

**SOMALIA AS A FAILED STATE:
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS**

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FACULTY OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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**SOMALIA AS A FAILED STATE:
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS**

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ABSTRACT

This study is “Somalia As A Failed State: Internal and External Dynamics”, and examines both the internal and external factors that have contributed to the failure of Somalia. The aim is to examine how the internal factors contributed to the failure of Somalia; similarly, how have external factors contributed to the failure of Somalia? This is to start with a short introduction of Somalia’s historical background, problem statement, major research questions and objectives, literature review, research methodology, and limitations. Internally, the research will study who the Somalis are, Europeans’ early contacts with Somalis, the Europeans’ divide-and-control policy, Somalis’ response to the colonialists, the Jihadist Movement (1900-1920), the Nationalist Movement (1940-1960), and the United Nations Trusteeship’s effects on Somalia. Moreover, the study will cover the weakness of civilian rule in Somalia (1960-1969) and military misrule (1969-1991). Externally, the study will highlight the major factors that attracted global powers to come to Somalia, the impact of the Cold War’s politics on Somalia, particularly the Soviets and the United States’ roles in Somalia’s politics (1963-1977 and 1980-1991). Also, the study will highlight the impact of the Horn of Africa’s rivalry, particularly between Somalia and Ethiopia. Finally, the study also summarizes the research findings that include internal leadership failure, clan politics in Somalia, the impact of Europeans’ divide-and-rule policies during the colonial period, aid dependency and economic mismanagement. Externally, the research identifies Somalia as a chessboard of global powers and the impact of the region’s rivalry.

ABSTRAK

Kajian ini adalah mengenai “Somalia Sebuah Negara Yang Gagal: Faktor Dinamik Dalam dan Luaran”. Kajian ini adalah untuk melihat bagaimana kedua-dua faktor ini, iaitu faktor dalaman dan faktor luaran yang telah dikenalpasti menjadi penyumbang kepada kegagalan Somalia untuk berdiri sebagai sebuah Negara.

Ia dimulakan dengan pengenalan pendek mengenai sejarah dan latar belakang Somalia, kenyataan masalah, kajian mengenai soalan utama dan matlamat, kajian literature, kaedah kajian, matlamat dan batasan.

Dari sudut faktor dalaman, kajian akan melihat siapa dia yang dikatakan orang Somalia (Somali's)? Hubungan awal Eropah dengan penduduk Somalia, polisi pecah dan perintah Eropah, maklumbalas rakyat Somalia terhadap kolonialisasi dan Pergerakan Jihadis (1900-1920), Pergerakan Kebangsaan (1940-1960), dan kesan United Nation Trusteeship's ke atas Somalia. Lebih dari itu kajian ini juga akan meliputi kelemahan peranan perkhidmatan awam di Somalia (1960-1969) dan juga salah urus peraturan ketenteraan (1969-1991).

Dari sudut luaran pula, kajian ini juga akan memfokus kepada faktor utama yang menarik kuasa dunia untuk datang ke Somalia, impak politik daripada Cold War's ke atas Somalia, terutamanya peranan Amerika Syarikat dan Russia ke atas politik Somalia (1963-1977 dan 1980-1991). Dan juga kajian ini akan memfokuskan kepada pertelagahan di Afrika, khususnya Somalia dan Ethiopia.

Akhir sekali kajian ini juga akan mengandungi ringkasan dapatan daripada kajian yang meliputi kegagalan kepimpinan dalaman dan ahli politik di Somalia, dan kesan polisi pecah dan perintah Eropah semasa zaman penjajahan kolonial, kebergantungan bantuan dan salah urus

ekonomi. Manakala sudut luaran pula, kajian ini akan akhirnya akan melihat Somalia sebagai papan catur kepada kuasa dunia dan kesan kepada wilayah-wilayah yang bertelagah.

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I dedicate this study to

My mother Hajjah Adie Dhilow, my father Sheikh Ali Nur, my aunt Hajjah Madina Dhilow, my uncle Hajji Geedi Dhilow Gaabow, my wife Maryan Adei and Children Eassma, Anas and Mohamed Hassan Sheikh Ali Nur (better known as Big King).

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LIST OF COMMON ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADC	Agriculture Development Corporation
AFP	Agency France Press
APC	Armored Personal Carriers
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BBDO	Broad Based Diplomatic Office'
BMA	British Military Administration
CIA	Central Inelegancy Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMET	International Military Education & Training

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organizations
IOs	International Organizations
KGB	“KGB”, Committee for State Security”
LPEB	Local Political Education Bureaus
MAAG	Military Advisory Assistant Group
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MOD	Marehan, Ogadeen & Dhulmahante (3 calns)
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPO	National Political Office
NPRO	National Public Relations Office
NSC	National Security Court
NSL	National Security Law
NSS	National Security Service
OAU	Organization of African Union

SDR	Somali Democratic Republic
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SMA	Special Military Administration
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNL	Somali National League
SNM	Somali National Movement
SRC	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SRSP	Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SWLF	Somali Western Liberation Front
SYC	Somali Youth Club
SYL	Somali Youth League
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
USA	United States of America
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAC	United Nations Advisory Council

UNDP	United Nations Development Programs
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
USAID	United State Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background

Somalia's independence was proclaimed on July 1, 1960 from a merger of British Somaliland, which became independent from the UK on June 26, 1960, and Italian Somaliland, which became independent from the Trusted Italian Administrative (UNs Trusteeship) on July 1, 1960, to form the Somali Republic. Somalia covers an area of 637,657 square kilometers. It shares physical borders with Djibouti (58 km), Ethiopia (1,600 km) and Kenya (682 km). Somalia is located at the heart of the Horn of Africa and, as a bridge, links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. Somalia's strategic location on the Horn of Africa, along the Bab El-Mandeb route joining the Red Sea and Suez Canal to the west with the Indian Ocean to the east, invited the interests of foreign powers. This is why Somalia has been a geostrategically attractive and magnetic location for rival powers in the global power struggle since the colonial era.¹ In addition, Somalia's Capital is Mogadishu, overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, population estimated at nine million.² However, in September 24, 1992, the *Washington Post* reported the demise of the Somalia's state to say: "just thirty years after it officially became an independent nation, Somalia essentially has ceased to exist".³

On January 26, 1991, Somalia's state that had been established in 1960 totally collapsed. Somalia became a failed state and Abayomi Azikwe had to say this:⁴ "Somalia has not had an internationally recognized government since 1991, when the longtime superpower-backed regime of General Mohammed Siad Barre collapsed." General Mohamed was in power (October 21, 1969 - January 26, 1991) in different titles,

¹ Meith, N. The State of Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study by the United Nations Environment Programme, December 2005. Available at http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/dmb_somalia.pdf. (October 12, 2009).

² The United Nations Environment Programme, Graphics by: Global Resource Information Database (GRID). 3.2 million People were counted, and this number was estimated to have grown to 9.5 million by 2002 (UN, 2002).

³ *Washington Post*, on 24 September 1992 (AP).

⁴ Azikiwe, Abayomi. Where Do Calls to Intervene in Somalia Come From? Published Global Research Canada on June 19, 200. Available at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php.context=va&aid=9385>. (accessed on May 2, 2009).

from 1969-76 serving as the Chairman of Somalia's Revolutionary Council, from 1976-1980 as the Secretary-General of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, and from 1980-1991 as the President of Somalia. After his regime's fall, he first fled to neighboring Kenya and later into exile in Nigeria where he died on January 2, 1995.⁵ Many countries including the U.S severed diplomatic relations with Somalia after a civil war broke out in 1991 that saw warlords fighting for control of the country.⁶ The military ruler was overthrown by the United Somali Congress' militia; however, they failed to reestablish the state. The seeds of the inter-clan disagreements were sown long before the fall of General Mohamed. Therefore, the elites' factionalism was expected. Consequently, as expected the USC's elite soon split into two factions. The problem lay in the fact that the Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed belonged to the Abgal/Hawiye sub-clan and General Farah Aided belonged to Habar Gedir, also a Hawiye sub-clan. These clans were the most dominant clans, and in the absence of mechanisms for conflict management, their disagreement led them to total civil war. The state's security institution disintegrated before General Mohamed's total fall and Susan L. Woodwan had to say:⁷ "one of the first agencies to collapse in failed states is the police, and the security problem in a state that has failed tends to entail a long process". As matter of fact, Somalia became an example of a failed state, and in his work *A Passage to Africa*, George Alagiah has to say after he visited Somalia in early 1990s:⁸ "there is a place called Somalia on the map, but by any other definition of statehood, the country has ceased to matter. Somalia as a state with which one could trade, a nation with which one might have diplomatic relations or a country one would want to visit Somalia has slipped off the

⁵Somalis have no family names. Instead, a Somali has a given name followed by the name of father and grandfather. Thus the (Somalia) president's father was Siad, his grandfather was Barre. See Peter Bridges, *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 79.

⁶ See Somali PM lays foundation stone for new Nairobi embassy building published on Hiiraan online on November 9, 2015. The report is available at [http://www.Hiiraan.com/news4/2015/Nov/102492/Somali embassy](http://www.Hiiraan.com/news4/2015/Nov/102492/Somali%20embassy). (accessed on November 9, 2015).

⁷ See Woodward, L.Susan. *Failed States: Warlordism and Tribal Warfare*, (Volume 52, No. 2 (1999).

⁸ Alagiah, George. *A Passage to Africa*, London: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2002, 91.

radar screen of public consciousness and is not likely to return to it for some time”. Valeri Amos had to add:⁹ “up to one million people have lost their lives in the fighting between rival factions in addition to losses due to famine and disease”. In order to understand Somalia’s case, first we must understand that once the central government failed, each tribe’s major concern was solely its own survival. Ego and the fear of exploitation at the hands of other tribes who thirsted for greater power only increased insecurity, and self-defense became urgent. It was extremely hard to distinguish between offensive and defensive, because everybody viewed him/herself as the victim of another. In this perilous environment, warlords became the dominant players. They established their own tribal or regional forces. They constructed their regional or district orders and challenged any power, including traditional chiefs and Sheikhs. They formed verbal contracts with fellow militants (kinsmen), and in doing so they indirectly filled the vacuum of public administration.

In this respect, the self-elected warlords commanded their own militias in order to gain illegitimate political power. Though some were civilian, the majority were comprised of the national army officers whose ranks included major generals, generals and colonels and they graduated from top military academies in Italy, UK, the Soviet Union and the U.S.. Their list is too long but to include Major General Omar Haji Massale, Major General Mohamed Hirsi Said (Morgan), Col. Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, Col. Mohamed Hassan, Major General Adam Abdullah Nur, and the more famous General Mohamed Farah Eided.¹⁰ Hence the chaos they created was the result of purely selfish motivations and non-adherence either to the modern nations’ principles or Somali traditional culture. Consequently, in the absence of state political order these military men (trained by the

⁹AFP Report (February 20, 2011). Somalia Facing Cataclysmic Crisis. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=87#sthash.7RctIRKo.dpuf>. (accessed June 12, 2012).

¹⁰The civilians include Mohamed Omar Ahmed, Muse Sudi Yalahow, Osman Hassan Ali and Mohamed Qanyare Afrah. They divided the nation into pieces.

Italians, UK, Soviets and the U.S.) were destroying everything and terrorized everybody, including the respected Sheikhs and trusted traditional elders. Therefore, the vital question is: what are the factors that brought Somalia to that condition? Always there is a disagreement among scholars about the real causes of any state failure, and Somalia is not a different. Thus the primary goal of this study is to narrow that disagreement. In doing so, this study is seeking in equal manner to locate these factors both from the internal and external levels. In other words, the study is addressing besides the domestic factors how the colonial legacies and superpowers' geopolitical interests influenced and shaped Somalia's domestic policies since its partition in the late 19th century.¹¹ Colonial powers divided the Somali people into five portions which forced them to adopt nationalism through the years 1890-1960; as well, superpowers' ill advice forced them to adopt wrong policies. Besides the superpowers' ill advice, they purposely either punished Somalia or misled it throughout the Cold War (1960-1991); for instance, after the Somalia-Soviet split in November 1977, the Soviets' ambassador to Somalia had said: we will bring them to their knees. In fact the Soviets destroyed Somalia's army during Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia in 1978. The American Peter Bridges (US Ambassador to Somalia 1984-86) has to say too:¹² "in Somalia the government comes begging to the aid trough and we fill it. We have led them to a new dependency, not to independence". It is very clear that the colonial legacies and the superpowers' ill advice produced a perpetual internal challenge that kept Somalia in dispute with others. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate in a balanced way, between the domestic and external factors, how global powers' influences, bad advice and misconduct affected Somalia's political process. The research chapters are divided into major sections addressing the effects of both internal and external factors.

¹¹Cambridge Dictionary defines the term geopolitics the study of the way a country's size, position, influence its power and its relations with other nations. Available at [tp://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/geopolitics?q=geopolitics](http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/geopolitics?q=geopolitics). (accessed on May 11, 2012).

¹²Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, Kent, Ohio and London: published Kent State University Press, 2000, 200.

1.2. Problem Statement

Since 1991, Somalia is considered the clearest example of complete state failure, and according to Jean-Germain Gros' Taxonomy of State Failure types, Somalia is a model because the state lost control over its political territory. It is also no longer able to keep law and order among its citizens. This loss of control signals that the state has collapsed or became anarchistic, meaning that there is no longer an overarching authority.¹³ Clearly, Somalia is a failed state; however, so far there has not been much debate on both internal and external factors' dynamics in a balanced way. The research seeks to identify the internal dynamics that directly or indirectly contributed to the failure of Somalia; it also seeks to identify the external dynamics that may have contributed to the failure of Somalia. Therefore, the research's main goal is to locate the sources of state failure, both internal and external dynamics, in a balanced way.

1.3. Research Questions

This thesis's major research questions are:

What are the criteria that make Somalia a model of a failed state? What are the internal factors that have caused Somalia to fail? What are the external factors that have contributed to Somalia's political failure? This is to investigate if Somalia failed due to its own domestic problems or if external factors also contributed to its failure.

1.4. The Objectives of the Study

This thesis's main objective is to investigate both the internal and external factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia in January 26, 1991. Firstly the study will investigate

¹³Gros, Jean-Germain. *Failed States in Theoretical and Policy Perspective*, (ed.), W. Heitmeyer, 'Control Violence' New York: Springer verlag New York, 2011, 539.

the internal factors, particularly the impacts of Western colonialism on Somalis. The study will highlight the impacts of the partition on Somalis, and how they divided the society into many sub-sections to put an end to the society's internal structure. The study will also pay especial attention to Somalia's uneasy road to independence and its colonial response during the struggle for independence. Apart from the above, the study will also investigate the weakness of civilian rule in Somalia (1960-1969), the oppressor military rule in Somalia (1969-1978) and the weakness of military rule in Somalia (1979-1991). In detail the study will pay attention to the civilian governments' corruption and General Mohamed's misrule to divide the society into friendly and non-friendly clans. Secondly, the study will investigate the external factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia, particularly the factors that attract global powers to Somalia; therefore, the study will pay very special attention to Cold War politics in Somalia, mostly the role of the Soviets (1960s-1977), as well, and the role of the United States of America (1980-1991). Lastly the study will examine the Horn of Africa's rivalry between Somalia and Ethiopia. The purpose is to attempt to know if external factors have a similar or even greater effect than internal factors, and this comprehensive study will allow us to capture the core sources of state failure. In addition, as M. Hussein Adam pointed out:¹⁴ "whereas the numbers of studies of Somali internal factors are legion, studies of external factors are far fewer". For that reason, this study's significance is to fill the gap and to provide a fresh answer to what factors made Somalia fail. Moreover, currently the Somali elite is facing big challenges to rebuild Somalia because they are repeating the same mistakes that made or pushed Somalia to fail. They failed first to ask themselves what are the major factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia in 1991, simply assuming Somalia failed because of its society's tribal nature. In a different view, this study is examining both internal and

¹⁴Adam, M. Hussein. *Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?* (edit by) I. William Zartman *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

external factors in a balanced way. Therefore, if research is able to identify correctly the major factors, the thesis's outcome will assist Somalia's future elite to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

1.5. Literature Review

1.5.1. Failed State General

This research is providing that the sources of state failure are not only originated from domestic sources. Different from previous studies' conclusion, which focused only on domestic factors, this study is trying to include the external factors that influenced Somalia's political process and domestic condition which collectively pushed Somalia to fail. The work by Jean-Germain Gros entitled "Failed States in Theoretical, Historical and Policy Perspectives" uses Somalia as a real model of failed states (State Failure Type 1, Somalia) in the international system, and according to his (type 1) definition a failed state is:¹⁵ "the state loses control over maintenance and war making. It is also no longer able to keep law and order among its citizens, nor is it able to protect its territory from external predators of whatever origin. This loss of control signals that the state has collapsed or become anarchic, meaning that there is no longer on overarching authority". Furthermore, Mohamed Saleh Bali said:¹⁶ "the collapse of Somalia in 1991 is now considered the most examples of complete state failure and disorder."

¹⁵Gros, Jean-Germain. *Failed States in Theoretical, Historical and Policy Perspectives*, (ed.), W. Heitmeyer 'Control Violence', New York: Springer Verlag New York, 2011. For other type's characteristics are like this type 2 (North Korea), the state loses control over time internal order, but maintains it over the ability to wage war. This scenario is also rare. It typically occurs in a pre-collapse situation, where the state remain militarily stronger enough to defend its territory against external enemies, but has lost much of its legitimacy that is vulnerable to collapse from within. Type 3 (Haiti), the state loses control over the capacity to wage war but maintains it over internal order. It should be recalled that states behave like discriminating monopolists; they do not spread their assets evenly throughout the realm. Type 4 (Congo), the state lacks control over both internal order and war making, but this loss is neither complete nor permanent. Failure here is that "fluid halting place" Rotberg mentions: Typically states exhibit prater capacity in maintaining order and waging war in the center than in periphery. 539-541.

¹⁶Bali, Mohmaed Saleh. *An Introduction: Somaliland From Maroodi Jeex*, published on Somaliland Alternative Press, No. 3, (Winter 1996). Available at <http://www.mballi.info/bali04.htm>. (accessed on May 17, 2008).

Then, since its collapse in 1991, Somalia was labeled by the global media as an example of a genuinely failed state. Domestic order is so chaotic, and in fact Somalia is lacking the basic characteristics of a state. Here, rather than trying to reemphasize the domestic factor of “tribalism and bad leaders’ effects”, this research is developing an interplay concept which focuses on both internal and external factors in a balanced way.

Since 1990, many scholars and politicians with different perspectives have tried to explain and articulate the sources of Somalia’s political failure and have offered different views. The list includes Ahmed I. Samatar,¹⁷ who published his work in a collection of 8 essays. These essays were the first scholarly work that appeared after Somalia’s state failure. Ahmed and his team’s work is considered a pioneering effort. They did a great job, but nonetheless, their work was not much related to Somalia’s failure. They used the term “catastrophic” rather than “failed state”. It was properly a work of history of Somalia. Because that time (1994) was just 2-3 years after state failure, things were not very clear. Nobody was expecting Somalia to fail in this way. Although the symptoms and indications of state failure were clear, nobody was expecting Somalia to suddenly disintegrate. Additionally, the definitions and characteristics of failed states were not yet well developed. Another study by Richard Greenfield¹⁸ argues the causes of Somalia’s failure. He underlined numerous factors, including in his view society’s tribal nature, elites’ failure and most importantly nationalism. He sees nationalism is a serious factor which brought many conflicts, particularly to Somalia and Ethiopia. The article did not much analyse the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical position and its severe effects on Somalia’s interaction with others, including the superpowers. Hussein M. Adam¹⁹ published a very important article, and basically his main focus was on General

¹⁷Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenges from Catastrophic to Renewal*, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1994.

¹⁸Greenfield Richard. *Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor*, (eds.), by Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth: *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa*, London: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1994.

¹⁹Hussein M. Adam. *Terrible Beauty Being Born*, (edit by) I. William Zartman *Collapsed States*.,

Mohamed's misrule and he underlined eight factors that pushed Somalia to fail. In his view seven factors are internal in nature, while only one factor is external. He concludes that Somalia failed because of its bad leadership. Abdisalam M. Issa Salwa²⁰ published a very exceptional work focusing on two major issues, which together pushed Somalia to fail. In his view General Mohamed's military rule and Greater Somalia brought many problems, both in terms of domestic politics and international affairs. General Mohamed was very oppressive in nature, which in turn created intra-state conflicts, while on the other hand, nationalism created many problems between Somalia and others, including the UK, the USSR, the US, France and of course Somalia's neighboring states, including Ethiopia and Kenya. Mohamed Osman's²¹ view is very clear that Somalia failed because of its bad leadership. Two Somali intellectuals, Oman Hagi and Abdiwahid Osman Hagi,²² published a well-documented book on Somalia's political process from 1960-1991. The authors provided substantial evidence to show how Somalia's military ruler General Mohamed failed to uphold justice for his people. They provided all governments' composition through the years (1960-1990), particularly General Mohamed's era and they profoundly stressed the sources of Somalia's failure originating in injustice and General Mohamed's favoritism toward his close clans or tribesmen.

Mariam Gassim Arif²³ in her work greatly stressed the disputes existing between the state's political interests and narrow-minded elites' selfishness; however, she is arguing that the seeds of Somalia's current crisis were sown by the Italians before Somalia became an independent state. She is saying because of its misrule Italy deserves to be blamed.

²⁰Abdisalam M. Issa Salwa, *the Collapse of the Somali State*, London: HAAN Publishing, 1996.

²¹Mohamed Omar. *Somalia A Nation Driven to Despair: A Case of Leadership Failure*?, New Delhi: Somali Publications Co. Ltd, 1996.

²²Oman Hagi and Abdiwahid Osman Hagi. *Clan, Sub-clan and Regional Representation in the Somali Government Organization 1960-1990: Statistical Data and Findings*, Washington: Publisher N/A, 1998.

²³Mariam Gassim Arif. *Somalia: Clan vs. Nation*, Sharjah: Publisher (N/A), United Arab Emirates, 2002.

