, particularly those of the period encompassing the Cold War and beyond.

But before we do so we need to take note of some of the key pre-Cold War foreign policy doctrines that roughly defined and dominated its external interactions. First of these is the Monroe Doctrine that was articulated by the fifth American President James Monroe in his Annual Message to the U.S. Congress in 1823. It is easily the first comprehensive foreign policy statement of the United States of America. In short, this doctrine asserts that

⁷⁵ Thus, we see the Central Asians rapidly establishing relations with U.S.A., Japan, P.R.C., Germany, France, U.K., Italy, Russia, Korea, India, Turkey, I. R. Iran, I. R. Pakistan, Malaysia and the like, the leading nations of our own times besides with a sprinkling of others across other well-established politico-geographic regions.

in return for U.S. non-interference in European affairs, colonial and ex-colonial European powers should not attempt to colonize the Western Hemisphere. Any such attempt would be regarded as “the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.” Except, perhaps, in 1917, during the First World War, this doctrine largely still guides the U.S. role within that hemisphere even till today.⁷⁶

Second come the Roosevelt Corollary, after the periods of continental expansion, national consolidation and industrialization, in 1905 when President Theodore Roosevelt asserted the United States’ right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American nations when America deem their political, economic and/or financial situation(s) to be so unstable as to threaten U.S. interests therein. Despite coming from a martial background, the impressive Republican Theodore Roosevelt had a peaceful and economic bent of mind. Strongly benign traits that later got him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1906 for arbitrating an end to the Russo-Japanese War earlier. Contemporary U.S. presidents, even Democratic ones, except debatably Obama, are more known for wars, seemingly by default, rather than for honest mediations leading to true peace.

Despite the Democratic President Wilson’s repudiation of this corollary later in 1913, upon coming into office, neither he nor most of the presidents following him managed to refrain from intervening within that region. Worse, despite having a legal bent of mind, Wilson having proclaimed neutrality in World War One, could not resist the temptation to take revenge upon consolidation. Nevertheless, even he was given a Nobel Prize in 1920 for advocating for a post-war League of Nations.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ It was, in fact, under this Doctrine that the disjointed two-termer Democrat President Grover Cleveland appointed a commission to resolve the border dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana in 1895 on the heels of the first Pan American Conference held in the interregnum. Wanting to exceed the Democratic practitioners of this doctrine, the Republican, President William McKinley took it to the hilt venturing beyond even across the Pacific through his Gunboat Diplomacy against Spain and imposing Open Door policy even farther on China around 1899-1900.

⁷⁷ It needs to be noted here that it was during Wilsonian and immediate post-Wilsonian presidencies that did Tadjikistan (now Tajikistan), Turkmenia (now Turkmenistan) and Uzbekistan became union republics, though, within the Soviet Union of the 1920s. In

A third foreign policy approach that the U.S. followed throughout the 19th century and rather loosely thereafter till mid-20th century was Isolationism. This approach, in fact, can be traced back to President Washington's caution against "entangling alliances." But well into the 20th century, with ground-breaking developments in transportation and communication technologies the cushioning protection once given by oceanic distances rapidly disappeared. Isolationism as it was once known thus went the way of the dinosaurs, a museum exhibit, to be admired for sure, but dangerously irrelevant in the coming ages.⁷⁸ From then, the new axiom that America readily and conveniently accepts has been this: "The United States cannot afford to leave the world alone because the world will not leave it alone".⁷⁹

Well over half a century later, as if to vindicate this never more useful axiom and stress its continued, post-Cold War, relevance even into the 21st century, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on and in the U.S. took place. Significantly for the later part of this research, its alleged masterminds conspired out of Afghanistan – an essentially Central Asian country – the remotest possible place on Earth imaginable, from which to hatch plans to strike at the U.S.; as if to remind America that it simply can't afford to irresponsibly retire isolationistically into its own continental cocoon to conveniently escape from the unanticipated consequences of the monstrous chaos and tragedies it enthusiastically helped engineer in its Cold War adversaries' backyards! Anyway, now hopping back to the Cold War era, a period of intense ideological rivalry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., one sees American elites perceiving the world as broken into two basic camps: a democratic-

1936 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (then called Kirghizia) also became similarly union republics, though again, within the U.S.S.R. Perhaps, being bitten by Wilson's peace-building bug the three Republican presidents who, in turns, succeeded him into the White House were more into peaceable solutions, including by signing the Kellogg-Briand Pact and by proclaiming the Stimson Doctrine on 7th January 1932.

⁷⁸ F.D. Roosevelt, a Democrat, the only three-term U.S. president, capitalized on the long-running peace-dividend and was attempting to turn America's "dip-in and dip-out of isolationism" strategy to its advantage when Hitler came a calling by not so suddenly over-running Poland in Europe in 1939. Then, the 7th December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, of course, quite wishfully, one should add, drove the final nails on the coffin of Isolationism as a viable foreign policy option.

⁷⁹ Bailey, *A Diplomatic History...*, op. cit., p. 973.

capitalist one and a totalitarian-socialist another. So in this period one needs to note in general the American perception of world geopolitics, identifying broadly their friends and allies within the Third World, the means and strategy they utilized in tackling the spreading Soviet influence and presence therein besides considering the goals and ambitions, explicit or otherwise that they sought to realize over there. One needs also to similarly scrutinize, as far as it is discernible, the pattern of American behavior in the developing countries and identify if and how they have reconsidered their extensive involvement therein during the Cold War years.

All through the Cold War years American leaders and their varying administrations have continually if inconsistently attempted to export their self-perceived civilized liberal values, lifestyles and way of life to the rest of the world. They apparently viewed the world to have been divided, as hinted above, basically into two camps, i.e.: the capitalist, the larger of the two, shepherded by the Americans themselves; and the other, the communist, albeit smaller, commandeered by primarily the Soviet Union.⁸⁰

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, for example, in expounding the Marxist-Leninist theory in 1919 asserted that: "...the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end".⁸¹ Over a few decades later Brezhnev not only continued to reaffirm the Soviet founder's cautious dictum but went one step ahead when he categorically stated that the "total triumph of socialism the world over is inevitable. And for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people, we will fight, unsparing of our strength".⁸² This famous edict not only

⁸⁰ Since these camps were founded on virtually contradictory ideas, values and philosophies they (the leaders) like their Soviet counterparts assumed that these contradictions would bring both the camps to either loggerheads in due course or lead, ultimately, to the disintegration of one of the camps either as a result of a direct clash between the pre-eminent powers or till communism (from the Soviet perspective read: capitalism) as the governing value destroys itself through political stagnation and socio-economic collapse.

⁸¹ See V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol.: VIII (New York: International Publishers, 1943), p. 282.

⁸² Qtd. by Foy D. Kohler, Leon Goure and Mose L. Harvey, *The Soviet Union and the October 1973 Middle East War* (Miami: U of Miami, 1974), p. 24.

clearly stresses the then hostilely anticipated zero-sum gain to the socialist bloc but simultaneously also brought out the real depth of the Soviet dedication and commitment to their cause. Though between Lenin's and Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenkov's tenures there were periods of "peaceful co-existence" and "détente" in the relations between the superpowers, on the whole the nature of the relations between them have continually been widely perceived as hostile. The United States emerged after both World Wars as the leading power in the world having overwhelmed its enemies at all the European, African and Asian theaters.

Its potent war-time advent at the international scene also ushered the decline and gradual wasting away of the older but largely spent colonial powers like Britain, France and Japan especially in the wake of rising vernacular nationalism all across the Third World.⁸³ Meanwhile, its war-time ally the Soviet Union despite having suffered more during the war gradually shaped-up as America's new threat. This threat assumed such a proportion that the communist were in absolute control of countries in Eastern Europe like Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania by late 1947. In June the next year President Eduard Benes went down in a Soviet-sponsored coup d'état, in Czechoslovakia.⁸⁴ The month of June of the same year also saw the city of Berlin blockaded. The world witnessed how these events jolted policy makers across America to come up with an appropriate response that would tell the Soviets that they have gone too far and that from now on America meant business. This radical stance of America then, is what came to be later known as the new containment policy. In a nutshell, what this bold policy amounted to was in the words of Gordon B. Smith:

⁸³ U.S. President Harry S. Truman, a Democrat, the first American Cold War president, despite coming from a business and legal background had to martially lead modern America at one of its most militant period. Having accepted Germany's surrender he went on to authorize the dropping of atomic bombs, at three days interval, on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945.

⁸⁴ Czechoslovakia, a central European republic, much later, on the 1st of Jan. 1993, of course, parted in a "velvet revolution" that formed the currently separate and independent countries of Czech Republic and Slovakia.

“the defense of Greece and Turkey (the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947), the economic rehabilitation of Europe (the Marshall Plan of June, 1947), and collective security for Western Europe (the Vandenberg Resolution of June, 1948, the Berlin airlift of 1948-49, and the North Atlantic Treaty of April, 1949)”.⁸⁵

This innovative idea of “containment” was first broached in an article signed “X” in pseudonymity that appeared in *Foreign Affairs* journal of summer 1947 but as it came to be known later was actually written by the eminent State Department diplomat and scholar George Kennan⁸⁶ who, rather sagely, in my retrospect, prognosticated that containment of the foe’s expansionary impulse would eventually lead to internal collapse of the enemy. Fortunately, as it would turn out for Americans, good old Kennan had the last laugh at poor Gorbachev’s and the hapless Soviets’ expenses, of course.

The U.S., as mentioned earlier, emerged from World War Two as the most powerful country in the world, having over-revengefully crushed Japan with atomic bombs and defeating Germany more conventionally but with greater subterfuge. A little before that the old colonial powers Britain and France declined and lost their prestige internationally leaving in their aftermath numerous budding nationalisms, both genuinely home-grown and metropole-nurtured, in the vacated, decolonized lands of the yet to be variously aligned Third World. Because of its strategic depth the U.S.S.R. fared better and was able to absorb the ravages of that war, despite having been in the thick of it, and, astonishingly, it (particularly with Central Asia’s enthusiastic involvement) rebounded very rapidly that it soon appeared to America as a threat. And thus willy-nilly a rivalry developed thence between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in winning over the hearts and minds⁸⁷ of these yet to be aligned, apparently, nationalistic multitudes. Unlike the U.S.S.R., which questioned the

⁸⁵ Gordon B. Smith, *Soviet Politics: Struggling with...*, op. cit.

⁸⁶ See “X” (penned anonymously by George F. Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” *Foreign Affairs* 25.4 July 1947: 566-82. See also Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U P, 1992).

⁸⁷ Ludwig W. Adamec, *Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain* (Tucson, Arizona: U of Arizona P., 1974), p.266.

nature of their independences, however, the U.S. did not fully subscribe to the “two-camp” theory of Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov – a Russian high official – and readily believed in the existence and de jure independence of many Third World states. America, however, rightly felt that these states are extremely weak and thus vulnerable to Communist pressure and therefore it proceeded earnestly to strengthen them and thereby, cultivated them as its long-term allies. Luckily, for the Third World, it obviously did not totally share the early Russian view that a country cannot survive as a total neutral.⁸⁸

The aid America shelled out to the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, and countries in West Asia and the Middle East were enormous though perhaps not in the same scale as those ladled out under the Marshall Plan which it undertook for the reconstruction, understandably, of war-ravaged Europe. In so doing America built-up its international power standing and status in the eyes of the Third World. This also served notice to the Soviets that Americans are now the new guardians of the ex-colonial, if also still basically feudalistic, developing states supplanting Britain and its like therein.

The American commitments to the nationalist elites and governments of the Third World was such that, the Soviets, particularly in the Stalin era, saw the Third World nationalities and especially their elite heirs as nothing but Western servants and their professed foreign policy neutrality as purely a Western-inspired-contraption designed to fool and keep these Third World countries and especially their unsuspecting and innocuous larger masses from associating with the progressive communist world. Here it is important to note that unlike the Russian Soviets the Chinese Maoists did not consider the Third World nationalists as pure servants of the West but rather treated them basically, like

⁸⁸ It was on the basis of these basic convictions, its other deeper traditions and its desire to be seen as a better alternative model to Old Europe that the Americans supported national liberation movements in the Third World in general and in Asia and Africa in particular. And when Third World nations became independent in waves across these regions it offered to them loans and assistances on reasonable terms to keep them from being enticed by the Communists in general and the Soviets in particular. Thus one sees them cultivating new nationalist governments and states across the whole world.

themselves, as anti-imperialists, perhaps as born-again ones, who could be encouraged, if not also cultivated, and used to usurp power for the communists.⁸⁹

However, unlike the Soviets and the Chinese, the Americans have always recognized, given their own experiences in this regard and being themselves capitalistic too, the genuine national aspirations of the colonized subject peoples of the Third World and had at every opportunity, with few exceptions, held out a helping hand to them. This is particularly true in the case of the overseas Chinese whose good fortune is not entirely due to pure diligence as clearly alluded to by western observers.⁹⁰ As per American tradition it prefers to deal with free peoples and with independent, sovereign countries rather than, if it can't really avoid, with colonies. This is, of course, and it needs to be especially noted here, a key tradition rooted deep in American history. Nevertheless, this tradition has been conveniently overlooked in the case of *Tibet*, *Chechnya*, Kosovo and the like but piously observed in the case of *Palestine*, *Kashmir*, *Xinjiang* and so on.

Given the Soviet's general distrust of the nationalist governments of the Third World there was relatively little Soviet interest in cultivating them prior to the 1950s. Part of the reason for this general disinterest is that the Soviets in the pre-1950 period were more engrossed in consolidating their hold on their inner empires (or now-a-days Near Abroad in contemporary Russian parlance), Central Asia included, and in extending their influence over external satellites in Eastern Europe and across the world, including those in Asia like Vietnam and even China itself. The actions and general behavior of any power in any region may not be completely understood without visualizing the broader context. Thus, American behavior vis-à-vis the developing countries in various politico-geographic

⁸⁹ D.S. Carlisle, "Stalin's foreign policy and the National Liberation Movement," *Review of Politics*, July (1965): pp. 339-41.

⁹⁰ See, for example, Sterling Seagrave who observes thus: "The extraordinary success of Overseas Chinese in modern times has occurred in countries where authoritarian Western governments kept order and encouraged commerce. Chinese gravitated to places like Singapore because there the public acknowledgement of greed was part of the West's work ethic." Sterling Seagrave, *Lords of the Rim* (London: Corgi/Transworld, 1995), p. 156.

regions would be fully appreciated only when we study the bigger picture of American-Soviet/Russian world-wide competition generally. Tensions and fissures began to develop in the wartime alliance of the United States and the Soviet Union toward the end of 1945.⁹¹

In the Cold War period two basic principles governed American foreign policy. These were, first, the primacy of national security, whereby the threat that is deemed to emanate from an expansionist Soviet communism reduced all other issues to a subordinate position when compared with national security. U.S. initiatives and actions, big or small, were, therefore, driven by enlightened self-interest geared to increase American security. The second American foreign policy principle, largely supportive of the earlier one, is the encouragement of an ideological commitment to market capitalism and discouraging any deviation from it as an unacceptable evil. Even, otherwise authoritarian, dictatorships that subscribed to this principle were supported and offered massive aid. Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's Iran and some of the Gulf's absolute monarchies were and still are good examples of this politico-strategic arrangement.

Actually, both these superpowers came to loggerheads in the post-World War Two period first around the Mediterranean, particularly in Greece and Italy wherein local communists were radically defeated by Western parties that benefited enormously from substantial American economic and military aid. Close on its heel came in 1947 the doctrine of President Truman that sought to initially contain communist, albeit Soviet, ascendancy in Turkey and Greece. In Truman's own words: "it must be the policy of the

⁹¹ By 1948, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania became Soviet satellites. Albania and Yugoslavia too came under Soviet influence. The Soviets cut off their satellites from the West under a barrier that came to be known as the Iron Curtain. Suspicion grew between East and West. Thus a Cold War – a struggle between East and West for international influence and allies - developed. Soviet relations with the West improved after Stalin's death. Unlike his predecessors, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev believed that war was not necessary for Communism to triumph over the West. So, under his policy of peaceful co-existence the Soviets competed with the West in technology and economic development while avoiding direct wars. But the Soviets still tried to expand their influence by encouraging strikes, riots and revolts in non-communist nations. China criticized this "soft" Soviet policy and in the 22nd Communist Party Congress in Moscow in 1961, the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, an accomplished realist, walked out. This effectively split the Communist bloc with only the Albanians, a Euro-Muslim nation, going with China.

United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures".⁹² Thus, this Truman Doctrine was not only used to support NATO but also to participate in a host of other small and large crises all over the world that arose during the Cold War. Incidentally, after having recognized the new state of Israel, in total disregard of the doctrine, and also setting-up NATO by 1949, the Truman-led U.S. entered into combat in Korea in 1950, obviously boosted by this doctrine. Nevertheless, not wanting to leave behind a legacy of run-away militancy, Truman relieved Gen. Douglas MacArthur of his Far Eastern command. More broadly this foreign policy principle of containment was used to halt the influence of the U.S.S.R. and it remained the dominant foreign and national security policy of the United States till the final end of the Cold War much later in 1991.⁹³

It is, therefore, only in this relatively new context of American- Soviet/Russian rivalry that American behavior in the Third World could best be understood. Actually, to the partial surprise of the West, the Russians having driven the Nazi Fascist out of Russian borders and those of Eastern Europe and into Germany itself were, then, perceived in the West to be intending to go even beyond. So, it was in 1947 that George Frost Kennan – head of the States Department's, then, newly created Policy Planning Staff – formulated this policy of containment wherein was stressed a major U.S. objective in handling the post-war Soviet Union was the need to contain the continued Soviet military and ideological expansion. This he proposed to achieve by strengthening all nations threatened by the U.S.S.R.'s expansion.⁹⁴

⁹² Cited by Bailey, *A Diplomatic History...*, op. cit., p. 797.

⁹³ Anyway, it was with the advent of Khrushchev in 1953 that, under the full impact of the hostile Truman doctrine, there was seen in the Soviet Union a sort of reorientation in its relations with the developing countries. The Soviets in this period, perhaps taking a leaf from their Chinese comrades, began to view nationalism in the Third World as a significant force to be cultivated, with a view to expel the West from its continued entrenchment in its colonies in Asia and Africa, through their cooperation while simultaneously, in so doing, establish and expand Soviet influence amidst them.

⁹⁴ Working under President Harry S. Truman, he was able to achieve this objective through forging a series of military alliances, under an understandable, though perhaps overworked, spell of pactomania, starting with the transatlantic NATO and similar others that range in

Also, as per Kennan's advice, intra-communist frictions were seeded and fanned and existing frictions between the Soviets and international communism were capitalized on towards achieving the same objective.⁹⁵ The split among the communists in Afghanistan and in the broader Sino-Soviet rift (1960s to 1980s) readily comes to mind in this regard.

Feeling hemmed-in in such a manner, naturally the Soviets began exploring for ways and means to undermine these alliances and get these American sponsored security pacts dissolved. But to their disappointment they generally failed initially. Perhaps, this negative outcome was due to the fact that they were not providing the right carrots or at least sufficient quantities of it. For example, in the fiscal-decade 1955-1964 the economic aid they were able to hand out to the whole Third World in general was only about 3.8 billion U.S.\$ equivalent which was much lesser than what they had to ladle out in subsequent decades.⁹⁶ However, in 1958, the Soviets had a momentary victory when rebellious military officers overthrew what they viewed as a pro-Western monarchy in Iraq and took Baghdad out of the Baghdad Pact thus rendering CENTO lame and effectively abrogating the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1955. With Khrushchev in place the Soviets went on to gradually gain further dramatic successes at incremental costs.

Meanwhile, when the Republican Dwight David Eisenhower became President of the United States, he in keeping with American anti-colonial traditions not only refused to join Britain, France and Israel in an invasion of Egypt, thereby censuring the invaders but also denounced in the strongest terms the U.S.S.R. for brutally crushing the Hungarian uprising in Eastern Europe. Besides, in 1957 President Eisenhower proposed and Congress

geographical coverage from the Mediterranean to the South Pacific and from the Middle East to the Far East. Thus, besides NATO the world saw military / security institutions like the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), U.S. – Japan Security Treaty and SEATO ringing the Soviet Union's southern fringes and its allies across the world.

⁹⁵ Graham T. Allison, Jr., "Testing Gorbachev," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1988), p. 32.

⁹⁶ See Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (New York: Cornell U P, 1987), pp. 78-79.

approved a policy called the Eisenhower Doctrine that pledged U.S. financial and military aid to any Middle East nation that asked for help against Communist aggression. Ironically, this doctrine was subsequently used to send troops to Lebanon to protect its pro-Western government from rebel forces. American involvement there, of course, also apparently helped, in a self-serving way, to protect U.S. oil interest in that region.⁹⁷

In general, Eisenhower believed in greater delegation of authority and in keeping with this tendency he relied rather heavily on his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Dulles a veteran career diplomat found the “containment policy” too passive and therefore opted for a more dynamic policy of “massive retaliation” to be directed specifically at Moscow and Peking (now Beijing) in the event of any further Communist aggression in the world. His willingness to go “to the brink of war” to “roll back” Communism and free Eastern Europe led to his foreign policy being known as “brinkmanship.” It was during his period that the U.S. detonated its first hydrogen bomb in 1952. The arms race between the superpowers was so intense that within six month the USSR responded in kind.⁹⁸

Yet, despite these dramatic tensions in 1963 the U.S. and U.S.S.R. set up a direct teletype hotline connection between Moscow and Washington DC. In 1963 too, the U.S.S.R. began buying wheat from the West. Nevertheless, a range of episodes like the Bay of Pigs, the Berlin Wall (1961-1989) and the Cuban Missile Crisis were enacted, erected or both enacted and erected, as if to brace up their eroding Cold War credibility

⁹⁷ Surprisingly, for someone with so thorough a martial foundation, the distinguished Eisenhower displayed fine qualities of mind and heart and came across in much of the Third World and in Eastern Europe too as a true statesman. But, these episodes, nonetheless, indicate that though Eisenhower’s America was tough on rhetoric it did precious little to really check the spreading Communist influence in the Third World in general and even in Eastern Europe in particular. Still, in 1960 when the Soviets shot down a U.S. reconnaissance flight over its airspace, it could scuttle the summit conference between them. The American debacle in Cuba perhaps typifies this attitude best. The Eisenhower-Khrushchev understanding then, obviously, was meant to preserve and enlarge the climate of détente then obtaining in American-Soviet relations.

⁹⁸ In East Asia, the Eisenhower administration was able to arrange an armistice in the Korean War. Though Eisenhower increased economic and military aid to the French fighting in Indochina, he however rejected Dulles suggestion of a tactical usage of nuclear weapons against the Communist dominated Vietnamese nationalists, proving his true statesmanship and emphatically underscoring that the buck finally stops with the president despite any earlier delegations. In spite of this display of restraint in a far off region, yet John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, ordered in 1962, a naval quarantine off Cuba nearer his home turf and insisted on removal of nuclear-capable missiles from Cuba in exchange for similar withdrawal of American ones from Turkey.

across the world.⁹⁹ Yet an idealistic and accommodating Kennedy said America would “[l]et every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty”.¹⁰⁰ The post-Cuban Missile crisis period saw the start of a period of “thaw” in the Cold War as relations grew much friendlier with the Soviet Union.

Although the U.S. has traditionally been involved in Latin America, the Third World of the western hemisphere, in the period 1946-1975, its aid to this region was generally much less than its aid to Asia. For example, American military aid to Brazil, the biggest recipient in the region was only about U.S. \$ 603 million whereas the amount ploughed towards S. Vietnam was an astronomical U.S. \$ 16.5 billion¹⁰¹ though this was mainly due to the fact that America was bankrolling a war there then. But, then again even the Middle East received more American aid than Latin America. Meanwhile, the Soviet’s, slowly but surely increasing, interest saw them extending economic and military aid to Central American countries like Nicaragua over vociferous objection from America.¹⁰²

In 1961 and 62 Kennedy sent military advisers to S.E. Asia including to Laos. After the tough sounding late 1940s American policies of containment and the tougher early 1950s “rolling back” policies, especially of then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the American policies of the 1960s and 70s appeared strangely rather ambivalent if not actually

⁹⁹ Nonetheless, the world was led to believe that the superpowers were on the brink of a nuclear war which would, upon first strike, easily set them back in population by at least 100 million each. Anyway, thankfully a nuclear atmospheric test-ban agreement was dramatically achieved and a treaty to that effect was signed in 1963 under the watch of Kennedy, that youthful Democrat.

¹⁰⁰ The charming President J.F. Kennedy in one of the best Inaugural Addresses on record, delivered in Washington, D.C. on 20th January, 1961 and now available at: <<https://www.jfklibrary.org>>.

¹⁰¹ Noam Chomsky, *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs* (London: Pluto/ South End, 2000), p. i.

¹⁰² In Cuba, Fidel Castro who came to power in January 1959 after ousting the corrupt dictator Fulgencio Batista utilized the early 1960s to consolidate close relations with the Soviet bloc. The Soviets, of course, won and kept the loyalty of their client in America’s backyard by showering various aids including soft loans, even through allowing overpriced Cuban exports to the USSR and of course, completely charmed them through outright grants too. America’s implementation of the CIA plan drawn under the Eisenhower administration, to dislodge Castro using Cuban exiles met with unmitigated disaster. Subsequent American failure to intervene with regular American troops led Khrushchev to underestimate the determination of Kennedy to fight communism. So, like in Berlin during the Cuban Missile crisis too Kennedy had to stand firm. Only this determination of Kennedy plus the American overwhelming conventional and nuclear military superiority especially in the Caribbean region made the Soviets to finally give in to the counter pressure. To follow up, in March 1961, Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, an initiative of aid and trade to help Latin American countries.

indifferent. It was during these later periods that the USSR made much headway within the Third World.¹⁰³ Perhaps, to balance the unchecked Russian ascendancy during these later periods, Communist China, for the first time, moved closer towards America. The American desire to encourage this development could also explain its weak response to the Soviet advances, as any appearance of an increase in American strength may spark a renewed comradeship between the leading communist states. The pan-communist control of Indochina was so complete that in a remarkable irony of world politics then obtaining, two powerful communist states backed two adversarial communist regimes there.¹⁰⁴ Thus, we saw a Soviet-supported Vietnam crossing bayonets with the Chinese-backed Khmer Communists in that region.

Lyndon Baines Johnson who assumed the U.S. Democratic presidency upon Kennedy's assassination got a bit too martial. Even while taking on a heavy domestic socio-economic agenda he ordered bombings on North Vietnam, boosted troop strengths in Indochina and intervened with U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic,¹⁰⁵ all in 1965. Still, he was able to host Soviet Premier Aleksei Nikolayevich Kosygin later in 1967. The Republican President Richard Nixon came into office with apparent Cold War vengeance and almost immediately went on to out-do his democratic predecessors by sending U.S. combat troops in 1970 into Cambodia to destroy the enemy sanctuaries, ironically, under his "secret plan to end the war."

He extended lend-lease to South Vietnam, supplying the tools of war to the natives, thereby, like Johnson did a F. D. R. to Asia. This seeming Cold Warrior later in 1972 not

¹⁰³ The weak American response to the obvious Russian advance could be variously attributed to perhaps American over-engagement in Vietnam, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet rift and, of course, the over-arching existence, then, of the relatively friendly climate of détente between the U.S. and the USSR.

¹⁰⁴ Francis Fukuyama, "Gorbachev and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1986), p. 729.

¹⁰⁵ Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, 2nd edn. (Boston, MA.: South End, 1979), pp. 243-251.

only went to China but also met Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev himself in Moscow in a Henry Kissinger-inspired endeavor towards achieving a general détente.¹⁰⁶ While there he signed agreements (1972) to limit missiles including ABMs. Having, thus, struck agreements with these communist powers, he went on for a cease-fire with Vietnam itself in 1973. Building on his apparent policy of “strategic passivism,” he toured the Middle East before being persuaded to resign as president, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.

Taking over from a resigning Nixon in 1974, another Republican, President Gerald Rudolph Ford, as if pre-arranged, immediately granted him an “absolute” pardon for all his federal crimes as a president to the total dismay of a dumbfounded America. After achieving agreement with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev on the number of offensive strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems till 1985, at Vladivostok, in the Russian Far East, Ford went on in 1975 to witness the fall of Saigon and surrender of South Vietnam to the Communist North, perhaps just in time to somberly mark the 200th birth anniversary of the United States in 1976. Attempting to inaugurate the U.S. into its third century on a better footing, an America on the decline, decided to elect James Earl (“Jimmy”) Carter, Jr., a deeply moralist Democrat, and that too an outsider, as president.¹⁰⁷ Carter also improved upon the earlier Republican initiative with China and the Soviet Union by similarly establishing diplomatic relations with China and reaching limitation agreement on Strategic Arms in the form of SALT with Soviet President Brezhnev. Unlike the Republicans however, Carter was able to do these better, thanks initially to a relatively less hostile Democratic Congress. Seagrave captures this adjustable and accommodative spirit of the U.S. in a related context thus:

¹⁰⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*, 8th rev. edn. (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1997), pp.228-229.

¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, he signed treaties towards the neutralization of the Panama Canal and, significantly for this research, also created a Department of Energy in 1977 under the watch of James R. Schlesinger. Carter proceeded to work out at Camp David along with Menachem Begin and Muhammad Anwar el-Sadat frameworks of peace in the Middle East and specifically that between Israel and Egypt.

“America insists that China instal a democratic system modelled on Western concept of universal justice and morality. Asians respond that trust and justice are not abstractions, and only tyranny and corruption are absolute. Taiwan shows how a government shielded and enriched by America did nothing to advance democracy, until that protection was removed; now the KMT buys time from the firing squad by showering its citizens with liberties”.¹⁰⁸

However, unfortunately for the militantly humanist Carter, seeming to save the Shah of Iran, later ran America afoul in the judicious eyes of an even more spiritually pious Ayatullah Ruhallah Khomeini. Carter’s ill-advised decision to rub I. R. Iran the wrong way and worst mishandling the hostage crisis there brought America into renewed notoriety and it is believed also primarily robbed Carter of an otherwise deserved second presidential term. Sadly, against the best interest of the United States and the world at large, an Islamophobic element of the American establishment, managed to cunningly set-up two obvious moralist, faithfully at each others’ throats, thereby unwittingly stabbing the assiduously built “strategic passivism” in the back and simultaneously setting-up Radical Islam as an inflated threat, thereby effectively postponing a possible era of global peace.

Having run into bad luck, doubly-ironically, with a liberal-moralist president, the U.S. then resigned to script-in a popular and accomplished actor, the Republican convert Ronald Wilson Reagan, as its 40th president. Reagan a dramatic Cold Warrior was rewarded by an unsuspecting Iran with the release of 52 American hostages instantly upon his Inauguration.¹⁰⁹ The relatively muted American response to the expansionary provocation of the Soviet Union till the late 70s abruptly changed when the theatrically belligerent President Reagan rolled into the White House. The Reagan administration authoritatively chaperoned by George H.W. Bush and foxily marshaled by Secretary of

¹⁰⁸ Seagrave, *Lords of the Rim*, op. cit., pp. 366-7.

¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, jollily surviving an early assassination attempt on 30th March 1981 and about three years into his presidency, terrorist bombings killed 100s of U.S. peacekeeping forces in Lebanon in October 1983. Elsewhere in the Third World, vowing to “restore order and democracy” U.S. troops also invaded Grenada.

State George P. Shultz and Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci and which, quite inexplicably, saw an unprecedented turnover¹¹⁰ of eminent National Security Advisors, remarkably outspent militarily and out-proposed politically the Soviets in charming the Third World leaderships and otherwise pushed up the cost of cultivating clients amongst them. Remarkably, for a “cold warrior” who long considered the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire,” Reagan met Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev thrice all entirely in the short four-year span of his second term, obviously playing a dramatic role there, given that the C.I.A. itself finds him to be a president lacking in substance. Not wanting to be outdone even theatrically by Reagan, perhaps also aspiring to eclipse even Khomeini as the “Man of the Decade” and wishing to seize the international limelight at any cost Gorbachev on his part reduced Soviet forces unilaterally by half a million troops and 10,000 tanks.¹¹¹

In between, under his very principled nose, the U.S. administration bombed alleged “terrorist targets” in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya in 1986 and curiously too, his trusty officials secretly sold weapons, pre-positioned in Israel, to I. R. Iran and diverted the profits to revolutionaries in Nicaragua in what later came to be known as the Iran-Contra affairs. Presumably, these “secrets” also served to cement U.S.-Soviet engagement especially as covertly facilitated under H.W. Bush and Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, both veteran, respective establishments’ crypto-technocrats and/or espionage-chiefs.¹¹² Subsequent investigations brought home to the conveniently Alzheimer-prone president, the allegedly unknown episodes of his own play-acting presidency. The new post-Cold War U.S. presidencies that followed Reagan’s own would see the enactment of similar dramas too, only far bloodier and not just, as usual, in the Third World alone.

¹¹⁰ See US Cabinet Table in Appendix II on p. 455.

¹¹¹ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 791.

¹¹² For a photograph of their apparent first encounter, see Christopher Andrew, *For the President’s Eyes Only* (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), p. Illustrations insert facing page 309.

Emerging much consolidated from Reagan's useful shadow, the thorough-bred blue-blooded oily politician, and now president too, George Herbert Walker Bush had no difficulty in super-competently supplanting the rather characteristically-pleasant but over-delegating Reagan. Seizing the opportunity offered by Emperor Michinomiya Hirohito's funeral in Japan he visited both China and South Korea, trying to capitalize on his past diplomatic links with that Far Eastern region. Curiously to me, Bush has a strong knack for (if I may coin, a new political phrasal term here) Condolence–Diplomacy.¹¹³

It is not for nothing, that Bush is known, to the politically well-versed world, as the first post-Cold War U.S. president for; after all, he is a, if not the, key player in the Cold War endgame. Having earlier, as prospective president, induced Marxist countries with his possible offer of outright loans,¹¹⁴ now as president he toured Eastern Europe urging them to adopt free-market policies. Perhaps, in keeping with the realist policy of “constructive engagement” America, this time, under H.W. Bush rapidly moved to build on Reagan's Afghanistanism by, strangely, invading Panama in late 1989, overthrew the government and capturing strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega, his old ally who apparently had then gone rogue.

Graduating from invasion to liberation, Bush freed Kuwait from Saddam's troops at the head of a U.N.-backed intervention coalition in 1991, thereby pulling the curtains down on the then convenient earlier “Vietnam Syndrome” and the even more annoying later “Iranian Syndrome” that has been said to have been continually afflicting America. Following an entire month of air war, America with Allied support retook Kuwait in just four days of ground assault with minimal U.S. casualties. Leaving Saddam still on the

¹¹³ After all, it was only a few years before this, in 1985, to nail the exact year, that, as vice-president, he attended Konstantin Chernenkov's funeral where he buddied-up with Gorbachev, an anointed Andropov protege. In the following few years, the world saw, what a global game-changer this fateful interaction turned out to be.

¹¹⁴ George Bush and Doug Wead, *Man of Integrity* (Eugene, Oregon: Harvest House Pub., 1988), n.pg. given but, presumably “p. 197.”

saddle,¹¹⁵ Bush, however, could not sustain the popularity he gained by spilling innocent Iraqi blood beyond 1991, when basic economics caught up with him at home. While doubts about the real motives of the Persian Gulf War began affecting his popularity, still the disintegration of the Soviet Union throughout 1991 did serve to enhance his status somewhat and enabled America to wallow in the limelight of shallow-triumphalism¹¹⁶ for some moments, longer.

Having benefited from the economic boom of Reagan's America and the contributing "Voodoo economics" of Reaganomics, Bush continued overseeing, but now as the president, the mismanagement of those resultant economic resources by squandering the same on military campaigns in some of the Third World states and on economic inducements hazarded onto the Eastern Bloc. These cumulatively brought the American economy into a recession by 1991.¹¹⁷ Given the dismal economic outlook, America decided to elect Clinton on his economic agenda. Accordingly, Clinton oversaw NAFTA kicking-in in 1994, thereby integrating Mexico substantively into the North American economy and in 1995 oversaw the establishment of the WTO as if to crown U.N.'s 50th year.

The democrat, Clinton, restored ousted Aristide to power in Haiti, in 1994. America under Clinton later continued to maintain 100s of U.S. troops in Haiti, to keep it from slipping into chaos in 1997. Earlier on, unwilling to stop ethnic-cleansing in Bosnia using U.S. ground troops, Clinton, nonetheless, sent U.S. peacekeepers to enforce the U.S.-brokered Dayton Accord there in Nov. 1995. Did we see "liberal internationalism" playing

¹¹⁵ US News and World Report, *Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War* (New York: Times, 1992).

¹¹⁶ A goal for which it had long seeded, see Richard M. Nixon, *1999: Victory without War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988). See also Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National Interest* Summer 1989: 3-18; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992).

¹¹⁷ It was the staggering budget deficit and the high national debt of an increasingly unemployed America that effectively ruined his chances of re-election despite obviously having boosted the American national ego with his vain-glorious foreign policy and national security activism.

out differently in these cases? Anyway, the expanded NATO was left to extend the mission if it chooses to. America re-elects Clinton in 1996 on account of his first term economic performance. A strong stock market, robust economy and prudent economic management produced a federal budget surplus for the first time in about 30 years in 1998 with Clinton planning towards balancing the budget by 2002. Having satisfied his domestic audience with a tidy economic performance during his first term, he began using this politico-economic capital to address some of the global problems in his second term.¹¹⁸

Earnest in his economic priorities, Clinton wasted little of American's time in easing restrictions on humanitarian aid and travel to Cuba, i.e.: sanctions which were imposed after Cuban MIGs shot down two private planes commuting Cuban exiles that violated Cuban airspace earlier in 1996. The U.S. and its allies opposed independence for Albanian-dominated Kosovo from Serbia in 1998 and instead worked for restoring just its autonomy which was stripped from it by Slobodan Milosevic in 1989. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Bosnia was initially confined to being an U.N. "protectorate." Then in 1999 Clinton and Tony Blair, at long last intervened with a 78-days NATO bombardment of Serbia during which campaign the Chinese embassy was allegedly mistakenly bombed.¹¹⁹ Thus, the Balkans was, it is claimed, once again saved from descending into chaos.¹²⁰ Perhaps to divert attention from his national and personal scandals, Clinton aerially punishes alleged terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Sudan in Aug. 1998 blaming them for bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, where over 250

¹¹⁸ Though America was able to oversee peace breaking-out between Israel and Jordan in 1994, Clinton however failed to revive the larger Middle East peace process even after meeting both Netanyahu and Arafat, separately, in Washington, D.C. in Jan. 1998, mainly because of continued Israeli control over West Bank and Jerusalem. Though Clinton credited the U.S. military in the Persian Gulf for producing a deal with Saddam, still he wanted to use only covert operations, beyond the C.I.A., against Saddam. We may recall Clinton, quite arbitrarily, told Saddam: "You cannot defy the will of the world" and vowed, in Jan.1998, to prevent Iraq from using WMD.

¹¹⁹ See Glen Yeadon and John Hawkins, *The Nazi Hydra in America: Suppressed History of a Century* (Joshua Tree, Calif.: Progressive P, 2008), p. 499. Whether the CIA deliberately misled Clinton on the targeting or Clinton himself exploited the agency's well known propensity to do so, to advance his own agenda in the Balkens, one can never be certain at this juncture.

¹²⁰ China, the unofficial champion of the Third World, was only recently known as the "Butchers of Beijing" to the American media but by 1998, had transformed, in America eyes, to be the "Bulwark of Stability" given their, if little else, mutual economic imperatives. Having boosted Yeltsin's election prospect by promising economic aid to Russia earlier, Clinton visited Moscow in Sept. 1998 where Yeltsin sought U.S. help to lure back deserting international investors. In his entire tenure, the Rwandan crisis was perhaps his biggest failure.

innocent lives were lost. Winning the presidency on an electoral technicality, George W. Bush, his father's true son, but seemingly on the mend, controversially led America into a what for the world at large obviously appears to be a shockingly bloody, new millennium.

Whatever secretly bugged Al-Qaeda, surprisingly, they decided to take out their frustrations on an incoming, though not innocuous, Bush. Perhaps, conveniently, forgetting that it was really Clinton's America that punished their fellow groups for bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa in Aug. 1998 they, allegedly, terroristically ambushed the iconic WTC towers and the Pentagon, curiously, in Bush-time America on 11th Sept., 2001, it is reported, tragically, killing about 3,000 innocent multi-national lives.¹²¹ Even with numerous prior, secret but accurate, warnings by highly responsible American officials,¹²² Bush still could not act in time to prevent losses of innocent lives.¹²³

Later Bush, as if on a cue, but this time so clear-headedly, vowed to get back at them, i.e.: at the amorphous Al-Qaeda, with a "war against terrorism." Accordingly, America under Bush not only attacked whatever they took for being "al-Qaeda" but also, perhaps under a policy of "moral militarism," deposed al-Qaeda's devoted host the Taliban in Afghanistan, whose immediate, alleged crime was just being duly grateful, in itself a fine quality, that the American elites must not have failed to observe in the Talibans, when they themselves hosted the Talibans earlier in the U.S. itself.¹²⁴ With the Afghanistan campaign

¹²¹ For a reasonable assessment of this tragic disaster and its pre-Iraq war consequences, see Fred Halliday, *Two Hours That Shook the World: September 11, 2001: Causes and Consequences* (London: Saqi Books, 2002).

¹²² Even pre-G. W. Bush-era U.S. and foreign officials were quite in the loop on the activities of these extremists. In fact, even the Malaysian Special Branch provided intelligence support to the U.S. to cover the 5th Jan. 2000 Al-Qaeda operational meeting in a K.L. condominium of a Western-educated Malay Malaysian. Whether known or unknown to all the parties involved, these extremists' antics and the security co-operation extended as a response, actually had various "CIA operatives" involved at every end, if not also at every turn. Thus, these preludes to the subsequently bloody activities clearly indicate that the 9/11 false flag tragedies were a TOTAL insider CIA job, actually abusing and undermining the very spirit of international security cooperations, and have little to do with the benign Islamic religion, which was needlessly maligned, as a consequence. Why do religion and the religious have to be tarnished in these shenanigans forged entirely by the security and/or so-called security sectors of these basically secular nations? Does the Zionist-abused U.S. aim, thereby, to expose the habitual sycophancies of its Muslim allies, to their own societies and to the larger world, thereby?

¹²³ Strangely, he, unlike his habitually on-the-toes father, was then nothing but simply in stupid inertia, too caught-up in childish narrations, or so it seemed!

¹²⁴ America's strange associations and unique working relations with various reincarnations of terrorists, including Muslim ones, first in the form of the anti-Soviet *Mujahideens*, then in the form of the anti-socialist *Talibans* and thereafter with the amorphous anti-secular *al-Qaeda* and its ilk, perplexes many thinking scholars, including, for example, the much confounded but respectable Indian Justice Hosbet

yet incomplete, on Jan. 2002, under sudden mysterious, perhaps Neo-Con promptings, Bush specifically named Iran, Iraq and N. Korea as the “axis of evil”. Only later did Americans understand that this was just the tactical appetizer to greater blood-letting evils that were about to be released from their own shores. Meanwhile, hopping to Moscow in May 2002, Bush met Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and, inter alia, signed a pact to cut nuclear armaments.¹²⁵

Meanwhile, having sold an incredible Afghanistan and Iraqi threats story successfully to the U.S. public,¹²⁶ the American electorate handsomely re-elected Bush in 2004 even without much military successes to merit it. Worse, later the U.S. senate concluded that the U.S. intelligence on Iraqi WMD, the very basis for their attack, was itself flawed. More difficult for the U.S. public to swallow was the fact that U.S. taxpayers’ billions were pumped out to rebuild Iraq while at home itself, New Orleans was left to struggle after being deluged by hurricane Katrina. Meanwhile, the first lady Laura Bush toured the Middle East promoting Women’s Rights and Democracy even while unsurprisingly America’s half-baked efforts to instil democracy in Iraq¹²⁷ only graduated from, this time, insurgency to a civil war in 2006. On a “positive” note, America under lame duck Bush surged troops into Iraq in 2008 and unbelievably albeit, this time, commendably worked with Sunni militias to bring down the level of violence there.

Suresh who publicly declared: “There is no difference between the USA and the *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, both believe in killing the innocent.” In this regard, watch *Tonight with Dr. Zakir Naik*, “Is Terrorism a Muslim monopoly?,” Peace TV, telecasted over *Hijrah TV* (Malaysia), on 13th September 2014 at 11.10 p.m. Also cf. Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third...*, op. cit., *passim* on America’s deep rooted dubious accomplishments of terror at a global scale in this regard.

¹²⁵ Sure enough, in March 2003 the U.S. and its usually reliable poodle U.K. launched an air and ground war against Iraq, where for some while Saddam was accused of hiding WMD and for at least 17 other U.N. resolution violations. Bush had said Saddam’s removal was necessary for U.S. security but annoyingly the bloodier replacement of bloody Saddam did not bring any security but instead only saw worse insurgency rising. U.S. troop numbers in Iraq kept rising along with this growing insurgency that by Sept. 2005 they stood at 140,000.

¹²⁶ Despite the usual reliability of the Anglo-American crusading solidarity, which their leaders routinely never fail to profitably tap into, there are signs that the Europeans and the U.S. public are wiseing up to the new incompatible and unsustainable realities of the actual costs of these ridiculously-idealistic wars; U.S. publics simply can’t bear that it is the Euro poodles who get all the cuddles while they only got and still get bloody and fleeced, for nothing much in return. In this context, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, with moderational introductions by David Ignatius (New York: Basic, 2008), pp. 204-205.

¹²⁷ On America’s democracy hatching enterprise in Iraq, see V. Stanski, “Linchpin for Democracy: The Critical Role of Civil Society in Iraq” *Journal of Third World Studies* 2005; also cf. E. Davis, “Why Iraq Might be a Better Candidate for Democracy Than You Think” *Foreign Policy Research Institute* 2003.

Certain hidden forces propelled freshman senator Obama to the fore, so much so that he himself was surprised with his belated positive over-coverage, in the media,¹²⁸ that is. In this regard, he had also quipped: “I’m overexposed, I’m making Paris Hilton look like a recluse.” Still, as U.S. economy deteriorated and insurgencies gained strength both in Iraq and Afghanistan pushing the real costs of these wars even higher, never mind the shame that these are also deficit and debt-financed conflicts, Obama picked up courage and successfully took on a Bush-linked veteran, John McCain in the 2008 election, who was then riding high on even bipartisan strength.

Riding on a media-hyped popularity, Obama easily defeated McCain and became the 44th U.S. President. Determined to leave behind Bush’s rather bloody legacy as rapidly as possible, he apparently followed the pointers¹²⁹ offered by the U.S. National Security Strategy 2009 and began retreating somewhat from Bush’s “axis of evil” agenda and it seemed began refocusing on Afghanistan-linked issues and reworked relationships with fresh socialism-apostates in China and Russia, clearly under the spell of “strategic reassurance.” But the refocusing and reworking did not stick for long apparently as by 2011 under Obama’s change agenda, ironically, the U.S. began, perhaps as an extension of its “Arab Spring” sponsorship, also seeding terroristic uprisings in Syria, now believing the Russians to be on board too, courtesy of his accommodating policy!

America’s Various Interests and Concerns in the Muslim World; especially so Within the Central Asian Convicinity

The previous section of this chapter was largely concerned with an analysis of perceivable American motivations, agency, plausible interests in and actual behavior within the

¹²⁸ See Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer, *The Post-American Presidency: The Obama Administration’s War on America* (New York and London: Threshold, 2010), pp. 248-249.

¹²⁹ “Overview of United States of America’s National Security Strategy 2009: Counterterrorism Policy Recommendations and Implications,” Task Force 2009 (Seattle, WA.: Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, 2009).

erstwhile Third World and especially concerns America's attitude towards its small-state-allies therein. Though this research is about U.S. relations with CAS/CARs, which we will be addressing directly in Chapters 3 and 4, it is important to look at the record briefly here of American relations with the Muslim World too because the CARs are themselves largely Muslim, if not also Islamic, in content; mostly small-states themselves, relatively energy-significant and contemporarily strategically-located too and being very similar as such, may be treated in the same light too by the United States.¹³⁰ After all it is not without reason that the U.S. has institutionally clustered most of them at the DOS under its Bureau of South and Central Asia; and at the COCOM of the DOD, specifically, under its CentCom which overwhelmingly engages Muslim states,¹³¹ as we can readily see in Map 24.

This present section, however, gets just one more level closer to the area of our analytical focus by attempting to discuss the American involvement in and interaction with the Muslim world, very broadly, the Middle Eastern region in general and the Central Asian neighborhood in particular wherein the Americans and the new Central Asian states encounter each other in events and developments that end-up shaping their perceptions of and policies, imagined or actual, towards one another. The Middle Eastern region and the immediate Central Asian periphery, including the adjacent contiguous areas of fundamentally non-Muslim neighboring powers, of course, are overwhelmingly Muslim in character and forms or once formed the central core of the Muslim world, as may be verified in the historical Appendix I, at the end of this study.

¹³⁰ See Philip Robins, "The Middle East and Central Asia" in *The New Central Asia and its Neighbours*, ed. Peter Ferdinand (RIIA, London: Pinter, 1994), 55-74; See also John O. Voll, "Central Asia as a Part of the Modern Islamic World" in *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Beatrice F. Manz (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1994).

¹³¹ Michael DeLong and Noah Lukeman, *Inside CentCom: The Unvarnished Truth about the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004). Print.

Though religion is not a focus here, it has latent, if not marginal, relevance in U.S.-CARs relations and the U.S. too is relatively a religion-deferring state very unlike Europe which is stridently secular and, ironically, unlike Turkey, that is trying to integratively embrace a Eurasia which is currently devoted to rediscovering, as again may be discernible in Appendix I, its true religious bearings. America's relations with the larger Muslim world also have certain distinct characteristics that have much to do with, of course, the long-standing Arab-Israeli conflict.

Much broadly, while the U.S. support for its allies in the Muslim world and, particularly, in Muslim internal politics during the 1970s through the early 1990s; for example, their support for the Shah's policing role around the Persian Gulf, their bankrolling of Zia's covert interventions in Afghanistan, their substantial tilting towards Iraq despite their apparent neutrality in the Iraq-Iran war and their cooperation with the exiled Kuwaiti rulers to later drive out Saddam from their invaded lands; caused much anger and created intense animosity between the Americans and wide sections of the Muslim world including among the Central Asians (though Soviet-influenced as they then were); however, subsequent American hostility to revolution-exporting Iran, disagreements with China, then with Russia, and relative abandonment of martial Pakistan, not to mention also the later initiatives to build Middle East peace brought about some common interest between the Americans and the regimes of the Middle Eastern and Central Asian states including those that were appearing and disappearing periodically within Afghanistan.

The earlier part of this chapter helped us to conclude that major power competition, if not also rivalry, in many respects, had, exacerbated American involvement in states that are variously termed small, little or mini-states. American involvement is seen basically in their multi-faceted aid and assistance programs to these mostly weak and needy states. It

can also be noted in the numerous American armed interventions and military commitments across the globe.¹³² While the Americans have been overly keen to intervene across the world, this attitude was not always, constantly there. For example, after their bloody Indo-China debacle they did develop a Vietnam syndrome which they used, when suitable, to keep them relatively home-bound.¹³³

Then again after a short interlude of Gulf War jingoism and Cold War “triumphalism” they again developed a sort of lethargy in carrying out their self-mandated international security duty, complaining especially about the presence of security free-riders all over the world.¹³⁴ In the 1990s they were openly bitter with not only their First-World allies but also with their expanding erstwhile Third World ones too. Besides cost considerations the other factors that made the United States less adventurous were, of course, the world-wide expansion of anti-americanism at the popular level and the general political disposition of the post-Vietnam American leaderships, in general, and the sex-scandals-plagued Clinton administrations, in particular. The satisfactory continuity of this unattractive trend for the administration of Bush Jr. was rudely shattered by the catastrophic September 11 terrorist attacks¹³⁵ in the U.S. that at once served to bloodily awaken America from the Post-Cold war isolationist slumber into which it had irresponsibly drifted and almost dozed-off after being an over-enthusiastic key catalyst for the instability and destruction of some Muslim regions in the later Cold War years.

¹³² These range from Haiti in the Caribbean to Kuwait in the Middle East and through to South Korea in East Asia and all the way back across the Pacific Ocean to Panama at their own hemispheric backyard in Central America. Also not to be overlooked is their contemporary armed expedition into Iraq and Afghanistan even at their antipodes.

¹³³ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776* (Oxford; New York: Oxford U P, 2008).

¹³⁴ Fukuyama, *The End of History and...*, op. cit.

¹³⁵ For the most authoritative report on this tragedy, see Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, et al., eds. *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States*, Authorized edition (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2004) but see also again Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, *Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission* (New York: Vintage, 2007) for the controversies the original report generated and especially on the alleged Al-Qaeda-Iraq link, chap. II.

This section of the chapter attempts to discuss the past and present American behavior mainly in the larger Middle Eastern region that embraces the Central Asian periphery, and sometimes, also in the light of the on-going U.S.-Russian cooperation/competition therein too. For two hundred years even before the dawn of the 20th century, Czarist Russia expanded itself over what was largely Ottoman and Persian-influenced Central Asian Emirates like Bokhara, Khiva and Samarkand and were closing-in, in 1883, on even Afghanistan.¹³⁶ Meanwhile, driven by European industrialization and the attendant opportunity to augment his oil holdings Rockefeller, the Jewish American capitalist, decided to expand his venture by acquiring the hydrocarbon resources of colonial powers like France, Holland, Spain and Portugal.

However, Russia (with its own vast hydrocarbon resources) was weakened and stopped in its expansionary track by the outbreak of World War One and the Communist Revolution in Russia. The triumphant Western nations particularly this time, including an American-backed Britain, began consolidating their positions in the Middle East and were subjecting what were known later as Northern Tier states to greater pressure even while repeatedly attempting to intervene within Afghanistan even with overwhelming force. Being a background chapter that is both regional and thematic in treatment, this chapter like the other non-focal associated component of this research, as one can clearly see, may not consistently adhere to a, “since the World War II timeframe.”

Russia meanwhile, recoiled into an atheistic post-revolutionary isolationist mode. This interlude of Russian isolationism, however, began again to evaporate around the 1920s. Western nations, particularly Great Britain, used the period of chaos in Russia to gradually consolidate their position around the, now, Soviet underbelly running from the

¹³⁶ See Table 3, p.88 and Appendix I, pp. 426-427.

Black Sea area through the Caucasus and Soviet Central Asia to beyond Chinese Turkestan which effectively means courting and/or tying down countries like Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan not to mention also bracing-up their own position in British India.¹³⁷

The Western nations went about creating and strengthening “nationalist” regimes by shoring-up traditional feudal and aristocratic structures towards starving-off the appeal of Communism in these countries. In pre-partition India, the British even co-opted Islam and Muslims, a religion and community which, given their crusading experience, they, the British, have always deliberately victimized, with the complicity of the Hindu upper classes, in their continuing revengeful spirit, up to a point, in their campaign to ideologically check the apparently inevitable advancement of Communism into a poverty-saturated, Muslim-aggrieved and hence ripe and vulnerable country.¹³⁸ Meanwhile, despite their suspicion of West-sponsored, “nationalism” in the Middle East region, the Soviets did make gradual efforts to “revolutionize the imperialist rear.” The Soviets were, however, caught in a recurring dilemma. Should they encourage the Communist and lose a friendly nationalist regime, or co-operate with these desperately friendly regimes and destroy all possibility of local communists coming to power sometime in the future?¹³⁹ Western nations have all along given much help, in various forms, to, in particular, the elites, if not also the masses, of the countries and areas of these regions.

