CHAPTER SIX: PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE, 1142-1161 A.D.

I. THE SOUTHERN SONG DURING THE TWO DECADES OF PEACE

In 1142, the Southern Song had successfully established peace with the Jin, whilst internally, the dynasty had turned from the abnormal political situation of its early years during which the generals were holding the military power, and regional power appeared to be stronger than that of the central government. The Southern Song had again restored the dynastic tradition of centralization and civilian supremacy over the military. After fifteen years of struggle and careful planning, Gao Zong had finally brought peace and security to his government internally and externally, and consolidated his own power on the throne. The Southern Song was able to reorganize itself and build up its strength after the Northern Song debacle. Even though politically, they only owned half the territory of their ancestors, they succeeded in defending themselves from the invasion of the enemy and the reign of the imperial Zhao family had been prolonged. By giving a new life to the Song empire, Gao Zong can be said to have played a significant role as an "empire-builder".1

Gao Zong realized that to achieve success in the peace negotiations, he should first obtain the cooperation and confidence of the people. In his attempt to pacify the people in order to get continued support from them, the emperor both before and after signing the peace treaty had frequently emphasized that the peace negotiations were for the benefit of giving rest to the people and rebuilding their livelihood. Nevertheless, he also stressed that despite the peace agreement military preparation and defense should not be neglected. On the matter of the increasing tax burden on

---

the people, Gao Zong had promised that the heavy tax imposed on the people would be reduced once peace was restored. For the soldiers who were tired of war, the destitute and homeless refugees from the north, and also the southerners who lived in fear of losing their properties, such promises or political manifesto were indeed good news to them. Therefore, despite the humiliating terms of the treaty, there was no record of any uprising among the soldiers or the populace in protest against the peace agreement.

The policy of peaceful co-existence with the Jurchen was an inevitable step under the situation mentioned above. It was an expedient measure taken by the two countries, but it could not guarantee eternal peace to either party. It was therefore important for the government of Gao Zong to act vigilantly in peace times, to strengthen the country in different areas and to be ready to meet with any situation at all times. In the following sections, we shall examine the political and economic situation of the Southern Song before and after the treaty of Shaoxing, to see whether Gao Zong's regime had indeed taken the opportunity to fully utilize the twenty years of peace to improve its internal affairs or to the contrary.

(i) Imperial Power versus Ministerial Power

After moving to the south-east and retaining sovereignty over only a part of the country, with the weakening of its national and financial resources, and under the pressure of war, the Southern Song in its early years had merely established a simpler bureaucratic apparatus to meet the political situation of the day, and to achieve the goal of centralization more easily. The size of the various departments in the central government was reduced and the number of offices and posts was also reduced. The

---

most important reform took place in 1129 when the "Three Departments" (sansheng) were combined into one. Before this, the sansheng were separated and different duties were handled by different departments; the Imperial Secretariat (Zhongshusheng) was in charge of drafting the imperial edicts decided by the emperor, and the Imperial Chancellery (Menxiasheng) would examine and approve or rectify the edicts, which were then implemented by the Department Of Ministries (Shangshusheng). Under the new system, all three departments were combined into one and were under the control of the chief councillor. Furthermore, in the military field, the post of the Commissioner of Imperial Encampment (Yuyingshi), established in the early years of the Southern Song, was held concurrently by the chief councillor, who thus held the highest authority in the military. Although the Bureau of Military Affairs (Shumiyuan) continued to exist, it did not have much power in practice. It was only in 1130 that the post of the Commissioner of Imperial Encampment was abolished and his duties restored to the Bureau of Military Affairs, reviving the Bureau of Military Affairs as the highest authority of the military. Since then, the chief councillors were appointed to senior positions in the military Bureau concurrently, to be in charge of military administration so as to meet with the military situation of the time.

This was a significant reform in Song history; since the chief councillor was put in sole charge of both civil and military administration, it would mean a great increase in his power. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the new policy of administration had superseded the dynastic principle of the supremacy of the autocrat. Although Gao Zong had conferred huge power on the chief councillors, he was extremely careful in

---


5 Ibid., pp. 288-289.
dealing with them as he was in treating his military generals. For example, although Lu Yihao and Zhang Jun had attained much merit by restoring Gao Zong to his throne during the Miao-Liu Coup, the emperor nevertheless found various reasons to dismiss them because of the popularity and support they received from the army. Also, in the case of Qin Gui, although he was seen as a very competent person who could help Gao Zong, when he joined Lu Yihao in office, he had been warned by the emperor that he should not establish factions in court. It was only after Qin succeeded in the peace negotiations that Gao Zong conferred upon him more power to enable him to have full control over the government. Despite the great power bestowed upon him during the seventeen years of his chief councillorship, Qin was extremely careful in dealing with the emperor so that Gao Zong would not have any suspicion of him. At the same time, although Gao Zong had favoured Qin in the government, he was always on his guard towards the chief councillor and immediately took control of the government and eliminated Qin’s faction the moment Qin passed away.

Therefore, although the power of the chief councillors had increased in Gao Zong’s time, there existed no possibility of them taking over the throne as the chief councillors did not have their own army nor did they have the opportunity to establish large factions to serve as their power base. Consequently, no matter how much power was invested in the hands of the chief councillors, they would still be under the control of the emperor ultimately.

---

8 Deng Zhicheng, op.cit., p.291.
(ii) Economic Growth

To achieve the goal of dynastic restoration, Gao Zong had paid a great deal of attention to the country’s financial management. In the early days, he had appointed Huang Qianshan and Wang Boyan as his councillors as they were familiar with the waterways transportation in the Huai region. Later, when the Song retreated to the Yangzi region, men previously associated with the notorious Cai Jing (1047-1126) and Wang Fu (1079-1126) were appointed because of their expertise in financial management. The appointment of Lu Yihao was mainly because of his ability and experience in financial management and could therefore help Gao Zong take care of the financial problems during the early years of his reign. The appointment of Zhang Jun as chief councillor was also because he was familiar with area of Sichuan and could therefore manage the financial matters of this region. Later, the decision to relocate the capital city in Lin’an was not only because it would show to the enemy a gesture of retreating to the south, but most importantly, it was also because Lin’an was the economic centre in the south-east. With a strong financial base, the nation would be able to sustain the enormous expenditure on national defense, and support the growing number of bureaucrats and members of the royal family, and to pay the large sum of annual tribute to the Jurchen.

Ever since the beginning of Gao Zong’s reign, he had promised to reduce the tax burden imposed on his people. However, due to financial need, the government

---

During the last years of the Northern Song, Cai Jing, Wang Fu and others had formed factions and gained much power in court. They eliminated their political opponents, were openly involved in bribery and created border disputes, putting the country under internal disorder and external threat. A previous student of the National University, Chen Dong, had sent appeal petitions requesting for their execution, referring to them as the “Six Bandits”. In 1126 Qin Zong had demoted and dismissed these notorious ministers and their followers, and apart from Cai Jing who died of illness on the way to his place of exile, the other five were all executed one after another. See SS, ch. 472, pp. 13721-13728; ch. 468, pp. 13688-13699 and pp. 13662-13663; ch.470, pp. 13681-13686.
had to adopt a policy of heavy taxation to sustain the enormous expenses. Other than the taxes\textsuperscript{10}, a new tax called the \textit{Jingzhi Qian} was collected beginning from 1128\textsuperscript{11}. In 1132, the tax called \textit{Yuezhuang Qian} was also collected\textsuperscript{12}. In 1135, the tax called \textit{Zongzhi Qian} was introduced.\textsuperscript{13} Besides these, there were many other commercial taxes which were imposed. The expenses of the government were mainly paid by the taxes collected under the various items mentioned above. The revenue collected from the \textit{Jingzhi Qian}, \textit{Zongzhi Qian} and \textit{Yuezhuang Qian} especially were several times more than the regular tax. For these reasons, the government income had increased greatly but the people suffered and lived under great pressure.\textsuperscript{14} This was especially so in the Liang-Huai and Jingxiang regions where the population had greatly declined due to warfare and the land abandoned, making it impossible for the people to pay their taxes and the amount due would have to be borne by the people in the southeastern part of the country and in Sichuan,\textsuperscript{15} thus imposing a heavy burden on them.

\textsuperscript{10} This refers to the twice-a-year tax system whereby the taxes were collected after the harvesting months in summer and autumn. These taxes were generally not too heavy but due to corrupt practices, tax evasion and oppression of rich landowners and bureaucrats, the peasants had to bear a heavy tax burden. See Wang Zengyu, "Song Chao De Liangshui", \textit{Wen Shi}, (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, vol 14, July 1982), pp. 117-144.

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Jingzhi Qian} was the general term for various miscellaneous taxes imposed upon the people since the last years of the Northern Song and continued during the Southern Song. It was abolished in 1126 but was reimposed in 1128. It was a major source of income for the Southern Song. See Huang Song \textit{Zhongxing Liangchao Shengzheng}, (Taipei: Wenhua Chubanshe), thereafter LCSZ, ch. 6, pp. 663-664. See also Xi Haiying, "Shi Lun Nan Song Jing Zong zhi Qian de Zhengzhou ji Shehui Yingxiang", \textit{Song Liao Jin Yuan Shi}, (Peking: 1989), vol. 6, pp. 49-84.

\textsuperscript{12} This was also a miscellaneous tax introduced by Chief Councillors Li Yihao and Zhu Shengfei for the purpose of military expenses. Various areas in the Yangtze and Hunan regions were required to send 100,000 strings of cash monthly to pay for military expenses and this had greatly burdened the people. See LCSZ, ch. 14, p. 969.