Abdullah A. Mohamoud²⁴ in his work, *State Collapse and Post-State Development in Africa*, greatly focused on the issues related to resources and material scarcity's effects on parts of Africa, particularly Somalia. Therefore, he looks at Somali's failure from an economic perspective and actually says that Somalia's state failed because of resource shortage. The scarcity of resources leads to the elites' conflict over the state's few resources. Ismaeil Ali Ismail²⁵ published a book very much related to the modern history of Somalia Public Administration; however, his main focus is administrative failure. According to his view, the state's staff at every level was not trained properly. He said the problem not only originated from the top, but also that the lower levels played a crucial role in weakening the state's overall performance. Nur Omar. Qabobe²⁶ published *Somalia: From Nation-State to Tribal Mutiny*, and he mainly focused on leadership failure and particularly General Mohamed's divide-and-control policy, detailing the use of this policy through the years.

Locally, in the Somali language a few publications appeared, including Cabdulqaadir Aroma's²⁷ work '*Sababihii Burburka Soomaaliya (The Sources of Somalia's Failure)*'. The author detailed General Mohamed's misrule as the cause of Somalia's failure. He articulated how the regime destroyed the state's political core principles, including the ministry of defense and foreign affairs. He provided insight into General Mohamed's idea of dividing the society into enemy and friendly clans. Also, Admiral General Farah Ahmed Omar²⁸ published '*Midnimada Dalka & Ismaamul Goboleedyada' (The National Unity and Federal States)*'. The author detailed the sources of the previous state's failure and current mistakes, which possibly may lead Somalia again into trouble. He warned the current elite

²⁴ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-State Development in Africa*, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006.

²⁵ Ismaeil, Ali Ismail. *Governance the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2010.

²⁶ Qabobe, Nur Omar. *Somalia: From Nation-State to Tribal Mutiny* New Delhi: Pharos Media& Pub. Pvt. Ltd., 2002.

²⁷ Aroma, Cabdulqadir. *Sababihii Burburka Soomaaliya (the Sources of Somalia's Failure)*, (2nd Ed.), Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Zafar SDN BHD, 2005.

²⁸ Omar, Farah Ahmed. *Midnimada Dalka iyo Ismaamul Goboleedyada (the National Unity and Regional States)*, Mogadishu: Publisher N/A, 2015.

not to repeat the previous mistakes that caused Somalia to fail again. He is trying to advise the current regime to be aware of what policies pushed the previous state to fail in 1991. Abdiweli Hassan Mohamed²⁹ published 'Maxaa Hortaagan Dowlada Soomaaliya: Geeska Africa & Danaha Is-Diidan' (What are Obstacles to Somalia's State: the Horn of Africa and Conflicting Interests). The author's main focus is to analyse the current challenges to Somalia's rebirth, in particular the issues related to the Horn of Africa's inter-state conflicts and interests. Specifically he examines Ethiopia's role in keeping Somalia in a weak position and predicts Ethiopia's major concern with Somali nationalism. The Ethiopians are aware that a stronger Somalia will reclaim its lost territory, which is a threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity. Abdullah Ahmed Yusuf³⁰ wrote "Halgan iyo Hagardaado: Taatiikh Nololeed' (Struggle and Conspiracy: A Memoir) in which he detailed the Somali political dissidents' co-operation with Ethiopia's military ruler during the tenure of General Mohamed. Yusuf is the founder of Somali's first political dissident group in Ethiopia. He founded the Somali Salvation Democratic Front in 1979 in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians provided training and weapons to his SSDF's militia through the years. Therefore, his view is authentic about the Horn of Africa's arming rebels. In 1985, the Ethiopians arrested him and remained in prison until Col. Mengistu's fall in 1991. His work explains his disagreement with the Ethiopians after they tried to use him as their agent. The work's core value is to warn Somalia's future elite to be wary of working with Ethiopians for political support. He stressed the hidden factor, which is national interest. These Somali-language works are very much related to this research's core issues. In different ways they detail Somalia's tribal nature, elites' factionalism, and Somalia's endless wars with Ethiopia, as well as Somalia's dependency on aid.

²⁹Abdiweli Hassan Mohamed. *Maxaa Hortaagan Dowlada Soomaaliya: Geeska Africa & Danaha Is-Diidan*, (what are Obstacle to Somalia's State: the Horn of Africa and Conflicting Interests), Nairobi: published in Graphic Lineups Limited, 2009.

³⁰Abdullah Ahmed Yusuf. "*Halgan iyo Hagardaado: Taatiikh Nololeed' (Struggle and Conspiracy)*, Stockholm: published in Scansom Publisher, 2012.

1.5.2. Government and Politics of Somalia

Many scholars, diplomats, Somali historians and decision-makers have all attempted to investigate Somalia's ongoing political crises using different approaches or schools of philosophy. Those who tried to articulate what brought or pushed Somalia to fail are numerous; however, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is exceptional. In trying to explain why Somalia failed, he said:³¹ "unfortunately, the effort to set up a central authority in Somalia, much less a democracy, comes up against historical reality. Somalia was not a country but a collection of warring tribes, half of which had been governed by Italy before independence, the other half by Britain, so that the new country lacked even a common colonial history". If we accept Kissinger's view that Somalia was not a country but a collection of warring tribes, they divided themselves into these tribes and they have only themselves to blame. In other words, in Kissinger's view the sources of state failure originated from the society because of that society's tribal nature.

From a different viewpoint, Omar Salad Elmi says:³² "it is Somalia's leadership who failed to shoulder social and national responsibilities that should have guided, organized, served, secured, defended and led their nation with correct management and in a more suitable direction in order to prevent such a national disaster in the first place, or even to resolve it afterwards". Similarly, George B. N. Ayyittey has this to say: the repressive regime and his disastrous domestic policy pushed Somalia into civil war:³³

The chronic crises in Somalia and sub-Saharan Africa in general have been caused by a succession of repressive regimes and their disastrous domestic policies. Flawed economic and political models have led to dismal growth in per capita income, falling rates of food production, periodic famines, systematic disregard of basic liberties, institutionalized corruption, and ongoing civil wars.

³¹ Kissinger, Henry. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy: Towards Diplomacy for the 21st Century*, New York: Simon & Schuster Adult, 2002, 265.

³² Salad, Omar. *Millions of Somalis Endangered by Deep and Widespread Poverty*, published on Mudugnet.com on May 7, 2009. Available at <http://mudugnet.com/opinion/2007/full%20>. (accessed 20 May 2009).

³³ Ayyittey, George B. N. *Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution*, Policy Analysis no 205, CATO Institute on March 28, 1994. Available at <http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/somali-crisis-time-african-solution>. (accessed 11 Mar. 2009).

If we accepted Omar Salad Elmi and George B. N. Ayyittey's perspectives, Somalia failed because of its bad leaders' misrule. Furthermore, Robert I. Rotberg pointed out that:³⁴ nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility and the continuing nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens. It is clear that Henry Kissinger, Omar Salad Elmi, George B. N. Ayyittey, and Robert I. Rotberg all attempted to find out the answer on the domestic level, either that of society or state. The elite or leadership represents the state. This study identified three major viewpoints associated with three schools: sociology, political science and economics.

The sociologist school of thought identifies the causes of state failure in society's tribal nature and assumes clan politics destroyed Somalia's state. Ahmed I. Samatar asked himself:³⁵ "how is it that one of the few homogeneous societies in Africa can become so bitterly alienated from itself"? It was very sad for him to see the Somali people killing each other. He had to blame his people's tribal nature. These who blamed society's tribal nature also included former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Kissinger's view, Somalia was not a country but a collection of warring tribes, they divided themselves into tribes and they should blame their own people for their troubles. As a result, sociologists must see the roots of failure as originating in its domestic situation; therefore, they refer to Somalia as a country of clans with a pre-state society.

Political scientists tend to focus more on society-state relations and to look for the sources of conflict in a given state within its domestic milieu. In their view, crises tend to originate from the mismanagement of domestic policies. George B. N. Ayyittey stresses

³⁴ Rotberg, Robert I. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004, p.1.

³⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, 4.

this.³⁶ “the severe crises in Somalia and Sub-Saharan Africa in general have been caused by a succession of repressive regimes and their disastrous domestic policies. They see internal challenges to political authority as the more frequent cause of internal conflict in the Third World than are external disputes.³⁷ Thus, they are arguing that the state of Somalia failed because of its leadership failure. Furthermore, Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis pointed out.³⁸

“twenty years and many misadventures later, Siad Barre (Somalia’s President, General Mohd. S. Barre), had succeeded in destroying any semblance of national governmental legitimacy. Backed first by the Soviet Union and then by the United States, Siad Barre destroyed the institutions of government and democracy, misused his citizens’ human rights, channeled as many of the resources of the state as possible into his own and his sub-clan’s hands, and deprived everyone else at the end of the Cold War of what was left of the spoils of Somali supreme rule. His shock troops perpetrated one outrage after another against Somalis. By the onset of civil war in 1991, the Somali state had long since failed”.

The civil war destroyed what was left, and Somalia collapsed into itself. It is clear that Somalia’s failure is in fact manmade and not accidental; furthermore, it is leadership errors across history that have destroyed states for personal gain. Likewise, Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis said:³⁹ “in the contemporary era, leadership mistakes continue to erode fragile polities in Africa, Asia, and Oceania that already operate on the cusp of failure. Somalia is a nation that is at conflict with itself because of its leadership’s failure”. Somalia’s elite or leaders failed to frame sound policies in order to manage their state. The U.S.’s ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges said:⁴⁰ “Siad Barre was a tough, indeed ruthless, man, and he deserves considerable blame for the Somali misfortune. The civil war that erupted and dethroned him was to a considerable degree a reaction against the later days of his rule, when Siad surrounded himself with cronies and bodyguards from his own clan, the Marehan”. Robert I. Rothberg supported this view when he remarked:⁴¹ “there are many

³⁶Ibid. Ayittey, George B. N. The Somali Crisis.

³⁷Nur, Hassan Sheikh Ali. The Horn of Africa: Regional Security Crisis and Possibility of A Security Framework. Unpublished M.A. Dissertation, University of Malaya, 2002. 25.

³⁸Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, (8th ed.), New York: Pearson Intentional Edition, 2007, 452.

³⁹Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis. International Politics, 458.

⁴⁰ Bridges, Peter. Safiirka: An American Envoy, 98.

⁴¹ Rothberg, Robert I. When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 11.

possible explanations [as to why Somalia failed], but destructive leadership predominates”. Additionally, Hussein M. Adam also blames the leadership and according to findings on the question of why the Somali state collapsed, he claimed eight factors including:⁴² “Personal Rule, Military Rule, From Nomenclature to Clan-Klatura⁴³, from Class Rule to Clan Rule, Poisoning Clan Relations, Urban State Terror, Neo-fascist Campaign against the North, and External Factor. [...] Seven of eight are essentially internal. The eight considered external [...] military, technical and financial foreign assistance played a key role in prolonging the life of Siad’s (General Mohamed) regime”. Thus, this school’s thinkers focus on the state and its leadership, and blame the elite as the main sources of state failure. As a result, Somalia is a nation that clearly failed because its political leaders failed to frame sound policies for the nation’s survival.

In a different view, the economists stress that the Somali state failed because of material scarcity. Abdullah A. Mohamud said:⁴⁴ “Material scarcity makes elitists and powerful men rivals for national wealth as competitors in dividing political (and hence material) power. Environmentalists contend that the political economy, which resulted in internal elite rivalries and clannish national politics, was what finally fragmented the state by causing increasingly blatant nepotism in state affairs”. In the economist’s view, Somalia failed because of its lack of resources. Since the meager domestic economy could not meet their desire to accumulate wealth, political elites resorted to politics that resulted in their plundering scarce national resources, which in turn caused state bankruptcy and a violent struggle for power that led to governmental crisis. All these views are focusing on society’s tribal nature, leadership failure, and material scarcity as causes of Somalia’s demise.

⁴² Adam, Hussein M. *Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?* 71-75.

⁴³ Nomenclatura and Klatura are from Russian Language. In former Communist Countries, the Nomenclatura were the people the Communist Party approved of and appointed to positions of authority.

⁴⁴ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 12

As a result, their analyses have considerably served to obscure any understanding of the primary causes of Somalia's failure outside of their views. Unfortunately, Julius O. Ihonvbere says:⁴⁵ "Analyses of the origins, dimensions, and implications of the crisis tended towards the superficial and impressionistic. Part of the problem was because the world, even the academic community, had to rely on the media's journalistic interpretations and fondness for sensationalism". In report after report, Somalis were referred to as clans, a warlike pre-state society, and were therefore blamed for most of their problems. The people in the United States, Europe, and other parts of the world were consequently convinced that the conflict in Somalia is just tribal warfare and warlords fighting against each other. In fact, prior studies on Somalia failed to go beyond tribalism and leadership failures. The problem they rarely, if ever, failed to pay even a little attention to was that of the effects of external factors. They failed to examine the impacts of Western colonialism, a divided society, Somalia's uneasiness to independence to adopt nationalism and Greater Somalia against others, the Cold War's negative impacts on Somalia, particularly the role of the USSR's ill-advised involvement in Somalia's politics, the U.S.'s ill-advised role in Somalia's politics, Somalia's foreign aid dependence, and the rivalry in the Horn of Africa.

This study is not denying the internal factors' effects; however, from a different viewpoint, this study will demonstrate that clan warfare and leadership failure are merely partial explanations of the actual causes of Somalia's failure. In other words, this research is proposing the interplay concept as an alternative approach to address both internal and external factors' effects in equal measure.

⁴⁵ Ihonvbere, Julius O. The World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programs and the Somalis Crisis, A paper prepared for the Symposium Towards Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa, organized by the African Studies Program, Central for Connecticut State University, New Britain, Connecticut, 19 Nov 1994. Available at <http://www.hartford.hwp.com/archives/33/006.html>. (accessed 7 May 2007).

1.5.3. An Interplay Concept As An Alternative Model

An interplay concept says the sources of state failure are interplaying factors, and in fact, clan warfare and leadership failure are not enough to explain what brought about the failure of Somalia as a state. Consequently, this study is adopting a new model (interplay concept) that is more likely to address both levels in a balanced way. This significant concept has not yet addressed the role of external factors in pushing Somalia to fail. According to Abdullah A. Mohamoud:⁴⁶ “The factors can be external, such as the impacts of the global economy driven by the logic of the market and maximization of profit; or internal, arising from sectarian and particular tendencies, ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural differences, or political and economic insecurity.” From Abdullah’s view of “what brought or made Somalia to fail”, the answer can be found on two levels, internal and external. The external level will address geopolitical positions, superpowers’ chessboard strategy to export their conflicts into peripheral regions including the Horn of Africa, colonial legacies, and USSR and U.S.’s negative economic influences. This is to pay equal attention to all forms of effects that possibly pushed Somalia to fail. Hence, this new concept is more comprehensive and, therefore, to investigate the sources of failure from an external angle, it is necessary to go beyond domestic factors. This view is in line with Ahmed Ismail and Reginald Herbold Green’s views:⁴⁷ “Understanding state collapse in Somalia requires looking beyond clanism and ongoing factional intrigue, which is a symptom of state collapse rather than its cause”. Thus, this interplay concept is trying to go beyond domestic factors to seek a possibility of external factors’ effects. This method may allow us to reveal the true dynamics that pushed Somalia to fail.

⁴⁶Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-State Development in Africa*, 15.

⁴⁷ Ismail, I. Ahmed and Reginald Herbold Green. *The Heritage of War and State Collapsed in Somalia and Somaliland: local-Level Effects, External intervention and Reconstruction*, *Third-World Quarterly* 1999, 115.

1.6. Methods of Data Collection

This study is basically using both primary and secondary sources such as official websites reports, including those of the World Bank, the U.S. Department of State, the United Nations Program Developments' reports, BBC' Streamline, African Watch (a New York-based human rights organization), the European Research Institute, Failed States' Index created Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy, Global Security.org, and the African Union. Moreover, information is also sought through books, academic journals, a few previous dissertations, and more wide Internet resources. Besides the abovementioned resources, the researcher did consult and interview some Somali public figures, including former ministers, diplomatic and military officials, and intellectuals, as well as Sheikhs and traditional leaders.

Among them were Abdurrahman Abdulle. Shuuke, Abdurrahman M. Abdullahi, Mariam Arif Qassim, Amassdor Isse Mohamud (better known Issa Dhere), Col. Ali Hussein Jaras, Sheikh Ali Mohamud, Suldan Ahmed Jama Warsame and Isim Mohamed Ali Hussein. In detail, Abdurrahman Abdulle. Shuuke is a senior politician and Former Minister of Education from 1982-1985, as well Former Minister of National Planning from 1986-1988. He is very familiar with Somalia's political process since its independence. Our interview was conducted at a restaurant in Dubai, UAE, on December 3, 2011. Abdurrahman M. Abdullah is a senior military officer trained by the Soviets and the U.S. Dr. Abdurrahman is also an educationist and peace activist. Our interview was conducted at a hotel in Djibouti, Republic of Djibouti, on September 2010. Mariam Arif Qaasim is a senior lawyer and member of the National Assembly. She is also well known among Somalis' intellectual forums. Our interview was conducted at a house in Sharjah, UAE, on February 12, 2011. Ambassador Esse Mohamud (Issa Dheere) has been a senior Somali diplomat for over 30 years. He was Somalia's ambassador to the Arab League and to Tunisia (1979-1985) and Somalia's ambassador to Iraq (1985-1991). He is very familiar

with Somalia's diplomatic history. He is currently a senior advisor to Somalia's PM. Our interview was conducted in his house in Mogadishu, Somalia, November 13, 2011. Colonel Ali Hussein Jaras is a senior military officer and knowledgeable about the Somalia's national army's military doctrine, strategy, training and general structure. Colonel Ali has held various positions in the army. Our interview was conducted at a house in Gombak, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 21, 2011.

Sheik Ali Mohamud is a senior preacher of Islam through the public media, including mosques, TV, and radio. He has been a member of the Al-Itihad and other Islamist groups in Somalia. He is very familiar with the ways former dictator General Mohamed engaged in conflict with the Sheikhs over 20 years. Our interview was conducted at the Hotel Ambassador in Mogadishu, Somalia, on December 12, 2012. Sultan Ahmed Jama Warsame is a senior traditional leader in the northwestern region of Somalia. The Sultan is very knowledgeable about Somalis' traditional so-called XEER and ways of solving problems in earlier days. The interview was conducted in at the Hotel Ambassador, Hargeysa, Somalia, on December 27, 2010. Lastly, Hussein, Isim Mohamed Ali Hussein is a senior traditional leader in the northeastern region of Somalia. The Isim is knowledgeable about Somalis' traditional so-called XEER (traditional codes) and ways of solving problems during the pre-colonial era, and this interview was conducted at a restaurant in Gombak, KL, on January 12, 2010. The interviews were conducted in the Somali language, and the interviews' aim was to try to identify the causes of Somalia's political failure according to the interviewers' opinions. Therefore, the interviewers were aware of the interview's aim, as the researcher informed them that he is currently completing his doctorate on Somalia's political failure.

Additionally, the candidate also conducted field research to visit the House of the People of Somalia, which is comprised of 275 MPs, on November 1, 2015 and distributed a questionnaire to fifty of Somalia's Parliament members; however, only twenty-two members replied. The members of Somalia's Parliaments were asked to grade the four possible factors that may or may not have contributed to the failure of Somalia as a state on January 26, 1991. As a result, in actual fact this research is in line with the qualitative view based on description on observation and analysis, nonetheless, it also is slightly in line with the quantitative view.

Design

No.	Factors	25%	50%	75%	100%	Frequencies	%
1.	Tribalism						
2.	Poor Leadership						
3.	Colonial Legacies						
4.	Cold War's Impacts						
Total							


Findings

No.	Factors	25%	50%	75%	100%	Frequencies	%
1.	Tribalism	5	8	5	6	24	32%
2.	Poor Leadership	4	6	8	3	21	28%
3.	Colonial Legacies	6	5	4	2	17	22.7%
4.	Cold War's Impacts	5	5	1	2	13	17.3%
	Total					75	100%

Formula: the sum of each factor's frequencies were divided by the number of the total frequencies, which is 75, and then multiplied by 100 (i.e. $24/75 \times 100 = 32$).

Explanation of the Results

The survey's findings are moderate and statistically showed that the internal factors played a greater role, with tribalism at 32% and poor leadership at 28%, altogether 60%. However, external factors also played a considerable role with colonial legacies at 22.7%, plus the Cold War's impacts 17.3%, altogether 40%—which is actually very high. In other words, the difference between the two factors is only 10%.



Finally, the researcher admits that this research facing four major challenges. The first is how to decide whether a given factor is internal or external. The border between external and internal is often thin and hazy, if it exists at all.⁴⁸ It is nearly impossible to separate domestic issues from regional or international affairs in social science studies, including this thesis. For example, colonialism and nationalism, defense policy, state behavior, policies of subversion, threat perception and many other factors cannot easily be isolated from each other. Furthermore, while there is a wealth of data dealing with Somalia's domestic issues, there are few studies about the external

⁴⁸ Mohamoud, Abdulah A. State Collapse, 42.

factors dealing with Somalia's interactions with others, whether in cooperation or in conflict. Secondly, it is challenging to determine what to include and what not to include in the factors that directly and indirectly contributed to Somalia's failure. Thirdly, Somalia and Ethiopia are neighboring countries and have been in acute conflict; for that reason, it is very hard to differentiate one country clearly from the other as their histories interlink more than do those of other states in Africa. This historical interconnection creates challenges when defining internal vs. external elements, since domestic events in one country can and do affect the other's domestic politics.⁴⁹ Fourthly, a major challenge to this study is how to find primary sources. Much data was destroyed during the uprising. The problem is that during General Mohamed's fall in the 1990s, all the Government's principal offices, including the State House (or Villa Somalia), the state's key Ministries including the Defense, Interior, National Planning, and the Central Bank had either been destroyed by government officials to cover up their wrongdoings or were robbed by criminals or looters.⁵⁰

1.8. Limitations of the Study

In order to identify the causes of Somalia's failure, this study examines three periods: pre-colonial, colonial era (1890s-1960), civilian governments (1960-1969) and military regime (under Soviet influence) period (1969-1978), and lastly, military regime (under U.S. influence) period (1978-1991). This involves examining the tribal state's period, colonialism, the efforts of state making by the elites, both the civilians and

⁴⁹Ethiopia is located in the Horn of Africa and is bordered on the north and northeast by Eritrea, on the east by Djibouti and Somalia, on the south by Kenya, and on the west and southwest by Sudan. See Bureau of African Affairs, Ethiopia' Profile, updated January 2009.