The Soviets perhaps, taking a tactical leaf from past Tsarist intercourse, therefore, decided to support the ruling nationalists both politically and materially with the view to wean away these nationalist elites from addiction to the West. Towards this end they did not even mind antagonizing their own communist comrades in these countries. The West

¹³⁷ After about two years of strengthening atheistic, Communist rule in the new Soviet space the Russian/Soviets once again fell to competitive urges and began developing friendly relations with Turkey and even signed treaties of friendship with Afghanistan and Persia. Their purpose here was obviously to undermine aggressive British influence-building in that region.

¹³⁸ The historical Appendix I, appearing later, situates these disjointed affairs, throughout, in their proper chronological contexts.

¹³⁹ Joseph Stalin, *Foundation of Leninism* (New York: International Pub., 1939), pp. 79-80.

also was aware that as a transitional tactic the Soviet did not mind striking up alliances with those they call bourgeois-nationalists in these countries. Because of this new Soviet flexibility and ability to adjust tactically towards the realization of their strategic goals in the region, the Western nations too adopted similar tactics, by tempering their aggressive tendencies with more subtle approaches.¹⁴⁰

American policies framed for any region in the world are usually done so either with a view to enhance its own self-preservation or aimed to secure highly cherished albeit not necessarily altruistic objectives or to capitalize on diverse opportunities around the globe that arise with the passage of time. The Middle East including the Central Asian neighborhood is, of course, no exception to this basic American truism. The Middle Eastern policy of the United States has mostly been pegged to its strategic well-being and, purportedly, that of its chief allies in the region, i.e.: principally Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan and, up till 1979, Pahlavi Iran.¹⁴¹

Besides most of these countries are, along with pre-1979 Iran, indispensable to the United States because they constituted or still constitute as major markets for American arms, trade, investments and capital goods. Afghanistan, in C.A., commanded much but belated U.S. attention during the Cold War era as part of its policy to subvert and undermine the Soviet evil, and in the immediate post-Cold War period Afghanistan

¹⁴⁰ Thus, one sees both the West and the Soviets adapting and adopting accommodative methods in their competitive efforts to retain as much influence and control in these regions even though they may, by habit, relapse, once in a while, into their traditional infamous meaner ways. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, going against these pragmatic trends, must have occurred precisely in this context, if we are to take Zbigniew Brzezinski's later assertion seriously. Anyway, this *modus operandi* of theirs continues to the present times not just in spirit but, often, also in form.

¹⁴¹ Generally, the West's guilt and remorse for the Holocaust and Israel's multi-faceted strengths and, particularly, its powerful lobbies within the U.S. political system itself makes U.S. regard for and support to it, highly imperative. Egypt and Turkey are influential leaders of the Arab and Turkic worlds respectively and both have bottleneck control over important straits that link politico-economically vital open seas. *Inter alia* for both these reasons the U.S. attaches much importance to them. Again Turkey and also Pakistan are known as strong Muslim states with staunch, if on occasion unwieldy, pro-U.S. regimes or juntas that must be assiduously cultivated. Moreover Pakistan and by extension, Afghanistan are coveted by the U.S. for their strategic location, being the only states that physically link South Asia and East Asia with Central Asia and West Asia. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait along with most of the other Gulf states are important to the U.S. because of their material resources, particularly, for their abundant energy reserves and the quick wealth potential they represent.

obviously was abandoned¹⁴² briefly only to be recovered with renewed vigor again, in the later post-Soviet period, especially given the further unavailability of a compliant Iran, as a strategic springboard of the U.S. into a new and expectant Central Asia.

Continually throughout the Soviet period the U.S. had vigorously courted the elites of the Northern Tier countries in a calculated strategy to head off the magnetic attraction of Soviet-inspired progressivism, if not also communism, to the general masses in these Muslim lands. The weak secular regimes in these states were, thus, highly vulnerable. For example, in the mid-1940s, Soviet leaders, particularly, Stalin attempted to extract various concessions from the weak regimes of Iran and Turkey. It must not be forgotten that, it was the United States which at that juncture stepped in to thwart the Soviet moves.¹⁴³

While this situation, more or less, prevailed in the rest of the free Middle East region, in Soviet Central Asia as a result of the Soviet “Iron Curtain” barrier the United States was denied the opportunity to openly involve meaningfully therein. Furthermore, unlike the Soviet Union the U.S. has, of course, no direct physical access whatsoever, to Central Asia, nor any dependable foothold within that region.¹⁴⁴ Also the religious and cultural make-up of these Marxist-Muslims did not give the U.S. any clear incentive to be enthusiastic within that region even when the capitalistic Afghan elites made welcome overtures and appeals particularly for American arms, the U.S. gave them the cold-shoulder for this reason if not also to please an objecting Pakistan that faced a destabilizing Pukhtoonistan claim from the Afghans, as may be verified in the historical appendix later.

¹⁴² In this context, one Col. Imam quipped: “America had been happy to use Islam to make the mujaheddin fight, but did not want that these mujaheddin make their Islamic government, so they stopped their support and abandoned them.” Qtd. by Christina Lamb, *Farewell Kabul: From Afghanistan to a More Dangerous World* (London: William Collins, 2015), p. 452.

¹⁴³ Perhaps, as a result of this, these two countries, in particular, signed agreements with the U.S. on close cooperation, especially with regard to their security. The British who were holding to the region, generally, at those times had a hard time too starving off sustained Soviet attempts at cultivating the goodwill of these important Muslim states.

¹⁴⁴ Arnold L. Horelick, “Soviet Involvement in the Middle East and the Western Response” *Middle East Information Series* June (1972), p. 3.

This should not be surprising when one considers how even Eastern Europe fared in this regard despite having much closer religio-cultural affinities with the U.S.

If one were to use academia¹⁴⁵ and media¹⁴⁶ coverage as a barometer for measuring U.S. interest on the Middle East, then the available evidence suggests that there has always been a sustained and increasing U.S. interest on that general region over the decades. However, when this is narrowed to the sub-region of Central Asia one notes that in the period when there was détente (1953-1979) in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations there is a noticeable decline in the number of articles and books written by American scholars on Central Asia, generally.¹⁴⁷ Then there was a sudden surge again, sometime in the late 1970s, in scholarly interests on Middle East in general and on Central Asia in particular, a surge that appears to be driven in earnest by the rude shock of the 1973 oil crisis. The Islamic revolution in Iran served only to propel this renewed interest further. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union came in handy as a facilitating opportunity to escalate even further America's newly nascent interest and influence in Central Asia.

Unlike America's long standing commitments and expanding interest in the larger Middle East, the Soviet/Russian involvements and commitments in that larger region, excepting in a few individual countries like Syria and Libya, has been quite fleeting. For example, first the Soviets gave their approval for Czechoslovakian shipments of arms to the Zionists of Palestine and then, amazingly the Soviets were quick also in recognizing, the, then new, state of Israel. Of course, one may say that they did this in pursuit of their overarching goal of crippling Great Britain and its allies, wherever and whenever possible.

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, the numerous eminent scholars on the region and their works listed all across the bibliography.

¹⁴⁶ One may verify this using, for example, the search feature at *Washington Post* website.

¹⁴⁷ There was also an associated disappearance of American specialists and dedicated publications that dealt with the region. This was the situation from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s. Perhaps, the diversion of American energies into the Indo-China crises accounted for the decline of U.S. interest on Middle East during this period.

However, till the Soviet collapse Russian interventions in the Central Asian region itself has been an abiding feature of their domestic policy.

Even in present post-Soviet times, when Russia has engaged internationally albeit with a weaker hand, it has, nonetheless, continued, after a brief interlude of neglect, exercising its influence in the now expanded Central Asian region, a key sector of what it terms as its Near Abroad.¹⁴⁸ By contrast, America's commitment to Israel in the Middle East, whatever the real reasons for it, has been consistent and enduring. Even as America redoubles its efforts, today, to increase its friends and its influence in the Muslim world, using sometimes even unorthodox methods, its commitment to Israel remains, to the chagrin of the perplexed Arab world, vestedly deep. In comparison, with the Russians or any other imperialistic Europeans for that matter, Americans thus appear friendly to peoples seeking self-determination and freedom¹⁴⁹ and, therefore, were attractive as patrons especially to the elites of the erstwhile Third World. Even when communism had wide mass appeal across the Third World, Communist leaderships in the ex-U.S.S.R. and China had viewed all Afro-Asian and Middle Eastern nationalist movements and Third World independences very dimly for a long while.¹⁵⁰

Under this favorable climate of skepticism that reigns strongly in the Communist heartlands and elsewhere, America capitalized on it by seizing the opportunity to establish and develop relations with the leaderships of most of the important newly independent Third World states. America's global geo-strategic calculations demanded that it cultivate these friendly Third World regimes, especially the Muslim ones therein not because of any

¹⁴⁸ Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad'," *Washington Quarterly* 17.3 (Summer) 1994; This concept actually started its history as "inner abroad," but referring to yet another Turkic region: Chechnya. On this, see Gerard Toal, *Near Abroad: Putin, The West, and The Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford U P, 2017), p. 1.

¹⁴⁹ Brzezinski brings out this aspect of the American personality quite well in his *Second Chance*, see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower* (New York: Basic, 2007).

¹⁵⁰ In fact, both these pre-eminent communist powers believed, for long, that Third World leaderships, in general, were little more than self-serving stooges, if not also loyal running dogs, of vacating imperialist powers.

religious, cultural or ideological affinities with them but simply because they providentially happen to be in control of some of the most strategic (in terms of geography, geology and geopolitics) pieces of real estates of that world, a world that their mutual past colonial masters quit because of the various intolerably rising costs and thus burdens to them, in the aftermath of their rivalistic and imperialistic misadventures.¹⁵¹

American involvements in the Muslim world, as currently visualized in Map 14, gradually grew originally from the Eastern Atlantic coast and moved deeper into the Mediterranean region and fanned out across a substantial portion of the Afro-Asian landmass before leap-frogging into the South-East Asian archipelagoes from both Indian and Pacific Ocean areas. Actually America, as an independent nation, first interacted with the Muslim world along the Barbary Coast some 200 years ago and established tributary relations with the weak Maghreb states; states that in contemporary American nomenclature would easily be deemed rogue, or in current, highly-rewarding, parlance terrorist, states.

In this early case of American involvement in the Muslim world, America was, of course, acting in pursuit of its purported objectives: i.e.: protection of free trade, ensuring freedom in the high seas and, strangely it may seem, co-opting states deemed as threats to American interest, even at times, by paying tributes to them.¹⁵² In many respects, America's current involvement in Afghanistan too reflects, inter alia, a preoccupation with similar objectives. Though back then there was no ready oil or the domestic need for it to be imported from the region to attract the Americans, nor any domestically powerful and/or important lobbies and clients to protect, such as Israel in the region, and definitely no

¹⁵¹ They must have reasoned that the unmanageable costs are better transferred to and the burdens better saddled on willing Third World sycophantic mules who being natives, could easily thrive on into the future as uncompromising nationalist leaders, at least, in the eyes of their own societies, and who could also simultaneously and reliably take care of their foreign masters' various interests, less problematically and much cheaper too, on the sly, so long as they park the proceeds in Western banks and tax havens. That the long-suffering Third World multitudes have been duped thus is least of their mutual concern, especially when the resultant bargains are disproportionately rewarding them.

¹⁵² Rand H. Fishbein, "Echoes from the Barbary Coast," *The National Interest* Winter 2001/02, p. 48.

hostile global superpower to contain within the region through securing of strategic locations and bases, nevertheless, the Americans, over the later years, in earnest pursuit of these objectives and various other self-interests, moved inexorably into the relatively lukewarm reception of the Muslim world particularly across the strategic Middle East to gradually replace a credibility-diminished Great Britain therein.

The early years of independent America was, of course, spent consolidating domestically and expanding continentally as dictated by its Manifest Destiny.¹⁵³ As the new state reigned through the decades, the same Destiny, it appears, brought it farther and farther afield, even across the seas and, norm-shatteringly, also out of what it considered to be its own exclusive hemisphere; a hemisphere from which European imperialists were actively encouraged to stay away from. With Europe now trying to keep the U.S. at bay even from a U.S. rebuilt Europe, this is easily understandable.



Map 14 – World Political (Muslim-Majority States - starred)

Source: Adapted from *Whitaker's Almanack 2012*, 144th edn. (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), p. map insert.

¹⁵³ For a good 20th century reinterpretation of these episodes of earlier American history, see Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).

However, opportunities presented by or necessities required by the outbreak of the two World Wars, their dismal consequences across Europe and Asia and America's subsequent emergence as the pre-eminent economic, military and technological power resulted in the whole wide world increasingly looking to remarkable America for charting their own progress and America, in its turn, grew dependent ever more on the whole world for both greater resources and markets. America's relations with the Muslim world, was no exception to this operating norm too. As we can see in Appendix I, the Muslim world both before and after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate was, of course, highly fragmented, being occupied at various times by different imperial powers.¹⁵⁴ For example, after the Tsarist expansions, Russian revolutions and also as a result of the creation of the Soviet Union the entire Muslim population in the Russian realm, including those of Central Asia and the Caucasus fell under overwhelming Russian and/or Soviet influence and rule. The other European colonial powers too had their hold on various other parts of the Muslim world either under direct occupation or under mandate covers. As the effective hold of these colonial powers weakened over the Muslim regions of the world as a result of internal and/or external causes, America, due to its unique and exceptional strengths, attributes and attractions has been able to either supplant them or rapidly to move in and fill the voids created by their self-serving departures. This is surely an U.S. exceptionalism which few rulers in the Muslim World would object to!

Even if one discounts the early activities of American oil pioneers in the Baku region at the turn of the century, later during the 20th century, one still finds within the Arabian peninsula American companies, particularly those in the oil business, making great headway. Specifically, in the 1930s and later, some United States companies secured oil

¹⁵⁴Bertold Spuler, "The Disintegration of the Caliphate in the East" in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, eds. P. M. Holt; Ann S.K. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 2 Vols (Cambridge: Cambridge U P, 1970).

concessions in Saudi Arabia. Then in 1949 Getty Oil of the U.S., later to be acquired by Texaco Inc. in 1984, was granted a 60-year concession by Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁵ The U.S. has continued this behavior due to the energy needs of its important allies and itself, even in the CARs, which we will be analyzing in depth in Chapter 5 of this study, where we will discover that the CARs have the potential to indeed meet these various U.S. needs, well into the medium term. Thus, America was known not only to pursue opportunities in the Muslim world but is also recorded to have missed them too. For example, exceedingly capitalistic promptings prevented the United States in July 1956 from reaching a financial arrangement on the High Aswan Dam project, thus, losing an excellent opportunity out to the Soviets who readily seized it much to the chagrin of the entire West.¹⁵⁶ America's creation of the Baghdad Pact too brought it much hostility in the Arab world which, as a consequence, began looking to the Soviet Union for an effective alternative. For one, America lost Egypt's Gamal Abdel-Nasser Hussein, Egypt's president then to the Soviets who wooed him on through liberal arms deliveries and other incentives that in turn helped Nasser win greater prestige within the Third World in general and in the Muslim and Arab worlds, in particular.¹⁵⁷ The Soviets were, of course, motivated less, in this, by the need to maintain the military balance of the Arabs and the Israelis, obtaining then, than by their urgent desire to cut off Nasser's, in their opinion, reckless dependence on Western arms. Unlike the Soviets, the Americans, even while working to reduce Soviet advances in the Middle East, were ever-mindful of the necessity to maintain the delicate Arab-Israeli

¹⁵⁵ See *Chronology of the 20th Century*, Philip Walter, ed., (Oxford: Helicon Pub. Ltd., 1995), p. 243.

¹⁵⁶ America's somewhat weak response to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt could have won for it much more friends in the Middle East, had its position been less equivocal. For different reasons, it disregarded, as mentioned earlier, Afghan overtures too.

¹⁵⁷ For comprehensive coverage, see Mohamed Heikal, *Sphinx and Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East* (London: Collins, 1978).

military balance and, owing significantly to Jewish lobbying power within the U.S., to always keep that balance tilted in favor of Israel.¹⁵⁸

From the above it becomes clear that, unlike for the Soviets, to the Americans, the Middle East has been important firstly, for its strategic location, then for the security and protection of the state of Israel and also for securing and control of energy resources for the U.S. and its allies around the world. As a strategic location, the Middle East has been important to the Americans, variously. The Middle East too needed the U.S., initially, as an emerging economic power; then, as a leading military power; thereafter, during the Cold War period, as a competing superpower; and then again, in post-Cold War times, as the pre-eminent globalizing hyper-power basking obviously under its unipolar days.¹⁵⁹ As America contemplates its economic revival and the CARs, like many other parts of the Muslim World, seeking to brace up their independence and survival, they have mutually discovered their interdependence, as we may later see in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.

The Muslim world and the Middle East has also been important to the U.S. whenever it helps to sabotage or sink policies within different regions, that are deemed to endanger American interests or its security, broadly. For this reason too Americans cultivated regional allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and pre-revolution Iran to undermine the rapidly expanding influence, even within elite circles, of the Soviet Union and other hostile powers such as China, initially, and much later post-revolution Iran, both within their regions and elsewhere too around the world. This sort of behavior by the superpowers is often mutual.¹⁶⁰ Unlike the Soviets, however, the

¹⁵⁸ The, ridiculously scandalous, Israeli clandestine stockpile of nuclear warheads would conveniently ensure Israeli superiority, even if America were to incredibly, fail in this respect, in the near future.

¹⁵⁹Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment; Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21.4 Spring 1997: 49-88.

¹⁶⁰ For example, the Soviets armed Egypt not only to defeat the Anglo-French-Israeli alliance but also to weaken both Western and U.S. influence in the region and to increase Egyptian all-round dependence on the Soviet Union.

Americans are often viewed as reluctant or slow takers when it comes to opportunities that arise in any region, especially wherein there is little energy resources to seize lucratively quick control of. This is, of course, not to deny the larger fact that they usually take the initiative to create opportunities for themselves in any region where they want to be present to enhance their overall world position *vis-a-vis* the Soviets, in the past, and other emerging powers, like China and Iran, deemed malignant, currently, and this has particularly been the case in the whole length and breadth of the broader Middle East and the emergent and yet evolving Central Asia.

The Americans often accuse the Soviets of claiming cheap credit for successful actions by nationalist leaders in the Middle East and other regions. For example, Americans have charged that Soviets have cheaply claimed credit for saving Egypt and help defeating the hostile alliances against it when in fact it was a bold initiative by Nasser that won that outcome. The pattern was also the same elsewhere in the Middle East, East Asia and Indo-China they claim. But the Americans themselves were no different in this respect. For example, in the South Asian crisis of 1971, America made much of its tilt towards Pakistan, but discerning Pakistanis themselves found the American claim to be quite hollow.

Similarly too the Americans claimed that they were responsible for the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan when in reality it was the sheer commitment of the Islam-inspired Afghan *mujahideens* themselves and those of the other affected and nervous regional powers that brought about that victory though, no doubt, American supplied Stinger missiles did play quite a remarkable, if not vital, role in that achievement.¹⁶¹ Nevertheless, this American claim did raise expectations amongst Afghans of continued American commitments to them as partners in that victory but, unbelievably, the Afghans saw the

¹⁶¹Lamb in her *Farewell Kabul: From...*, op. cit., p. 450.

Americans turning their backs on them and heading treacherously for a ball, perhaps under a policy of “liberal internationalism,” with their erstwhile enemy, the Soviets and their pre-eminent, *albeit* on the sly, client India, especially during the early Clinton years. Again going back to Nasser’s time, his disillusionment with the West actually seeded a budding polarization within Arab politics, creating a new anti-Western camp.¹⁶² In this regard, I wish to quote Mohammad Ayub Khan, a true friend of Allen Dulles of the C.I.A., who puts these matters into broader context, i.e. from the perspective of a pro-Western Muslim leader:

“The Baghdad Pact was sponsored by the United States. Originally the United States was willing to come into the Pact as a full member. The strong reaction of President Nasser, however, made her change her mind and she decided to participate only as an observer. The American interest in the Pact was well known; they wanted to establish a counterpoise to communism in the Middle East. It was this fear of communism that had impelled the Christian world to help the Muslim world, for the first time in history. The Muslim world occupied an area which was vital strategically and economically and that was the reason why the United States and other Western countries thought it worth their while to befriend the Muslims. The Muslim world itself was at that time emerging from the domination of Western powers. It needed material assistance and also time and the technical know-how to develop its human and material resources. There was no reason why we should not have taken advantage of the opportunity”.¹⁶³

Ever since these episodes, the polarization of the Muslim world into pro-American and anti-American camps have continued down the various 20th century decades right into the new millennium when, despite a veneer of unity, various Muslim societies and mostly their leaderships remain covertly split along similar lines; with some Muslim actors treating America as an enemy and still others considering it a friend, in need if not also in deed, indeed! In other ways too America is similar to the Soviet Union. Consider this, for example, immediately upon the collapse of the monarchy in Iraq the Soviets pounced on the

¹⁶² In 1958 the death of Iraqi monarchy resulted in Iraq’s departure from the Baghdad Pact and knocked the early nails on the coffin of that American sponsored alliance purportedly arranged for the protection of the Muslim world.

¹⁶³ See Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London and Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 154.

opportunity thus created by establishing quick relations with the in-coming regime and rushed both economic and military aid to that key oil state in the Gulf even though the new rulers were clearly heavy-handed on the communists in their country.¹⁶⁴

Similarly, the Americans were quick to establish relations with the newly independent government of Kazakhstan in Central Asia and offered, then rushed, various aid and assistances to that key energy-rich state with limited outlets via the Caspian Sea and possessing other key geo-strategic attributes even though its incumbent power-elites were hostile to Western notions of democracy and were strangers to exceedingly liberal views of human rights. This applies somewhat to the U.S. in the case of Azerbaijan and early Taliban in Afghanistan too. In this respect one sees that America, though powerful as it is, is still no exception to the realistic but clearly amoral norm where countries give the highest priority to establish and develop positive relations with the most significant state available in every region in the world regardless of the inconvenient fact that these key states/entities may even be those that cherish ideas, ideals and values that are in diametric opposition to those espoused by the very power that initiates these diplomatic relations.

Owing to America's principally 20th century nascent interest in Muslim, particularly Saudi Arabian, oil, it had to accept the creation of Israel lukewarmly, rather than overwhelmingly, as it would have been the case, otherwise, in 1948. Under the budding influence of its domestic Jewish lobby, the United States actually became the first country to recognize the new religiously-forged state that terroristically mutated out of a convenient British mandate.¹⁶⁵ To be precise, the British turned the Palestine problem over to the United Nations, wherein the Americans and Soviets very cooperatively foisted an imposed

¹⁶⁴ See Aryeh Y. Yodfat, *The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), p. 17.

¹⁶⁵ For the power of the Jews in the U.S., U.K. and Europe and in particular the overwhelming influence of the Ashkenazi so-called Jews therein, see Omar Zaid, *The Hand of Iblis: An Anatomy of Evil – The Hidden Hand of the New World Order* (Kuala Lumpur: A.S. Noordeen, 2013), pp. 347-360.

Jewish, albeit Zionist, solution to the Palestine problem, on the badly divided Muslims. The still settlement-less Karabagh issue of Azerbaijan seems to be a similar case. As a consequence the Muslims, particularly the Arabs, being, on the main, ideologically if not also innately hostile to Communism, kept their distance from the Soviets but remained relatively receptive to the West, especially to the United States owing, perhaps, to its rather attractive God-deferring, if not also fearing, and anti-colonial trappings.

Sensing this unfavorable state of affairs, it was of little surprise then that the Soviets became more than keen, initially, in the creation of Israel, being seen as a ready, if unenthusiastic, ally, within the Middle East. The traditional Russian/Soviet antipathy to Muslims in general, given their bitter encounters throughout history, and their appropriately-informed disinterest in the Middle East in particular, perhaps as a consequence, remained so till 1955. However, certain developments in the mid-50s, subsequently, helped to reverse this tradition.¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, America which has, and historically had, better dealings with the Muslim world, in general, began losing that goodwill somewhat, with the creation of Israel, across the Muslim world excepting, perhaps, in the Persian Gulf, Caucasus and South-West Asian areas involving such key Muslim states as Saudi Arabia, post-Nasser Egypt, Pahlavi Iran, secular Turkey and martial Pakistan.¹⁶⁷

In this respect, in the case of America's pre-eminent ally Israel – the key non-Muslim state in an overwhelmingly Muslim region – the U.S. has often, if not always, intervened in or interceded with Israel's Muslim neighbors, specifically, to create for it

¹⁶⁶ From then on the Soviets began to unequivocally associate themselves with the just and legitimate cause of the Palestinians and thus created for themselves a promising role in the Middle East and, thereby, began to win greater favors for themselves across the Muslim world.

¹⁶⁷ These states individually and/or collectively have continually been pivotal to American policies in the Muslim world particularly to those that it has that pertains to their immediate neighborhoods. Thus, whenever any crisis erupts within the regions involving any of these key states it invariably led to American involvement therein chiefly to offset the corresponding Soviet moves.

(read: Israel) greater security and protection in addition to, ostensibly, neutralizing any hostile Soviet moves across the region.¹⁶⁸ In the context, of the long-running Israeli-Arab conflicts, American record in the United Nations has consistently and irresponsibly, if also shamefully, been biased towards the Israeli position, whereas the Soviets, despite having also been a Jewish-influenced fellow early backer of Israel like the U.S., often more responsibly backed the Arabs, if disturbingly so, especially the stand of the radical Arabs. To the CARs, being mainly Muslims of the Turkic strand, this is an important record, for as they newly develop ties with the U.S. they can determine their own stance on matters pertaining to Israel and the Jews, the real dominant elements actually engineering and shaping U.S. foreign policy.

Anyway, over the years with some, even Arab, states moving to separate peace with Israel and the later demise of the Soviet Union too releasing the Turkic states of Central Asia to form a freer interactions with the larger world, the new opportunities for the US to create greater security, protection and to enhance the position of Israel in tandem with America's own rising interaction and influence across Turkic Central Asia, could only increase. As we saw in the historical Appendix I, the Turkic world has long been tolerant of Jews, if not also Zionists. That Israel could figure, within or without the context of the US, in ties with Central Asia in contemporary times should, therefore, surprise no one. It is in this, disquieting, context of lessened Muslim-Israeli tensions that the U.S. is able to "pressure" the illegitimate Israeli state to give in more to legitimate Palestinian expectations. Though this reality was perceivable under Obama's first term, its origins were

¹⁶⁸ However, this does not mean that there are no differences of view within and between the U.S. and Israel; to be sure, there certainly are, as it is bound to be in any bilateral relationship, but these are usually put in the back-burner, especially, once there is any outbreak of hostilities between the Arabs and Israelis. At these crucial junctures the U.S. would not only focus on Israeli security but would usually use its substantial leverage with its Muslim allies, including with Non-Arab Muslim ones, around the region, to if not actually enhance the position of Israel, to at least ameliorate Israel's, otherwise, overwhelmingly hostile politico-diplomatic milieu.

actually traceable much earlier to the times of Bush, Sr., indicating thereby, unbelievably, the presence of clear policy continuities, like America's ongoing entanglement with Israel!

Conclusion

To recollect broadly, the United States in wanting to maintain and expand its economy and its overall power, vis-a-vis the other great powers, gradually and perhaps disjointedly attempted to cut-down its sustained economic obligations to the developing multi-layered Third World. Basically, it did this by not just managing its relations well with its important allies, both large and small, in the Third World but also increasingly enticed and nurtured expanding relations with the Eastern Bloc socialist states, particularly those that, it viewed to be strategically and economically significant, including gradually with those in the C.A. region which I have redefined and politico-geographically studied earlier on in this chapter.

Other than providing economic assistance, the Americans were particularly enthusiastic in extending political and military support to ensure the survival of their allies and more generally towards the enforcement and enhancement of their powers over them. But this enthusiasm began to wear off gradually around the late 80s and thereafter, though, to be sure, interventions did continue haphazardly, in the Third World in particular. The reasons for this may be discernible in the generally changing conditions of the 90s.¹⁶⁹ The American behavior in the newly independent Central Asian region in particular typifies this sort of attitude, as may be conceptualized in Map 12. Despite the rekindled interest of the Russians in this region the Americans did not feel threatened and astonishingly displayed an attitude of gross indifference to their obvious set-backs. The successive waves of fading European colonialism, over the years, saw the Americans gaining ground across the Third

¹⁶⁹Meanwhile, radical nationalism was resurfacing all across the developing world and distinctly so in Eastern Europe. This was simultaneously accompanied by the change in the political and strategic disposition within the United States. This shift manifested itself clearly, from the perspective of the developing world, in the enigmatic indifference of the Americans.

World lands that that colonialism vacated. Other than in the Philippines and a few other countries with traditionally deep anti-americanism, the Americans were perceived as a benign superpower, out to make meaningful, albeit enterprising, friends.¹⁷⁰ When we consider formal relations, what strikes us immediately is the fact that starting around the late 1980s the United States began to again gain diplomatically as a wave of new states emerged from new European disintegrations. As a superpower on an apparent rebound the United States not only embraced them through establishing diplomatic relations but often strengthened them through extending economic aid and military assistance. In addition to its old allies like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, the rest of GCC states, Egypt, the OIC and Asean it also increased its overt presence in countries like South Africa, Somalia, Namibia, Nigeria, Kenya, Venezuela, Mexico, Albania, Croatia, Slovenia and not to mention in Eastern European and ex-Soviet states in general.

Though Americans occasionally feign retreat into isolationism they more often than not, given their current internal and external realities, practice internationalism not just at the level of benign engagement and presence but also through involvements that may or may not border on intervention, which, in turn could lead, even, to hostilely intrusive penetration.¹⁷¹ Usually political involvements also lead to strategic presence. Presence of this nature is usually cultivated through economic and military grants and assistance. Cases where Americans undertook immediate military action of one sort or another to fortify an ally or to neutralize and reverse an unfavorable development in a region it deems of interest

¹⁷⁰The fact that they are welcomed across the world, especially by the ruling classes, is clear when one reckons the number of countries and political entities with whom they maintain diplomatic relations. Also their major airlines land in virtually all the political capitals of the world. There are very few territorial waters in the world wherein American ships do not transit onto or cruise on.

¹⁷¹Diplomatic and political engagement with many of these countries was forged through display of goodwill and moral posturing in many cases and alternatively also came, ironically, in the wake of merciless application of martial power. For example, in the extreme case of Japan, it came in as the reconciliatory reparational aftermath of acts of racially opportune atomic barbarianism.

to it are replete in modern history.¹⁷² In 1918, the U.S. sent about 15,000 troops into even Russia itself to assist anti-Bolshevik forces and to counter also Japanese influence in Siberia. That same year it made U.S.S.R. troops pull out of Iran when a tense crisis developed between it and the U.S.S.R. there. American “involvement,” to put it very mildly, in Vietnam runs the whole gamut, in terms of tools employed to secure its objectives therein.

In, relatively, recent times it did not only send troops into Latin American and Middle Eastern countries like Granada and Lebanon, respectively, but also intervened in a big way earlier in Korea and Vietnam. Even in these post-Cold War times it invaded Panama running after its former ally there Manuel Noriega in what the U.N. denounced as a “flagrant violation of international law.” Then, perhaps in the spirit of Afghanistanism, in 1993 it went on a humanitarian intervention, this time along with the U.N., into Somalia. Even after the Cold War ended the U.S.-led COCOM still proscribed the FSU and the CEECs as late as 1994, perhaps to pressure them to fall in line. This was applied to China too despite its opening up but unlike many other countries, after the staggered return of Hong Kong, China was allowed to tap into U.S. technology via the Hong Kong loophole, perhaps to lock-in a rampant growth engine, something akin to leashing a reliable service-dog. Then in 1995 the U.S. joined the U.N. and NATO in bringing about a ceasefire in the ethnic war in Bosnia. Thereafter, in the late 1990s the U.S. got involved in Kosovo.

The U.S. has active duty troops stationed in about 150 countries across the world. U.S. active military personnel strength worldwide in 1997 totaled some 1,443,138 personnel. Between 2001 and 2003 it had over 730 military installations worldwide

¹⁷²In this context the Berlin airlift comes readily to mind. American troops were involved in Asia in 1900 in China to put down the Boxer Rebellion and to enforce and maintain its Open Door policy there; this came, of course, after its initial interest in the Philippines which it seized earlier on in 1899 only to formally quit it much later in 1946.

including in all of the CARs. In 2011, even with tight budget, it had more than 1,138,044 active personnel, including in 1,000 overseas bases, around the world without counting those in rotational transit at various high seas. Even in late 2012, within the CARs., it had over 71,000 troops especially in over 450 bases in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan; and lily pads in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan too.¹⁷³ Since FY2001 U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan has been rising steadily and those in Iraq have been declining since 2009. In Afghanistan U.S. troops are largely based in the South and the East of the country. The U.S. conducts military activities across the CEECs.; including in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Balkans, Ukraine and in the Black Sea. Though after the Vietnam War the U.S. has shown greater caution about military involvements mostly in the Third World it has nevertheless continually been involved in military activities of one sort or another across the world notwithstanding its much-publicized Vietnam syndrome. Its Gulf War performance may signal future fresh crusades elsewhere in the region especially if it promises to bring in appropriate rewards. The U.S. used the pre-9/11 WOT and the post-9/11 GWOT to fully exorcise itself out of the Vietnam syndrome at the continuing misery of the well torpedoed “Third World”, including mainly the World, if not also the Words, of Islam.

Generally then, U.S. motivation across the world has been all about U.S. consolidation and prosperity, securing energy security, advancing mostly self-serving rule of law and human rights, combating perceived crimes; and seemingly also about enlarging democracy, checking spread of WMD, preventing unhealthy migrations, humanitarian intervention; and if the preaching is to be believed, arresting the downward slide in the Third World, being a beacon to the Eastern Bloc and preventing future “Chernobyls”!

¹⁷³ David Vine, “The Lily-Pad Strategy,” *Foreign Policy in Focus* 16 July 2012, <<http://www.fpiif.org>>; Dept. of Defense, Sept. 2012, <<http://www.dod.mil/>>; SIPRI, <<http://www.sipri.se>>, all accessed on 14 May 2016.

In conclusion too we saw, *inter alia*, in this chapter, that in the Muslim world, the U.S. actually cashed in on strong anti-communist sentiments and Soviet/Russian characteral weakness such as their arrogance and mishandlings. As a result perhaps, Muslim states such as Sudan in 1971 and Somalia in 1977 took leave of the Soviets. Moreover, Soviets were seen as, allegedly, inferior to the U.S. in both manners and machines. Perhaps because of their allergy to Soviet atheism, the Muslims were inclined to see Soviets as weak in terms of capability, power, reach and their willingness to intervene in any crises, internal or otherwise. Muslims conveniently forgot that it was the same Soviet manners and machines/technologies that were behind the Vietnamese success, of course, along with their leaders' uncompromisingly true determination and fidelity to the real interests of their masses. Strong and committed U.S. support for Israel drove most Muslims away from it and made some Muslims especially the radical ones move to the Soviet side. Thus in the 1950s and to at least late 1970s the Soviet, unsurprisingly, gained much influence in the Muslim World at the expense of the West generally.

But after a decade of bitterness at Soviet invasion of Afghanistan thereafter, the, secretly relenting, Soviets again gradually gained ground, especially, in the secular Muslim world, till the surprising Soviet collapse. The Non-alignment trend also played out in favour of the Soviets. Unlike the U.S. the Soviets were often generous in the Muslim World, given the relative disadvantage they face therein. Most Muslim states are small states and as such they face a dilemma. To meet their developmental needs they have had to even reluctantly align especially during the Cold War. States such as Libya, S. Yemen and Syria were close to the Soviets and later with Russians. With generous Soviet/Russian

support Syria can afford to linger in Lebanon. Similarly, U.S. help, useless with India, given the strings, was nonetheless vital for Pakistan to subvert unfriendly Afghans.¹⁷⁴

The Muslim particularly the Arab disillusionment with Soviets, for their lack of useable influence with Israel, made the Muslims rethink their distancing from the U.S., which clearly has much mutual influence with Israel. Hence, the Soviets were expelled from Egypt and their friendship treaty was also abrogated in 1976. This reality made Carter successfully mediate peace between Egypt and Israel. Carter not only mediated but also raised the hope that this commitment would continue as he transitions out.¹⁷⁵ American commitment and loyalty to Israel is seen as a virtue, no matter how painful this is to the Muslims. When it comes to neutrality, the Soviets were more neutral than the U.S. in the Iraq/Iran war. If the Soviets can be believed, Iraq a close Soviet ally and a radical state, invaded Iran without notifying even the Soviets! Under Cold War setting it was easier to support different sides in intra-Muslim conflicts. Muslim, particularly Arab but at times even Turk, suspicions of Soviet real aims, brought disproportionate gains for the U.S. in the Muslim World.¹⁷⁶

Soviet godlessness, being clearly at variance with Islam, was also a factor. For this reason communists are almost always targeted in the Muslim World. In Iran, the Soviets have always been suspected and kept at bay. Still, the U.S. because of its oil-related involvements and its religio-social recklessness earned the displeasure of the Iranian masses. The resultant hostility spiked with the arrival of Khomeini.¹⁷⁷ Unlike Muslim elites,

¹⁷⁴ With alignment, purposefully or otherwise, interdependence occurs. The downside of this is, superpower presence “over the horizon”, making frequent port calls, if not also actually being present within the small states themselves.

¹⁷⁵ See Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Barton, 1982), p.598.

¹⁷⁶ Soviet latent capacity to export their revolution is often seen as a threat, not totally unjustifiably given their record in Afghanistan. U.S. interests in the Muslim World, as reflected in the vast literature, were aimed more at consolidating U.S. power, if not also prosperity, in relation to that of competing other powers, securing energy and strategic materials, protecting Israel’s security, advancing rule of law and particularly women’s rights, checking the spread of WMD, humanitarian intervention, enlarging democracy and checking Islamic extremism, sadly even without understanding the possible disastrous implications that this could entail.

¹⁷⁷ He famously regards the U.S. as worse than Great Britain, the British worse than the U.S. and WORST the Soviets as worse than both! Being a solid religious figure and the Soviets most obdurate of atheists, this is totally unsurprising. Incidentally, in the CARs, if the

the Muslim masses were attracted to the welfaristic attributes of the Soviets. The Russians, it must be mentioned, in finally ditching Communism gained Muslim elite support across the world while also saving cost by abandoning the teeming masses in the Muslim World including in its Near Abroad, who cut off of subsidies, are left largely at the mercy of their self-preserving if not also indulgent leaders. In this regard, the U.S. has fresh opportunity in the region, given their frequent freedom and humanitarian trumpeting.

In general too then, U.S. interest in the Muslim World, as hinted earlier, is primarily anchored to Israel's survival; diversified, secure and reliable access to energy and strategic resources; peddling capitalism and democracy; unwittingly seeding, as we recently saw in Syria, and disproportionately responding, as we have been seeing for about a decade in Afghanistan and Iraq, to terrorism; checking WMD proliferation; humanitarian interventions and seeming to secure Muslim allies, including those in the C.A. periphery, all neatly packaged under the guise of pursuing global peace and security. In the following three chapters, we shall, thus, be able to see how successfully the U.S. has been able to pursue some, if not all, of these interests also within contemporary Central Asia. How they have taken up this challenge, consistently or flippantly, in the redefined C.A. region? All these we may examine in the next focal chapters.

incumbents, who claim to be born-again Muslims, are not in power, they most probably may identify with such sentiments too, especially given the American track record in Iraq, Guantanamo and, of course, in the Af-Pak theatre too.

CHAPTER THREE

The Evolving Changes in American-Central Asian Relations, 1991-2012: The AKT

States

Introduction

In the previous chapter we saw how the U.S. often in competition with the Soviet/Russians and their allies, pursued its various interests in the world, including in the Muslim World and the C.A. convicinity, now here and in the following chapters we narrow our focus to do the same in Central Asia proper *albeit* as redefined and as regrouped as the AKT states and the AKTU republics. American interest, both direct and allied, on the central asian region and around its peripheral expanses can be traced back deep into the early modern period.¹ This curiosity, no matter however fleeting continued right till the demise of Czarist Russia and, intermittently, even beyond. The communist revolution in Russia, the emergence of the Soviet Union and the rapid expansion of communism beyond its borders all served to constrain Great Britain, America's then powerful ally around the region, from spreading its influence deep into Central Asia (C.A.). Indeed, it is this long-drawn campaigns and counter-campaigns of influence spreading by Great Britain and Russia across the whole central asian region that historically came to be known as the Great Game.² A Game that was, in time, localized, then adjourned to and became mired, along with the fickle memories and, consequently, fleeting loyalties of the natives, in the winding valleys and shifting sands of neutral and still independent Afghanistan and also in what was then known as Chinese Turkistan.

¹A. K. Henrikson, "America's Changing Face in the World: From 'periphery' to 'center'" in *Centre and Periphery: Spatial Variations in Politics*, ed. J. Gottman (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage, 1980).

² See Appendix I, *passim*.

At the most fundamental the British and the Russians were, in the Game, competing to win over “the hearts and minds of” the Muslim peoples in Central Asia and in the larger Middle East with a view to expanding their respective spheres of influence, in the first instance and then, thereby, to secure hold over the numerous resources, including the human, the markets they make-up and the other critical assets in their possessions. The discovery and later commercial exploitation of energy resources, particularly, that of oil, increasingly towards the late 19th century, served only to heighten this drive on their part. Not wanting to be left behind, the United States too began to pitch in, gradually, starting in Saudi Arabia, thereafter expanding across the Gulf States before supplanting the British in Iran.³ Earlier, the British, of course, had occupied southern Iran “to protect its oil interests” there.⁴ Meanwhile, the Russians have all along been consolidating their own hold on similar resources within Azerbaijan, northern Iran and later all across Central Asia and then reaching finally into Afghanistan too. Saudi Arabia, through the special channel provided by Pakistan, and Pahlavi Iran, both oil-rich and staunch U. S. allies in the Central Asian neighborhood spent the whole of 1970s trying to wean Afghanistan away from the Soviet camp. In this regard, Shireen T. Hunter states that:

“Throughout the 1970s, Saudi Arabia and Iran were Western allies and partners in the fight against the communists and other leftist radicals, but also competed for influence in the Persian Gulf and beyond, including South and Central Asia”.⁵

Ironically, America’s then anti-Islamic policies and oil-related grievances in Iran brought about in 1979 an indigenous anti-American revolution there that was initially facilitated by the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party acting obviously as a proxy for the Russian

³ For a relatively recent take on America’s hearts and minds efforts in the C.A. periphery, see John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahead, “Battle for Muslim Hearts and Minds: The Road Not Yet Taken,” *Middle East Policy* 2008.

⁴ David B. Nissman, *The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration* (Boulder and London: Westview; F.A. Praeger, 1987), p. 130.

⁵ Shireen T. Hunter, *Central Asia since Independence*, The Washington Papers: 168 (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1996), p.141.

Soviets if not also for oily Anglos. The oil-driven, socially-reckless modernization of Iran by the pro-American Reza Shah Pahlavi that was highly insensitive to the Islamic values and sensibilities of the Iranian masses set the stage for the phenomenal Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini to completely eject America out of its strategic presence in the Central Asian peripheral neighborhood.

The larger outcome of this is that while the Soviets have had a free-hand to continue the over 500 years old expansionary hobby of the Czars into even beyond the region, the Americans lost their sole bridgehead to compete and check Soviet/Russian lingering privileges and future prospective Iranian inroads around the region. It is partly, to redress this shocking setback and partly, albeit more importantly, to tackle the energy crisis that has been festering since the early 1970s that, upon the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on 25th December 1979, allegedly, to protect its interests therein, did President Jimmy Carter, who in August 1977, it must be remembered, created a Department of Energy⁶ to deal with the menacingly hovering energy crisis. Charging too the same as the greatest threat to peace since World War II and also warning the Soviets against interference farther into the Persian Gulf, he moved simultaneously to lend the struggling Afghan resistance a helping hand with the express objective of stemming the Soviet strategic flow south towards the warm waters of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, with the Soviets seeking, ostensibly, to secure a port that may serve as an ocean-direct, warm-water-outlet for it.

Incidentally, it was about the time of the liberal Carter administration's move into office that various discernible efforts were stepped up to seriously explore alternative sources to, and reduce the American dependence on, Persian Gulf petroleum including through scholarly and other exchanges with the Soviet Union. The Iranian crisis coming at

⁶ See Appendix II, p.455.

the tail end of Carter's maiden term served only to increase this trend many folds, though discreetly. Genuinely committed to détente and stung, to an unanticipated degree, by Irano-Islam, Carter moved swiftly to contain it under an anti-Soviet smokescreen. The realism, idealism tango implicit in these times is captured by Brzezinski, his NSA.⁷ An under pressure General Zia ul Haq of Pakistan sensed the real game and batted on with the “geopolitical” flow! The early 1980s saw the conservative Ronald Reagan move into the White House as U. S. President. He moved stridently to check and contain the “Evil Empire” from spreading its tentacles, especially during his first term only to mysteriously cool down somewhat through his second. In fact, perhaps in pursuit of the 1987 INF treaty, after only four days of summit talks towards the end of May 1988, Reagan, the renown American cowboy actor-turned-statesman, was able to consummate a historic, short- and intermediate-range missile treaty in Moscow quite cordially with Mikhail S. Gorbachev the conveniently available maverick young leader of the Soviet Union, a state, nay then a superpower, that Reagan long and well into his tenure in office reviled as the “Evil Empire.”

All through the 1980s an energy-conscious-if-not-also-crunched-America was busy figuring out not only how to reduce its oil dependence on the Middle Eastern region but also got highly anxious about the rapid rise of a relatively new phenomenon called “Political Islam” around the same region starting with, of course, Islamic Iran. With that loss of Iran to radical Islam, American elites, rightly or mostly wrongly, began perceiving Islam as the new threat⁸ that is fast supplanting the well-established role long played by

⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrer-Straus-Giroux, 1983).

⁸ Peter Mandaville, *Global Political Islam: International Relations of the Muslim World* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

Soviet communism as a challenge to the inception and expansion of American interests in the Middle Eastern region and beyond.

It was in this anxious context, that at the end of his second term, did Reagan the suitably mellowed-conservative began vigorously campaigning for George H. W. Bush, the moderate Republican. Bush, it must be noted, of course, was not a mere thespian like Reagan, brought in democratically with a popular, solid mandate, by the powerful American establishment, just to simulate a required role and deliver the well-scripted histrionics, obviously in national interest; but also actually himself a long-established oil magnate with lucrative, narrower, special interests to secure and safeguard on behalf of his real “constituency”: the oil industry and the military/industrial complex.⁹ Unlike Reagan who was strong on merely anti-Soviet rhetoric, Bush a former D.C.I. was and remains a life-long influential decision-maker, particularly in foreign affairs, who was not at all averse to flirting with even disillusioned Russian or Chinese communist apostates.

Given the various, mostly legitimate, anxieties that brought him to office, including the afore-mentioned ones, Bush did appropriately thank Reagan and purposefully observed in his *Inaugural Address* that “[a] new breeze is blowing, and the old bipartisanship must be made new again”.¹⁰ Bush, subsequently, carried forward this rediscovered pragmatic domestic spirit and applied it to foreign affairs too, especially in his relations with the Soviets, surprisingly, managing virtually to co-opt them in the Gulf War. But as typical of them, under a Republican president the U. S. was in a no-nonsense-U.S.-means-business, militant mood with much of the world in this period, unlike in past periods under most Democratic chief executives and unlike especially Carter who, except for his abortive sally

⁹ Yeadon and Hawkins, *The Nazi Hydra...*, op. cit., especially, pp. 600-5.

¹⁰ See President George H.W. Bush, ‘Inaugural Address,’ delivered at West Front of the Capitol, Washington, D.C. at 12:05p.m., 20 January 1989, available online from The George Bush Digital Library at <<http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1989/89012000.html>>.

in April 1980 to free the American hostages held in Iran, managed to have a rather peaceful term with no American combat deaths and, much laudably, with very little trigger-happy resorts to force overseas.

Anyway, it was in such a period and under such an American elite dispensation and superpower orientation that things were also inexplicably devolving in the Soviet Union. The West, including the U.S., was egging on Gorbachev, the young blood in the Soviet leadership, in his apparently self-motivated obsession to rid the Soviet Union, including Soviet Central Asia, of its perceived general stagnation. Consequently, emerging as newly independent states (NIS) out of more than seven decades of political isolation under the Soviet Union, most Central Asian states are comparatively new countries to initiate and develop relations with the United States. Nevertheless, upon their independence, these states were quick in establishing broad range of ties with the U.S., including in the political, economic and strategic domains.¹¹

Despite the enormous distances and lack of any direct land access, boundaries, not to mention any border, between these C.A. states and the United States, they variously have managed to develop increasing trade relationships. The United States has given these C.A. states much transformational, humanitarian and developmental aid under its various politico-economic and strategic programs. The United States has made significant investments in various energy related projects in Central Asia but its investments are by no means confined to the energy sector alone but instead also involves investments in Central Asian industrial, business and services sectors too, often, initially, along with Turkish partners. Much later down the road, the US “made foreign investment more of a strategic

¹¹ Please be informed that significant sections of this chapter, starting here but also interspersed throughout, have previously appeared in my article in the *Central Asia* journal, published under the joint auspices of the Pakistan Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the Area Study Centre (Central Asia) of the University of Peshawar, entitled: “A Concise Interpretive Analysis of U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations, 1991-2013,” which is, it has to be strongly stressed here, *itself based on and grew out of this very Ph.D. research undertaking*, that you are presently reading; to verify this, see Sahib, “A Concise Interpretive Analysis...,” *op.cit.*, pp.15-64.

tool for winning allies in the region”, especially after Sept. 11 as a part of it’s ongoing WOT.¹² The United States also has important security-related ties with most C.A. states. Multi-laterally, the United States has been supportive of Central Asian states in their getting international loans and in their securing smooth, if not always rapid, accessions into macro-functional and global institutions.

Politically, not wanting to offend Gorbachev, his partner in the Cold War endgame, George H.W. Bush was overly cautious in welcoming the independent Central Asian states, initially. Nevertheless, with his popularity slipping by the day and having just over a year of his term left, diplomatically, he rushed his secretary of state James Baker to the C.A. region to register America’s keenness on them nonetheless and to serve to the Central Asians the appropriate pointers for pursuing future co-existence with the U.S. Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed. Given America’s disdain for the political Islam espoused by Iran, the U.S. held up Europe and Turkey as models for the Central Asian states to emulate, at the very outset, as pointedly noted by Gareth Winrow.¹³ Legislatively, given the United States’ long running obsession with the non-proliferation of WMD, and also with an eye on the emerging unstable Central Asian strategic realities, the U.S. enacted a facilitating legislation the Nunn-Lugar Act. In pursuance of this, the United States made a priority of effecting nuclear threat reduction generally across Central Asia and not just exclusively so in Kazakhstan.¹⁴

¹² See Oksan Bayulgen, “Facing the dilemma of global capitalism: the case of Azerbaijan,” *Central Asian Survey* 22.2/3 (June/September, 2003):209-220, p. 210.

¹³ Gareth M. Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia* (London: RIIA, 1995), p.13. See also Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, trans. Carol Volk, originally published as *L’Echec de l’Islam politique* by Le Seuil in 1992 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U P, 1994).

¹⁴ For the text of an U.S. Senate bill that reflects the legislative evolution of this process, see Bill Text, 109th Congress (2005-2006) S. 313. Is available online at <<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.313>>.

The U.S. Peace Corps touted worldwide as promoting peace, friendship and understanding between the U.S. and other countries also ran or still runs its program in most Central Asian states since way back in 1962 in Afghanistan but mostly since 1992 in the rest of Central Asia as per the request of those governments, following initial presentations there by Peace Corps staff. Bilateral agreements codify and consolidate further the works of the Peace Corps within Central Asia. Since independence numerous PCV groups have successfully served in most of Central Asia.

The main objective of their co-operation in the political sector is the consolidation of democracy and promotion of good governance via supporting sustainable economic, social and environmental development. In the area of legal reform, promotion of rule of law is an overriding objective. USAID funding has been used on the judiciary to enhance their efficiency and effectiveness and to upgrade their skills at adjudicating cases, especially commercial cases and also more generally reforming commercial law. The U.S. provides such assistances that would win the judiciary, greater trust in the eyes of the Central Asian publics. Civil society and media development is enabled by U.S. technical assistance on legal and regulatory reforms addressing those sectors. The U.S. encourages citizen participation in the Central Asian public arena through its support of local NGOs. Other NGOs dealing with development of “independent media, legal reform, woman’s rights, civic education and legislative oversight” are also supported by the U.S. with generous grants.

Most Central Asian states and the U.S. are new but fast growing trade markets for one another. The trade value as represented by both the exports value and imports value of goods between them shows continual growth. As per the records of the U.S. Census Bureau, from the time when trade figures became available for most of these states, i.e.

from February or March 1992, just over one or two months after the US recognized most of them, US bilateral trade in goods with all of them, with the somewhat exceptions of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, has grown continually.¹⁵ Though the growing trade figures are remarkable in themselves, these are still miniscule in comparison to the United States' trade figures with older and longer well-established states like those in Eastern Europe and the Baltics, not to mention with heftier partners elsewhere in the world, least of all with the emerging economic powerhouse, neighboring China. Thus, the prospects for US-Central Asian trade in the future certainly looks bright, especially given broadly the United States' own keenness to diversify its various trades, encourage emergent economies and, specifically, brace up the independences of the ex-Soviet states. Under the Cold War vintage Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Sections 402 and 409 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act, most of the CARs, were expected and have mostly complied with its freedom of emigration provisions and accordingly have secured U.S. presidential certifications to that effect, annually, each time over the years.

Indirectly, the CARs' increasingly market-based economies and their capacity to trade globally have been increased by American investments in the development of key institutions and infra-structure that facilitate and enable their regional integration and thereby open-up alternative outlets for Central Asian resources, in general, to reach the world markets. The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector. In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Central Asian firms with relevant U.S. businesses. The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and help in adopting commercial and regulatory laws;

¹⁵ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with...[specify required country]' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014); Individual country data accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.

given the CARs' gradual embrace of market reforms, the U.S. supports their transition to market economy across C.A. and thereby work to integrate the entire region into the world trade system fully. In this regard, the U.S. supports the CARs' ultimate individually negotiated accessions to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Kyrgyzstan met early but quite shallow success in this regard.

Generally, the focus is on economic, fiscal, financial and trade policy, including economic liberalization, fiscal reform, improving economic transparency including by introducing auditing standards, energy sector reforms including improving its regulatory environment and investments in energy efficiency, shaping consensus for the mining sector of each republic, addressing and reducing climate-change related emissions, privatization of state enterprises in a number of business sectors. Building separate national consensus and institutional capacities in their banking sectors appear to be a priority. Sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas, water and others too, remains a focus. Very broadly aid in the economic sector includes that geared to maintaining the open trade and investment environment.

With the Bushes back in power in Washington, the Central Asians were obviously unnerved by the regional impact and ominous implication of the Sept. 11 attacks, coming totally as surprisingly as it did to most if not all of them. The U.S. had been obviously pursuing a number of objectives in Afghanistan long before then. *Inter alia*, they wanted to undermine the Taliban regime and put pressure on it to abandon the *Al-Qaida*; the Americans also wanted to raise I. R. Pakistan's dependence on them; they wanted to undermine the influence of I. R. Iran and its allies therein and thereabout; and obtain a reliable foothold in and a possible springboard to move further into the emergent Central

Asian region. Subsequent developments in the larger region show the pertinence of these objectives in themselves, if not also in their total realization.