\textsuperscript{13} This was the combination of all other miscellaneous taxes which were not included in the \textit{Jingzhi Qian} and \textit{Yuezhuang Qian} designated for the court's expenses. See \textit{Ibid.}, ch. 17, pp. 1130-1131. See also Xi Haiying, op.cit., pp. 49-54.

\textsuperscript{14} Zf, vol. 1, ch. 14, pp. 413-414.

\textsuperscript{15} Liang Gengyao, "Nan Song De Huantian Kaiken Zhengce", \textit{Shi Yuan}, vol. 5, p. 62.
Among the various taxes, the revenue from tea, salt and wine contributed the
greatest item to the national income. During the early years of Gao Zong’s reign, the
government had realized that government monopoly of the above mentioned products
was very important to pay for the national expenditure. As early as 9th/1129, when
Zhang Jun sent Zhao Kai (1066-1141) to Sichuan to take charge of the financial
matters in that area, Zhao at that time had imposed an additional tax on salt and
wine.\textsuperscript{16} In 10th/1132, Chief Councillor Lu Yihao had emphasized the importance of
tea, salt and wine taxes in supporting the military expenses.\textsuperscript{17} During the later days of
Gao Zong’s reign, these taxes were equally important. In 6th/1157, Gao Zong had
indicated that government monopolies on the sale of salt, tea and wine were due to
necessity, and that in future, if the financial situation would permit, it was only right
for the government to share its profits with the people, but due to the circumstances of
the time, it had to continue with the system of government monopolies for the time
being.\textsuperscript{18}

At that time, the government had paid a great deal of attention to the
production of tea and salt in Sichuan. When Zhao Kai took charge of the finance in
Sichuan, he implemented various reforms on the sale of tea. Licenses were given to the
tea merchants allowing them to trade freely with the consumers. Money collected
annually from the license fees came to around 1.5 million strings of cash.\textsuperscript{19} The
system for the sale of wine was also being altered. In 1132 it brought about 6.9 million

\textsuperscript{16} YZ, ch. 28, p. 565.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, ch. 59, p. 1025.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, ch. 77, pp. 2925 - 2926.
strings of cash to the country, about four times more than before.\textsuperscript{20} In 9th/1132, Zhao further implemented the salt monopoly and had brought in 4 million strings of cash, about five times more than before.\textsuperscript{21} These government policies had also curbed the local activity of the smuggling of the above goods indirectly.

In its attempt to explore more sources of tax revenue, the government of Gao Zong had also realized the importance of the potential profit in the agricultural sector. The government then employed vagrants and refugees (guizhengren)\textsuperscript{22} and also soldiers to cultivate the wasteland. The additional income could then be used to ease the burden of the people in Sichuan and the south-east, and could also help to sustain the country’s expenditure, and solve the problems regarding the people’s livelihood. To carry out this policy of cultivating wasteland, the government had implemented a system of land-cultivation known as tuntian and yingtian.\textsuperscript{23} Under this system, the government was in direct control of the unit in operation, and the land was owned by the government, and peasants, refugees or soldiers were collectively engaged in agricultural production. The government would provide funds for cultivation, and after harvests, the farmers would have to share their produce with the government. The other method adopted for the cultivation of wasteland was a system of farming, called kentian, whereby the people would have to apply to the government for a piece of wasteland, and the peasants after getting their land free of charge, would work on

\textsuperscript{20} ZJ, Vol. 1, ch. '14, pp. 445 - 446.


\textsuperscript{22} The term “guizhengren” refers to the refugees from the north who escaped to the south and pledged their loyalty to the Southern Song. See Huang Kuanzhong, “Lue lun Nan Song Shidai De Guizhengren”, SSYJ, vol. 14, pp. 475 - 476.

\textsuperscript{23} Originally, tuntian was assigned to the soldiers while yingtian was assigned to the civilians but later there appears to be no such distinction between them.
the land individually, and the ownership of the land would be gradually transferred to the farmers.\footnote{LiXiang, \textit{op.cit}, pp. 55-113.}

The encouragement of wasteland cultivation by the government was quite successful in redistributing the population and increasing food supply. Those areas affected by war, such as Huainan, Jingxiang, and Guanwai, were actually regions with fertile land, and had experienced rapid growth since the government promoted the plan of recultivation in these areas. Many people from other parts of the country had rushed to Huainan and Hubei, thereby increasing the population in these areas and also resulting in a great increase in food production. This was especially noticeable after the signing of the Treaty of Shaoxing.\footnote{Ibid.}

To encourage the growth of agriculture, Gao Zong had personally engaged in the cultivation of wheat and the rearing of silk worms in the palace,\footnote{\textit{LCSZ}, ch. 21, pp. 1342-1343.} setting an example for the people. He had also discussed agricultural matters with his councillors, showing that he indeed had certain knowledge with regard to agricultural matters.\footnote{YuZ, ch. 102, p. 1665 and ch. 110, p. 1781.} For an emperor, such agricultural activities as the planting of wheat and the rearing of silk worms in his palace was certainly of a symbolic nature and with a political intent. Knowing fully the importance of agricultural revival in dynastic restoration, Gao Zong decided to indicate his high regard for agriculture, so that this would serve as a moral encouragement to the people.
Under the policy of heavy taxation, the government had also focused its attention on the efficiency of tax collection. During the early days of the Southern Song, due to the loss of census records during the war, taxes were collected by local government officers and clerks. However, these local officers frequently collaborated with the powerful landowners to evade tax, and the problem of tax evasion became extremely serious. To ensure that sufficient revenue was collected, Gao Zong in 7th/1130 had approved the suggestion from the Ministry of Finance to put pressure on the local government officers and to access them according to their efficiency in tax-collection. Government officers would be rewarded or punished in accordance to their performances in collecting tax, so as to ensure that they would do their best in increasing the income of the country. In 6th/1148, The Circuit Intendants (jiansi) were given the task to look into the local books of accounts, and if the accounts did not tally, the local officers would be punished for not being competent in their office.

In dealing with the problem of tax evasion, the government had in 11th/1142 accepted the suggestion of the Division Chief in the Department of Ministers (Zuos Yuanwailang), Li Chunmian (d.1159), to implement the land reform known as jingjieta, by which the government would remeasure the agricultural land owned by individuals and to reset the tax rates. The reform was first carried out in Pingjiangfu, and later implemented in most other places. Ever since it was first implemented, the reform had met with much opposition, especially from the wealthy and influential families, nevertheless, the government succeeded in collecting the revenue from the various circuits. By the winter of 1149, the reform had been implemented in most of

28 Ibid., ch. 35, p. 680.
29 Ibid., ch. 149, p. 2398.
30 Ibid., ch. 147, pp. 2365 - 2366.
the prefectures and was found to be satisfactory, but the government decided not to further implement the project in other areas due to too much opposition.\textsuperscript{31} Furthermore, due to the fact that Li Chunian was dismissed in the same year, the implementation of the reform in certain areas had been interrupted.\textsuperscript{32}

(iii) The Long-Reigning Sole Surrogate

After the signing of the peace treaty in 1142, Gao Zong had stayed behind the political scene most of the time, while Qin Gui took over the major political role during this era. This was partly due to his confidence in the loyalty of Qin, but mainly due to the fact that Qin was the person who had provided Gao Zong with some rest and relief after fifteen years of difficult struggle in his political life. Although the country had to suffer humiliation by becoming a vassal state to Jin, but Gao Zong managed to save his throne and consolidate his own power. However, he knew that this situation would not last forever, so he must continue his struggle to maintain the status quo. Being a wise and crafty monarch who had the wisdom to shift the responsibility and blame on Qin Gui to implement the peace policy and to bring about Yue Fei's death, he would certainly be able to find a surrogate to carry out his future policies. At that time, the most suitable candidate would still be Qin Gui. As Qin was the crucial person who had brought about the success of the peace negotiations, he had certainly gained the confidence of the emperor, who thus bestowed even greater power upon him, allowing him full control in the planning and running of the government.

After the war, the political situation of the Southern Song had gradually stabilized from the chaotic state, and the people from the whole country were longing

\textsuperscript{31} ZJ, Vol. 1, ch. 8, pp. 193 - 196.

\textsuperscript{32} YL, ch. 160, p. 2598.
for a peaceful and prosperous society to live in. The slogan adopted by Gao Zong to gain support since the beginning of his reign had always been and continues to be "dynastic revival" (zhongxing). If Qin Gui did have such ambition, with the special trust which he gained from Gao Zong, and with his long reign as a sole surrogate of the emperor, this would be the best time to bring about revival or resurgence of the country. Unfortunately, scanning through the historical events in the middle and later stage of Gao Zong’s reign, it is difficult to discover Qin’s contribution to the long-term development of the Southern Song. On the contrary, we can see that he had deliberately used his power to defeat his opponents and consolidate his own power in the government.

First of all, Qin knew that Gao Zong detested the forming of factions among his subordinates, and Qin himself had suffered the experience of being dismissed when he was accused by Lu Yihao and Zhu Shengfei for setting up his own faction in court. Therefore, after his re-appointment as chief councillor, Qin had used the same method of accusing his political foes of "establishing faction" and "slandering the court" to get rid of them. The employment of such tactics had contributed greatly to the advancement of Qin’s political career.