⁵⁰The researcher was an eyewitness during the fall of General Mohamed's regime and he observed what was going on in Mogadishu after the General's fall. He saw on January 27, 1991, how in the morning thousands of Mogadishu's inhabitants came to the National Place (Villa Somalia) to take away or loot everything including cars, salons, chairs, tables, print machines, and papers. Also, on the same day the researcher went to People's Militant, Paramilitary Head Office in Mogadishu nearby the Ministry of Defence to witness what was going on and he saw a young Somali woman collecting more than to 6 or 7 automatic machine guns and carry them away as Somali women do in the nomadic life while in the forest to collect firewood for cooking. She asked for help but what is more surprising is that these automatic guns were from the Soviet, USA, Germany, Italy, China and other major powers.

military periods, and Somalia's relations and interactions with others at both the regional and global levels. The major concern is to examine the impacts of Western colonialism, Somalia's uneasy road to independence, the weakness of civilian governments and the military's oppression and divide-and control-policy. Similarly, the research examines external factors that directly contributed to the failure of Somalia, particularly the role of the USSR's and U.S.'s ill-advised roles in Somalia's politics. Lastly, the research highlights the impacts of Somalia's rivalry with Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.

1.9. Chapterization

This research is divided into five chapters. The first chapter is covering the thesis's historical background, problem statement, research questions, research objectives, literature review, limitations, research methodology and organization. The second chapter details with the failed states' definitions, characteristics of failed states, conditions of failed states, and Somalia as a model for failed states. The third chapter highlights the internal factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia. These factors include the impacts of Western colonialism, Somalia's partition, jihadist and nationalist responses, and Somalia's uneasy road to independence. Furthermore, the chapter details the weakness of civilian rule in Somalia (1960-1969), the military rule in Somalia (1969-1991) and elites' factionalism and corruption that led Somalia to fail. The chapter four analyzes the external factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia, including those factors that attracted global powers to come to Somalia or to the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the chapter details the roles of the USSR and the U.S. in Somalia's politics, as well as the impacts of the Ethiopia-Somalia rivalry. Chapter five summarizes the research findings. The research identifies six interplaying factors that collectively pushed Somalia to collapse in 1991. Three of these factors are internal while the rest of the three

are external. The chapter provides each factor in detail and finally, the conclusion of the thesis.

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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. What is a failed state?

David A. Reilly says the literature on failing states defines them by describing the process of state failure, or by comparing or analogizing them to collapsed states, rogue states, fragile states, weak states, and quasi-states. Robert I. Rotberg takes a more basic approach:⁵¹ “Rather than defining it, he argues that, you know it when you see it. This typifies analytical problems inherent in the literature: cause and effect are often conflated in such a way that the explanation becomes tautological”. To avoid this repetitive description of a failed state, we accept Jean Germain Gros’s “Taxonomy of State Failure”, as standard because of its uncomplicatedness and simplicity. He classified state failure into four types and Somalia is precisely type 1. According to this criterion, a failed state is when:⁵² “The state loses control over maintenance and war making. It is also no longer able to keep law and order among its citizens, nor is it able to protect its territory from external predators of whatever origin. This loss of control signals that the state has collapsed or become anarchic, meaning that there is no longer an overarching authority”. This study notes there is another term, “state collapse”, which has a meaning similar to state failure. William Zartman says:⁵³ “State collapse means that the basic function of the state is no longer performed, as analyzed in various theories of the state. As the decision-making center of government, the state is paralyzed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced”. Clearly, a failed state is a state that has lost control of its vital instruments, including the ability to deploy security forces for public safety and to engage in diplomatic affairs with other countries.

⁵¹Rielly, David A. The Two-Level Game of Failing State: Internal and External State Failure, the article is published online by the Journal of Conflict Studies, the Center GREGG Center for the War and Society, (Vol. 28, 2008). Available at <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/11244/13417>.

⁵²For more details see Jean Germain Gros’s Failed States in Theory, Historical and Policy Perspective, 539.

⁵³Zartman, I. William. Collapsed states: The Disintegration and Restoration and Legitimate Authority, 5.

2.2. Failed State's Phenomenon and Nature

Jean-Germain Gros said:⁵⁴

From the end of World War II until 1991 stability in the international state system was maintained by the two hegemonic powers –the USA and the former Soviet Union. During this period the internal weakness of certain member states, aggravated by irrational economic policies that led to low levels of economic growth, political corruption and dismal human rights records, were, to put things mildly, overlooked by the major powers in order to keep the weaker states within their spheres of influence. Now however, some of these 'Fourth World' 'collapsed' or 'failed' states, as they are generically and somewhat incorrectly called, have imploded in full force, with the most graphic and heart-wrenching pictures making it difficult for even die-hard realists and isolationists to ignore.

The phenomena and nature of failed states is not a new one; however, there is no common agreement among scholars over the definition, the sources of failure, the nature of failed states, and lastly how to remedy their situations. James Bingham said:⁵⁵ “The most simplistic definition of state failure is that of a binary world; divided into ‘stable’ and ‘failed’ states, with a blurred boundary between the two; this definition becomes severely problematic when viewing states on a case-by-case basis.” For example; where does Mexico fall by this definition, in terms of its severely degraded internal security situation? However, a more insightful definition is that given by Robert Rotberg, who assigns grades of severity, beginning with a ‘weak’ state and moving through to ‘failing’, ‘failed’ and finally ‘collapsed’. This graded classification assigns attributes of severity to each of the failures in state function, including the ability of the state to collect taxes, provide legal structures, the extent of corruption and criminality, group and gender-based inequality and the ability to provide safety and security for its citizens, amongst others. In addition, the ‘Failed State Index’ produced by the US think tank *Fund for Peace* uses twelve such indicators, grouped into political, economic and social categories, to produce a severity rating for the stability of states ranging from ‘sustainable’ to ‘alert’. In his own

⁵⁴Gros, Jean-Germain. ‘Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti’, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 17, No 3, 455-471, 1996, 455.

⁵⁵Bingham, James. *State Failure Characterised by the Westphalian Model of Sovereignty*, published by E-International Relations Studies available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/08/05/state-failure-characterised-by-the-westphalian-model-of-sovereignty>. (accessed on November 12, 2015).

view, Jean-Germain Gros has this to say:⁵⁶ “Indeed, even the phenomenon- failed states – is poorly defined. The term was made popular by the current (1996) US ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, but has not received the type of careful scrutiny that it deserves.” Historically, the phenomenon of failed states is nothing new, and according to Jeffrey Herbst:⁵⁷ the enormous majority of states in Europe failed after 1500, for instance, it took between 300 and 500 years for the modern French frontier to be established. Therefore, although the phenomenon is not new, researchers on failed states have increased after the events of September 11, 2001”. Admittedly, before September 11, 2001, some important articles dealing with failed states had been published by several leading international journals, including *International Security*, *Foreign Policy*, and *Foreign Affairs*. On the whole, defining a failed state is very problematic and there is no common agreement among scholars as how to define, explain, or identify the causes of state failure. For instance, the pioneering scholars in this field are Gerald B. Holman and Steven R. Ratner, who published their first article “Saving Failed States” in the 1989 issue of *Foreign Policy*. They defined and categorized failed, failing, and weak states in the international system, and by their definition a failed state is one that is:⁵⁸ “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community.” Much of their analysis focused on the scope of intervention by the UN rather than unilateral actions on the part of major powers. They recommended that the members of the United Nations should address the problem directly by creating a conceptual and juridical basis for dealing with failed states as a special category and by forming institutions to succor them.⁵⁹ In 1995, I. William Zartman had this to say about the failed state:⁶⁰ it refers to a situation where the structure, authority,

⁵⁶Gros, Jean-Germain, *Towards a Taxonomy*, 544.

⁵⁷ Herbst, Jeffrey. *Let Them Fail: State Failure in Theory and Practice: Implications for Policy*, (eds.), Robert I. Rotberg. *When States Fall: Causes and Consequences*, New Jersey: Princeton university Press, 2004, 303.

⁵⁸ Helman, Gerald B. and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States”, *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 89, no.3 (1992), 3.

⁵⁹For more details see Helman and. Ratner, *Saving Failed States*, 20.

⁶⁰Zartman, I. William. *Collapse State: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 1995, 1.

law and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new. Jeffrey Herbst published “Responding to State Failure in Africa” in the *International Security Journal*. He pointed out:⁶¹ “The situation in parts of Africa, and perhaps elsewhere in the developing world, has now diverged so dramatically from the legal fiction that it would actually be in the long-term interest of the great powers to create a new category for states that really can no longer be considered sovereign.” Furthermore, he proposed that new tools be developed to deal with these new problems. In Herbst’s view, the old practice of simply accepting that all countries must always be sovereign should be reviewed. Harvard Professor Robert I. Rotberg published an important article “Failed States in a World of Terror: the Road to Hell” in *Foreign Affairs*. His main and core argument was:⁶² “In the wake of September 11, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension; because the existence of these kinds of countries and the instability that they harbor, not only threaten the lives and livelihoods of their own peoples but also endangers world peace.” His suggestions were very important, and he stressed that to prevent those states failing and to resuscitate those that had already failed was a strategic and moral duty for well-managed nations. Furthermore, he warned wealthy nations that if state-building is done on the cheap, or if the big powers walk away from failed states too soon and decide that the long slog of reconstruction is for others, then the war against terror will not have been won. In simple and easy way Robert I. Rotberg defined the failed state:⁶³ “...as a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world”. Also, John Baylis,

⁶¹Jeffrey Herbst. “Responding to State Failure in Africa”, *International Security*, Vol. 21:3 (Winter 1996/97), 120-144.

⁶²Rotberg, Robert I. Failed States in a World of Terror”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, No.4, (July/August 2002), 126-140. Available at <http://www.cfr.org/africa/failed-states-world-terror/p4733>.(accessed 31 Mar. 2012)

⁶³Rotberg, Robert I. *The failure and Collapse on Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repairing*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004, 6.

Steven Smith, and Patricia Owens defined a failed state as: ⁶⁴ “a state that has collapsed and cannot provide for its citizens without substantial external support and where the government of the state has ceased to exist inside the territorial border of the state.” Similarly, there is no common agreement among policy makers over the definition, the sources of failure, the nature of failed states, and lastly how to remedy them. In a different view, the United Kingdom’s Former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw asserted that a failed state must be unable to ⁶⁵ first, to control its territory and guarantee the security of its citizens; second, to maintain the rule of law, promote human rights and provide effective governance; and third, to deliver public goods to its population (such as economic growth, education and healthcare). Again there is no common agreement among scholars and decision makers as to what to do about failed states and how to remedy their internal weaknesses. Generally speaking, all they agree that a failed state is one that fails to deliver politically. However, they failed to address properly what are the major causes that are pushing the states to fail. The main weakness is their tendencies to focus on the symptoms, including civil war, starvation and maybe piracy, rather than seeking the vital factors, both internal and external, or interplaying factors that are pushing the state to fail from the beginning.

2.3. The Characteristics of Failed States

The failed states’ first characteristic is to attract criminal behavior, including money laundering, human trafficking, drug trafficking, hunger, vast ungovernable territories, weak government with corruption, secessionism and separatism, political rebellion, elites’ factionalism, ethnic and tribal warfare between or among ethnic groups or clans,

⁶⁴John Baylis et al (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to International Relations* (4th edition), New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 580.

⁶⁵Straw, Jack. Failed and failing States, Speech by UK Foreign Secretary at the European Research Institute, Birmingham, UK, 6, Sep. 2002. Available at http://www.britain.info/usaterrism/xq/asp/Sarticletype.1/Article_ID.2584/qx/articles.(accessed on April 3, 2009).

weak economy and foreign aid dependency, proxy wars, harbouring non-state actors like warlords and terrorists, and many more. All these characteristics foster anarchy, which directly contributes to all forms of illicit activities. In Somalia's case, all these failed-state characteristics are present. The northwestern regions (Somaliland) proclaimed independence from Somalia and they are adopting secessionist behavior. Also, the northeastern regions (Puntland State) are not much different from the northwestern region; they also have proclaimed their autonomous status within Somalia. The rebellion and jihadist militia (so-called Al-Shabaab), which has links to Al-Qaeda, also occupies the country's southwestern regions. The American academic Robert Rotberg's helpful definition is that of a territory that is "tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous and bitterly contested by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals."⁶⁶ In fact, Somalia's state failure created a vacuum, which allowed jihadist groups including Al-Qaeda from Arabian countries and other Muslim countries to migrate to Somalia and first brainwash the poor and jobless youth, secondly train them and lastly deploy so-call Jihad against others, including Somalis. These young boys are violating human rights; they just kill everybody who refuses to bow to their harsh and wrong Islamic interpretations. As a result, Somalia regularly is listed at the top of the world's failed states, scoring high on every social, economic, and political indicators of failure. In the 2010 'Failed State Index' compiled by the U.S think tank the Fund for Peace, Somalia scored a 'perfect 10' for three of the twelve indicators, and high '9s' for the most of the others. In 2011, for the fourth year running, it was again at the top of the list.⁶⁷ In a general view, failed states' characteristics can be summarized into one of these three internal deficits: security deficit, capacity deficit and legitimacy deficit. The first of these deficits is the security deficit, when there is widespread and

⁶⁶Rotberg, Robert I. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004, 5.

⁶⁷Harper, Mary. *Getting Somalia Wrong? Faith, War and Hope in A Shattered State*, London and New York: Zed Books, 2012, 105.

mostly unchecked violence within a state, possibly including sectarian or ethnic violence amongst the people; the state has lost its monopoly on violence. This is concisely argued by Max Weber, who defined the principle legitimacy of a state as ‘the ability to successfully hold a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. If violence has become widespread the state has lost the legitimacy of being the sole designator of violence’.⁶⁸ An example as Al-Shabaab in Somalia. They are challenging the government’s ability to govern. In the Westphalia state system the ability of the state to provide security for its internal population is the most basic function of any state within the nation state system. Secondly, the capacity deficit is characterized by an inability of the central state to provide crucial services to the population such as water, healthcare, and a judiciary system. If the state has no longer has the capacity to provide such services, other groups will fill the gap; one example in Somalia is the use of Islamic Courts established by the clans in northwestern regions of Somalia. The final deficit is one of legitimacy if there is a severe lack of exercisable and legitimate authority over the territory of a state, as well as the ability to interact effectively with the international community.⁶⁹ In most cases of state failure the population choose (or are forced) to accept alternative forms of authority such as the Al-Shabab insurgency in Somalia. In Somalia’s case, Somalia is a real model to *Fragile State Index*, and from 2010 until today Somalia has held the top spot in both the *Index of Failed States* and the *Fragile States Index*.⁷⁰ Somalia ranked number one with 114.7 out of 120 for 12 categories, including demographic pressure, refugees and IDPs, group grievances, human flight, uneven

⁶⁸This view in line with Jean-Germain Gros’s view on “Failed States in Theoretical, Historical and Policy Perspective, see 537-538.

⁶⁹For more details see State Failure Characteristic by the Westphalian Model of Sovereignty by James Bingham published E-International Relations Students on August 5, 2014. Available at <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/08/05/state-failure-characterised-by-the-westphalian-model-of-sovereignty/>. (accessed on November 11, 2015).

⁷⁰Failed States and Failing States Index: Fund for Peace, available at <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2011>. (accessed on Nov. 9, 2010).

development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, a factionalized elite, and finally external intervention.

2.4. Somalia As A Model for Failed States

In 1995, Hussein M. Adam published an article to describe perfectly how Somalia is a model for failed states. His expression was so powerful and he said:⁷¹

in some respect, the country (Somalia) appears to have reverted to its status of the nineteenth century: no international recognized polity; no national administration exercising real authority; no formal legal system; no banking and insurance service, no telephone and postal system; no public service; no educational and reliable health system; no police and public security services; no electricity or piped water system,; weak officials serving on a voluntary basis surrounded by disruptive, violent bands of armed youth.

Until recently, in every way Somalia embodied the failed states' definition, characteristics, criteria and conditions. In the "*Failed States Index*" that identifies a risk of conflict for thirty-five countries in the higher-risk category, Somalia is ranked either number one or two. Therefore, Somalia fulfilled the primary criteria of failed states and, for instance, Andrew S. Natsios (USAID) said that a failed state must have these five serious problems simultaneously:⁷²(a), massive population displacement either within or across borders, (b), massive food insecurity, (c), massive malnutrition and epidemics, (d), massive macroeconomic crisis that might include hyperinflation, a currency collapse and high unemployment; and (e), government services that have ceased to function. Somalia fulfilled these five major criteria perfectly in 1991. Consequently, no disputes among academicians, thinkers, decision-makers Somalia has provided a model for total state collapse or failure state in 1991. However, today after 25 years of failure, Somalia is recovering and today is more likely a fragile state rather than a failed state, as it was in the 1990s. It has regained many of the functional nation-state's features including re-

⁷¹Adam, Hussein M. *Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born*, 78.

⁷²Andrew S. Natsios. World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2002 Session on "Rebuilding Failed States": What are our Options, the program broadcasted by the BBC's World TV.

establishment of a recognized central state, a National Assembly, an elected President and Cabinet Ministers, and diplomatic missions cross the world including the U.S.. Additionally, the majority of big cities or Regional Provinces are either under the central governments' control or to some extent show loyalty to the central government. Accordingly, this research is seeking the sources or original cause of state failure from the beginning. The aim is that Somalia's future elites should be aware of the dangers of replicating the same faults and previous mistakes.

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CHAPTER 3: INTERNAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF SOMALIA

3.1. Homogenous and Stateless Society

Who are the Somalis?

At the outset, we may ask who are the Somalis. As mentioned in earlier chapters, many scholars claim that Somalia's state failed because of its tribal nature. In other words, they asserted that sources for the state's failure are to be found within the society. Therefore, this section is answering who are the Somalis? This is to examine the society's pre-state political order and ways of government. The aim is to enquire as to whether the society's way of life and culture contain an anti-state element. Now let us see how ethnic Somali people governed themselves before the colonial powers' arrival in the late 19th century, and go on to look at how tribal elders and Sheikhs' views were incoherent for good. Somalis' major tribes each had political sovereignty. In order to understand the nature of Somali society and its role in state failure, we need to review their pre-colonial history before 1890 and sketch its main characteristics. In fact, early Somali society consisted of a confederation of tribes or clans in which every tribe or clan was supposedly sovereign, free from domination by other tribes. Yes, it is true that in short, pre-colonial Somali society was a stateless state. This view concurs with what Abdullah A. Mohamud said:⁷³ "Stateless state means a political organization no formal centralized polity exists but which maintains the social order and stability through moral, material and social sanctions." Obviously, the Somalis were a decentralized society, but at the same time they remained homogenous in terms of sharing race, religion and cultural unity. Since each tribe had its own political sovereignty, all tribes were

⁷³Mohamud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 18.

equal—at least the major tribes. Every group of Somali clans claimed an Arab ancestor who had come across the water to the Horn of Africa with the new Islamic faith.⁷⁴ (Looking at various tribal origins is beyond the scope of this work.) Geographically, the Somalis, as an ethnic group, stretched throughout the Horn of Africa, from the Gulf of Tadjoura in modern day Djibouti, through to Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, and down to the coastal regions of northern Kenya. Over many centuries, major Somali tribes retained their political sovereignty. The Somali population is made up of Hawiye, Darod, Isaq⁷⁵ Dir., and Rahan-Weyn, within which each tribe has its own subclans, and each clan has sublineages that extend to relatives, and finally families. Hussein M. Adam describes Somalis:⁷⁶ “Within a series of concentric and interconnected circles, with kaleidoscopic and diffuse attachments, the most stable sub-unit is the lineage segment, consisting of close kinsmen who together pay and receive blood-compensation in cases involving homicide.” Similarly, Said S. Samatar noted this:⁷⁷ “Traditional Somali society is egalitarian and there is no centralized form of authority, kinship is the key to traditional Somali political organization.” Besides the major tribes, which make up 85 percent of the population,⁷⁸ there is a small minority of Bantu-speaking people living in the southern part of Somalia. These Somali Bantu-people are scattered in cultivating areas and along the Shebelle and Juba Rivers. I. M. Lewis said:⁷⁹ “although they (Bantu people) still retain much of their physical distinctiveness, socially these communities are becoming increasingly absorbed into the wider Somali society.” Generally speaking, each Somali tribe/clan family has its own lands governed by freely elected elders. All clans acknowledge their self-identity as Somali; however,

⁷⁴Bridges, Peter. *Safirka: An American Envoy*, 5.

⁷⁵For more details see I. M. Lewis’s view on Somali people is made up various tribes, clan and sub-clans.

⁷⁶Adam, Hussein M. *To Born A Tribal Beauty*, 70.

⁷⁷Said, S. Samatar. *In the Shadow of Conquest Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa*, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, Inc, 1992, 40.

⁷⁸Some scholars contend that Somali’s homogeneity is in fact a myth that obscures long-standing tension between nomadic groups and descendants of Bantu- speaking slaves.

⁷⁹Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 7.

no common political institutions existed before the European arrival in the late 19th century. In other words, Somali people had no developed centralized political structure equivalent to those found in Europe. Now the most important question is how did the Somalis manage to survive over the centuries? What rules and norms did they use to deal with or manage daily life, both in peace and during periods of conflict? If every tribe/clan retained its own political sovereignty, what were their resources and facilities for the maintenance of social order prior to the late 19th century? How did they freely elect their chiefs and elders? Somalis are a largely homogeneous race that shares ethnicity, language, religion and ways of conflict resolution, yet they had no centralized political structure. Nevertheless, they organized themselves according to their needs and formed a political order. All the Somali clans accepted two sets of law: Islamic law and the Somali Customary Law or so-called *HEER*. The Somali Customary Law, though not recorded in a written form, was as effective as the rewritten laws of other nations. The Laws were made by general assembly, in which the people inhabiting the district or the region participated. The general assembly was usually held in the village, at the well or water point. Each law was named after the locality in which it was approved.⁸⁰ Therefore, the Islamic Law and the Somali Customary Laws or in other words, traditional values (drawn from Islamic teaching) and locally produced rules and laws were strengthening society's internal cohesion and gave them a communal identity. Ali Ismael Ali has this to say:⁸¹ "The Islamic Law and traditional laws both induced conformity and were vital aspects of self-governance." British sociologist I. M. Lewis insisted that the Somali state as a framework of identity among Somali tribes already existed before the Europeans occupied the Horn of Africa.⁸² However, kinship was the key to Somali political order, and Said S. Samatar has this to say:⁸³ "Each

⁸⁰ Ahmed, Ahmed Sheikh Ali. *The Somali customary Laws*, Nairobi: Designed and Printed by Kups (K) Printers, 2000, 1.