Pakistan or important elements within it had a pre-eminent role in the transformation of the Taliban religio-social movement into a menacingly potent force capable of seizing and projecting its power right across Afghanistan and debatably beyond.¹⁶ Though Pakistan was the main conduit for weapons and supplies reaching the Taliban from its rather few backers in the international community, yet very few would doubt that Pakistan could have sustained its deep involvement and backing of the Taliban that long without the support in kind, if not just in cash, of America or some influential elements within it. These facts are not lost on the Central Asians. Thus, when Pakistan dramatically swung away from the Taliban in the aftermath of the tragedies of Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan—a widely-acknowledged sponsor of the hostile Taliban could without much difficulty reconcile with and rebuild up its relations with the Central Asian states. As unlikely as it may seem, the Taliban, unwittingly, served as the catalyst for development of closer Pakistan-Central Asia relations. An anxious *albeit* Indo-Israeli inspired U.S. showed its bewildered appreciation, for the painful and hesitant Pakistani swing nevertheless, as can readily be discerned from the American media.

Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite rapidly, if also cautiously, U.S. – Central Asian relations, despite having brief hiccups, have, generally, continuously galloped along with growing amity. But hopes of a rapid and sustained improvement in relations between the U.S. and Central Asian states were somewhat dashed under G. W. Bush’s continuing realist policy of “moral militarism,” with the further outbreak of the Iraq War. Though this caused some tension in government

¹⁶ Please see, generally, the works of Ahmed Rashid in the bibliography but, in particular, for post-9/11 development, in this context, see Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin, 2008).

circles, it did not lead to anything even remotely resembling confrontation between them but this is not to say that the larger Central Asian societies took this U.S. aggression on their strides. At the social level, across the region, there certainly was much unease at seeing a fellow Muslim state being attacked by the very superpower that was making clear introductory and sustained overtures to their own governments.

This is markedly different from their perception of the earlier American involvement, within the region, in Afghanistan, especially so their record and behavior towards the Taliban regime there. U.S. intervention then and their involvements therein thereafter in post-Taliban times constitute one of America's costliest involvements ever in the erstwhile Third World, albeit in yet another Soviet-vacated theater. This represents presumably a positive case where American sponsorship of aggression helped upset and undo a local balance of power and imposed a rapid and decisive result in a Third World setting that was disturbingly poised to slip into a horrible Fourth World. In the eyes of outlet-seeking Central Asians, though the U.S. did not deploy much ground forces there, they were anticipantly amazed at America's projection of its phenomenal air power and special forces and its ability to mobilize even the largely Muslim, if not also necessarily socialist, masses to drive out a patently retrogressive, albeit questionably religious Islamo-Capitalistic regime. For these reasons, as the United States began its Afghan operation, almost all the Central Asian states, as mentioned earlier, stepped in with offers of various facilities even despite most of their location being less than ideal for U.S. needs in Afghanistan.

Most of the armed forces in the C.A. region participate not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but they also join-in multi-laterally in NATO's Partnership for Peace (Pfp) program. The US Central Command, similarly,

conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with most of the Central Asian defense ministries and their other related agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges to full military exercises involving a few or most of the CARs over the years since their independence. Military officers from the CARs attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training via the IMET program. The U.S. seems to believe that military exchanges, visits and various other forms of engagement with the CARs would be useful tools in exposing the Central Asian forces to the military practices and values of the U.S. and in building goodwill and credibility, generally across the region.

While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's later tenure somewhat bled into Obama's own first term. As far as aid is concern, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to the C.A. region, generally.¹⁷ But, Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan, perhaps under the influence of the idealist policy of "strategic reassurance" is, still, viewed with some concern as to what this may actually augur for the Central Asian region generally in the future, though the CARs, in the meanwhile, rake in millions of U.S. \$ per annum officially just from the U.S. for their role in permitting the "reverse transit" via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of "sustainment and total cargoes" exiting from Afghanistan.¹⁸ However, mindful of the difficulties of their geo-strategic neighborhood and the potential instabilities arising from the current drawdowns and the then looming post-2014 American troop exit, alas from Afghanistan. The rest of Central Asia were particularly anxious to keep all their neighboring powers and the United States too equitably and

¹⁷ Jim Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress (RL33458), 9 Jan. 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013), pp. 64-65.

¹⁸ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit., p.4.

positively engaged with them and be relevant and available in their developmental immediate futures.

Over the times, mutual relations have now proceeded well beyond two decades, for most C.A. states largely rather amicably with some minor to bitter tensions along the way in their various separate bilateral relationships. Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, together being all in a highly unstable state as well as betraying a relatively higher degree of often contested sovereignties, may easily be grouped together and termed as the AKT sub-sector of this C.A. region, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. What, therefore, follows is the analysis of these various bilateral relationships of the United States with the post-Soviet, hence, wider Central Asian region, in a unit by unit¹⁹ order, starting here alphabetically and appropriately too, with the Afghanistan-U.S. relationship.

Afghanistan – U. S. Relations

To outsiders, historically, the mere mention of Afghanistan conjured up an image of a land of enchantment and adventure. Whether that enchantment and adventure, subsequently, turns out to be transient or terminal depends largely on the real objectives of the outsiders and their innate natures. The strategic mystique of Afghanistan, unsurprisingly, had all through the centuries, more often than not, attracted invaders of every hue and temperament. They include from Cyrus II in the 6th century BC²⁰ through Alexander the Great in the 4th century BC to the Great Britainers and the Russians then Soviet in our own

¹⁹ The **unit by unit** treatment given to the countries of the Central Asian region is important because, though most of the CAS/CARs and their relationship with the U.S. are loosely and broadly similar across the entire region, there are **individual peculiarities** and **data particulars** that are totally different for each unit within the region. It is these that the individual treatment addresses, though in brief, but within a **common outline**. In doing so, the output may appear **recycled** and **repetitive** but this is inevitable to some degree. In writing on political units of an international region, it is quite common to have similar material on the different units because sometimes their experiences are very similar and, in some general context, may even be **identical**. Even the DOS, CIA and Area Study publications cannot escape this inevitability and sometimes are and remain vulnerable, on this score. Hence, this treatment is appropriate!

²⁰ See Ch. 2(Two), p. 84.

20th century AD.²¹ Over yore Afghanistan has thus, either been a guesthouse or a graveyard to adventurous outsiders. What it became to them depended on what they proved to be, i.e.: in-comers or invaders?

In the recently receded century both the British and the Soviets, unfortunately, turned out to be, in Afghan eyes, malicious invaders who attempted to pass themselves off as benign, altruistic in-comers. Being traditional imperialists of the unreconstructed Western mold, both the British and Soviets, unsurprisingly, came to exploit, colonise and subjugate Afghanistan. However, given America's credentials as a God-revering and an innately anti-colonial power, enlightened Afghans have long anticipated it to be different from all the rest in the West and the "West" in the rest – i.e.: from both the Occidental and Oriental strands of the developed so-called "civilized" world. The contemporary politico-economic anarchic vacuum has presented the United States with unique opportunities in Afghanistan. Their record therein, so far, has been mixed but, nevertheless, is worth proper scrutiny.


Of all the states and countries of the Central Asia region, Afghanistan has known independence the longest and has the longest-running and sustained Western interest to it. Indeed, Americans proper have shown an interest on it since the days of Josiah Harlan,²² if not also earlier. Historically, Americans have been interested on it not only because it holds the largest population and hence market in Central Asia but more so because of its strategic location. In fact, Afghanistan, as may be seen in Map 15, is where four entirely distinct Asian sub-regions come together, i.e. it is where Central Asia²³ meets South Asia, West

²¹ Ch. 2, pp. 85-89 and Appendix I, *passim*.

²² On Josiah Harlan and his adventures, see Josiah Harlan, *A Memoir of India and Avghanistaun* (sic.), (Philadelphia: J. Dobson, 1842).

²³ As alluded and explained in pages 3, 11-12, 37; Chap. 2 and Appendix I, Afghanistan has, historically and even in contemporary geopolitics, been treated easily as a part of both ancient and the redefined Central Asian region. We must not forget that Herat was the political and cultural capital of Timurian Central Asia under Queen Gauhar Shad, whenever we question Afghanistan's position in Central Asia! There is nothing new in it being seen as part of C.A.; most of the reputable journals dealing with the Central Asian region have long included Afghanistan in their coverage for example: *Central Asian Survey* (Abingdon, U.K.), *Central Asia* (Peshawar, Pakistan)

Asia and yes, East Asia, that is via the Chinese central asian autonomous region of Xinjiang. Unsurprisingly, it is a profoundly multi-ethnic country that homogenizes only under various strands of Islam. Unlike the rest of the Central Asian region, Afghanistan has deeper capitalistic roots.



Map 15 - Afghanistan (Physical-Relief)

Source: Adopted from *DK World Desk Reference*, 3rd edn. , previously published as the *World Reference Atlas* (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2002), p. 77.

Afghanistan was where, in the recent past, northern atheistic communism faced off southern Islamo-capitalism and where too, astonishingly, the materialistic Goliath succumbed to a Mujahideenistic David. As far as Afghanistan's borders are concern, it shares its broad top, west to east, with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, sequentially. Its entire bottom rests south-easterly on Pakistan. While China's Xinjiang nips it at the Wakhan pan-handle to the east, Iran butts it firmly on the entire west. In Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, even while getting pricked itself, the U.S. gets to pinch Iran,

journal, *Central Asian Affairs* (Leiden); and *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst* (Washington, D.C.). Though, in the past the United States' *FRUS* series did cover Afghanistan under its South Asia coverage. Furthermore, even an eminent Indian expert on C.A., K. Kulbhushan Warikoo entitles one of his works as: *Central Asia and Kashmir: A Study in the Context of Anglo-Russian Rivalry* (New Delhi: Gian, 1989), implicitly including Afghanistan thereby within Central Asia. But, as the Afghanistan situation is very much still in the realm of classical geopolitics, one cannot say with certainty if this weak, nay feeble and failable state/entity will politico-economically integrate with South Asia, as India and to a lesser extent the U.S. wish; remain a physical buffer between the rest of Central Asia and South Asia providing "strategic depth," as Pakistan desires; or disintegrate and fragment away into the adjoining ethnic titular CAS/CARs and southwest asian I.R. Iran and Pakistan, as the inevitable, if not also impending, U.S./NATO exit and resulting vacuum may augur. If we are to take H.J. de Blij and Peter O. Muller's classifications, as acceptable examples, than the U.S. academic community too has included and accepted Afghanistan fully as part of Turkestan and also excluded it from the South Asian region; on this see H.J. De Blij and Peter O. Muller, *Geography: Realms, Regions, and Concepts*, 12th edn. (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2006), pp. 370-377 and ch. 8.

simultaneously from both sides even while regionally engaging the rest of the Central Asian region to its north and east. Like Russia uses Kazakhstan to rework its ties with the rest of Central Asia, so too the U.S. gets to use Afghanistan to likewise shape its relations with what it calls the Greater Central Asian region.

American interest on Afghanistan has continued from deep down the British and Russian, then Soviet, periods. Afghanistan, of course, achieved its independence from the British²⁴ (having been, initially, in the British sphere of influence) on the 19th of August 1919, long before most of the states of the Central Asian region got theirs in the early 1990s from the Soviet Union. In fact, a quick examination of historical records, reveal that after having formalized its recognition of Afghanistan on 21st August 1934, America had incepted diplomatic relations with Afghanistan, through the non-resident William H. Hornibrook, its envoy accredited to Tehran, way back on 22nd January 1935. The U. S. had its own Legation Kabul on the 6th of June 1942 with a resident *Charge d'Affaires ad interim*.²⁵ Afghanistan has never been out of American media attention for long in the past. American media's Central Asian coverage used to end at Afghanistan, especially so, during the Cold War period when everything beyond the Afghan border into Central Asia was secreted away by the so-called Iron Curtain. However, after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American media never ran beyond a day without some reference to the Afghanistan crisis or to the subsequent civil and internecine conflicts within Afghan society. Currently, coverage on Afghanistan is a *sine qua non* for the American media given the U. S. military's intrusive hyper-involvement therein and America's continually increasing, higher stakes across the rest of the Central Asian region, especially, though not

²⁴ Adamec, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, op. cit., pp. 4, 22 and esp. 316.

²⁵ See Appendix III on U.S. Diplomatic Representation in Central Asian states (Historical).

exclusively, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in mainland U.S.A.

In fact, both before and after 1919 when Britain finally signed the Treaty of Rawalpindi giving Afghanistan independence and also the right to conduct its own foreign policy, the interest and struggles of the outside powers vis-à-vis the central Asian region, popularly known as “the Great Game” has been very much a part of the Central Asian political scene. Britain, America’s strong ally in the vast Asian hinterlands, in fact, invaded Afghanistan twice in the 19th century in order to maintain its status as a buffer state between British India and the ever expanding Russian empire. Afghanistan, for its part, has mostly been equivocal in its foreign policy orientations. For instance, before signing the final document of the above treaty, the Afghans also concluded a treaty of friendship with the new Bolshevik regime in Russia, becoming, thus, the first nation to recognise the Soviet state. This behavior is not altogether different from the contemporary foreign policy practice of the ex-Soviet Muslim republics, for they too display similar characteristics but with more of an energy twist to it, in their own versions of the Great Game.²⁶

Given the post-Cold War period’s rather loose international system and its less than coherent strategic realities and the varied immediate needs and challenges these republics face, their volatile international interactions, though, obviously, incongruous, is, of course, readily understandable. Contemporary Afghanistan is, of course, keeping very much close to the spirit of this Central Asian foreign policy culture. The polarized and civil war-torn Afghanistan and its ethnically fragmented society have been courted, engaged and variously connected with every inner-regional, outer-regional and extra-regional major power or their

²⁶In this regard, see Frederic C. Hof, “The Great Oil Game,” *Journal of Commerce* (1998). Actually, Chapter 5 of this very research, coming later, deals with the energy profile of this game!

allies active in the region including, pre-eminently, in the recent past the lone super-power, the United States of America. Thus, it should surprise no one, least of all the Americans if competing Afghan groups attempt to singly or collectively develop ties with other powers, including with recent enemies like Russia, even while they endeavor to increasingly engage the United States as a prospective partner in shaping the, hopefully positive, future of Afghanistan. Incidentally, one must remember that Afghan rulers, be they *Amirs*, Kings or Presidents, since early modern times, have mostly been pro-Russian/Soviet if not also always anti-British. This was also the case from King Amanullah's time, through President Daud Khan's right to PDPA political siblings Nur Muhammad Taraki's, and then onwards to Hafizullah Amin's and Babrak Karmal's till, of course, President Najibullah Ahmadzai's in mid-1992. Even deposed King Muhammad Zahir Shah, who was co-opted and promoted by the United States as a figurehead to unify a post-Taliban Afghanistan, was just seemingly anti-Russian even when he officially pursued a policy of non-alignment *a l'Inde*, in the past. This fact may not be lost to the United States even as it, for purely tactical reasons, "struggles" to isolate and neutralize the *Talibans* (Pashtuized Arabic meaning "students"), who, paradoxically, are none but the regimented successors of America's beloved, mainly Pashtun *Mujahideen* (Arabic for "holy warriors") allies of the 1980s.

Beneath its harsh anti-Taliban rhetoric the US was actually seeking to do (i.e.: create unity, peace and stability) through the former what it failed to achieve with the latter. In the studied opinion of this writer, in feigning to tackle the apparently intractable *Talibans*, for alleged terrorism, America is attempting to get the rest of the mutually hostile, Russia-friendly, Central Asian ethnic groups of Afghanistan that are operating under the rubric of "Northern Alliance", as also their state-backers in the rest of the C. A. neighborhood, to collectively jump into its strategic developmental bandwagon that not

only would shun violence but would be heading tentatively towards a much touted, prospective Central Asian revitalization that would also, in turn help fuel an American relevance and resurgence including in the heart of Asia. But before such interdependent development is possible, certain manifest obstacles and problems must be overcome by both these parties. Afghanistan it must be recognized is a highly fragmented country in terms of ethnicity, language and religious denomination over and above tribal and political divisions. About half of the Afghan populace is Pashtu-speaking-*Pookhtoons*, a quarter, Dari-speaking-Tajiks, about ten percent are Uzbeks, speaking a language that is basically a Turkic dialect. Then there are also significant numbers of Hazarachs, Aimaks, Turkmens and even Uighurs speaking various titular and other languages.

In fact, Uighurs, who form a minority of the Afghanistan population and across the C.A. region, are a Turkic people too who are traditionally fond of their Western contacts and deeply appreciate the true American concern²⁷ for the human rights of Xinjiang's oppressed minorities, including their co-ethnics, who are the prospective titular one there. The Uighurs, in *Xinjiang* and abroad including in Afghanistan, have long been agitating for the creation of an Uighuristan²⁸ out of *Xinjiang*. Religiously too Afghanistan is, broadly-speaking, fragmented between Sunni and Shia factions of Islam. The United States under both Republican and Democratic administrations of the past has largely dealt with the *Pookhtoon* segment of Afghan society. America's *Mujahideen* proxies, who fought the Russians in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s, as mentioned earlier, were largely drawn from *Pookhtoon* ethnics who overwhelmingly straddle the arbitrary Durand Line²⁹ that currently separates their ancestrally unified traditional *Pookhtoon* territory into its

²⁷ Kara Miriam Wortman, and Kerry Dumbaugh, *China's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Developments and U.S. Interests*, 28 Sept. 2001, CRS Report for Congress (RS20476), Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, (Washington, D.C.: LOC; Congressional Research Service, 2001), *passim*, accessed via WikiLeaks Document Release at <<http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS20476>>.

²⁸Historically spelt as Uyghurstan; this project has been revived somewhat with the contemporary convening of the ET(U)NC.

²⁹ For a terse and contextual recent portrayal of the arbitrarily drawn line named after Sir Mortimer Durand, see Victoria Schofield, *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 59-61.

Afghan and Pakistani portions. Roughly in this period the U. S. also provided these *Mujahideen* groups, mainly through its ally Pakistan, about U.S. \$3 billion in economic and covert military aid to Afghanistan.³⁰ Table 4 places this, U. S., not just overt, assistance to Afghanistan between the years 1978 to 2012, in its overall contextual perspective; however, note in particular the continuity of this aid throughout that whole period regardless of who was in power. The main beneficiary of this American largesse, especially in the Soviet Period, was, however, Pakistan's favorite Afghan *Mujahideen* group, the *Hizb-e-Islami* (Party of Islam) headed by the *Pookhtoon* Islamic fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Though not fully reflected in Table 4, the value of covert aid to the *mujahideen* in 1989 alone is said to have reached about U.S. \$750 million. Given this Pakistan-American preference, naturally the other groups had to look elsewhere for additional support. Many of the other groups are being supported by any or many of the following nations: Saudi Arabia, I. R. Iran, India, Japan, France, China and a host of other countries. The Russians, of course, have long enjoyed special constituencies within the other Central Asian groups of Afghanistan like the Turkmens, Tajiks and Uzbek besides the basically South Asian Pashtuns. The Americans have over the years made both direct and indirect overtures to these other Central Asian groups both among the Afghanistan-based *Mujahideen* commanders and U. S.-based *émigré* of Central Asian stock. The United States has, of course, been doing these with a view to building-up influence across the rest of Central Asia, over the long haul, wherein these other races have their own independent titular states which, conveniently have contemporarily been granted independence and which have had now enjoyed diplomatic and other relations for well over two decades with the United States. Regardless of whether, initially, the U.S. used the Mujahideens (proto-Taliban) to

³⁰ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Afghanistan*, November 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2008), accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm>>.

lure Sheikh Osama bin Laden in to the C.A. periphery or Osama (remember senior Laden was Aramco-linked!) used the unsuspecting Saudis and the U.S. to shape the Taliban; by Clinton-time 1997 the Taliban refused to extradite Osama to the U.S., thereby mutually, if not also consensually, setting up an inevitable, perhaps self-serving, bloody climax that duly arrived after 9/11.

Table 4 – U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan (in Millions of Dollars)

Period	Fiscal Year	D.A.	E.S.	P.L. 480*	Military	Others	Total
S O V I E T	1978	/		/	/	/	11.789
	1979	/		/		/	10.616
	1980+						+
	1981						+
	1982						+
	1983						+
	1984						+
	1985	/					3.369
	1986			/			8.900
	1987	/	/	/			32.500
	1988	/	/	/			74.900
	1989+	/	/	/			77.600
P D P A	1990	/	/	/			88.100
	1991	/	/	/			80.100
	1992	/	/	/			81.400
	1993	/	/	/		/	68.200
T A L I B A N	1994	/	/	/		/	42.300
	1995	/		/		/	45.800
	1996			/		/	42.500
	1997			/		/	49.900
	1998			/		/	52.740
	1999						76.600
	2000						113.200
	2001						182.600
P O S T T A L I B A N	2002	/	/	/	/	/	908.000
	2003	/	/	/	/	/	970.000
	2004	/	/	/	/	/	2,393.000
	2005	/	/	/	/#	/	4,711.000
	2006	/	/	/	/	/	3,351.000
	2007	/	/	/	/	/	9,818.000
	2008	/	/	/	/	/	5,732.000
	2009	/	/	/	/	/	9,299.000
	2010	/	/	/	/	/	14,848.000
	2011		/	/	/	/	15,801.000
	2012		/	/	/	/	15,051.000
	2013		/	/	/	/	Rq,9,703.000

Notes: D.A. – Developmental Assistance; E.S. – Economic Support; * - Title I and II (Food Aid); + - U.S. provided about 3 billion \$ covert aid to the *Mujahideens* between 1980 and 1989; and via the ISI trained over 95,000 fighters; # - Reflecting and consisting overwhelmingly, fundings for ASSF since 2005 on; and Rq. – Requested amount only.

Sources: Prepared by this researcher from DOS and CRS data.

Having achieved greater unity and relative peace in Afghanistan through *first* the Taliban proxy, of their ally Pakistan, and then *second* through the coalition-based post-Taliban governments, the U.S. has contemporarily, under Hamid Karzai, forged a broader-based, representative, secularism-friendly, Muslim government therein that it believes can, despite the obvious shortcomings, bring Afghanistan greater peace and stability. Toward this end too the U.S. has established PRTs to ease U.S. forces from a military role to one of positive engagement with Afghan society and created PSC like Blackwater and PMC like XE Services to basically brace up Karzai in his position and consolidate West-sponsored state-building in Afghanistan. American military efforts in the recent past to drive out the *Al-Qaida* international terrorist group from Afghanistan, with or without the capture and extradition of Osama bin Laden,³¹ should also be seen as a move towards that end. America believes that with peace and stability finally restored, Afghanistan would be ripe for sustainable reconstruction and development. Full American participation in the total reconstruction and development is feasible, of course, only when there is not just relative but actually sustainable peace in Afghanistan and along Afghan borders. Perhaps as a prelude to this, Afghanistan underwent a name change in 2004 from TISA to become the IRA, i.e. the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or I.R. Afghanistan despite America's secular dreams for it.

At this juncture, one must remember that Afghanistan, as well as the rest of the independent Central Asian republics, are all basically land-locked states that are highly dependent on powerful neighboring states, filled with egress to the open seas, for their

³¹ Having expanded about US \$400 billion, over many years, on seeking the capture of Bin Laden, the U.S., particularly, its Rob O'Neill, of Team 6 of the U.S. Task Force 160 Special Forces Seals, claims to have "killed" Osama in a Black Hawks raid at Abbottabad, Pakistan on 1-2 May 2011. In this context, see *New York Post*, 1 May 2011, pp. 2-9. But cf. also "Dead Osama was Brought Into Abbottabad and Killed," *Pakistan Observer* 12 May 2011. The controversy thickens with claims of the involvement of an Osama look-alike; and that the real Osama had deceptively stayed in Abbottabad, after all, but without the knowledge of the Pakistani authorities. For one of Osama's daughter Sumaiya told another one Miriam: "tell them (the raiding Americans) the truth, they are not Pakistanis" during the alleged attack on their father. On these, see *Pakistan Observer* 22 May 2011 and 27 May 2017. Still, currently, he is rumoured to be alive and living it up at Nassau in 2013 in the Caribbeans, who can we believe? On this, see True or False, "Bin Laden Alive in Bahamas Strong Fact-NSA leaked info from...," 0:32-1:30, BBC; You Tube, *You Tube*, 28 July 2016, Web, accessed 17 November 2017.


continued development, future progress, prosperity and full integration with the world economy. In this regard both Americans and Afghans are aware that Afghanistan, especially after the demise of the Soviet Union, not only shares borders with countries like Pakistan, Iran and China that offer port facilities and outlets to the open sea but also with three totally land-locked ex-Soviet Muslim states that yearn for non-Russian trade outlets and access to the open seas.

For the Afghans as well as most of the Central Asians the trade outlets offered by both Russia, immediately, and China, over the long-term, are plainly unattractive because of the sheer distances, as seen in Map 16, and the convoluting, if not also constraining, logistics, and therefore the costs, involved. The trade outlets offered by I. R. Iran, immediately are extremely attractive to the Central Asians, in general, but only marginally so for the Afghans, who being, as they have been for millennia and decades, both physically and accord-wise, respectively, linked closely with Pakistan. For the American government too, trade links to Afghanistan and most of Central Asia, through Pakistan is more preferable than any through Iran – a budding Russian and recently a ready Chinese ally.

The U.S. government has been very categorical in this regard. Their hard-line stand against I. R. Iran shows very clearly when one considers the pipeline politics³² being played out in the C.A. convicinity by the regional and extra-regional powers since the very outset of the geo-political transformations unleashed by the Soviet collapse. Ironically, under an idealist policy of “liberal internationalism”, an Irano-phobic, if not also Islamo-phobic, United States moved aggressively, especially during the Clinton administration, to minimize and foreclose any benefits that may accrue to I. R. Iran as a result of the opening-up of Central Asia to the world. Despite the attraction of Iranian trade and logistics facilities

³² See Chapter 5, pp. 326-335.

and reliable outlets to even American private-sector companies and oil corporations due to their relative shortness of distance from C.A. and, therefore, cost-effectiveness, the U.S. government has strongly rejected all proposed and present trade routes and pipelines that traverses Iranian territory because these may bring Iran immediate boom and long-term boon in terms of not just handsome transit fees but also greater strategic influence all across the Central Asian states. As a result of such fears the U.S. government likes, nay prefers, to support any alternative route that avoids Iran even if this entails a much larger outlay of capital. This attitude was particularly acute during the Clinton administrations, and especially so when it coincided with the reign of Taliban in Afghanistan.



Though Afghanistan represent America's oldest interest in the C.A. region, before the coming of independences to most of the rest of the CARs., the U.S. has long had a

cautious view of both Afghanistan and its various rulers suspecting most of them to have Russian or later Soviet sympathies despite their at times impressive rhetorics to the contrary. Despite winning independence on 19th Aug. 1919 the U.S. took nearly two years to formally recognize that Afghan independence, the first of the Central Asian region.

Though U.S. media continued, in a reduced fashion, its coverage of Afghanistan affairs, there appears to be not much direct interactions whatsoever between the U.S. and Afghanistan particularly in the years 1992 to 2000. Other than in this period there are records of continual interactions at various significant levels between these states since at least 1950, including in highly covert forms with Afghan mujahideen rebels between the years 1980 to 1991. U.S. efforts to have friendly relations with Afghanistan in contemporary times may also have been intended to frustrate Iranian attempts to build influence therein. Overriding the Congressional pro-Israeli lobby's concerns, Reagan allowed the sale of Stinger missiles to help the Afghan mujahideen's struggle against the Soviets in the past. Reagan, a landslide American president, hosted mujahideen leaders at the White House in 1985 and even considered them "the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers".³³

As Afghanistan's civil tensions degenerated towards conditions akin to civil war following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, hopes for improving the relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan virtually evaporated. Progressively the relationship among them declined to a state where the U.S. cooperated to destabilize the Afghan government with and via its Pakistan and other proxies. In the ensuing Afghan civil struggle, the Soviet Union and U.S.-supported Pakistan were involved in bloody confrontations wherein America and Saudi-backed Pakistan supported the seven-party mujahideen Afghan rebels

³³ Qtd. by Lamb in her *Farewell Kabul: From...*, op. cit., p. 447.

and the Soviet Union, on its part, propped-up the Afghan Marxist government forces rather directly. The Afghan civil war is a case where American arms and U.S. sponsored arms, via its proxies, enormously braced up on otherwise under-armed rag-tag Afghan rebel militia to reverse a totally unfavorable local power equation and help accomplish a victorious outcome in a Third World setting. It also represent a situation where for the first time the U.S. has extended substantive assistance, including arms, to a Muslim country and its policy tools facing off, unbelievably, even a non-Muslim one and a superpower at that.

In these times, the United States was obviously pursuing some key objectives in Afghanistan. These include locking in Pakistan's dependence on the U.S.; ratcheting up pressure on the Marxist government in Kabul; obtaining "listening posts" if not also bases in the Afghanistan neighborhood; and put pressure on the Soviet Union and its puppets in the Afghan conflict. In time, these objectives were mostly more than realized. Given the obvious weakness of the mujahideen forces, Pakistan had little choice but to commit a significant contingent of its, albeit irregular, forces to the struggle in a sort of holy-mercenary role. In doing so, Pakistan was able to reenact an America subsidized "Vietnam" for the Soviets in Afghanistan. Obviously, Pakistan was able to so prosecute its bloody involvements and protracted, proxy conflict in Afghanistan only with the unremitting support of the U.S. and its other allies.

In the time of Najibullah the relation between the Afghan factions seem to be improving. Politically, Afghanistan underwent a name change, from DRA it became ROA. Najibullah made many concessions to other Afghan factions opposing him. Pakistan appeared to be taken in by these moves within Afghanistan. For its part, the U.S. too appeared to appreciate this development as is discernable in the U.S. media of that period. America's shifted positive trend towards Najibullah continued even when he finally took

refuge in the U.N. compound in Kabul. But unfortunately for Najibullah, America's accommodating stance was not similarly received by their Taliban then prodigies who subsequently went rogue. Years later, the U.S. instigated and supported other antagonists in another C.A. regional conflict beyond the Afghanistan border. In 2005, the U.S. was believed to back the rebels stirring up trouble and fighting to overthrow the Uzbekistan government and help spread the democratic/Islamist movements into the rest of the C.A. region. As a consequence America's perceived support for these movements against the Uzbek government increased Karimov's and, by extension, the rest of the CARs leaders' suspicions of the U.S. and lend credence to their intuition that America may be intending to undermine their governments if not also to destabilize the entire C.A. region. It must be mentioned, that the U.S. had difficulty in recovering back some of the Stinger³⁴ missiles that the Afghan mujahideen had earlier received via U.S. ally Pakistan.

In the Cold War period, the U.S. was known to initiate and sponsor various regional initiatives and integrative organizations that would lend strength to otherwise weak states that faced potential Soviet expansionism. The Soviets naturally opposed all such integrative schemes aimed at increasing the cooperation between regional states, in keeping with its long-time strategy of opposing regional integration of states. But this situation changed somewhat in the post-Cold War times when Russia supports state integration in the C.A. region whether in the form of the CIS, CSTO or even the SCO, which the U.S. has reservations about despite the membership of both Turkic-sensitive Afghanistan and Pakistan therein. Though the Muslim societies of both Pakistan and Afghanistan are highly sympathetic to the Turkic/Uighur cause in Xinjiang, the governments, particularly, in

³⁴ Stinger missiles had much appeal around the region then mainly because of their portability and their effective strike altitude of about 14,000 feet from the ground, they were said to be particularly useful in neutralizing the deadly Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopters.

Pakistan are highly pragmatic and dispassionate on this issue and assiduously work to treasure Pakistan-China ties, sincerely.

Still, the U.S. is uneasy with the SCO despite the membership therein of numerous Turkic states and America's growing friendship with the Turkic world, sponsorship of Turkic nationalism across the C.A. region and support of Turkic self-determination even into the Caucasus and Chinese *Xinjiang*. America's interest in wanting to be in friendly terms with a Taliban-led Afghanistan was, *inter alia*, motivated by its strong desire to access C.A. hydrocarbons via Afghanistan too. But issues like America's efforts to drive a wedge between the Taliban and their Al-Qaeda guests, including Osama bin Laden, who sought and have been in sanctuary in their territory; the relentless American propaganda against the Taliban and their alleged retrogressive practices, and the rather limited freedoms allowed to Afghan women by the Taliban all served to raise the tension between the U.S. and Talibanistic Afghanistan.

For the most part, Afghan-U.S. relations are seen to be rather cold, usually marked by benign calm if not unsubstantive friendship. In such periods there have been congratulatory exchanges in the form of letters or calls, especially on occasions of national importance. Heightened ties are often marked by elite visits, sometimes signaling a positive change in relationship. But their relationship is also interspersed with sporadic periods of blatant hostility and enforced engagements. Since the inception of relations between both countries, relations have seen periods of friendship, neutrality and hostility, in cycles too. The Daud years, for example, can be considered as a period of neutrality, despite its socialist trappings. Their fluctuating relationship is interspersed with recurring desire for normalizing relations after episodes of decline in relationship. A factor in this is the high

Afghan expectations from its U.S. relationship. America has long shown interest in wanting to maintain relations with Afghanistan.

After a gradual rise in ties between them over the early three odd decades, their relationship rapidly declined over the following three decades. One reason for this appears, after the creation of Pakistan, to be U.S.–Afghan relations becoming subservient to U.S.–Pakistan ties over the Cold War years. This protracted formal decline in relationship culminated in the American “invasion” of Afghanistan following the tragic events of Sept.11, 2001. NATO entered Kabul in 2003 perhaps to allow Bush America to ambush Iraq on WMD pretext. When Obama came in he continued Bush’s belated surge in Afghanistan. After an Al-Qaeda double agent kills CIA agents in a suicide attack at Khost, David Patraeus was given command of both U.S. and ISAF forces in 2010. A military partnership with the U.S. was ironed out after Karzai visited Russia in 2011.

After Tokyo donor conference pledges about 16 billion U.S. dollars civilian aid till 2016 to Afghanistan, the Taliban were allowed to open its office in Dubai for possible peace dealings with Obama’s America. Since then under the geo-strategic framework of American occupation of Afghanistan, U.S.–Afghanistan relationship, albeit one that riskily continues to sideline the bulk of the well-rooted native Talibans, appears to be picking up and deepening over the recent odd decade and beyond. But it could have been better if all those aid³⁵ said to have been given to Afghanistan by the U.S. and the West actually and overwhelmingly went to the betterment of the Afghan peoples. Sadly, this was not so, but anyway on the cultural-educational front, an American University of Afghanistan was chartered in 2002 under Bush time America and it actually came of age in 2011 with its first ever “convocation.”

³⁵ See Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (New York: Oxford U P, 2008), pp. 86-88.

Kyrgyzstan - U.S. Relations

Despite being staunch socialist Muslims, as is also mostly the case in Afghanistan, and only next to the Kazakhs in being Russian-friendly; yet when the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed, their Russian overlords, disregarding these familiar sentiments, rushed to the doors, abandoning the Kyrgyz to face immediately a strategic void. Left vulnerable in this condition, Kyrgyzstan's location placed it in a two-dimensional politico-geographic situation. As may be discerned in the Kyrgyzstan Map 17, located on its north and south-west dimensions are introverted Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, respectively, preoccupied each in their own immediate "businesses."

Present amidst the west and south-east dimensions are, respectively, Uzbekistan and China via *Xinjiang*, both somewhat geo-politically inclined. Uzbeks and Uighurs can be found in significant numbers in Kyrgyzstan. Survival-minded, initially Kyrgyzstan took sanctuary under a policy of neutrality, only to discover that it may continue to do so, unwisely, at the cost of national and strategic dynamism. With Russia disinclined on any mutually beneficial integrative projects, Kyrgyzstan had no choice but to, pragmatically, ditch neutrality in favour of the open door. When recognition was given, it came *en mass*, the United States recognized Kyrgyzstan along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991. Having established diplomatic relations with Kyrgyzstan relatively quickly the U.S. went on to open its diplomatic mission and embassy in its capital Bishkek in 1 Feb. 1992. Its first resident representative there was *Charge d'Affaires ad interim* Edward McWilliams preparing the way for the arrival of the first U.S. ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Mr. Edward Hurwitz.³⁶

³⁶ See Appendix III, p.459.

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Kyrgyzstan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Kyrgyzstan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., Kyrgyzstan in the initial years had rather limited volume of trade, as may be readily verified via the U.S. Census Bureau's website,³⁷ with the U.S. thus, it is no surprise to find Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and China figure as greater trade partners than, of Kyrgyzstan. Though, one must admit to find Germany, and lesser so Russia, figuring in it, indeed surprising. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan's exports to and imports from the U.S. has rapidly, if continually, grown since its independence, though from a low base.

Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed. Delegations of key members of the U.S. executive branch have visited their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan and the vice-versa. H.W. Bush's administration did not extend much in terms of aid to Kyrgyzstan. In 1993, U.S. Dept. of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP (1991) to lure Kyrgyzstan to participate in its program.

Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite rapidly, U.S. - Kyrgyzstan relations, despite having very brief hiccups, have continuously galloped along with amity of sorts. There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states, including, Kyrgyzstan tied close to the Russian bosom. It must be noted that Putin had opened a

³⁷ This is accessible at: <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c4635.html>>.

Russian base quite near to the Manas U.S. base in 2003. After Bakiyev replaced Akayev in 2005 Russia was allowed a second base too in 2009 but only after the U.S. base was allowed to operate at triple its previous rent payment.



Map 17 - Kyrgyzstan (Physical)

Source: Taken from *Merriam-Webster's Pocket Atlas*, published together by Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. and Toppan (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1998), p. 90.

U.S. aid to Kyrgyzstan was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. It rose significantly in 2002 as Bush entered his first term mid-election year, which is also the highest aid during his tenure in office. To continue the Democratic Party's own past engagement with Kyrgyzstan, Barack Obama took up where Bush left. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, it is a surprise to see U.S. aid surging initially almost in parallel to Clinton's first term feat. Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with some concern as to what this may actually

augur for the future, though Kyrgyzstan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S. for its role in permitting the “reverse transit” via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and which has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of “sustainment and total cargoes” exiting from Afghanistan.³⁸ Under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Kyrgyzstan’s transition to democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Kyrgyzstan right from its independence.

Kyrgyzstan had Peace Corps volunteers engaged in various activities including in imparting business education, teaching English, public health, HIV/AIDS prevention, community development, developing environmental NGOs, youth development and provided medical and food supplies to vulnerable populations.³⁹ Very broadly, American aid in the Kyrgyz politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary. Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Kyrgyzstan and the vice-versa, periodically.⁴⁰

Economically, Kyrgyzstan is key to the U.S. in the region because of its location, its economic bravery, and its natural resources,⁴¹ including meager energy⁴² ones. The post Soviet collapse’s decline in demand was overcome with bold economic reforms and more than reversed with the help of mainly aid inflows, foreign investments and even improving

³⁸ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit., p.4.

³⁹ United States of America, DOS-FOAA, *Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Kyrgyz Republic*, 20 January 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009), accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/103641.htm>>.

⁴⁰ EKrUSA (Embassy of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan in the USA), ‘Speaker of the Kyrgyz Parliament met with U.S. President Barack Obama,’ 26 Sept. 201? (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, 201?), Last accessed online on 20 April 2014 at <<http://www.kgembassy.org/index.php?view=...>>.

⁴¹ See Table 8.

⁴² Jim Nichol, *Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress (97-690), 30 August 2013, (Washington, D.C.: LOC; CRS, 2013), pp. 26-7.

harvests. U.S. investment sources gradually began paying more interest to Kyrgyzstan as a destination for their investments especially after the conclusion of the OPIC agreement and bilateral investment treaty with it. Although Kyrgyzstan is not the largest recipient of the United States' foreign direct investments in the C.A. region, the U.S. is a FDI source for Kyrgyzstan.

The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector. In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Kyrgyz firms with relevant U.S. businesses. Sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas, water and others too, remains largely a focus. The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and help in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; given Kyrgyzstan's amazingly rapid embrace of market reforms, U.S. supports the transition to market economy in Kyrgyzstan and thereby work to integrate it into the world trade system fully.⁴³ In this regard, the U.S. supported Kyrgyzstan's relatively very early accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 1998.⁴⁴ In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the Kyrgyz government to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection. In this context too, the U.S. helps Kyrgyzstan advance towards its MDGs better than with the rest of the CARs.

Kyrgyzstan's armed forces participates not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but it also joins-in multi-laterally in NATO's Partnership

⁴³ United States of America, USAID (US Agency for International Development), 'USAID Country Profile: Kyrgyzstan' (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <<http://www.info.usaid.gov/countries/>>.

⁴⁴ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kyrgyzstan*, April 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2009), accessed online on 16 Sept. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5755.htm>>.

for Peace program. The US Central Command conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with the Kyrgyz Defense Ministry⁴⁵ and its other agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges to full military exercises. Quantitatively, these events are rising in numbers continually over the years. As a non-NATO member Kyrgyzstan is kept quite close to the U.S. through other programs. American aid to Kyrgyzstan is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the Kyrgyz defense and security sector. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning the U.S. has been involved in defense reform in Kyrgyzstan.

Kyrgyzstan has since 1994 an active partnership with the Montana National Guards. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Kyrgyzstan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields. Confidential sources say that a number of bases in Kyrgyzstan were considered for this purpose. The U.S. helps Kyrgyzstan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reforms including in creating an adequate Kyrgyz force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Kyrgyzstani military by providing the required training and equipment so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Kyrgyzstan has a relatively good level of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S. amongst CIS states. Russia's legitimate concern on NATO affairs involving the FSU has been moderated to an extent through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which allows Russia some inter-face ability without giving it veto power over any NATO moves. It is under this background of lukewarm but tacit approval that

⁴⁵ It is one of Kyrgyzstan's key ministries, as may be seen in Appendix V.

NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helps restructure even the Kyrgyz military, as hinted to earlier. U.S. Central Command organized various cooperative security-related events in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere. It also co-operates bilaterally and participates in bilateral military exercises. In direct military to military cooperation, Kyrgyzstan participates in the American IMET and FMF programs. Kyrgyz military officers attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training via IMET program.

Perhaps with its base security in mind, the U.S. supports the anti-terrorism Rapid reaction force (RRF). Despite the broad range of its defense and security cooperation with the U.S. and having an U.S. base on its territory Kyrgyzstan has off and on demanded the U.S., interestingly, via even the SCO to set a timetable to quit even its existing bases including the one within it at Manas. Simultaneously, however, in the context of the United States' impending so-called "exit" from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan has earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN, an American-led logistics arrangement (as we shall see in Map 21 later), at uneconomically higher costs, that is intended to reduce supplies transiting Pakistan by relying more on the apparently more reliable routes and ports of northern Eurasia.

Nevertheless, at independence, unlike with the other Central Asian states, and despite the initial euphoria, the U.S. welcome of Kyrgyzstan was somewhat restrained, given Kyrgyzstan's too high an affinity to a non-Gorby-led Russia and its initial caution on reforms and flirtation with neutrality. Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush's tenure grew reasonably, continually with significant rises recorded in 2003 and 2006. Many leading Americans have later followed at the heels of Mrs. Clinton to Kyrgyzstan. The trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's later tenure somewhat bled into and really took off in

Obama's own first term. As far as aid is concern, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to Kyrgyzstan, which was regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing.

Since Kyrgyzstan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID has extended to it till 2012 is fully valued higher at about US \$ 762.74 million. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be 2010 when Kyrgyzstan received U.S. \$ 117.52 million.⁴⁶ Aid has drastically fallen since then, but follows at levels which first appeared in 1995. As per the records of the U.S. Census Bureau, US bilateral trade in goods with Kyrgyzstan has grown continually.⁴⁷ The export value of goods from the US to Kyrgyzstan grew continually from 18.4 million US dollars in 1993, the first full year of exports to be recorded, to US\$145.5 million in 2012. The upward growth trend dipped only in the years 1994, 1997, 2004, 2007 and 2008 in between. The US is not among the top three of Kyrgyzstan's export markets.

The import value of goods to the US from Kyrgyzstan also grew continually from about US\$ 2 million in the first full year of trade in 1993 to some 9.3 million dollars in 2012. The upward trend dipped somewhat significantly only after the years 1996, 2004 and 2010. The import value began growing exponentially from 2003 which is a remarkable peak of sorts at US\$ 11 million. On average the peak months for US exports to Kyrgyzstan is Octobers and the average peak months for US imports from Kyrgyzstan is Januarys.

When one looks at Kyrgyzstan's trade partners, Russia still figures as Kyrgyzstan's leading trade partner overall. The E.U., especially Germany and China follow Russia in this respect. Without using the strict and comprehensive, if not also cumbersome, classification

⁴⁶ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 65.

⁴⁷ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with Kyrgyzstan,' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.


of trade products employed by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), one can generally say that trade between western countries, including the United States, and Kyrgyzstan are dominated by oil, ferrous & non-ferrous metals including uranium and mercury, machinery, minerals and cotton.

The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Kyrgyzstan's oil reserves as 0.040 billion barrels of proven reserves. Strategically, the U.S. is, of course, in Kyrgyzstan as much to diversify its energy sources (as we shall see in the later Chapter 5) as it is to prevent Kyrgyzstan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as "Islamic radicalism," both of which are, by the way, key U.S. national security priorities. In this and other contexts too, Kyrgyzstan has turned to the U.S. for military supplies to protect its assets and its sovereignty. But after allowing NATO to evacuate via its territory in 2012 Kyrgyzstan tells Putin via Almazbek Atambayev that it will not renew the Manas base to the U.S.

Tajikistan – U. S. Relations

Unlike some Kyrgyz, the Tajiks are one among the more West inclined peoples of the ex-Soviet Union, despite this they were the most disinclined towards independence at the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Soviet Central Asia, Tajikistan stood out for two reasons: it was the poorest of the lot and was the only republic with a Persian majority ethnic stock. Like Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan shares long borders with all its neighbors with a similar dimensional aspect except on the North-South axis, where in the north it is well braced by Kyrgyzstan and somewhat unpleasantly embraced too closely at the west and north too by Uzbekistan; and volatile Afghanistan similarly lays unstably the length of its entire south. To the east, emerges Chinese *Xinjiang*. As can be seen in the Tajikistan Map 18, a salient

feature, that makes it attractive to the United States in the current context more so than Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, is its rather long and tough frontier with Afghanistan where the U.S. is engaged in a critical mission chasing a stability that remains as yet elusive.



Map 18 - Tajikistan (Physical)

Source: Taken from *Merriam-Webster's Pocket Atlas*, published together by Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. and Toppan (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, 1998), p. 167.

Even decades before the coming of independence, the Western media have reported on Islamic or nationalistic stirrings within Tajikistan. Generally, if one is to characterize the relatively late starting relation between the U.S. and Tajikistan one may term them as a relationship marked by suspicious optimism. The suspicion is long with roots running deep into pre-independence times when it was firmly within the Soviet Union. This suspicion began to give in more to optimism as the Soviet Union fell away approximately about the

time the Najibullah regime in Afghanistan started going green–friendly in its dying attempt at full reconciliation with the Muslim resistance.

Over the next few years the hard socialism of Tajikistan and the harder Islamism of Afghanistan encountered one another across increasingly porous borders anxiously watched over by the U.S. and its regional proxies all quite well aware of a weakening Russia beating a gradual retreat from the C.A. region. More often than not, in both countries the U.S. was supportive of the reformers or the rebels. Despite these facts, the U.S. still viewed Tajikistan as a Russian–rump annoyingly continuing to hold and host the Russian 201st Motorized Mountain Division in bases in its territory and more understandably having Russian border troops at Khorog within the country, ostensibly, just to keep radical Islamist out of Tajikistan.⁴⁸

The change of leadership in Tajikistan did not bring about much of a change in its relationship with the U.S. The trend of suspicious optimism continued somewhat. There was not much significance to the change in leadership, in U.S. perception because the Russian attitude to its presence in Tajikistan changed very little. The U.S. was more hoping for change to appear from the activities of the democratic and/or Islamic elements therein, wishfully to bottle up the still unruly communist genie.

Though Tajikistan held different views on some international issues from the U.S. still, the Sept. 11, 2001 events stirred Tajikistan sufficiently enough to offer the U.S. their air-corridor and airport facilities. Though Tajikistan is an optimal operation staging location for the U.S. in relation to its campaign in Afghanistan yet the possibility of these

⁴⁸ Russian bases have been there since at least 1918, if not earlier, and may stay there beyond 2018 and on this, see Kleveman, *The New Great Game: ...op.cit.*, pp.193-197.

being abused for launching operations against I. R. Iran put a hurdle in these prospects given that Tajikistan has some special attachment to Iran.

The motivation for the Tajik offer was also to help the U.S. contain Radical, if not also Political Islam. In a similar vein, given their mutual allergy for Militant Islam, Russia too was quite subdued in its response to Tajikistan's offer of facilities to the U.S., at least, in the earlier period. Given this ability for both the U.S. and Russia to work out a mutual arrangement of co-existence within Tajikistan and the lessening tension that this represent, the question naturally arose in some minds, of the further need for Tajikistan's continued security patronage from external powers particularly Russia and the U.S.?

Despite this the U.S. media has taken a dim view of the contained friendship between Tajikistan and Russia and has been highly disturbed, as noted earlier, by the uninterrupted presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan since even pre-Soviet times. Though the U.S. has not explicitly denounced the existence of Russian bases in Tajikistan, it has viewed these, since the Soviet collapse, with increasing but continual unease. Western observers have noted the exit of Russian border guards from the Tajik-Afghan border with mixed feelings. Unlike the U.S. government the U.S. media, in the light of these facts, at times even question if Tajikistan is at all independent?

Given that Tajikistan and Afghanistan have been having diplomatic relations from pre-Taliban times on, their mutual ties and regional cooperation can only improve further when the U.S. and Russia scale down or better yet cease their narrowly-focused security presence therein, respectively, and supplant it with offering increased broader-based socio-economic and developmental assistance and investments. Contrary to what people may assume Russia's reception of the U.S. linkages with Tajikistan, particularly in the

immediate months after 11th Sept. 2001 was very much positive and accommodating. Given that this was also the sentiment in the rest of C.A. there was precious little else to read into the new situation, other than to view it as bringing in heightened security to the region as a whole.

Though elements in the Afghanistan entity supported an insurgency to overthrow the Tajikistan government, and spread their version of radical Islam to Tajikistan and via it to the other countries of the region,⁴⁹ the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the uprooting of the Taliban at least from regions adjacent to Tajikistan put an effective stop to this. The U.S., particularly since 2002, has been supportive of Afghanistan's better relations with Tajikistan as well as with the rest of C.A. The U.S. motive for this move looks like its evolving desire to reach across the entire C.A. region and to draw the same towards its already deeper presence in the South Asian region thereby attempting to minimize C.A.s' increasing attractions towards China, I. R. Iran and Russia too. Inducing the CARs to greater mutual dependence may also in the long run translate to getting more regional bang for its bucks, in terms of higher returns for the aid it dispenses to the region. Though the Taliban removal from Afghanistan definitely relieved the tension that existed between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, over the longer term Tajik and other Central Asian suspicions remain over the future of Afghanistan and what that holds for them. In the meanwhile, Afghanistan's thoroughly decapitated army or what passes for it does not present any great conventional threat to Tajikistan or the other CARs.

As the U.S. gets to grip with the security situation in Afghanistan so too does Russia within Tajikistan. But weather these are sufficient to check the non-conventional threats that are breeding across the entire region, remain very much to be seen. Drugs and illicit

⁴⁹ It is believed that the ILP has numerous supporters within Tajikistan and some 20,000 of its fighters are believed to be in Kyrgyzstan too.

arms, if not WMD, trade and transits are clear threats in Tajikistan for the U.S. and the general poverty and weak state structures too are its immediate challenges. The U.S. sees the Tajik civil war also as Russian attempt to play one Tajik faction off against the other in its deeper interest to maintain influence in Tajikistan's politics and thereby secure its continuous hold over its strategic bases that litter across Tajikistan.

Of all the Russo-friendly C.A. states Tajikistan has a stronger capitalistic streak. But despite this U.S.–Tajikistan relations started a little late perhaps owing to its politically unstable situation, initially. Breaking into civil war almost at independence, U.S. – Tajikistan relations was still on track well despite the later start. Lack of resource endowments, lingering Soviet legacies, higher Iranian ties and die-hard communist habits are the constraining factors in their relationship. U.S.-Tajikistan relations may be characterized as warm but cautious. Generally, political and strategic issues mark the friendly and not too friendly periods of their relationship.

The United States recognized Tajikistan along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991. Having established diplomatic relations with Tajikistan relatively quickly the U.S. went on to open its diplomatic mission and embassy first in a hotel⁵⁰ in its capital of Dushanbe on 13 March 1992. In fact, the U.S. was the second to do so in this regard. But more than seven months into it, it had to close the embassy and was able to reopen the same only on 11 March 1993.⁵¹ Its first resident representative there was *Charge d'Affaires ad interim* Edward McWilliams preparing the way for the arrival of the first U.S. ambassador to Tajikistan Mr. Stanley Tuemler Escudero. Later, after relocating temporarily to Almaty in 1998, on account of security concerns following the bombings of

⁵⁰ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Tajikistan*, March 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2009), accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5775.htm>>.

⁵¹ See Appendix III.

the U.S. embassies in Africa, the U.S. Embassy of Tajikistan moved into its new purpose-built Dushanbe embassy “on June 28, 2006, with participation of the President of Tajikistan”.⁵²

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Tajikistan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Tajikistan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., Tajikistan in the initial years had rather limited volume of trade with the U.S. thus, it is no surprise to find Uzbekistan as the leading trade partner. What is surprising is to still find Russia and even more Netherlands, Liechtenstein and Switzerland figure as greater trade partners than, of Tajikistan. Nevertheless, Tajikistan’s exports to and imports from the U.S. has gradually, if continually, grown since its independence from a rather low start.

Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were gradually signed. Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Tajikistan and the vice-versa. Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Tajikistan and the vice-versa over the years. During these visits they met top U.S. elites in-charge of State, Defense and the Commerce departments. H.W. Bush’s administration did not extend much in terms of aid to Tajikistan. In 1993, U.S. Dept. of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP (1991) to lure Tajikistan to participate in its program.

⁵² ETjUSA (Embassy of Tajikistan to the USA), ‘Tajik-American relations,’ 24 September 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of Tajikistan to the United States of America, 2013), accessed online on 20 April 2014 at <<http://tjus.org/tajikistan/tajik-american-relations>>.

The U.S. was delighted, when Tajikistan joined NATO's PfP program, thereby displaying Tajikistan's relative capacity for independent foreign policy action. Though Russia was uneasy about this, it drew some consolation, in the initial years at least, from the fact that this was not the NATO of old and that it no longer appears to be arranged against Russia and that it now is more poised to tackle out-of-area responsibilities. On Tajikistan's part, it too not wanting to appear as moving close to the West tried to balance such sentiments by joining the Eurasian Union and later joined a Russia-led Customs Union too under the same spirit.

During the Clinton administrations, trade saw steady but continual growth with the United States registering both surplus and deficit balances with Tajikistan. Though Tajikistan has a policy of positive cooperation with all its neighbors and the great powers, since its independence, its relations with the United States has generally been quite amicable but interspersed with brief periods of lukewarmity. Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite gradually and also cautiously, U.S. - Tajikistan relations, despite having hiccups have continuously galloped along with amity of sorts.

There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states, including, even Tajikistan tied overly close to the Russian bosom. U.S. aid to Tajikistan was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. It rose almost exponentially in 2002 as Bush entered his first term mid-election year, which is also the highest aid received by the country so far. To continue the Democratic Party's own past engagement with Tajikistan, Barack Obama took up where

Bush left. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, it is a surprise to see U.S. aid surging initially and maintaining high if lower levels thereafter.

Nonetheless, Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with extreme concern as to what this may actually augur for the future, though Tajikistan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S. for its role in permitting the "reverse transit" via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and which has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of "sustainment and total cargoes" exiting from Afghanistan.⁵³

Under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Tajikistan's transition to democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Tajikistan right from its independence. There are no indications of Tajikistan allowing Peace Corps volunteers to engage in any activities including even in imparting business education, teaching English and public health. Still, very broadly, American aid in the Tajik politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society.