Qin Gui was also aware of the importance of political propaganda through the dissemination of writing. Therefore, he had appointed his son Qin Xi (d.1161) to take

---

33 Ibid., ch. 87, pp. 999 - 1000.

34 As in the case of Zhao Ding, after his dismissal from the post of chief councillor, he was continually impeached by Qin, and his followers were either demoted or exiled. Even after his death, his close associates continued to be impeached on the grounds that they had previously formed faction with Zhao. See Ibid., ch. 156, p. 2537.

35 After consolidating his power, Qin not only got rid of the remnants of the war advocates, but also turned against those peace advocates who had the potential to be his rivals in court. See Ibid., ch. 146, p. 2340 and ch. 151, p. 2427.
charge of the compilation of books and the writing of history. Since the beginning of Gao Zong’s reign, the emperor had realized the importance of collecting various books and writings. After the successful conclusion of the peace agreement and the stabilization of the political situation, the government had diligently searched for the writings of authors who had passed away. Apparently this was to promote education and culture, but in actual fact, it was to make use of this opportunity to ban and destroy those writings which were regarded as unfavourable to the government. This was especially true when it comes to the writing and compilation of history, whereby the government took possession of all historical materials. According to tradition, the writing and compilation of history was under the charge of the chief councillors, and Qin therefore actively involved himself in this. First of all, he brought about certain reforms. In 2nd/1140, he abolished the Institute of History (Shiguan), and assigned the Secretariat Department with the keeping and compiling of the daily events, while the national history would be compiled by the Staff Authors under the supervision of the chief councillor. The Department of Secretariat from now on had thus become the most important body in the collection of historical materials and compilation of historical writings. The second step taken by Qin Gui was to appoint his family members and his followers to take over positions in the Department of Secretariat and with that, Qin would be able to eliminate those writings which were unfavourable to him while at the same time, to provide logical explanations for the things he had done.

36 Ibid., ch. 152, p. 2245
37 Ibid., ch. 134, p. 2152
Besides, both Gao Zong and Qin Gui had the greatest fear for privately written historical works which were widespread throughout the country. Therefore, in 4th/1144, Qin put forward his proposal to prohibit private history writing. From then onwards, his call was followed up by both government officials and the educated public to ban the writing of private history and to destroy privately written collections kept by the authors' family so as to avoid offending Qin Gui. From the banning of books to the prohibition of writing, Qin Gui moved a step further by imposing literary inquisition (wenziyu) to suppress public opinion and to defeat his political foes. During that time, many well-known ministers such as Li Guang, Wang Shu, Zeng Kai (date of birth unknown), Yan Dunfu (1071-1141), Li Erxun (1090-1153), Hu Yin, Zhang Jiucheng (1092-1159) and Hu Quan had been either imprisoned or banished to far-away places, so that Qin's power would remain unshaken.

The above campaign on the banning of books and private history-writing had much to do with the political circumstances of the time and the situation faced by Gao Zong himself. Politically, following the invasions of the Jurchen and the captivity of the two emperors, there was a vacuum in the power structure. Even though Gao Zong ascended to the throne in the midst of turmoil and chaos, the legality of his succession was doubted and was frequently challenged by some ambitious people. Furthermore, within the first three to four years of his reign, the emperor's throne had changed hands three times and it was a very complicated scenario with widespread rumors. Therefore, when the political situation was later stabilized, Gao Zong had the intention to eliminate all the rumors that would affect his reputation and authority. Under

---

39 YZ, ch. 151, p. 2433.

40 Ibid., ch. 154, p. 2477 and ch. 156, p. 2548.

41 Huang Kuanzhong, op.cit., p. 255.
these circumstances, the fastest method to achieve his purpose would be to gain control over the medium of writing and to control public opinion in general. This would result in thought control and the freedom of speech within the country. For this reason, Gao Zong had deliberately ignored the activities carried out by Qin Gui in the banning of books, the prohibition of private historical works and the literary inquisition imposed by him.

Analyzing from the historical source Jianyan Yilai Xinian Yaolu, one finds that all the events which occurred after the enthronement of Gao Zong are recorded in great detail but the records of events during the period from 1142 to 1156 are rather brief. This shows that during Qin's "reign of terror", not only was it difficult for objective historical records to remain intact, but it was also a time of great humiliation for the literati. The court, on the other hand, consisted mainly of opportunists who were fond of currying favour with the authorities but brought no contribution to the nation's development.

(iv) Education and the Civil Service Examination System

The Song had traditionally adhered to its basic policy of promoting education and honoring the scholars. To preserve the peace situation within the country and to prevent chances of rebellion by the military men, Gao Zong and Qin Gui had put in a lot of effort in the rebuilding of a civil society by largely promoting education and culture.

In 8th/1143, the National University (Taixue) had been re-established and Gao Zong was indeed pleased with the revival of learning soon after the restoration of
peace to the country.\textsuperscript{42} In 3rd/1144, after a visit to the National University, Gao Zong had praised Qin Gui for his efforts in bringing about peace, thus resulting in the flourishing of education.\textsuperscript{43} Gao Zong had also frequently reminded the people that it was only when the country was in peace that the people could enjoy the leisurely life of scholars. In a society that honoured scholars and learning such as the Song, these were words which would lead to certain positive reaction among the people, and cause them to sympathize with the government’s peace policy.

A major step towards the building of a civil society was to increase the number of schools and the amount of land owned by these schools (Xuetian). The idea of school land was first implemented by the Northern Song government in 1022. Under this project, the government would assign 500 to 1,000 \textit{mu} of land to the schools for the students to work on in order to cover their daily expenses. Even though during the Northern Song, education was already widespread, there were still many areas where there were no schools. Furthermore, the warfare in the early years of the Southern Song had also destroyed a number of schools. When Qin came into power he started rebuilding the schools on a large scale, and many schools were established, even in the remote prefectures. In places where the economy was more advanced, the granting of school land had increased several folds.\textsuperscript{44}

With school land as its financial backing, the educational system of the Southern Song had thus experienced rapid growth and development. This could probably be regarded as the positive results of Qin’s policies which were motivated by

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{YL}, ch. 149, p. 2403.

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Ibid.}, ch. 151, p. 2429.

\textsuperscript{44} Qi Xia, \textit{Songdai Jingji Shi}, (Shanghai : Renren Chubanshe, 1987), pp. 307 - 308.
self interest. Nevertheless, Qin had also brought much abuse to the civil service examination system, the channel whereby students could become officials. Since the war advocates of the time were mostly in favour of the teaching of the School of Principle (Daoxue), Qin had tried to get rid of them in several ways. Besides the banning on books and historical writings, and the literary inquisition mentioned earlier, he had also made use of the examination system to stop these people from entering the civil service. First of all, there was a ban on the so-called "private and distorted teaching" of the Cheng school, and the prohibition of the publication and distribution of books under this school. Secondly, there was an alteration in the examination syllabus and the criterion for passing the jinshi or Doctoral examinations. The civil service examinations no longer favoured the teaching of the Cheng school as before. Furthermore, those candidates who had severely criticized the Cheng school in their examination answers, would be able to score high marks in the examination. For example, in 3rd/1154, a candidate named Cao Guan succeeded in attaining the second place in the palace examination because of his severe criticism of the Cheng school. In addition, after the examination, the supporters of Qin Gui would be recruited in large number into the civil service. For example, in the examination held in 1142, Qin had openly appointed many of his followers’ relatives and family members. In the 1154 examination, he had even appointed the examiners himself, and as a result his grandson Qin Xuan (date of birth unknown) was placed first in the jinshi examination.

---

45 This refers to the teaching of Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073), Zhang Zai (1020-1078), and Cheng brothers, namely Cheng Hao (1082-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107). It was known as Daoxue since early Southern Song, and was also later known as Liuxue.

46 The Cheng school refers to the teachings of Cheng Hao and Cheng Yi.

47 YZ, ch. 166, pp. 2712 - 2713.

48 Ibid., ch. 144, p. 2318.
though he was eventually given the third place in the palace examination.49 Besides Qin Xuan, family members of Qin Gui’s followers had also scored good results on this occasion.50 Therefore, in evaluating the civil service examination system of the Southern Song under Qin’s administration, it can be seen that the examination system had been greatly abused for the attainment of selfish ends.

(v) The False Appearance of Prosperity

The Treaty of Shaoxing in 1141 had determined the Southern Song’s position as a vassal state of the Jin, and the Song-Jin war since the end of the Northern Song had ended for the time being. The Southern Song after this had enjoyed twenty years of peace, the economy of the country had experienced rapid growth, while the standard of culture and education had also improved greatly. Due to the migration of the northerners to the south, including many well-to-do aristocrats and merchants, many great cities had thus risen rapidly, while the literati, poets and painters had brought about unprecedented development in the cultural field. The whole south-eastern part of China was in a prosperous state compared to Northern China under Jin rule. However, whether the above situation could be regarded as “peaceful” or not has yet to be seen.

First of all, many problems arose out of the government’s policy of heavy taxation. The heavy tax burden undoubtedly affected the livelihood of the people. The great increase in national income could still provide much luxury to the imperial family, even after the deduction of the national expenditure and the annual tribute to

---

49 Qin Xuan was originally named first in the palace examination but after Gao Zong had read his paper, he felt that the subject matter had been discussed before by Qin Gui and Qin Xi, and thus granted him third place in the examination. See ibid., ch. 166, pp.2712-2713.