⁸¹ Ismail, Ali Ismail. *Governance the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 2010, xviii.

⁸² Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, p.?

⁸³ Said, S. Samatar. *In the Shadow of Conquest Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa*, New Jersey: Red Sea Press, Inc, 1992, 40.

clan had its own political organization with which it was governed.” Traditional rulers such as Imams, Sultans and Sheikhs were the symbols of tribal sovereignty. In this sense, Somali tribes formed a kind of state without realizing it, but one that conformed to their way of life in the Horn of Africa.. Yet interactions among tribes were governed by diplomatic rules and protocols, much like in a modern nation-state. Sultans sent delegates to one another in the same manner as modern sovereign states in order to exchange views or negotiate with each other. In the process, the tribal-state system, with Islamic Law at its core, came into being centuries ago and successfully developed a common culture and society that maintained its integrity and autonomy until the arrival of the colonial powers. The fact is that prior to the arrival of the colonial powers, the Somalis were pre-eminently civilized according to political identities based primarily on clan membership. The regulation of public order was considered a personal duty for every adult. The teaching of Islam was free to the public. For public order and safety, there were continual tribal conferences that were normally held under a large tree named *Geedka Nabada*, “Tree of Peace”. There, tribal elders discussed issues related to society’s well-being. Of course, tribal societies are never free from antagonism or friction. In a nomadic society, the basic ways of life depend on livestock, and there were inevitable clashes over scarce water and grazing areas. These and other conflicts were, however, dealt with by elders using the Customary Laws of “XEER”. In terms of decision-making, tribal elders comprised an independent organ of the polity whose efforts at resolving interclan conflicts were highly credible. Their main duties included resolving serious crimes like murder. For example, according to tribal institutions, once blood money had been offered by the offender’s party and accepted by the victim’s party, the case was legally closed. These historical facts and others show that Somalis were originally a group of tribes with a uniformly recognized political authority, albeit one comprised of many clans and

clan-families.⁸⁴ In fact, the Somali tribal pre-modern state system was quite different from the European feudal system, which had never existed in Somalia. For instance, unlike feudalism, public property belonged to the people. People were free and had the right to use their property according to their own will. In Europe, feudalism gave a very few lords (elite) control over land and resources, as well as vassals who were practically slaves of the lords.⁸⁵ In Somalia, lands and resources were, in contrast, not controlled by Sultans, Imams or Sheikhs. As George B. N Ayittey indicated:⁸⁶ “Generally, in Africa, including Somalia, peasants were free to choose whatever occupation they wished.”

Yet European feudalism and the Somali tribal state share some similarities. Both systems offered hereditary titles; Sultans and Imams in Somalia were much like European lords in this respect. Both were hierarchical systems, in which every member of society had a set position. However, outsiders might indeed have difficulty understanding differences between the Somali tribal system and the European feudal system. In Europe, according to Dan Caldwell, feudalism was:⁸⁷ “a social, political, and economic system based on ownership of land and hereditary titles. Feudalism was a hierarchical system in which every member of society had a set place. This system flourished in Europe from the eighth through to the twentieth centuries and in Japan from the tenth to late nineteenth century.”

In Somalia, titles were hereditary as in Europe, which meant that Sultans or Imams could not shift from one house or family to another. Rights of succession to the positions of Sultan or Imam were determined by birth and blood relationships. However, there were some important differences, of which one was key. Somali Sultans and

⁸⁴ The study admits that this imagination is not necessarily a clear-cut assumption, although it is closer to the truth than are the theories of Hobbs and Locke.

⁸⁵ Caldwell, Dan. *World Politics and You*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000. 26.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Ayittey, George B. N. —Somali Crisis.

⁸⁷ Caldwell, Dan. *World Politics and You*, 331.

Imams did not have veto power or the capacity to impose their own opinions.⁸⁸ The tribal society's judicial system was indeed exceptional. The elders were assisted by Sheikhs to make certain that all decisions were in line with Islamic Law. To avoid any possible disagreement, before elders made any final judgment they had to pass their opinion to the Sheikhs to assure no contradiction of Islamic Law. According to Abdullah A. Mohmoud:⁸⁹ "In addition to blood ties and XEER (customary law), Islam was the third element of the superstructure, which governed the political organization of the Somali people in pre-colonial society. The Sheikhs were very powerful, thanks in large measure to Islamic Law, which gave them the power to challenge Sultans and Imams." While Sultans and Imams held the highest positions in their respective tribes, they too were required to adhere to the general principles of Islam.

Furthermore, if the Sultans or Imams and tribal elders disagreed on a particular issue, a tripartite (Imams, elders and Sheikhs) meeting was arranged and the issues were put forward for discussion until a consensus was reached. In short, there were checks and balances. Elders were an independent organ of the government and not easily removed as if they were elected by the people. The Sheikhs were, on the other hand, an independent organ and did not allow others to obstruct their views. The Sultans and Imams meanwhile, were viewed as voices of order and justice. In this system, no Sultan or Imam could appoint himself as chief executive. In addition, the power base began at the bottom of society, or at the clan level. Society first elected its clan elders; next, these elders elected their chiefs; after which and together with the Sheikhs, they finally elected the Sultan or Imam as chief executive. This separation of powers or tripartite system existed in Somalia long before the colonial powers arrived. In modern terms, the Imams' power was very much like an executive capacity, the chiefs were much like legislators, and

⁸⁸ Simply Somali's Sultans and Imams are like a modern British Monarchy. In Britain, the monarchy personalizes the state, embodies national unity, and links the present with a glorious past. Similarly Somali Sultans and Imams personalized the tribes. See more details by John A. Jacobson; *An Introduction to Political Science*, 345.

⁸⁹ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post Conflict Development in Africa*, 18.

the Sheikhs like a judiciary. In Islamic affairs, the Sheikhs were more powerful than anybody else, including the Sultan or Imam. They had the capacity to denounce or even dethrone or depose a Sultan or Imam if, in their judgment, they failed to adhere to Islam. In effect, the elders brought synchronicity between Islamic law and traditional codes as a functional system that maintained public order and the well-being of society.

It is clear from the foregoing that the sources of government in pre-colonial Somalia originated from Islam and a social unity based on kinship, both of which formed the society's core identity. The Somali tribal state with its Islamic and traditional codes were not just a matter of choice in the ways of daily life, but also played important roles in avoiding anarchy and disorder. Broadly speaking, the pre-colonial tribal state system of Somalia was moderate and stable. Nevertheless, because it lacked a formal central government, it remained vulnerable to external pressures and incursions as pointed out by Abdullah A. Mohamoud:⁹⁰ "The Somali people had lived in this simple organization of communality and stateless conditions until around 1890, which was when the colonial powers forcefully intruded into the country." This incursion refers to the 1890s during which there ensued the Horn of Africa's colonial scramble, where Europeans divided Somalis by force and hence destroyed Somali unity by nourishing tribalism in order to weaken society's internal makeup. The Europeans belittled the society's cultural values that had guided their cultural unity for centuries. Let us now look in detail at how the colonial powers attempted to govern in order to achieve colonial interests, of course, at the expense of the Somali people.

3.1.1. Early Europeans and Somali Contact

Somalia's modern history began in the late 19th century when various European powers began to travel to the Horn of Africa. At that time, Somalis identified

⁹⁰ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-State Development in Africa*, 19.

themselves with Islam and their tribe or clan rather than with Somalia as a modern nation-state. Although all believed in Islam and collectively belonged to one race, they were essentially tribes and clans. If we were able to return to the 18th or 19th centuries and ask one of these tribesmen, What or who are you? It is definitely so that no one would say he/she was a Somali; rather, they would say they belonged to the Hawiye, Daarod, or Dir tribes and sub-clans, and so on. These tribes considered themselves endowed with the right to govern themselves; i.e., with inherent sovereignty. That situation changed in the 19th century when Europeans began to colonize Africa. In the late 19th century Somali tribal political sovereignty regulated by tribal chiefs and sheikhs came to an end during the course of Somalia's partition. The European powers did not bother with pre-existing national, ethnic or other boundaries and did not recognize African divisions or rivalries.⁹¹ They simply divided peoples and lands among themselves according to their own interests and applied a rigidly centralized, foreign system of governance. They proclaimed the doctrine of the "White Mans' Burden", in order to justify their domination by force.⁹² In Somalia, the process of colonialism took place in three stages. First, Europeans collected information via missionary spies. Second, they signed friendship agreements with clan elders through merchants. Finally, they brought in armies of occupation in order to proclaim their political authority over the land and its people. These three stages took about fifty years. For the first period, the Europeans came to Horn of Africa as just ordinary men. The Somalis actually trusted and welcomed them, assuming they were just travelers, but the Europeans had a different agenda entirely. The Europeans' strategies were Machiavellian in nature. They did not disclose their final goal until they had their own military power on the ground to impose their political will. In the southern regions, the first

⁹¹Ash, Narain Roy. Book Review: The Scramble in the Horn of Africa: History of Somalia 1827-1977, African Quarterly: Indian Journal of African Affairs, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, Indian, Vol. 43, No.2, (2003), 106.

⁹²The White Men's Burden is view which supposed or presumed responsibility of white people to govern and impart their culture to non-white people, often advanced as justification for Europeans colonialism.

European, an Englishman named William Christopher, arrived in Somalia in the early 19th century through exploration, reaching the Geledi Sultanate in 1843. The Geledi Sultanate was a powerful political entity based in the Mogadishu area. In the northwest, the first European was Captain Charles J. Cruttenden, who penetrated the interior of the country. During the same period, French Commodore Charles Guillian explored the southern coast. In the northwestern region, the famous Richard F. Burton from Britain reached Zeyla and Berbera in 1850. In the northeastern region, John Speke, a protégé of Burton, arrived at Las-Khorai and got as far as the Nugal in central Somalia.⁹³ These explorations continued with many more Europeans visiting Somalia, including even some disguised as Muslim preachers from Arabia. For example, Richard F. Burton in 1853 undertook a Hajj or Pilgrimage to Mecca in disguise, and his account of this trip made him famous. The following year he explored what is now Somalia with a number of other officers, including John Speke.⁹⁴ Richard F. Burton used the alias of Hajji Abdullahl (he was a British spy), who spoke Arabic fluently and dressed up in a jubbah and great turban to look like a true Muslim pilgrim. Because of this, the Somalis welcomed him as a fellow Muslim and even let him lead their prayers in Barbara's main mosque.

When the missionaries had collected enough data, they went back to Europe to pass their collective data to their respective governments for colonial purposes. In reality, the missionaries were spies who paved the way for the full military colonization by Europeans. They studied the Somalis' way of life and their traditions in order to identify their weaknesses and strengths. They observed that the Somalis adhered to Islam and enjoyed cultural unity yet also observed sub-divisions into tribes and clans, which would be very useful to weaken Somali unity. For the second period, in order to secure their positions, colonialists signed a series of commercial treaties with coastline clans. For example,

⁹³ Salwe, Abdisalam M. Issa. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, London, HAAN Publishing, 1996, 13.

⁹⁴ See BBC History: Sir Richard Burton (1821-1890), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/burton_sir_richard.shtml. (accessed on April 21, 2012).

in 1827 Britain (via the British East Africa Company), proposed a commercial treaty to the clan elders of the Isaq tribe of Berbera in order to ensure safe passage of its ships along the Somali coast en route to East Africa and India.⁹⁵ The main goal of these commercial treaties was, however, to divide and conquer the peoples. Britain repeatedly and carefully proposed close friendships with each sub-clan rather than signing a single commercial treaty with the overall chief of any given area. In early days Britain's interests were limited to mutton (Somalia is very rich in mutton) and according to Ismail Ali Ismail, the British wanted to bring the Somali coast facing Aden (southern Yemen's main city) under their influence; their main concern was to ensure a supply of mutton on the hoof for their garrison in Aden and control over both flanks of the Gulf of Aden, so their shipping lanes to India would not be endangered.⁹⁶ Britain's main rival in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region at that time was France. In 1859 the French Consular Agent at Aden obtained the cession of the Dnakil Port of Obock (Djibouti), and three years later in 1862, France purchased the port and the French flag was hoisted. The two rivals (France and Britain) had a love-hate relationship; they had to work together to a point, but at the same time they were competing with each other for geopolitical interests. In 1881, after the opening of the Suez Canal, France took advantage of her stake at Obock and the French-Ethiopian Trading Company was installed.⁹⁷ This move was a real threat to Great Britain's superiority on the Red Sea. Even more important, as Emile Burns noted:⁹⁸ "This territory Obock/Djibouti) is at the southern end of the Red Sea, opposite the narrow straight joining the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. That is to say, it commands an important point on the route to India."

Thus, in the second half of the 19th century, Somalia attracted global powers out of

⁹⁵ Abdullah, M. Abdurrahman. Tribalism, Nationalism, and Islam: the Crisis of Political Loyalty in Somalia, MA thesis, Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1992, 48.

⁹⁶ For more details see Ismail Ali Ismail's views on Governance, the Scourge and Hope of Somalia, 54.

⁹⁷ Lewis, I. M. A Modern History of the Somalia, 41.

⁹⁸ Burns, Emile. Abyssinia and Italy, London: Victor Collanz Ltd, 1935, 37

geopolitical interest, which, in turn, paved the way for the third stage. For the third period, for colonial purposes the Europeans started using force against the Somali people, beginning with naked aggression. The catalyst for this was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which greatly increased the geopolitical value of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Furthermore, Great Britain occupied Egypt by force in 1882, which also had an impact on the Horn of Africa's political future. Prior to its fall, Egypt had been in control of Somalia's northern region on behalf of the declining Ottoman Empire. The end of the Ottoman Empire's political authority in the region, along with the opening of the Suez Canal and Britain's occupation of Egypt itself, all increased the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa's geopolitical importance. The region's geopolitical importance led the Europeans to move quickly and occupy the entire region. The Red Sea's strategic significance for shipping motivated Britain, France, Italy and Germany. Prior to 1871, the British had been the dominant power. However, after Germany's unification in 1871, the European balance of power changed and during the 1880s, German Chancellor Bismarck began to challenge the old powers, particularly France and Britain. Germany was asking for a redistribution of occupied territories, while France and Britain wanted to keep the territories they held. This surging political rivalry drove a new imperialism or what is called the Scramble for Africa.⁹⁹ In order to lay down some rules for the game and avoid open conflicts, the Europeans organized an international conference in Berlin from November 1884 to January 1885 under the chairmanship of Otto von Bismarck. On February 26, 1885, the Berlin Act, which promulgated the rules of partition, was signed. According to George B. N. Ayittey:¹⁰⁰ "A key rule was that any power that wanted to claim any African territory should notify the other signatory powers." In effect, the Berlin Act sanctified the occupation and colonization of Africa; all the Europeans had to do was to notify

⁹⁹ European nations divided African peoples among themselves at the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884-1885).

¹⁰⁰ Ayittey, George B. N. *Africa Betrayed*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 7.

other signatory powers.

In the Horn of Africa, Great Britain rapidly took advantage of the Berlin Act to grab northern Somalia by military force. Ignoring its friendship treaties with Somali clan elders, Britain also helped Italy to occupy southern Somalia. Italy was a weak state, yet in 1885, the British brokered an arrangement between Italy and the Sultan of Zanzibar, which gave Italy commercial concessions in Mogadishu in return for a handsome amount of money paid to the Sultan. In fact, Britain's hidden agenda (to bring Italy into the Horn of Africa) was to establish a balance of power against other European powers, particularly France and Germany. Italy was a weak power, and to achieve its colonial interest in 1889, made a deal with some of Somalis' Sultans, including Ali Yusuf of Obbio and the Sultan of Alula, by means of which the latter placed their territories under Italy's protection.¹⁰¹ However, after four years the Italian Government assumed direct administration and in 1893, Italy appointed Filonardi Vincenzo as Italy's first administrator.¹⁰² All this led to division of the Somali nation by colonial powers into five partitions: British Somaliland, French Somaliland (Djibouti), Italian Somaliland, the Ogaden region in Ethiopia, and the Northern Front District (NFD) in Kenya.¹⁰³ Not to be taken lightly is that the Somali people were the largest single ethnic nation within Africa and as such, represented a singular threat to the colonial powers. In fact, in the late 19th century, according to Barry B. Hughes, only four Sub-Saharan countries (Lesotho, Somalia, Cape Verde and the Comoros Islands) were composed of single national groups.¹⁰⁴ Lesotho, Cape Verde and the Comoros Islands were colonized but not divided, unlike Somalia. Lesotho became a British

¹⁰¹ In the Horn of Africa which Somali people inhabited in the early 1820s, the Omani Agent in Zanzibar ruled by force in Mogadishu and coastal area until 1880s.

¹⁰² Oman Hagi & Abdiwahid Osman Hagi. *Clan, Sub-clan and Regional Representation in the Somali Government Organization 1960-1990: Statistical Data and Findings*, Washington: Publisher N/A, 1998, 219.

¹⁰³ Abdullahi, Abdurrahman M. *Tribalism, Nationalism, and Islam*, 47.

¹⁰⁴ Hughes, Barry B. *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives*, (4th ed.), New Jersey: Upper Saddle River, 2000, 239.

Protectorate, Cape Verde was colonized by Portugal, and the Comoros Islands were colonized by France. These are all small islands or isolated territories with only a small number of inhabitants. The Somalis, on the other hand, were much larger in number and essentially were one nation with a shared history and faith, occupying substantial territory in the Horn of Africa. The Europeans drew up new boundaries with total disregard for Somali interests. Treaties were drawn up dividing territories and delineating boundaries.¹⁰⁵ British Somaliland was delineated in a series of political treaties with France in 1888, Italy in 1894, and Ethiopia in 1897 and 1954, and in none of these deliberations were the Somalis ever consulted.¹⁰⁶ Italy also established its respective boundaries with Ethiopia and the British in 1897. By the early 20th century, these colonial agreements had brought almost every part of Somali territory under either Ethiopian occupation or European administration.¹⁰⁷ In fact, nobody consulted the Somalis or took the trouble to inform them of these agreements. The Europeans' occupations ended Somalis' unity. They divided brothers and sisters, and Said Yusuf Abdi wrote:¹⁰⁸ "Before being colonized in the second part of the nineteenth century, Somalis in the Horn of Africa formed a well-defined, autonomous community with a distinctive way of life, language and culture. Their cultural unity disappeared when they entered what historians call the colonial period." The Europeans shattered Somali unity with the result that, until today, all major Somali tribes, including the Hawiye, Dir, Darod, and Isaq, are to be found living in more than one state in Ethiopia or Kenya. This colonial partition is a fact and indeed, it is the taproot of the causes for the present-day problems in the Horn of Africa. Since the 1890s, all Somalis have considered themselves victims of grave

¹⁰⁵Greenfield, Richard. *Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor*, (edited by) Woodward, Peter and Murray Forsyth, *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and its Alternatives* New York: Published by Dartmouth Publishing Company limited 1994, 105.

¹⁰⁶Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland*, 26.

¹⁰⁷In fact, Somalia's current political crisis originates with these fabricated boundaries.

¹⁰⁸Said, Yusuf Abd. *Decolonization in the Horn of Africa and the Outcome of Somali Aspiration for Self-determination*, Working Documents and Report of Meeting of Experts held Warsaw, Poland, from 9-13 Oct. 1978, Published in 1982 by the UNESCO, Place de Fontenoy, Paris, 97.

injustice.¹⁰⁹ Now let us look at the Europeans' early administration of Somalia and how the Somalis reacted to their rule.

3.1.2. The Europeans' Early Administrations

After they divided Somali lands physically into five sectors, the Europeans turned to administration and in 1884 (even before the partition was complete), the British Government appointed Frederick M. Hunter as Political Agent in northwestern Somalia. Nine years later in 1893, Italy appointed Filonardi Vincenzo as Italy's Administrator in the south.¹¹⁰ From that time forward, Somalis were forced to accept the European political system of governance, a truly alien system to Somalias' people. That system endured for nearly a century. Though the history of Somalia is complex,¹¹¹ it is fair to say that when colonial powers arrived in the Horn of Africa, Somalis were more of a reasonably coherent society than any other society in the region. Colonial powers soon interfered with society's ways of life and governance. They disrupted the society's makeup and soon divided it into friendly clans and enemy clans, then armed friendlies against enemies to fuel animosity.¹¹² The Bimal clan revolt, for example, was easily put down with the aid of Somali allies among the Geledi clan.¹¹³ Both the Bimal and Geledi are neighboring clans from the Lower Shabbele Region, south of Mogadishu. The Italian Government befriended the Geledi Sultan and armed him against the Bimal because the latter group of enemies had rejected Italy's misrule. In addition, in order to further weaken Somali society's internal cohesion, Europeans purposely disrupted society's internal order by simply disqualifying elected leaders and setting up their own paid elders. They further applied pressure on the populace to abandon trusted chiefs in order to accept

¹⁰⁹For more details see Greenfield, Richard. *Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor*, 106.

¹¹⁰Oman Hagi and Abdiwahid Osman Hagi; *Clan, Sub-clan and Regional Representation*, 219.

¹¹¹The study is not designed to provide a detailed history of Somalia, yet the main historical events are outlined as a brief background to the current inquires to identify the cause of state failure.

¹¹² Warsame, Ahmed Jama, (traditional leader interviewed, December 27, 2010).