Economically, Tajikistan is key to the U.S. in the region because of its strategic location, its physical attractions, and its natural resources, including energy ones. The post Soviet collapse's decline in demand was overcome with some economic reforms and more than reversed with the help of aid inflows, social developments and even improving harvests. U.S. investment sources gradually began paying more interest to Tajikistan as a destination for their investments especially after the conclusion of bilateral investment treaty with it.

⁵³ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit., p.4.

Despite the U.S. not being a significant FDI source for Tajikistan, the U.S. commercial service runs business internships; it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors. In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Tajik firms with relevant U.S. businesses. The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and help in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; U.S. supports the transition to market economy in Tajikistan and thereby works to integrate it into the world trade system fully.⁵⁴ In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the Kyrgyz government to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection.

With Russia's initial disinterest vividly in mind, it is, understandably, cautious too about Russia's continued reliability and viewing contrastingly, especially America's military-first approach in its periphery and the greater Middle Eastern region with concern, it is highly cautious of engagements with the U.S. However, mindful of the extreme difficulties of its strategic neighborhood and the potential instabilities arising from the current drawdowns and the looming post-2014 American exit from Afghanistan, Tajikistan is particularly anxious to keep all its bigger neighboring powers and the United States equitably and positively engaged with it and to be relevant and available in its developmental immediate futures.

Still, Tajikistan's armed forces participates not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but it also joined-in multi-laterally in NATO's

⁵⁴ United States of America, USAID (US Agency for International Development), 'USAID Country Profile: Tajikistan' (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <<http://www.info.usaid.gov/countries/>>.

Partnership for Peace program since 2002.⁵⁵ The US Central Command conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with the Tajik Defense Ministry and its other agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges to even military exercises. Quantitatively, these events are rising in numbers continually over the years. American aid to Tajikistan is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the Tajik defense and security sector. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning the U.S. has been involved in defense reform in Tajikistan. The U.S. Department of Defense launched the CTR program in 1992 to facilitate the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction across the former Soviet Union including within strangely Tajikistan too.

Tajikistan has an active partnership with the Virginia National Guards. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Tajikistan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields, though mainly to other NATO members. The U.S. helps Tajikistan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reforms including in creating an adequate Tajik force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Tajikistani military by providing the required training and equipment so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity but comes much behind Russia in these important aspects to bolster regional stability the U.S. also supports U.N. observers in Tajikistan under the UNMOT.

Tajikistan has modest levels of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S. amongst CIS states. Russia's legitimate concern on NATO affairs involving the FSU has been moderated to an extent through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which allows Russia some inter-face ability without giving it veto power over any NATO moves.

⁵⁵ Jim Nichol, *Tajikistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress (98-594), 25 September 2013, (Washington, D.C.: LOC; CRS, 2013), p. 4.

It is under this background of lukewarm but tacit approval that NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helps restructure even the Tajik military, as hinted to earlier. U.S. Central Command organized various cooperative security-related events in Tajikistan and elsewhere. In direct military to military cooperation, Tajikistan participates in the American IMET and FMF programs. Tajik military officers attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training via IMET program.

When it comes specifically to security, the U.S. helps the Government of Tajikistan to draft effective legislation and improve enforcement of existing laws by providing relevant training to customs and other enforcement officials to tackle all manner of trafficking in of narcotics, persons and WMDs. Tajikistan has benefited from various security-related assistances too. In the area of security assistance again, the U.S. helps Tajikistan by providing training and equipment to combat transnational threats such as WMD technology and materiel proliferation, increase border security, counter-terrorism co-operation especially after the advent of the so-called “war on terror”, and to address other seemingly “lesser” security related threats such as money laundering, terrorism financing, illegal drugs and trafficking in persons illegally.

Despite the broad range of its defense and security cooperation with the U.S., Tajikistan has demanded the U.S., interestingly, via even the SCO to set a timetable to quit its existing bases elsewhere in Central Asia. Simultaneously, however, in the context of the United States’ impending so-called “exit” from Afghanistan, Tajikistan has earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN, an American-led logistics arrangement (as we shall see in Map 21 later), at uneconomically higher costs, that is intended to reduce

supplies transiting Pakistan by relying more on the apparently more reliable routes and ports of northern Eurasia.

Nevertheless, at independence, unlike with the other Central Asian states, and despite the initial euphoria, the U.S. welcome of Tajikistan was somewhat restrained, given Tajikistan's too high an affinity to a non-Gorby-led Russia. Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush's tenure grew continually with significant rises recorded in 2001, 2004 and in 2006. Many leading Americans like Ray Mabus, Robert O. Blake, Jr. and Simon Limage have later followed at the heels of Mrs. Clinton to Tajikistan. While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's later tenure did not bleed into Obama's own first term. As far as aid is concerned, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to, an otherwise regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing Tajikistan.

Since Tajikistan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID has extended to it till 2012 is fully valued higher at about US \$ 703.83 million. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be 2002 when Tajikistan received U.S. \$ 136.34 million.⁵⁶ Aid has drastically fallen since then, but follows a trend which first appeared in 1995. As per the records of the U.S. Census Bureau, US bilateral trade in goods with Tajikistan has grown continually.⁵⁷ The export value of goods from the US to Tajikistan grew continually from 11.6 million US dollars in 1993, the first full year of exports to be recorded, to US\$54.2 million in 2012.

The US is not among the top three of Tajikistan's export markets. The import value of goods to the US from Tajikistan also grew slowly and continually from about US\$ 17.7

⁵⁶ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 65.

⁵⁷ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with Tajikistan,' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.

million in the first full year of trade in 1993 to some 26.8 million dollars in 2012. When one looks at Tajikistan's trade partners, Russia still figures among Tajikistan's leading trade partners overall. The United States and its proxies rarely figure as key trade partners of Tajikistan. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Tajikistan's oil reserves negligibly at 0.012 billion barrels of proven reserves.

Strategically, the U.S. is, of course, in Tajikistan mainly to prevent Tajikistan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as "Islamic radicalism," which is, by the way, even in Obama's time a key U.S. national security priority. In this and other contexts too, Tajikistan has turned even to the U.S. for military supplies to protect its sovereignty. Nevertheless, in 2012 Tajikistan extends the Russian base, due to expire in 2014, by 30 years to counter influence of Islamist, perhaps Western sponsored, and drug trafficking. It must be remembered that Putin visited Tajikistan in 2003 to boost Russian military presence there after Tajikistan had braced-up its borders in 2002 to prevent *Al-Qaeda* escaping to farther afield including to Chechnya⁵⁸ from U.S. forces in Afghanistan, all rather cooperatively with the U.S.!

Conclusion

Despite the initial cautious euphoria (1991-1994) at the independence of most of the CAS and the early geo-strategic imperatives to be addressed via the establishment of diplomatic and security relations with them, generally relations between the CAS and the United States only proceeded incrementally between the years 1995 to 1999 and this pattern continued somewhat similarly thereafter between 2000 to 2003 but with a change of focus in policy,

⁵⁸Brian Glyn Williams, "Allah's foot soldiers: an assessment of the role of foreign fighters and Al-Qa'ida in the Chechen insurgency" in *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus: Post-Soviet disorder*, ed. Moshe Gammer (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 156-178.

aimed later more on counter-terrorism. In this context, Central Asia generally was already poised to gain positively, when the monstrously tragic Sept. 11, 2001 terroristic attacks took place on iconic and strategic buildings in key U.S. cities. Sure enough, the U.S., instantly, realized the strategic importance of the Central Asian region generally and Afghanistan in particular, to its national security, as a result. Accordingly, President Bush reoriented America's attention back to the Central Asian region from Clinton's well-advised but rather premature indulgence with India. Then from 2004 onwards the U.S. did not change its relationship with the CAS of the C.A. region but rather adjusted the relation to refocus its attention from crude counter-terrorism to more involvement on state-building and broader security issues, not just in Afghanistan but also in most of the CARs. Actually, after the deflation of their initial high expectations in their relations with the U.S., the CARs have been, understandably, quick to reinvigorate their lessening ties to Russia. This in turn served to dampen somewhat American keenness to deepen its relations with the CARs to some extent.

On the political front, unlike Russia and China who find the status quo advantages, the U.S. has been rightly and responsibly concerned about the halting democratic development in the C.A. region generally. It has long viewed corruption, unfair elections, clientelism, weak pluralism, lack of freedom of association and other human rights abuses with legitimate concern.⁵⁹ As noted herein earlier and also as generally reflected in the larger literature, Americans have regularly raised these issues and America's developmental assistances in the politico-legal, econo-developmental and socio-environmental sectors have largely been addressed to pursue these issues. Given how the year 2000 U.S. election undermined American democracy, C.A. leaders may be forgiven for looking up instead to

⁵⁹ Though these have long reflected American values and concerns, they have since become questions in America itself, cf. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: Norton, 2003).

Yeltsin's manner of nominating his successor,⁶⁰ as a more practical, if not also worthy, model to emulate, in their own succession exercises when these finally arrive, at least they would then not have to judicially short-circuit democracy, which they despite being recent democratic converts, truly value, when doing so. As we saw elsewhere, given America's certainly deeper democratic traditions, the U.S. was able to pursue its relationship institutionally, that despite changes in and of U.S. administrations and even internal turf wars, the U.S. did manage to continually build-up its ties with the CAS.

Whereas most of the CARs, on the contrary, being new to the Western democratic philosophy, badly need the comforting tutelage of their pioneering leaders, not only to stabilize and strengthen their statehoods, but also to anchor, smoothen and hopefully, secure their American relationship, at least in these formative decades. Therefore, in the interest of the emergence of a genuinely democratic future C.A., the U.S. should allow, for example, the Kazakh anointed "*El Basy*" to run his now legislatively-safeguarded lifetime course fully, as per the apparent wishes of his peoples, as we shall see in the next chapter, and the U.S. should just soberly jog along to reap the lasting benefits of a consequent stronger relationship with it, otherwise the Kyrgyz case would repeat all across C.A.

In the economic sphere, despite being an economic power *albeit* debt-ridden, the U.S. lack of any direct border with the CAS/CARs truly shows its effect. While we saw their bilateral trade and other economic ties continually growing, these have not been as impressive as the CARs economic ties with either China or Russia both of which amicably share borders with some of the CARs and enjoy the consequent economic boon, thereby. Both the U.S. and the CARs have worked hard towards integrating the emergent C.A. with the world economy. While these efforts are indeed laudable, the U.S. in particular must

⁶⁰ See Nicole J. Jackson, "The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia's Influence on Central Asian Regimes," *Contemporary Politics* 16.1 (March 2010): 101-18.

cobble up the necessary facilitating arrangements nationally, regionally, transregionally and in the outer Central Asian region too to ease the integration process so that both the U.S. and various CAS/CARs can derive maximum benefits from their economic intercourses and, more importantly, allow these to trickle down fairly to the general population.

Their mutual positive influence or involvement in Afghan affairs, in these contexts, must always be welcomed. Being remote, land-locked and lacking any direct borders with the United States, the CARs' sovereignties, independences and strategic survival could not be easily safe-guarded and promoted without taking a regional approach in the exercise of their emergent integration with the larger free world. With this in their minds, the CARs and the United States have consistently adopted a regional approach, if not also as yet within a viable and an acceptable regional framework, and worked for regional integration in all respects save, understandably in, the political. Politically, as we have seen and as we would see in the next two chapters too, the region, as a conceptual unit, has a number of burning issues, especially pertaining to natural resources, to mutual tensions and rivalries which all need to be benignly tackled before any better integrative dreams in this regard, despite CASA-1000 and the like, can be brought to fruition. When and if that happens, the CAS/CARs variously, the region as a whole and even the facilitating U.S. may begin cutting much ice and more globally so, so to speak. Meanwhile, generally, multi-track dialog must be strengthened and regionally-minded, multi-faceted intercourses and exchanges at every level must be further deepened.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Evolving Changes in American-Central Asian Relations, 1991-2012: The AKTU Republics

Introduction

Even before most of the Central Asian states became independent, they have continually, if sparsely, figured in American media¹ including in the *Washington Post*, in the various contexts of a) strategic developments within the Soviet Union and the rest of Eurasia, b) ecological and other disasters within Cold War Eurasia, c) Gorbachev's anti-corruption campaigns under *glasnost* and d) in the immediate past even in the context of Central Asian leaders' reactions to the Gulf War.² Incidentally, it was actually American media coverage of coup-affected Moscow that enabled Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, a pre-eminent C.A. leader, to save both Mikhail Gorbachev and then Boris Yeltsin too, at the Union level, from falling prey to the trouble-making hardliners. Proving, thereby that the U.S. even through its media had long tuned in to and been attentive to developments even within Soviet Central Asia.³

Actually, continuing the momentum of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, from 1988 on, Gorbachev began granting greater degree of autonomy to the Soviets of the union republics of the USSR, including to those in the Central Asian region. Taking this up the Soviet Central Asian peoples, in their own titular republics, established variously their own

¹ For example, *Washington Post* via online at <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost_hist_orical/results.htm>. The search feature at *New York Times*' website may also be used between the year ranges 1951-1991 for verifying the same.

² *Washington Post*, various issues.

³ As mentioned elsewhere earlier, significant sections of this chapter, starting with this section, but also interspersed throughout, have previously appeared, exactly or with small variations, in my article in *Central Asia* journal, published under the joint auspices of the Pakistan Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the Area Study Centre (Central Asia) of the University of Peshawar, entitled: "A Concise Interpretive Analysis of U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations, 1991-2013," which is, it has to be stressed here again, *itself based on and grew out of this very Ph.D. research undertaking*, that you are presently reading; to verify this, see Sahib, "A Concise Interpretive Analysis....," *op.cit.*, pp.15-64.

governing structures, determined their own future courses by choosing their own national emblems, and even declaring their own individual republican sovereignties, between 23rd of September 1989 and 15th of December 1990. Though Western observers generally, both at Central Asian independence and immediately prior to it, have considered the Central Asians as lacking in nationalistic spirit, in comparison to the Balts for example, and highly clannish, if not also nomadic, in their socio-political make-up to merit national independence, American elites in particular have shown some interest, given their long praise-worthy commitment to anti-colonialism, in the independence of the Central Asian states and in wanting to establish separate relations with them.⁴ Thus, it came as no surprise, when the U.S. became one of the first nations in the world to recognize Central Asian independences and to rapidly open diplomatic relations with them, thereafter.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Central Asian states, for their strategic and resource endowments, generally and in particular, Kazakhstan immediately caught the American eyes not just obviously because of its sheer size beneath the Russian shadow but, given the long and on-going American WMD non-proliferation obsession the U.S. was under even then, also because Kazakhstan nominally inherited over a hundred strategic nuclear weapons that include, easily, more than a thousand nuclear warheads about them and even the rest of Central Asia bristling with yet to be secured BCN proliferation risks.

Though there had been informal first encounters between U.S. citizens and Central Asian natives before and around the independence of the Central Asian states, their first formal diplomatic encounters, however, obviously had to wait for their individual independences. When independence did come, alas, the United States was amongst the first

⁴ Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (2ndedn) (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press; Stanford U, 1995), pp. 290-94; R. Charles Weller, *Rethinking Kazakh and Central Asian Nationhood: A Challenge to Prevailing Western Views* (Bloomington, IN.: Xlibris Corporation, 2006); Richard Weitz, *Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia*, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, July 2008 (Washington, D.C.: John Hopkins University-SAIS, 2008), p. 122 and p. 127.

countries to grant them its diplomatic recognition. Freed unwillingly of the yoke of Union and unsure of how to proceed ahead into the approaching twenty-first century without the protection of the Soviet umbrella, most of the Central Asian states earnestly embraced the welcome of the remaining superpower, the United States of America.

In fact, it was this sense of non-confidence and unpreparedness for independent statehood that made most Central Asian leaders including the Gorby-loyal Kazakh nationalist Nazarbayev, having himself been in the chief executive slot only since 1989,⁵ to root earlier and vainly for a renewed Union.⁶ Kazakhstan, like the rest of ex-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus, was instead, non-consultatively and unceremoniously booted-out, figuratively speaking that is, of the Soviet Union by the key Slav states, decisively so, after their Belovezh Conspiracy.⁷ Finding themselves insecurely left out of the previously well-acclimatized Russian cold, most Central Asian states, for the same non-confidence, in contrast to the Baltic States, collectively pushed for a looser confederal arrangement in the shape of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), loyal members of which some of them remain even till today.

With the encouragement of the West, of western allies like Germany and Turkey and the increasing indifference of Russia itself to their fate most Central Asian states declared their independences, quite reluctantly, between 30th August 1991 and 16th December 1991 particularly after the failure of the August coup against Gorbachev. Having had a paramount role in the Soviet endgame, it was somewhat surprising that the United States led then by President George H.W. Bush lagged⁸ behind states like Turkey and Italy

⁵ He had, of course, been the Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1984.

⁶ Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.270; Bhavna Dave, *Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, language and power*, Central Asian Studies Series 8 (London & New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 8 and p.178, f. 4.

⁸ It is not clear if Bush lagged in this regard, on account of his loyalty to Gorbachev or more to his anxiety over the strategic *chemodanchik*; on this see Andrew, *For the President's Eyes...*, op. cit., p.531.

in granting political recognition to the independence-poised Central Asian states. When recognition was given to the ex-Soviet Central Asian states finally, it came *en mass*; the United States recognized all of them along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991.

In I. R. perspective, episodes of elite visits between countries having relationship usually mark upswings in their relations. Thus, besides periodic visits by top C.A. elites like presidents and cabinet members, there have been some visits and numerous authoritative statements by intermediate policy practitioners at the level of special envoys, deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries, deputy assistant secretaries of various relevant executive departments/ministries and security officials too, from, of and to the Central Asian states. Similarly, delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in the Central Asian Republics (CARs), periodically, and vice-versa. Relatedly, no Central Asian state is a visa-waiver country, indicating thereby that they still have some grounds to cover before they could be deemed as U.S. friendly-countries; and hence Central Asians visiting the US and vice-versa do need visas for mutual visits.

Being Russo-friendly, and having recently been freed from Soviet-imposed atheism, most of the Central Asians generally, except perhaps the Afghans, take an evolutionary approach to inevitably but gradually rediscovering their Islamic faith and Muslim traditions. Having uneasily accommodated even the despicable atheism in their midst for so long, they have no trouble, unlike some of their Islamic brothers in the more orthodox areas of their Muslim periphery and beyond, at being tolerant of and accepting the presence amidst them of numerous minorities holding radically diverse faiths from theirs. Thus, Americans either

visiting or stinting⁹ anywhere in Central Asia can easily observe the unmolested presence of adherents of not just the Russian Orthodoxy – the immediate past overlords of most of Central Asia – but also members of other churches of Christianity, e.g. Autocephalous Orthodox, Apostolic Orthodox (both of Eastern Orthodoxy), Protestant (of evangelical and Baptist varieties including Lutherans, Jehovah’s Witnesses and even Seventh-Day Adventists) and Catholic; Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, Tengrism and Shamanism, quite culturally, and the blooming of all their various institutions and/or organizations in Central Asia.

Conversely, Central Asians visiting the U.S. can similarly see Muslims in general and Turkic-Muslims on average and members of even the Central Asian diaspora¹⁰ doing reasonably well in the United States. If Central Asians can survive even in communo-atheistic Soviet Union till Gorbachev’s openness granted them overt practice then they certainly can flourish in god-loving capitalistic America where no U.S. president, neither Republican nor Democrat, would hinder them from peacefully practicing their religion and extolling their faith, given that, after all, America, conveniently for the mostly tolerant and overwhelmingly spiritualistic Central Asians, is both the modern Mecca for freedom *of* religion and, ironically, also for freedom *from* religion too.

Upon the independence of the CARs, H.W. Bush’s administration did not extend much in terms of aid to the Central Asians, generally, but Nazarbayev, being acutely aware of and, helped much by the Nunn-Lugar-visit in this regard, was determined to get Kazakhstan’s fair share of whatever was given out as CTR aid. Similarly, the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA), which largely duplicates the earlier language of the CTR program

⁹ For example, see John Ordway’s interview with Dina Bukayeva of Khabar Television on 27 Feb. 2005, accessed online at <<http://kazakhstan.usembassy.gov/khabar-interview.html>>.

¹⁰ Including so-called “defectors” like Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov and “dissidents” like Bigeldin Gabdullin.

legislation (P.L.102-228), is a facilitating legislation enacted in a timely fashion to give substantive backings to pursue America's diplomatic and politico-economic missions in the newly independent nations of the ex-Soviet Union, including those in Central Asia. The U.S. enacted the Freedom Support Act in October 1992 to serve as the legislative cornerstone for its efforts to help the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) in their political and economic transformations as independent successor states of the collapsing Soviet Empire. In this context, under the FSA the U.S. was also committed to aiding the C.A. states' transition to democracy and to their reconfiguration as open market economies. Thus, the AEECA-linked FSA had formed a significant percent of the United States' total aid to the Central Asian states over the years.

The U.S. government has been providing various bilateral development assistances to Central Asia not just principally through its key executive departments such as State, Defense and Energy but also through its other agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). In keeping with America's neo-liberal agenda, the Agency's program in Central Asia emphasizes a number of themes such as: a) private sector-led economic growth¹¹ that is sustainable, b) accountable governance that is also effective, c) promote market reforms including liberalization, d) establishing base for open, prosperous and democratic societies in Central Asia and e) security help.

The United States took the early disinterest of Russia on Central Asia in general, as a sort of cue and moved ahead, if hesitantly, to build a broad-range of ties with all the newly independent states (NIS) of Central Asia. This fact is adequately reflected in the broad politico-economic coverage of the FSA (P.L.102-511) of 1992, though Russia was

¹¹ Western scholars hold contrasting views on importance of economic growth, see, for example, R. Barro, *Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Study* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); cf. Kent E. Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific* (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1997).

still its intended primary beneficiary, more so by default than by design, it appears. Anyway, Russia was also not too much disturbed by the initial American interest in the ex-Soviet space and especially the facilitating structure of the FSA because, in the early years, this initiative, as just mentioned, was, as if to appease the self-appointed guardian bear, primarily a Russia-centric initiative.

This was not surprising given that Russia was undeniably the pre-eminent state to emerge from the disintegrating Soviet Union and that all the other successor states were much inferior to it in their politico-economic weightages. Russia was also the United States' working partner in ending the original Cold War episode and, along with other Slav states, the prime mover of the Soviet end-game. But having eased the Soviet collapse and helping Russia towards finding its proper nationally-independent *albeit* reduced space and, consequently, welcomed place in the international community and its institutions, the U.S. also felt that it should do likewise to the ex-Soviet rest particularly to key states like Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

As the years passed and as things evolved in that reconfigured space the need to pay greater attention to these key states and the rest of the non-Russian NIS also grew apace. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. went on in later years, to reinvigorate its diplomatic relations and further extend its presence in the NIS generally and particularly so variously, as we shall see shortly, in the Central Asian states. The U.S. was overly keen on Kazakhstan, along with Russia, given their overwhelming territories and the obvious natural resources that these represent. In the context of ex-Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan was inexplicably also

given a greater priority, by the ostensibly market-focused US, initially, than Uzbekistan which clearly has a larger population and, by implication, a bigger market.¹²

At the grassroots level, the U.S. helps in addressing local disputes, securing respect for human rights, promoting civic activism and facilitates coalition-building among local NGOs. Media institutions are funded to increase the public's access to objective news and information. Very broadly, American aid in the Central Asian politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary. In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the various C.A. governments to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection. In this regard, the U.S. together with the E.U. worked with most of the CARs to establish later in 2001 a Regional Environmental Center (REC) at Almaty.

America's relationship with the Central Asian states is not limited to just the political but also has complementary economic dimensions. With the Soviet collapse, the successor states, including the Central Asian ones were enticed to the open-market way by the Western world. Central Asian moves towards economic development individually and also through regional cooperation quite easily harmonized with U.S. policy for that region. Utilizing the opportunity that came its way, as a consequence, the U.S. rapidly forged economic links with the C.A. states that includes seizing investment opportunities, establishing and building trade ties to gradually induct these states towards the open market

¹² Robert Legvold, 'U.S. Policy Toward Kazakhstan,' A discussion paper presented at: An International Conference on the Future of Kazakhstan's Geostategic Interests, Its Relations with the West & Prospects for Reform, Regent Almaty Hotel, Almaty, Kazakhstan, December 8-9, 2004, p.1.

world trading system and promoting private-sector led business culture across Central Asia by facilitating the presence and legally safeguarded growth of solely American and/or U.S.–linked businesses all across the Central Asian market places.

In keeping with its long sustained objective of preserving its global pre-eminence, even in a post-Cold War world of presumed lower strategic competition, the U.S. characteristically went for the key states/players of the emerging broader Central Asian region. Along with countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the similarly impressive entities of Afghanistan and *Xinjiang* too figured brightly in its strategic calculations if not also on its contemporary politico-economic radar. This, however, does not mean that the lesser endowed countries of the region, escaped its entrepreneurial, if not also strategic, attention, especially so when they manifestly possess other energy and/or mineral assets¹³ to get the U.S. interested.

Whether, the U.S. realizes this or not, states like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in Caucasus/Central Asia region do admire America's post-Shah, exemplary role in the Persian Gulf area. They are attracted to the business successes and developmental models of the U.S. energy companies and other MNCs in that region and wish the same could be adapted and emulated in their region too. On average, Central Asian states view America's good relations with Turkey, a key Muslim-Turkic state, as a model to aspire to, though America's idealistic push for an overnight democratic-credential down their throats is a bit difficult for them to ingest in the short term.¹⁴

The first William J. Clinton administration, not wanting to be left, diplomatically, out of the loop, for its part, had Strobe Talbott and Warren Christopher making a beeline to

¹³ See Table 8 and Appendix X.

¹⁴ Weitz, *Kazakhstan and the New*, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

the Central Asian region quite early too. This keenness on the U.S. democratic side was also amply reciprocated by the Central Asians when some of their elites established a pattern of periodic visits to the U.S. during Clinton's total tenure. During these visits they met top U.S. elite in-charge of State, Defense, Energy and the Commerce departments. In the security sphere, Clinton's astute secretary of defense William Perry was particularly instrumental in proposing a regional non-aggression pact.¹⁵ The U.S. was delighted, in 1994, when Kazakhstan joined NATO's PfP program, thereby displaying Kazakhstan's relative capacity for independent foreign policy action.¹⁶ Though Russia was uneasy about this, it drew some consolation, in the initial years at least, from the fact that this was not the NATO of old and that it no longer appears to be arranged against Russia and that it now is more poised to tackle out-of-area responsibilities.

During the Clinton administrations, trade saw steady but continual growth with the United States registering both surplus and deficit balances with the Central Asian states. In terms of aid, the U.S. extended increasing amounts of aid to most of the CARs except Afghanistan, but still these were nowhere near to the greater amounts given out in the following Bush years, generally.¹⁷ Since independence the C.A. states have seen a gradual growth in the business activities of U.S. companies in also various other areas of business than just pure trade on their territories. In keeping with the American private sectors tendency to invest in various new and growth economies, and to when most Central Asian states began welcoming foreign investments particularly as Russia receded away in this respect, U.S. investment sources then gradually began paying more interest to C.A. as a destination, for their investments especially after the conclusion of separate OPIC

¹⁵ Oumirseric Kasenov, 'The Institutions and Conduct of the Foreign Policy of Postcommunist Kazakhstan' in *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, eds. A. Dawisha and K. Dawisha, The International Politics of Eurasia Series, vol. 4, pp. 263-285 (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), p. 278.

¹⁶ Bek-Ali Yerzhan, 'Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan' in *Contemporary Kazakhstan: The Way Ahead*, eds. Arun Mohanty and Sumant Swain, pp. (3) 5-20 (New Delhi: Axis Publications, 2009), p.13.

¹⁷ Jim Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress (RL33458), 9 Jan. 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013a), p.6.

agreements and bilateral investment treaties with them. First on the Central Asian investment scene were, of course, the U.S. energy corporations, since they already had an eye on Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon riches even from pre-independence times.¹⁸

Thus, it is no surprise at all to find American companies having a head start, heavily invested and actively involved particularly in the Central Asian petroleum sector. Having been kept out of most Central Asian territories during Soviet times, American energy corporations pro-actively seized the opening to the regions resources not only at the first opportunity but also subsequently as offered by their imminent independences. The U.S. administrations of those times long plagued by the need to diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby need not be invited to bandwagon, as we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter. Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over C.A.'s extractive sector, generally, and petroleum resources, in particular, came to a rapid end. On the CARs' part, conscious of the positive impact of investments on economic growth and employment, they have often encouraged foreign direct investments (FDIs) especially in sectors that they deem are ready for them.

Strategically, the U.S. is, of course, in Central Asia as much to diversify its energy sources (as we shall see in the later chapter) as it is to prevent the Central Asian states from becoming U.S. hostile safe-havens, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as "Islamic radicalism",¹⁹ both of which are, by the way, key U.S. national security priorities.

¹⁸ United States of America, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), *Kazakhstan: An Economic Profile* (Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 1993).

¹⁹ If **Islam** is linked, adjectivally, to radicalism, extremism or fundamentalism, then the resultant phrasal term and its import can **never** *per se* be bad. But as for terrorism, because Islam being *a*, and in itself meaning *the*, Divine *religion of peace*, it is innately humanitarian in content, and any irresponsible terrorism wrongly or rightly attributed to it that could impossibly still be unaccountable to *Allah* (God) in the Day of Judgment, unlike in some other "civilization" which believes in irresponsible, disproportionate and illegitimate, nay, even jolly application of overwhelming power for its own, derring-do or demonstrative, sake, has **never** had any place in Islam, period! But if those same terms are, more appropriately, applied instead to culpable **Muslims**, i.e. as Muslim radicalism, terrorism, extremism or fundamentalism, thereby deliberately confounded in a negative sense, then it is tolerated, if not also readily accepted, by Muslims. Because, given a badly affected Muslim's own earlier painful sufferings, state-sponsored or associationally perceived otherwise, at the hands of his or her target, he or she may revengefully, perhaps even sinfully, become a **Muslim terrorist** may be to sincerely repent later on, as is mostly the case of the average frustrated Palestinian. Conversely, an **Islamic extremist**, as per his **extreme** religious upbringing and choosing to devote his life to **fanatically** defend a Muslim or non-Muslim statesman or anyone for that matter, with his own life,

In this and other contexts too, most of Central Asia have turned to the U.S. for military supplies to protect their energy and other assets not just in the Caspian. Anyway, we must note here that after the independence of the Central Asian states, America has been much opposed to Russian and Iranian moves to treat the Caspian Sea as a lake and accordingly gain thereby a mutual right to restrict free navigation thereon or therein, on the basis of a treaty-provisioned joint division of the Caspian surface-waters. Some Caspian littorals and Central Asian states like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan too, it seems, loosely share America's perception on this matter. But, less controversially, the Caspian sea-bed would, as agreed, be divided on a sectoral basis amongst all the littorals.

In this context, American aid to Central Asian states, as mentioned elsewhere too, is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the defense and security sector. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning the U.S. has been involved in defense reform in the C.A. region. The U.S. Department of Defense launched the CTR program in 1992 to specifically facilitate the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction across the entire former Soviet Union and the C.A. region as well. This program promoted both denuclearization and demilitarization.

It must be noted here that, the U.S., clearly under lobbistic pressure, had long supported an antagonist in the Central Asia/Caucasus periphery. From even before Central Asian independences, America has had sympathies for the Armenians rebelling in Nagorno

extremely sincerely; one must admit, certainly cannot be **bad** despite his multiple **extremeness**, even if anyone wishes otherwise! In other words, one may justifiably be terrified of a **Muslim terrorist**, that is understandable, but to be "terrified" by **Islamic extremists**, that is learned nonsense, if not patent lunacy! Terrorism is highly subjective; when Afghans bloodily overwhelmed by foreign invasion (via a war machine), slip into terrorism, out of frustration, to put up resistance or simply to drive home their objection, through similar **lower scale** violent means, they are subsequently, on that very ground, banned even from sitting in their parliament for having been warlords (perhaps U.S. blessed!) in the past; but when Israelis turned and **terrorized**, or more probably "te-r-r-r-o-o-rized," even their British very ushers into Palestine, they not only made it into their own parliament as pioneering heroes, but sometimes got to be even prime minister (Menehem Begin), not to mention bag a Nobel Prize too under full limelight with standing ovation to boot! This is not just double standard but **troubled standards** that must be addressed, perhaps within the oversight-obsessed OSCE framework, despite its own blemishes on this score and for want of better alternatives.

Karabakh²⁰ and agitating for uniting with an Armenia that was uncertainly poised for independence. American feelings, if not also strong support, for the Karabakh rebels, obviously served to increase Central Asian doubts on American neutrality in and about their region. Most of the CARs enjoy relatively a high level of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S. as individual states. Russia's legitimate concern on NATO affairs involving the FSU has been moderated to an extent through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which allows Russia some inter-face ability without giving it veto power over any NATO moves. It is under this background of lukewarm but with tacit approval that NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helps restructure the willing militaries in the C.A. region.

In 1993, U.S. Dept. of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP (1991) that grew out of EUCOM, to lure the former Soviet republics, including those of Central Asia and the Caucasus to participate in its program. Incidentally, in doing so, it perhaps encroached on some of the much earlier interest of the U.S. Dept. of State, giving rise to a latent inter-Departmental turf war of sorts. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 most of the CARs have offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the U.S. use of their key airfields.²¹ The CARs have benefited from various security-related assistances too. In this area, the U.S. helps most of the CARs by providing training and equipment to them to combat transnational threats such as WMD technology and materiel proliferation, increase their border security, counter-terrorism co-operation especially after the advent of the so-called "war on terror," and to address other seemingly

²⁰ For background on this conflict, see Jim Nichol, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests," CRS Report for Congress (RL33453), 27 September 2012, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress; CRS, 2012), p. 16. Cf. Kenneth Weisbrode, *Central Eurasia: Price or Quicksand? Contending Views of Instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan* (London: IISS, 2001).

²¹ See Map 21 of this work, later in p. 261.

“lesser” security related threats such as money laundering, terrorism financing, illegal drugs and trafficking in persons illegally.

Though America’s attitudes in the Russo-Georgian and Ukrainian crises, both before and after, were and are not intended primarily as tools to impress the non-Russian NIS generally, the Central Asians, nevertheless, could not help but take astonished, if not also cautious, note of those too. Most Central Asian states, having enduring fraternal Eurasian ties to Russia, kept their equi-distance intact between the U.S. and Russia. They work hard to equitably regulate their ties with both these key powers and constantly aspire to balance them. With Russia’s initial disinterest vividly in mind, most of them are, understandably, cautious too about Russia’s continued reliability and viewing contrastingly, especially America’s military-first approach in the greater Middle Eastern region with concern, they at times go easy on any U.S. overt impetus for deeper intercourse with them. As far as the CARs are concern, they welcome and are happy if the U.S. confines its role, in their region, to just “stock and hoe” and hazard not into “shock and awe” as it habitually is prone to, generally west, south and farther to the south-west of their region.

Since 2004, key officials like Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Armitage and important generals like John Abizaid, Richard Myers and Lance Smith all came over to the Central Asian region, some repeatedly so. During G.W. Bush’s second administration, U.S. elites visiting Central Asia were more representatives of the politico-economic sector. With people like Condoleezza, Dick Cheney, Samuel W. Bodman and Richard Boucher, just to name a few, flying in for visits. Generally, the Central Asian states have a policy of positive cooperation with most of their neighbors and the great powers, since their independences, and their relations with the United States are not an exception in this regard and have generally been quite amicable.

Still, the U.S. was cool to Kazakhstan's proposal and spirited efforts for the creation of the Eurasian Union. There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states tied too close to the Russian bosom. U.S. aid to the Central Asian states was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House.²² Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush's tenure grew exponentially, continually throughout both his administrations.

To continue the Democratic Party's own past engagement with the Central Asian region and wanting to exceed even Clinton in this respect, president-elect Barack Obama included Nazarbayev, a key C.A. leader, in his introductory calls to world leaders. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, he had to wait two years before he could receive Nazarbayev in Washington. Perhaps, moved by the regional ramifications of the Andijon episode of 2005 and having seeded for the OSCE chairmanship in 2006 through the strangely highly-reluctant second G.W. Bush administration, Kazakhstan, with the support of most C.A. and European states, got the chairmanship and hosted the OSCE summit in 2010 in its desire to not just work for regional conflict-resolution at the Central Asian level but to attempt to do so at the all European regional level too. Kazakhstan had mixed results in this ambitious endeavor, however, but still the Europeans in general and Mrs. Hillary Clinton in particular, who, this time as the sixth visiting U.S. Secretary of State, leading the U.S. delegation to the summit, was full of praise for Kazakhstan's achievements notwithstanding the various shortcomings in its net outcome. Many leading Americans like Ray Mabus, Robert O. Blake, Jr. and Simon Limage have later followed at the heels of the rather Central Asian foot-loose Mrs. Clinton to the region.

²² Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, p. 65.

Over the times, mutual relations have now proceeded well beyond two decades, especially for the following republics of the redefined C.A. region, largely rather amicably with some minor to bitter tensions along the way in their various separate bilateral relationships. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, together being all energy-rich and exporting as well as being relatively stable republics with rather little disputed sovereignties in their cases, may easily be grouped and termed as the AKTU republics – i.e. the globalization-inclined, more dynamic sub-sector of the C.A. region. What follows here is the analysis of these various bilateral relationships of the United States with the post-Soviet, hence, wider Central Asian region, in a unit by unit order, again starting alphabetically and appropriately too, with this time the Azerbaijan-U.S. relationship.

Azerbaijan – U. S. Relations

Compared to Afghanistan, Azerbaijan knew independence much later but still relatively earlier than the rest of the countries of the Central Asian region. Though Azerbaijan is physically located in the Caucasus region, it is historically, very much culturally, and for all practical existential purposes, it is just an extended limb of Central Asia via the watery medium of the Caspian, a strategic body of water that links Azerbaijan to Central Asia in more ways than one. Of all the C.A. countries, except Kazakhstan, it borders too the key non-Muslim CIS, namely the Russian Federation, and is the only one to border three non-Muslim CIS, namely Georgia and Armenia in addition to Russia at its west and north. To its east, it faces, beyond Caspian maritime boundaries, Turkmenistan and tangentially Kazakhstan.

As may be seen in Map 19, at the south it rests both on north-western Iran and Iranian long-standing claims on the Caspian. Azeri ethnics are, of course, well spread deep across north-western Iran. Azerbaijan has a critical stretch of border to its extreme south-west with Turkey via its disjointed enclave of Nakhichevan. In fact, it is via this slim link that it and the rest of Turkic Central Asia maintain a direct connection with mainland Turkey. Indeed, it was this part that served as the placenta that sustained Azerbaijan's underground Americophilia all through Soviet-times and more.



Map 19 - Azerbaijan (Physical-Relief)

Source: "Azerbaijan (P0014667)," printed using *DK Reference Encyclopedia*, CD-ROM, a Dorling Kindersley and Global Software (GSP) product (n. p.: Research Machines (2004); Helicon, 2006).

Despite these facts, in the entire Central Asian region, America took the longest time to formally recognize and longer still to establish *de jure* diplomatic relation only with Azerbaijan. Gorbachev-presided realpolitik activism in the late 1980s saw Soviet Armenia annexing Azerbaijani territories including the Armenian-majority enclave of Nagorno-

Karabakh in a purely geo-political move that has remained so far impervious to even American-mediated resolution efforts. Historically, the Armenian Lobby has ceaselessly toiled to dampen American interest on Azerbaijan, while its oil, if not also the Azeri peoples' ever welcoming warmth, served to energize U.S. interest in it. Interestingly, this disquieting reality continues to hold true even today, with little change, if any. Even more than the rest of Central Asia, America and its, then, powerful ally Britain, had keen interest on Azerbaijan over much of the nineteenth century, perhaps this was because of its obvious attractions: i.e.: strategic location and, of course, oil.

One may recall here that the Treaty of Turkmenchai of 1828 gave southern Azerbaijan to Iran while northern Azerbaijan was kept by Russia. Thus historic Azerbaijan was partitioned in this manner and after a lengthy interlude of being free of Russian/Soviet rule southern Azerbaijan or the Iranian province of Azarbaijan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1945. Significantly, this Soviet excursion and its resultant puppet government were terminated by the intervention of Britain and the United States. So the Western allies restrained the Soviets again within northern Azerbaijan. In contemporary times it is this smaller Sovietized Azerbaijan that has once again reemerged as an independent state on 30th August 1991 just before the implosion of the Soviet Union.

After Kazakhstan it is, of course, again Azerbaijan that got the most coverage from the American media upon the advent of independence in Central Asia. In fact, right after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, the American media began giving greater attention to monitoring the situation in Azerbaijan, it being, in its judgment, dangerously, both physically and religiously, too close to I. R. Iran, its newly-emergent enemy around the Middle Eastern and West Asian regions. In the periods leading up to and after Azerbaijan's independence, like all Western media, the American media too went euphoric. The elation,

however, began to wind down gradually between 1989 and 1994 when Azerbaijan was mired in coups, rapid leadership turnovers and particularly after it began imposing a blockade on Armenia for its incursions into not just the enclave of Karabakh but also into Azerbaijan's southern territories. The strong Armenian *émigré* lobby in the United States pressured the U. S. government to impose sanctions on Azerbaijan for even this mere reaction.

Though the U.S. was not the first country to recognize Azerbaijan at its independence, which it did a little later *en mass* along with those of most of the CIS on 25th Dec. 1991, it had *de facto* "recognised" it, along with the Allies, much earlier, than most of the CARs except for Afghanistan, in January 1920.²³ But it must be recalled that like the Baltic states, it had established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan in the early 1920s, if not earlier, and unlike the Baltics this was ended with the occupation of Baku by the Red Army. Since then till the late 1980s there were hardly any interaction between them, given that Azerbaijan was totally subsumed under the Soviet Union in those times. Azerbaijan was viewed by the U.S. media as another Russian "protectorate" that for all practical purposes is no more than a colony whose rich oil deposits have fallen under the control of the Soviet State.

Both when Karabagh opted to join Armenia and later when Armenia annexed Azerbaijani territories, the U.S. remained quite indifferent. Perhaps this was due mainly to not wanting to displease the Armenian lobby in the U.S. Even when Soviet troops entered Azerbaijan or even when Azerbaijan decided to join the CIS via the Alma Ata declaration, this American attitude continued somewhat. The overthrow of the Azerbaijan leadership had some effect on its ties with the U.S. Despite the establishment of diplomatic relations

²³ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Azerbaijan*, March 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009), Accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2909.htm>>.

and the exchange of ambassadors between Azerbaijan and the U.S. their relations still remained somewhat cool. To win cooperation and understanding if not also sympathy, Azerbaijan gradually improved its relations with the U.S. As a consequence, diplomatic support, economic cooperation and even technical assistance began to flow in.

Owing to the influence of the Armenian lobby the U.S. was initially quite cautious in its relation with Azerbaijan, but perhaps after watching Russia's handling of the crisis in the Caucasus region and the publicity campaigns of the U.S. energy lobby the U.S. began tilting to a more neutral position on the Karabagh crisis while not totally abandoning the Armenian cause. Azerbaijan wants the U.S. to play a more pro-active role in solving the Karabagh problem along with Russia though the Russians may not think it so important. Anyway, Azerbaijan is determined to one day restore its territorial integrity, if need be militarily; though peaceful solutions to this issue have also been on the cards.

The U.S. has military agreements with Azerbaijan, a long-time pro-U.S. GUAM member. Bringing the Karabagh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan to a peaceful conclusion is also one of the aims of GUAM. The quicker a settlement is found, the lesser will the need be for America's focus on security to prolong, at least on that sector of Azerbaijan. After all one of Azerbaijan's motive for signing those agreements is to counter Armenia's support for the Karabagh rebels who oppose the Azeri government. Though Azerbaijan initially thought it can make do with Russia's support on this, it proved to be vain till the U.S. came into the picture. In this regard, the U.S. also pursues a peaceful solution for this issue via its co-chairmanship of the OSCE's Minsk Group. If this frozen conflict were to heat up again sometime into the future, would the U.S., as per these agreements, undertake a military counter-intervention in support of Azerbaijan, especially when Russia militarily stands by Armenia, is a useful hypothetical question to be asked in

this context? How much of a co-operation will Azerbaijan get from America's commitment?

The Caspian "Sea", prior to C.A. independences, had existed, in the Soviet period, as a Russo-Iranian lake wherein both the latter states maintained treaty bound interactions. The collapse of the Soviet Union resurrected a debate on the Caspian Sea with a view to making it safe for international navigation involving the newly independent Central Asian states too. In this respect, the "sea" aspect of the Caspian Sea assumed greater importance, with the U.S., an extra regional power, siding Azerbaijan primarily. Conversely, I. R. Iran and Russia oppose the involvement of foreign non-regional states (meaning the U.S.) in the internal affairs of the countries of the Caspian region, including under any pretext for ensuring freedom of navigation and for exploration.²⁴

As far as economic dealings are concerned, Azerbaijan and the U.S. have trade cooperation agreement which serves as the legal basis for their gradually rising trade relations. In the first instance, U.S. officials take pride in having a formal agreement, though this has not quite matched the trade quantities and values between Azerbaijan and Russia. Protocol on economic cooperation that permits joint oil exploration, marketing and financing has also been concluded. Had the Soviet Union remained intact there would have been accusations of Azerbaijan having "sold out" to the U.S. and to Western capitalist oil firms, but thanks to Gorbachev's earlier apostasy against the very communism he claimed to be consolidating, the Azeris have been spared such an embarrassment!

U.S. oil majors participate in international consortiums drilling for hydrocarbons in the Caspian. American help has been sought to protect Azeri ships in the Caspian. Azeris

²⁴In this context, there was a gunboat incident in the Caspian Sea on 23rd July 2001 over oil exploration by BP Amoco regarding which both Azeri and American diplomats protested. On this, see Klevevan, *The New Great Game*:...op.cit., pp.145-146.

believe renting marine assets from the great powers can, indirectly, bring protection. Thus the U.S. gets to again extend its sphere of influence into the Caspian, which if it does not take up, it would lose out the same to Russian “hegemony”! The U.S., on its part, backed its policy by leasing out petrol boats to operate in the Caspian.

Obviously, the U.S. has been keen on Azerbaijan for its hydrocarbon riches which would additionally also give it added weightage in international affairs in the long term, something the U.S. can, in turn, utilize in its favor in the future given that the U.S. often runs into Muslim hostility in the region and elsewhere in the world. As non-OPEC oil producer Azerbaijan can contribute handsomely in American energy diversity exercises. Politically, Azerbaijan can be useful in international organizations such as the ECO, if not also in the CIS. Though displeasing to Iran and/or Russia, Azerbaijan’s at time lukewarm or even indifferent posture to issues emerging within these organizations do please the U.S., if not also Israel. Azerbaijan and the U.S. are not entirely pleased with Russia promoted solutions to the Karabagh problem or even the Caspian question.

Despite the presence of great sympathies for the Armenian cause in the U.S., Azerbaijan also visualizes advantage to it in this context. American influence if not also leverage can constrain further Armenian aggression and even help restore its territorial integrity. Azeri elites know that, as a credit-rich superpower with high influence the U.S. can nudge even radical Azeri opposition to less hostile position, and this fact makes maintaining friendly relations with the U.S. very useful to the Azeri government.

Presence of a strong Armenian, if not also with an added Israeli, lobby in the U.S. serves to put a damper on any American wish to provide Azerbaijan with especially highly advanced weapon systems for even its legitimate defence needs. Azerbaijan’s purchase of

U.S. arms indicates not only on a defense agreement but also on its policy of diversity in its arms procurements. Military delegations have visited one another. In the post-Cold War climate there is absolutely nothing wrong in wanting to maintain positive relations with both Russia and the U.S. simultaneously. For the rest of the CARs, Azerbaijan's dealings with both the U.S. and Russia bears close watching as a possible model for conducting relations with the great powers.

In the Caspian-linked C.A./Caucasus region, Azerbaijan's enthusiasm for sovereign statehood and independence was second to none. This enthusiasm was politico-legally reflected when Azerbaijan became the first to have a contemporarily ratified constitution to move on formally with its independence, in a resolute manner, among all the NIS. Though rooted in a long-running platonic friendship, relations between Azerbaijan and the U.S. started on a cautious but positive note. Their relations have seen periods of enthusiastic engagement and constrained indifference.

When recognition was given, it came *en mass*, the United States recognized Azerbaijan along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991. For a country having had historic diplomatic trappings²⁵ with Azerbaijan, the U.S. went on to open its diplomatic mission and embassy in its capital Baku, surprisingly, only later on the 16th of March 1992, about a week after its hesitant acceptance, relative to most of the other CARs, by the UN²⁶ as a member. Its first resident representative there was *Charge d'Affaires ad interim* Robert Finn preparing the way for the arrival of the first U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan Mr. Richard Monroe Miles.²⁷

²⁵ See Appendix I, p. 433-434.

²⁶ Please verify at: <www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>.

²⁷ See Appendix III, p.458.

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Azerbaijan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Azerbaijan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., Azerbaijan in the initial years had rather limited volume of trade with the U.S. thus, it is no surprise to find Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Iran and Georgia figure as greater trade partners than, of Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan's exports to and imports from the U.S. has rapidly, if continually, grown since its independence. Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, like in the security sector, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed. Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Azerbaijan and the vice-versa.

H.W. Bush's administration did not extend much in terms of aid to Azerbaijan. After 1993, U.S. Dept. of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP to lure Azerbaijan to participate in its program. The U.S. was delighted, when Azerbaijan joined NATO's PfP program, thereby displaying Azerbaijan's relative capacity for independent foreign policy action.²⁸ Though Russia was uneasy about this, it drew some consolation, in the initial years at least, from the fact that this was not the NATO of old and that it no longer appears to be arranged against Russia and that it now is more poised to tackle out-of-area responsibilities. On Azerbaijan's part, it too not wanting to appear as moving too close to the West tried to balance such sentiments.

²⁸ By the way, in our redefined C.A. region, Azerbaijan is the most West-inclined state for various reasons, besides participating in various EU-linked programs like ENP, TACIS, TRACECA and BSEC it is, unlike the other CARs, covered actually by the US EUCOM, thus apparently has been brought closer to the Euro-Atlantic Coordination Command (COCOM).

During the Clinton administrations, trade saw steady but continual growth with the United States. Though Azerbaijan has a policy of positive cooperation with all its neighbors and the great powers, since its independence, its relations with the United States has generally been quite amicable but interspersed with periods of lukewarmity, on account of Karabagh tensions, if not actually neutrality. In this context, Western observers have noted Azerbaijan's cold-shouldering of even Russia on occasions. Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, relatively rapidly, if also cautiously, U.S. - Azerbaijan relations, despite having brief hiccups, have continuously galloped along high amity. There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia around the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the Caspian states, including, Azerbaijan tied too close to the Russian bosom.

U.S. aid to Azerbaijan has long been rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. It rose significantly in 2002 on as Bush entered his first term mid-election year the highest aid during his tenure in office came later in 2006. To continue the Democratic Party's own past engagement with Azerbaijan, Barack Obama took up where Bush left. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, it is not a surprise to see U.S. aid rapidly dropping off. Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with some concern as to what this may actually augur for the future, though Azerbaijan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S. for its role in permitting the "reverse transit" via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and which has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of "sustainment and total cargoes" exiting from Afghanistan.²⁹

²⁹ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit.

Despite the Armenian lobby in the U.S. under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Azerbaijan's transition to democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Azerbaijan right from its independence if not actually before. Azerbaijan had Peace Corps volunteers, rather late since 2003, engaged in various activities including in imparting business education, teaching English, public health, HIV/AIDS prevention, community development, developing environmental NGOs and youth development.³⁰ Very broadly, American aid in the Azeri politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary³¹.

Economically, Azerbaijan is important to the U.S. in the region, because of its location, its economic bravery, and its high energy resources, including hydro-carbons. The post Soviet collapse's decline in demand was overcome with bold economic reforms and more than reversed with the help of aid inflows and mainly foreign investments. U.S. investment sources gradually began paying more interest to Azerbaijan as a destination for their investments especially after the conclusion of the OPIC agreement and bilateral investment treaty with it. First on the Azerbaijan investment scene were, of course, the U.S. energy corporations, since they already had an eye on Azerbaijan's hydrocarbon riches even from not pre-independence but historic times. Although Azerbaijan is not the largest recipient of the United States' foreign direct investments, the U.S. is a dominant FDI source for Azerbaijan within the CIS it is only next to Kazakhstan in this regard.

³⁰ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Azerbaijan*, op. cit.

³¹ United States of America, DOS-FOAA, *Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Azerbaijan*, 20 January 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009), Accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/106462.htm>>.

What remains a focus is sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas and others too. The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector. In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Azeri firms with relevant U.S. businesses. The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and help in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; given Azerbaijan's rather rapid embrace of market reforms, U.S. supports the transition to market economy in Azerbaijan and thereby work to integrate it into the world trade system fully.³² In this regard, the U.S. supported Azerbaijan's desire for early accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the Azeri government to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection.

Azerbaijan's armed forces participates not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but it also joins-in multi-laterally in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. The US Central Command conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with the Azeri Defense Ministry and its other agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges, special force trainings to even full military exercises. Quantitatively, these events are rising in numbers continually over the years. As a non-NATO member Azerbaijan is kept close to the U.S. through other programs like IPAP. American aid to Azerbaijan is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the

³² United States of America, USAID (US Agency for International Development), 'USAID Country Profile: Azerbaijan' (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <<http://www.info.usaid.gov/countries/az/>>.

Azeri defense and security sector. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning the U.S. has been involved in defense reform in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has an active partnership with the Oklahoma National Guards of the U.S. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Azerbaijan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields. Confidential sources say that a number of bases in Azerbaijan were considered for this purpose. The U.S. helps Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reforms including in creating an adequate Azeri force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Azerbaijani military by providing the required training, equipment and facilities so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity, after the Karabagh crisis.

Azerbaijan has a relatively good level of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S. amongst CIS states. Russia's legitimate concern on NATO affairs involving the FSU has been moderated to an extent through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which allows Russia some inter-face ability without giving it veto power over any NATO moves. It is under this background of lukewarm but tacit approval that NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helps restructure even the Azeri military, as hinted to earlier. U.S. Central Command organized various cooperative security-related events in Azerbaijan and elsewhere. It also co-operates bilaterally and participates in bilateral military exercises. In direct military to military cooperation, Azerbaijan participates in the American IMET and FMF programs. Azeri military officers attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training via IMET program.

When it comes specifically to security, the U.S. helps the Government of Azerbaijan to draft effective legislation and improve enforcement of existing laws by providing relevant training to customs and other enforcement officials to tackle all manner of trafficking in narcotics, persons and WMDs. Azerbaijan has benefited from various security-related assistances too. In the area of security assistance again, the U.S. helps Azerbaijan by providing training and equipment to combat transnational threats such as WMD technology and materiel proliferation,³³ increase border security, counter-terrorism co-operation especially after the advent of the so-called “war on terror”, and to address other seemingly “lesser” security related threats such as money laundering, terrorism financing, illegal drugs and trafficking in persons illegally.

Strangely for a country perpetuating unipolarity, the U.S. supports the anti-terrorism Rapid reaction force (RRF). It has broad range of defense and security cooperation with the U.S. and having a U.S. lily pad on its territory Azerbaijan has not been keen on getting the U.S. out of the region. Simultaneously, in the context of the United States’ impending so-called “exit” from Afghanistan, Azerbaijan has earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN, an American-led logistics arrangement (as we shall see in Map 21 later), at uneconomically higher costs, that is intended to reduce supplies transiting Pakistan by relying more on the apparently more reliable routes and ports of the Black Sea. Earlier Azerbaijan had worked closely with the US Transportation Command and the US Air Mobility Command by providing “a secure route for 40 percent of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) multi-modal transit into Afghanistan”.³⁴ Nevertheless, at independence, unlike with the other Central Asian states, and despite the initial euphoria,

³³ Generally, Western efforts in this regard was somewhat cinematically portrayed, for example, by the British agent 007, James Bond in the film entitled *The World is not Enough* wherein he was casted as heroically involving himself in checking proliferation risks and nuclear clear-ups in the C.A./Caspian region.