50 Ibid.
the Jin. Imperial family members indulged in luxuries such as the construction of palaces and temples and the holding of grand ceremonies.\textsuperscript{51} Much of the expenses incurred by the royalty also came from the so-called "contributions" from prefectural officials. These "contributions" in fact amounted to open bribery, for those who offered "contributions" were often promoted.\textsuperscript{52} These "contributions" however, were actually derived from the taxes collected from the people. In the early days of Qin Gui's administration, finding that the financial resources were insufficient, he had secretly ordered the Circuit Intendants in the Jiangzhe areas to increase the local tax rates by seven to eight folds.\textsuperscript{53} Qin had also supported those venal officials so that he could share the spoils. On the occasions of his birthday, officials from various prefectures throughout the land had sent expensive presents to gain his favour. After his death, it was discovered that his wealth was several times more than that of the national treasury. Evidently these were all derived from the taxes collected from the people. Therefore, under the dictatorship of Qin Gui, although the country was free from war, the people in general were still suffering great difficulties in their livelihood. Behind the scene of prosperity, there were frequent cases where people died of starvation.\textsuperscript{54}

Secondly, corrupted practices had also led to much abuses within the military. After twenty years of peace, the military leaders were used to an easy life, and had devoted their attention to increasing their wealth rather than attending to military affairs.\textsuperscript{55} The general Yang Cunzhong, a military official highly regarded Gao Zong,

\textsuperscript{51} Zlj, Vol. 1, ch. 2, pp. 127-140, pp. 142 - 143 and pp. 144 - 146.

\textsuperscript{52} YZ, ch. 145, p. 2322.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., ch. 169, p. 2772.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., ch. 189, p. 3155.
had been heavily involved in land annexation. His possession of land in Chuzhou alone had amounted to 39,000 *mu.\textsuperscript{56} Another general, Liu Bao (date of birth unknown), had submitted falsified figures on the number of soldiers in his army in order to get extra military fund. He had also illegally operated a brewery to get extra personal income.\textsuperscript{57} Such activities were rather common within the military, and the military camp had now become more like a trading centre, and the generals had all turned into great landlords and wealthy merchants. More often than not, when their businesses were successful, they would monopolize the trading market, causing the common folks to lose their means of livelihood.\textsuperscript{58} With the move towards the development of a highly commercialized military, the training of troops was naturally neglected, and in some cases, the soldiers were ordered to work like slaves, while their wages were pocketed by their leaders.\textsuperscript{59} There were also many old, weak and sick soldiers in the army; many had also run away but had not been replaced,\textsuperscript{60} and the majority consisted of new soldiers who were forced to join the army.\textsuperscript{61} With such poor quality and the lack of discipline within the army, it was to be expected that when the country was again invaded by the Jurchen, there were many who defected from the army and many who did not fight whole-heartedly when they were confronted by the enemy.

During the dictatorship of Qin Gui, although the government had tried very hard to control the writing of history, and the literati involved had also secretly

\textsuperscript{56} Ss, ch. 369, p. 11438.
\textsuperscript{57} Yz, ch. 188, p 3141.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid, ch. 189, p. 3155.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid, ch. 163, p. 2667.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, ch. 185, p. 3100.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, ch. 179, p. 2953.
destroyed their private writings and tried not to talk about political affairs, nevertheless, there were still records which had been handed down concerning various rebellions and uprisings against the government. Although these rebellions were relatively small in scale, these nevertheless prove to be an irony and a great contrast to the claim made by Gao Zong that with the stopping of war, the whole nation was experiencing peace and prosperity.

2. THE INVASION OF WANYAN LIANG IN 1161

The fact that the Southern Song could maintain its regime in the south-eastern part of China, was not due so much to the signing of the peace agreement, but was because the Jin were no longer as aggressive as before. During their invasion to the south in 1139, the Jurchen had discovered that the Song troops were much stronger than before. Within less than a year after the Treaty of Shaoxing, the former citizens of Song who remained in the north had frequently rebelled against the Jin, and kept them busy dealing with these rebel forces, in addition to the problems they were facing in their internal administration back home. No doubt it could be said that the Southern Song at this particular time did not have the capability to restore their lost land, but neither were the Jin able to eliminate the Song at this time. Therefore, it had provided a good opportunity of respite for the Southern Song. After the success of the peace negotiations, Gao Zong had bestowed great power upon Qin Gui. If Qin Gui had

---


63 YZ, ch. 156, p. 2523.

64 Ibid., ch.133, p. 2142.

65 Yuwen Maozhao, Da Jin Guozhi (Siku Quanshu Zhenben, Vol.27-28), ch 11, pp 11b-12a.

66 Xi Zong was suspicious by nature and was fond of killing and this led to much fear among the officials in court. Wanyan Liang harboured the intention to revolt. See ibid., ch. 13, p. 2a.
been sagacious and farsighted, this was indeed the best time for the Southern Song to put everything in order, and to rebuild and strengthen the nation. However, in order to consolidate his own power, Qin had concentrated all his efforts in defeating his political opponents, controlling public opinion and restricting freedom of speech. These had undoubtedly helped him to stay in power, but had also caused the Southern Song to lose its opportunity of an effective dynastic restoration.

The Southern Song under the administration of Qin Gui had not experienced much national development. At the same time, the internal political situation of the Jin had undergone great changes. The third emperor of the Jin, Xi Zong, was enthroned at the age of seventeen in 1135. Due to his young age, some officials from the royal family, like Wanyan Chang and Zongbi had frequently interfered with politics in court, and had taken the opportunity to strengthen their own power. When Xi Zong grew older, he very much hated the interference of his relatives, and hoped that the Jin could adopt the Song system of autocratic government. Thereupon he started executing those officials he was unhappy with, leading to much anxiety and fear in court. His cousin Wanyan Liang⁶⁷ then took the opportunity to revolt against the emperor; he was successful in killing Xi Zong and taking over his throne.⁶⁸ However, when Wanyan Liang was on his throne, he also felt the necessity to suppress the power of the royal members in the court, and gather all the power into the hands of the emperor himself. Therefore, he was even more ruthless than Xi Zong in killing his

---
⁶⁷ After the death of Wanyan Liang in 1162, he was posthumously called Hailing Junwang, thus most historical sources refer to him as Hailing Wang. We will use his personal name in this thesis. The deeds of Wanyan Liang can be seen in JS, ch. 5, pp. 91-120.

⁶⁸ This happened in 12th/1149. See YZ, ch. 160, pp. 2599-2600. See also JS, ch. 4, p. 87 and ch.5, p. 93.
officials to consolidate his own power and position. Finding the lack of support from his own people, he dismissed the Jurchen officials from court, and recruited the people from the Central Plain and put them in important positions as his henchmen. In 1153, he had left the capital Shangjing (Huiningfu), where the Jin regime was first founded, and moved to Yanjing, renaming it Zhongdu, the centre of administration. To move the capital southward, was not only for easier access to govern the Central Plain, but also to enable the process of Sinicization to take place rapidly within the governmental and bureaucratic organizations. Liang had received a Chinese education in his younger days, and very much admired the culture of the Chinese. Although the Jurchen had been successful in establishing their state on the basis of its military strength, Wanyan Liang nevertheless had the intention to bring about complete Sinicization of the Jin, and to adopt the Chinese system of government to rule his country. After moving to Yanjing, Liang on the one hand had hoped that the Jin could be transformed into an empire of the Central Plain, and on the other hand, he also harboured the ambition to be the successor of the Northern Song, to fight for legitimacy with the Southern Song regime. Therefore, Liang had once again moved the capital in 1161 to the former capital of the Song in Kaifeng, and actively prepared his army to eliminate the Song once and for all, to unify the country and to become the only legitimate ruler of China.

On the part of the Southern Song, there had been reports since 1156 that the Jin were planning to invade Song again. In 3rd/1156, a holder of the Jinshi degree,

---


70 See *YZ*, ch. 161, p. 2625; ch. 162, p. 2650 and ch. 164, p. 2681. After moving the capital to Yanjing, Wanyan Liang had adopted the Chinese system in his government, see *JS*, ch. 5, pp. 91-101 and ch. 125, pp. 2715-2717.

71 *YZ*, ch. 191, p. 3205.
Liang Xun (date of birth unknown) from Dongpingfu (present Dongping in Shandong) had escaped from the north and had sent an appeal petition to the throne, claiming that the Jin would definitely launch an attack on Song and urged the government to make preparation to defend the country. However, Gao Zong at that time still had full confidence on the peace treaty, and Liang Xun was punished to be kept under supervision in a remote area for defying the ban on appeal petitions and for his boldness in discussing the issue of external affairs. Besides Liang Xun, the well-known war advocate Zhang Jun had also submitted a memorial stating that the Jin would certainly breach their treaty and asked the government to consider carefully its strategy of defense. As a result, he was also punished by being exiled to Yongzhou (Present Lingling district in Hunan) for having “spread rumours and shaken the stability of the country”.

To make clear his standpoint regarding Liang Xun’s claim of the inevitability of Jin attack, Gao Zong then issued an edict to prohibit discussion on border matters. By then Qin Gui was already dead for some time, so the reason for issuing the edict was to declare to the Jurchen as well as to the Song people that the policy of peace was Gao Zong’s own decision, and that the policy would remain despite the death of Qin Gui. Gao Zong realized that he had to act severely to stop all rumours and dissent. So the punishment of Liang Xun and Zhang Jun had stopped the people from voicing their opinion for the time being.