¹¹³ Hess, Robert L. *Italian Colonialism in Somalia*, London and Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1966, 181.

quislings whom they appointed and paid. These unelected paid men formed a partnership with the colonialists. This intervention caused a deep division among the people who found themselves unable to elect their own elders, being forced to accept lackeys appointed by the colonialists. The Europeans also chose to work with self-appointed Sultans who were willing to enter into alliances with them. For example, Italy's Consul in Zanzibar, Filonardi, worked with the self-appointed Sultan Yusuf Ali; they provided deadly weapons including rifles, cartridges and other gifts as support against the anti-Italian party at Obbia.¹¹⁴ These self-appointed Sultans and quislings were also empowered with a mobile police force to impose colonial policies on society.

In terms of Islamic Law, although such matters as marriage and divorce were left to the Sheikhs, core principles of Islam such as the supremacy of Shari'ah Law were set aside in favor of European-style penal codes. By the early 1920s, and for the first time since the advent of Islam in Somalia, Islamic Law and religious leaders no longer played a central role in Somali society. Traditionally, the Sheikhs were the most trusted members of society, and their moral authority played an influential role in shaping public opinion as to what was considered right and wrong. The Europeans were well aware of the importance of Islam and took great care to sideline resistant Sheikhs, who were then compelled to accept the pre-eminence of European penal codes. This grave misconduct and European attitude towards Islam only angered the Sheikhs. Making matters worse and creating even greater danger, the Europeans constantly concocted moral justifications for colonizing the less fortunate peoples (Africans) by claiming a civilizing mission. As part of this, they used Christian missionaries to proselytize native populations, particularly children, to convert them to their several brands of Christianity. For example, in British Somaliland, where the people were one hundred percent devout Moslems, a Christian missionary school was introduced in 1891 in Berbera and began taking in orphaned children

¹¹⁴Hess, Robert L. Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 31.

for the purpose of Christian conversion. The true nature of that school was laid bare when the children were given Christian names such as James, Robert, and Lawrence.¹¹⁵

In short, the Europeans systematically subverted the Sheikhs' role, and Sheikh Ali Mohamud had this to say:¹¹⁶ Somalis perceived this as an insulting deprecation of their Islamic faith. Hence, they began to resist and quickly lined up in ranks behind the Sheikhs in a Holy War. The Sheikhs launched a Jihad against the colonial powers, one that continued for more than twenty years. The result was that during the early 20th century Somalis witnessed waves of war between Jihadists and colonial powers. The European intention was to uproot the cultural and spiritual ethos of the Somali society and replace it with Western norms. Naturally this created animosity between the local and Europeans, in Somali eyes, Europeans were against the Islamic teaching. Moreover, according to the Holy Qur'an, Muslims should not accept domination by non-believers but to the contrary, should adhere to Jihad if non-believers invade Muslim lands and persecute their way of life and religion.

3.1.3. Somalia's Uneasy Road to Independence

3.1.3.1. Jihadist Movement (1900-1930)

The Jihadists advocated for Greater Somalia, which simply means that the divided brothers and sisters of Somalis rightfully desired reunification. Despite division into sub-clan families, Somalis still feel united as one nation, tracing their origins back to their earliest ancestor, Samale. The Samale clan-families were comprised of the Dir, Isaq, Hawiye and Darod, all of whom were primarily pastoral nomads who were variously distributed throughout the land.¹¹⁷ Due to their well-defined regions, their adherence to the Islamic faith, and their belonging to a single primogenitor, they felt themselves to

¹¹⁵ For more discussion see on Ismail Ali Ismail. *Governance the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 56.

¹¹⁶ Sheikh Ali Mohamud (religious and Islamic scholar, interviewed, December 12, 2012).

¹¹⁷ For more details see Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 5-6.

be one people with the right to establish their own state, the so-called Greater Somalia. Bernard Brain explained why they resisted as follows:¹¹⁸ “They speak the same language, share the same customs, and practice the same faith. They desire unification and feel, not without some justification, that they have been torn apart by the machinations of great powers.” Their collective thinking and their desire for unity (as a political aspiration) created conflicts with others.¹¹⁹ The role of this political aspiration (Greater Somalia) has not been much debated in scholarly study. Yet understanding the society’s early political aspirations in the 1900s will greatly help us to understand the philosophy of Greater Somalia. Therefore, this section will pay great attention to the jihadist movement against the colonial powers. In fact, the faith of Islam includes metaphysics and political theory. Consequently, it is not surprising that the colonial disruption of Islamic affairs led Somali society to defend its faith. Those who adhered to Islamic tenets had every reason to assume that the Europeans were their foes. Somali reactions to alien domination have always been aggressive and served to emphasize a common identity based on religion (Islam) and nationalism (ethnicity).¹²⁰ The Islam and cultural unity unified them, and to respond the Europeans, they first used Islam in the early 20th century (1900-1920). In the first period of the early 20th century, the Sheikhs were the leading figures motivating people to engage in holy war against so-called unbelievers. The Sheikhs awakened people’s consciousness and in the process, posed a real threat to colonial authorities. They fought fiercely over 20 years and according to Richard Greenfield,¹²¹ “Since medieval times at least, the Somalis have demonstrated- despite clan differences-considerable cultural and religious homogeneity, expressed particularly when faced by external aggression.” The Somalis fought bravely and fiercely

¹¹⁸ Brain, Bernard. *Clouds over the Horn of Africa*, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct., 1958), pp. 435-443, 436.

¹¹⁹ Great Somalia; refers to those regions in the Horn of Africa in which ethnic Somalis are and have historically represented the predominant population.

¹²⁰ Salwe, Abdulsalam. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, 49.

¹²¹ Greenfield, Richard. *Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor*, 104.

with local weapons like arrows, swords and knives against modern European weapons like automatic rifles and mortars, and even then they forced Great Britain to use air power against them.¹²² It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the details of this jihadist resistance. Somali Sheikhs insisted that you Europeans have your laws, which are in line with your religion, and we Somalis have our laws which are in line with Islam. The Europeans attempted to give their judicial system supremacy, which insulted the dignity of the people's core principles, Islam. This insult unified the Somalis, as Jeffrey Gentleman pointed out:¹²³ "Somali society often divides and sub-divides when faced with internal disputes, but it quickly bands together when confronted by an external enemy." Therefore, in order to expel the colonialists from Somali territory, the Sheikhs called for jihad against colonialism, which was in line with Islamic teaching. One exceptional sheikh was the well-respected Sheikh Hassan Barsane and, according to Abdurrahman M. Abdullah:¹²⁴ "Sheikh Hassan Barsane was not just a jihadist but also an articulate scholar who was open to the views of others. He insisted, however, that your government (Italy/Christian) has its laws, and we (Somalis/Muslim) have ours. We accept no law other than ours. Our law is the law of Allah and his Prophet."

Hence, in no way could Sheikh Hassan accept the application of Italian laws to his people. He received a letter from Italy's Fascist Governor De Vecchi Val Cismon asking him to surrender, and in March 1924, Sheikh Hassan answered the Governor as follows:¹²⁵

¹²²It is a very comical if congeries of disunited and often hostile clans which themselves were regularly divided by bitter internecine feuds, as I. M. Lewis claimed, required an air force to defeat them. It seems I. M. Lewis wanted to claim that when Europeans arrived in Somalia there was nothing other than disunited and hostile clans, yet the facts are otherwise.

¹²³Gentleman, Jeffrey. Somalia a Graveyard of American Foreign policy Blunders. The article appeared in Ethiopian Review, on February 17, 2009.

¹²⁴ Abdullahi, Abdurrahman M. (Interviewed, September 12, 2010).

¹²⁵Collecting the History of the Somali Clans of Hawiye. This article was published by SOMALISWISS COMMUNITY. This information is available at <http://somaliswiss.wordpress.com/2009/12/16/collecting-the-history-of-the-somali-clans-of-hawiye/>. (accessed on May 12, 2012). Sheikh Hassan was sentenced to death by (fascists) in 1924, but had his sentence commuted to life imprisonment and died in prison in 1929.

In the name of Allah, most gracious, most merciful. I have received your letter and understood its contents, but must advise that we cannot obey your orders and join with you in a covenant. Your government has its laws, and we have ours. We accept no law other than ours. Our law is the law of Allah and his Prophet. We are not like other people, none of us has ever enrolled in the Zaptie (colonial forces), never and if you come to our land to fight against us, we will fight you with all possible means.

In these early years of the 20th century, a whole series of Somali religious men acted in the same way as did Sheikh Hassan. These included the famous Sheikh Ahmed Gabyow in the Middle Shebelle Region, the well-known Mullah Mohamed A. Hassan¹²⁶ in central Somalia, Sheikh Bashir in Burco in the north, as well as Biyamal and Wacdan's Sheikhs, all of whom led revolts at Marka and Afgoye in the south and resisted the European occupation.¹²⁷ These men led a holy war against the invading Europeans, unifying the people under the banner of Islam. Their primary goal was to reject European laws. Therefore, the Sheikhs' call for jihad played a significant role in bringing together the different tribes and clans into a unified force.¹²⁸ The Europeans finally defeated the Sheikhs.

Following the defeat of the Sheikhs and their supporters by superior European firepower, Somalia went into a period of lapse or discontinuity. There was no major resistance between 1920 and 1940. The Sheikhs were either killed or captured and imprisoned, including the fearless Sheikh Hassan Barsane, who was sentenced to death but later died in prison in 1929. Nevertheless, although the Sheikh failed to defeat their enemies, they shaped the people's collective consciousness and created a common stand for Islam and to fight for freedom from foreign occupation.

In the 1940s, Somali uniqueness and resistance was again revived but with a different secularist expression. Whereas the Sheikhs were refusing the Europeans' laws (Penal

¹²⁶He had declared a Jihad, or Holy war, against the British in 1899, when he found that a Catholic Mission at Berbera was weaning Somali boys away from Islam. See Peter Bridges Safirka: An American Envoy. 115.

¹²⁷ Sheikh Bashir is one of those who led the Jihad against Britain in the Northwestern Somalia; in 1947, Britain executed him in Burco.

¹²⁸Sheikh Ali Mohamud (religious and Islamic scholar, interviewed, December 12, 2012).

Code), now the nationalists were again rejecting the Europeans' occupation and calling for struggle for Greater Somalia. In the Sheikhs' struggle, the theme was "Your government has its laws and we have ours". But now the nationalists' central theme was: you have to govern your countries, and we have to govern our country. In other words, we have to have a right to govern ourselves and you Europeans should go back to your own countries. In the end, both the Sheikhs and nationalists had similar political objectives but expressed them differently. Sheikh and nationalist alike were calling for an end to European occupation. Therefore, in 1940s, the focal point shifted from religion to nationalism during World War II.

3.1.3.2. Nationalist Movement (1940-1960)

The nationalist movement initially started in the southern region, where Italian rule was very oppressive and banned all political activities. The Italian were fascist in nature and a warlike people. They wanted revenge against Ethiopia and in 1935, Italy launched an offensive against Ethiopia and furthermore aligned itself with Nazi Germany against the British. As a result, from the outbreak of World War II, Somalia became an arena of military operations pitting the British against the Italians. Initially, Italy scored a victory over the British in northern Somalia, and in the process captured British Somaliland in August of 1940; thus, they enlarged Italian territory and sent Ethiopian King Haile Selassie to exile in the UK. Italian Somaliland was combined with the Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a larger province of Italian East Africa.¹²⁹ However, this was a short-lived success. Only seven months later, in 1941, Britain defeated Italy in East Africa, shattering Italian dreams of imperial grandeur in the Horn of Africa.¹³⁰ Allied forces led by the British drove the Italians out of southern Somalia, which had been under Italian

¹²⁹ BBC's Timeline: —A Chronology of (Somalia's) Key Events, this information appeared on September 28, 2010. .

¹³⁰ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa, 69.

occupation since 1893. The British established a British Military Administration throughout the Horn of Africa, encompassing Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea.¹³¹ The British were friendlier than the Italians and for the first time, the Somalis were able to express their political opinions. Consequently, in early 1940s, an urban and semi-elite group emerged in Somalia to articulate the people's grievances. Step by step Somali nationalism emerged, and the Somalis started asking themselves why the colonialists had divided them and occupied their motherland. This simple demand (secular expression) was signaling a shift from the jihadist's worldview to a nationalist view. This shift would have a major influence on Somalia's political process over the coming 40 years.

3.1.3.3. The Somali Youth Club (1943-1947)

As noted above, during the British Military Administration in the early 1940s an urban and semi-elite group emerged in Somalia to articulate their political grievances. This group's political demands and expressions were very moderate; therefore, the British Military Administration let them set up an organization, the so-called Somali Youth Club', which established its headquarters in Mogadishu in May of 1943. It was comprised of thirteen founder members representing all the main Somali regions and according to Dahir Haji Osman (member of founders) their names are:¹³² (1). Abdulkadir Sakhawedin, 2. Mohamed Hussein Mohamed, 3. Yassin Haji Osman Sharmarke, 4. Sayyidin Hirsi Nur, 5. Osman Geedi Raage, 6. Mohamed Abdullahi Hayesi, 7. Dheere Haji Dheere, 8. Dahir Haji Osman, 8. Khalif Hudow Ma'allim, 9. Ali Hassan Mohamed, 10. Mohamed Farah Hilowle, 11. Mohamed Osmn Barbe, 12. Mohamed Ali Nur and 13. Mohamed Hirsi Nur.

¹³¹ For Ethiopia's side, Italy occupied Ethiopia and forced King Haile Selassie into exile. King Haile Selassie spent his exile in the UK and was restored to power with British military assistance.

¹³² See Osman, Dahir Haji., *Asaaskii Xisbigii Leegada (SYL)*, Available at <http://mudugonline.com/Qoraalo/SYL/asaaskii>. l.htm. (accessed 2 Jan. 2010).

These young men offered a new paradigm with a clear vision for the future.¹³³ The youth had been influenced by the Europeans' educational and political system, and all of them favored their ethnic Somali people and idealized the establishment of Greater Somalia. Although they were using different words and forms, their demands were basically a continuation of the Sheikhs' demand to reunify their ethnic Somali people across the Horn of Africa, and they used nationalism as a political instrument to achieve self-governance. This represented a new development in Somali political will and a shift from an Islamic religious perspective to secularism. This change was the Second World War's consequent events in the Horn of Africa, and I. M. Lewes has this to say:¹³⁴ "One of the many side-effects of the Second World War was to stimulate a new concept of Somali nationalism, fostering the nationalist aim of unifying Somali territories and providing conditions under which this aim could be realized. With the sole exception of French Somaliland, which in 1942 declared for De Gaulle, all Somali territories remained for almost a decade under the British flag." In these circumstances the youth movement began its struggle against the colonial partition, calling for the reunification of all five Somali territories as Greater Somalia. This idea of Greater Somalia incited the people and gave them a fresh sense of belonging to the same race rather than faith.¹³⁵ Bernard Braine explained it as follows:¹³⁶ "Despite the division of the Somali people among five administrations and their own intense tribal rivalries, they feel themselves to be one people. They speak the same language, share the same customs, and practice the same faith. They desire unification and feel, not without some justification, that they have been held apart by the machinations of the great powers." Within a short time, the Youth Club's demands were transformed into a political framework for the reunification

¹³³ Surprisingly, the SYC's Chairman Abdulkadir Sakhawadin and his Deputy Chairman Mohamed Hussein Mohamed were neither from powerful clans (but) they were from minority group.

¹³⁴ Lewis I.M. *A Modern History of the Somali*, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2002, 116.

¹³⁵ Abdullahi, Abdulrahman M. (Interviewed, September 12, 2010).

¹³⁶ Braine, Bernard. *Storm Clouds over the Horn of Africa*, *International Affairs*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, (1958), 436.

of all five Somali territories. They banned tribalism, which the colonial powers had favored, and adopted the motto “Viva Greater Somalia”. They emphasized Somali cultural unity rather than their common faith, Islam. It also helped that these ideations aligned with British political views at that time. The British Military Administration’s main objective was to diffuse people’s anger and befriend Somalis and mobilize anti-Italian sentiments. For their part, Somalis preferred the British to Italy. Italian rule had been so repressive and racist that it triggered nationalist feelings, and postwar developments only boosted the movement towards independence.¹³⁷

The SYC’s political aspiration changed Somalis’ history forever. There had never been a pro self-rule doctrine in Somali history that capably challenged Islam in favor of secularism. Indeed, for the first time in Somali history nationalism had become a unifying factor, for the different tribes and Somalis all over the entire Horn of Africa began to organize and demand independence and self-rule.¹³⁸

Meanwhile and surprisingly, the British Military Administration adopted an attitude of cooperation and empowerment rather than opposition to the Youth Club; for example, they allowed better-educated police and civil servants to join it. This strategy was designed to enable them to monitor their political activities from the inside. For some Somalis, the British actually fostered the Somali Youth Club’s political demands in order to disqualify Italy’s claim to southern Somalia. But whatever the reasons, the Youth Club matured and renamed itself the Somali Youth League in 1947. Then, SYL began to open offices throughout the Horn of Africa. As a result, SYL was recognized by the Second World War’s victorious powers—the Soviet Union, the US, France and Britain—as representatives of the Somali people.

¹³⁷ Ismail, Ali Ismail. *Governance; the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 90.

¹³⁸ With its defeat in May 1941, Italy lost all its colonial positions and consequently, all the Somalis territories with the exception of the French Somaliland, were again united under a British Military Administration. See more details Ismail Ali Ismail, 12.

3.1.3.4. Somali Youth League (1947-1960)

The Somali Youth League would then lead Somalia from 1947 to its independence in the 1960s. They opened offices not only in British Somaliland but also in the Ogaden region and Northern Frontier District.¹³⁹ The SYL's main political platform was to reunite the Somali people into one nation. They committed themselves to lead their society into self-rule. It was also a broader political forum, open to every Somali in every territory, which grouped its members around a program of concrete, well-defined aims. Principal among these were to encourage modern education and progress in general and to overcome what had now become traditionally particular rivalries that had divided Somali society since the colonial partitions.¹⁴⁰ Apart from the philosophy of Greater Somalia, the SYL was a non-violent organization. If there was an obstacle or issue to pursue, they resorted to mass demonstrations against colonial policies. Step by step, they developed a political platform based on a four-point blueprint: first, to unite all Somalis in general and the young in particular, with the consequent repudiation of harmful old prejudices of tribal and clan distinctions. Second, by means of schools and cultural circles, they intended to educate the youth in modern civilization. Thirdly, they sought to foster interest in assisting the elimination, by constitutional and legal means, of any existing or future situation that might be prejudicial to the interests of the Somali people. Fourth, to develop the Somali language and assist in putting the Osmaniya Somali Script into use among Somalis.¹⁴¹ These four points remained as guidelines for the struggle against oppressors. To unite all Somalis generally meant to form one state and eliminate the colonial legacy, demolishing the artificial political boundaries imposed by the colonial powers during the partition. Unfortunately, the SYL's political aspiration weren't successful because of the new Cold War's effects on Somalis. The four victorious Allied powers failed to agree as to

¹³⁹ Lewis, I. M. A Modern History of Somalia, 114.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 123.

what to do with Somalia. Due to its geopolitical location and because of their particular strategic interests, they agreed to re-divide the Somalis.

3.1.3.5. From Hope to Disarray: Four Powers' Disagreement on Somalia

After the end of World War II, all colonial empires, including Britain, Italy and France were crumbling, and newer powers (USSR and U.S.) were emerging with fresh principles that reflected the beginning of a new era known as the Cold War. In 1947, the Cold War captured the hearts and minds of the global powers, raising concerns about the continued stability and security of the world. The victorious countries set up a so-called Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers (USSR, USA, UK and France) to take up the question of the disposal of the three former Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somalia and Libya. In line with the peace treaty concluded with Italy at the end of the war, what was to be done with Libya, Italian Somaliland and Eritrea was to be determined by France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America. If within one year they could not agree (and this proved to be the case), they were to turn the matter over to the UN General Assembly for resolution.¹⁴² Meanwhile, the British government (which held effective control over most of the Somali lands) was preparing its own solution, proposing Greater Somalia. One year earlier, in 1946, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had proposed that the Somali lands should remain united as a single state and thus be prepared for self-government.¹⁴³ By this time, the SYL had become the vehicle for Somali nationalism. The SYL saw Great Britain as an honest broker and, because of its promise to unify the Somalis, they aligned themselves with its policy. Greater Somalia, as proposed by the Foreign Minister Bevin, was to be formed by the establishment of a single Somali nation

¹⁴² Bennett, A. Leroy. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 124.

¹⁴³ Lewis, I. M. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History and Society*, London: HURST Publishers Ltd, 2008, 124.

comprised of Djibouti, Northern Kenya, the Western Somalia and Somaliland.¹⁴⁴ As a result, the SYL sided with Great Britain against the other major powers because of Britain's promise to unify the Somali ethnic people. According to Ismail Ali Ismail:¹⁴⁵ "The SYL had a vision of a Greater Somalia that would encompass all the Somali territories in the Horn of Africa; one that would be facilitated by the fact that these had-with the sole exception of French Somaliland-all come under a single colonial power, the United Kingdom, for almost a decade." The British promise to unify the Somali people incited them to believe in the possibility of establishing Greater Somalia. For the first time in over seven decades, Somalia was once again close to being a unified nation. As Kassim Shehim and Searing James said:¹⁴⁶ "Somalis everywhere were inspired by the desire to create a Greater Somalia encompassing all ethnic Somalis." Nonetheless, this dream wasn't achievable. As mentioned earlier, Somalia occupies a geopolitically strategic location over which the global powers were in contest. Great Britain's proposal to unify the Somali ethnic people did not, therefore, find favor with other powers. The problem was that Britain was seeking to be guardian of the Somalis in order to protect its strategic interests. France was fearful of losing its strategic territory in Djibouti. The U.S. and USSR were meanwhile eyeing Somalia's geopolitical location for their own security and military bases on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Britain's proposal for Greater Somalia was therefore torpedoed by the other three powers. They refused to help unify the Somalis for different reasons, and accused Britain for seeking strategic advantages to expand its empire at the expense of others. The Ethiopians also were demanding a return to the pre-war status quo, and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia lobbied hard against Greater Somalia.¹⁴⁷ Finally, no agreement among the Four

¹⁴⁴ Eshete, Tibebe. *The Root Causes of Political Problems in the Ogden*.