³⁴ ERAUSA (Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the USA), ‘Azerbaijan-US Relations,’ 20 April 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United States of America, 2014), accessed online on 13 Feb. 2015 at <<http://www.azembassy.us/foreign-policy/azerbaijan-us-relations.html?tmpl=component...>>.

the U.S. welcome of Azerbaijan was somewhat restrained, given Azerbaijan's problems with the Armenian community and especially with its diaspora.

Also, as strategic materials particularly oil including its equities,³⁵ facilities and discoveries expanded and became available for foreign participation (as we shall see in the next chapter) in Azerbaijan and its environs, the U.S., as pushed by its now well-entrenched oil lobby, began to appreciate even more the need to develop greater ties with Azerbaijan. Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush's tenure grew exponentially, continually with significant rises recorded from 2003 on and peaked in 2008. Many leading Americans like Strobe Talbott have later followed at the heels of Mrs. Clinton to Azerbaijan.

While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's later tenure somewhat bled into Obama's own first term, overall trade values maintained higher levels, as Obama settles into his term of office and, as Obama approached his re-election year, trade clearly slid down somewhat. As far as aid is concern, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to, an otherwise increasingly prosperous and regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing Azerbaijan.

Since Azerbaijan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID has extended to it till 2012 is fully valued higher at about US \$ 1.02 billion. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be 2006 when Azerbaijan received U.S. \$ 80.24 million.³⁶ Aid has drastically fallen since then. As per the records of the U.S. Census Bureau, US bilateral trade in goods with Azerbaijan has grown

³⁵ See Appendix VIII, p.465.

³⁶ Nichol, *Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia:...*, op. cit., p. 60.

continually.³⁷ The export value of goods from the US to Azerbaijan grew continually from 1992, the first full year of exports to be recorded. Trade peaked in 2008.

When one looks at Azerbaijan's trade partners, Turkey and Russia still figure as Azerbaijan's leading trade partners overall. The Georgia and Ukraine follow Russia in this respect. One can generally say that trade between western countries, including the United States, and Azerbaijan are dominated by oil, ferrous & non-ferrous metals, machinery, industrial materials, gas and chemicals. United States' FDI in Azerbaijan was only second to that in Kazakhstan amongst the CIS states according to the U.S. State Department's website.³⁸ Given that oil and gas is Azerbaijan's leading economic sector, the U.S. has appropriately made its heaviest investments in that sector, as can be seen clearly in the next chapter.

Having been kept out of most Central Asian territories during Soviet times, American energy corporations seized the opening to the regions resources offered by their imminent independence. The U.S. administration of the day long plagued by the need to diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby need not be invited to bandwagon. Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over the Caspian's extractive sector and petroleum resources, in particular, came to a rapid end. In fact, in 2010 B.P. supported a gas pipeline that would bypass Russia completely. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Azerbaijan's oil reserves as 8.5 billion barrels of proven reserves. Azerbaijan's oil reserves have continued to grow gradually as relatively positive exploration result seeps in, if only in fits.

³⁷ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with Azerbaijan,' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.

³⁸ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Azerbaijan*, op. cit.

Strategically, the U.S. is, of course, in Azerbaijan as much to diversify its energy sources (as we shall see in the following chapter) as it is to prevent Azerbaijan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as “Islamic radicalism,” both of which are, by the way, key U.S. national security priorities. In this and other contexts too, Azerbaijan has turned to the U.S. for military supplies to protect its energy and other assets not just in the Caspian.

Now to summarize this section, Azeri elites consider their ties with the U.S. as good on all spheres. Over the years U.S.-Azerbaijani relations have matured towards a degree of cordiality bordering on friendship. Though springing from different ideological backgrounds, their increasing mutual needs help carry their relationship to a higher order of peaceful and beneficial co-existence. Despite the re-flaring in 2012 of Armenian-Azerbaijan tensions and Russia’s perceived hands in this, the U.S.-Azeri relation is viewed and at times treated as a model for other Eurasian states, in their dealings with the U.S., though not specifically designed as such.

Kazakhstan – U. S. Relations

As alluded to elsewhere earlier, even decades before the imposed independence of Kazakhstan, American media interest on it was well established. A simple review of the American print media of that period would reveal it reporting on events/developments, usually negative, occurring within Central Asia, in general, and Kazakhstan, in particular. This was usually done with the sole-objective of propaganda against and nit-picking on the Soviet Union and on its sundry alleged inefficiencies. Also there were reportings on natural and man-made disasters occurring therein like earthquakes, famines and nuclear, ecological

and other environmental catastrophes. But once in a while with much reluctance, it also mentions about the Soviet successes in outer space activities carried out from Kazakhstan.

It has also kept regular tab on nuclear testings carried out therein all through the Soviet period. For these and other reasons Kazakhstan has been a Central Asian favorite with the American media. About a decade before Kazakhstan's independence the media was reporting on ethnic tensions and industrial strikes and even riots therein. Then a few years before 1991 the American media began speculating on the safety or otherwise of nuclear materials in Kazakhstan. Upon independence the media became obsessed with, *inter alia*, Kazakhstan's strategic natural resources particularly, though not exclusively, with its energy resources especially oil.³⁹

As may be readily seen in the Kazakhstan Map 20, Kazakhstan emerges from the domineering shadows of mighty step-motherly Russia to fuse variously and effortlessly with the rest of Central Asia. To its north, it shares one of the longest continuous land borders with the Russian Federation, excluding a formally well demarcated maritime boundary over the Caspian. Like the Afghan north, Kazakhstan shares similar but all Turkic neighbors, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the south-west and south, where in place of a volatile Tajik frontier it also shares a boundary with Kyrgyzstan. To the east, it somewhat geometrically grinds jaws with Chinese Xinjiang while having non-contiguous Mongolia over it, just for a shouting neighbor.

Uyghurs, their Turkic cousins from Chinese Xinjiang, are widely present in eastern Kazakhstan. At the extreme south-west, along with the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan it also shares a critical maritime boundary with Azerbaijan over the Caspian. These latter factual observations may not all be graphically represented in the above map.

³⁹ For example, see *Washington Post*, various issues since 1951.

Anyway, Kazakhstan is the Afghanistan of the northern Central Asian region in that it is where the rest of Central Asia meets European and Asiatic Russia, East Asia via Chinese Xinjiang and the Caucasus and West Asia via the watery medium of the Caspian Sea



Map 20 - Kazakhstan (Physical-Relief)

Source: Adopted from *DK. World Desk Reference*, 3rd edn., previously published as the *World Reference Atlas* (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2002), p. 338.

When recognition was given, it came *en mass*, the United States recognized Kazakhstan along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991. Still, “the United States was the first country to recognize Kazakhstan on December 25, 1991 and opened its Embassy in Almaty in January 1992; the Embassy moved to Astana in 2006,” cleverly states the official *Background Note* of the US Department of State.⁴⁰ According to Jonathan Aitken, Turkey was the first in this regard.⁴¹ Nevertheless, at independence, unlike with the other Central Asian states, and despite the initial euphoria, the U.S. welcome of

⁴⁰ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, April 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2009), Accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm>>.

⁴¹ Jonathan Aitken, *Nazarbayev and the Making of Kazakhstan* (London and New York: Continuum, 2009), p.125.

Kazakhstan was somewhat restrained, given Kazakhstan's too high an affinity to a non-Gorby-led Russia which was also critically underpinned demographically then.⁴²

Having established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan relatively quickly the U.S. went on to open its diplomatic mission and embassy in its then capital Alma Ata (the present Almaty) in January 1992. Besides having its embassy/chancery in Astana, the US also maintains a consulate and offices of the USAID and Peace Corps at Almaty in view of its closeness to the Kazakh concentrations in southern Kazakhstan and to the heart of the rest of native Central Asia. Similarly, too Kazakhstan has its embassy in Washington, D.C. and it has a consulate at New York, to be close to not just the world of American business but also to attend to the United Nations and partake in the business of global affairs thereby. The United States' first resident envoy to Kazakhstan was William Harrison Courtney, who started his mission in Alma Ata as *Charge d' Affaires ad interim* on 3rd February 1992 and the current U.S. ambassador is Kenneth Fairfax. Yerlan Idrissov⁴³ has been Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States since 4th July 2007.

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Kazakhstan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Kazakhstan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., Kazakhstan in the initial years had rather limited volume of trade with the U.S. thus, it is no surprise to find Russia, Belarus and Kyrgyzstan figure as greater trade partners than of Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan's exports to and imports from the U.S. has rapidly, if continually, grown since its independence.

⁴² Olcott, *The Kazakhs*, op. cit., p. 265; Kassymzhomart Tokaev, *Meeting the Challenge: Memoirs by Kazakhstan's Foreign Minister*, Trans. A. R. Shyakhmetov (Singapore: Diplomatic Mission of Kazakhstan to Singapore; Keppel Offshore & Marine, 2004), p. 125.

⁴³ See Appendix IV.

Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Kazakhstan and the vice-versa. As you may see later, the re-election year 2004, for example, saw more U.S. elites visiting Kazakhstan. Despite the 5-years visa given, Kazakhstan is still not a visa-waiver country. Formally, from early on Kazakhstan, in keeping with the foreign policy dictum of its *de facto* Father of the Nation has pursued its various interests by seeking to meet its economic, security, political and developmental needs through its relations with the U.S., which, by the way, occupies the fifth circle in Kazakhstan's favorite foreign policy model.⁴⁴

Not wanting to offend Gorbachev, his partner in the Cold War endgame, George H.W. Bush was overly cautious in welcoming an independent Kazakhstan initially. Nevertheless, he rushed his secretary of state James Baker to Alma Ata to register America's keenness on Kazakhstan nonetheless and to serve to the Kazakhs the appropriate pointers for pursuing future co-existence. Baker, of course, met literally naked success in this during his "sauna diplomacy" with Nazarbayev! Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, like in the security sector, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed. Having taken the full measure of initially Western-backed and Russia-ignored Turkey to help in their restructuring processes and economic development Kazakh leaders still needfully proceeded to I. R. Iran to develop more lucrative economic relation with it in the wake of the Ankara Summit of October 1992.

Given the United States' long running obsession with the non-proliferation of WMD,⁴⁵ and, perhaps, also with an eye on Central Asian strategic realities,⁴⁶ the U.S.

⁴⁴ See Nursultan Nazarbayev's article in *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* of 16 May 1992 entitled: 'A Strategy for the Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign State' for details of Kazakhstan's foreign policy model.

⁴⁵See Henry A. Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston, Mass.: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 183-6.

enacted a facilitating legislation the Nunn-Lugar Act. Later, in pursuance of this, the United States made a priority of effecting nuclear threat reduction in Kazakhstan. H.W. Bush's administration did not extend much in terms of aid to Kazakhstan but Nazarbayev was aware of and, helped much by the Nunn-Lugar-visit, determined to get Kazakhstan's fair share of whatever was given out as CTR aid. In Kazakhstan itself their elites were quite divided into hawks, bargainers and doves on the nuclear issue.⁴⁷

Some, including Nazarbayev himself, well aware of the pre-independence Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement, only were too keen to rid Kazakhstan of these standing symbols of Soviet administered radioactive, environmental and health abuse of Kazakhstan.⁴⁸ Others more cognizant of Kazakhstan's geopolitical vulnerability in a growing nuclear neighborhood and aware of the bargaining value of even under-maintained Russian nukes slated for destruction under START, thought otherwise. For these legitimate reasons, Kazakhstan took its time first in renouncing nukes then further delaying the total removal and/or conversion and destructions of its strategic weapons and its associated components. In this regard, America has been benignly cleansing and ridding off Kazakhstan⁴⁹ of its accumulated atomic pollutions and totally stumping out nuclear radiation and proliferation risks in the rest of the region in its yeoman effort to make the entire Central Asian region a nuclear free zone.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Besides age-old concerns about ethnic tensions in *Xinjiang*, Americans have also been most anxious, *inter alia*, about the numerous nuclear-testings around the Lop Nur and Turfan-Kuerla regions which they also mainly came to know through the propaganda efforts of the ULO in Kazakhstan.

⁴⁷ Tokaev, *Meeting the Challenge*; op. cit., p.128; Jonathan Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes after 20 Years of Independence* (London and New York: Continuum, 2012), p.79.

⁴⁸ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Epicenter of Peace* (New Hampshire: Hollis Pub. Co., 2001); Ambassador Kanat Saudabayev and Senator Sam Nunn, *Kazakhstan Nuclear Disarmament: a Global Model for a Safer World* (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan; Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2006).

⁴⁹ It was even rumored then that, in this context, Obama may visit Kazakhstan sometime in his second term, when though being weak he would still be freer to shape a sparkling legacy in this regard, perhaps also becoming, thereby, the first U.S. sitting President to have visited both Afghanistan and post-SCA.

⁵⁰ For a different take on America's indulgence with uranium in the broader Central Asian region and beyond, see John Catalinotto and Sara Flounders, eds. *Metal of Dishonor: How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers and Civilians with DU Weapons* (New York: International Action Center, 1999), esp. Articles 20 and 23.

In 1993, U.S. Dept. of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP (1991) to lure Kazakhstan to participate in its program.⁵¹ The U.S. media, while sharing the coolness of the American government towards Kazakhstan, also covered the dealings of U.S. oil firms in Kazakhstan's energy sector besides also noting quite uneasily Kazakhstan's continued sheltering under Russian hegemony, if not imperialism too, as symbolized by the on-going lease of Baykonur⁵² Cosmodrome to Russia.

The first William J. Clinton administration had Strobe Talbott and Warren Christopher making a beeline to Alma Ata (later Almaty) quite early in its tenure. However, it is believed that Nazarbayev seeing Christopher to be relatively a weak player in the U.S. sent him back to the U.S. to fetch vice-president Al-Gore for signing any more pithy agreements like the Disarmament and Democratic Partnership ones which were signed later on. This keenness on the U.S. democratic side was also amply reciprocated by the Kazakhstanis when Nursultan Nazarbayev established a pattern of mostly biennial visits to the U.S. during Clinton's total tenure. His foreign minister Tokaev was also engaging his counterparts in both Clinton administrations. During these visits they met top U.S. elites in-charge of State, Defense, Energy and the Commerce departments.

In the security sphere, Clinton's astute secretary of defense William Perry was particularly instrumental in proposing a regional non-aggression pact⁵³ and also over-seeing the top-secret Operation Sapphire (1994) involving the sale of Kazakh HEU, roughly

⁵¹ National Guard, 'For the Media, Homeland Defense Fact Sheets, Global Engagement, State Partnership Program (SPP),' March 2011, Accessed on 3 June 2014 and available online at <<http://www.ng.mil/media/factsheets/2011/SPP%20Mar%2011.pdf>>; Sgt. Edward Balaban, 'Arizona National Guard shares knowledge with Kazakhstan unit,' *National Guard News* 20 November 2012, accessed on 3 February 2014 online at: <<http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/ArticleView/tabid/5563/Article>>.

⁵² Also spelt Baikonur; American unease at this is justified, as strategic missiles and even other secret pyrotechnic devices continue to be launched or otherwise liquidated, presumably with U.S. understanding but, worryingly, without a corresponding U.S. verification role, from this more than mere cosmodrome. In fact, one of the recent reported one took place on 27 Dec. 2011, when an RS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile was launched from there.

⁵³ Kasenov, 'The Institutions and Conduct, op. cit., p. 278.

sufficient for making 25 atomic bombs, to the U.S.⁵⁴ The U.S. was delighted, in 1994, when Kazakhstan joined NATO's PfP program, thereby displaying Kazakhstan's relative capacity for independent foreign policy action.⁵⁵ Though Russia was uneasy about this, it drew some consolation, in the initial years at least, from the fact that this was not the NATO of old and that it no longer appears to be arranged against Russia and that it now is more poised to tackle out-of-area responsibilities. On Kazakhstan's part, it too not wanting to appear as moving too close to the West, or for that matter to China, tried to balance such sentiments by proposing a Eurasian Union (later aka EurAsEc) and later joined a Russia-led Customs Union too in May 1995 under the same spirit. Later, in these contexts too, Western projects like TACIS, TRACECA, ENP, Greater Central Asia and IPAP, and Chinese projects like R.A.T.S., "One Belt One Road" and SCO were balanced by Kazakhstan through the Eurasian CSTO and EurAsEc.

Though Kazakhstan has a policy of positive cooperation with all its neighbors and the great powers, since its independence, its relations with the United States has generally been quite amicable but interspersed with brief periods of lukewarmity if not actually neutrality. In this context, Western observers have noted Kazakhstan's cold-shouldering of even Russia on occasions. During the Clinton administrations, trade saw steady but continual growth with the United States registering both surplus and deficit balances with Kazakhstan. There were relatively remarkable trade volumes notched up in both 1997 and 2000. In terms of aid, the U.S. extended relatively high amount of aid in both 1994 and 1995. It began declining after 1996 with it again picking up thereafter only in 2000.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ William C. Potter, 'The 'Sapphire' File: Lessons for International Nonproliferation Cooperation,' *Transition*, no.1 (Nov. 17, 1995): 14-19.

⁵⁵ Yerzhan, 'Foreign Policy of Kazakhstan', op. cit., p.13.

⁵⁶ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 65.

With the Bushes back in power in Washington, Nazarbayev, perhaps a little unnerved by the regional impact and ominous implication of the Sept. 11 attacks, rushed to Houston to pay sincere homage to his initial American friend H.W. Bush and then onwards to Washington to meet the son, President George W. Bush and his powerful team of advisers on official business. The U.S. had been obviously pursuing a number of objectives in Afghanistan long before then. Pakistan or important elements within it had a pre-eminent role in the transformation of the Taliban religio-social movement into a menacingly potent force capable of seizing and projecting its power right across Afghanistan and debatably beyond. Kazakhs discovered this disturbing capability more than a decade later when responsibly and responsibly the Kazakhstan Senate reversed its earlier decision to commit Kazakh officers to the ISAF in Afghanistan in uninitiated disregard of Taliban sensitivity.⁵⁷

Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite rapidly, if also cautiously, U.S. - Kazakhstan relations, despite having brief hiccups, have continuously galloped along with growing amity. However, since 2004, relations have noticeably changed for the better. Mutual confidence being somewhat at a higher level, during G. W. Bush's first administration, Nazarbayev made fewer personal visits to the U.S. but this period saw a higher number of other elites from either side visiting, to take Kazakhstan-U.S. ties to another level. For starters, in the said year, there was a sudden parade of security-related elite visits from the U.S. to Kazakhstan. Key officials like Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Armitage and important generals like John Abizaid, Richard Myers and Lance Smith all came over, some repeatedly so.

Perhaps, this activism was merely linked to the bigger number of treaties signed between the U.S. and Kazakhstan the previous year, loosely reflecting the situation a

⁵⁷ Jim Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress (97-1058), 22 July 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2013), p. 24.

decade before, when similarly a big number of treaties were signed between the U.S. and Kazakhstan, but were then more typical of nations establishing relations and freshly putting their initial ties on proper, if also strategic, tracks. Anyway, it must be noted, hopes of a rapid and sustained improvement in relations between the U.S. and Kazakhstan were somewhat dashed with the outbreak of the Iraq War. Though this caused some tension in government circles, it did not lead to anything even remotely resembling confrontation between them, perhaps because of its anticipated catalytic effects on oil prices in its immediate future, as verifiable in Chart 1; but this is not to say that the entire Kazakh heterogeneous society took this U.S. aggression on their strides.




Chart 1 - World events and their impact on Crude Oil prices, 1861 – 2012 (US \$ per barrel)

Note: The price level before the invasion of Iraq

Source: Adapted by the researcher from *B.P. Statistical Review of World Energy* (London: BP p.l.c., June 2013), p. 15.

Much earlier, it must be recalled, as the United States began its Afghan operation; “Kazakhstan offered the U.S. overflight and basing, although the latter did not prove necessary, due in large part to Kazakhstan’s geographic location being less than ideal for

U.S. needs. The end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan was certainly viewed as beneficial in Almaty”.⁵⁸ Also, as strategic materials particularly oil including its equities, facilities and discoveries expanded and became available for foreign participation (as we shall see in the next chapter) in Kazakhstan and its environs, the U.S., as pushed by its now well-entrenched oil lobby, began to appreciate even more the need to develop greater ties with Kazakhstan.⁵⁹

During G.W. Bush’s second administration, U.S. elites visiting Kazakhstan were more representatives of the politico-economic sector. With people like Condoleezza, Dick Cheney, Samuel W. Bodman, Richard Boucher and even the old-hawk Henry Kissinger swooping in, just to name a few. The U.S. was cool to Kazakhstan’s proposal and spirited efforts for the creation of the Eurasian Union. There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states, including Kazakhstan, tied too close to the Russian bosom. What is strange, however, is that the U.S. is also quite averse to Kazakhstan’s growing closeness, since at least 2006, even to the clearly more Western oriented and U.S. - led OSCE too! U.S. aid to Kazakhstan was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. It rose significantly in 2004 as Bush entered his re-election year, but the highest aid during his tenure in office came when he went lame-duck in 2008.⁶⁰ Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush’s tenure grew exponentially, continually with significant rises recorded in 2002, 2005 and in 2008. Other than in 2002 the U.S. trade deficit trend with Kazakhstan continued throughout both his administrations

⁵⁸ See, for e.g., Olga Olikier, ‘Kazakhstan’s Security Interests and Their Implications for the U.S.-Kazakh Relationship,’ *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, 5.2 (2007): 63-72, p. 67.

⁵⁹ Legvold, ‘U.S. Policy Toward,’ *op.cit.*, pp.1-2.

⁶⁰ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

To continue the Democratic Party's own past engagement with Kazakhstan, president-elect Barack Obama included Nazarbayev in his introductory calls to world leaders. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, he had to wait two years before he could receive Nazarbayev in Washington. In 2010 Nazarbayev got the, long overdue, reception he deserved as the model leader of a nation that had the courage to renounce nuclear weapons. A brave undertaking in the interest of humanity, to be sure, but indeed an accomplishment in which the United States itself compares most miserably. Perhaps, in exchange the U.S. got NDN, i.e. Northern Distribution Network⁶¹ over-flight rights and a consulate general in Almaty. A month earlier, Washington had, of course, launched the ABC, the Democrat's own initiative to take U.S. - Kazakhstan ties to a higher plane, politically. This trend continued when the 3rd ABC in 2012 upgraded itself significantly to a SPC, signaling thereby that ties are getting more mutually pro-active.⁶²

Kazakhstan got the chairmanship and hosted the OSCE summit in 2010 in its desire to not just work for regional conflict-resolution at the Central Asian level but to attempt to do so at the all European regional level too. Kazakhstan had mixed results in this ambitious endeavor, however, but still the Europeans in general and Mrs. Hillary Clinton in particular, who, this time as the sixth visiting U.S. Secretary of State, leading the U.S. delegation to the summit, was full of praise for Kazakhstan's achievements notwithstanding the various shortcomings in its net outcome. Many leading Americans like Ray Mabus, Robert O. Blake, Jr. and Simon Limage have later followed at the heels of Mrs. Clinton to Kazakhstan. While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's later tenure somewhat bled into Obama's own first term at the cost of, initially, a higher trade deficit, overall trade

⁶¹ See Map 21, p.261.

⁶² EKzUSA (Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA), 'Kazakh Foreign Minister Yerzhan Kazykhanov's Visit Further Strengthens Bilateral Dialogue,' Feb. 2012 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2012), Accessed online on 3 Feb. 2014 at <<http://kazakhembus.com/article/kazakh-foreign-minister-yerzhan-kazykhanovs-visit>>; EKzUSA, 'Kazakhstan-US Relations,' Aug. 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2013), accessed online on 3 Feb. 2014 at <<http://kazakhembus.com/Kazakhstan-US-Relations>>.

values maintained its rising high levels, as Obama settles into his term of office but with the significant outcome of a steady reduction of their trade deficit with Kazakhstan, helped by gradually rising exports and declining imports, as Obama approached his re-election year. As far as aid is concern, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to, an otherwise increasingly prosperous and regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing Kazakhstan.⁶³

Kazakhs note America's recent more moderated approach to Muslim world and energy security issues, with a sense of relief.⁶⁴ During Nazarbayev's 2010 visit to Washington, D.C. to attend the Nuclear Security Summit he was also given an award by the East West Institute for "championing preventive diplomacy and promoting interfaith dialogue at the global level".⁶⁵ But, still, Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with some concern as to what this may actually augur for the future, though Kazakhstan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S. for its role in permitting the "reverse transit" via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and which has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of "sustainment and total cargoes" exiting from Afghanistan.⁶⁶

Under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Kazakhstan's transition to democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Kazakhstan right from its independence. By the end of 1992 it had extended a modest figure of 20.33 million in this regard. The U.S. had provided around US "\$1.205 billion in technical assistance and investment support" to Kazakhstan between the years

⁶³ Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments*, op. cit., p. 23; Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

⁶⁴ Marat Shaikhutdinov, 'Kazakhstan and the Strategic Interests of the Global Players in Central Asia,' *Central Asia and the Caucasus* (a Journal of Social and Political Studies) 2009, available online at: <http://www.ca-c.org/online/2009/journal_eng/cac-03/12.shtml>.

⁶⁵ EKzUSA, 'President Nazarbayev Visits the United States April 12-13, 2010 for the Nuclear Security Summit,' April 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2010), accessed online on 3 Feb. 2014 at <<http://kazakhembus.com/article/president-nazarbayev-visits-the-united-states>>.

⁶⁶ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit., p.4.

1992 to 2005.⁶⁷ Since Kazakhstan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID has extended to it till 2012 is fully valued higher at about US \$ 2.09 billion. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be 2009 when Kazakhstan received U.S. \$ 220.28 million.⁶⁸ Aid has drastically fallen since then, but follows a trend which first appeared in 2002. Though this in itself appears to be negative, it merely indicates that other than on the human rights issue, Kazakhstan has progressed, achieved economic growth, is democratically better than Russia itself, has an increasing security strategic value and U.S.-Kazakhstan relations have stabilized more substantively to embrace numerous other sectors and not merely confined to a developmental aid dependency relationship.⁶⁹

Kazakhstan had about 140 volunteers in 2009 engaged in various activities including in imparting business education, teaching English, public health, HIV/AIDS prevention, community development, developing environmental NGOs and youth development.⁷⁰ As one of the most well developed state in the world to host a Peace Corps program, Kazakhstan cumulatively saw, depending on the source relied, anything between 1,120 to 1,176 volunteers serve in its territory before suspending their program in 2011.

While Kazakhstan's 1991, 1999, 2005 and 2011 presidential election records may not all measure up to European standards, the U.S. is right to acknowledge the democratic improvements, however haltingly, taking place over successive elections, including the legislative ones, in Kazakhstan.⁷¹ However, outside observers too are right in feeling that American's energy interests do override its seeming democratic concerns in Kazakhstan

⁶⁷ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, op. cit.

⁶⁸ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 65.

⁶⁹ Curt Tarnoff, *U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union*, CRS Report for Congress (RL 32866), 1 March 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division; Congressional Research Service, 2007), pp. 4, 7-10. See also Curt Tarnoff, *The Former Soviet Union and U. S. Foreign Aid: Implementing the Assistance Program* (Washington, D.C.: CRS Report; Library of Congress, 18 Jan 1995). Print.

⁷⁰ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, op. cit.

⁷¹ EKZUSA, 'Kazakh Foreign Minister, *loc. cit.*

and that there is much more to be desired in this regard.⁷² In this regard too, USAID has long supported anti-corruption project and also runs leadership and professional training courses for Kazakh mid-level elites. American help also goes to improving the skills of registered political parties and their officials. On Kazakhstan's part one-third, about a thousand, of all Bolashak scholarships, holders of which may turn out to be future leadership material, it offer are slated for higher studies in the U.S. alone. In the area of legal reform, promotion of rule of law is an overriding objective. The U.S. provides such assistances that would win the judiciary, greater trust in the eyes of the Kazakh public.

Civil society and media development is enabled by U.S. technical assistance on legal and regulatory reforms addressing those sectors. Specifically, through these engagements, the U.S. seeks to encourage the civil society in Kazakhstan "to influence national-level public policy decision-making".⁷³ Very broadly, American aid in the Kazakh politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary.

Economically, Kazakhstan is key to the U.S. in the region because of its location, its economic bravery and dynamism, its higher industrial capacity, its array of natural resources, including energy ones and its low-density territory. The post Soviet collapse's decline in demand, that reached its nadir in 1994, was overcome with bold economic reforms and more than reversed from 2000 on with the help of the rising energy sector, aid inflows, foreign investments and even improving harvests. As per the records of the U.S.

⁷² Glenn Kessler, 'Oil Wealth Colors the U.S. Push for Democracy,' *Washington Post*, 15 May 2006; Enayatollah Yazdani, 'U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Central Asian Republics: Myth or Reality?,' *International Studies*, 44.2 (2007): 141-55.

⁷³ United States of America, DOS-FOA, 'Foreign Operations Assistance: Kazakhstan-Fact Sheet,' 1 June 2013 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2013), accessed on 3 June 2014, available online at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/2013/212979.htm>>.

Census Bureau, US bilateral trade in goods with Kazakhstan has grown continually.⁷⁴ The export value of goods from the US to Kazakhstan grew continually from 68 million US dollars in 1993, the first full year of exports to be recorded, to US\$882.5 million in 2012. The upward growth trend dipped only in the years 1995, 1998, 2003 and 2009 in between.

Though the US is not among the top three of Kazakhstan's export markets it does figure as the third leading import market of Kazakhstan after Russia and Ukraine. The import value of goods to the US from Kazakhstan also grew continually from about US\$ 41 million in the first full year of trade in 1993 to some 1,565 million dollars in 2012. The upward trend dipped somewhat significantly only between the years 2001 to 2003. The import value began growing exponentially from 2005 on continually reaching a remarkable peak of sorts at US\$ 1,872.4 million in 2010. On average the peak months for US exports to Kazakhstan is Octobers and the average peak months for US imports from Kazakhstan is Aprils. Overall in 1993 bilateral trade was valued at a meager 109 million US dollars but with a US surplus. Most US surpluses, however, continually ran out by 1998 when the US began its protracted deficit run in its bilateral trade with Kazakhstan. In 2002, against the trend, the US registered a surprise surplus, perhaps an unanticipated positive outcome of the tragic Sept. 11 episode.

Viewed in a 5-yearly perspective, bilateral trade so far was valued at US\$203.8 million in 1995; in 2000 it was 553.2 million; in 2005 bilateral trade was valued at US\$1.64 billion, a 91% increase from 2004. Under the Cold War vintage Jackson-Vanik Amendment to Sections 402 and 409 of the 1974 U.S. Trade Act, Kazakhstan, by extension, was expected and has always more than complied with its freedom of emigration⁷⁵ provisions

⁷⁴ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with Kazakhstan,' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.

⁷⁵ With Kazakh-linked Jews like Alexander Mashkevich (representing wealth at its entrepreneurial best) and Sasha Baron Cohen (representing artistic liberty at its perverted worst) being totally free to roam the globe representing or, as in the latter's case,

and accordingly secured U.S. presidential certification to that effect, each time in the past. As a symbolic boost to the gradually rising U.S.-Kazakhstan trade relations their 2006 agreement specifically excluded Kazakhstan henceforth from this amendment and its expectations, thus doing away with the need for a waiver to receive MFN treatment and actually graduating towards the WTO.⁷⁶ In 2010 trade was valued at more than 2.60 billion and in 2012 it slid a little to rest at about US\$2.45 billion. The general upward trend saw relatively small if not slight dips in the years 1998, 2001, 2003, 2006, 2009 and 2011.

When one looks at Kazakhstan's trade partners, Russia still figures as Kazakhstan's leading trade partner overall. The E.U. and China follow Russia in this respect. The United States and its proxies Turkey, U.K., Germany and S. Korea also figure as key import partners of Kazakhstan. Without using the strict and comprehensive, if not also cumbersome, classification of trade products employed by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), one can generally say that trade between western countries, including the United States, and Kazakhstan are dominated by oil, ferrous & non-ferrous metals including uranium, machinery, minerals, industrial materials, gas, chemicals, electronics and transport vehicles. Specifically, in the case of the United States, the transportation vehicles deals of General Motors and General Electric come to mind in this context.⁷⁷ Somewhat lower down the rank, traditional agricultural products such as grains, including preeminently wheat, wool, meat, cotton, coal and general food items also matter in their products trade.

misrepresenting Kazakhstan, it is absolutely absurd to consider the amendment as even remotely relevant to Kazakhstan, as may be concluded from perusing, United States of America, DOS-USRWKz, 'U.S. Relations With Kazakhstan-Fact Sheet,' 16 Nov. 2012 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State; Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2012), available online at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5487.htm>>, accessed on 9 Aug. 2013; If it continues to be applied at all, then clearly it must be for some other reasons. For sampling Sasha and his handiwork entitled *Borat*, see Borat Sagdiyev, *Borat: Touristic Guidings to Minor Nation of U.S. and A. and Touristic Guidings to Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan*, With Anthony Hines and Sacha Baron Cohen, (New York: Flying Dolphin Press-Random House, 2007).

⁷⁶ EKzUSA, 'Kazakhstan-US Relations', *loc. cit.*

⁷⁷ *Idem.*

Kazakhstan has seen a gradual growth in the business activities of U.S. companies in also other areas of business than just pure trade. However, even these varied business investments are only a part of a much larger U.S. investment portfolio in Kazakhstan encompassing not only principally the energy sector but also involves sectors such as mining, real estate, business services, chemicals, transport and communication and electric, gas and water production and distributions and also infrastructure at a much lower level.⁷⁸

In its more traditional sector, it is a major exporter of wheat. Kazakhstan envisions itself as a future agro-export power. It has boosted its productivity by adopting U.S. methods and machinery of harvesting and herding. In 2010, it airlifted more than 2,000 Angus and Hereford cattle from North Dakota as breeding stock. It plans to create feeding complexes for livestock under U.S. joint ventures to feed 5,000 heads of cattle.⁷⁹ It wishes to adopt latest U.S. scientific methods for sheep and poultry breeding as well. Speaking of joint ventures, there were 374 U.S. joint ventures in Kazakhstan by 2009. Other than the many joint ventures in the energy sector like TengizChevroil, as we shall see enumerated in the next chapter, the renowned U.S. firm General Electric itself has a joint venture factory right in Astana (variously known in the past as Akmola and Tselinograd) itself, manufacturing railway locomotives.

Anyway, in the newer business sectors generally U.S. companies with large investments in Kazakhstan include Chevron, Kerr-McGee/Oryx, B.P., PFC Energy, IBM, AGCO Corporation, Boeings, Baker Hughes, Sikorsky Aircraft, Apache Corp., FedEx, Asia-Africa Projects Group and Citibank.⁸⁰ Kazakh sources state there were between 50-70 U.S. firms in Kazakhstan by mid-1994. In 2000 there were about 150 U.S. firms in Almaty.

⁷⁸ EKzUSA, 'Kazakh Foreign Minister', *loc. cit.*

⁷⁹ EKzUSA, 'Kazakhstan-US Relations', *loc. cit.*

⁸⁰ EKzUSA, 'Kazakh Foreign Minister', *loc. cit.*

Together they hold the leading positions in the Kazakhstan market. To deeply ingrain the business culture, in 2002 both state parties launched a Business Development Partnership, known also as the Houston Initiative. Further still, as if to give a fillip to these trends, the WB named Kazakhstan as the world's most reformed business economy in 2011. U.S. investment sources gradually began paying more interest to Kazakhstan as a destination for their investments especially after the conclusion of the OPIC agreement and bilateral investment treaty with it.⁸¹

First on the Kazakhstan investment scene were, of course, the U.S. energy corporations, since they already had an eye on Kazakhstan's hydrocarbon riches even from pre-independence times.⁸² Thus, it is no surprise at all to find American companies having a head start, heavily invested and actively involved particularly in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector. On Kazakhstan's part, conscious of the positive impact of investments on economic growth and employment, Kazakhstan has often encouraged foreign direct investments (FDIs). Boosting Kazakhstan's reform efforts further in this regard were the endorsements of the "IMF, the World Bank, the EC and then-US secretary of state James Baker," who even backed it with a supply of American economists.⁸³ Kazakhstan has seen over \$122 billion in FDI inflow since its independence, with the last five years alone bringing in about \$70 billion. A significant part, usually, over a quarter or at times, about just under one half, of these FDIs are directly from the United States.

Although Kazakhstan is not the largest recipient of the United States' foreign direct investments, the U.S. is a dominant FDI source for Kazakhstan. In 2006 American FDI in

⁸¹ United States of America, DOS (Department of State), 'US-Kazakhstan relations – joint declaration and Department of State statements,' US Department of State Dispatch, 25 May 1992, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1992).

⁸² United States of America, CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), *Kazakhstan: An Economic Profile*, (Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Information Service (NTIS), 1993).

⁸³ Ahmed Rashid, 'The Next Frontier: Kazakhstan is a Magnet for Energy Firms,' *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 Feb. 1993, p. 49.

Kazakhstan was 27% of the total.⁸⁴ United States' FDI was 24.6 % of Kazakhstan's total FDI in the first half of 2007 says one of the last *Background Note: Kazakhstan* to be available online at the U.S. State Department's website.⁸⁵ The U.S. percentages have increased further since then. By 2009 American companies have invested some U.S. \$ 14.3 billion in Kazakhstan since 1993. This was despite the then obtaining less than favorable legal conditions and the generally poor investment climate, including arbitrary enforcement of laws. Wanting to create a better investment and trade climate, the U.S. and Kazakhstan have had a Bilateral Investment Treaty and an Avoidance of Dual Taxation Treaty in place since 1994 and 1996 respectively, to cater to the needs of their investors and business peoples.⁸⁶ To boost U.S. investments further the first-ever Kazakhstan-U.S. Investment Forum was held in New York City in 2009 trumpeting afresh its desire to diversify, including through privatization, as per the Kazakh development plan and, generally, promoting its investor friendly climate.⁸⁷ The legal investment framework has subsequently been improved further, as a result perhaps, but also by a new 2011 legislation passed by the Kazakh parliament.

Presumably, the cumulative effects of these and other legal and business reforms saw the volume of gross inflow of American direct investments to Kazakhstan to grow to more than U.S. \$ 24.2 billion by mid 2012, i.e. within two decades of independence.⁸⁸ Still, the National Bank of Kazakhstan (NBK) puts it at 17.9 billion and states that the "Netherlands" hold top spot at \$49 billion in early 2013.⁸⁹ Generally however, FDIs have shot up dramatically since the post-2001 period. As recent as 2011 alone Kazakhstan had raked in U.S. \$ 1.039 billion in American FDIs.

⁸⁴ Weitz, *Kazakhstan and the New*, op. cit., p. 125.

⁸⁵ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, op. cit.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷ 'Kazakhstan-U.S. Investment Forum 2009,' an official forum on U.S.-Kazakhstan investments, Harvard Club of New York City, New York, U.S.A., November 23-24, 2009, the program can be found online at <www.kazakhinvest.com>.

⁸⁸ EKzUSA, 'Kazakhstan-US Relations,' *loc. cit.*

⁸⁹ Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments*, op. cit., p. 14.

Sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas, water and others too, remains a focus. Given that oil and gas is Kazakhstan's leading economic sector, the U.S. has appropriately made its heaviest investments in that sector, as can be seen clearly in the next chapter. Being acutely aware of the economic vulnerabilities of rent-seeking economies like Kazakhstan to the Dutch-disease, the U.S. is right in launching the Houston Initiative to nurture entrepreneurship and take Kazakhstan on the, hopefully sustainable, path to economic diversification that may bring in greater socio-economic spin-offs. Building national consensus in the banking sector and, specifically, building Kazakhstan National Bank's institutional capacity is also an U.S. goal.⁹⁰

Besides working to improve its public sector governance and capacity, Kazakhstan also joined the United States' Economic Development Program which includes advancing the diversification of the economy, creation of small business support, promotion of economic competitiveness and regional integration and regulatory simplification and sustainable growth across economic sectors. "Kazakhstan became the first country" in 2006 "to share directly in the cost of a U.S. Government's foreign assistance program".⁹¹ This program was subsequently extended to 2012, considering the mutual benefits it offers to both the U.S. and Kazakhstan. Specifically, in the context of the diversification of the Kazakhstan economy, after more than two decade of exclusion, the 4th Kazakhstan-American Investment Forum in New York on 7th December 2011 addressed newly the development of strategic industries, with a higher manufacturing role, in Kazakhstan.⁹²

The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector.

⁹⁰ United States of America, DOS-FOAA, 'Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Kazakhstan-Fact Sheet,' 20 Jan. 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009), available online at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/103634.htm>>, accessed on 9 Aug. 2013.

⁹¹ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, op. cit.; EKZUSA, 'Kazakhstan-US Relations,' *loc. cit.*

⁹² *Idem.*

In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Kazakh firms with relevant U.S. businesses. The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and help in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; given Kazakhstan's gradual embrace of market reforms, U.S. supports the transition to market economy in Kazakhstan and thereby work to integrate it into the world trade system fully.⁹³ In this regard, the U.S. supports Kazakhstan's ultimate accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the Kazakh government to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection. The U.S. and E.U. worked with Kazakhstan to establish in 2001 a Regional Environmental Center (REC) at Almaty.⁹⁴

Kazakhstan, a state with enduring fraternal Eurasian ties to Russia, kept its equidistance intact between the U.S. and Russia. Kazakhstan works hard to equitably regulate its ties with both these key powers and constantly aspires to balance them. This Kazakhstan foreign policy ambivalence was noted in America much earlier even by the Library of Congress' *Country Study: Kazakhstan*.⁹⁵ With Russia's initial disinterest vividly in mind, it is, understandably, cautious too about Russia's continued reliability and viewing contrastingly, especially America's military-first approach in the greater Middle Eastern region with concern, it at times goes easy on U.S. overt impetus for deeper intercourse. As far as the Kazakhs are concern, they welcome and are happy if the U.S. confines its role to just "shock and hoe" and hazard not into "shock and awe" as they are habitually prone to,

⁹³ United States of America, USAID (US Agency for International Development), 'USAID Country Profile: Kazakhstan' (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <<http://www.info.usaid.gov/countries/kz/kaz.htm>>.

⁹⁴ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, op. cit.

⁹⁵ United States of America, FRD (Federal Research Division), 'Foreign Policy,' *LOC Country Study: Kazakhstan*, ed. Glenn E. Curtis (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+kzO\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+kzO))>.

west and south of the Kazakhstan backyard. Robert Legvold in exploring Kazakhstan's strategic issues, environment and the major power dynamics therein even goes to the extent of elevating Kazakhstan itself as a major power and tries to bring this fact out in the context of its tensions especially with Uzbekistan.⁹⁶

However, mindful of the difficulties of its strategic neighborhood and the potential instabilities arising from the current drawdowns and the looming post-2014 American exit from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan is particularly anxious to keep all its neighboring powers and the United States equitably and positively engaged with it and to be relevant and available in its developmental immediate futures, particularly, towards the pursuit, in the short-term, of its visions 2030⁹⁷ and 2050 over the longer haul. As if to keep in step with these legitimate Kazakh anxieties, according to the DOS, the strategic aim of the United States "in Kazakhstan is to ensure and maintain the development of the country as a stable, secure, democratic, and prosperous partner that respects international standards and agreements, embraces free-market competition and the rule of law, and is a respected regional leader".⁹⁸

Having been kept out of most Central Asian territories during Soviet times, American energy corporations seized the opening to the regions resources offered by their imminent independence. The U.S. administration of the day long plagued by the need to diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby need not be invited to bandwagon. Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over C.A.'s extractive sector and petroleum resources, in particular, came to a rapid end. Strategically, the U.S. is, of course,

⁹⁶ See Robert Legvold, ed., *Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2003).

⁹⁷ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *Kazakhstan-2030: Prosperity, Security and Ever-Growing Welfare of All the Kazakhstanis* (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1998).

⁹⁸ United States of America, DOS-FOA, 'Foreign Operations Assistance', *loc. cit.*; Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments*, op.cit., p.21.

in Kazakhstan as much to diversify its energy sources (as we shall see in the later chapter) as it is to prevent Kazakhstan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as “Islamic radicalism,” both of which are, by the way, key U.S. national security priorities. In this and other contexts too, Kazakhstan has turned to the U.S. for military supplies to protect its energy and other assets not just in the Caspian.⁹⁹

The US-Kazakhstani security ties including in “non-proliferation has been a cornerstone of the relationship” says the US State Department, which again stressed that “Kazakhstan showed leadership when it renounced nuclear weapons in 1993”.¹⁰⁰ In this area the US has helped Kazakhstan, under treaties signed on 13th December 1993 and multi-lateral ones committed to even earlier¹⁰¹, as noted below, to remove nuclear warheads, weapons-grade materials,¹⁰² and their supporting infrastructure. The US under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program spent U.S. \$ 240 million in assisting Kazakhstan eliminate WMD and their related infrastructure.¹⁰³ As many as 1,410 nuclear warheads were removed from their SS-18 ICBMs (many targeted at the U.S.) and either converted or sold.¹⁰⁴

Perhaps in appreciation of this the US Department of Defense signed a “Memorandum of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation in the field of Defense and Military Relations” with the Kazakh Ministry of Defense on February 14th, 1994. Later building upon the successes of their post-Sept. 11 security co-operations the same parties consolidated their ties in this field further by signing the “Memorandum of Consent on

⁹⁹ For example, to guard the western border in the Atyrau region, the U.S. committed to build and equip a \$3.8million anti-terrorist center for a Kazakh marine battalion based there, see Legvold, ‘U.S. Policy Toward, *op. cit.*, p.3.

¹⁰⁰ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, *op. cit.*

¹⁰¹ United States of America, DOS, ‘US-Kazakhstan relations, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰² Including, 600kg of, previously, forgotten ones from the Ulba plant at Ust-Kamenogorsk (today’s Oskemen), in 1994.

¹⁰³ United States of America, DOS-USRWKz., ‘U. S. Relations With, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁴ EKZUSA, ‘President Nazarbayev Visits, *loc. cit.*

Mutual Intent to Implement the Five-Year Military Cooperation Plan 2008-2012” on 1st February 2008. As the Kazakh Embassy in U.S. website states, these “plans cover the area of strengthening the fighting and peacekeeping capacities of Kazbat, airmobile forces, naval forces, as well as the development of military infrastructure in the Caspian region”.¹⁰⁵ This memorandum continues and improves upon the security cooperation tradition established under the September 2003 five year military cooperation accord.

Kazakhstan’s armed forces participates not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but it also joins-in multi-laterally in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The US Central Command conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with the Kazakh Defense Ministry and its other agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges to full military exercises. Quantitatively, these events are rising in numbers continually over the years. As a non-NATO member Kazakhstan was yet further accommodated within Western security structures under NATO’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).

As mentioned before, in a multi-lateral context Kazakhstan has already signed on and committed to a number of long pre-existing security-related agreements, that have a strategic dimension, even from earlier on including the START Treaty and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty both of 1992, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993 and the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 2001.¹⁰⁶ The on-going periodic launches of a range of pyrotechnics from the Baykonur (more than

¹⁰⁵ EKZUSA, ‘Kazakhstan-US Relations,’ *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note:Kazakhstan*, *op. cit.*; United States of America, DOS-USRWKz., ‘U.S. Relations With,’ *loc. cit.*

mere) Cosmodrome should be seen in this context. Both Kazakhstan and the U.S. are concerned, nonetheless, but for mostly different reasons.

American aid to Kazakhstan is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the Kazakh defense and security sector. Principally, the U.S. urges and supports Kazakhstan's adherence to all previous arms control agreements and treaties, as we noted above. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning the U.S. has been involved in defense reform in Kazakhstan. The U.S. Department of Defense launched the CTR program in 1992 to facilitate the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction across the former Soviet Union including within Kazakhstan (Dec. 1993). It has helped in the conversion and management of four nuclear facilities. Being successful over the years, this program has been continuing also since its renewal in 2006.

In this context, an amendment to the Nunn-Lugar program was signed on 13 December 2007, prolonging the same till 2014.¹⁰⁷ This program promoted denuclearization and demilitarization. Specifically, Kazakhstan has co-operated with, ironically, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) on matters such as nuclear materials safeguards and non-proliferation issues. With U.S. assistance Kazakhstan closed 221 nuclear test tunnels at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) by Nov.2012.¹⁰⁸ The world's only nuclear desalinization fast breeder reactor at Aktau had about 300 metric tons of uranium and plutonium spent fuel to be properly secured.¹⁰⁹ The U.S. government's involvement in the

¹⁰⁷ Kazakhstan, MFARK (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan), 'Cooperation of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the United States of America,' Relations with Countries of Europe and America, 10-09-2008 (Kazakhstan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2008), accessed online on 3 Feb. 2014 at <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/policy/cooperation/europe_america/19>.

¹⁰⁸ United States of America, DOS-USRWKz., 'U. S. Relations With, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰⁹ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 63.

handling, variously, of this radioactive material of reactor BN-350 in the Mangyshlak Atomic Energy Complex at Aktau has continued beyond 2010 to the present.

Kazakhstan has since 1994 an active partnership with the Arizona National Guards. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Kazakhstan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields. Confidential sources say that a number of bases in eastern Kazakhstan were considered for this purpose. Specifically, the Kazakh defense ministry says the U.S. government requested the use of military bases in Taraz and Taldykorgan.

The U.S. is involved in the reform of the Kazakh armed forces. The U.S. helps Kazakhstan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reforms including in creating an adequate Kazakh force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Kazakhstani military by providing the required training and equipment so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kazakhstan has the only Humvee¹¹⁰ center in Central Asia. To strengthen Kazakhstan's Caspian shore defenses the U.S. has provided "\$20 million for radar and intercept boats".¹¹¹ Joint exercises also aim to improve inter-operability of Kazakhstani forces with the U.S. military. The capacity of the Kazakh forces to participate in counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operation abroad as per NATO Partnership, United Nations and Coalition goals was enhanced.¹¹²

In this regard, Kazakh military personnel, including 27 combat engineers and sappers, participated in coalition operations in Iraq in 2003 helping clear about 1.5 million mines per year there. Under the Partnership for Peace (Pfp) Trust Fund, Kazakhstan destroyed numerous conventional landmines/explosives within its own territory and did

¹¹⁰ These are famed two and a half tons American military vehicles that are in the service of various armed forces around the world.

¹¹¹ Legvold, 'U.S. Policy Toward', *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹¹² United States of America, DOS-FOA, 'Foreign Operations Assistance', *loc. cit.*

similar activities in Iraq too. In fact, destroying about 4 million mines there, asserts the Kazakh Embassy.¹¹³ Their experience there prepared them for later peacekeeping duties with both the United Nations and NATO. Kazbat (created in Jan. 2000) has involved itself, remarkably, in peacekeeping duties under UN mandate in Iraq. It has thus, multi-laterally, been “incorporated in UN Blue Helmets” and NATO inter-operability, a U.S. objective, is also gained by Kazakhstan, thereby.¹¹⁴


Kazakhstan enjoys the best level of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S. amongst all the CIS states. Russia’s legitimate concern on NATO affairs involving the FSU has been moderated to an extent through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which allows Russia some inter-face ability without giving it veto power over any NATO moves. It is under this background of lukewarm but tacit approval that NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helps restructure even the Kazakh military, as hinted to earlier. In this context, Kazbat which evolved from the earlier CENTRASBAT has been transitioning to KAZBRIG at least since 2008 if not earlier. It would be an added peacekeeping asset to the 32 brigades Kazakhstan Army.

U.S. Central Command organized various cooperative security-related events in Kazakhstan and elsewhere. It also co-operates bilaterally and participates in bilateral military exercises. Kazakhstan and the United States have hosted joint exercises, including series called such as Balance, Cooperative Nugget, Combined Endeavor, Zhardem, and Regional Cooperation Exercises. The annual series called Steppe Eagle began in July 2003. Steppe Eagle 2011 was held from August 9-19, 2011 at the Iliy (Ilysk) range, focusing on peace-keeping interoperability. The two week long Steppe Eagle 2013 started on 10 Aug.

¹¹³ EKZUSA, ‘Kazakhstan-US Relations,’ *loc. cit.*

¹¹⁴ Centre of Foreign Policy and Analysis, *Kazakhstan the Crown Jewel of Central Asia*, Press Service of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan: Kazinvest Adviser and Kazakhstanika, 2003), p.20.

and the drill involves assessing the operational capability of the long restructuring KAZBAT. In direct military to military cooperation, Kazakhstan participates in the American IMET and FMF programs. Kazakh military officers attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training via IMET program. The U.S. seems to believe that military exchanges, visits and various other forms of engagement with the Kazakhs would be useful tools in exposing the Kazakhs to the military practices and values of the U.S. and in building goodwill and credibility, generally.



Map 21 – Northern Distribution Network

Note: US strategic involvements/presence in C.A.; Air routes are schematics, other routes are close approximates.

Source: Adapted from Jeffrey Mankoff, *The United States and Central Asia after 2014*, A report of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia program, Jan. 2013, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2013), p. 3.

When it comes specifically to security, the U.S. helps the Government of Kazakhstan (GOKz.) to draft effective legislation and improve enforcement of existing laws by providing relevant training to customs and other enforcement officials to tackle all

manner of trafficking in of narcotics, persons and WMDs. Kazakhstan has benefited from various security-related assistances too. Incidentally, the oily (pun intended) involvements and technical assistance the U.S. gives in the energy sector should similarly also advance reforms that would prevent the recurrences of Zhanaozen type of violence, given that the incident arose in an energy production-linked region.¹¹⁵ The U.S. has helped Kazakhstan procure detection equipment for border guards.

In the area of security assistance again, the U.S. helps Kazakhstan by providing training and equipment to combat transnational threats such as WMD technology and materiel proliferation, increase border security, counter-terrorism co-operation especially after the advent of the so-called “war on terror”,¹¹⁶ and to address other seemingly “lesser” security related threats such as money laundering, terrorism financing, illegal drugs and trafficking in persons illegally. “Specifically, the United States is supporting the GOKz’s plans to build a WMD interdiction training facility, and providing regional enforcement training for Kazakhstan and its neighbors”.¹¹⁷

The U.S. supports the anti-terrorism Rapid reaction force (RRF) and has helped in the refurbishment of security helicopters. Despite the broad range of its defense and security cooperation with the U.S., Kazakhstan avoids having any U.S. bases on its territory and has since July 2005 demanded the U.S., interestingly, via the SCO¹¹⁸ to set a timetable to quit even its existing bases elsewhere in Central Asia.¹¹⁹ Simultaneously, however, in the context of the United States’ impending so-called “exit” from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan has

¹¹⁵ For details, see Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments*, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

¹¹⁶ In this context, Kazakh natives who have been under extra judicial detention that too extra-territorially in the U.S. base in Guantanamo for alleged ties to the Taliban include Yaqub Abahanov, Abdulrahim Kerimbakiev and Abdallah Tohtasinovich Magrupov. On this, see: <<http://www.dod.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf>>.

¹¹⁷ United States of America, DOS-FOA, ‘Foreign Operations Assistance’, *loc. cit.*

¹¹⁸ For an authoritative, if not also official, American interpretation of the context of the Kazakh input in the request, see NCAFP (National Committee on American Foreign Policy), *Regional Security and Stability: Perception and Reality*, a Roundtable on the U.S.-Kazakhstan Relationship, NCAFP, New York City, U.S.A., March 4-6, 2007. See also Weitz, *Kazakhstan and the New*, op. cit., p. 125.