---

72 Ibid., ch. 172, p. 2827.
73 Ibid., ch. 175, pp. 2885-2887.
74 Ibid., ch. 172, pp. 2827-2828.
However, in the next few years, there were occasional references to the fact that the Jin could not be trusted, and suggestions that there was an urgent need to get the army prepared. In 2nd/1158, a Song envoy Sun Daofu (date of birth unknown) had returned to the country, and passed on a message that the Jurchen were blaming the Song for buying horses and making preparation for war. Sun also mentioned that there were widespread rumours that the Jin did had the intention to invade south again, and preparation should be made as soon as possible. The Drafting Official of the Secretariat, Wang Gangzhong (1103-1165), and the Professor of Imperial Sacrifices (Taichang Boshi), Du Xinlao (1107-1164), had commented about the same thing. Subsequently, Wang Gangzhong was appointed Pacification Commissioner of Sichuan, and made preparation for war in Sichuan. At the same time, Gao Zong was afraid that the defense preparations might offend the Jurchen and give them the excuse to move their troops to the south, so he did not engage in any large-scale military movement apart from this.

In 2nd/1159, the Jin had abolished all the trading centres on the border of both countries, leaving Sizhou as the only centre for trading. It was only then that the Song responded passively, and sent more military guards to close the border. In 4th/1159, the Vice Director of Education (Guozi Siye) Huang Zhong, after returning from his mission to congratulate the Jin emperor on his birthday, had brought news that the Jin had rebuilt Kaifeng and moved to the city, and there would be an invasion to the south. Although Gao Zong was terrified by the news, he also had the impression that the Jin ruler might only be reconstructing a temporary palace for his occasional

---

76 Ibid., ch. 179, p. 2958.
76 Ibid., ch. 180, p. 2986.
77 Ibid., ch. 181, p. 3001.
visits. To be doubly sure, however, Gao Zong dispatched the Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Wang Lun (d.1161) on a thanksgiving mission to Jin to sound out Jin’s intention and to show goodwill to Jin. Wang Lun had returned in two months' time and stated that the Jin were friendly and keen to maintain peace, and Gao Zong believed it entirely. Until then, the Southern Song were still afraid to make large-scale military preparation for war. Following this there were more rumours about the enemy breaching the treaty. Gao Zong had on the one hand dispatched envoys to survey the actual situation in the north, and on the other hand, he had adhered to the suggestion from the Division Chief of the Ministry of Personnel (Libu Yuanwailang), Yu Yunwen (1110-1174), to secretly engage in defense preparations. On the part of the Jin, although they had actively prepared to invade the south, their ruler Wanyan Liang had intentionally dispatched envoys to Song stating that his purpose in leading his troops to the northern Huai region was just for hunting activities, and that the Song should have nothing to worry about. Therefore there were many in Song who held the opinion that all the rumours about the Jin were not true after all. As a result, the government was undecided on what actions to take. Although more military preparations were made, the court did not have the courage to move its troops to the borders even as late as 4th/1161. With regard to the moving of the Jin capital to Kaifeng, and the stationing of Jin troops in Suzhou and Bozhou, the

---

78 Ibid., p.3011.
79 Ibid., ch.182, p.3023.
80 Ibid., ch.183, p.3053.
81 Ibid., ch.184, p.3070.
82 This occurred in 1st/1161. See, id., ch.129, p.2784.
Song could only wait and see, and not take any hasty action in case the Jin found an excuse to invade Song on the grounds that the latter had broken the treaty.  

In 5th/1161, Jin had sent envoys to Song to inform about the death of Qin Zong, and also to blame the Song for not keeping the treaty by accepting the refugees from the north; the Jin further demanded the boundary between the two countries to be redefined. The Song found these demands by Jin unacceptable and it was quite clear that Jin was actually provoking the Song to start a war. It was only then that the Song were convinced about the intention of the Jin to breach the treaty, and started to prepare for war actively. Gao Zong then dismissed the peace advocates in court, and the war advocates led by chief councillor Chen Kangbo started to gain ground. Discussion on restoration was once again rife in court, and Gao Zong himself had the intention to lead the troops personally to fight the Jin. He had also summoned Zhang Jun back to supervise the army so as to raise the morale of the troops. Nevertheless, Gao Zong still dispatched envoys to Jin to congratulate its ruler for his move to the new capital. However the envoys were stopped by the Jin troops at Xuyi and were prevented from seeing Wanyan Liang. It was only then that Gao Zong knew for sure that war was inevitable and had stopped sending envoys to Jin.

83 YZ, ch.189, p.3167.
84 The date of Qin Zong’s death was unknown. However, according to Chen Ting of the Ming Dynasty, Qin Zong met his death in Yanjing in 1160, when Wanyan Liang was planning for a southern invasion of Song. See Chen Ting, Lianshan Motan (Shanghai: ShangwuYinshuguan, 1936), ch. 15, p. 125 and ch. 16, p. 138.
85 YZ, ch. 190, pp. 3172-3173.
86 Ibid., p. 3175.
87 Ibid., p. 3181.
88 Ibid., p. 3188 and ch. 191, p. 3195.
89 Ibid., p. 3202.
To raise the morale of the people, Gao Zong had carried out various acts to gain public favour such as sending his concubine, Lady Liu back to her own family,\(^90\) and dismissing the imperial doctor Wang Jixian (1098-1181)\(^91\) and the eunuch Zhang Quwei (date of birth unknown).\(^92\) Both Lady Liu and Wang had earlier suggested killing the war advocates to ensure the continuation of the peace treaty,\(^93\) while Zhang had secretly obstructed the plan to fight the enemy.\(^94\) The dismissal of these people had pleased most people at the time,\(^95\) and Gao Zong had further declared his intention to go war personally and to recover the lost territory.\(^96\) However, this does not mean that Gao Zong really had the desire to bring about restoration, for soon after this, when the Pacification Commissioner of Sichuan, Wu Lin had won the first battle against the Jin troops, Gao Zong indicated to his councillors that he was forced by circumstances to go to war, and if given the chance, he would prefer to keep the peace treaty so that innocent civilians would not be killed.\(^97\)

The Jin were fully prepared for their military campaign by 9th/1161, and their army would be attacking Song from four directions. The major army led by Wanyan Liang himself would cross the Huai River and attack Shouchun. The other three divisions would attack separately, one coming from Caizhou (present Runan district in


\(^{93}\) *Ibid.*, ch. 192, pp.3209.


Henan) to the south, another coming from Fengxiang to attack Dasanguan, and the naval troops would come down via sea to attack Lin'an, to prevent Gao Zong from escaping to the sea.98 In the war that followed, the Southern Song adopted the Jiang-Huai region as its main defense line, using the Hunan region as an auxiliary base, extending westward to the prefectures of Qin and Feng in Shaanxi, and reserving the regions of Fujian and Guangdong as the final line of retreat.99 The Southern Song government had actively prepared for defense from 5th/1161, the most important measure was the building of ships in Wenzhou.100 Although this was officially stated as a step to strengthen the naval power, it also provided a means of easier retreat to the sea if the situation seemed unfavourable. This tactic of evading the enemy had been practiced since the time Zongbi forced Gao Zong to flee to the sea from Lin'an. Ever since that time, this was an important measure adopted by the Song to evade the enemy. Although Gao Zong at this time had declared his intention to lead the army personally, he was not too sure about the ability of his army to fight, and it was thus necessary for him to prepare a route of retreat.

During this war, the Deputy Commander of the Calvary and Infantry (Mabujun Fuzongguan) of Zhexi, Li Bao (d. 1165), was assigned to be in charge of the naval troops, and had won a few battles in the war. He had first taken Haizhou (present Donghai xian in Jiangsu),101 then he defeated the Jin navy at Jiaoxi (present Jiaodao) at the sea near Chenjiaodao.102 This naval victory was crucial to the continued survival of

98 Ibid., ch. 191, p. 3205.
99 LDZZS, vol. 12, p. 325.
100 YZ, ch. 191, p. 3193.
101 Ibid., ch. 193, pp. 3230-3231.
102 Ibid., pp. 3251-3252.
the Southern Song. It was a heavy blow to the military strategy of the Jin, and had successfully eliminated the Jin threat to Song from behind the battlelines, so that they could concentrate their war efforts in the Yangzi region. In Sichuan, when Wu Lin noted that the Jin troops in Shaanxi only had the strength to defend themselves, he launched a full scale attack on them, recovering more than ten prefectures and forced the enemy troops back to their defense lines at Dasanguan and Liupanshan. At the same time, the loyalist troops in Junzhou (present Jun xian in Hubei) and Jinzhou (present Ankang xian in Shaanxi) had joined forces with the Song army to fight against the Jin troops in the various prefectures in Henan, and in Huazhou and Shaanzhou, and became a major threat to the Jin troops. It was only in the Jiang-Huai region where the main Jin forces led by Wanyan Liang had pushed southwards to the north of the Yangzi in Hezhou and Guazhou, putting the Southern Song in an endangered position.

In 10th/1161, the Song had appointed Liu Qi to defend Huaidong, and Wang Quan (date of birth unknown) to defend Huaixi. Liu Qi at the time was 63 years of age and was even too old and frail to ride a horse. Although the government intended to use the fame he had achieved in his younger days to fight the enemy, he was nevertheless defeated by the strong and experienced troops of the Jin army, and retreated to Jiangnan. On the other hand, Wang Quan in Huaixi had also retreated without putting up a fight. He had even abandoned his troops in the front-line while he himself took the opportunity to retreat. Later Wang, without waiting for the

103 Ibid., ch. 194, p. 3271.
104 Ibid., ch. 192, p. 3213.
105 Ibid., ch. 190, p. 3186.
106 Ibid., ch. 193, p. 3237.
court's order, decided to cross to the south of the Yangzi and station at East Caishi.¹⁰⁷ When the Jin troops heard that Wang Quan was retreating, they pursued him and arrived at West Caishi (present Hengjiangpu in Hexian, so named because it was facing the east bank of Caishi), and were preparing to cross the river.¹⁰⁸ Subsequently Wang Quan was dismissed, and the Regional Commandant (jiedushi) of Ningguo Jun, Li Xianzhong (1110-1178), was ordered to defend Caishi against the Jin troops.¹⁰⁹ In 11th/1161, the Drafter in the Department of State Affairs (Zhongshu sheren), Yu Yunwen, who had been appointed Consultant of Military Affairs (Canmou Junshi) was dispatched to Wuhu. At that time, the reinforcement troops under Li Xianzhong had yet to arrive and Caishi was left without a military leader. The Jin troops had gathered their forces and were preparing to cross the river. Thereupon, Yu Yunwen rushed to Caishi and took over the responsibility of reorganizing the remaining troops of Wang Quan to defend the Yangzi. The Song troops with their strong navy and experience in naval warfare, finally defeated the Jin troops.¹¹⁰ This was the famous Battle of Caishi.