¹⁴⁵ They (British, in early 1940s) discussed the possibility of a Great Somalial to be created by the merger of the Italian, British, and French territories. See more on Ismail Ali Ismail, *Governance, the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 12.

¹⁴⁶ Shehim, Kassim and James Searing. *Djibouti and the Question Afar Nationalism*, African Affairs, Published by Oxford University Press, Vol. 79, No. 315 (April 1980), p.212. 209-226.

¹⁴⁷ Ismail, Ali Ismail. *Governance the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 17-18.

Powers was possible, because they came up with a range of different views reflecting respective national interests.¹⁴⁸ As the time limit (September 1948) approached, they began to discuss alternatives for what to do with Somalia, and again they failed to agree to any form of settlement. However, as a last option it was suggested to the General Assembly that the Somalis should be re-divided into roughly the same parts as had been the case during the colonial division in the late 19th century.

The General Assembly accepted the Four Powers' suggestion and on November 21, 1949, the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an International Trusteeship System for ten years, following which, it was to become an independent state in 1960. On December 2, 1950, the Security Council approved the General Assembly's Resolution.¹⁴⁹ As a result, Italy was to serve as the Administration Authority, with the aid of an Advisory Council set up by the United Nations.¹⁵⁰ The General Assembly's Resolution was not in line with the Somali Youth League's political aspirations for so-called Greater Somalia. Meanwhile, amidst this growing mistrust between East and West, the SYL's leaders attempted to adjust their political demands to Cold War realities by proposing a ten-year period of trusteeship under the Four Powers (the US, Soviet Union, UK and France) in place of a return to Italian rule.¹⁵¹ However, the Four Powers and General Assembly ignored Somalis' demands for unification in favor of Ethiopia. The Four Powers' solution effectively dismembered Somalia again. The southern region was placed under a defeated Italy with a ten-year mandate, the northern regions reverted to their former protectorate status, and the western region was returned back to Ethiopian occupation. John H. Spencer

¹⁴⁸ For more details see Abdulkadir Orama's books (Sabibihii Burburka Somalia).

¹⁴⁹ For more details see George A. Lipsky. Survey of World Cultures, 221.

¹⁵⁰ See Bennett, A. Leroy. International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 124.

¹⁵¹ Ismail, Ali Ismail, 127.

observed:¹⁵² “One of the greatest problems encountered during the negotiations was the British insistence on retaining the Ogaden (Western Somalia).” For whatever reason, in 1950, Italy returned to its misrule of Somalia.

3.1.3.6. The UNs Trusteeship and Italy’s Misrule (1950-1960)

The United Nations Trusteeship Council met in Geneva in January 10, 1950, and formally adopted the agreement that set forth the conditions under which Italy was to govern southern Somalia in trust for ten years. Containing 25 articles and a constitutional annex, it provided for a United Nations Advisory Council consisting of representatives from Egypt, Colombia and the Philippines to work closely with Italian administrators.¹⁵³ The Italian Administrators duly came to Somalia and took over the British Military Administration that had been in occupation since 1941. The United Nations supervision of this former Italian colony, with an area of approximately 190,000 square miles and an estimated population of 1,210,000, was scheduled to end by 1960. Moreover, according to the Geneva Agreement, all matters including legislation related to political, social, economic, and educational advancement of the Somalis were to be referred to the Advisory Council for consultation and advice. Italy was authorized to raise a police force and establish defense installations within limits provided by the UNs Charter. The agreement also called for the establishment of a territorial council composed of inhabitants from the territory, who were to be consulted on all matters other than defense and foreign affairs. Also, local district commissioners and councils were to be appointed by Italy’s Administration. Nobody (either from the Four Powers or the UN) asked how Italy, a defeated country with a bad political reputation and a record of corruption, could achieve this huge task. On top of these handicaps, Italy’s economic capability and political weight were simply not up to the task of Somalia’s nation-building; Italy itself was

¹⁵²Spencer, H. John: Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa, and U. S. Policy (Foreign Policy Report September 1977), Washington: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, INC, 12.

¹⁵³ The General Assembly decided, by a vote of 44 to 6, to endorse the draft written by the Trusteeship Council.

receiving financial support from the U.S. under the Marshall Plan. As it turned out, the Italians returned to Somalia with their inherent political corruption and favoritism. As usual, they used their old strategy to divide the society into two camps: pro-Italian and anti-Italian. Nationalist Somalis from the Somali Youth League who had been close to the British and favored Greater Somalia were then oppressed or punished.¹⁵⁴ The SYL's prominent members who had promoted civil service's better positions under the British Military Administration were reduced in rank, dismissed, and in a few cases imprisoned. Similar measures were also taken against leading Somali Youth League civilians, particularly those adjudged to be dangerously anti-Italian, and a determined attempt was made to discredit the Somali Youth League.¹⁵⁵ In the process, the Italians revived their old strategy and instead of building up Somalia, they were re-dividing it along tribal lines and sowing seeds of conflict at every level of state and society. Italy's main objective was to split every existing organ, including the Somali Youth League members, into many units; for instance, they classified the Somali Youth League members into moderate and extremist elements, and favored the moderates over so-called extremists.

As part of this process, the Italians established the first Somali Interior Government in 1956. This government consisted, however, exclusively of those who favored Italy's policy. Hence, this Interior Government divided the people more than it unified them. The clans were killing each other. the politicians were at each other's throats for political power, and corruption, political cronyism and immorality were rampant.¹⁵⁶ The nationalists and trusted leaders were isolated in favor of leaders imposed by the Italians. In 1959, at the request of the Somali Interior Government, the United Nations General Assembly advanced the date of independence from December 2 to July 1, 1960. Finally, on 1 July 1960, independence was declared and Somalia became a member

¹⁵⁴ Mariam Arief Qasim (a lawyer and politicians interviewed, February 12, 2010).

¹⁵⁵ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of the Somalia: Revised, Updated and Expanded* (4th Ed.), Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2002, 140.

¹⁵⁶ Abdullahi, Abdurrahman M. (Interviewed, September 12, 2010).

of the United Nations.¹⁵⁷

Unfortunately, the new Somali state was born in 1960 with four major obstacles: firstly, a society divided into many clans and sub-clans over seven decades of misrule, during which the colonial powers militarized the Somali clans and plunged them into a situation in which turmoil, instability and destruction prevailed.¹⁵⁸ To militarize the society was an artful strategy intended to fuel clans' and tribes' internal animosities. As a result, Somalia's internal cohesion in the 1960s was fragile, and inter-clan conflict was never far from the surface. Secondly, the elite were never true representatives of the people. The elites were handpicked and appointed by the colonial powers, who favored sympathetic stooges over authentic public personalities. As an example, the post-war Italian Administration prepared a managerial class that served it and every other neocolonialist interest.¹⁵⁹ In effect, those trusted to govern the new state were essentially neocolonialist agents. Thirdly, the new state was born as a divided nation. In the late 19th century the colonial powers had divided the Somali nation into five parts, of which only two became independent and hence, formed Somalia in 1960. Thus, the legacy of partition obliged the new state to continue the struggle for Greater Somalia, which inevitably brought it into conflict with its neighbors in the Horn of Africa. Fourthly, the new state was born into a bitterly divided world because of the Cold War. Under these circumstances, it was predictable that the new state's need for money and resources and superpowers' geopolitical interests would drag Somalia into global conflicts. In other words, colonial powers, particularly Italy, had deliberately sown the seeds of Somalia's inter- and intra-state crises before its birth in 1960. In the next section we will analyze how these four major obstacles would destroy Somalia after 30 years by 1991. In fact, Somalia's state was born in 1960, a child with multiple diseases.

¹⁵⁷ Bennett, A. Leroy. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 124.

¹⁵⁸ Mohmoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 61.

¹⁵⁹ Glendenning, Peter. *The Somalian Revolution*, 46.

3.3. The Elites and Somalia's Clan Politics

3.3.1. The Weakness of Civilian Rule (1960-1969) under Italy's Influence

Somalia's state-making is divided into two periods: under civilian and under military rule. In the first period (1960-1969) Somalia was under civilian rule and was still somewhat under Italy's influence. In the second period (1969-1991), Somalia was under a military ruler, namely General Mohamed Siad Barre; however, his rule can be divided into two periods. His first period (1969- 1978) was tied up with the Soviets and his second period (1978-1991) was tied up with the U.S.; therefore, these ties with global powers were affecting Somalia's domestic and foreign policy priority implementations. In this regard, this section is investigating how Somalia's elites (both civilian and military) tried to achieve their domestic and foreign policy goals under the different influences first of the Italians, the second of the Soviets, and thirdly of the U.S. Throughout the years 1960-1991, external powers were directly involved in Somalia's political process. The research will assess the civilian government's overall performance, investigating how it attempted to achieve their target goals such as society's well-being, Greater Somalia and diplomatic prestige among nations. This is to examine the civilian government's economic models, political system, and state-society connection, as well as Somalia's main objectives in its defense and foreign policies under its different patrons: Italy, the Soviets and the U.S. Italy was providing political advice and economic aid, the Soviets were providing military training and weaponry, and the U.S. was providing food. This balanced view will allow us to identify easily the external powers' influence on Somalia's political process over three decades.

3.3.2. The Civilian Governments' Pivotal Priorities and Challenges

In 1960, in Africa and elsewhere in the world, many new nations like Somalia became independent states. On July 1, 1960, a merger of the British sector (independent from the UK as of June 26, 1960) with Italian Somaliland (independent from Italian Administred United Nations Trusteeship as of July 1, 1960) formed the Somali Republic. These newly independent states faced serious challenges to their survival. This thesis intends to study the policies that Somalia's elite adopted to overcome these challenges. In a wider scope, Somalia witnessed three periods of state-making: weak civilian government from 1960 to 1969, a reasonable military regime from 1969 to 1978, and finally a failing military regime from 1980 to 1990. These three periods are further divided into two intervals with two sub-periods each; that is to say, the civilian governments period plus the military's first rule (1960-1969¹⁶⁰ and 1969-1978), and the military regime's second period (1978-1991). The civilian government's period plus the military's first period deal with the elites' efforts to build the nation, while the military regime's second period covers the military ruler's survival. This is to validate and answer the question of what methods and policies were attempted by the elites to build up the nation of Somalia over three decades (1960-1990). Specific attention has paid to the Somali state's political orientations, defense and foreign policy priorities, economic methods, and lastly society-to-state connections and instruments used by the elites over this time period. Also the study investigates Somalia's ties with the Soviets (1960s-1977) and the U.S (1978-1990). The major aim here is to examine the state's political input and output in a balanced manner in order to identify the possible factors that may have contributed to the failure of Somalia.

¹⁶⁰First, the civilian government's leadership can be divided into two periods; President Adam Abdullah Osman's rule (1960-1967), and President Abdul Rashid Ali' and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal's rule (1967-1969). This period (1960-1969) deals with their nation-building and pays greater attention to the new state's political democratization front with regards to its defense and foreign policies, as well as its economic policies and social concerns.

However, this study firstly identifies three pivotal political priorities and four political challenges. During the 1960s, Somalis were expecting their new state to achieve three pivotal goals. First, after the creation of the Somali state, it became the new state's obligation to establish a viable government for its people's well-being through the economy. Secondly, it was the new state's obligation to act on behalf of the people and design a viable strategy to achieve Greater Somalia to recover the missing territories through a strong military instrument. Thirdly, it was the new state's obligation to act and interact with other states on behalf of the people and to design viable strategies for the achievement of prestige among nations through effective foreign policy. This meant that the economy was the government's first pivotal priority to achieve society's well-being, the second priority was to achieve Greater Somalia via military power, and the last priority was to attain diplomatic prestige among nations via diplomatic expertise. The above priorities were accepted as the state's core values, and the Somalis were ready to offer ultimate sacrifices in order to achieve these three goals. However, the new state had also to deal with four challenges. Firstly, the state had to deal with a tribal society that was sub-divided and antagonized by colonialists over eighty years; secondly, the state had to deal with the Greater Somalia slogan inherited from the SYC-SYL. Thirdly, the state had to deal with the Horn of Africa's boundary disputes; fourthly, the state had to deal with the global powers with the Cold War impositions and the Horn of Africa's geopolitical importance. This research defines clearly the new state's core values and the obstacles that may have hindered it in achieving its target goals; therefore, knowing the existence of these priorities and challenges permits us to understand the conditions that forced the elite to adopt a particular political position that may not have been the best. In general terms, the core values and interests are those goals for which people are willing to sacrifice, because they relate to the existence of a state. According to Prakash Chandra,

they are:¹⁶¹ “(a) Self-preservation, defense of strategically vital areas, ethnic, religious or linguistic unity and protection of cultural and political institutions, belief and value, (b) economic development and prosperity. No government irrespective of complexity can dare to adopt a course of policy that ignores the core values and interests and yet survive.” Starting here, this section’s essential objective is to inquire as to how the new state’s leaders tried to achieve their core values with the existence of the abovementioned four challenges— also, why the elite adopted a particular policy and what conditions forced to them to do so. Examining the policies adopted by the elite allows us to identify the opportunities and challenges they faced as well their successes and faults during the period of Somalia’s nationhood (1960-1991). This is intended to evaluate (a) the new state’s economic policies in terms of the achievement of society’s well-being; (b) the state’s defense policies as mechanisms to attain Greater Somalia; and (c) the state’s foreign policy as an instrument to attain diplomatic prestige. Within this context, the economy is a domestic issue, defense is a regional concern, and foreign policy affairs are related to Somalia’s ties with global powers. However, in some cases domestic and foreign policies are mixed, and it not easy to separate domestic factors from external factors. According to John A. Jacobson:¹⁶² “Besides being the legal organization of a society the state is also, especially in its interactions with other states, a creation of law with obligations and rights.” This means that Somalia’s nationalism and its foreign policy’s priorities were subjected to external influences.

3.3.3. Political Opacities

The civilian elites ruled Somalia from 1960-1969, and their core policy was to achieve the above three pivotal goals. On July 1, 1960, Somalia gained its independence from colonial rule, and its people were euphoric. Free at last, they chanted that "foreigners" had

¹⁶¹ Chandra, Prakash. *International Relations: Foreign Policies of Major Powers and Regional Systems*, 6.

¹⁶² John A. Jacobson. *An Introduction to Political Science*, New York: West/Wadsworth, 1998, 25.

been driven out of their motherland and they are a sovereign state. However, the principal question is this: was Somalia really capable of achieving their three pivotal goals? If yes, are they were free from external powers as they assumed. If they are not free from external powers' influences, then they should deal with global powers via principles that originated from the Westphalia nation-state system.¹⁶³ Were the Somalis ready to meet the Westphalian nation-state system's principles? Did their new state have supreme authority domestically and free from external powers' influences? Of course, Somalia was an independent state since July 1, 1960, but Somalia wasn't in the right position to meet the Westphalian nation-state system's political principles because of their internal weakness. According to John Baylis's definition of state independence:¹⁶⁴ "The state has supreme authority domestically and independence internationally." Additionally, state sovereignty is increasingly understood as the shared exercise of public power and authority between the national, regional and global authorities. The critical question is did Somalia have supreme authority in its domestic affairs, as well as shared power authority between the national, regional and international authorities? In fact, Somalia was not totally free from external powers' intervention because of their economic weakness, and Somalia's state was born without enough resources to govern itself. They relied on foreign aid. Thus, definitely Somalia's elite wasn't in a good position to enjoy their political sovereignty, in order to achieve their political priorities. Certainly, they needed someone else to assist them. As a result, they have to accept others' advice for economic and political support.

¹⁶³Nation-state systems appeared during the aftermath of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. For details see John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, the *Globalization of World politics: An Introduction to international Relations*, 4th edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 588.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 587.

3.3.4. Elite Factionalism and Democracy's Impotence

It was in the early sixties that the majority of African countries, including Somalia, became independent.¹⁶⁵ The 1960s brought a debate to Africa as to whether or not it was a viable policy to encourage Africa's newly independent states to adopt democracy, or Western political style. Differences of opinion arose as to what to do for Africa's political system; i.e., whether to apply its traditional rules or allow the application of a Western political system. Those who believed Africa should adopt the latter included the American scholar, David D. Latin, who believed:¹⁶⁶ "The institutional transfer of democracy from Europe to Africa was a viable strategy." Somalia's civilian elite were aligned with David S. Latin's view and accepted the Western political system. They did this in order to achieve international status and much needed economic support by embracing Western democracy and its parliamentary system. In the 1960s, the Somalis were filled with new hope, and the most desired possession of most Somalis nomads was a radio used to stay informed on political news. Therefore, their political awareness and expectations were high, and according to Abdurrahman M. Abdullah:¹⁶⁷ "Somalia was recognized by international media and observers as representing a progressive Third World State and often depicted as a model of democracy in Africa." Somalia was also regarded by many as not only modern but also an African state whose level of political participation often surpassed even that of many Western democracies.¹⁶⁸ In fact, the civilian leaders went out of their way to prove that they were citizens of a modern nation-state. As a result, they preferred to exercise a multiparty parliamentary system. Nevertheless, this was a counterfeit image as the concept of self-rule remained poorly disseminated and in fact the elite themselves did

¹⁶⁵Glendenning, Peter. *The Somalian Revolution*, 23.

¹⁶⁶David, D. Laitin. *Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somalia Experience*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977, 5.

¹⁶⁷Abdurrahman M. Abdullah. *Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam*, 2.

¹⁶⁸See on mudulood@com on Main Events of Somalia's History in Chorology from 1960-1969.

not understand well what democracy actually is. Why? As elsewhere in Africa, there were few educated Somalis and for instance:¹⁶⁹ “In British Somaliland (a year before the Somalia gained independence in 1960), less than three percent of Somali children attended school and southern Somalia was little different from the north.” Therefore, civilians’ political education was very weak. as Peter Glendenning pointed out:¹⁷⁰ “There was a lack of any national leadership able to work out an autonomous point of view on overcoming colonialism in a country underdeveloped to an exasperating degree, or on the neocolonialist regression which immediately ensued.” Moreover, the constitution and laws were drafted by the Italians before their departure on July 1, 1960, and the Italian experts did not take into account pastoral democratic traditions based on traditional power-sharing concepts.¹⁷¹ In the 1960s nobody educated the Somalis as to the basic requirements for applying the European political system. It was pure mimicry (from Italy’s original constitution); a mere cut-and-paste operation applied to nomadic society. No technical commission existed to evaluate whether a European political system was applicable to Somalia, an eighty percent nomadic society. The European political system was undermining itself and William Pfaff has to say:¹⁷² “Most of Africa lacks the crucial educated middle and professional classes and the mediating private and public institutions that compose a civil society. Civil society makes democracy possible; without it, democracy has failed and will continue to fail in Africa.” In fact, generally speaking, what a democratic state actually is, or what are national interests and how Somalia could avoid the Cold War’s negative impacts were never appropriately debated by the elites.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 88.

¹⁷⁰Glendenning, Peter. *The Somalian Revolution*, 22.

¹⁷¹ For more details see Hussein M. Adam *Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination*, 114.

¹⁷²William, Pfaff. *A New Colonialism: Europe Must Go Back to Africa*, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, and No.1 (January/February 1995) 3.

¹⁷³Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein, (interviewed, October 21, 2011).

Additionally, the elite adopted factional behavior. They divided themselves into many groups. They divided themselves into clans or regions rather than the state or political views. Historically in Somalia, the South's parliamentary structures were established in 1956 (during the United Nations Trusteeship) and remained very fragile at the time of independence, and the North was even more of an infant.¹⁷⁴ The National Assembly's 123 members, 90 of whom were from the South and 23 from the North, lacked any semblance of cohesion. As mentioned earlier, Italy had divided the Somali Youth League into pro- and anti-Italian factions and favored pro-Italian elements. In addition, northerners also divided themselves into two camps: the Somali National League (SNL) representing the Isaq clan-family that constituted a numerical majority in the British Somaliland regions, and the United Somali Party (USP), supported largely by non-Isaq partisans, particularly the Gadabursi, Esse, Dhulmahante and Warsengali clans of British Somaliland. The problems arose as northern Darod clan members aligned with fellow members of the Darod's larger tribe against the Isaqs, which then decreased Isaqi's political power. The Isaqs did not have many kinsmen in the south and naturally felt betrayed. They were a friendless clan among friendly clans.¹⁷⁵ I. M. Lewis has this to say:¹⁷⁶ "The National Assembly was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens. It was now widely regarded cynically as a sordid market-place where, with little concern for the interests of those who had voted for them, deputies traded their votes for personal gain." The parliament became a house of nepotism, and the elite were pursuing individual rather than national interests. The worst, due to the elite's factionalism political parties proliferated, from less than four parties in 1960 to sixty-plus in 1969. The civilian elite formed so many political parties that the 1969 general election witnessed over

¹⁷⁴For more details see David, D. Laitin. *Politics, Language, and Thought*, 81.

¹⁷⁵Although the Hawiye (the largest tribe in Somalia) had some sympathies for the Isaq, because there is common belief that both belong to larger Samale and the Somali name originated from the first Samale. However, it is a matter of debate since there is no written record.

¹⁷⁶Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of the Somali*, 206.

sixty-four parties contesting for 123 seats. The election thus became moot and Hussein A. Admen to say:¹⁷⁷ What followed was a rush to join the leading party in order to obtain ministerial positions.

Hence, Western political democracy served the corrupt elite and according to Isse Dheere's view, Italy had produced a Westernized elite that was not much different from their patrons, except their names were Mohamed, Hassan and Ali.¹⁷⁸ They ignored or were not interested in their people's political culture and simply accepted the Western political system without making any effort to examine it.

As a result, the infant and Europeans' parliamentary model failed and the major cause of its failure was its European structure. According to Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed's assessment this system's weaknesses were numerous, but the most important were that (a) the people were not counted, (b) the voters were not documented and every citizen was eligible to vote without an identity card, and the election were managed by the party in power; as a result, these elections were meaningless.¹⁷⁹ This imported system helped the elite to misuse the public's funds for their own political interests and Ahmed I. Samatar had this to say:¹⁸⁰

Perhaps the most telling actions were these: (1) open raiding of the state treasury (about U.S. \$ 8 million); (2) pressure on the Chief of the National Police Corps, General M. A. Muse, to use his forces and their resources to help those S.Y.L candidates campaigning in tightly, contested districts; (3) a modification of electoral rules to favor the S.Y.L; (4); the more than 1,000 candidates put forth by over 60 parties for the 123 seats; and (5) the death of nearly forty people-making the election Somalia's bloodiest.