¹¹⁹ NCAFP, *Regional Security and Stability*, op. cit., p. 6; Fatima Kukeyeva and Zhulduz Baizakova, ‘Realism and Middle Powers: A Case Study of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy,’ *Contemporary Kazakhstan: The Way Ahead*, eds. Arun Mohanty and Sumant Swain (New Delhi: Axis Publications, 2009), p.41.

earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN, an American-led logistics arrangement (as we saw in Map 21), at uneconomically higher costs, that is intended to reduce supplies transiting Pakistan by relying more on the apparently more reliable routes and ports¹²⁰ of northern Eurasia. In this regard, Kazakhstan is advocating the increased use of Aktau, presumably for containers, each bringing in U.S. \$17,500 in transit fees, and transshipping via Poti.¹²¹

Turkmenistan – U. S. Relations

If one takes a cursory general review of American print media, one finds that, of all the CARs, Turkmenistan received the least coverage. Articles that do deal with it, more often than not, tend to be quite critical. However, one should not take this fact to mean that Turkmen-American relation is less than cordial or bad. There are various reasons for this seeming lack of interest in Turkmenistan including the absence of a multi-party system, states the *Ashgabat Vecherni*, the perestroika-era newspaper. A disinterest that is, perhaps, symbolically albeit unwittingly affirmed when it became the last of the post-Soviet CARs to have a U. S. embassy opened within it, i.e.: in 17th March, 1992. Although it was one of the last to achieve independence from the collapsing Soviet Union, the U. S. nonetheless welcomed and recognized it on 25th December 1991 along with most other ex-Soviet CARs. Like with most of the ex-Soviet CARs, the U. S. established diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan at *Chargé d' Affaires ad interim* level on 19th February 1992.

Given the U.S.'s overwhelming interest in strengthening the reformers and the democrats in a Soviet Union that was poised to implode and focused as it was then on

¹²⁰ The outer and extra regional ports utilized chiefly include Poti, Tallinn, Riga, Klaipeda and it is believed even Vladivostok (see Map 16). When President Obama met President Nazarbayev on 11 April 2010 he praised Kazakh assistance to Afghanistan and Nazarbayev, in turn, promised to facilitate a new trans-polar flight route (see Maps 6 and 21) for the transiting U.S. military; See Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments*, op.cit., p. 21.

¹²¹ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit.

developments in Russia, the U.S., even under the Republicans, was atypically concerned with human rights issues across Central Asia but particularly so in Turkmenistan. Later on it was important to the U.S. for its location, for it was one of only three countries of the Central Asian region that share any length of border with U.S. rival, I. R. Iran. As may be seen in Map 22, Turkmenistan, by the way, is yet another virtually land-locked Central Asian country that borders Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan at the north and north-east, Iran and Afghanistan at the south and south-east, and faces Azerbaijan to the west over a maritime boundary on the southern Caspian Sea.



Map 22 - Turkmenistan (Physical-Relief)

Source: Adopted from *DK World Desk Reference*, 3rd edn., previously published as the *World Reference Atlas* (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2002), p. 581.

In the context of the Caspian and its rich hydrocarbons, Turkmenistan, being gas-rich, was also viewed as “a key player in the U.S. Caspian Basin Energy Initiative, which sought to facilitate negotiations between commercial partners and Governments” of the region linked to the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline (TCGP) project. In 2000, the Government

of Turkmenistan (GOTm.) excused itself from these negotiations ‘by refusing all offers by its commercial partners and making unrealistic demands for billion-dollar “pre-financing”.’¹²² Struck by the neutrality bug quite early on in its independent life it relatively avoided deep security ties with any power, regional or global. Turkmens are a Turkic people whose kin and brethren spill liberally across north-eastern Iran.

The U. S. is not very happy with the continuation and strengthening of Turkmenistan-Russia military co-operations even though this has largely happened within the CIS framework, although this fact may not be readily perceived given the American “understanding” of the short-term inevitability of Russia dependency within the CARs in this respect. The United States recognized Turkmenistan not along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991 but later still only in February 1992. But having established diplomatic relations with Turkmenistan relatively quickly the U.S. went on to open rapidly its diplomatic mission and embassy in its capital Ashgabat in 17 March. 1992.

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Turkmenistan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Turkmenistan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., Turkmenistan in the initial years still had one of the highest volumes of trade with the U.S. in the C.A. region thus, it is no surprise to find I. R. Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Russia but surprising again to find China figure as greater trade partners then, of Turkmenistan. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan’s exports to and imports from the U.S. has rapidly, if continually, grown since its independence. Still, unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties

¹²² United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Turkmenistan*, November 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2008), Accessed online on 16 Sept. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35884.htm>>.

there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, like in the security sector, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed. H.W. Bush's administration did not extend much in terms of aid to Turkmenistan. In 1993, U.S. Dept. of Defense, wanting to gain friendly access to a newly-freed region, used its National Guards SPP to lure Turkmenistan to participate in its program.

Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Turkmenistan and the vice-versa. During these visits they met top U.S. elites in-charge of State, Defense, Energy and the Commerce departments. The U.S. was delighted, when Turkmenistan joined NATO's PfP program, thereby displaying Turkmenistan's relative capacity for independent foreign policy action. Though Russia was very much uneasy about this, it drew some consolation, in the initial years at least, from the fact that this was not the NATO of old and that it no longer appears to be arranged against Russia and that it now is more poised to tackle out-of-area responsibilities. On Turkmenistan's part, it too not wanting to appear as moving too close to the West tried to balance such sentiments.

Though Turkmenistan has a policy of positive cooperation with all its neighbors and the great powers, since its independence, its relations with the United States has generally been lukewarm if also under neutrality. In this context, Western observers have noted Turkmenistan's cold-shouldering of even Russia on occasions. During the Clinton administrations, trade saw dips and spikes but continual growth with the United States. Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite rapidly, if also cautiously, U.S.- Turkmenistan relations, despite having periods of long trough, have continuously galloped along, nonetheless, with amity of sorts.

There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states, including, Turkmenistan tied too close to the Russian bosom.

U.S. aid to Turkmenistan was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. It zigzagged throughout and achieved a peak of sorts in 2007, the highest aid during his tenure in office. Perhaps this was due to U.S. happiness at the passing off of Suparmurat Niyazov in 2007 and to signal to Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow that a fresh start to U.S.-Turkmen relations is possible. To continue the Democratic Party's own past engagement with Turkmenistan, Barack Obama took up where Bush left. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, it is a surprise to see U.S. aid surging initially only to drop off thereafter.

Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with some concern as to what this may actually augur for the future, though Turkmenistan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S. for its role in permitting the "reverse transit" via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and which has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of "sustainment and total cargoes" exiting from Afghanistan.¹²³

Under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Turkmenistan's transition to democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Turkmenistan right from its independence. Turkmenistan had Peace Corps volunteers since 1993 engaged in various activities including in imparting business education, teaching English, public health, community development, developing

¹²³ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit., p.4.

environmental NGOs and youth development.¹²⁴ Very broadly, American aid in the Turkmen politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary.

Economically, Turkmenistan is key to the U.S. in the region because of its location and its natural resources, including energy ones. The post Soviet collapse's decline in demand was overcome with managed reforms and with the help of aid inflows and foreign investments. U.S. investment sources gradually began paying more interest to Turkmenistan as a destination for their investments especially after the conclusion of the OPIC agreement and bilateral investment treaty with it. First on the Turkmenistan investment scene were, of course, the U.S. energy corporations, since they already had an eye on Turkmenistan's hydrocarbon riches even from pre-independence times. Although Turkmenistan is not a large recipient of the United States' foreign direct investments, the U.S. is a FDI source for Turkmenistan.

The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and helps in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; given Turkmenistan's cautious embrace of market reforms, U.S. supports the transition to market economy in Turkmenistan and thereby work to integrate it into the world trade system fully.¹²⁵ In this regard, the U.S. supported Turkmenistan's possible accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In other social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the Kyrgyz government to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-

¹²⁴ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Turkmenistan*, op. cit.

¹²⁵ United States of America, USAID (US Agency for International Development), 'USAID Country Profile: Turkmenistan' (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <<http://www.info.usaid.gov/countries/>>.

resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection. Sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas, electricity and others too, remains a focus. The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector. In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Turkmen firms with relevant U.S. businesses.

With Russia's initial disinterest vividly in mind, it is, understandably, cautious too about Russia's continued reliability and viewing contrastingly, especially America's military-first approach in the greater Middle Eastern region with concern, it readily goes easy on further engagements. However, mindful of the difficulties of its strategic neighborhood and the potential instabilities arising from the current drawdowns and the looming post-2014 American exit from Afghanistan, Turkmenistan is particularly anxious to keep all its neighboring powers and the United States equitably and positively engaged with it and to be relevant and available in its developmental immediate futures.

Turkmenistan's armed forces participates not just in the American IMET, FMF and CT bilateral assistance programs but it also joins-in multi-laterally in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. The US Central Command conducts numerous bilateral events of military cooperation with the Turkmen Defense Ministry and its other agencies. These events range from mere information exchanges to full military exercises. Quantitatively, these events are rising in numbers continually over the years. American aid to Turkmenistan is not all confined to politico-legal, socio-economic and developmental sectors alone. An important policy area of developmental assistance is the Turkmen defense and security sector. In the realm of defense, almost from the beginning the U.S. has been involved in defense reform in Turkmenistan.

Turkmenistan has an active partnership with the Nevada National Guards. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Turkmenistan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields. Confidential sources say that a number of bases in Turkmenistan were considered for this purpose including that in Mary. The U.S. helps Turkmenistan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reforms including in creating an adequate Turkmen force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Turkmenistani military by providing the required training and equipment so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

When it comes specifically to security, the U.S. helps the Government of Turkmenistan to draft effective legislation and improve enforcement of existing laws by providing relevant training to customs and other enforcement officials to tackle all manner of trafficking in of narcotics, persons and WMDs. Turkmenistan has benefited from various security-related assistances too. In the area of security assistance again, the U.S. helps Turkmenistan by providing training and equipment to combat transnational threats such as WMD technology and materiel proliferation, increase border security, counter-terrorism co-operation especially after the advent of the so-called "war on terror", and to address other seemingly "lesser" security related threats such as money laundering, terrorism financing, illegal drugs and trafficking in persons illegally.

The U.S. supports the anti-terrorism Rapid reaction force (RRF). Despite the broad range of its defense and security cooperation with the U.S. and having an U.S. base on its territory Turkmenistan has off and on demanded the U.S., interestingly, via even the SCO to set a timetable to quit even its existing bases elsewhere in Central Asia. Simultaneously, however, in the context of the United States' impending so-called "exit" from Afghanistan,

Turkmenistan has earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN, an American-led logistics arrangement (as we saw earlier in Map 21), at uneconomically higher costs, that is intended to reduce supplies transiting Pakistan by relying more on the apparently more reliable routes and ports of northern Eurasia. Also, as strategic materials particularly oil including its equities, facilities¹²⁶ and discoveries expanded and became available for foreign participation (as we shall see in the next chapter) in Turkmenistan and its environs, the U.S., as pushed by its now well-entrenched oil lobby, began to appreciate even more the need to develop greater ties with Turkmenistan. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan continually built or upgraded gas pipelines to Iran (1998 and 2010), China (2006) and, of course, to Russia.

Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush's tenure grew exponentially, continually with significant rises recorded in 2000, 2001 and in 2004. While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's earlier tenure somewhat bled into Obama's own first term it thereafter somewhat tapered off as Obama approached his re-election year. As far as aid is concern, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance to, an otherwise increasingly prosperous and regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing Turkmenistan.

Since Turkmenistan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID has extended to it till 2012 is fully valued at about US \$ 175.63 million. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be very early in 1993 when Turkmenistan received U.S. \$ 57.28million.¹²⁷ Aid has drastically fallen since then, but generally follows a trend which first appeared in 1997. As per the records of the U.S.

¹²⁶ See Map 25, Table 6 and Appendix VIII.

¹²⁷ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 65.

Census Bureau, US bilateral trade in goods with Turkmenistan has grown continually.¹²⁸ The export value of goods from the US to Turkmenistan grew continually from 35.1 million US dollars in 1992, the first year of exports to be recorded, to US\$293.7 million in 2009. The upward growth trend dipped only in the years 1995, 1999, 2003 in between and 2010 beyond it.

Though the US is not among the top three of Turkmenistan's export markets it does figure as the fourth leading import market of Turkmenistan after Turkey, Russia and Germany. The import value of goods to the US from Turkmenistan also grew continually from about US\$ 1.9 million in the first full year of trade in 1993 to some 90 million dollars in 2012. When one looks at Turkmenistan's trade partners, Turkey and Russia figure as Turkmenistan's leading trade partner overall. The United States and its proxies Turkey and Germany also figure as key import partners of Turkmenistan. Without using the strict and comprehensive, if not also cumbersome, classification of trade products employed by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), one can generally say that trade between western countries, including the United States, and Turkmenistan are dominated by oil, gas machinery, cotton, chemicals and foodstuffs. United States' FDI was fourth in Turkmenistan among the C.A. states according to the U.S. State Department's website.¹²⁹

Given that oil and gas¹³⁰ is Turkmenistan's leading economic sector, the U.S. has appropriately made its heaviest investments in that sector, as can be seen clearly in the next chapter. Having been kept out of most Central Asian territories during Soviet times, American energy corporations seized the opening to the regions resources offered by their imminent independence. The U.S. administration of the day long plagued by the need to

¹²⁸ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with Turkmenistan,' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.

¹²⁹ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Turkmenistan*, op. cit.

¹³⁰ Jim Nichol, *Turkmenistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests*, CRS Report for Congress (97-1055), 17 August 2012, (Washington, D.C.: LOC; CRS, 2012), p. 7.

diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby need not be invited to bandwagon.¹³¹ Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over C.A.'s extractive sector and petroleum resources, in particular, appear to move towards a rapid end. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Turkmenistan's oil reserves as 1.9 billion barrels of proven reserves. Turkmenistan's oil reserves have continued to grow gradually as relatively positive exploration result seeps in, if only in fits.

Strategically, the U.S. is, of course, in Turkmenistan as much to diversify its energy sources (as we shall see in the later chapter) as it is to prevent Turkmenistan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as "Islamic radicalism," both of which are, by the way, key U.S. national security priorities. In this and other contexts too, Turkmenistan has turned to the U.S. for military supplies to protect its energy and other assets not just in the Caspian.

Uzbekistan – U. S. Relations

If one excludes Afghanistan, then Uzbekistan easily has the largest population¹³² in the entire C.A. region. In addition significant numbers of Uzbeks live in all the neighboring C.A. states. Being at the very heart of the C.A. region and bordering most C.A. states, including Afghanistan, Uzbekistan occupies an important geo-strategic location in the region for the U.S. As may be seen in Map 23, the Aral Sea and what passes for it punctuates Kazakhstan's long embrace of Uzbekistan, at its north and north-west. Kyrgyzstan too does so, somewhat similarly but at a lower scale, at Uzbekistan's north and north-east. Tajikistan lies, sophisticatedly, at the east of Uzbekistan, sticking out an *avant-*

¹³¹ In fact with Henry Kissinger, representing the oil lobby, present, President Saparmurad Niyazov signed an agreement with Unocal in N.Y. on 21 October 1995, see Kleveman, *The New Great Game*:... op. cit., p.160.

¹³² See Table 1.

guard limb into the trifurcated Farghona Valley. A stump of Uzbekistan stands on the top of Afghanistan, to the south, while also lying south-westerly on Turkmenistan.



Map 23 - Uzbekistan (Physical-Relief)

Source: Adopted from *DK World Desk Reference*, 3rd edn., previously published as the *World Reference Atlas* (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2002), p. 610.

Uzbekistan's natural resource endowments include cotton, gold,¹³³ uranium, oil and gas. Uzbekistan boasts the biggest armed forces in the C.A. region and has since its independence been quite willing to deploy them even beyond its own borders. Significantly for the U.S., Uzbekistan has not been shy to assert its independence from Russia and has been pro-active in courting U.S. security ties. Uzbekistan has the second biggest GDP in the C.A. region which is also relatively more diversified. The United States recognized Uzbekistan along with the rest of the CIS on Christmas Day, 25th December 1991. Having established diplomatic relations with Uzbekistan relatively quickly the U.S. went on to open its diplomatic mission and embassy in its capital Tashkent in 16 March 1992. Its first resident representative there was *Charge d'Affaires ad interim* Michael Mozur preparing the way for the arrival of the first U.S. ambassador to Uzbekistan Mr. Henry Lee Clarke.¹³⁴

¹³³ See Table 8.

¹³⁴ See Appendix III, p. 460.

Trade relations began to take shape and U.S. exports to and imports from Uzbekistan gradually rose but only continually so. Not having common border has its impact on trade relations between Uzbekistan and the U.S. Having rather limited economically-sensible outlets to the world market including to those of the U.S., despite this Uzbekistan in the initial years had rather high volume of trade, compared to the rest in the C.A. region, with the U.S. thus, it is no surprise to find Russia and China figure as greater trade partners than, of Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan's exports to and imports from the U.S. has rapidly, if continually, grown since its independence. Unsurprisingly, in the initial year of ties there was not much of a trade figure to show for, though, like in the security sector, important agreements on trade, investment protection and avoidance of double taxation were signed in 1994.¹³⁵ Delegations of key members of the U.S. legislative branch have visited their counterparts in Uzbekistan and the vice-versa.

During the Clinton administrations, trade saw steady but continual growth but dipping in 1995. Though Uzbekistan has a policy of positive cooperation with all its neighbors and the great powers, since its independence, its relations with the United States has generally been quite amicable but interspersed with brief periods of lukewarmity and actually hostility. In this context, Western observers have noted Uzbekistan's cold-shouldering clearly of even Russia on many occasions. Having cleared all the initial diplomatic formalities and early treaty and relational milestones, quite rapidly, if also cautiously, U.S. - Uzbekistan relations, despite having brief plunges, have continuously moved along with amity of sorts. There was nothing surprising in this in the sense that the U.S., despite working cooperatively with Russia in the region, has always been quite

¹³⁵United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Uzbekistan*, December 2008 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, 2008), Accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm>>.

uneasy with all schemes aimed at keeping the C.A. states, including, Uzbekistan tied close to the Russian bosom, despite their frequent tensions.

U.S. aid to Uzbekistan was already rising even before G.W. Bush took over the White House. In 2002 Karimov visited the U.S. to sign a strategic partnership with it. Aid rose exponentially in 2002 as Bush entered his first term mid-election year, which is also the highest aid during not just his tenure in office, but also till the end of our study period. Perhaps sensing the need for effective multi-polarity, balance and regional security in the world of GWOT, Uzbekistan anticipatively joined the R.A.T.S. in 2004. In 2005 Uzbekistan signed a military agreement with Russia. Thus, when the Andijan tragedy of 2005 followed, Uzbekistan could easily identify with China, I. R. Iran and even Russia on the need to tackle extremism, terrorism and separatism, what the Chinese self-servingly call the three evils, from unsettling the C.A. region. But not entirely comfortable with the outer regional powers it again sought to balance them in 2008 by allowing the U.S. limited use of Termez.

Barack Obama took up where Bush left. But coming into office on a largely domestic-change agenda, it is a surprise to see U.S. aid surging initially but then rapidly sliding. Barack Obama's keenness to drawdown from Afghanistan is viewed with some concern as to what this may actually augur for the future, though Uzbekistan, in the meanwhile, rakes in more than U.S. \$125 million per annum officially just from the U.S. for its role in permitting the "reverse transit" via NDN (a logistics arrangement originally begun in Jan. 2009 and which has also now been operating in reversal mode since 2012) of "sustainment and total cargoes" exiting from Afghanistan.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Mankoff, *The United States and Central*, op. cit., p.4.

Under the FSA the U.S. was committed to aiding Uzbekistan's transition to more democracy and to its reconfiguration as an open market economy. In fact the US has assisted Uzbekistan right from its independence. Uzbekistan had Peace Corps volunteers engaged since 1992 in various activities including in imparting business education, teaching English, public health, HIV/AIDS prevention,¹³⁷ community development, developing environmental NGOs and youth development. Very broadly, American aid in the Uzbek politico-legal sector includes encouragement of democratic political development and imparting of political skills, promoting the public role of civil society and the mass media; and improving the functioning and independence of the judiciary.

In social and environmental sectors, the U.S. via the Global Health Initiative (GHI) supports and help the Uzbek government to provide effective social services including by combating HIV/AIDS, addressing multiple-drug-resistant TB and offering help in basic health care and environmental protection. Sustainable development of natural resources, including oil, gas, water, electricity and others too, remains a focus. The U.S. commercial service runs business internships, it also offers various business services and exchanges across all economic sectors, including in the energy sector. In addition it runs also matchmaker programs that link Uzbek firms with relevant U.S. businesses. The U.S. has been running USAID assistance and activities in support of privatization, private entrepreneurs and help in adopting commercial and regulatory laws; given Uzbekistan's very cautious embrace of market reforms, U.S. supports the transition to market economy in

¹³⁷ United States of America, DOS-FOIA, *Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Uzbekistan*, 20 January 2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State (DOS); Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 2009), Accessed online on 31 Aug. 2009 at <<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/103648.htm>>.

Uzbekistan and thereby work to integrate it into the regional and world trade system fully.¹³⁸

With Russia's initial hostility vividly in mind, it is, understandably, cautious too about Russia's continued reliability and viewing contrastingly, especially America's military-first approach in the greater Middle Eastern region with concern, it is cautious with its U.S. engagements despite the welcome. However, mindful of the potential instabilities arising from the current drawdowns and the looming post-2014 American exit from Afghanistan, Uzbekistan is particularly anxious to keep all its neighboring powers and the United States equitably and positively engaged with it and to be relevant and available in its developmental immediate futures.

Uzbekistan has an active partnership with the Mississippi National Guards. Particularly, but not exclusively, after the terroristic attacks of September 11, 2001 Uzbekistan had offered the U.S., intelligence sharing, opening air corridors and even allowed the use of its airfields. Most public sources say that a number of bases, including Termez, K2¹³⁹ and Navoi in Uzbekistan, were considered for this purpose too. The U.S. helps Uzbekistan's Defense Ministry in areas of military reforms including in creating an adequate Uzbek force structure. The U.S. helps increase the professionalism of the Uzbekistani military by providing the required training and equipment so that they can better protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Uzbekistan has reasonably good level of bilateral military and technical cooperation with the U.S. amongst CIS states. Russia's legitimate concern on NATO affairs involving

¹³⁸ United States of America, USAID (US Agency for International Development), 'USAID Country Profile: Uzbekistan' (Washington, D.C.: US Agency for International Development, 1997), accessed online on 18 Aug. 2008 at <<http://www.info.usaid.gov/countries/uz>>.

¹³⁹ Traditionally, in that part of the world K2 used to refer to Mt. Godwin Austin at the Baltistan (Kashmir)-Xinjiang boundary but with the collapse of the Soviet Union the twin towns of Karshi-Khanabad in southern Uzbekistan also came to be popularly known as K2. In fact the U.S. leased the Khanabad Air Base there for about U.S. \$100 million annually.

the FSU has been moderated to an extent through the creation of the NATO-Russia Council which allows Russia some inter-face ability without giving it veto power over any NATO moves. It is under this background of lukewarm but tacit approval that NATO, with strong U.S. backing, helps restructure even the Uzbek military, as hinted to earlier.

U.S. Central Command organized various cooperative security-related events in Uzbekistan and elsewhere. It also co-operates bilaterally and participates in bilateral military exercises. In direct military to military cooperation, Uzbekistan participates in the American IMET and FMF programs. Uzbek military officers attend the George C. Marshall Centre programs. Security assistance includes English-language and military professionalism training via IMET program.

Despite wanting to distance Uzbekistan from the Russian embrace, the U.S. supports the anti-terrorism Rapid reaction force (RRF). Despite the broad range of its defense and security cooperation with the U.S. and having U.S. access facilities on its territory Uzbekistan has off and on demanded the U.S., interestingly, via even the SCO to set a timetable to quit even its existing bases elsewhere in Central Asia. Simultaneously, however, in the context of the United States' impending so-called "exit" from Afghanistan, Uzbekistan has earnestly extended its co-operation and support to the NDN, an American-led logistics arrangement (as we saw earlier in Map 21), at uneconomically higher costs, that is intended to reduce supplies transiting Pakistan by relying more on the apparently more reliable routes and ports of northern Eurasia.

Nevertheless, at independence, unlike with the other Central Asian states, and despite the initial euphoria, the U.S. welcome of Uzbekistan was somewhat restrained, given Uzbekistan's overly cautious embrace of various Western prescribed reforms.

Remarkably, bilateral trade during G.W. Bush's tenure grew exponentially, continually with significant rises recorded in 2003 and in 2008. While the trade growth achieved in G.W. Bush's later tenure somewhat slid into Obama's own first term, trade values maintained its high levels. As far as aid is concerned, Obama's first administration, in keeping with its predominantly domestic priorities oversaw a gradual decline in U.S. assistance, after an initial surge to, an otherwise increasingly prosperous and regionally, if not also nationally, stabilizing Uzbekistan.

Since Uzbekistan's independence the total U.S. government aid, in grant form mostly, including those that the USAID has extended to it till 2012 is fully valued at more than US \$ 1 billion. The peak year for aid thus far appears to be 2002 when Uzbekistan received U.S. \$ 220.28 million.¹⁴⁰ Aid has drastically fallen since then, continually. As per the records of the U.S. Census Bureau, US bilateral trade in goods with Uzbekistan has grown continually too, with it mainly dipping in 2006 before zigzagging up again towards 2012.¹⁴¹ The export value of goods from the US to Uzbekistan grew continually from 50.7 million US dollars in 1992, the first figures of exports to be recorded, to US\$284.6 million in 2012. The upward growth trend dipped mainly in the years 1995, 1998, 2005 and 2009 in between.

Though the US is not among the top three of Uzbekistan's export markets it does figure as the fourth leading import market of Uzbekistan after Russia, South Korea and Germany. When one looks at Uzbekistan's trade partners, Russia still figures as Uzbekistan's leading trade partner overall. The E.U. and South Korea follow Russia in this respect. The United States and its proxies Turkey, U.K., Germany and especially S. Korea

¹⁴⁰ Nichol, *Central Asia: Regional*, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁴¹ United States of America, FTD (Foreign Trade Division), 'Trade in Goods with Uzbekistan,' (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2014), accessed online on 3 February 2014 at <<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance>>.

also figure as key import partners of Uzbekistan. Without using the strict and comprehensive, if not also cumbersome, classification of trade products employed by the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), one can generally say that trade between western countries, including the United States, and Uzbekistan are dominated by cotton, gas, ferrous & non-ferrous metals, machinery, minerals and chemicals.

United States' FDI in Uzbekistan was only next to its FDI in Azerbaijan. Having been kept out of most Central Asian territories during Soviet times, American energy corporations seized the opening to the regions resources offered by their imminent independence. The U.S. administration of the day long plagued by the need to diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby need not be invited to bandwagon. Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over C.A.'s extractive sector and petroleum resources, in particular, came to a rapid end. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Uzbekistan's oil reserves as 0.1 billion tones of proven reserves. Uzbekistan's oil reserves have continued to grow gradually, if only in fits.

Strategically, the U.S. is, of course, in Uzbekistan as much to diversify its energy¹⁴² sources (as we shall see in the later chapter) as it is to prevent Uzbekistan from becoming a U.S. hostile safe-haven, for what it erroneously and maliciously labels as "Islamic radicalism," both of which are, by the way, key U.S. national security priorities. Similarly too, the US under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program spent millions in assisting Uzbekistan eliminate WMD and their related infrastructure.

¹⁴² 'Uzbekistan seeking foreign partners for E&P projects,' 5 Aug. 1996, *Oil and Gas Journal* 94.32, pp. 16-20; Jim Nichol, *Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and US Interests*, 21 August 2013, CRS Report (RS21238), (Washington, D.C.: LOC; CRS, 2013), p.10, accessed via <http://www.ndu.edu/library/docs/crs/crs_rs21238_02may05.pdf>.

Conclusion

Eyeing the Soviet Union, its rampant anterior, including the affairs of Soviet Central Asia if not also the rest of inner asia was a favorite American Cold War pastime. Yet the independent CARs in the AKTU sub-group of C.A. received at best a lukewarm reception from the United States in comparison to the NIS of the Baltic, Caucasia and even SCA's step-mother Russia itself upon their independences. Despite the paradoxically euphoric slow start, over the past more than two decades U.S. – Central Asian relations, with some exception, show a gradual upward trend tri-lineally in strategic, economic and political terms, exactly in that order of relational strength. Remarkably, even the tragic September 11th episode had a generally positive impact on the region and these relations too.

As strategic materials particularly oil including its equities, facilities and discoveries expand and became available for foreign participation (as we shall better see in chapter 5 too) in the CARs and their environs, the U.S., as pushed by its well-entrenched oil lobby, began to appreciate even more the need to develop greater ties with the Central Asian region.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, a number of issues did and do bug the evolving relations between these parties. These included the U.S. occupation of Iraq, uncertainty about American's real agenda for the Af-Pak hyphenation,¹⁴⁴ American lukewarmity towards the Muslim Central Asian (MCA) region generally and America's attitude towards Islam and Muslims and particularly so the Western bracketing of terrorism¹⁴⁵ with Muslims.¹⁴⁶

Over the recent decades and varyingly through its various administrations in the study period covered, the U.S. has broadly kept to its strategic objectives in the region. As

¹⁴³ Legvold, 'U.S. Policy Toward, *op. cit.*, pp.1-2.

¹⁴⁴ Bob Woodward, *Obama's Wars* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010); see also Barnett R. Rubin and Abubakar Siddique, *Resolving the Pakistan - Afghanistan Stalemate* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP), 2006).

¹⁴⁵ While in the West people may confuse terms such as terrorism, extremism, separatism, radicalism and fundamentalism, and at times irresponsibly use them loosely or interchangeably, in the Central Asian region, remarkably, their leaders are quite well-versed and do have a rather nuanced understanding of these distinct terms and the positive or negative implications they, to varying degrees, carry.

¹⁴⁶ Nursultan Nazarbayev, *The Critical Decade* (London: First Books, 2003), p. 29.

the lone superpower desperately clutching to its fleeting unipolar moment,¹⁴⁷ it has used the same to pursue its security, economic, political, and strategic interests, as elsewhere, in C.A. too. Similarly, the CARs in keeping with the foreign policy dictums of their elites have pursued the same by seeking to meet their various economic, security, political and developmental needs through their relations with the U.S. They both are trying to compensate somewhat for the diminishing opportunities and rising challenges in their traditional domains by gradually seizing the new and rising opportunities in different sectors, presented by each to the U.S. and vice versa. The CARs, in general, see in the U.S., a hedge against a potentially imperialist, reverting Russia and, the U.S., in turn, sees the CARs as its key Eurasian foreground to transplant, if haltingly, sustainable freedoms in and around Eurasia. In pursuing their strategic intercourse, the CARs seek to refrain from relapsing into international isolation and the U.S., in turn, seeks thereby, to refrain from courting Eurasian irrelevance.

On the political front, while Central Asian presidential election records thus far may not all measure up to European standards, the U.S. is right to acknowledge the democratic improvements, however haltingly, taking place over successive elections, including the legislative ones, in most of the CAS. However, outside observers too are right in feeling that American's energy interests do override its apparent democratic concerns in energy-rich Central Asia and that there is much more to be desired in this regard.¹⁴⁸

Given that the U.S. seeks energy security through energy diversification, as we may see better in the next chapter too, its strategic reach and deep involvement in the C.A. energy scene is totally understandable. Besides turning in tidy profits, especially for the

¹⁴⁷In this it is following Nixon's prescriptions upto a point, see Richard M. Nixon, *Seize the Moment: America's Challenge in a One-Superpower World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).

¹⁴⁸Kessler, 'Oil Wealth Colors,' *loc. cit.*; Yazdani, 'U.S. Democracy Promotion,' *op. cit.*

U.S. private sector, perhaps even indirectly via the various investment and tax offshore havens, these involvements help some of the CARs reduce their total dependence on Russia for their oil trade and thereby provide them with viable alternatives and also boosts their politico-economic leverage vis a vis Russia and its ilk. However, the U.S. can better serve these objectives if it also enables the CARs to export their hydrocarbons also via I. R. Iran to the world markets. Doing so may also encourage Iran to tread a less hostile nuclear path and work with the U.S. towards positive regional developments. Furthermore, it is also easier, in this regard, for the U.S. to prevail on Russia to withhold nuclear technology from states with questionable intentions, especially given their mutual allergy for, if nothing else, “Islamic” extremism. The energetic (pun intended) involvements and technical assistances the U.S. gives in the various sectors should similarly also advance reforms that would prevent the recurrence of any major type of violence, across the region.

Speaking of the occurrence of violence and the consequent sense of insecurity in parts of C.A., one can easily appreciate America’s increasing involvement in most of the CARs’ defense and security spheres. Their altruistic involvement in the denuclearization issue has been appreciated even in Kazakhstan, unlike in Ukraine where some bitterly view their case as tripartite nailing. Anyway, the U.S. is also involved in Central Asian force restructuring and is also providing security related assistances as we have noted earlier. Some words of caution need to be added in these regards. As the U.S. seeks to drawdown from Afghanistan also via the FSU including MCA, it should be careful that the consequent financial windfalls, not to mention the deadly defense items, it leaves behind *enroute* and the lethal trainings it imparts to the various C.A. Special Forces are never abused and expanded upon innocent Central Asians who may only be attempting to recover the basic socio-economic privileges that they have lost through the Soviet retreat or collapse and

similarly ensuring that the religio-cultural rights that they have regained, mostly thereby only recently, are not beastly or otherwise trampled upon therewith.

In a regional context, it was Uzbekistan that enjoyed primacy of American attention during these periods and preeminently so in the years following Sept. 11, 2001.¹⁴⁹ Despite Kazakhstan having more real estate and greater economic dynamics, it is Uzbekistan that boasts of a higher population in the region; it is again Uzbekistan that has *centrality* within a reconfiguring Central Asia, i.e. it borders most of the countries constituting the region, as here defined, and Uzbeks are found in significant numbers across most of the region; and it is Uzbekistan yet again that, by virtue of its centrality and its logistical connectivity, was more relevant in America's earlier campaigns and subsequent on-going missions in an instability-ridden Afghanistan.

In this context, while Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in our AKTU subgroup are doubtless of greater strategic importance, it is clear Uzbekistan, obviously, has a higher immediate strategic value to the U.S. and is the key to stitch the region together as a coherent whole for ensuring future regional development, which in themselves are critical U.S. objectives.¹⁵⁰ Meanwhile, generally, multi-track dialog must be strengthened and regionally-minded, multi-faceted intercourses and exchanges at every level must be further deepened. Whether the U.S. did this in Central Asia in its global pursuit of strategic materials, particularly energy ones in the context of cooperation and competition with Russia is what we will examine in the next chapter.

¹⁴⁹ Legvold, 'U.S. Policy Toward,' *op. cit.*, p. 1.

¹⁵⁰ 'Hanging separately,' *Economist* (Special Report), 26 July 2003, accessed online on 3 Feb. 2014 at <<http://www.economist.com/node/1921970>>.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Importance of Strategic Materials, Especially the Critical Primacy of Energy Resources and the Expanding U.S.-Russian Competition in Central Asia and its Environs.

Introduction

Though attention on Central Asia (and its immediate environs) was historically due to its strategic position, nestled as it has been from time immemorial at the cross-roads of ancient cultural and expansionary powers like China, India, Persia, Byzantium and Russia; in fact it is this very region that enjoys the enviable fame for having hosted and preserved, albeit without much fanfare, the various historically fabulous civilizationally-enriching Silk routes linking these mutually-cautious, if not also suspicious, nations with one another and all of them, variously, with the rest of Europe, Asia and beyond with Africa too. Contemporary history, however, is witnessing the broader area, and this region in particular, becoming a focus once again, only this time, additionally, for its geo-political uncertainties, strategic attributes and potentials and, more temptingly, its ample natural resource endowments,¹ specifically now, for its rich hydrocarbon reserves, for starters, that is!

The modern industrialization-driven-world has on the basis of its varied materialistic needs identified, categorized and determined certain critical materials as strategic. The possession of these strategic materials, particularly petroleum, has increasingly made these possessor states within the region appear attractive in the world and the rapid lucrative exploitation of the same, it is widely believed, would expedite their

¹ As far as natural resources of the region go, these are not strictly a modern focus in the world. In fact, Egypt and India are known to have received lapis lazuli (an azure semi-precious stone that is essentially a mineral of sodium aluminum silicate and sulfur) mined in Afghanistan from even before 3000BCE.

economic, political and developmental growth, and, there through, secure the greater involvement and participation of these Central Asian states in the larger regional as well as world affairs including in the dynamics of the global economy.

Of the various strategic materials (a selective brief survey of which is available both in Tables 5 and 7 within this chapter and a slightly expanded coverage of the non-energy significant ones can also be found at Appendix X) found in the vast and rich Central Asian region, those that have the potential to provide energy such as natural gas, uranium and especially oil, etc have always commanded the overwhelming attention of area specialists and other scholars for some decades now. This should not be surprising given, firstly, the indispensability of energy sources like oil, uranium and, increasingly alternate sources like, natural gas for the continued all-round progress and sustained well-being of the developed First World, and increasingly, the developing and under-developed, erstwhile, Third World.

Secondly, the presence of those strategic materials and, in particular, these energy sources has, upon the achievement of independence of the core regional states, turned Central Asia into the cynosure of the resource-hungry-world not least in the enterprising eyes of the United States and also, the now, resurgence-minded-Russia. Incidentally, as vouched for by multi-national projects like the twenty billion dollars Tengizchevroil Consortium, it is surmised by perspicacious observers, that it were Russian energy entities and American oil companies,² working in cooperative competition since at least 1988, if not earlier, who served as supervising gynecologists, if not also as the actual mid-wives, who delivered the Central Asian states into independence.³ Thirdly, being energy and resource

² Narsi Ghorban, "The Role of the Multi National Oil Companies in the Development of Oil and Gas Resources in Central Asia and the Caucasus," *Iranian Journal of International Affairs* 5 (Spring 1993): 1-15; Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies & The World They Shaped* (New York: Viking/Coronet, 1975).

³ 'Pipeline politics,' *BulletinWire*, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 4 December 1999, accessed online on 3 Feb. 2002 at <<http://www.bullatomsci.org/bulletinwirearchive/BulletinWire991204.html>>. See also Richard Longworth, "Boomtown Baku," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* May/June 1998, accessed online on 3 Feb. 2002 at <<http://www.bullatomsci.org>>.

rich, the newly-freed states naturally aspire to integrate with, and benefit from, the global free-market economy and, thereby, hopefully, develop the desire to play their long-denied but clearly destined constructive role in world affairs.

In this fifth chapter, I would basically attempt to test the assumption laid-out in hypothesis three; viz.: the more the importance of Central Asian strategic resources, particularly energy ones, are to the Russians and the rest of the world, the greater would be the urge for the developed world, and, hence, principally, to, the U.S. to want to establish, sustain and expand its influence in that region and its environs. Moreover, the political, economic and strategic significance of petroleum in U.S.-Russian competition and the possibility of oil to serve as a bountiful politico-economic catalyst and instrument of the nascent Central Asian states would similarly be explored herein.

In every attempt to satisfy man's needs for goods and services energy is always utilized, especially in the civilizing modern ages. Some form of energy is always present behind every modern activity. As world population grows the need for adequate goods and services too multiply. The world had 2.7 billion people in 1955 but by 2012 the world population has swelled to around the 7 billion mark. Consequently, economic activities have increased throughout the globe in the process of catering to their expanding needs, progressively requiring greater and greater inputs of energy to wholesomely sustain this rapid growth.

Lack of energy will impact, adversely, on any nation's social progress, infrastructural development and economic growth. Both developed and developing nations cannot attain their various and multi-faceted developmental and economic goals without adequate and sustained supplies of energy. In the developed world both Russia and the

United States are, as expected, the pre-eminent producers and consumers of energy. China, as an emergent power, of course, follows closely behind leading the rapidly growing developing world, as the world's third largest producer and second largest consumer of primary energy.⁴

Russia (so too was the ex-Soviet Union) is currently one of the two major powers that remain comfortably self-sufficient in their domestic energy supply. With the passage of time, Russia has been adding more and more fresh supplies to its energy pool. While this situation is also true with the other major powers, it is only Russia and the U.K. that continue to produce energy surpluses while in the rest consumption exceeds by far their production of energy. The U.S., France, Japan and Germany are all highly energy-deficient economic and/or military powers. So too are the, cumulatively, over two billion-sized-markets and emergent economies of China and India.

However, when the growing needs of their energy-dependant allies and clients are factored-in, then virtually all the major powers are or become energy-dependant to varying degrees. With important energy-dependant allies like Japan, Germany, France, South Korea, the Philippines, Cuba, Vietnam, Austria, Greece, Ukraine and Taiwan and significant energy-dependant clients like India, China, Brazil, Italy, Spain, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Turkey and Argentina besides many lesser others out there, scanning world-wide for energy supplies, the stakes for both energy giants Russia and the United States are certainly astronomical.

Petroleum, which is synonymously known and interchangeably also referred to often as gasoline or crude oil or simply as oil, has gradually, for its remarkable

⁴ According to the U.S. Department of Energy the U.S. leads the world in both the production and consumption of primary energy. Russia follows as the second largest producer and third largest consumer of primary energy in the world, measured in quadrillion BTUs.

materialistic, logistical and technical versatility, become the most preferred form of energy in the contemporary world. Oil has been native to the Central Asian and Mesopotamian regions since pre-historic times. The ancient peoples of Azerbaijan and Persia specifically the fire-worshipping Zoroastrians amongst them have been known to be its earliest users. More significantly, in the early modern period the famous Nobel brothers made their fortune by trading in Baku oil. Kazakhstan, a key country in the region, has had an oil industry for about 100 odd years now. In short, this region knew big-time-oil long before even Iraq and Saudi Arabia discovered their own and began commercial production some time in 1912 and 1938 with Western, particularly, American technology and expertise. Though, thereafter American companies got more focused on Iranian and Saudi Arabian sectors, perhaps as a result of securing handsome equities or concessions therein. Gulf and, particularly, Central Asian oil, meanwhile, fell away to the enterprising attention of British, Russian and other European companies.

Subsequently, however, Western and Eastern prospectors, both companies and governments, over the years, have discovered oil and, I should add, gas fields across the whole Central Asian region. In more recent years the general situation has changed. Particularly, about and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, American energy companies have begun to take an increasing interest in the energy resources of the Central Asian region particularly in those of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. According to some, even before the Soviet collapse the Americans have been dealing with the Russians in “early oil” from the region. In fact, one observer pointed out that, some American specialists sojourning in the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s were also moonlighting therein informally on “oil missions”.

Though the C.A. region has been an important strategic crossroad of great civilizations from time immemorial, in the early modern period, it is the discovery and presence of oil that drew the keen interests of great powers like Great Britain, Germany and Russia to this region. In our own times this is also the case with the Europeans in general, Japan and the Americans too. The CARs, of course, have long been aware of the strategic resources they possess beneath their feet and have witnessed how the Soviet Union (read, Russia) has long benefited from their exploration and exploitation. This is particularly so in the case of energy resources. The extensive energy pipeline and other transportation networks feeding Russia from the region is a concrete testimony to this fact. With the coming of independence, the CARs and the region in general are in a position for the first time to benefit directly from developing and dealing in their ample strategic and energy resources whereas in the past this could happen only indirectly under the cumbersome framework (and centralized control) of the Soviet Union.

The CARs and the region then had no importance of their own other than as exploitable backyards of Russian Eurasia and were basically a marginalized buffer triangle between the rest of the Soviet Union and the capitalism-oriented Northern Tier and Maoist China. When it is oil, great power interest and competition is inevitable, given its strategic value. Thus, even as early as 1943, when the U.S. was still considered to be self-sufficient in oil, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, considering the importance of oil to national security, went so far as to advocate that the U.S. government should take direct control of Saudi oil fields and not just leave it to American companies to compete with British oil companies.⁵

⁵ Lawrence P. Frank, "The First Oil Regime," *World Politics* July 1985, p. 591.

Before World War II oil was generally sought for purely commercial/industrial purposes but thereafter this changed when it increasingly began to figure in international politics.⁶ This new phenomenon started in the early 1950s. A typical example would be when at the instigation of the British, the Americans opportunistically set in motion, citing possible Soviet occupation of Iran as a justification for intervention, a covert operation that ousted Mohammed Mossadegh, the Iranian Prime Minister, when he authorized the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).⁷ The reward then was a 40% stake for U.S. companies in the new oil consortium cobbled-up in its aftermath.⁸ In mid-1970s, secretary of state, the incorrigible Henry Kissinger, advocated seizing the oil fields of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi even using U.S. airborne forces.⁹

Similarly, in the late 1970s, again in Iran, this time ostensibly, on a hostage rescue mission, they went prepared to overthrow the Islamic revolution there which had disrupted their oil supply. With the mission ending in disaster, all they had to show for their covert strategic move this time was colossal humiliation. On both these occasions they were attempting to reinstate the Shah of Iran with a view to securing oil resources. The first was successful but the second has remained, so far, a failure. Later, the U.S. invaded Iraq, ostensibly, to rid it off weapons of mass destruction and to flush out perceived terror cells there, but ended up imposing a regime change that the U.S. fervently hope would allow America unhindered access to Iraqi oil and other resources.

⁶ Paul Jabber et al. [Gary Sick, Hisahiko Okazaki and Dominique Moisi], *Great Power Interests in the Persian Gulf* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989), p. 25.


⁷ Yeadon and Hawkins, *The Nazi Hydra...*, op. cit., p. 573.

⁸ Jabber et al., *Great Power Interests...*, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

⁹ Kevin Philips, *American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil, and Borrowed Money in the 21st Century* (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 40. In this regard, see also the official CRS report: United States of America, *Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study*, a Report to the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), Aug. 1975).

American behavior so far in the Central Asian region suggests that in addition to continually seeking to wean away the CARs from total dependence on Russia, acting to contain the resurgence of Russian influence and attempting to obstruct the rapidly spreading Iranian and Chinese interests, it has continuously been oil or energy-focused in its Central Asian policy. Disregarding any other earlier interests from one Bush administration to the other Bush administration and even beyond oil and energy resources and unhindered access to it remains the principal strategic objective of the United States (as attested to in Appendix VII - U.S. Imports of Crude Oil). This judgment is determined from the persistent fact that energy resources from any source have been vital to the sustained survival and growth of all industrialized and industrializing allies of both the U.S. and Russia.

Even in these post-Cold War times, both the U.S. and Russia continually consider each other as an imaginary or actual “threat” in the Central Asian region if not also elsewhere. Whether the ex-Soviet Union, now once again in the truncated form of Russia as it was in Tsarist or pre-Soviet times, still sought access to warm waters or not it did perceive the U.S. as a continuing threat to the central asian region that partly formed its soft underbelly when it invaded Afghanistan on Christmas day in 1979 paradoxically even as the U.S. influence was collapsing in Iran. After a brief interlude of visualizing the U.S. as a possible “strategic partner” in the region it again began to perceive the growing U.S. activity and influence, in its “Near Abroad” particularly in Central Asia, as a “threat” to be watched. Significantly, this tendency is particularly acute in its powerful nationalist, intelligence and military circles.



Key

- The Area of responsibility (AOR) of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).²
- The eight nation South and Central Asian sub-region of the USCENTCOM (shown here excluding Iran and Pakistan).³
- Declared Strategic Nuclear powers.
- Nuclear power/weapons aspirants.
- Either de facto Nuclear weapons states or states deemed to maintain a degree of Nuclear ambiguity.⁴
- U.S. communications and logistics support base that hosts an amphibious ready group/marine expeditionary force and that is a service station for visiting carrier battle groups.
- Joint Russian-Kazakh strategic facilities.
- Major Russian bases beyond the Russian Federation.⁵
- U.S. forward facilities/bases around the larger M.E. region.
- Russian forward facilities / bases around the larger region.
- Major general directions of present and future fuel out flows.
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members.
- Major non-OPEC oil exporters.
- Potential non-OPEC oil exporters.
- Some present and future out-of-ex-Soviet-space-oil-export-terminals marked as follows:

- A - Gwadar, Pakistan
- B - Jask, Iran
- C - Bandar Abbas, Iran
- D - Fujairah, U.A.E.
- E - Bandar Khomeini, Iran
- F - Muscat, Oman
- G - Yanbu, S. Arabia
- H - Dortyol, Turkey
- I - Aqaba, Jordan

Map 24 – The Central Asian States' Geo-strategic and Politico-economic Milieu and the U.S. Security Presence Thereabout ¹

- Note: ¹ There are an estimated 15,000 active duty U.S. military personnel present in the parts of the world shown here, including about a hundred or so within the former Soviet republics (FSU) and about 4,000 afloat in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.
- ² The AOR of USCENTCOM covers about 25 countries from Kazakhstan to Kenya and Egypt to Pakistan.
- ³ Note that Azerbaijan is not a part of USCENTCOM but being treated as an European country it falls within the AOR of the United States European Command (USEUCOM)
- ⁴ Though, Kazakhstan is nuclear-free for now, it may respond to any changes in Ukraine's nuclear policy.
- ⁵ Most Central Asian states have Russian troops in the few token thousands, except Tajikistan which has about 20,000 of them; in Turkmenistan, however, the Russians are part of state forces held under joint command.

Sources: Composed by the researcher mainly from the: U.S. Dept. of Defense, 1997; The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2000; Colin L., Powell, 1991. Base Force Concept. Testimony before the U.S. - House of Representatives, p. 17; OPEC, 2001; and IJSS The Military Balance.

As for the U.S., the Carter Administration specially created a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF¹⁰) to tackle perceived Soviet advances in a region that it labeled Southwest

¹⁰ It appears that this force over the longer haul has evolved into the CentCom.

Asia,¹¹ perhaps not anticipating then that subsequent dramatic political developments in the adjacent area would soon render this label irrelevant and obsolete being supplanted more coherently instead by the new label of Central Asia or Greater Central Asia. After the defection of Iran from the American camp following the Islamic revolution and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. has been persistently seeking to secure pre-positioning facilities if not also trying to establish bases in this newly-redefined region curiously even as it consolidates its strategic base in Diego Garcia and vacating from various other far-flung bases elsewhere in the world. It has been continually approaching and even engaging some of the insecure and vulnerable countries in legally binding military agreements that are bilateral or multi-lateral in this relatively large geo-strategic region, as was seen in Map 24, even as a “receding” Russia keeps-up its grumbling frown at the AOR (area of responsibility) of the RDF.

The Dependence on, and Strategic Importance of, Central Asian Strategic/Energy Sources to Russia and America and their Respective Allies and Clients

Despite the fact that both Russia is and America was relatively-speaking domestically self-sufficient in energy resources they are becoming or have become ever gradually more dependent on foreign sources of energy especially oil for meeting their various strategic needs and/or sustaining the well-being of their world-wide allies and other commercial clients. Taking Russia’s case first, even long before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Soviet-Russia depended on the energy resources of the Central Asian region to meet the energy needs of its clients both within and without the Eastern Bloc. Central Asian oil and

¹¹Some works that recognize this regional term include: Shirin Tahir-Kheli, ed. *U.S. Strategic Interests in Southwest Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1982); Robert G. Lawrence, *U.S. Policy in Southwest Asia: A Failure in Perspective* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense U P, 1984), Miron Rezun, *Intrigue and War in Southwest Asia: The Struggle for Supremacy from Central Asia to Iraq* (New York and London: Praeger, 1992) and Rosemary Hollis, “Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,” in *From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game*, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Exeter, U.K.: U of Exeter P, 1994).

gas has not only been sent to Central Asian states like Afghanistan and Soviet-republics like Ukraine and Belarus but also to East European countries like Poland and even to those beyond like France.

Though in later Soviet years the Russians have grown more and more self-sufficient in oil, especially in non-Baku or non-Central-Asian-oil, nevertheless in post-Soviet times, the Russians have rediscovered the strategic importance of Baku/Central Asian oil not only for meeting, as before, their allies' needs, but also for their very own regional economic developments now and well into the near future. In the case of United States their need, as a continuing super economy and being the vanguard of global strategic leadership, for oil from any source has been getting more and more acute. As the world-dominating American economy grows and grows their energy demands have, per force, grown continually if not continuously in tandem.

Being the leading economic and pre-eminent military power in contemporary times the geo-political realities and geographic imbalance and unfavorable distribution of world strategic resources, are rightly perceived as having salient implications for America's national security interests and strategic well-being. As is well known, with the end of World War II, America no longer enjoys any self-sufficiency in energy or in most other strategic materials, for that matter, as does, its long erstwhile Cold War rival, Russia largely, as well enumerated by E. A. Koziorskii in his authoritative work, to even these days.¹² In constantly endeavoring to sustain its status as the leading military and economic power in the face of rapid and varied challenges from its rivals and allies, America has grown ever more dependent on outside sources of critical materials that it deems strategic.

¹²E. A. Koziorskii gives a relatively clear picture of the materials security level of Russia in the CIS countries, especially on the strengths of its strategic minerals and energy sectors. See E.A. Koziorskii, *Mineral 'no-syr'evye problemy Rossii nakanune XXI veka: Sostoianie i prognoz* (Moskva: Russkii biograficheskii Institut; Moskovskii gas. gornyi universitet, 1999). For a portrayal of the mineral situation in the Soviet era, see Demitri B (oris) Shimkin, *Minerals: A Key to Soviet Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U P, 1953).

The release of Central Asia from Russian over-lordship and its opening-up to the free-world has simultaneously presented the U.S. with yet another openly available outside source for procuring its strategic materials or seeking to profitably influence the international markets for the same.

Critical and Strategic Materials

Now before we delve into these issues further it is imperative that we understand what is generally meant by the term “strategic materials”. Originally the adjectival word “strategic” simply meant pertaining essentially to effective military strategy. But over the years it has acquired a broader sense and is used widely, including in the United States, to convey an element of criticality in reference to almost anything. Typically, the words “strategic” and “critical” are both used in Sections 12 (1) of the American *Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act* (50 U.S.C. 98 *et seq.*) which provides definitive elucidation; thus the term “strategic and critical materials” means that [A] it¹³ would be needed to supply the military, industrial and essential civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency, and [B] are not found or produced¹⁴ in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such a need.¹⁵

In other words, the U.S., like most developed states, routinely imports various materials to meet the, often, expanding demands of its economy when adequate deposits and quantities are absent within its own home sector or when other countries enjoying a comparative advantage in the production of any of these materials are willing to sell them to any country at a lower competitive price. Countries needing such materials to cater to essential, and especially the lucrative, sectors of their economies commonly label those

¹³ As listed in Table 7 and Table 8.

¹⁴ As listed in Table 5 and Chart 2.

¹⁵ As cited by Rae Weston, *Strategic Materials* (London & Sydney: Croom Helm and Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), p. 1.

materials as “critical”. When such materials are commercially available only from less than secure foreign countries whose possible future denial of access to those materials also directly benefits an adversary of the needful country then those same materials are billed “strategic”. A material that is deemed strategic to one country may just be considered critical in another and vice-versa and, conversely, a material that is perceived as strategic or critical by some countries may be treated merely as marginal or incidental by yet some others. What makes a strategic material more or most important for a given country at any one time is governed by key factors like: the number of countries that can serve as alternative sources for the strategic material in question; the political stability and friendly disposition of producer states; the resource magnitude and economic reliability of the available supply sources; and the low dependency or self-sufficiency of the needful country’s adversary or rival in that strategic material.

The developed world’s rapidly expanding scientific research and development programs, in general, and the superpowers’ military and technological progress and military and economic competition, in particular, created new and challenging needs for strategic resources that, simultaneously, exacerbated the demand for materials previously considered marginal to progress to a new high level of criticality to the progress of their various cutting-edge technological complexes. Both in military and economic term the developed world, particularly though not exclusively the U.S. could never survive in a healthy fashion without continued easy access to these newly essential materials. These materials, if they are procurable within the borders of the needful country is considered, aptly, a critical material; however, if they must be imported from a foreign country, particularly, one that is not too friendly, then such a material is termed strategic. Modern trends like the politicization or nationalization of commodities trade too have given added significance to

anything that is deemed a strategic item. In this context, the mid-Oct. 1973 oil embargo of the OPEC cartel¹⁶ and the export embargo of chrome by the Rhodesian (Zimbabwean in today's nomenclature) authorities stand as important examples.