Before the battle in Caishi, Wanyan Liang had received news about the usurpation by Prince Ge (posthumously named Jin Shi Zong, r.1161-1189) in Dongjing (Kaifeng).¹¹¹ After the defeat in Caishi, Liang felt that if he were to withdraw his troops and return to his homeland, he would have achieved nothing. Therefore, he moved his remaining troops to Huaidong and stationed at Guazhou where he planned

---

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 3247.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 3249.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., ch. 194, p. 3257.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 3259-3270.

¹¹¹ Ibid., ch. 193, p. 3234 and p.3254.
for another crossing of the Yangzi.\textsuperscript{112} It was his intention to demolish the Song first before dealing with the internal rebellion back home. Knowing that this would be a crucial battle, Liang commanded his troops to cross the river within three days, threatening to impose the death penalty on those who failed to do so. This caused much fear and anger among his subordinates, who were afraid of the formidable Song navy on the one hand, but on the other hand, they had to face the death penalty if they did not advance in time. Their desperation finally forced them to follow the plot conspired by a military leader Yelu Yuanyi to assassinate Wanyan Liang,\textsuperscript{113} and thereafter to seek peace with Song.\textsuperscript{114}

The assassination of Wanyan Liang was mainly due to the internal rebellion in the Jin government. The usurpation of Jin Shi Zong had affected the morale of the Jin troops, causing Liang to have difficulty in controlling his troops. Adding to this was the fact that the Southern Song under the capable leadership of Yu Yunwen had succeeded in defending the Yangzi. Being stronger than their enemy in naval power, as long as the Song were well prepared, the Jin troops would find it impossible to cross the Yangzi.\textsuperscript{115} The significance of the Battle of Caishi was that it had stopped the Jin troops from crossing the river and penetrating into Jiangnan. If the Jin had succeeded in doing so, the fate of the Southern Song would then be unpredictable.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[112] \textit{Ibid.}, ch. 194, p. 3278.
\item[113] \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 3280-3281.
\item[114] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 3284.
\end{footnotes}
3. THE ABDCICATION OF GAO ZONG

In 12th/1161, after hearing about the assassination of Wanyan Liang and the withdrawal of the Jin troops, Gao Zong ordered his troops along the Yangzī to launch a counter-attack to pursue the enemy,\(^{116}\) and he also personally moved to Jiankang to reward the soldiers there.\(^{117}\) However, the Song troops were actually not strong enough to fight the Jin. Although they were pursuing the enemy in name, the Song did not dare to go near them and were thus merely “escorting” the enemy back north across the border.\(^{118}\) For example, in one case, the Pacification Commissioner of Huaidong, Cheng Min (1094-1174), only dared to “pursue and attack” the enemy when he heard that the enemy had retreated northwards across the Huai River.\(^{119}\) To boost the morale of his army, Gao Zong had repeatedly talked about restoration of the lost land,\(^{120}\) hence the call for recovery (huifu) became even more frequent. In actual fact Gao Zong knew very well that the Song did not even have the power to counter-attack, and the goal of huifu was almost impossible to attain. He had referred to it to meet the situation of the time.

After the death of Wanyan Liang, the Jurchen had attempted to negotiate for peace. Gao Zong responded positively with two conditions, firstly, the return of the territories in Henan to Song, and secondly, the change in the diplomatic status of Song from “vassal” to “younger brother” of the Jin.\(^{121}\) The second condition especially had

\(^{116}\) YL, ch. 195, p. 3289.

\(^{117}\) Gao Zong arrived at Jiankang in 1st/1162. See ibid., ch. 196, p. 3306.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., ch. 195, p. 3291.

\(^{119}\) Ibid., p. 3298.

\(^{120}\) Ibid., p. 3293.

\(^{121}\) SS, ch. 373, pp. 11570-11571.
been Gao Zong’s desire for a long time because the “elder and younger brother” relationship would at least symbolize the equal status between the two countries. However, Jin Shi Zong had totally rejected the above mentioned conditions, and planned for another invasion instead. Therefore, the Song-Jin war was renewed. In the renewed warfare, Wu Lin led the army in Sichuan and Shaanxi, and had succeeded in reviving four civil and eleven military prefectures, whereas the battles in Dasanguan and Fengxiang came to a stalemate.\(^{122}\) In the Jiang-Huai region however, although the Song troops had had several opportunities to defeat the Jin, they suffered from the lack of financial resources to sustain their fight.\(^{123}\) Therefore, although the Song troops were in good fighting spirit, they were defeated by the enemy. Subsequently, when Jin Shi Zong sent envoys to negotiate for peace with the Song, Gao Zong decided to proceed with the negotiations as he did not want the country to be engaged in a prolonged war. At the same time, he had made a sudden decision to abdicate the throne to Xiao Zong, when the war had subsided to a great extent.

In 7th/1129, after the Miao-Liu Coup, Gao Zong’s only son Zhao Fu had passed away due to sickness.\(^{124}\) After that Gao Zong did not have any descendants. A few days after the prince’s death, a Jinshi named Li Shiyu (date of birth unknown) had memorialized the emperor requesting His Majesty to appoint his heir. This had enraged Gao Zong, who ordered Li to be exiled. However, ever since the above issue had been brought out, there were frequent references by the ministers in court


\(^{123}\) Due to insufficient military fund, the government had asked the civilians for donations. See Ibid., ch.198, p. 3351.

\(^{124}\) Ibid., ch. 25, p. 510.
concerning the nomination of an heir-apparent. In 8th/1129, the Chancellery Imperial Recorders, Hu Yin, warned that if the Jurchen were to enthrone someone from without the royal family in the north, the regime of Gao Zong would be shaken easily because he had not named an heir. During that time, Liu Yu had not yet been enthroned by the Jin, and Hu was dismissed because of his direct reference to the emperor’s taboo. Soon after this, the Jin had enthroned Liu Yu as the puppet emperor of Qi to rival Gao Zong. In the following year, a Subprefect of the Shangyu subprefecture in Yuezhou, Lou Yinliang (date of birth unknown), had requested Gao Zong to name a descendant of Tai Zu as his successor. As the enthronement of Liu Yu had been a strong blow to the unstable regime of the Southern Song, Gao Zong therefore started to consider the matter seriously. In 5th/1132, Gao Zong had selected a descendant of the royal family, Bo Cong, to live in the palace. In 5th/1134, another descendant of the royal family, Bo Jiu, was also chosen. From then on, the naming of the heir-apparent had centred upon these two candidates. However, until 1157, Gao Zong had not made any decision on his heir, probably because he was still hoping to produce another son to inherit his throne. Eventually, in 2nd/1160, Gao Zong had finally decided to make Bo Cong the heir, and named him Prince Jian. In 1161, during the Jin invasion, Prince Jian was indignant and had volunteered to lead

---

125 Ibid., p. 511

126 Ibid., ch. 27, p. 542. See also LCSZ, ch. 6, pp. 636-658.

127 YZ, ch. 45, p. 814.

128 Bo Zong was the future Xiao Zong. He was only six years old when he was chosen to live in the palace. See ibid., ch. 54, p. 953.

129 Ibid., ch. 76, p.1259.

130 Ibid., ch. 184, p. 3082.
the troops personally to fight the enemy.\textsuperscript{131} His rash move had however raised Gao Zong’s anger and suspicions, for even though prior to that the emperor had promised to lead the troops personally, nevertheless after having lost to the enemy in the Liang-Huai region, he was advised by the officials to evacuate to the sea.\textsuperscript{132} Prince Jian’s suggestion to lead the army personally had therefore brought embarrassment to the emperor and besides, it also reminded the emperor of the incident in the Tang Dynasty whereby when Tang Xuan Zong fled to Sichuan during the uprising of his troops, his throne was taken over by his heir at Lingwu (present Lingwu xian in Ningxia).\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, since the Song founder Tai Zu was able to establish his regime in a military coup during an expedition, it was the dynastic tradition of the Song to prohibit members of the royal family from leading military troops. Thus this had added to Gao Zong’s anger and suspicion. It was only after the tutor of Prince Jian, Shi Hao (1106-1194), had mediated that Gao Zong finally forgave Prince Jian for his recklessness, and brought the latter with him to Jiankang, so that he would get to know the military leaders there.\textsuperscript{134} Possibly, Gao Zong at that time had decided on the person to inherit his throne. Not long after they moved to Jiankang, the Jin had asked for peace negotiations and being reluctant to take further risk in fighting the war, Gao Zong moved back to Lin’an.\textsuperscript{135} After his return to Lin’an, Gao Zong, pleading that he was

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{ZJ}, Vol. 2, ch. 1, p. 711.