The corruption was prevalent, and neither the President nor the Prime Minister seemed concerned about the normalization of official corruption and nepotism. Generally speaking, the multiple political parties adopted by the civilian elite as a tool of the political process (Europeans' political model) were meaningless; therefore, the

¹⁷⁷Adam, Hussein M. Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination, 69.

¹⁷⁸Dhere, Ambassador Isse, (interviewed, November 13, 2011).

¹⁷⁹Ahmed, Abdullah Yusuf. Halgan iyo Hagardaamo: Taariikh Nololeed, Stockholm: Scansom Publisher, 2012, 1.

¹⁸⁰Samatar, Ahmed I. The Somali Challenges from Catastrophic to Renewal, London: Lynne Rinner Publisher, 1994, 115.

exported model failed to achieve anything except leadership failure.

3.3.5. Foreign and Defense Policies' Opacities

On July 1, 1960, colonialism left multiple challenges to the new state, and these challenges included regain ingmissing territories since colonial partitions. Somalia had become one nation divided into five pieces and in 1960, the new state formed only two from five pieces. Therefore, the new state's pivotal objectives included to struggle to get back these missing territories. Clearly Somalia's new state was rejecting the region's political boundaries that were established in the late 19th century by the Europeans. This meant that the new state's major mission was to reconstruct its political boundaries via military means. As a result, to achieve that pivotal goal Somalia should build up a very powerful army for Greater Somalia. This slogan, Greater Somalia says, to reunify Somali ethnic people in the Horn of Africa is a national interest or core value. Since then, Somalia directly or indirectly was telling others that they were ready to use force against them, particularly Ethiopia. However, to use force against other nations required building up a great military with advanced weaponry for Greater Somalia. Under these circumstances the elite internally used irredentism/nationalism as a political instrument to incite the public. Irredentism, as defined by Conway W. Henderson,¹⁸¹ means the desire of a people of a state to annex territory from an adjoining state where their ethnic kinfolk reside. From its independence, successive Somali governments sought to reincorporate Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti into Greater Somalia.¹⁸² Throughout history, the nationalism played a crucial role to incite the society, and the Somalis were not an exception. The civilian elite divided the world into two categories. For example, if state's A policy is in line with Somalia's nationalism, then it will be counted as a friend;

¹⁸¹ Henderson, Conway W. *International Relations; Conflict and Cooperation at the Turn of the 21st Century*, Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1998, 91.

¹⁸² Somalia Irredentism and the Changing Balance of Power appeared on CIA's World Factbook, Somalia-Country Studies, Sep 16, 2010. Available at: http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/national_security_irredentism (accessed 7 Dec. 2010).

conversely, if state B's policy is in line with Ethiopia's political interest, then it will be counted as an enemy. The elite adopted my enemy's enemy is my friend as a guideline to the state's defense and foreign policies. This militaristic behavior should restrain Somalia's diplomatic relations with others, particularly its neighboring states and the global powers. Normally, every state has a right to frame its foreign policy priorities, and according to Prakash Chandra, "All states should frame their foreign policy for these reasons:¹⁸³ "no state in the modern times can avoid involvement in international affairs, and this involvement must be systematic and based on certain principles. In other words, states have to behave with another in a particular manner. The framing of foreign policy is, therefore, an essential activity of modern states, for a state without foreign policy is like a ship without radar which may drift aimlessly and may be swept away by a storm of current events."

Unfortunately Somalia's foreign policy was like a ship without radar, because its elite's involvement in the international affairs was not based on the United Nations Charter principles, particularly Article 2, Para 4, which says: all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.¹⁸⁴ The elite were ignoring the abovementioned principles and they became a threat to others because of their readiness to use force against others. Greater Somalia was misguided and blinded at both the elite and grassroots levels. From the beginning, Greater Somalia set aside society's well-being.¹⁸⁵ Ironically, this study notes that if the state had adopted more aggressive policies against Ethiopia, society co-operated with the elite more; in reverse, if the elite attempt to adopt a less aggressive policy against

¹⁸³ Chandra, Prakash. *International Relations: Foreign Policies of Major Powers and Regional Systems*, (2nd Ed.), New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD, 1994, 1.

¹⁸⁴ Hamid, Abdul Ghafur. *Public International Law: A Practical Approach*, KL: Prentice Hall, Pearson Malaysia, SDN BHD, 2007, 109.

¹⁸⁵ Here, we have to distinguish between two terms, Somali and Somalia. We mean Somali as an ethnic people living in the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, by Somalia, we mean those who live inside Somalia as a recognized independent state since 1960.

Ethiopia, society invalidated them and accused them of not doing enough to achieve Greater Somalia. Hence, besides the elite's blindness because of Greater Somalia, also society played a crucial role in pushing the elite to adopt aggressive policies against Ethiopia, and Benjamin Miller observed: ¹⁸⁶ "The strong commitment of domestic constituencies to ethnicity and nationalism generates pressures on and incentives for state leaders to maintain a hardline and even to go to war." This means that less belligerence against Ethiopia assists the state to reduce its defense spending and bring some benefits to society's well-being; however, it disharmonizes the relationship between the elite and society. In this sense, Greater Somalia wasn't a threat to others but was a threat to society's well-being. As a result, the state's pivotal goals created many problems both within the state and with others, particularly Somalia and Ethiopia.

3.3.6. Economic: Foreign Aids' Dependency and Corruption

The Somali state was born in the 1960s with a liberal economic system; however, according to Jamal A. Mubarak: ¹⁸⁷ "The domestic private sector was in its infancy and without much capacity, weak and essentially not worth mentioning." In 1960-1969, Somalia was under Italy's economic care and, moreover, Peter Glendenning quoted Ozay Mehmet the author of Efficacy of Foreign Aid Development Countries, including Somalia: ¹⁸⁸ "In nine years 1960-1969, eighty-five percent of the costs to develop Somalia were financed by foreign sources." Even though the absolute figure is low by comparison, it is certain that eighty-five percent is correct and hence, it's very hard to believe in the possibility of Somalia's economic independence. Somalia was "aid dependent" to the extent that Somalia's government could not carry out its duties or deliver basic public services without external assistance. Thus, Somali development

¹⁸⁶ Miller, Benjamin. *States, Nations, and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional Wars and Peace*, New York, Melbourne and Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 109.

¹⁸⁷ Mubarak, Jamal A. *An Economic Policy Agenda for Post-Civil War Somalia*, NY, Edwin Mellen Press, 2006, 38.

¹⁸⁸ Glendenning, Peter. *The Somalian Revolution*, 34.

in the 1960s presents a unique example of development with foreign aid, and this table shows the sources of Development Finances 1960-1969¹⁸⁹

Sources	Somali Shillings	%
Somalia (internal sources)	283,531	14.9%
Foreign Aid	1,691.528	85.1%
USSR	388.928	20.4%
USA	326.489	17.2%
EEC	245.108	12.9%
World Bank	219.427	11.5%
UNs	143.567	7.5%
F. R. Germany	122.951	6.3%
Italy	71.339	3.7%
China	39.220	2.1%
Saudi Arabia	14.561	0.8%
Others	47.938	2.5%
Total	1, 903, 059	100.00

The above table shows Somalia's foreign aid dependence, which was extremely high. The country was proving only 14.9% its economic development, and based on that fact nobody could expect Somalia to solve its economic problems. Furthermore, Italy's Foreign Aid and Economic Assistance to Somalia was essentially empowering only a corrupt elite. Italian aid developed a culture of dependency and elitist corruption that served its interests through the *Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia* (A.F.I.S),

¹⁸⁹Sources: German Planning and Economic Advisor Group, Reports on the Progress of Development Projects in Somali Democratic Republic (Mogadishu and Frankfurt, 1969 mimeo), see Abdullah A. Mohamud, State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa, 92.

which means Trusted Italian Administration of Somalia. The A.F.I.S. had prepared a managerial class that served Italian interests well and then catered to every other neocolonial interest.¹⁹⁰ Additionally, Peter Glendenning pointed this out:¹⁹¹ “Aid is today so permeated by vested interest on the part of the donors that it is not really clear who is aiding and who is being aided.” Italy’s purpose was to prevent Somalia from standing on its own feet. Italy, as historians know, had a most infamous history of political corruption. In fact, Italy transferred its political style through foreign aid in order to control Somalia’s little economic matters. Hence, its economic relations with Somalia’s elite were in favor of Italy’s economic interest. For instance, many Italian companies (via elite’s partnership) were allowed to establish banks, including the Banks of Roma, the Bank of Italy, the Bank of Naples, and the Bank of Trade and Commerce. The Italians were also in control of the energy and transportation sectors, and totally monopolized Somalia’s fruit (banana). Besides economic weakness and total dependency on foreign aids, the majority of Somali people was nomadic and according to Bandow Doug’s view:¹⁹² “Nomads make it hard to build a modern state, nomads can't be taxed, they can't be drafted, and they can't be controlled. They also can't be used to attract foreign aid, unless you can get them to stay in one place.” In the early 1960s, eighty percent of Somalis were nomadic; in sum, the elite had little chance to overcome its economic weakness. The reason was that if eighty-five percent of the state’s cost intended to develop infrastructure was financed by foreign sources, that figure alone suffices to argue that it is a waste of time to debate any further. In every venue, Italy used foreign aid to control the new state’s elite through economic partnership. The ultimate truth but usually unstated fact was that much of Italy’s foreign aid went to buy influence. Italy’s main goal was to keep Somalia under its post-colonial

¹⁹⁰Glendenning, Peter. *The Somalian Revolution*, 46.

¹⁹¹According Pestalozza the date is quoted in Ozay Mehmet’s article the Efficacy of Foreign Aid to Developing Countries, the Somali case! *Journal of Modern African Studies*, no. 1, 1971.

¹⁹²Doug, Bandow. *A New Aid Policy for a New World*, Cato Institute Policy No. 226 published on May 15, 1995. Available at: <http://www.cato.org/> (accessed 1 Nov. 2010).

political umbrella.

3.3.7. Ineffective Leadership and the Parliamentary System's Failure

Meanwhile, Somalia's civilian elite was failing in all aspects. Their political views and approaches were fragmented and contradictory. The state was hanging on somewhere between east and west. The society and state were in great disagreement. Strangely enough though, the state's defense and foreign policy priorities fell in line with Soviets' strategic interests while the state's parliamentary system and economic model were in line with the West's political and economic models, particularly Italy's economic interests. The Soviets were training the army's generals for tomorrow while Italians were increasing its economic ties with the local elite. Suddenly on one distressed day (October 15, 1969), the President's personal bodyguard, Said Yusuf Ismail, shot him.¹⁹³ This killing brought many crises to Somalia's domestic policy as well as to its relations with others. The Premier, Minister Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, tried to arrange for the election of a new president by the National Assembly. His choice was Haji Musse Boqor, a former Home Minister and a relative of the assassinated President. The National Assembly rejected the Premier's choice, and for more than a week the National Assembly failed to elect a new President. The President's kinfolk in parliament proclaimed that the new President should be from their house. In reply, others said no such monarchical constitution existed in the country. The public became fed up with the civilian elite's misconduct and expected the army to act.¹⁹⁴ Hence, the civilian elite's failure paved the way for the military to take over on October 21, 1969. This marked the end of Somalia's civilian misrule. In fact, the civilian government failed to achieve its three pivotal goals: society's well-being, Greater Somalia, and diplomatic prestige among nations. The abovementioned four challenges were obstacles to them. .

¹⁹³The assassin, Said Yusuf Ismail, was tried and sentenced to death on 10 Feb. 1971. See Peter Glendenning, 294.

¹⁹⁴ Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein, (interviewed, October 21, 2011).

Peter Glendenning expressed it as follows:¹⁹⁵ “Above all, one of the most corrupted and inept regimes that had grown up in Africa in the shadow of neocolonialism had ceased to exist, but also the last African multi-party parliament regime had ceased to exist.” Nobody regretted the civilian governments’ demise due to its multiple failures. On October 21, 1969, Major-General Mohamed, Commander of the Army, led a coup that ushered in 22 years of military rule.

3.4. The Authoritarian Military Ruler in (1969-1978) Under the Soviets’ Client

Among those most dissatisfied with civilian governments’ misrule were members of the armed forces and police. The most significant element here was the military, which since 1960 had remained outside of politics because its genuine mission was to prepare to go to war against neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Kenya because of their occupation of Somalia’s missing territories. Nevertheless, the army changed its political mission and, on October 21, 1969, a group of officers, (Tuesday at 3:00 AM) took over power. In the early hours the army rounded up and arrested several political figures, including the former President and the Premier, Adam Abdullah Osman and Mohamed Ibrahim. Furthermore, the army immediately dissolved the elected Parliament, deposed the civilian government and finally abolished the Supreme Judiciary Council. Then power was in their hands. They named their coup, ‘A White Revolutionary’ because the coup was bloodless. The Commander of the army, General Mohamed Siad Barre, led the coup and immediately formed Somalia’s Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) initially comprised of twenty-five members.¹⁹⁶ The SRC’s membership was kept secret for ten days. However, the membership of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) was announced on

¹⁹⁵ See more details from Peter Glendenning, 40.

¹⁹⁶ See Peter Glendenning on the Somalian Revolution, 270.

November 1, 1970.¹⁹⁷ To make their power structure official, they elected the oldest General and army's former Commander, General Mohamed, as their Chairman. General Mohamed soon named himself Commander-in-Chief of the army. The twenty-five men (SRC) who took over power included officers above the rank of captain and represented most major clans and regions of the country.¹⁹⁸ The Supreme Revolutionary Council justified their action as saving the country from illegitimate hands and accused civilian politicians of misusing public funds in order to strengthen their political status. This news delighted many Somalis, who believed the army had just taken over power in order to manage the state's affairs better than the corrupt civilian elite. The SRC set up a civilian cabinet after they secured political power, but they retained the executive power. I. M. Lewis said:¹⁹⁹ "On November 1, 1969, the SRC announced the formation of a fourteen-member Committee of Secretaries with executive rather than ministerial powers, who would be responsible for day-to-day administration." These subordinate fourteen men lacked any meaningful political power, and their role was to execute decisions made by the SRC. The SRC promised to fight corruption and nepotism, and then the public believed and welcomed them because of the army's good reputation since the 1960s. He remained in power for over two decades.

In a short time, the SRC changed their soft approach and adopted a posture against the civilian elite to erase the prior civilian government's political heritage, and to do so, they even changed the country's name from the Somali Republic to the Somali Democratic Republic.²⁰⁰ The SRC acted, on the whole, on behalf of the people of the Somali Democratic Republic.²⁰¹ To consolidate greater gains, the army arrested all

¹⁹⁷ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 207.

¹⁹⁸ Markakis, John. *Radical Military Regimes in the Horn of Africa*; John & Michael Waller, *Military Marxist Regimes in Africa*, London: FRANK CASS AND CAMPONY LIMITED, 1986, 21.

¹⁹⁹ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 207.

²⁰⁰ Mohamed, Abdulwali Hassan. *Maxaa Hortaagan Dowladnimada Somalia: Geeska Afrika & Danaha Is-diidan*, Nairobi: graphic Lineups Limited, 2009, 39.

²⁰¹ *Somalia Today*. Printed by the State Printing Agency for the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, Mogadishu, 1970, 42.

prominent and potential political rivals.²⁰² With regard to further action against civilian movements, members of the public were invited to lodge complaints about past mismanagement of the country and make suggestions as to future improvement.²⁰³ The junta was turning everything upside down, and according to Ismail Ali Ismail: ²⁰⁴ “On its first anniversary in October of 1970, the SRC announced that the country would be guided by scientific socialism and changed the nation’s name to the Somali Democratic Republic.” The Junta was very thoughtful, and to legitimize their illegitimate coup they included the term “democratic” in the country’s renaming; in this manner they dismissed democracy itself. The junta’s major justification was to eradicate all civilian governmental influence. Apart from the conflicts between the military’s elite and the civilian’s politicians, the junta members also disagreed among themselves. The Supreme Revisionary Council’s Chairman General Mohamed claimed that another two groups conspired against the state within the junta’s ranks, meaning among those who had plotted the coup. In the early 1970s, three key generals (SRC members) were associated with a pro-Western camp and the accused plotters were the most senior among the SRC members, namely First Vice Chairman General Jama’ Ali Qorshel, whose plot was discovered on 28 April 1970. He was accused of wanting to strike at the Revolution by preparing a war against Ethiopia in concert with Western powers.²⁰⁵ In April 1970, the National Security Court convicted him of treason and sentenced him to prison. For a second time, one year later the Second Vice Chairman, Major General Muhammad Ainanche Guled and the fellow SRC member and the Soviet-trained General Salad Gavaire Kadiye (who had served as Head of the Ministry of Defense), were both arrested on May 5, 1971 along with several other army officers for plotting against the state. After a short trial by the National Security Court,

²⁰² On May 1, 1973, 18 members of the previous government, in detention since 1969 were released. They included Former President Aden Abdullah Osman, Former Premier Abdi-Rizak Haji Hussein, and members of the former Premier’s Cabinet.

²⁰³ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 208

²⁰⁴ Ismail Ali Ismail. *Governance: The Scourge and Hope of Somalia*. 219.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 43.

Ainanche, Gaviare and a key army officer, Colonel Abdulkadir Dhile, were sentenced to death on condition the Supreme Revolutionary Council Chairman approved.²⁰⁶ As expected, the Chairman (General Mohamed) approved their conviction and they were executed publicly on July 3, 1972, by firing squad in the capital, Mogadishu. For the third time, General Mohamed ousted two more fellow SRC members. He dismissed former Mogadishu Governor General Ahmed Mohamud Ade and Captain Bashir Elmi Yusuf. Since then, General Mohamed did emerge as the undisputed leader and as a result, he ruled Somalia from 1969-1991. Somalia's state belonged to him and he was managing it as his own property.

Generally speaking, General Mohamed was a lucky man, thanks to the Cold War's nature. He was backed by both superpowers because of the Cold War's nature and Somalia's geopolitical location. He was cashing in on his country's geopolitical location. First, during his golden era he aligned with the Soviets and signed many treaties (1970-1978). The Soviets were generous to Somalia's national army. However, the Horn of Africa's strategic position altered in 1978, and he came to disagree with the Soviets during Somalia's War with Ethiopia in 1977-78 and turned back to the U.S., and through the years 1978-1990 the U.S and Somalia signed numerous agreements, including a military pact. He received advanced weaponry and financial support from Washington from 1980 to 1989 in exchange for a military base.

General Mohamed under the Soviets (1970-1978) and the U.S.'s influences applied very contradictory policies that brought many problems, including Somalia-Ethiopia's war, economic collapse, and political dissidents.²⁰⁷ He was executing and torturing his opponents, including fellow SRC members and distinguished Sheikhs. He claimed to adhere to scientific socialism as a framework for Somalia's nation building from 1970 to

²⁰⁶The most fearless of these generals was General Salad Gavaire. He was a well-known and after the Somalia-Ethiopian war of 1964, the state decorated him with its highest honors.

²⁰⁷Shuuke, Abdurrahman Abdullah a Former Minister of Education (interviewed, December 3, 2011).

1978. For a second time, he changed his mind and then claimed adherence to the West's economic model that called for free markets (1979-1991). He disappointed everybody including his junta members. In early 1970s, the public was expecting a better performance from the army than the corrupt civilian corrupted government. The question is: how did General Mohamed survive over two decades and what variety of policies did he apply to his country over that time?

3.4.1. Military State and the Lack of Political Legitimacy

First of all, General Mohamed's first major concern was how to legitimize his military rule. Hence, his junta men outlined their own so-called Seven-Point Policy as a domestic politics guideline:^{208 (1)} To constitute a society based on the right to work and on the principles of social justice, considering also the environment and social life of the Somali people; (2), to prepare and orient the development of economic, social and cultural programs to rapidly attain progress in the country; (3), to combat illiteracy and develop an enlightened patrimonial, cultural heritage for the Somali people; (4), to constitute with appreciation all adequate measures for the basic development of writing the Somali language; (5), remove all kinds of corruption and anarchy, and the malicious system of harmful conduct in state activities; (6), to abolish all political parties; and finally, (7) to conduct timely and impartial elections.

In all avenues of approach to these goals, the public expected their beloved army to fulfill the perennial Somali ideals. Honestly, the public believed the junta's promise and welcomed them without reservation. General Mohamed also promised to constitute a society based on the right to work and principles of social justice so that Somalia would become a rapidly progressing country. The junta's promises were all in line

²⁰⁸ See: Somalia Today, 45-46.

with the civilians; pivotal goals, therefore, this study notes that the military's political objectives were not much different from the civilian's pivotal goals, except for the military's scientific socialism's propaganda. Therefore, since the military and civilians' priorities were the same, nothing was changed except the instruments. Still, the army had to achieve the society's well-being, Greeter Somalia and to attain diplomatic prestige among nations. We must keep in mind that since 1960, the public remained ready to make the ultimate sacrifice for the above pivotal goals. Public order was essential to the junta's success. Civil codes were insufficient to oppress the public; therefore, the junta needed create new laws. In fact, the democratic constitution of the 1960s was suspended at the time of the coup and replaced by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) under powers conferred by Law Number 1, which assigned to the SRC all functions previously performed by the president, the National Assembly, and the Council of Ministers, as well as many duties of the courts.²⁰⁹ It seems clear that before approaching other matters, the junta's chief goal was to secure public order. To achieve this they outlined several laws under the First Charter of the Revolution; they introduced sweeping legal and administrative reforms, and carried out measures with far-reaching social, political and internal security consequences. To bring people into subjugation for example, in the name of public order the junta issued the following laws and institutions:

Law No. 1, of January 10, 1970: power to arrest;

Law No. 3, of January 10, 1970: creates National Security Court;

Law No. 14, of February 15, 1970 on the creation of National Security Service;

Law No. 54, of September 10, 1970 on National Security Law;

Law No. 67, of November 1, 1972 on Socialist defense;

Law No. 38, of April, 1972 on Judicial Powers of the Supreme Revolutionary

²⁰⁹Samatar, Said S. *The Somalis: Their Origins, Migrations, and Settlement*, (Ed); Helen Chapin Metz, *Somalia, A Country Study*, Washington: Library of Congress, 1993, 38.