The term "strategic materials" as defined and used in this research includes not just strategic metals and minerals but also embraces certain derived strategic elements and commodities as is readily attested to by the various tables and charts employed in this chapter. What needs to be stressed here, however, is that, when it comes to specifying what materials qualify as strategic, no clear-cut consensus emerges from any quarters, least of all from the U.S.

The lack of consensus in the U.S., as to how many materials may exactly fall within the ambit of strategic materials, is clear from the following examples: the Sinclair Securities Company¹⁷ considers about **18** materials as strategic; The renowned strategic materials surveyor Rae Weston¹⁸ treats **23** items as such; the International Strategic Metals Ltd¹⁹ refers to about **24** major strategic materials in respect of U.S. stockpiles; Kenneth Kessel²⁰ in his scholarly book on this subject opines that President Reagan's SDI program (if it were to be fully and fruitfully implemented) would require about **30** strategic minerals, metals and 4 other entire classes of materials for its successful realization; Gordon McLendon²¹ mentions about **31** strategic materials; the U.S. National Defense Stockpile Inventory of Strategic and Critical Materials²² serially lists about **60** group of items; Van Slambrouck²³ considers the U.S. to be in need of **64** strategic and critical metals and minerals and the

¹⁶Albert L. Danielsen, *The Evolution of OPEC* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982); I. Skeet, *OPEC: Twenty-Five Years of Prices and Politics* (New York: Cambridge U P, 1988).

¹⁷Sinclair Securities Company, *Strategic Materials - A Guide* (New York: Sinclair, 1980).

¹⁸Weston, *Strategic Materials*, op. cit., p. 2.

¹⁹International Strategic Metals Ltd., Prospectus (New York: ISM, 1981).

²⁰Kenneth A. Kessel, *Strategic Minerals: U.S. Alternatives* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense U P, 1990), p.105.

²¹Gordon McLendon, *Get Really Rich in the Coming Super Metals Boom* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980).

²²Reproduced in Weston, *Strategic Materials*, loc. cit.

²³See Paul Van Slambrouck, "Is U.S. Setting Itself Up For a Minerals Crisis?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12 December, 1983, pp. 24-25.

American Geological Institute²⁴ warned U.S. presidential candidates that the U.S. stockpiles of 93 strategic materials were as much as 80 percent short of their stockpiling goals.

If a particular material, not present domestically, is, however, widely distributed globally and is available from many other sovereign countries, the likelihood of its total denial to the interested country by all these possible alternative sources, acting in concert, is highly remote. If on the contrary, the same indispensable material is obtainable only from a handful of countries, then any prospective denial of access would become a matter of serious concern, especially when those few countries' political stability and general security themselves become questions.

Strategic Materials and Geopolitics in the Context of Geo-strategic Competition

With or without man's awareness and knowledge energy, broadly defined, has, since time immemorial, always been indispensable for his temporal survival and absolutely essential for his mundane growth, progress and development. With growing awareness, man has realized that energy is also key to achieving all his worldly goals and critical especially for chasing his expanding strategic and even celestial dreams.

Strategic Materials: Energy-Significant

Over past millennia man has continuously met, passively, his physiological well-being and, actively, his increasing material well-beings by harnessing and exploiting the various forms of energy he either stumbled upon or discovered in nature or he invented through his intellectual, scientific and technological strivings. The former he has been procuring, historically, from the sun, the wind, the ocean, lightening and in such materials as wood, charcoal, surface asphalt, biomass, coal, peat and from petroleum seepage; and the latter,

²⁴ Cited in Weston, *Strategic Materials*, op. cit., p. 150.

since modern times, in electricity, variously, from thermal, hydro, atomic fission, solar, wind, tidal, and in the mid-future, possibly through thermo-nuclear fusion and super laser sources; and, chemically, from organic substances like coal, petroleum and natural gas.

Table 5 - Strategic Materials: Energy-significant

Material	Description
<p>Natural Gas</p> <p>[G]</p>	<p>Generally all inflammable underground gas is known as natural gas. It is mainly composed of methane. It has a heating value of 920-1250 British thermal units (Btu) per cubic foot. Deposits of soft coal and oil are usually accompanied by gas and this fact suggests that they may have a common source. The condition favorable to underground accumulation of gas can be artificially created. However, natural gas is widely distributed across the world. It is mainly used as fuel for the production of heat, light and power. In the U.S. the main areas of production are, as may be seen in Chart 2, Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Alaska and New Mexico. In terms of value it is much more than that of all the metals produced in America. The ex-Soviet Union had by far the world's largest reserves of this mineral substance. The Central Asian Region has inherited about 14% of the ex-U.S.S.R.'s huge natural gas resources, especially Turkmenistan, as may be seen in Tables 1 and 8. In fact one of the largest natural gas fields in Central Asia is at Gizli in Uzbekistan.</p>
<p>Petroleum</p> <p>[O]</p>	<p>This "black gold" or crude oil is actually a naturally occurring bituminous dark green mineral oil that differs widely in color and consistency. The extracted crude petroleum may be used for making water gas, to oil roads or generally for fuel. But refined petroleum and its derivatives have numerous uses depending on the nature of the treatment it receives. It is the source of gasoline, naphtha, kerosene, paraffin, etc. like unguent or salve. Tank trailers, tank-rail cars, oil-tankers and pipelines are used to transport the oil to refineries located at great distances to convert them to these numerous other products. In the U.S. the leading states producing petroleum are, as may be seen in Chart 2, Texas, Louisiana, California, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, Kansas and New Mexico. Significant reserves are in Alaska too. The U.S. being an automobile and airplane-dominated country would like to get all the oil it could get. Statistically, about a quarter of all the petroleum used to meet the nation's energy needs are imported. It is more widely demanded across the world than it is available across it. In fact Central Asia inherits about 32% of the ex-U.S.S.R.'s petroleum resources. The rapid modernization and industrialization of the developing and the population explosion in these and the least developed world too add to its growing indispensability. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan can be helpful for long in this respect.</p>
<p>Uranium</p>	<p>Uranium is a naturally radioactive element that is malleable and is known to have the highest atomic weight in nature. However, it is never found pure but occurs in ores that are compounds of various elements</p>

[U]

like radium, polonium and sodium. Vanadium, produced commercially in Kazakhstan, is an important by-product of uranium. It has over the years become a highly sought after element because it is the basic source of atomic energy. One of its isotopes, particularly, of mass 238 can be transformed into plutonium, an element with an atomic weight of 242, the direct application of which is the making of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. The states of New Mexico, Wyoming, Colorado and Utah in the United States are leading producers of uranium ore, as may be seen in Chart 2. Uranium is found, as may be seen in Table 8, and is exploited widely across the Central Asian region. In fact, the region has 90% of the total ex-Soviet resources.

Sources: U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Department of the Interior.

But what exactly is meant by energy? Energy has been defined as: the capacity or ability of matter to perform work or act as the result of its motion or its position in relation to forces acting on it. It is virtually tantamount to power. Energy in relation to motion is known as *kinetic energy* and that pertaining to position is known as *potential energy*. Energy manifests in various guises; it can be mechanical, chemical, thermal, radiant, electrical or atomic. Energy can be perceived as light and heat. Current flows as electrical energy. On an atomic or at a molecular level it can be seen as chemical energy. It's most dangerous, and potentially most powerful form comes at the smaller nuclear dimension, as nuclear energy.

Energy in all its various forms is inter-convertible. Using appropriate processes, one form of energy may be transformed into another and then into yet another. In the transformation process *potential* or *kinetic* energy may be seen to be gained or lost, immediately, but its sum total always remains the same, ultimately. A basic tenet of classical mechanics is the concept of conservation of energy which, simply put, means that energy can be transformed but it cannot be created or destroyed. So also is the case of conservation of matter. In nuclear reactions, energy and matter are inter-convertible. Thus, in modern physics the conservation of both energy and mass are unified. However, this

underlying fundamental unity is obscured at the phenomenal-level by a sophisticated dualism.

Indeed, modern man as he gains in knowledge is only too aware of the fact that energy and matter are simply two faces of the same universe. While **matter** is the substance of the apparent cosmos, **energy** is its invisible mover. Without either there would be not just NO-thing, including vacuum, but even philosophically absolutely nothing too; save the Almighty, for just those with *iman*, that is! Therefore, it follows that any material in the known universe be it in the form of gas, liquid or solid, essentially possesses potential energy in a chemical form that using appropriate processes can be expended and revealed as heat and light when ignited. All forms of energy, including potential and kinetic, tend to be transformed into heat, the most transient form of energy. Materials that dispense the most intense heat and highly efficient “burns” are generally referred to as fuels, fuel-significant materials or simply as combustibles.

Incidentally, it must, however, be noted that, theoretically, non-fuel-significant strategic materials that we would be covering in the later sections like cobalt, manganese, chromium, mercury and gold too can be transformed into heat and energy but these may not as readily and efficiently be transformed into heat and energy as can the highly-fuel-significant strategic materials of uranium, natural gas and petroleum that we shall now be covering here in greater depth.

But before we embark upon that important focus, we may also profit from, casually taking into our cognizance, in brief, the fact that all materials, including common ones, that provide energy do have relative and varying heating values that are meaningfully measurable in BTUs, under which term alone, of course, uranium should be studied first.

This simple fact is brought out by and can also be verified in the comparative table of heating values of selective, ordinary and strategic materials which can be seen at Appendix IX.

Uranium

Uranium is the first fuel significant material covered in the present study of eight shortlisted strategic materials. We would cover the non-fuel relevant metals of manganese, cobalt, chromium, mercury and gold in greater detail later in Appendix X. But of the following three fuel significant material to be covered here, we present uranium first because of its superior heating value as hinted above and like the five above-mentioned metals it too basically is a strategic metal and as such only forms part of the secondary focus of our present study which is more concerned with the primary energy/fuel materials of natural gas and petroleum.

Brief description

Uranium a silvery-white, hard and heavy metallic element is named after the planet Uranus, which itself was named after the mythological Roman god of the heavens, after being rediscovered in modern times in 1789 by the German chemist Martin Heinrich Klaproth. Symbolically it is expressed simply as U. It is a nickel-like malleable metal that is as heavy as gold. Uranium has the second heaviest atom in nature among all the natural elements. Uranium is an actinide metal related to the chromium group, a sort of rare-earth element that has been classified towards the end of the contemporary table of elements. Determined as having an atomic weight of 238.02891 it has been assigned the atomic number of 92, i.e. the biggest number given to any naturally-occurring-element. All elements numbered beyond 92 are ones that are often man-made in atom-smashers and are accordingly labeled “transuranium.” However, in 1971 a most stable plutonium isotope was discovered to be

present in nature. Accordingly, Pu-244 was assigned the atomic number 94 and declared as the largest and heaviest atom found in nature.

The most common form of uranium has a half life of 4.5 billion years. Uranium, particularly uranium 235 - a fissionable isotope of prime importance in the nuclear age, of course, achieved notoriety as the active agent in atomic weapons. In fact, it was uranium 238 that was bombarded with neutrons in 1941 to discover plutonium 239, the artificially-invented highly fissile material that is widely and wildly sought after by mass-destruction weapons proliferators the world over especially after 1945. Plutonium is so attractive to them because unlike the equally fissile uranium 235 its production is easier and much cheaper. Nevertheless, the importance of uranium, be it of isotope 238 or more so, immediately, of isotope 235, is only too obvious. By end of the 90s world uranium ore reserves stood at about 2,975,000 short tons. Naturally, uranium occurs in three isotopes: U-238, i.e. the raw material for producing plutonium, makes up about 99.28 percent of all natural uranium; U-235 is about 0.71 percent and U-234 accounts for only 0.006 percent. Generally, uranium makes up only about 2.6 pounds of every million pounds of the Earth's crust and about 10 pounds of every billion pounds of world water and its constituents.

Properties

Along with plutonium, radium and thorium, uranium figures as another naturally radioactive metal. Uranium crystals form at different degrees of heat. The form that crystallizes at about 1426.6 degrees Fahrenheit is malleable and ductile, otherwise it is machined, though, being strong, it can be cast, formed and welded by most standard methods. At 1832 degrees Fahrenheit uranium combines with nitrogen to form yellow nitrides. It is an acid-forming and a base-forming element that yields numerous compounds.

Purified uranium burns readily in air at around 302 degrees Fahrenheit. Uranium melts at 1132 degrees C/2070 degrees F and boils at 3818 degrees C/6872 degrees F.

Uranium is soluble in both nitric and hydrochloric acids and becomes insoluble in alkalis. Uranium is naturally radioactive and its chief feature is the ready fissionability of its isotope 235, to the extent that it could with ease sustain a critical chain reaction, and the neutron absorbing capability of its isotope 238. As may be verified in Appendix IX, Uranium has very high heating properties and thus energy. A softball-sized chunk of uranium can release more energy than coal weighing 3 million times that weight could! Even depleted uranium (DU) is mildly radioactive, has pyrophoric properties and chemical toxicity. Its pyrophoricity is such that even its powder can self-ignite to 300-350 degrees F at the touch of oxygen, so, special precaution must be taken while handling it.

Occurrence

Uranium is never found in its pure state in nature. It occurs as an oxide or complex salt in minerals like pitchblende or ores such as carnotite. The slow decay of neptunium within pitchblende produces uranium-235. The milder isotope uranium-238 (which can be converted to plutonium) makes up 99.28 % of pure uranium, whereas the highly fissile uranium-235 is present less than a single percent (at 0.71 %) and minute amounts of U-234. Uranium-239 is one of a number of artificially-produced isotopes of uranium. Prospectors are using instruments like Geiger-Muller or scintillation counters, besides increasingly using satellite telemetry to detect for its ores. Ores like uranophane, carnotite, pitchblende, metasomatite and coffinite are extremely rich sources of uranium. Olympic Dam, sandstone, phosphate, quartz-pebble conglomerate, granite and shale may contain deposits of uranium too. Uranium ore is the parent substance of radium, vanadium and polonium. Uranium is mined mostly in open pits, underground, *in-situ* leaching or through borehole

mining using high-pressure water jets. Depending on the nature of the host ore, uranium is extracted, in modern times, variously, including through processes such as ion exchange, solvent extraction and volatility methods.

Uses

Historically, uranium has been in use for about 2,000 years. In A.D. 79 uranium oxide was used as a pigment for making mosaic murals. Much later it was used for processing photographs. Sodium uranate, also known as uranium yellow is used to make fluorescent glass. Uranium also has applications in archaeological works where besides other uses it is also used to determine the age of rock samples. The conclusion of World War II, with the culmination of the Manhattan Project of 1936-1942, tragically in Aug. 1945, saw the start of large-scale international search for uranium. With the discovery of nuclear fission, uranium became a strategic metal. One of its isotopes, particularly, of mass 238 can be transformed into plutonium, an element with an atomic weight of 242, the direct application of which is the making of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. At first it was used only for military purposes. Uranium and its alloys figure in non-nuclear military applications as armor-piercing ammunition for anti-tank weapons and as counterweights. Uranium trioxide [UO³] is a radioactive compound used in ceramic, pigments and in the very process of uranium refining. Uranium dioxide [UO²] is got from packing nuclear fuel rods.

But later as its power/energy potential became more apparent uranium enriched in isotope U-235 was made available to other agencies for development of nuclear energy. It has over the years become a highly sought after element because it is the basic source of atomic energy. Like plutonium, U-235 is a ready source for generating atomic energy. In fact, in 1954 the U.S. government relaxed controls to facilitate leasing of enriched uranium to both private and foreign agencies for disseminating nuclear power for peaceful use. Various

other peacetime applications of uranium were deliberated in three international conferences on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in the years 1955, 1958 and 1964 and subsequently in other forums. Uranium's potential as an attractive source of industrial power and national prestige was brought to the fore in 1954 with the launching of the *USS Nautilus*, the first nuclear-powered submarine. In relatively modern times, uranium with low-level radioactivity is used in gyrocompasses for aircrafts and spacecrafts wherein, in addition, it is also used as radiation shield. Generally, among very dense minerals, uranium is usually selected over others because of its ease in casting and fabricating compared to tungsten and its relative cheapness compared to platinum and gold.

In 1957, the first nuclear power plant in the U.S. began operation at Shippingport, Pennsylvania. By the early 1980s, the industrial nations were hosts to about 200 nuclear plants. As we noted elsewhere earlier, in Central Asia also there are reactors in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and perhaps in Xinjiang too. The seductive attraction of nuclear power is easily appreciated when we learn that it takes less than 15 lb of uranium-235 a month to produce 60,000kw of electricity whereas when using coal it would take at least 40 million lbs of coal a month to generate that same amount of electric power. Thus today uranium is the key source of energy used to generate electric energy at all large commercial nuclear power plants. Such power plants operate in about 30 countries.

Nevertheless, the full realization of nuclear energy's immense potential is hindered by such important problems like new plant's relative costs, scarcity of pure uranium, plant safety, and the storage and safe disposal of radioactive uranium and plutonium waste products. Anyway, given the post-Soviet dismantling of old nuclear warheads under START, proposals are afoot to develop "mixed-oxide fuel" (MOX), in which surplus plutonium from destroyed bombs is to be blended with HEU for prospective use in civilian

reactors to generate electrical energy. This unexpected windfall may also serve to postpone any need for large-scale conversion of the abundant radioactivable series of thorium²⁵ resources to uranium to some indefinite future, assuming, of course, that taming Deuterium²⁶ and, remoter still, farming anti-matter remain elusive even then.

Supply Sources

In general, uranium ores are found widely dispersed across the world and the best quality ores are found in countries like Canada, Australia, Czech Republic, U.S., Niger, Congo, Namibia besides, of course, the Central Asian states, preeminently in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, as may be seen in Table 8. The Canadian province of Saskatchewan is a leading producer of uranium and Mali is rumored to have enormous reserves. In the U.S. the main uranium ore deposits are in Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, Florida, Nebraska and Washington, as can be seen in Chart 2. The U.S. was the leading producer before the 1980s but its production has gradually fallen behind many other countries since. On the basis of available figures, the world production level stood at about 35,000 metric tons in 2002 as it also was in the late 1970s. While U.S. production of uranium has declined from the highs of the 1970s to under 5,000 metric tons in 2002, other countries like Niger, Kazakhstan and Namibia have increased their productions and gained greater market share. Consumption too is rising with the world consuming about 500,000 pounds of uranium per day²⁷ in 2005. Within this study period its lowest price was \$10 in 2001 and it fetched the highest price of \$300 in 2007.²⁸ Central Asia has abundant uranium reserves. In fact, it now owns about 90% of the total ex-Soviet Union's resources.

²⁵ Thorium, fortunately, is a false strategic mineral, which is plentiful in earth with Brazil, Turkey, India, Australia, Venezuela, Norway, U.S.A., Russia and Canada holding high reserves. Significantly, just a ping-pong ball sized mass of Thorium holds all the power supply needed by an average man for his entire life!

²⁶ Cf. Appendix IX, p.466.

²⁷ Peter Tertzakian, *A Thousand Barrels a Second: The Coming Oil Break Point and the Challenges Facing an Energy Dependent World* (New York, N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2006), p.1.

²⁸ See Wikipedia.



U.S. STATES	STRATEGIC MINERALS																				
	Ag	Al	Au	C	Cr	Co	Cu	Fe	G	Hg	K	Mn	O	Pt	S	Sb	Sn	Ti	U	W	Z
Alabama								=													
Alaska			=		=				=	=							=	=			=
Arizona	=		=				=													=	=
Arkansas		=																			
California		=	=				=														=
Colorado	=		=															=	=	=	=
Florida																				=	
Idaho	=		=				=										=				=
Kansas															=						
Louisiana									=						=		=				
Michigan								=	=			=									
Minnesota									=												
Missouri																					
Montana	=				=		=														=
Nebraska																					
Nevada	=		=														=	=			=
New Jersey															=						=
New Mexico	=		=							=					=						=
New York		=							=												=
N. Carolina																					=
Oklahoma										=					=						
Pennsylvania				=		=									=					=	
S. Dakota			=																		
Tennessee																					
Texas								=		=										=	=
Utah	=		=																		=
Washington			=																		=
Wisconsin										=											
Wyoming				=																	=

Chart 2 - United States of America (Mineral-Rich States - relief)

Source: "United States (P0014885)", adapted, composed and printed by the researcher using *D K Reference Encyclopedia*, CD-ROM, a Dorling Kindersley and Global Software (GSP) product (n. p.: Research Machines (2004); Helicon, 2006).

Nazarbayev urges the world to adopt peaceful nuclear energy solutions and eyes working with the IAEA in this and related regards. Kazakhstan own 21% of the world's natural uranium.²⁹ To be exact Kazakhstan produced around 2,824 metric tons of uranium metal in 2002. Kazakhstan's production was 4,365 tonnes in 2005 and it intends to produce more well into the future. In fact in 2012 Kazatomprom produced over 18,000 tons of uranium³⁰easily, accounting for about 37% of world production. Tajikistan has some 14 percent of the world's known scarce uranium resources.

Natural Gas

Natural Gas is the second fuel-significant material covered in this study of various strategic materials. Fuel-significant materials are valued for the energy potential they represent. However, these fossil fuels are not the only sources of energy. There are also many other renewable energy³¹ sources like solar, geo-thermal, wind, tidal and their likes, latently present in nature, but it is beyond the scope of this study to examine them and are therefore deliberately avoided. This being so, we now look more appropriately on the primary energy/fuel materials first, of natural gas then, later on petroleum too.

Brief description

Natural gas is a raw, light-hydrocarbon that is a type of dry inflammable fuel gas, consisting mainly of methane and ethane that always arise and forms naturally over trapped underground oil or coal deposits. Natural gas has been known to exist since pre-historic times, and gas flames from natural vents have been kept burning for centuries in the temples of fire-worshippers across Southwest Asia and North India. Historically, natural

²⁹ EKzUSA, 'President Nazarbayev Visits, *loc. cit.*

³⁰ Aitken, *Kazakhstan: Surprises and Stereotypes*, op. cit., p. 85.

³¹ Godfrey Boyle, *Renewable Energy; Power for a Sustainable Future*, 2nd edn, an Open University Project (New York: Oxford U P, 2004).

gas was simply allowed to escape in the frantic search for petroleum. Later it was just flared off as an indicator around oil fields. After man began refining it, and especially after he began liquefying natural gas via supercooling it, its constituent gases like methane and ethane have been useful, as in the past as domestic and industrial fuel for providing light, heat and energy. Its heavy hydrocarbons like propane and butane and LPG are bottled off as portable gas for industrial as well as for recreational uses. Increasingly in modern times, natural gas and its organic constituents have become a rich raw material and feedstock source of chemicals for a wide range of industries, including in the petrochemical sector.

Properties

Natural gas being an element and compound composed of molecules of linked hydrogen and carbon atoms is accordingly known as a light hydrocarbon mixture that is usually about 0.62 as heavy as air, weighs between 47 to 49 pounds per 1000 cubic feet and it has a heating value in the range of about 1250 BTUs per cubic foot.³² In comparison to many other molecular fuels like petroleum and various kinds of alcohols, if not also spirits on an ounce-for-ounce basis, natural gas is highly combustible and gives off the most heat.

Occurrence

The exact origin of natural gas is absolutely unknown but the principal explanation is that it was produced, over the ages, by decomposition and the decay of organic matter especially trees and plants. Natural gas almost always occur in association with deeply entrapped oil deposits and gushes to the surface along with crude oil when a well is successfully bored and this maiden gas is appropriately billed as casing-head gas, which true to its oil association is rich in gasoline. However, wells drilled in specifically designated gas fields usually yield only natural gas, i.e.: the so-called dry gas, devoid, often, of butane and

³² See Appendix IX.

propane. Natural gas consists primarily of gassy paraffin hydrocarbons - a group that includes sister gases like methane, ethane, propane and butane and natural gasoline. It also has non-hydrocarbon impurities like hydrogen sulphide, nitrogen, oxides of carbon and helium.

The general conditions that favor underground accumulation of rich gas deposit include: [1] a middle porous layer of rock, sandstone or soil of similar constitution, which serve to hold the gas; [2] an impermeable blanketing layer, perhaps of shale or slate, which hermistically locks the gas in; and [3] an arc or cupola in the strata, which serves to collect the raising gas under a “dome” permitting the gas to “ice” the often present oil and salt water pudding below it, as it were.

To secure the natural gas, wells are drilled piercing through the impervious layer of rock covering the underground deposit. Depending on the depth of the gas deposit, bores of various sizes are used to finally reach it. Gas wells may bear “fruit” at depths of anything from a score of feet down to even as deep as 8000 feet or more. Usually, the deeper the deposit the higher would be the cost of the well. Whenever a gas-bearing stratum is breached, the gas almost always rushes out with great force as a result of the water pressure below it. Natural gas fields have often been discovered by means of natural vents opening up on the surface of the earth, at times, by accident when drilling for oil or salt brine. Increasingly, natural gas fields are discovered by experts like geologists and geophysicists who trace out the summits of rock waves at times even using high-resolution 3D seismic signals/images and satellite technologies.

Uses

The principal use of natural gas is as fuel or fuel gas for producing heat, light and to generate power. Unrefined natural gas has always been widely utilized as cooking fuel in

homes, often in the form of LPG. Industry makes extensive use of natural gas and its heavier hydrocarbons such as butane and propane for fuel. The so-called dry gas is increasingly used as a source in the manufacture of such chemical products as plastics (polyethylene and polyurethane), drugs (benzene) and dyes. In fact, large quantities of gas have been burned simply to secure *gas black* - a fine pigment used extensively to manufacture printing ink. With the emergence of 3D printing, this use is bound to increase.

Vapors of natural gasoline is extracted from natural gas by passing the gas, as it comes from the well through a series of towers containing a light oil called straw oil which absorbs the gasoline before being distilled off. Then, of course, casing-head gas, as noted above, is a rich source of gasoline that at times may yield scores of gallons of gasoline per 1000 cubic feet of gas. Natural gas is, increasingly, an attractive raw material, in the forms of ethylene, propylene and benzene, for the rapidly expanding petrochemical industry.

Supply Sources

Natural gas is available in many parts of the world including, increasingly, under various lakes, seas and oceans across the world. Countries with the biggest gas reserves include Iran, Russia, Qatar, Turkmenistan, USA, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E. and Venezuela. The C.A. region has much gas, as may be seen in Table 8 and Map 25. In Afghanistan there is gas at Shehbergan and Murgab. Azerbaijan's Caspian sector is a virtual Qatar. Kyrgyzstan has gas at Ferghana Valley and Issyk-Kul. Tajikistan has associated gas. Turkmenistan has gas all over including at Daulatabad, Murghab and in its sector of the Caspian basin. Known Turkmen gas-fields include Galkynysh, Bagtyyarlyk and Minara. Uzbekistan is fully gassy too; it has gas at Shakhpakhty and condensate at Adamtash. To be sure, Xinjiang too has a few gas deposits but certainly not to be called its own, while still being a part of China! Karachagnak gas field is the biggest in Kazakhstan. Gas production has seen continual

growth in Kazakhstan reaching 19.7 billion cubic meters in 2012.³³ The natural gas infrastructure is relatively less developed in comparison to those of both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. For this reason, some percentage of its associated gas are either flared off or are like at Karachaganak re-injected back into the ground. The gas sector hopes to reduce flaring in the future as liquefaction integrative infrastructure expands.³⁴

Oil (Petroleum)

Crude oil, or petroleum to be more precise, is the last fuel-relevant material to be treated here but, in contrast to the rest, it represents *the* focal energy source and strategic material being dealt with in the present study. This should not come as a surprise, as petroleum, given its unchallenged paramony in contemporary civilized global existence and affairs, is the most strategic of all the strategic materials around, weather it is specifically popularized as such or not! As may be clear shortly all the strategic minerals and metals mentioned previously owe, to varying degrees, their concentration, refinement, extraction, manufacture and distribution the world over, both in times of war and/or peace, primarily to petroleum. Today, petroleum basically powers the entire global economy and is being used to make almost everything, including, unbelievably, **water**, across the world.

Brief description

Petroleum (literally rock oil) is an unctuous, greasy, liquid mixture of various subterranean volatile hydrocarbons that naturally coalesces from decaying minerals, vegetables, algae, plankton and animals. Petroleum is usually a dark green liquid. It was also known as

³³ B.P. *Statistical Review of World Energy (BPSRWE)*, June 2013 (London: BP p.l.c., 2013), p.22.

³⁴As also mentioned in the previous chapters, significant sections of this chapter too, starting with this section, but also interspersed throughout, have previously appeared, exactly or with small variations, in my article in *Central Asia* journal, published under the joint auspices of the Pakistan Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the Area Study Centre (Central Asia) of the University of Peshawar, entitled: "A Concise Interpretive Analysis of U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations, 1991-2013," which is, it has to be again strongly stressed here, *itself based on and grew out of this very Ph.D. research undertaking*, that you are presently reading; to verify this, see Sahib, "A Concise Interpretive Analysis..." *op.cit.*, pp.15-64.

naphtha - perhaps derived from the Persian word for petroleum, i.e.: *naft* - and has been recorded of since early ancient times. The existence of petroleum has been known to many peoples of the world for millennia. It is said that the Sumerians, Assyrians and the Babylonians have all slathered it between planks of wood, to waterproof their ships. Later still the Zoroastrians and Jews are known to have very deep religious or historical connections with petroleum. The fire-worshipping followers of Zoratustra, especially the priests, of Persia have a long power/spiritual association with oil.

The sense of power which oil gave to the Zoroastrian priests enabled them to charm, captivate and command the pious or dreadful tension of their followers. There is even Biblical evidence in *Job* pertaining to petroleum: “the rock poured forth rivers of oil”. Jews have dominated and continue to dominate the oil trade right to present times.³⁵ Baku in Azerbaijan is historically famed for it and it is from there that the mega-oil-regions of Ural-Volga, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and Caspian/Central Asia radiate. Being a non-element it, unsurprisingly, does not figure in the Periodic Tables. However, it shares the symbol **O** with oxygen but only as a mineral compound. Petroleum is largely measured and commercially traded either in gallons or barrels.

Properties

Petroleum is basically a mineral oil that varies in color from yellow through brown, green to total black. In fact, in its natural state, it is usually a greenish-black, sticky, thick substance that oozes or gushes out from below the earth depending on the strength of the subterranean force and pressure it was under there. Its derivatives have heating values ranging between 19,000 and 20,750 BTUs per cu. ft., as may be verified in the Heating

³⁵ The renowned John D. Rockefeller, his Standard Oil and its subsequent reconfigured reincarnations are typical and representative of this as may be gathered from Antonia Juhasz, *The Tyranny of Oil: The World's Most Powerful Industry and What We Must Do to Stop it* (New York, N.Y.: William Morrow of HarperCollins, 2008), *passim* but especially pp.25-32, pp.60-71, pp.105-125 and pp.131-2.

Values Comparative Table in Appendix IX. Chemically seen, petroleum is quite a simple compound consisting of essentially two natural elements, *viz.*: hydrogen and carbon. Hence, it is prosaically and commonly referred to, in educated circles, as “hydrocarbon”.

However, hydrocarbons are not of a uniform constitution. In fact, hydrocarbons are made of the elements of hydrogen and carbon in so many varied proportions, combinations and admixtures as to form a veritable range of compounds, including gases, liquids and solids, each having their own distinct properties, attributes and peculiarities. It may be as thin as kerosene or as thick and ugly as molasses. The many types and grades of gas, oil and sands, ranging from natural gas in its vaporized form through gasoline and kerosene as its liquid form to bitumen and tar in its gooey form to asphalt in its solid form are all attributed to this non-uniform fact of hydrocarbons.

Occurrence

Crude oil, a complex hydrocarbons liquid, occurs naturally in the pores and fissures of the earth’s sedimentary crust. Its exact origins are, however, steeped in controversy. Among experts there is as yet no agreement on its actual organic or inorganic origin. Scientists are similarly divided as to its derivation from either animals or vegetation. A loose consensus has emerged, however, that it arises from the decomposed remains of long-dead plants and animals, including dinosaurs. These decayed flotsams they believe floated and drifted on river water along with mud and silt and gradually sank and settled on marsh, lagoon, river and sea bottoms. Over the decades and centuries these got deeply buried by the mud, sands and gravels in the water-bed.

Over millions of years these blanketed deposits of decayed plant and animal matter encased in limestone, clay, silt and sand lays as a layer buried under similarly constituted

other layers. The passage of time adds more and more layers over the earliest layer. Consequently, over eras and eons, by the cumulative effects of the pressures from the layers resting above and the extreme temperatures arising from the bottom at those crustal depths, and other factors yet to be known to man, some of the earliest deposits are transformed into proto-petroleum beads. These randomly occurring hydrocarbon beads tend to migrate, over successive eras and centuries, and coalesce into large underground reservoirs of petroleum. These sealed reservoirs, appropriately, form under humpable (usually formed by its rising associated gases mainly in the form of natural gas) domes of impermeable clay and rock.

Though petroleum as a substance is vastly present and widely spread, albeit unevenly, in nature, across the world. It is probably the next substance to water itself in its wide prevalence on the earth's crust. Specifically, oil is found prevalent, geologically, not only in the Laurentian rocks but also among the relatively recent rocks of the Quaternary period. But for purposes of commercial exploitation petroleum found in the older Devonian and Carboniferous formations and those of the Tertiary rocks are most suitable. Hence, carbonaceous deposits in bituminous shales are important sources of petroleum and soft coal. In fact, the more fossiliferous the shale mass are, the higher would be, often, their petroleum content. In fact, it is these types of rocks that yield about 50% of all the petroleum extracted the world over. Happily, for our research, the oil fields of Central Asia too are of this class of petroleum-rich rocks.

It is said that over the past 300 million years, the natural forces of geology acted to create about 2.2 trillion barrels of conventional oil on our planet.³⁶ Geologically, petroleum deposits accessibly-occur close to mountain ranges or around depressions, both features prevalent in the Central Asian region, due to the formation, under the elevatory process of

³⁶ Tertzakian, *A Thousand Barrels*, op.cit, p. 126.

evolution, of minor folds which serve to capture and collect the petroleum in productive spongy belts of concentrated rich deposits or fields. Geographically too petroleum fields are widely distributed across both sets of hemispheres, i.e.: eastern and western hemispheres; and southern and northern hemispheres.

Extraction

It is sometimes pumped to the surface from a depth of more than a few miles and in the case of off-shore drillings it may reach depths of even four miles and beyond. In the processes of cracking, refining and coking, the petroleum is variously distilled to yield a range of fractions that separates into aviation gasoline, jet kerosene, diesel, motor oil, solvents, heating kerosene, lubricating oils and heavy fuel oils, including marine bunkers. The residual part of crude oil goes to create heavy hydrocarbon products like petrolatum, wax, paraffin, bitumen, asphalt, coke and visbreaker. Depending on the quality of the crude oil used, 1 to 50% gasoline used to be yielded traditionally when petroleum is usually boiled between 38° and 205°C (100° and 400°F) or even higher at 500°C .

Superior modern cracking processes, however, have increased the yield of gasoline manifolds. To secure increasing yields of gasoline or motor oil, the complex hydrocarbons of the heavier fractions like paraffin, asphalt and coke are further broken down by either thermal or catalytic cracking. Thereafter, specifically, through a process of hydrocracking or hydrofining, i.e., the hydrogenation of refined petroleum oils under high pressure in the midst of catalysts like molybdenum oxide, high-grade gasoline can easily be produced. Even in the past, Germans and subsequently South Africans have perfected the energy-intensive extraction, albeit expensively, of “artificial” petroleum, diesel and even gasoline

from coal. On average, anything between 84 to 94% of each barrel of crude goes to produce just various forms of fuels for the world transportation sector alone.³⁷

Uses

Natives in many parts of the world have been known to be familiar with it, mostly using it as an elixir or panacea. Later white men believing in its medicinal properties began selling it as a cure for rheumatism. It is primarily used for powering, i.e.: providing energy; lubricating, lighting and heating. The extracted crude petroleum may be used for making water gas, to oil roads or generally for fuel to move heavy machinery, transportation or run heavy industries and put up gigantic infrastructure. Actually petroleum is the chemical term used generically to denote the ever-expanding multitude of products and direct fractions that are derived from the refinement and varied technological treatments that natural crude oil are subjected to.

Famous direct products of petroleum include gasoline (petrol), naphtha, benzene, kerosene, jet fuel, gas oil and distillates, lubricating jellies, asphalt, petrolatum, paraffin wax like unguent or salve and ointments. Refined petroleum and its derivatives have numerous uses depending on the nature of the treatment it receives. Hence, petroleum in the refined form of petro-chemicals and other feedstocks are widely used in the manufacturing of plastic wares, synthetic fibers, clothes, detergents, medicines, cosmetics, fertilizers, foodstuffs, building materials, paints, dyes, rust preventives, insecticides, and of course, to generate electricity. It has become such an essential and almost indispensable material in human life. Though we have passed the Fire and Coal, and now passing the Oil and Gas Ages, we have never actually quit any of them totally, as we did, debatably, the Stone and Bronze Ages. So, it is hard, especially, to imagine how modern lifestyle can be better

³⁷ See "The World in a Barrel," *The Economist* 23 Dec. 2017-5 Jan. 2018, p. 70.

sustained without oil! Though, for sure, we would be moving into the Uranium, Plutonium, Deuterium, fuel microbes, anti-matter and God-alone-knows-what-else-next Ages, now on.

Production

In the U.S. the leading states producing petroleum are Texas, Louisiana, California, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Kansas and New Mexico. Significant reserves are in Alaska too. The U.S. being an automobile and airplane-dominated country would like to get all the oil it could get. Statistically, about a quarter of all the petroleum used to meet the nation's energy needs are imported. The ex-U.S.S.R. was the second largest producer of oil after the U.S. before 1940, 80% of oil there came from the Baku and North Caucasus fields. Now new producing fields have been discovered all across the Caspian Sea, Central Asia, Siberia and the Russian Far East.

Consumption

It is more widely demanded across the world than it is available across it. In fact, as alluded to by Peter Tertzakian, demand approached "86.0 million barrels per day, or a thousand barrels a second" in 2005³⁸ and actually breached it in 2007! The main consumers are USA, the E.U. but principally Germany, China, Japan, India, Russia, Brazil, S. Korea and Canada. In fact, the U.S. uses about 25 percent of the entire world's oil production every year and this used only by it's merely 5 percent of the world's population!³⁹

Main Supply Sources

Main world suppliers are Saudi Arabia, Russia, U.S.A., China, Canada, I. R. Iran, Kuwait, U.A.E., Iraq, Mexico, other FSU, Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, Qatar, Algeria,

³⁸ Tertzakian, *A Thousand Barrels*, op.cit, p.101.

³⁹ United States of America, Census Bureau/DOE, Energy Information Administration, "World Oil Balance Chart 2003-2007," available online at: <<http://www.eia.doe.gov>>.

Brazil, Angola, Norway and Azerbaijan.⁴⁰ Given that the USA, China and Brazil are themselves big importers of crude, they may not be too useful as suppliers though they remain big producers, especially of petroleum products, including the various light and middle distillates.

Availability in Central Asia

Having been kept out of most Central Asian territories during Soviet times, American energy corporations seized the opening to the regions various resources, as may be seen in Table 8, offered by their imminent independence. The U.S. administration of the day long plagued by the need to diversify its energy supply sources and well represented by the oil lobby need not be invited to bandwagon. Thus, the Soviet monopolistic hold over C.A.'s extractive sector and petroleum resources, in particular, came to a rapid end.

The U.S. Department of Energy estimates Kazakhstan's oil reserves as 9-40 billion barrels of proven reserves and an additional 92 billion barrels of possible reserves, thus giving Kazakhstan an oil reserves total of anything between 101 to 132 billion barrels. Kazakhstan's oil reserves have continued to grow gradually as relatively positive exploration result seeps in, if only in fits. Over a hundred hydrocarbon fields have been discovered and more than 200 hydrocarbon concentrations have been identified. Its main offshore hydrocarbon fields are Kashagan and Kurmangazy and its onshore fields include Aktobe, Mangistau, Uzen, Tengiz and Karachaganak.⁴¹

Afghanistan has oil deposits at Kasha Kari and Amu Darya. Azerbaijan is the Kuwait of the Caspian in this respect. Baku is an old oil region of the world. In the 1870s and 1880s the famous Rothschild and Nobel families financed the Baku oil industry and

⁴⁰ "Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production," *Oil & Gas Journal* 104.47 (2006):24-25.

⁴¹ Martha Brill Olcott, Kazmunaigaz: Kazakhstan's National Oil and Gas Company, a policy report of the Japan Petroleum Energy Center and The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy (Houston: Rice U, 2007), pp. 62-66.

even owned half of its oil exports.⁴² Gorbachev's *perestroika* helped reopen Baku to foreign investors, especially after October 1991. In fact, about "34 companies from 15 countries are engaged in operations in 30 fields in Azerbaijan," according to its US embassy's website.⁴³ Kyrgyzstan has oil at Ferghana Valley, Issyk-Kul and at At-Bashi. Tajikistan has hydrocarbons at Selrokho, Rengan and Sargazon. Turkmenistan has oil at Cheleken, Daulatabad, Yashlar and Amu Darya. Uzbekistan has oil at Ferghana Valley, Yalama, Yuzhny and Kandym-Khauzak-Shady. Even Xinjiang has oil deposits sprinkled across it, as may be seen in Map 25. Its currently verified holdings, of about 30 billion tonnes,⁴⁴ of petroleum are also a magnet for many foreign oil firms.

In 2001, Kazakhstan and the U.S. established an Energy Partnership. Perhaps as a consequence Kazakhstan is fast emerging as a key petroleum producer in the Central Asian region and it has become one of the world's major crude oil producers. Kazakhstan's output stood at about 900,000 barrels per day in 2004. This fact alone is largely responsible for increasing Astana's state revenue.

Kazakhstan's oil production is rapidly increasing. It neared doubling every five years since 1995. However, it has not kept to this trend since 2005 when the output was 1,288,000 barrels per day and it rose to only 1,525,000 barrels per day in 2010.⁴⁵ In 2008 the production figure was 1,345,000 barrels per day. It is hovering at under 2,000,000 barrels per day currently and was slated to reach 3,000,000 barrels by 2015. As a non-OPEC nation Kazakhstan is not bound by any fixed production quotas, however, in the

⁴²Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). See also R. W. Tolf, *The Russian Rockefellers: The Saga of the Nobel Family and the 1891 Russian Oil Industry* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1976).

⁴³ERAUSA, 'Energy,' 20 April 2014 (Washington, D.C.: Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United States of America, 2014), accessed online on 13 Feb. 2015 at <[http://www.azembassy.us/economy/energy.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=>](http://www.azembassy.us/economy/energy.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=).

⁴⁴ This presumably "verified" figure is more the claim of *The Straits Times* (Singapore) but the more likely figure is 3.5 billion tonnes.

⁴⁵ U.S., Census Bureau.

interest of maintaining a healthy price level, it maintains voluntary constraints under various guises.

There has been a high convergence of the private sectors of both the U.S. and Kazakhstan in energy partnerships. Through these energy co-operations U.S. majors hold leading positions in the Kazakh energy market. Unlike many countries in the Middle East, Central Asian states exploit their oil resources via joint-ventures or PSA operations with international oil majors and IOCs. Thus, it is no surprise to find many energy multi-national corporations, including American ones operating various energy projects in this key sector of most Central Asian economies. While Central Asian oil may not be relatively cheap to produce, it is of sufficient high quality to attract most oil majors to invest. In fact, the oil industry has been willing to spend 10s of billions of dollars annually in this sector.

Depending on Western including American oil corporations' good behavior in terms of allowing adequate Kazakh equity stakes in their energy consortiums, tax settlement, Kazakhization, environmental responsibility and good social infrastructural help, the Kazakh government rewards them with additional contracts if not also concessions including such as cancelling fines and duties. The nature of Kazakhstan's dealings with Chevron and later with ExxonMobil⁴⁶ too comes to mind in this regard. Very broadly U.S. corporations are involved in both hydrocarbon field development projects and energy transit pipeline projects in Kazakhstan and the rest of the C.A./Caspian region.

⁴⁶ Dagmar Schreiber and Jeremy Tredinnick, *Kazakhstan: Nomadic Routes from Caspian to Altai* (Hong Kong: Odyssey Books/Airphoto International, 2008), p.67.

Hydrocarbon field development projects - Some of the specific Central Asian/Caspian linked large energy projects where American corporations' equities⁴⁷ are inevitably involved include hydrocarbon field development projects such as:

Tengiz – Situated in the northeastern Caspian Sea shore, Tengiz is a 2,500 square miles field that holds between 6 to 9 billion barrels of proven recoverable reserves of high-quality oil. In 2000 it produced over 215,000 barrels per day. At 20% of production its operator TengizChevroil has been the largest producer of hydrocarbons so far in Kazakhstan. Between 1993 and 2009 about 177.9 million tons have been extracted from the Tengiz field and paying the Kazakh government some \$43 billion in taxes and royalties.⁴⁸ American equity holders in the TengizChevroil consortium are: Chevron 50 %, ExxonMobil 25% with 20% held by the Kazakh government via KazMunaigaz and the remaining 5% by LUKArco.⁴⁹

Karachaganak – The Karachaganak Consortium known also as the KIO is involved in exploiting this gas condensate field. About 70 % of the KPOC's oil exports exits via the CPC. The Kazakh government subsequently demanded a 10% stake in the consortium whose American equity holder is Texaco originally at 20%.

Kashagan – This giant discovery of the Caspian region was for long notching up delays and cost overruns. Finally in 2013 it has begun to produce in commercial quantities. Now operated by the NCOC, its American interests are held by ExxonMobil 16.81 %, Shell 16.81 % and ConocoPhillips at 8.4 %. Remarkably, in July 2013, i.e. over six months beyond our study period, Kazakhstan had ConocoPhillips' stake sold to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).⁵⁰ The

⁴⁷ See Appendix VIII, p.465.

⁴⁸ EKzUSA, 'Kazakhstan-US Relations,' *loc. cit.*

⁴⁹ United States of America, DOS-BN, *Background Note: Kazakhstan*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁰ Nichol, *Kazakhstan: Recent Developments*, *op. cit.*, p.15.

Shell Company represents American interests in some of the smaller hydrocarbon fields too like holding 50 % in Arman and 55 % in Zhemchuzhiny.⁵¹

Given that Soviet Russia had enormous geo-political and geo-economic influence and control over Central Asian energy export routes from even pre-independence times, a primary post-independence U.S. concern in this context, has been to provide immediately non-Russian and non-Iranian and over the longer haul even non-Chinese alternative export outlets for Central Asian hydrocarbons.⁵² Central Asian independences have gradually led to the withering away of the Russian energy-transit monopoly present earlier. Energy-hungry economies around the Central Asian periphery have broken into vicious competitions over Caspian oil resources. China, E.U., Eastern Europe, India and Turkey have taken the plunge into C.A. hydrocarbons. While the U.S. is not a neighbor of Central Asia, this has not prevented its internationally active IOCs from strategically reaching out and taking exceedingly liberal bites at the Caspian energy pie, particularly via large investments in energy transit infrastructure.

Energy transit pipeline projects - Some specific energy transit pipeline projects through which the U.S. has chosen to concretely manifest its interest in or express its reservations on Caspian hydrocarbons and projects include:

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline - About 733 million barrels per year of Kazakh oil travels on this pipeline, having been supplied earlier via barges from Kazakh ports on eastern Caspian Sea (Map 25). The capacity of this pipeline has been doubling continually since it started in 1996. The main American stake-holders in this pipeline are: Chevron, ConocoPhillips and ExxonMobil. As per Table 6, anything between 70,000 to 500,000 bpd of Kazakh oil would be barged to Baku,

⁵¹ Olcott, Kazmunaigaz: Kazakhstan's National, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

⁵² Weitz, *Kazakhstan and the New*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

Azerbaijan to exit via this pipeline's total throughput capacity of 1.2 million bpd, along with Azeri production at Shah Deniz and ACG. Options for replacing Kazakh barge traffic with fixed pipelines in the future do exist.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) - Connects major Kazakh oil deposits, including from Tengiz, to Novorossiysk, a Russian port on the eastern Black Sea coast. From there it may reach world market either through the Turkish Straits or the NSC route by first using Sovkomflot. This pipeline's capacity has continually grown somewhat. CPC is owned and operated by a multi-national consortium that includes the U.S. private-sector majors Chevron (15%), Mobil (7.5%) directly and also indirectly via Oryx, Arco, Shell and even Rosneft. Russia for its part has a rather high controlling stake in this pipeline, amounting to more than 24%.

Uzen – Atyrau - Samara (UAS) pipeline - This pipeline connects Kazakh oil to the extensive Russian Transneft distribution system up north, the Kazakhstan portion of which is 100% owned by KazTransOil.⁵³ This pipeline carries about 730,000 bpd and operates under a 15years transit agreement with Russia. Depending on availability of a higher transit quota, the capacity of this pipeline may be boosted in the future.

West Kazakhstan-West China (WKWC) pipeline – Basically, it carries Kazakh oil from Tengiz area to China proper via Xinjiang. It began operating in 2004 after Atasu was linked to Alashankou and has grown in phases and has operated at full capacity since 2009. Some Russian oil has also joined in in this pipeline, along with additional supplies from the Hungarian oil fields in northern Xinjiang.

⁵³ Olcott, Kazmunaigaz: Kazakhstan's National, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

Table 6 - Some Past, Present and Future Oil and/or Natural Gas Routes or Pipelines in and out from the Central Asian Region

LN	Name	US Link	Type /s	Route/s	Capacity	Length	Cost (\$)	Limiting Terms	Current Status	Remarks/ Reactions
NORTH										
1	Glavtransneft (includes pipelines such as the UAS)	No	O	All across within FSU and extending into Eastern Europe	600 mt./yr	65,000 km	NA	Subject to quotas and transit fees	Operating with hiccups, owing to monopolistic hold	Central Asian post-Soviet states plan to reduce its usage.
3	AIOC "Early Oil" (Northern Pipeline)		O	Baku-Novorossiysk via Grozny	120,000+ Br/Dy	1,000 mi	NA	Involves transit fees, taxes and quotas	Russian side is functional but Chechen sector is inoperative	Chechens may restore links when Russia settles dues; works in hiccups.
4	"Early Oil" Northern Route		O	Tengiz-Aqtau-Baku-Novorossiysk	100,000 Br/Dy	1,500+ km	NA	Ditto	Continually continuing	Involved parties are somewhat satisfied.
7	Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)		O	*Kazakhstan/Tengiz-Russia/Novorossiysk via Tikhoretsk	1.5+ mBr/Dy	1,500 mi	2.6 b	No swaps; has taxes and transit fees	"First oil" delivered on late March 2001; upgrades to be ready by 2015	Keenly used by involved parties. With minimal Russian inputs.
19	Central Asia-Center		G	Turkmenistan to Russia	2.2 Tcf	N.A.	N.A.	Feeds UGSS	Operating well	Used by parties
WEST										
5	"Early Oil" Western Route		O	Baku-Batumi	NA	NA	NA	With transit fees and taxes	Kazakh oil passes via barges to and by rail onwards from Baku	Parties are somewhat satisfied.
6	AIOC "Early Oil" (Western Pipeline)		O	Baku-Supsa via Tbilisi	200,000+ Br/Dy	550 mi	300m	Ditto	Operating fully via small pipeline	Watched with anxiety by Russia.
8	AIOC Main Export Pipeline (MEP)		O	Baku, Azerbaijan-Ceyhan, Turkey via Tbilisi (BTC)	1.0+ mBr/Dy	2,000+mi	3.7b	Ditto	Operating since May 2006; also with Kazakh oil.	Very strongly supported by the US and Turkey.
9	Central Asia-Turkey Pipeline (may grow out of the current KCTS)		O	*Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan (may be with under-Caspian Sea link) to Azerbaijan and on to Turkey via Georgia	300,000+ Br/Dy	1,300 mi (est.)	4b	Ditto	MOU signed on March 2001 but pending resolution of Caspian Sea legal status	US would oppose a route that skirts the Caspian Sea via Iran; E.U. and C.A. keen, nonetheless.
10	Iran-Turkey Pipeline (KCA)		G	North Iran to eastern Turkey, perhaps with a Turkmenistan line	10 Bcm/yr ; over 23yrs.	600 mi	NA	Ditto	Contract signed; financing uncertain.	The US may not be too keen.
20	SCP (or BTE)		G	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzarum	3 Bcf/yr	1,040 mi	NA	Ditto	On and expanding	Nabucco link-up?
21	Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP)		G	Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan via Sub-Caspian link	16 Bcm		20b+/-	N.A.	Resurrected since May 2007.	Same as for LN 9
SOUTH										
2	Old Afghan Pipeline		G	Jowzjan Prov. to FSU via Uzbekistan	NA	180km	NA	NA	Afghan side uncertain	Cannot be fully guaranteed until stability returns.
11	Iran (swap) Routes		O	*Baku, Neka etc-Kharg Island via Tabriz or Tehran	300,000+ Br/Dy	NA	NA	Involve limits of swapping	Turkmen and Kazakh oil; Growing gradually.	Discouraged by US Government.
12	Kharg Island Pipeline	No	O	*Baku-Kharg Island	210,000+ Br/Dy	100km	350m	With transit fees and taxes	Unclear	Generally, all Iran-linked" southern routes" are opposed by the US government.
13	Bandar Abbas Pipeline	No	O	Tengiz-Bandar Abbas via Turkmenistan	NA	NA	NA	Ditto	Unclear	May not be supported by US government.
14	Turkmen-Pakistan Pipeline (CentGas)		G	*Dauletabad to central Pakistan via Afghanistan (TAP); also involving Uzbek gas	2Bcf/Dy	872 mi	3b	Ditto	Signed on as TAPI, 2010 but instability in Afghanistan is stalling construction work	Russian and Caspian fuel may also use this pipeline when finally built.
15	Central Asian Oil Pipeline (CAOP)		O	*Chardzhou to Gwadar or Karachi via Afghanistan	1.0+ mBr/Dy	1,700km	2.7b	Ditto	Instability in Afghanistan is stalling construction work	MOU signed in Dec. 2002
18	KKK Pipeline	No	G	Turkmenistan/Korpe zh-e to Iran/Kurt-Kui	300 bcf/yr	125mi	NA	NA	Functioning since 1997	It is Turkmenistan's answer to Russian pressure.
22	DSK Pipeline	No	G	Turkmenistan to Iran	12 Bcm/yr	113mi	180m	NA	Operating	Well used.
EAST										
16	Kazakhstan-China Pipeline (KCPC)		O	Western Kazakhstan to Western China via Sinkiang	240,000+ Br/Dy	3,700mi (est.)	NA	NA	Begun 2004; operating fully since 2009	May be linked-up with Japan.
17	Turkmenistan-China Pipeline. (TAGP)		G	Chardzhou to China via Uzb. , Kaz. and Sinkiang	1,400 bcf	3,700mi (est.)	5.0b	NA	Uzbek and Kazakh gas may join in, so also Tajik and Kyrgyz via Line D	May be extended to S. Korea/Japan.

NOTE: THIS TABLE IS INTENDED TO BE STUDIED ALONG WITH ITS ASSOCIATED MAP 25.

Notes: LN = Line Reference Number (i.e. in the afore-depicted Pipelines Map); US Link - Indicate on United States' Government or private sector participation; Type/s: O = Oil, G = Gas and O-G = Oil and Gas; Route/s: * - These suggested routes also have a number of proposed variants and may include multiple projects too; Capacity: mt/yr = million tons per year, Bcf/Dy = billion cubic feet per day, Br/Dy = barrels per day, mBr/Dy = million barrels per day, bcm/yr = billions of cubic meters per year. TBA = to be announced/agreed; Length: km = kilometer/s, mi = miles, est. = estimate; Cost: \$ = refers to U.S. dollars, m = millions/s, b = billions/s, NA = not available or not applicable; FSU = Former Soviet Union; AIOC = Azerbaijan International Operating Company; Quota system is employed by some pipeline networks; Numerous other purely intra-Central Asian pipelines/routes are ignored here, for obvious reasons.