\textsuperscript{132} When Wang Quan fled from the battle at Zhaoguan, Gao Zong had decided to flee to the sea to evade the enemy but was stopped by chief councillor Chen Kangbo. See \textit{YZ}, ch. 193, p.3243.

\textsuperscript{133} \textit{ZJ}, Vol. 2, ch. 1, p.711.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 712.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{YZ}, h. 197, p. 3325.
“old and sick” and weary of his political life and would like to be relieved from his burden, abdicated his throne in favour of his son Prince Jian. 136

At the time of his abdication, Gao Zong was only fifty-five and was still in his prime of life. He had stated that he was “old and sick” but not long before this he had personally led his troops to war in Jiankang. After his abdication, he continued to lead an active life and even recruited more than ten new concubines into his palace, 137 and only passed away at the ripe old age of eighty-one. 138 Even though he stated that he was weary of political life, after his abdication, he had frequently interfered with governmental affairs. This means that he had not really lost interest in court politics. 139 Also, his quick decision to abdicate was a great contrast to his act of delaying in the choosing of his heir. There must be reasons behind such a move. The most important reason was his intention to improve the diplomatic status of Song vis-a-vis the Jin. In 2nd/1162 when the Jin had sent envoys to negotiate for peace, Gao Zong was not sure with regard to the Jin’s intention and he therefore had not made any hasty decision. Later, he had adopted the proposal of the Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Ye Yiwen (1098-1170), to pose an uncompromising gesture to force the Jin into giving way to a new diplomatic relationship between the two states. 140 Under this plan, Gao Zong on the one hand had appointed the war advocate Zhang Jun to take charge of defense in the Liang-Huai region, 141 and on the other hand, he had decided

136 Ibid., ch. 200, pp. 3382-3383. Also see SS, ch. 110, p. 2642.

137 ZJ, Vol. 1, ch. 1, pp. 84-86.

138 Gao Zong passed away in 1187. See SS, ch. 32, p. 611.


140 ZJ, ch. 196, p. 3313.

to abdicate in favour of Prince Jian, who was well-known for his ambition to achieve re-conquest. These steps were actually taken to indicate a hawkish policy so as to force the Jin to come to a compromise with Song demands.142

The second reason Gao Zong decided to abdicate earlier was to save himself from criticisms. The stability of the Southern Song was built on the basis of the peace treaty. Although Qin Gui had taken full responsibility and all the blame for bringing about peace negotiations, nevertheless seeing that the peace treaty had resulted in bringing peace to the country for over a decade, after the death of Qin Gui, Gao Zong had frankly stated that the peace negotiations actually originated from his own decision, and he had full confidence on the peace treaty.143 However, only five years after he made the above declarations, the Jurchen had breached the treaty and had attacked the Song again. This undoubtedly was a serious blow to his prestige and policies, besides causing him great embarrassment. One of the most unforgivable mistakes he made was that during the time when there were reports that the Jin troops might attack, he had ignored the news and continued to believe that the enemy would abide by the peace treaty. This had delayed the preparation for war, and the Jin army almost succeeded in crossing the Yangzi. This probably made him ashamed to face his own people, and prompted him to pass on the throne to Prince Jian who was after all chosen by himself to be his successor. With this, he could show to the people that it was not his intention to continue sitting on the throne,144 and furthermore, after his


143 YL, ch. 172, p. 2827.

abdication he could still make use of his filial son to implement his own policies behind the scene.145

Lastly, Gao Zong’s symbolic status could be raised with his abdication, and his new position as “Retired Emperor” would divert the people’s attention from his previous mistakes and unwise policies. Besides, Gao Zong’s abdication had gained him praise in two other matters. First of all, he had chosen the right time to abdicate. Since the Song at this time appeared to have gained the upperhand in the Song-Jin war, Gao Zong’s decision to abdicate at this moment therefore created an impression that he intended to boost the people’s morale with a new emperor (who was noted for his hawkish inclination).146 Secondly, by abdicating in favour of Prince Jian, Gao Zong had passed back the throne to the descendants of Tai Zu.147 This decision was praised most by the officials and they had named him at par with the respected emperor Yao,148 and honoring him the exalted title of Guang Yao Shou Sheng.149 Therefore, instead of staying on his throne in an awkward and embarassed position, it was indeed far better for him to retire with great honour and praise.


146 Wang Fuzhi, Song Lun, ch. 12, p. 215.

147 Song Tai Zu had passed his throne to his brother Tai Zong, who was then succeeded by his son Zhen Zong. Since then, the throne was inherited by the descendants of Tai Zong until Gao Zong passed the throne back to Xiao Zong who was from the line of Tai Zu.

148 YZ, ch. 200, p. 3383.

149 SS, ch. 32, p. 611.
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

Gao Zong was enthroned fortuitously; since his accession to the throne he had shouldered a mission to revive the regime of Zhao-Song, and he had also inherited all kinds of political and social problems which remained since the last few decades of the Northern Song. In the political realm, he had to face both external threat from the Jurchen, as well as problems of internal administration such as the challenge to imperial power, the self-seeking attitude of the civil bureaucrats, the recalcitrance of military officials, and the interference of eunuchs in court politics. Besides, in the social realm, the years of upheaval had caused a lot of social and economic problems, with people losing their homes, and bandits running wild all over the country. Therefore, Gao Zong was faced with immense trials and challenges the moment he ascended the throne.

With these domestic troubles and foreign invasion at hand, Gao Zong and his ministers found it impossible to tackle all the problems at one go and could only attempt to solve the more urgent problems in a piecemeal fashion. Therefore, due to the lack of overall planning, the government's implementation of policies had shown a strong tendency towards compromise and accommodation. For example, the court had to tolerate the recalcitrant generals in order to obtain their help and support in fighting the Jurchen and suppressing local rebellions. Also, in order to strengthen and consolidate the new regime, the government had taken in officials who had previously served under the Northern Song, disregarding whether they had been corrupt or disloyal. Furthermore, to safeguard its political power and maintain peace within the country, it was the government's policy to recruit the bandits and robbers and to grant
them official ranks once they were recruited into the imperial army, despite all the criminal offences committed by them.

Such illogical planning and compromise in the execution of its policies had augmented the difficulties faced by the Southern Song in the founding of the dynasty in its early stage, and had resulted in a further decline of imperial power. These accumulated problems and challenges constituted the most difficult phase in Gao Zong’s political life. He had to struggle extremely hard to find a breakthrough, and the most crucial task of all was to ensure the supremacy of his own position. Thus initially, he had made use of the strength of the military generals to create a situation favourable to himself. First of all, with the help of these generals, he had made great efforts to suppress the bandits and rebels who were interested in claiming the throne for themselves. Secondly, he had shown an uncompromising stand toward Liu Yu who was enthroned by the Jurchen, so as to get rid of this greatest rival to his throne. Finally, after the generals had helped him attain stability both internally and externally, he was able to utilize his advantageous position, and turn against the generals, who were becoming increasingly uncontrollable, reclaiming the military power from them to avoid any possibility of a coup d'état which could affect his position.

Gao Zong had finally overcome this difficult phase of his political life in 1142, when he succeeded in reclaiming the military power from the generals, and had reached a compromise in relations with the Jurchen. After that he allowed Qin Gui to dominate power in court, and take the blame for all the unfavourable policies which had been enacted, while the emperor himself remained in control behind the scene. Adopting the policy of accommodation as his political approach, Gao Zong was willing,
to tolerate the faults of his subordinates, as long as they were not acting beyond certain limits, and did not pose a threat to the status of the emperor.

In the first six chapters of this thesis, we have discussed the major events which had occurred in the thirty-six years of Gao Zong's reign, from the time of his enthronement until his abdication in 1162. In this concluding chapter, we will attempt to give an overall review of his achievements and his contributions as the founder of the Southern Song dynasty.

Most historical records do not tell us much about Gao Zong's life before he was enthroned. When Gao Zong was a prince, there was no expectation at all that he would become the emperor one day, and thus he was never groomed to take over the throne. It is therefore to be expected that he did not have much opportunity to expose himself to the political affairs in the country. The "Calamity of Jingkang" had indirectly made him the emperor. Besides inheriting the heavy burden of governing the country, which he had never done before, he also had to adapt his personal lifestyle and his personal character to suit his new position. From then on, Gao Zong, despite his youth and lack of political experience, had to play the role of a national leader, a sagely monarch who could gain the honour and respect from his subjects. Irrespective of what kind of personality he possessed before his enthronement, his mission now was to save the nation and his parents (at least this was what the people hoped of him); he was only allowed to portray positive characteristics such as being stable and righteous, and had to be highly tolerant and accommodative, in order to win the long fight for the legitimacy of his reign, and to restore all irregularities, which were not in compliance with dynastic traditions, to their proper orders.
During the early years of his reign, the socio-economic conditions of the country were seriously ruined because of the continual invasions of the Jin and the Qi. Gao Zong had to solve numerous problems and settle various crises from the very beginning, and tried to establish a new order in the country. With the evidence of the historical records of *Jianyan Yilai Xinian Yuanlu* and *Jianyan Yilai Chaoye Zaji*, one would find that Gao Zong did put up great efforts and sacrifices for the purpose of national restoration. He was proven to be frugal, benevolent, stable and conservative in character, and had shown his interest in historical writings, archery, calligraphy, as well as in agricultural activities. By doing this, he had set himself a very good example to promote a frugal lifestyle among his people. Seeing that the extravagance and self-indulgence of his father Hui Zong had led to national disaster, Gao Zong was careful not to follow in his footsteps. Instead, he sought to win the support of the people by practising a simple and frugal lifestyle.