SOURCES: Adapted, updated and prepared by this researcher from: U.S. Dept. of State, *Caspian Region Energy Development Report* (as required by HR 3610) undated report attached to letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Robert Byrd, April 15, 1997, p. 3; *Century's Contract* (Baku: Azerbaijan Pub., 1994); Cummings, *Understanding Central Asia*; op.cit., p. 141; U.S. Dept. of Energy, EIA available at <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?tips=AF>; unsigned news reports; and news bulletins of various oil companies.

Shymkent-Chardzhou (SC) pipeline – It is an oil pipeline from the Shymkent refinery in Kazakhstan to Chardzhou in Turkmenistan that transits via Uzbekistan and may involve Russian oil products transactions.

Transneft (T) pipeline network - This extensive ex-Soviet and now Russian oil pipeline network enters Kazakhstan at various different places much like the gas-carrying CAC mentioned below (see, Map 25) but actually, in Transneft's case, both bringing oil into and out of mainly Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The transport quota (of 44 mbd) that Russia applied in these pipelines was felt to be too restrictive by both the Kazakhs and Americans.⁵⁴

Trans-Asia Gas Pipeline (TAGP) – Sometimes also known as the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline (CACGP), it carries Turkmen gas to China proper via Xinjiang. Kazakh gas may join in too via a new branch line (AS) being constructed from the drying (see Map 25) Aral Sea area. As of mid-2012 more Uzbek and other C.A. gases too have linked up to this interconnector pipeline/s to the Kazakh-Xinjiang border beyond which it connects to China's East-West line headed toward its Pacific coast.

Bukhara-Tashkent-Bishkek-Almaty (BTBA) pipeline - This pipeline, sometimes also known as the GSBA pipeline, delivers Uzbek gas, including from Gazli, to Shymkent in Kazakhstan and then onwards to Kyrgyzstan and would also interconnect to the TAGP by re-entering Kazakhstan towards its Xinjiang border to again link up with the Chinese network mentioned above.

Central Asia-Center (CAC) system - This pipeline system carries Turkmen and Kazakh gas to Russia transiting both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (please see, Map

⁵⁴ Kasenov, 'The Institutions and Conduct, *op. cit.*, p. 274.

25 again). It carries anything between 2.3Bcf. to 2.2Tcf. gas per year, out of C.A. to Russia and beyond. The main parties involved are Gazprom, Turkmengaz, Uzbekneftgaz and KazMunaiGas. In this regard, Gazprom had long used subsidiary companies and offshore intermediaries⁵⁵ including those in Cyprus, to deal more briskly with C.A. gas. More so than on the previous six pipelines the U.S. has scant interest on this system too.

Karachaganak-Atyrau (KA) pipeline - This is an oil pipeline that links the Karachaganak condensate field to Atyrau. Given that Texaco has a significant stake in the Karachaganak field, we may safely presume that America has some interest in the pipeline that leads out from there. This may interconnect with the CPC to find the Black Sea outlet for Kazakh and C.A. oil.


Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) - Kazakh and Uzbek oil joins Turkmen oil at Chardzhou in a southwardly direction towards Gwadar in Pakistan. The U.S. has long been keen on this project, as it tallies with its various objectives in the C.A. region, including in the goal of linking it to South Asia as part of its Greater Central Asia project.

Regarding Kazakhstan's pipelines strategy its former foreign minister Kassymzhomart Tokaev says "in general, our strategy is to have as many pipelines as is possible. We have no political prejudices. We want to export as much oil as is possible, in order to produce as much oil as is possible. We have very ambitious plans to produce more than 100 million tonnes in the next five years. Now we produce 60 million tonnes".⁵⁶ Presumably, the rest of energy rich Central Asia/Caspian too holds a similar strategy. Over

⁵⁵ It must be noted that use of intermediaries are mainly not for gaining any direct business benefits to the state-linked firm but are used rather more for navigating deals among the NIS, for asset stripping, for monopolizing markets, and for even obfuscating finance and ownership.

⁵⁶ *The Sunday Times* (Singapore) 13 Feb. 2005, p. 27.

and above petroleum resources Kazakhstan also possesses natural gas reserves amounting to some 45.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf.), both in its onshore and offshore gas and oil fields. Similarly, Azerbaijan has 31.5Tcf, Uzbekistan has slightly more at 39.7Tcf and Turkmenistan stands head, shoulders and navel above them all with a hefty natural gas reserve of 618.1Tcf.⁵⁷



Map 25 – Pipelines Map Associated with Table 6

Note: Representations of international boundaries and pipelines are not necessarily authoritative and are performed merely as approximations. Lines indicating either oil or gas pipelines may, in sectors, represent the presence of multiple pipelines, irrespective of their actual contents.

Sources: DOE-EIA; DOS; KazMunaiGaz; Transnaft; B.P.; and *OGJ*.

Pipeline Politics in Central Asia

After the West invested in the Caucasian/Central Asian hydrocarbon sector, they soon discovered the limits of the Soviet era energy infrastructure they had to make do with in the initial years. These infrastructures were inherited and thus monopolized by Russia to the unfortunate detriment of the other successor states and to the annoyance of other countries

⁵⁷ B.P. *Statistical Review of World Energy (BPSRWE)*, June 2013 (London: BP p.l.c., 2013), p.20.

and entities invested in them. To overcome this limiting factor, they together with the tacit approval of the Central Asian leaders hatched alternative projects for either upgrading existing or building totally new pipelines for exporting the hydrocarbons. Meanwhile, Soviet era production declines had to be reversed too and the fresh options for alternative routing that are fraught with multiple hurdles must be handled pragmatically. Fortunately, this was done quite rapidly.

Within a decade (2001/2) of independence the Central Asian region had more than 1,666 Tbd. of oil and more than 114 Bcm. of gas produced, according to BP and largely available for export to world markets.⁵⁸ Another decade later, in 2012, the production figures were 2,891 Tbd. and 157 Bcm., respectively. These increasing hydrocarbon productions would be dispersed both within and without the region utilizing a mixture of either upgraded or totally new pipelines, as may be seen in Map 25, that depart the C.A. region, multi-directionally, and as can be verified in Table 6 that is associated with it, quite readily.

The issue of gaining access to and drawing out securely, either via pipelines or other means, the hydrocarbon resources of the C.A. region has occupied the investment instincts and entrepreneurial acumen of Central Asia's outer and extra regional powers/actors, as we initially conceptualized via Figure 2 in the introductory Chapter One of this research, that have been engaged in a near cut-throat competition to lock-in as much of these resources in their favor, right from the very outset of the region's independence. A scrutiny of the rather vast literature⁵⁹ that discusses these issues reveals the four basic directional orientations of

⁵⁸ There were few separately and reliably produced production figures for Xinjiang. In 1999, Xinjiang was reckoned to have produced 17.4m. tons of oil. This figure converts to 358 Tbd., thereby easily placing Xinjiang's production figures above those of Azerbaijan. Thus, it can reasonably be surmised that Xinjiang's hydrocarbon production figures loosely parallels those of Azerbaijan though these resultant quantities are unavailable for export, given the rather high demand in China itself.

⁵⁹ See, for example, Shabir Ahmad Khan and Salma Ashraf Kayani, "Pipeline Politics in Central Asia: Paradox of Competitive/Cooperative Relations between the United States, Russia and China," *Central Asia*, 73(Winter 2013).

these various competitive energy projects and the geo-strategies these represent. It is to these existing and upcoming pipelines and/or routes and the directional politics they inevitably represent that I will now turn to, considering each briefly in a North, West, South, East order:

Northern outlets

When one views the north, the main pipelines and routes that present themselves are, pre-eminently, the *Glavtransneft*, CAC, AIOC⁶⁰ Northern Pipeline, “Early Oil” Northern route, CPC and the UAS. These outlets are mainly Russian based or proposed. They either use infrastructure inherited from the Soviets, or freshly proposed Russia-centric projects that chiefly or equitably benefits Russia.⁶¹ These projects, except the CPC, mainly cater to Russian energy demands and strengthen its monopolistic hold over C.A. hydrocarbon exports.

In terms of export capacities these outlets easily represent the lion’s share of C.A. exports. These outlets are subject to either total or high Russian control and also rather tight with hydrocarbon supplies unless these are bringing in hard currency benefits directly to Russia itself. Both the U.S. and the E.U. strongly discourage involvement in these outlets, though not exclusively so. Unlike those extra-regional major powers, however, Turkey, an outer regional power that directly stands to benefit from C.A. directional outlet choices also opposes these routes with a similar intensity, if not more so.

West

Given the United States’ keenness to strengthen the independences of the new Central Asian states including through reducing their vulnerabilities to Russia’s monopolistic hold

⁶⁰ Note in pre-1980s energy literature the AIOC abbrev. was used to refer to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company but since the early 1990s, it has mainly stood for the Azerbaijan International Operating Company.

⁶¹ See Map 25, Table 6 and Appendix VIII.

over their hydrocarbon export-outlets to their north, it is not surprising to see the various proposals and rapid development of alternative West-headed outlets by U.S.-led consortiums. The main westerly routes or pipelines that present themselves to us are the “Early Oil” Western Route, AIOC “Early Oil” Western Pipeline, AIOC Main Export Pipeline (MEP), SCP, and the two Central Asia-Turkey pipelines known as KCA and TCGP respectively. The MEP, or more popularly known as the BTC, was in fact negotiated by Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkey in the very late 1990s when Russia was in the thick of its military campaign in break-away Chechnya.⁶² Then there is, of course, the Iran-Turkey Pipeline in which, it goes without saying, the United States is not too keen to support, at least, under the current political situation.

South

Generally, southern routes and pipelines represent the shortest and hence the cheapest direct access to the open ocean for free-market seeking C.A. hydrocarbons. The main routes and pipelines that present themselves to us in this directional sector are the Iran (swap) routes, Kharg Island Pipeline, Bandar Abbas Pipeline, the KKK Pipeline and the DSK (Daulatabad-Sarakhs-Khangiran) Pipeline. The latter two are Iran-ended gas pipelines.

All these Iran involved routes and pipelines are discouraged by the United States which not only generally does not support but often opposes them as well, curiously, even while U.S. majors like Exxon, Shell and Conoco are secretly known to have struck energy deals with Iran throughout the 1990s⁶³ if not also later. However, not all south-headed pipelines face U.S. hostility. For example, the U.S. is neutral towards the old Afghan pipeline. Remarkably, the U.S. reserves some of its strongest supports to other south headed pipelines like the Central Asian Oil Pipeline and the CentGas pipeline. This is because,

⁶² ‘Pipeline politics,’ *BulletinWire, The Bulletin...*, op. cit.

⁶³ See Juhasz, *The Tyranny of Oil*, op. cit., p.334.

these pipelines totally avoid both Russia and I. R. Iran and integrates the Af-Pak region with Central Asian hydrocarbon projects as transit and/or consumer countries, both being energy enterprises that are very much in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives.

East

High emerging demands from the East necessitated the construction of hydrocarbon pipelines to China via *Xinjiang*. The two main pipelines that lead the way in this direction are the WKWC pipeline and the TAGP. Given the enormous distances these pipelines traverse, they easily represent the most expensive pipelines currently operating. Though the U.S. is not overly enthusiastic on these pipelines, they nonetheless do not oppose them as these are headed to China and perhaps onward to Japan and S. Korea, all growth engines in their own right, vibrant economies that the U.S. itself plans and/or accords to ride with, as it attempts to lock-in bigger markets for its technology, services and capital. If the U.S. uses nuclear proliferation and terrorism concerns to oppose southern routes via Iran then in a similar vein it uses human rights and minority issues to dissuade routes via China to the rest of the Asia-pacific.

Strategic Materials: Non-Energy Significant

In addition to the strategic mineral fuels of uranium, natural gas and petroleum that were covered adequately above, Central Asia also has abundant non-energy/fuel relevant strategic materials⁶⁴ which, as already briefly discussed earlier and being non-focal there, are, to simply cover their range and basic characteristics, just tabulated in Table 7.

⁶⁴ An expended coverage of some of these is also given in Appendix X.

Table 7 - Strategic Materials: Non-fuel Relevant

Material	Description
Aluminum [Al]	It is the most abundant metal on the earth's crust. Its world reserve is about 28,000 mil metric tons. Its chief source in the U.S. is bauxite and it is mined chiefly in Arkansas, New York and California there, as can be seen in the preceding Chart 2. Though it is not as heavy as steel it is as hard as silver. As a conductor of electricity and heat only copper, silver and gold exceed it. Aluminum is used widely in the transportation, packaging and building industries. These range from airplanes, other vehicles, cooking utensils and foils, scientific instruments, to making explosives and solid fuels for submarine-launched missiles. In fuel-conservation minded aero-space sector aluminium-composites such as GLARE are highly sought-after; in fact, Airbus has gone for it! Aluminum is worked in significant quantities in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and in Tajikistan too, as may be seen in Table 8.
Antimony [Sb]	Commercial antimony is a brittle metal that is obtained mainly from the mineral Stibnite. In the U.S. it is largely produced in Idaho, Montana, Nevada and Alaska. It is a poor conductor of heat and electricity. When alloyed it imparts its peculiar property of expanding while cooking. It is useful component in type metal and shrapnel shot metal besides of course for pewter fabrication. It is produced at Kadamzhay and Novay in Kyrgyzstan and at Dzhidzhikrutskiy in Tajikistan. Deposits are in Kazakhstan too.
Chromium [Cr]	This hard gray metal has a melting point between that of iron and platinum. The world reserve base of this mineral is about 7500 mil metric tons. It never occurs pure but found in minerals with lead or iron, in such ores as chromite. In the U.S. it is produced in Montana and Alaska. As an alloying element it imparts strength, hardness and elasticity to steel. 90% of the ex-U.S.S.R's reserve of this mineral is within Central Asia. Kazakhstan is a major producer of chromium. App. X in this study covers it in greater detail later.
Coal [C]	Coal is a carbon-based hard black or brownish inflammable rock/material used since ancient times as a solid fossil fuel. Coal ranges from light lignite to heavy anthracite. Coal is widely distributed across the world and is mined at reserves in over a 100 countries. The USA, Russia, China, Australia and India have vast reserves. The ex-U.S.S.R was the leading coal producer and was overtaken only since 1983 by China. Kazakhstan which emerged from the USSR produces coal at Karaganda. Turkmenistan has brown coal. Kyrgyzstan has highest quality coal deep in its mountains. In fact the Central Asian Region of the ex-U.S.S.R. contains about 26% of the total Soviet reserves.
Cobalt [Co]	A hard, pinkish white metal that is brittle but heavier than iron. It is strongly magnetic. The world reserve base for this mineral is about 9.0 mil metric tons. Some Moroccan mines produce it specifically, otherwise it is found in zinc ores. When alloyed with chromium, molybdenum and tungsten it is beautifully suited for making cutting tools. It is mainly used for alloys in rocket-ramjet propulsion systems and in engine parts. It was

produced before 1971 in the U.S. in the states of Idaho, California, Pennsylvania and Missouri. Important deposits of cobalt are present in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Appendix X towards the end of this study covers it in greater detail.

Copper

[Cu]

The metal is of reddish brilliant color and it is heavier than iron. Widely distributed in the world, it is the only metal that can be found in its pure metallic form in nature. Copper is exceeded only by gold, silver and platinum in being most ductile and malleable. It is excelled only by iron in tenacity. As a conductor of electricity it comes after silver. Only steel is more elastic than copper. The world reserve of this base metal is about 630 mil metric tons. Tellurium, molybdenum and selenium are by-products of copper refining. Molybdenum is produced at the Charukhdayransk and south Yashransk deposits in Tajikistan. Copper has wide industrial applications all over the world. In the U.S. it is produced extensively in many states including Arizona, Montana, Utah and Michigan. Copper is found widely across the Central Asian region. In fact Central Asia inherited about 76% of the ex-U.S.S.R.'s reserves.

Gold

[Au]

This precious lustrous soft metal is highly prized because of its resistance to corrosion and its scarcity. It is the most malleable of metals and can be beaten into sheets less than 1/300,000th inch in thickness. The world reserve for this precious mineral is about 74,000 metric tons. It is widely distributed in small quantities across the world. In the U.S. it is produced in paying quantities in South Dakota, Utah, Nevada, California, New Mexico, Colorado, Idaho, Arizona, Washington and Alaska. Gold is of course available for exploitation widely across the Central Asian region. Wider coverage of this precious element/metal in this study can be found at Appendix X.

Iron Ore

[Fe]

Iron is the most important of metals. But iron can be found in its most pure form only in meteorites. Cast iron or impure iron is turned into steel. Magnetism is the single most remarkable property of iron. The world has an identified reserve base of 270,000 mil metric tons of its crude ore. Iron and steel form the foundation of the titanic manufacturing industries of the world. It is mined most extensively in the U.S. in states such as Minnesota, Michigan, Wisconsin, Alabama, New York and Utah. The ex-Soviet Union was the world's leading iron-ore producer. Post-Soviet Kazakhstan is a major iron-ore producer in Central Asia and Atasu and Gornaya Shoriya are particularly famous for this.

Manganese

[Mn]

This gray lustered very hard metal is as heavy as iron. But unlike iron it is neither malleable nor magnetic. The world reserve base of this mineral is about 5,000 mil metric tons. It is found in ores like pyrolusite and never comes pure in nature. Ferromanganese contains 20-80% iron and iron with lesser than 20% manganese is known as spiegeleisen. In the modern manufacturing of iron and steel, manganese is virtually indispensable as it imparts strength, toughness and elasticity to them. It is also used in purifying water and can be used to neutralize the venom in snake bites. The states of Nevada, New Jersey and Montana produced significant quantities of it to exhaustion in the U.S. The Atusuy and Dzezhdy mines in Kazakhstan produce it. Afghanistan, of course has big reserves.

Mercury [Hg]	The silver liquid metal is twice as heavy as iron. It occurs in the sulphide ore called cinnabar. It combines with virtually all metals and also with most acids to form salts. Among its numerous uses are to make scientific instruments, for separating and refining gold and silver from their ores and fulminate for explosive caps. As seen in Chart 2, in the U.S. it is produced in California, Nevada, Alaska and Idaho. Central Asia, as may be seen in Table 8, inherited all 100% of the ex-U.S.S.R.'s reserves of this mineral. In fact, Khaydarkan hosts the largest mercury complex in Kyrgyzstan.
Platinum Group [Pt]	Six closely related metals viz.: platinum, palladium, rhodium, ruthenium, iridium and osmium together make-up the platinum group of metals (PGMs). Discovered in 1735, they are also commonly referred to as rare metals. The automotive, chemical and petroleum-refining industries use the metals of this group mainly as catalysts. Globally, the electrical, electronic, dental and medical industries and corporations too use them widely. Central Asia possesses significant reserves of it.
Potassium [K]	It is a light silvery white metal that is separated from its salts by electrolysis. Potassium or kalium never occurs in its free metallic state in nature, it is always found in combination with other elements in various rocks. When it is compounded with other minerals it has great economic and industrial value. Some kinds of potassium that are piezoelectric like Rochelle salt is at times used even to detect "silent" submarines resting on the ocean beds. The states of New Mexico, California, Utah and Michigan produce potassium in the U.S. It is found extensively in Turkmenistan.
Silver [Ag]	This sparkling white precious metal is extremely malleable and ductile. It has high tenacity and is simply the best conductor of electricity available. It is not affected by any atmospheric agent except sulphur compounds. It has great reflective properties. Silver is a native to nature in that it can be found in pure chunks but more often it is taken from ores containing other elements. Its world reserve base is about 420,000 metric tons. The Americas are never short of it and in the United States it is produced in the states of Idaho, Arizona, Utah, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada and Colorado. Copper is added to harden silver mostly. It has enormous social and industrial applications especially in a world of ever-growing states. Some of its popular uses are in the photography, jewelry, electrical and sterling ware industries. It is found extensively in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Sulphur [S]	Sulphur (also spelled Sulfur) is a yellow nonmetallic element that is found free in many places on earth especially in volcanic regions. It is a poor conductor of electricity and heat. Its bleaching, disinfectant and preservative properties give it numerous medicinal and industrial applications. The U.S. is a leading producer of sulphur and does so in states like Texas, Louisiana, California and Nevada. Large quantities of sulphur are required for making many things from paper and fertilizer to firework and gunpowder. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and most other Central Asian states are rich in sulphur deposits.
Tin	A malleable and ductile bluish-white metal that is as heavy as iron. Because it does not tarnish easily in open air it is often used as a

[Sn]	covering material for other more tarnishable metals. It is used for making a variety of domestic and industrial products. It is not that freely available from nature but is obtained from a kind of ore called cassiterite. An important by-product or co-product of <i>Stannum</i> (Latin for tin) is columbium. Although the U.S. produces very little amounts of tin in states such as Alaska, Colorado it consumes a significant amount of the world output. Central Asia has 86% of the ex-Soviets' resources. Deposits of tin are found in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Titanium [Ti]	Titanium is a lustrous silver transition chemical element that has low density and high strength. Widely distributed across the world it occurs in minerals such as anatase, brookite, ilmenite, perovskite and in rutile. As a metal, titanium enjoys wide commercial and military aerospace applications. It has high corrosion resistance and as such has wide maritime and medical application too. It is produced in Australia, South Africa, Canada, India, China, Japan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Russia and the U.S., as may be seen in Table 8 and Chart 2. The titanium world reserve base is about 600 mil metric tons of titanium dioxide (TiO ₂) content.
Tungsten [W]	This hard but malleable gray metal is often found in veins and placer deposits in some regions of the world. It is as heavy as gold and very resistant to acids but its most remarkable feature is its high melting point around 3400 ⁰ C, or 6150 ⁰ F. It increases the hardness and tenacity of any metal with which it is alloyed. In the industrial arena some of the best high-speed tool steels are made of tungsten alloys. It is produced from the ores wolfram and scheelite. In the U.S. tungsten ore and concentrate are produced in the states of California, North Carolina, Nevada, Colorado and Montana. Besides Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan too have deposits of tungsten.
Zinc [Zn]	This sparkling bluish metal is as heavy as iron and found in ores like franklinite and calamine. Zinc has great protective properties and for this reason it is highly sought after for coating metals like iron and steel. It has varied industrial applications including for galvanizing sheet iron and die-castings. It is used as an alloying metal with copper to make brass, and as a component of chemical compounds in rubber and paints. Other than a number of countries across the world, the U.S. has been the leading producer of zinc in states like New Jersey, Montana, Alaska, Tennessee, Idaho, New York, Colorado and Arizona. The Central Asian region is rich in zinc deposits. The strategic materials cadmium, indium and germanium are all by-products of zinc smelting as is produced in the Almalyk zinc plant in Uzbekistan.

Sources: U.S. Geological Survey; U.S. Department of the Interior.

As mentioned, in addition to the strategic mineral fuels of uranium, natural gas and petroleum that were covered adequately earlier, the regional availability of these materials and other minerals deemed critical or strategic by the USA, in a unit by unit tabular portrayal, can also be easily grasped when one studies Table 8 that here follows:

Table 8 – Selected Critical or Strategic Materials of the United States and of the Central Asian Region

Mineral	Afg.	Azr.	Kaz.	Kyr.	Taj.	Tkm.	Uzb.	Xin.	USA
Petroleum	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Natural Gas	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/	/*^
Uranium	/		/	/	/		/	/	/*
Gold	/		/	/	/		/+	/	/
Manganese	/		/						
Cobolt		/	/				/		
Chromium	/		/+	/					
Tin			/	/	/				
Potassium						/			/
Zinc	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/
Mercury				/+	/				/
Tangstun			/+	/	/		/		/
Silver	/		/	/	/		/		/
Antimony			/	/	/				/
Iron Ore	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/
Copper	/	/	/	/	/		/	/	/*
Sulphur	/		/			/	/		/*
Aluminium		/	/		/#				/*
Mica	/								
Bauxite			/	/					
Nickle			/						/
Titanium			/+						/*
Beryl	/		/						
Coal	/		/	/	/	/			/

Notes: / - This indicates the presence within the country of significant deposits/reserves of the checked materials; * - The largest producer in the world; ^ - The U.S.A. leads very slimly over Russia, surprisingly in natural gas production too; + - Significant production; # - A production specialization that arose due to well-endowed water resources.

Note: Some of the materials listed here may not be strategic as defined by purist in the United States but have nonetheless been included because the U.S., its allies or clients do have some dependence, no matter however small, on them and they are now reliably, *albeit*, not always readily available in the Central Asian region. The materials available within the U.S. and upon which the U.S. has a less than 75% dependence on currently, are listed too for consideration and comparison.

Sources: Compiled by the present researcher from a variety of sources including from the C.I.A. Factbook.

Conclusion

The analysis and empirical evidence proffered in this study adequately, though not exhaustively, presents the emerging, albeit shifting relations between the recently independent CARs and the United States of America, largely, in the context of the problems of their continual dependence on and vulnerability to access of and trade in strategic materials especially those that pertains to energy. The fact of this vulnerability highlights the problems of availability and access to these strategic materials, the future fruitful solution of which should drive the geo-political strategies of contemporary times. These

hypotheses are drawn not just from our analytical and empirical data but also from the geo-political literature which owes its legitimacy to its capacity to depict the milieu of the times.

The various concepts of geo-politics originated after and at the end of the era of European wars when the territorial expansion of states to their natural or perceived national boundaries or ideological horizons was vigorously pursued and commonly accepted. The primary theme of most European geo-political scholars then was, of course, the access to and control of pure territorial space. Integral to this principal concern of theirs was also the access to and control of all key physical resources, strategic or otherwise.

In our contemporary world, increasingly, revolutionary development in the technological, communicational, political and military spheres has resulted in, with irregular exceptions, the continual and progressive irrelevance of the classical concept of direct territorial expansion, control and dominance. Supersonic air links; computer-integrated real-time satellite communications and interactions; burgeoning popular quest for democracy amidst the world nations; dynamically expanding and functioning international, regional and other supranational organization; and, more realistically, the ceaseless deployment of ever more potent intercontinental weapons of mass destructions have together obviated the need for and practicality of attempting any direct territorial expansion and/or control.

Accordingly, geo-political concepts elaborated in these later times should play down the importance of territorial control or any perceived confrontation between the major powers and instead lay greater stress on how nations gain greater access and build influence or on how major powers engage in friendly competition in resource-rich regions especially in these post-Soviet times.

The fact that territorial expansions no longer bring greater benefits than certain and rising costs is adequately demonstrated by the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Soviet failure in Afghanistan and also to a lesser extent in the rest of Central Asia and the current predicament of the American-led coalition in post-Saddam Iraq as well as in post-Taliban Afghanistan.⁶⁵ Ironically, developments and technological progresses that erase the need for any direct territorial absorption and control also through a curious reality simultaneously increases the degree to which the West is becoming dependent upon foreign sources for many resources essential to their various strategic industries.

In particular, the United States' craze for control, if not also ownership, of strategic resources, principally energy related ones, has made it poke its head into every nook and cranny across the world starting mainly from the last third of the 20th century, if not earlier, but, particularly so, at its turning end, from the 1990s. As hydrocarbons, mainly oil, figure as the driving factor of the leading and largest economies of the world, it is desired by all of them; the U.S. as the sole superpower, other major powers, various regional powers and other wannabe powers too. All of these powers and actors, factor this objective into their foreign relations. As we saw in chapters 3 and 4 and, in particular, seen in this chapter itself, the U.S. and its transnational actors pursue this goal in their various relations across the C.A. region. The consequent struggle to competitively lock-in, if not also to hegemonically control, the available oil/energy supplies as these head for so-called peaks, often entails latent tensions if not also explode into bloody conflicts involving collateral casualties. This sort of geopolitical situation exist not just in Venezuela, Nigeria, Iraq and Yemen but also in countries like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and, yes Afghanistan, particularly in an energy transit context, in the new Central Asian region.

⁶⁵ By the way, in both Afghanistan and Iraq the U.S.-led "war" remains active, despite Obama's staggered drawdowns, especially given the ongoing bloody insurgencies. The Anglo-American Afghan War, is easily the longest by far in modern times for both these powers; and paradoxically too at that, for the **living long dead** former and the **dying and still high kicking** latter.

As the United States diversify also into the C.A. energy scene, the Russian and Iranian duopolistic hold over the Caspian resources will be fragmented and American participation in alternative energy export infrastructure development will affect global geopolitics and national securities as Russia's monopolistic control of C.A. exports to Europe and elsewhere is thus broken and gradually reduced. The consequent, reduced market and lesser exports, if also compounded by lower prices, will result in diminishing hard-currency revenue to Russia, thus chipping away at Russian power in its regional neighborhood and internationally too. When America expands its LNG market and develops exports from shale fracking too, in the near future, this pressure on Russia and Iran may increase many folds and would affect their I.R.!

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions

Although American general interest, for disparate reasons, in and on the larger Central Asian region can be traced back to well before the 20th century the United States' first diplomatic forays into the individual states of the region proper, however, had to, with the exception of Afghanistan and Azerbaijan in a *de jure* and Uzbekistan in a *de facto* sense, largely wait, as we saw elsewhere, till the dramatic demise of the Soviet Union and the resultant emergence of a cluster of newly-independent Central Asian republics in late 1991. Even *Xinjiang*, a Chinese autonomous region, did not completely escape America's all pervading interest, benign or otherwise; though we could not cover it as a **separate unit** in this study.¹

Despite the initial euphoria at this largely unexpected outcome in the U. S., its interest on the various states of this region began to slow down relative to its longer running interest in other politico-economically vital regions. This can be truly due to the gradual recognition by the U.S. of the lack of immediately viable (e.g. due to rather weak transportational and logistical links) opportunities present in the region and the continuity in the region of an entrenched political order, as may be seen in App. I and App. V, that is,

¹ When this thesis defined anew the re-emerging Central Asian region, *Xinjiang* was included not on any **flimsy ground**, but far from it *Xinjiang* remains clearly very much a part of it, not just at present analytically, but as we also saw much evidenced, physically, environmentally, culturally and politico-geographically, in Chapter 2 and historically, in Appendix I; and energy-focused geopolitically too, in Chapter 5 and its associated tabular components in it and in the pertinent appendices appearing at the end of this work. Though the U.S. role in developing relations with individual states and entities of the Central Asian region has largely been **coherent** and integrative in that region, over the years, under its concept of Greater Central Asia, the placing of *Xinjiang* amongst the CAS/CARs is still viewed as problematic by some quarters, both in Malaysia and abroad. But keeping in view that the U.S., as a superpower, do not need a region or its small state-units to be politically independent in order for it to recognize, **analyze** or interact with it, as happened in the Baltics in the past and as also seen in Gaza, Karabagh and their likes recently! Kara Miriam Wortman and Kerry Dumbaugh's report stands as a testimony to this disposition, for example. On this, see Kara Miriam Wortman and Kerry Dumbaugh, *China's Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region: Developments and U.S. Interests*, 28 Sept. 2001, CRS Report for Congress (RS20476), Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (Washington, D.C.: LOC; Congressional Research Service, 2001), via WikiLeaks Document Release at <<http://wikileaks.org/wiki/CRS-RS20476>>. Still, *Xinjiang* has been excluded as **an I.R. actor** of the Central Asian region and as **a unit** in Chapter 3 of this study, particularly, **in deference** to such views, though it remains, as we saw, an integral part, **analytically**, of the C.A. region, in the rest of this work.

understandably, not overly enthusiastic about moving rapidly away from its recent communist legacies.

The American approach to this region as a whole or to its constituent political parts appear to continually alternate between being dogmatic and pragmatic. The ability to inadequately take cognizance of local realities and a well discernible determination to persistently adhere to its real long-range objective of even geo-politically weakening the influence of its adversaries and competitors are the chief characteristics of the emerging American strategy in the region.

American objectives in this region, except perhaps in Afghanistan, has suffered because of quite clearly it's relatively small presence therein. It is to address this deficiency that the U. S. began courting the C. A. states diplomatically often displaying its strength and stressing its indispensability not to mention also exaggerating the dangers to the region from the likes of I. R. Iran, Russia and China, as we saw in Chapters 3(three), 4(four) and 5(five). The United States has from the outset, of course, played a gradually increasing role multi-laterally as well as bilaterally in conflict resolution attempts within the Central Asian region. Moreover, Azerbaijan's close ties with the United States serve somewhat as a guarantee against Armenia's territorial claims in Azerbaijan and its maritime disputes with Iran as well as Turkmenistan in the Caspian. The developing U. S. ties of Central Asian states are also opportunistically utilized by the elites of the C.A. states to douse their indigenous Islamist, if not also the democratic, oppositions.

Other than its obvious attraction as a powerful, albeit distant, alternative to Russia and as a check against growing Iranian influence in the societies of the region, especially in Tajikistan and Afghanistan and lesser so in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the United States

has relatively little meaningful success in the near term because of the region's physical remoteness, lack of access infrastructures, as we saw in Chapters 2 (two), 3 and 4, and very little facilitating soft infrastructure and hence viable opportunities for greater immediate involvement, not to mention also the layered cloud of uncertainties enshrouding the post-Cold War period that serves to dampen the climate for vastly beneficial inter-state relations particularly, with the pre-eminent power. Other limitations on the receptivity of American involvement within the C. A. region may be briefly enumerated as:

- Lingering conservatism in the elite circles,
- Deeply embedded communist values at the popular level and die-hard old habits sustained by an "ex-communist" leadership with continuing dependence on the Russian market, transit infrastructure and facilities, as was seen in Chapter 5, technology and expertise if not also, in continuity, on Russian largesse and/or capital,
- Misgivings about unbridled capitalism and its starkly obnoxious, and all too systemically apparent, shortcomings, as may be seen in p. 416, fn. 92; and
- Central Asian suspicion of American hegemonic intentions in the larger region as may be seen in its behavior with I. R. Iran, the Gulf and in Af-Pak region not to mention also its record farther in East Asia, the Caribbean, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere in the world, as we sampled in sections of Chapter 2(two).

Though the Americans have had a casual interest on this region from the dawn of the 20th century, as we saw too in Chap. 2 and may again see in App. I, later, sustained formal interest in the region began to take root only in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as was seen mainly in Chaps. 2, 3, 4 and 5. The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and the

“political vacuum” created by the general, initial withdrawal of Russia from Central Asia or what they subsequently call their “Near Abroad”; Iran and China’s well-scheduled growing influence and perceived ambition to captivate the minds and more of the newly-freed Central Asians; the presence of high world demand² for, and easily exploitable, alternative sources of energy in the C. A. region, as we saw in Chapter 5; the potential of the region to serve as a breeding ground, if not also an incubator, for terrorism; the region’s geo-political salience between established, emergent and aspirant nuclear powers, as was visible in Map 24; the disturbing potential for increasing the pool of unsavory states; the future developmental and economic potential of the region, as was seen in the Kazakh case; and its consequent multi-faceted strategic importance, all together serve to increasingly focus American attention to a hitherto closed region from which they have been traditionally and systematically excluded, as can be verified in Appendix I, later.

This renewed American arousal to the charms of this enchanting and promising region and its constituent states have turned it into an arena for major power competition if not also confrontation, as we clearly saw in Chapters 3 (three), 4 (four) and 5 (five). The obvious, albeit, mostly unexpressed American objective in the C. A. region, for the longer haul, is the gradual reduction of unwanted Russian, Iranian, Chinese and perhaps even Indian influence therein and rapid, if disjointed, enhancement of theirs, instead. Other objectives include promoting American security interests, including curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and, more importantly, in the near term, to secure multiple access to the region’s range of energy and other strategic resources, as we just saw, clearly, in Chap. 5.

² The IEA’s monthly reports quite easily attest to the global rising oil demand, especially since the wake of the 1973 oil crisis. This fact may also be verified in App. VII later, in the context of the U.S.

In the early 1990s observers began seriously noticing the surging Western interest and the corresponding, if disproportionate, slackening Russian capabilities across the disintegrating Soviet sphere. Gorbachev was widely seen to be earnestly indulging in his “new thinking.” Gorbachev’s *perestroika* and *glasnost* had their full effects felt in Central Asia too, if not initially to the extent felt in the Baltics for example. The United States was against Russian use of force to stamp resistance in the Soviet space. It was also, quite reasonably, expecting Russians to gradually evacuate their numerous military bases, as was seen in Maps 21 and 24, across the collapsing Soviet space, with only mixed results.

After the dawn of independence in the Central Asia states and especially when first RCD was reactivated, upgraded and expanded to ECO³ and then the Shanghai-5 was launched and later upscaled to the SCO, the United States was quick to express its reservations and strong disapproval about them suspecting that these regional fora are aimed at countering its own nascent growing interest in the region and geopolitically being mainly sponsored by clear American adversaries like Iran, China and Russia. America’s gradual, albeit, halting initiatives in and around Central Asia thus far betrays a possible policy of incremental advance at the expense of Russia rather than any overtly focused strategy to secure exclusively its aims there; the game of pivoting in and out around the C.A. region serves to indicate this.

In regard to the hypothesis stated in the introductory Chapter 1 (one), I believe a brief recapitulation of the foregoing discourse, would be necessary here. One key conclusion arrived at by myself in this research is that of U. S. intervention in the immediate environ of Central Asia. The nature of American treatment of I. R. Iran, U. S.

³ In these regards, see Institute of Strategic Studies (Islamabad), “ECO: Looking to the Future,” A Special Issue of *Strategic Studies* 15.2. (Islamabad, Pakistan: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1992). See also Zaman Sabaoun Stanizai, “The Economic and Political Integration of Central and Southwest Asia: An Analysis of the Economic Cooperation Organization,” Ph.D. Dissertation (U of Southern California, 1997).

involvement and interventions in the Gulf area, U. S. influence in Pakistan, America's Russia-centric policies and U. S. support for democratic/"Islamic" forces in the Central Asian periphery were detrimental influences on American – Central Asian relations, generally. These matters affected the relations between the two parties largely negatively. On the other hand, Central Asian – American relations seemed to progress when American involvement was perceived as benign and was deemed more balanced if not also actually constructive, all factors we explored in the Kazakhstan unit of the C.A. region.

Another over-arching factor in Central Asian – U. S. relations has, of course, been the kind of relations the CAS/CARs maintained with America. When one looked at these relations individually, as we did in Chapters Three and Four, one finds that, overall, over the past two odd decades, the best relations, over all, between any of the CARs and the United States, have been with, firstly, Kazakhstan (hence, the chunkier coverage in this work), despite inevitable shortcomings, followed by that with Azerbaijan. By contrast, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan adopted an unfriendly, if not always hostile, posture towards the United States for a substantial length of this period. Turkmenistan was viewed with great annoyance by the Americans whenever it moved to improve or strengthen its ties with I. R. Iran, an ally of both Russia and China. In the early 1990s the continued Russian military presence in Tajikistan was viewed with disfavor by the United States. Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan despite their higher, if not entirely satisfactory, interactions, easily fall between these groups. At various times, most Central Asian states received plaudits in the American media for inching away from Russia's apron strings.

The newly independent CARs do face major problems in their transformed relationship with, their big brother and the key successor state of the ex-U. S. S. R., i.e.: Russia. Like the problems of ex-colonies elsewhere in the world, most of the CARs too

have similar, if not identical, problems with their former colonial master and inevitable partner, if not necessarily ally, Russia. The chief problem, in this context, for them is how they could continue to depend on their somewhat estranged ex-master for their security and survival needs while striving to preserve their new-found independences and, if possible, the neutrality they, mainly Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, initially preferred to, tread. Independence actually delivered them into a neighborhood of competing regional powers whose vastly superior militaries, many nuclear armed, immediately present them with multiple threats.

It is to address these perceived threats that the CAS/CARs sought, in the first instance, protection from their erstwhile colonial master and inevitable ally, even while casting too their lines farther about for an extra-regional super-power, mainly the U.S., whose prowess we saw elaborated in the backgrounder Chapter 2 earlier. This latter endeavor is crucial for the CARs because protection, no matter how sacredly upheld and however iron-clad, received from their neighborhood, they axiomatically know, carries with it the ever dynamic potential for riskily compromising their own sovereignty. The historical, recurrent, experiences, as may be verified in Appendix I later, of the central asian peoples bear this truth out quite adequately, not to instantly recall also, in this regard, the continual Afghanistan tragedy and it's long-running and still bitter aftermath.

The CARs, despite their contemporary infancy, are only too well aware of the dangers of the preponderance of any one major power in their region. They fear that this may give rise to unhealthy major power rivalry, if not also active hostility, within their region. It is for this reason that most of the CARs, if not also all the CAS, continuously seek to balance the overbearing influence of any one power in their affairs, particularly so that of one from their own neighborhood, especially given the higher geo-political risks

these carries to their sovereignty and true independence. This was discernible across the entire C.A. but was very clear in the Uzbekistan case, where it swings back and forth.

The international exposure the CARs have been having for the past two decade or so have also helped them discover that, besides, in the first instance, reliance on great-power-allies, as theorized in the introductory Chapter 1(one), other new means like using their tremendous strategic resources, as we saw in Chapter 5, potential consequent financial power, potential for collective action and even their seminal diplomacy to influence events, as in the case of Kazakhstan, and to otherwise bring about outcomes that serve their varying interests, as was seen in Chapters 3 and 4. The CARs have slowly learned that these additional means can go a long way towards complementing their obvious military vulnerabilities especially in the near term. In particular, possession of significant exploitable energy potentials and reserves would potentially and increasingly give them; they believe, a strong voice in the international politico-diplomatic arena, as is the case of Kazakhstan and the nurtured regime in Afghanistan, in the context of energy transit, if not also in the global economy.

Possession of energy resources, particularly, though not exclusively, petroleum, brought great interdependence between the central asian region and the CIS, principally Russia, in the first place and increasingly, between the CARs and America and its allies, as we saw in Chapter Five. The mutual interdependence works out basically in this manner: The CARs look for American and Western help and understanding on security and development related matters, whereas America and its allies seek influence and co-operation on oil production, as may be seen tabulated in Appendix VII, its diversity and, by extension, principally pricing, as we saw in Chapters 4 and 5. America and its allies want oil both for resource supply control and energy consumption from Central Asia, whereas

the newly freed CARs require American and Western capital investments and advanced technologies to redevelop their industries, diversify their economies and revitalize and propel their societies into the 21st century.

To conclude, one can safely assert that while America's luck with Central Asia's neighbors may have plunged or rocketed to negative or positive extremes, its relations with the CAS/CARs have by and large been hovering between cautious engagement and calculated indifference. A number of factors contributed to bringing about this situation in the ties between the parties. The most important factor in this regard was the over-lordship of Russia, preponderant historically, as we may see in Appendix I, in the Central Asian region. Until late 1991 all of the CAS/CARs, except Afghanistan and Xinjiang, were directly part of the Soviet Union and for all practical purposes were under Russian over-lordship and protection or were, initially, under brutal occupation.

Mostly, under Soviet, then under CIS, aegis Russia maintained extensive bases and other military/strategic facilities all across Central Asia.⁴ The remnant of this reality continues even today in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan and, most obviously, in Tajikistan. The proximity of major powers like Russia, China and the relatively less powerful Muslim neighbors of Central Asia like Iran and Pakistan have served to keep Western, pro-Western and American ambitions, relatively benign and within bounds in the region.

Historically, Russian objective in Central Asia was to use the region to insulate the Russian empire to the north and west from the British and Chinese empires of the south and the east. Then in the early modern period it also coveted the region's enormous energy

⁴For a concise background, see Andrei Lipski, "The Community of Central Asia: Inside or Outside the CIS?," *International Affairs* (Moscow) Oct. 1993: 51-5.

resources besides trying to use the larger region to engineer an outlet, including via Baluchistan,⁵ to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The historic British campaign was to contain the Russian advance in the region and to protect its colonies in the Indo-Pak sub-continent and beyond. The *energetic* (pun intended) enthusiasm behind the American assumption of the British role in this larger region, gradually, especially after 1971, as we saw in Chapter 2 primarily and may see in Appendix I, was, both for protection of capitalist allies and control of oil and its flow to its other Asian and European allies besides, of course, for denying Russia a direct outlet to either the Mediterranean, via the Black Sea, the Gulf or the Indian Ocean. In addition to these long-standing American objectives, in the contemporary period, the United States wants to fashion totally compliant pluralistic states out of societies that are fast rediscovering their Islamic past and the freedom to shape their oncoming political, economic and strategic destinies;⁶ manage China's runaway economic growth and Iran's logistical over-attractions to most of the Central Asians.

Be that as these may, there are, however, some considerations that differentiate American relations with the CARs from those it has with Central Asia's neighbors. In the near term, at least, the real opportunities, to extend their relations well beyond the rhetorical, are highly circumscribed and practically limited. Most obviously, the CARs are all remote and virtually land-locked states that could not be accessed easily except, expensively, through air, as we saw in Chapters 2, 4 and 5, and riskily, through capital, by the United States. Secondly they are all, gradually, cash-starved states that have been, except for Tajikistan, denied continued Russian subsidies and have finally exited the ruble

⁵ Selig S. Harrison, *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations* (New York: C E I P, 1981), p. 127.

⁶ This can be seen clearly when the Mujahideens were lovingly abused to help secure U.S. geo-political and geo-strategic interests in C.A. and then their Taliban reincarnation pursuing their own form of "Islamic" governance was bloodily sodomized out of power, and in the process, turning their proxy patron Pakistan virtually into open swingers. There may be an eye-opening lesson here for aspiring Islamists, even those operating under a democratic cloak, in the rest of Central Asia!

zone and are not in a position to easily expand hard-currencies to procure American matériel and other goods and services that they may and do badly need. Thirdly, unlike the Baltic states, in recent times, at least, none of the CARs, except Afghanistan and later Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, had experienced much anti-Russian sentiments as was overwhelmingly the case in the neighboring states excluding post-Pahlavi-Iran.

Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that for a long while in the 20th century the Russians had actually built-up Soviet Central Asia as a “showcase” to promote their Soviet model of development within the larger Third World neighborhood which were, invariably, given the proxy capitalistic exploitations they were subjected to by their classist elites, poorly developed, by comparison, as well attested to, pre-eminently, by democratic India, even till today. The grievances that the CARs may have, however, relates more to the disturbing fact that by comparison to most other non-Muslim ex-Soviet states the CARs are lesser developed. For this reason, the masses in the CARs may not really object, if their elites, even primarily self-servingly, so decide to court the United States and the rest of the developed West, as can be seen in the cases of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and particularly Uzbekistan.

Fourthly, even on the question of Israel and American support for it, the attitude of the CARs is markedly different from those of most of its inner and outer regional neighbors, as we saw in a later section of Chapter 2. Accordingly, though the CARs were quick in developing ties with Israel, they could not practically enjoy the full benefits of these relations immediately, because of the large and stark hostility to Israel present in the neighborhood that they too are freshly trying to cultivate, diplomatically. Fifthly, given the region’s new experience with political parties and the organizational immaturity and limitations of these infant parties to stage credible challenges to the current governments in

the CARs the United States could not practically utilize them to generate adequate pressure on the current regimes to move relations to the higher and desired levels that the United States presumably wants.

This being the situation, the only viable leverage that remains for the United States to exploit, in the near term, was to pressure the CARs through America's proxies and allies within the neighborhood, chiefly the Muslim states of Turkey and Pakistan, though not exclusively so. In this regard, the geo-political activities of the various non-state entities sponsored by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, all non-regional key U. S. allies, and similar others must also be noted. However, given the inadequacy of this approach alone, America has also fallen back to using direct diplomacy and pragmatic accommodation to make greater inroads into Central Asia, as we clearly saw in Chapters 3 and 4.

The clear picture that emerges from the foregoing consideration of the facts is that American behavior in the Third World and in particular in the central asian neighborhood, as may be seen in Chapter Two, has usually been a factor in their relations with the CARs. The United States' less than desirable situation that it often finds itself in in the central asian neighborhood has necessitated that it embrace a more accommodative stance vis-à-vis the emergent ex-communist, post-Soviet CARs. Setting aside inherited antagonism and recent historical legacies the United States has had to move rapidly, if haltingly, to secure bridgeheads in Central Asia, as was the case in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and continually still the case with Afghanistan, and to work from there to repair its image elsewhere in the neighborhood. America's loss first of Iran, then of Russia; its gradual disappearance, especially during the Clinton administration, from the Afghan scene; the military setbacks of Azerbaijan and the decline in the fortunes of some of the independence-seeking pro-U.S.

forces in the central asian neighborhood, Chechnya and Xinjiang comes to mind here, somewhat diminished United States' influence in the region.

Unable to directly enforce its will, even with force, and notwithstanding its lingering reputation as the sole superpower, the Americans began resorting in earnest to diplomacy and other milder means to make meaningful headway in the CARs. Responsible application of power, largely through proxy, and rigorous diplomacy around Central Asia helped to persuade the CARs that unlike some of their immediate neighbors they can indeed work beneficially with the United States. Thus, it is not surprising that other than seemingly the radical Taliban regime that was in power in Afghanistan till 2001, all the other CAS/CARs do have a range of budding diplomatic relations with the United States from Azerbaijan through Uzbekistan all the way to even Tajikistan. Not mentioning too, sections of even the native Uighurs of Xinjiang or XUAR, not just in their diasporic manifestations, do have near excellent all but diplomatic relations with the U.S. and its society; even extra cautious, neutrality-anchored, Turkmenistan manages to have reasonably broad relations with the United States that can easily be termed cordial especially after the passing off of its venerable Turkmenbashi.

The diverse ground that we have covered so far reveals that the U.S., the lone superpower at the twilight of the 20th century and beyond, had incepted and pursued an increasing and diverse relationship with the small if not also weak states of a re-emerging, and hence redefined coherent Central Asian region. The diverse relations spearheaded by the various U.S. and CAS/CARs' presidents have evolved both in nature and over time into the 21st century but has not greatly changed in its general positive direction. In particular, the energy-rich AKTU sub-sector of the mainly newly-independent CAS have, in pursuit of this relationship and in the presence of high world demand for strategic materials in

particular the energy ones, given priority attention to the development of their energy sector both individually and regionally, as we saw clearly in Chapters 4 and 5.

Perhaps, appreciating that the land-locked CAS/CARs do need hard currency for their independent survival and future development particularly as they move away from a total Russian dependency both financially and logistically, the U.S. and to a lesser extent the other regional powers have strongly supported the multiple pipelines policy of the energy well-endowed CAS now finally pursuing their own national interests. America in supporting these alternative pipelines out of the C.A. region is thereby conflicting the interests of Russia and to a lesser extent I.R. Iran both of whom fear the undermining of their transit monopoly position vis-a-vis the energy and strategic resources of the land-locked C.A. region. The Western belief that doing so may “give the West geopolitical advantages against Russia, Iran and China may be alluring” but it could be a chimera that is counter-productive to America’s and NATO’s long term interests in the larger region. In the energy sector of Central Asian external relations we saw the competitive participation of not only global powers like the U.S., E.U., and Russia but also the presence of outer regional powers like China, Japan, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan in energy-focused rivalistic Great Gaming across Central Asia.

What is basically more a geo-economic and globalization-linked enterprise of the powers, particularly those of the U.S. and Russia, gets a distinct geopolitical⁷ edge when we notice the presence of both their military bases both in and around the C.A. region, sometimes within the same country: Kyrgyzstan! The multi-vectoring CAS/CARs should utilize the dynamic and strategic presence and participation of these powers, particularly

⁷ Though this research, so far has, touched on most of the **main issues** relevant to the U.S.-CAS/CARs relationship and of the redefined Central Asian region briefly, and placed the focus more on strategic/energy resources, **geopolitical issues** very much runs through the entire work, as was evidenced both in its textual, illustrative and bibliographical components but; that the work being more **in the spirit**, if not also in the tradition, of **critical geopolitics** rather than absolutely trapped within **classical geopolitics**, is a fact adequately made clear, particularly, in the energy-focused **rather than conflict-focused** Chapter 5.

that of the U.S., in the C.A. region to create broad-based, albeit complementary, economies that would bring equitable benefits and progress to their larger societies and not merely squander the percolating petro-dollars, when the price is right, on vainglorious elitist projects that serve only the indulgence of the privileged few, to the sure long-term peril of their nations.

In brief then, this study uniquely, if not also entirely originally, confirms that the C.A. region has indeed been and now stands *de facto*, if not also formally, redefined, as we saw in Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, in Appendix XI and in the bibliographic evidences as well. Then we observed, in Chapter 2, major power, in particular U.S., agency and behavior in the world, generally, and in the Third World and the Eastern Bloc, in particular. Thereafter, again in the later section of Chapter 2, we moved one more level closer, towards understanding the nature of U.S. behavior in Central Asia, by discussing in brief its record of behavior in the Muslim World, generally and in the C.A. neighborhood in particular.

Thereafter, we studied in Chapters 3 and 4 America's actually evolving relations with the CAS of the C.A. region and how most of its range of tools and tactics, employed elsewhere in the world, as we saw in sections of Chapter 2, are also applied in the Central Asian region and in Chapter 5, especially, we analyzed how the U.S. and Russia, an Iranian ally, simultaneously co-operated and competed in the context of the Central Asian region's strategic and energy resources and facilities and how, as a consequence, the US relations with the CAS/CARs evolved.

Thus, overall, as mentioned in the introductory chapter itself, we saw how the later chapters and the associated components of this study actually successfully addressed the main objectives of this research. In short, this research proves that: under mainly

presidential leaderships, multi-sectorial relations have taken place between the lone superpower, the USA and the Muslim small-states of the redefined Central Asian region and that these principally strategic/energy-focused relations have undergone changes in their general nature but not in their actual upward direction! Now, coming to the fate of the hypotheses as advanced in the introductory Chapter 1, i.e. hypothesis one (H1) to four (H4), this is how they fared, very briefly:

H1: As Russia and I. R. Iran become increasingly assertive around the Central Asia region, the more suspicious the CAS/CARs get towards them. We saw this in Chechnya and in the Gulf and in the later chapters how most of the CARs sought to balance these outer-regional powers, to a lesser extent also China, by welcoming the extra-regional actors, not just primarily the U.S.

H2: The closer the relations become between the U.S. and any or all of the CARs, the more negative the relationships between Russia or Iran and the CAS turn to. In Chapters Three and Four we saw how this came true in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and, of course, Afghanistan, overwhelmingly. This also happened in *Xinjiang*, though I could not cover it in Chapter 3, in a non-state context, with China in particular.

H3: The more Russia and Iran feel close to CARs, the more the U.S. really wants to influence the CARs. We saw this happening in the case of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan too.

H4: The weaker the Americans feel their position in Central Asia is, the more they will seek to boost relations with the CARs. We saw this happening in the post-Yeltsin years and also in the post-Andijon period, particularly, with the neighbors of Uzbekistan.

All the above dynamics were also reflected in Chapter Five in the context of energy collaboration and competition, as is also readily verifiable in **Appendix VIII**, between the U.S. and Russia. Thus, in addition, it discovered that, fundamentally, it was energy issues and not September 11 that is really behind America's real interest in the region, though, unfortunately, this tragic event has served to overly justify and legitimize its continuing, one-sided so-called security, interest in the region. In covering the subject in this particular manner, this study brings out the need for further researches in the future on the broad-range of issues it touches on and the disturbing ramifications that these hint at.

By way of some concluding recommendation, it must be observed that while the U.S. must be congratulated unreservedly for its positive initiatives like the Silk Road Initiative (1992), the NDN (2009), now-a-days the New Silk Road Strategy (2011) and its other integrative projects aimed at the creation of a broader Central Asian region that tightly embraces MCA it should also be pro-active in ensuring that these projects do not end up being limited to just enabling traffickings and indulging in contrabands alone, especially once the current Afghanistan facilitating operations and drawdowns are over; otherwise, over the longer haul, it may risk rapidly degenerating into just another infamous Burma Road rather than serve to truly help in substantively reviving the fabulous Silk Routes of the past! Constructive engagement of the CAS/CARs should never be allowed to drift away into a Chinese monopoly, even under a SCO cover!

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APPENDICES