Gao Zong’s lifestyle was in line with his political thinking as both proved him to be a pragmatic emperor. In his personal life, he was against extravagance and self-indulgence, while in his foreign policy, he made it clear that it was more important to save lives rather than sacrifice them for the sake of principle. Also, it was his desire merely to consolidate his regime, to stop the war and bring about restoration and recuperation within the nation. In 4th/1142, he granted special reward to Qin Gui and the Assistant Executive of the Secretariat Chancellery (*Canzhi Zhengshi*) Wang Ciweng (1079-1149) because through their advice and strategic planning, the government was able to achieve its purpose of “stopping the enemy without putting up a fight”. Gao Zong had stated that he loved his people in both the north and south, and therefore was very unwilling to see the country engaged in continual warfare with

---

1 *YZ*, ch. 145, p. 2322.
the enemy. He pointed that the earlier military campaigns were actually carried out against his will. He had known from the very beginning that in dealing with the ambitious Jurchen, it would eventually end in a peace settlement. Thus he had employed the “gentle approach” (rou dao) to “control” (yü) the Jurchen, and by so doing, he hoped to bring peace and stability to his people. Gao Zong’s pragmatism was therefore clearly portrayed in his political life. In the issue of peace or war with the Jin, even though most of the officials in court as well as the military were opposed to a peace settlement, their failure to provide a viable solution to the problems had made Gao Zong turn towards the policy to negotiate for peace. His adoption of the peace policy had finally been fruitful, and had brought about twenty years of peace to the country.

Gao Zong was a very diligent monarch. He personally read through all the memorials daily. Also with regard to the more important matters, he would first discuss them with the ministers at court before making his final decisions. Despite his lack of experience in political affairs, he was able to learn fast and became a very decisive emperor after having been enthroned for a few years. In the early years of the Shaoxing era, even though his foreign policy appears to be wavering between war and peace, in actual fact, he had already decided in favour of peace, but was forced by circumstances at times to adopt a war policy. There were altogether forty-eight assistant councillors who had served under him and the frequent changes in councillors were mainly due to the fact that they held different opinions from him. Gao Zong held political power in his own hands and made personal decisions on all matters, but he would delegate his authority to a capable executive to carry out his

---

2 Ibid., ch. 159, p. 2583.
3 ZJ, vol. 1, ch 9, p. 262
orders. After appointing Qin Gui as the chief councillor, Gao Zong found that Qin was the right person whom he had sought for so long. Qin could not only suppress other ministers who held different opinion, he was also willing to bear all the unfavourable criticism from others. Therefore, during the period Qin Gui served as the sole chief councillor, the frequent changes in the assistant councillors were mostly due to Qin’s decision rather than that of the emperor. After the death of Qin Gui, Gao Zong had difficulty finding another executive of Qin’s calibre to carry on his tasks, and consequently, within a short period of seven years (from the time of Qin’s death until the end of Gao Zong’s reign), Gao Zong had appointed five chief councillors and eleven assistant councillors at court.

In order to bring about peace, Gao Zong was willing to sacrifice his personal honour, and in this respect he could be regarded as a good ruler. The traditional criticism against Gao Zong which is mainly focused upon his peace policy and his execution of Yue Fei may need to be reexamined. From the political situation at home and abroad prior to the signing of the peace agreement, the reconquest of lost territories was indeed an ideal far beyond the ability of the Southern Song to attain. Nevertheless, during the two decades of peace after the signing of the 1142 treaty, Gao Zong had not made use of this opportunity to actively revitalise the nation, but instead, due to his fear of offending the Jin, had delegated his authority to Qin Gui and allowed him to take full control until the day of his death. While the delegation of authority to a chief councillor to rule the country may not be wrong in itself, however, the fact that even though he was fully aware of the abuses inflicted by Qin upon the government and the people in general, Gao Zong preferred to keep silent and did not do anything about it, seems to be an even greater reason why he should be blamed.
It is interesting to note that after his abdication, Gao Zong had gradually changed his lifestyle to one that was increasingly extravagant. The improved economic position within the country might have prompted him to lead a more luxurious life. Also, after his abdication, he no longer needed to be restrained by all the strict rules in the government and the palace, and could finally free himself from all these rules and regulations. Living in luxury within his palace, Gao Zong could indeed lead a carefree life. While enjoying his retirement, Gao Zong nevertheless continued to play an active role in politics behind the scene. Having been personally chosen by Gao Zong to succeed to the throne, Xiao Zong was absolutely loyal to his father, and was noted for his filiality to the ex-emperor. Therefore, the retired Gao Zong conveniently made use of his status as “Retired Emperor” to exert his influence upon Xiao Zong. Thus, despite his retirement, Gao Zong in actual fact was using Xiao Zong much like a chief councillor, delegating his authority to the latter to carry out his own policies and decisions.5

Xiao Zong appears to have been very much under the control of Gao Zong in various matters.6 The peace policy toward the Jin was still being monitored by Gao Zong and Xiao Zong was not able to do much to change the situation. Although Gao Zong after the assassination of Wanyan Liang did have the intention to make use of this opportunity to improve the status of Song by adopting a more aggressive posture, he nevertheless anticipated that eventually peace negotiations would take place.7 Therefore, although he had appointed war advocates to key positions and abdicated his

---

6 Songren Yishi Huijian, ch. 3, pp. 71-78
7 YZ, ch. 196, p. 3314.
throne to the more hawkish Prince Jian, it was more for the purpose of posing an aggressive posture rather than having the real intention to fight. He knew very well that the Song did not have sufficient strength to achieve recovery of the lost land,\(^8\) thus he was not willing to resort to military strength or undertake the risk of launching a military campaign. When Xiao Zong first ascended to his throne, Gao Zong was at the time adopting the above-mentioned aggressive posture towards the Jin, and consequently, the war advocate Zhang Jun was appointed by Xiao Zong as Pacification Commissioner of the Jiang and Huai regions, and a military campaign was launched.\(^9\) Despite their initial victories, the Song forces suffered a disastrous defeat at Fuli and lost almost all their supplies of armaments and food.\(^10\) This disaster had proven that the Southern Song was indeed not strong enough, and Gao Zong’s peace policy was seen in a more favourable light. He then advised Xiao Zong to adhere to his policy of peace and Xiao Zong thus decided to send envoys to negotiate for peace.\(^11\) Subsequently, the Song envoy Hu Fang (date of birth unknown) had been sent to Jin, and on his arrival in Jin, he declared that the Song intention to negotiate for peace was entirely Gao Zong’s idea.\(^12\)

At the same time the Jin ruler Shi Zong was also tired of war\(^13\), and was therefore willing to come to a peace settlement with four conditions: firstly, the Jin-Song relationship of lord-vassal could be altered to that of uncle-nephew; secondly, the

---

13 *JS,* ch. 87, p. 655.
Song had to cede the four prefectures of Tang, Deng, Hai and Si to the Jin; thirdly, the Song would continue to pay its annual tribute; and fourthly, the Song had to send back to Jin traitors and refugees who had fled to Song.\textsuperscript{14}

Personally, Gao Zong was fairly satisfied with the terms laid down by the Jin, especially the first condition. This was because with the above alteration he would be recognized by the Jin as an older brother, and this would finally free him from the humiliation of being a vassal of the Jin, and would instead give him equal status as the Jin ruler. However, Xiao Zong did not agree with Jin demand to cede the four prefectures, and therefore he had ordered the army to prepare for war once again. The chief councillor Tang Situi, fearing that Xiao Zong would really declare war, requested him to consult Gao Zong before taking further action.\textsuperscript{15} Xiao Zong finally did not go against the wishes of Gao Zong and had eventually agreed to negotiate for peace.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, the establishment of the new Song-Jin peace settlement during the Longxing (reign title of Xiao Zong) era was actually brought about by Gao Zong.

As a monarch, Gao Zong’s first priority was to safeguard his throne, to prevent Qin Zong from returning to the country but to bring about the safe return of Hui Zong’s coffin and his mother Wei Xian Fei from Jin. Apart from that, he also hoped to maintain peaceful relationship with the Jurchen so that the people in both the north and south would enjoy peace. It was also his desire to put an end to the chaotic situation since the last days of the Northern Song, to restore the imperial order and the dynastic traditions of “strengthening the trunk and weakening the branches” and

\textsuperscript{14} Song Shi Quanwen Xu Zizhi Tongjian, ch. 24, p. 1871.

\textsuperscript{15} ZJ, Vol. I, ch. 20, p. 649.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 651.
civilian supremacy over the military. It was not crucial for him whether the land in Henan could be reclaimed or not. He was content as long as he could stay safely in the south-east and safeguard the defense line in the Huai region. Regarding the vassal status of Song in Song-Jin diplomatic relations, he would certainly be happy if it could be upgraded, otherwise, he just had to accept it.

All the above goals of Gao Zong were successively achieved during his reign. After his retirement, he even had the opportunity to upgrade the status of Song. From Gao Zong's point of view, he should be very satisfied with his own political achievements in his lifetime. From the point of view of a historian, the fact that Gao Zong did not meet the ideals and expectations of many in various matters (such as fighting the Jurchen and recovering the lost territory, signing of the peace treaty and the execution of Yue Fei etc.) had brought him much criticism. Nevertheless, it should not be denied that his ability to save the country from the most chaotic situation and restore it to its proper order was indeed no minor achievement. He should therefore be given due credit for his political accomplishments in this respect.