Council.²¹⁰

The above security laws and many more provided by the junta as national security policy's framework for maintaining public order were created. This repression was state policy design on a grand scale, aimed to deal with domestic policy. But more alarmingly, on January 10, 1970, the SRC widened their political power when these edicts gave the National Security Service as well as Regional and District Revolutionary Councils the power to detain individuals they deemed: (1) dangerous to peace, order and good government; and (2) conspiring against the SRC by word or by action.²¹¹ The junta's rules and instructions caused a radical change in public order, something civilian governments had failed to achieve. The junta also mandated the death penalty for anyone harming national unity, peace or Somalia's sovereignty. Law Number 1 made provisions for security agencies to arrest individuals without trial or clear justification and to hold them indefinitely without giving the detainee any reason for their incarceration. Conditions of imprisonment were very harsh due to a lack of sufficient food and clean water. The junta insisted that these measures were required in order to safeguard public safety. In doing so, they established the most feared National Security Court, which dealt with a wide range of political offences, including nepotism and tribalism.²¹² To consolidate further, and, according to US ambassador, Peter Bridges:²¹³ "In 1970, with Law Number 54, the National Security Courts (NSC) was set up as a judicial arm of the SRC. Law Number 54 provided for not only imprisonment but also the death penalty for an entire string of loosely described offenses. For example: any act detrimental to the independence, unity or security of the Somali state". The junta's main objective of reforming the state's judicial system through its National Security Court was to adjudicate anti-

²¹⁰ Furthermore years later, to carry out additional harsh rules, General Mohamed established the Military Intelligence, the Military Counter Intelligence, Red Hats or Military Police, Party Investigators, Pre- Military Militia, etc. For details see: Ismail Ali Ismail, *Governance: the Scourge and Hopes of Somalia*, 273-274.

²¹¹ Salwa, Abdurrahman. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, 82-84.

²¹² Lewis, I.M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 212

²¹³ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 108.

state cases and thus, expand the military's political power over socially related issues. They used the National Security Court as an instrument to oppress all opponents. The NSC was completely governed by uniformed personal (military and police) and presided over by members of the SRC, including General Mohamed Sheikh Osman, and much feared General Mohamoud Ghelle Yussuf. Over the years National Security Courts, according to Ismail Ali Ismail:²¹⁴ "It was a judicial system in which the SRC and their collaborators were prosecutor, judge and jury." The junta (in line with Law No. 14, of February 15, 1970) also established the most feared National Security Service, in which, according to Abdulsalam Salwe:²¹⁵ "Top priority was given to the establishment of strong intelligence networks to legitimize NSS actions, all individual rights were suspended. The National Security Service (NSS) dealt with whoever was suspected of nurturing anti-revolutionary feeling." Members of the National Security Service were trained by the Sandburs and KGB. The NSS enjoyed arbitrary powers of arresting and according to I. M. Lewis:²¹⁶ "Numbers of public services were kept under surveillance, and NSS reports played an important part in promotion and/or demotion. Furthermore, private meetings for more than five people were specifically banned for national security concerns."²¹⁷ By all means possible, the military used the NSC/NSS as watchdogs against counter-revolutionary elements. All political dissidents were harassed, arrested, censored, prosecuted or murdered. The junta's domestic policy and public order laws were cruelly oppressive to public daily life. Without doubt, the idea of 'state security' was problematic from the viewpoint of the public. The junta used the state security to justify their repressive rule. National security by definition is to be free from military attack or coercion, internal subversion, and from the erosion of the political, economic and social values essential for

²¹⁴ Ismail, Ali Ismail. *Governance the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*. 220.

²¹⁵ For many years the Head of NSS was the General Ahmed Suleiman Dafle, General Mohamed's -son-in-law and a member of SRC.

²¹⁶ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 212.

²¹⁷ This militarism was counter-productive and compelled many civilian politicians and intellectuals to flee into self-exile.

any quality of life.²¹⁸ This definition includes non-military issues; however, General Mohamed and his junta exclusively militarized state security as an instrument to oppress so-called anti-state elements, and according to Abdulsalam Salwa:²¹⁹ “Underlying the regime’s extensive reform was the control of the people in the name of national security, and the consolidation of the power, in particular of its chairman.” General Mohamed’s main aim was to minimize any opportunity for his opponents to reappear. Nevertheless, let us review the military’s efforts to achieve the people’s three pivotal goals: society’s well-being, Greater Somalia and diplomatic prestige among nations. At present, let us detail General Mohamed’s nation-building policies (under Soviet supervision) in his first period, 1969-1978.

3.4.2. The Soviet Style: Progressive State

One year after the revolution, on 21 October 1970, the military regime announced this:²²⁰ “We are convinced that the only way to solve our problems is scientific socialism.” General Mohamed proclaimed adherence to a scientific socialism, as he convinced himself the only way to solve his country’s problems was to apply scientific socialism’s political principles. General Mohamed’s aim was to establish a close relation with the Soviets for support. In Somalia after 45 years there is still ongoing debate as to whether the Soviets had a role in assisting the army to take over power on October 21, 1969. However, the Soviets were well connected with the army since 1963. Tom Copper says this:²²¹ “Following the military coup of 1969, Soviet military assistance to Somalia increased substantially and several hundred Soviet officers (military advisers) and

²¹⁸Schmidt, Brain C. *The Primacy of National Security*; Smith, Steven, Amelia Hadfield & Tim Dunne, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008, 156.

²¹⁹ Salwa, Abdulsalam. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, 80.

²²⁰ See Peter Glendenning on the Somalian Revolution, 54.

²²¹ Cooper, Tom. *The Coup in Mogadishu*, published by the Air Combat Information Group (ACIG). This information is available at http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_188.shtml. (accessed 12 May 2010).

technicians with more equipment were to follow.” Since 1963, the Soviets’ main concern was to attain strategic military bases in the Horn of Africa for balance of power. Then, the Soviets transformed Somalia step by step into a socialist state and according to Ali Khalief:²²² “Somalia became a bone fide member of the progressive camp and the Soviets hailed General Mohamed’s political style.” In January 1971, the Second Charter came out with its dedication to scientific socialism as Somalia’s orbit of reference. By this time, the new regime knew where it wanted to go and more or less how to get there.²²³ The government was centralized under General Mohamed’s leadership, and Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for tutelage from 1970 to 1977.²²⁴ In fact, during the early 1970s, no one else in Africa seemed to enjoy the Soviets’ friendship as much as General Mohamed. He paid a state visit to Moscow to meet the Soviets’ senior leaders in the Kremlin, and according to Marian Kassim:²²⁵ “Somalia was transformed into an African satellite of the eastern bloc.” Peter Bridges said: “The Soviets had promised more weapons and financial aid to former presidents of Somalia, who had, for years, been Moscow’s closest African allies.²²⁶ The Soviets’ main policy was to attempt to redirect the country’s worldview in favor of socialism.

In a dramatic way the scientific-socialist-political-philosophy became the state’s political fixation, and pictures of patriarchs like Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and himself (General Mohamed) were placed everywhere. State media, including newspapers, Radio Mogadishu and Mogadishu’s National Theater, were used to teach the public about scientific socialism.²²⁷ General Mohamed frequently articulated scientific socialism and defined it as follows:²²⁸ “For us, socialism is simply defined: it is a system

²²²See Ali Kh. Glaydh’s notes on the State of the Somali State, Horn of Africa Journal Volume XIII, (1990), 1-28.

²²³Davidson, Basil. Revolution in Somalia: Available at <http://www.google.com.my/search?hl=en&q=Somalia>. (accessed 21 May 2008).

²²⁴Ibid. George Ayitty’s views in Time for an African Solution,

²²⁵ Kassim, Maryan. Somalia Clan vs. Nation, 67.

²²⁶ Bridges, Peter. Safiirka: An American Envoy, 6.

²²⁷ Sheikh Ali Mohamud (Islamic scholar, interviewed, December 12, 2012).

²²⁸Markakis, John. Radical Military Regimes in the Horn of Africa, 24.

in which the state takes primary responsibility for the political, social and economic development of the nation. The Soviets were pleased to have a tough general in the Horn of Africa.” In fact, General Mohamed’s scientific socialism was designed to please the Soviets in return for financial aid, weaponry and political support. The problem is there is no dialectical relationship between scientific socialism and the environment (nomadic society) in which General Mohamed was trying to apply it. Therefore, his effort to apply scientific socialism to nomadic society created a lot of confusion, which finally brought about a disconnection between society and state.

3.4.3. Progressive Society

Generally speaking, the public supported the military’s political takeover due to the civilian governments’ failure to fulfill the three pivotal goals and partial failure to maintain public order. The military was powerful enough to take tough action against troublemakers, and via decrees it gained much needed political legitimacy by providing public order. Hence, Abdulsalam Salwa said: ²²⁹ “Now there was a feeling that the army, which was apart from politics, had rescued the country and prevented it from plunging into turmoil.” Moreover, General Mohamed’s political arguments attracted many professionals and intellectuals because of his call to end nepotism, corruption and misrule. Consequently, during the early 1970s his regime embarked on massive political reforms that included a zero-tolerance for tribalism. For example, on November 11, 1970 at the Cons Stadium, General Mohamed informed the public of a revolutionary ban on tribalism. Tribalism was therefore condemned as the most serious impediment to national unity.²³⁰ The aim was to eradicate tribalism, irrespective of its values and norms, including a prohibition on paying blood money (Diya) for murder or serious injury, which

²²⁹ Salwa, Abdulsalam. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, 80.

²³⁰ Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenges from Catastrophic to Renewal*, 39.

is an Islamic form of justice and was tribal tradition for centuries.²³¹ In the process General Mohamed issued numerous decrees as a form of traditional norms vis-à-vis scientific socialism to revolutionize society's way of life in favor of progressive society. Additionally, the military stopped blood money and offered only the death penalty for murderers. They also abolished all clan titles such as Sultan, Garaad, and Chief (Local Authority), and dismissed every holder of any of these titles, thus advancing the processes begun by the colonials.²³² General Mohamed's regime, to prove his readiness to fight tribalism, formally honored and appointed his First Deputy, General Mohamed Ali Samater as his First Deputy and Minister of Defense. Most likely this was to show his sincere love of justice by promoting General Mohamed Ali Samater, from the Tumul Clan.²³³ Traditionally, the Tumul clan-family worked as smiths and shoemakers.²³⁴ As a result, because of the junta's tough actions against tribalism the distance between society and state was very slim during the early 1970s. For the first time, society accepted the state's supremacy.

After he secured his absolute power, General Mohamed appointed his own elders (paid by the government). Furthermore, in order to revolutionize the society's political behavior, he established Revolutionary Orientation Centers from village level upwards. These Orientation Centers' major job was to propagate scientific socialism's way of life across the country. This task was entrusted to the Ministry of Information and National Guidance, headed by Ismail Ali Abokar (SRC member), who became the junta's propaganda chief. At the state level, the junta established Local Political Education Bureaus (LPEB) to carry the scientific socialist message to the people and used Somalia's print and broadcast media for the revolutionary movement. The Local Political

²³¹ In the Somali cultural context, paying diya i.e., was customary compensation for homicide paid to the family of the slain.

²³² Ismail, Ali Ismail. *Governance the Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 235.

²³³ Somalis had many minorities, often seen (wrongly) as second class citizens, which is against Islamic doctrine. In fact, regardless of his clan membership, General M. Ali Samatar was a professional military man and one of the finest intellectual among the SRC members.

²³⁴ Bridges, Peter; Safiirka: *An American Envoy*, 95.

Education Bureaus' major tasks were to organize all social events, including marriage ceremonies, which were then held at the Orientation Centers. The SRC's Chairman, General Mohamed, presided over these ceremonies from time to time and conducted benefits for the social restructuring of outdated evils associated with tribalism.²³⁵ Citizens were then obligated to attend these Orientation Centers and to study scientific socialism's political ideology and ways of life. The schools and the state working places were used to mobilize the youth, as well as women's and workers organizations. Nevertheless, Local Political Education Bureaus' efforts to revolutionize the society's way of life confronted so-called reactionary groups, including a few intellectuals and Sheikhs. In 1975, it was time to deal openly with these reactionary groups whose views opposed scientific socialism's way of life. The Sheikhs refused to accept General Mohamed's personal interpretation to mix up Islam and scientific socialism's views. Earlier in 1972, General Mohamed claimed that his government's commitment to scientific socialism was fully compatible with Islam and to his view:²³⁶ "The founders of Scientific Socialism were not against religion in particular but they exposed and disproved the reactionary elements of religion that dominate the sound reasoning of mankind and hence, hinder the progress of society." General Mohamed was trying to say there is no contradiction between authentic Islam and scientific socialism's political philosophy. However, the Sheikhs refused his interpretation, and in fact the Sheikhs' views were the real threat to his absolute power. As a final resort he labeled them reactionary elements within the state. This was a green light to signal the state security agencies to arrest the Sheikhs or at least to harass them. As generally understood in Somalia, Islam is a sword that cuts both ways when either misused or ignored. Furthermore, since Islam is the core worldview construct of society's faith and identity, it can readily be used to deceive. Throughout Somalia's

²³⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenges from Catastrophic to Renewal*, 39.

²³⁶ General Mohamed explained this in a 1972 speech aimed at young secular radicals. See I. M. Lewis on *A Modern History of Somalia*, Revised, Updated and Expanded, 219.

history, Islam's political philosophy was at the center. Both sides (General Mohamed and Sheikhs) used Islam as a brutal weapon against each other. The state-owned media was trying to attempt to interpret Islam in favor of General Mohamed's scientific socialist view; however, the Sheikhs responded aggressively in favor of the traditional Islamic view. This standoff injured General Mohamed's absolute power over the state's political affairs and society's way of life. In his early days, General Mohamed appeased the Sheikhs, and the Second Charter stated that Islam is the official religion of the state. However, D-day came after General Mohamed proclaimed the New Family Law within the scientific socialist context. On January 11 1975, General Mohamed declared that women had equal inheritance rights and accused the Sheikhs of ignoring women's right to equality. Furthermore, Mark Bradbury had this to say:²³⁷ "Women were empowered to take on greater political and economic roles outside the household, and amendments to the Family Law in 1975 enhanced their legal and economic rights, particularly in relation to inheritance." In 1975, General Mohamed's regime was enjoying enough power to maintain public order. A few months earlier General Mohamed signed his prestigious Friendship Treaty with the Soviets, who promised to supply more advanced weaponry and free food in exchange for military bases.

Therefore, the Sheikhs were his only opponents, and he openly adopted tough measures against them. In response, they accused him of marginalizing society's fight and Islamic traditions, especially those that sustained and maintained matters of heritage, marriage, child care and divorce. He fought back by rejecting the Sheikhs' view, and he said that the Islamic inheritance system is not only archaic and inapplicable to the modern world, but even worse, he accused the Prophet Mohamed (Peace upon Him) of not protecting women's rights during His lifetime. In accordance with Islamic tradition, when it comes to inheritance a girl's share or claim is worth half that of her brother. The matter

²³⁷Bradbury, Mark. *Becoming Somaliland*, 37.

got worst and some even claimed that the General had become an infidel or apostate²³⁸ because of his rejection of the entire Islamic system of inheritance. The Sheikhs' views were in line with the Holy Qur'an and the Surah Al Nisa, 4, verse 11, which says:²³⁹

CONCERNING [the inheritance of] your children, God enjoins (this) upon you; the male shall have the equal of two female shares; but if there are more than two females, they shall have two-thirds of what (their parents) leave behind; and if there is only one, she shall have one-half thereof. God (thus) directs you as regards your children's (inheritance): to the male, a portion equal to that of two females.

It is clear that the Sheikhs aligned with the Holy Qur'an; therefore, General Mohamed's anger pushed him to order their arrests and trial by the National Security Court for treason. The National Security Court found them guilty and sentenced them to death by firing squad in Mogadishu on January 23, 1975. Hundreds fled, massive numbers were imprisoned and ten sheikhs were executed because of their opposition to General Mohamed's Family Law, and their names were²⁴⁰ Sheikh Ali Hassan Warsame, Sheikh Mohamed Said Hirse, Sheikh Ahmed Sheikh Mohamed, Sheikh Ali Jama' Musse, Sheikh Esse Hassan Ahmed, Sheikh Adam Ali Musse, Sheikh Musse Yussuf, Sheikh Osman Jama Mohamed, Sheikh Ahmed Liban, and Sheikh Yassin Elmi Awil. To execute Sheikhs was a vital mistake by the junta, creating a rift between the state and society. Since then, the state belonged to the junta. The public deserted the state.

Therefore, January 23, 1975 was a horrific day that marked General Mohamed's misrule. The Sheikhs' moral legitimacy rested largely on their semi-independent status that filled the gap between the Islam and tradition. Therefore, and according to Sheik Ali Mohamoud's view,²⁴¹ the execution of these Sheikhs deeply affected society's loyalty to the state and initiated a grave divergence between the state and society. The people never trusted General Mohamed's political slogans and accused him of murdering

²³⁸ Although General Mohamed embraced socialism and glorified Marxist's philosophy, he never publically embraced atheism as an alternative to Islam.

²³⁹ The Message of the Qur'an, Translated and Explained by Muhammad Asad, London: Dar al-Andalus, Gibraltar, 1980, 103.

²⁴⁰ Aroma, Abdulqadir. Sababihii Burburka Soomaaliya, Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Zafar Sdn Bhd, 2005, 96.

²⁴¹ Sheikh Ali Mohamud (religious and Islamic scholar, interviewed, December 12, 2012).

innocent fellow Muslims in order to appease his atheist Soviet patrons. In short, scientific socialism failed to produce a progressive society as promised by the military ruler General Mohamed.

3.4.4. The Soviet Style: Socialism Economic Model

As mentioned earlier, on 21 Oct. 1970, General Mohamed said:²⁴² “We are convinced that the only way to solve our problems is scientific socialism.” Therefore, Somalia’s economic policy must to fall in line with scientific socialism in order to achieve one of the three pivotal objectives, society’s well-being. For the economic side, Abdullah A. Mohamud said:²⁴³ The declared objective of the socialist government was to engineer a society based on justice and equality, and the development ideology of the regime was a greater self-reliance, which aimed to achieve economic independence.” The regime’s main instrument to apply socialist’s economic model was to nationalize the Italians’ properties and to accuse them of representing capitalist institutions (which in fact they were). His decrees were absolute, whereby any decree (via Radio Mogadishu) was enough to nationalize everything. Hence, he straight away attacked the Italians’ economic ties with local elites, particularly previous governments’ elites. He discredited their economic policies by saying they were formulated to loot public funds, which was indeed true. He claimed that all free markets and private enterprise were nothing except capitalist institutions, and that to free his country he must destroy all capitalist tools, institutions and facilities. However, nobody debated General Mohamed’s so-called New Economic Policy, and if anything it was limited to the junta’s members. He consequently desired to withdraw Italy’s inherited free market system in favor of the removal of wealth from bourgeois hands. His aim was to eliminate capitalism and employ scientific socialism

²⁴² See Peter Glendenning on the Somalian Revolution, 54.

²⁴³ Mohamud, Abdullah A. State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa, 92.

(centralism) as the state's economic model in order to eradicate poverty. The regime's final goal was to interfere with the state's financial and banking systems, and therefore in 1970s Somalia witnessed a dramatic change to its financial system. In line with scientific socialism's economic policy, four foreign commercial banks were nationalized on May 7, 1970, with a view to improving the performance of the banking system for national economic development and to permit more effective control over foreign exchange.²⁴⁴ These nationalized banks included the Bank of Rome, the Bank of Italy, Bank of Napoli and the Bank Port Said (Egypt's investment bank), and in fact these four banks belonged to Italy's financial system. Furthermore, he also nationalized on May 7, 1970 a sugar mill at Giohar belong to SNAI²⁴⁵ (National Industrial Agricultural Company).²⁴⁶ In a while, General Mohamed also nationalized the Italo-Somalia Electricity Company, the insurance companies, and the oil distribution and operating companies. In fact, the bourgeoisie never existed in Somalia except in Italy's banks and insurance companies. General Mohamed's excuse was the elimination of foreign banks' control of the economy. To show his readiness to eradicate the foreign banks' control of the economy, he increased the Somali Central Bank's power to control the state's financial regulations, particularly the Hard Currency's Exchange Rate. For foreign currencies, including the U.S. dollar, the Central Bank set its own rates so that black-market exchanges became serious crimes. For example, currency trafficking became punishable by 15 to 20 years in prison. General Mohamed's major argument was that every state has a right to control its assets. His basic assumption simply was that since the Soviets had state-owned and centralized economic policies and facilities that had allowed them to send a satellite to the moon, Somalia could and must do the same. Because of these

²⁴⁴ See Somalia Today, Banks and Banking System, 127.

²⁴⁵ S.N.A.I stands for Societa Agricola Italo-Somalal.

²⁴⁶ Production capacity: 50.000 t/ year, Staff: 1800 normally, 5500 at period of activities. For more details see Commission of the European Communities, Conditions for the Setting Up of Industrial Undertakings: Somalia. The Report published on June 1974. See page 22. Available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/34430/1/A379.pdf>. (accessed on May 23, 2013).

simplistic economic views, he was issuing decrees overnight. These sudden policies were creating more economic problems, and John Markakis has this to say:²⁴⁷ “These affected foreign trade as the state took over the import of cereals, fuel, medicine, films, and (some time later) the export of bananas, hides and skins.” The Italians who nationalized their properties went back to their home; however, there was no alternative mechanism to fill the gap. Yes, the Italian were making a profit at the expense of the Somali people, but they were also providing some needed services, including electricity, fuel, medicine, and exporting Somalia’s banana, hides and skins.

Internally, General Mohamed took further actions against so-called local bourgeois’ exploitation; therefore, the regime adopted price controls and various legislative instruments to fix prices for basic products and livestock in order to make food less expensive. To control daily life, the regime was increasing his power to control everything, including rental rates, the flow of money, and foreign exchange.

General Mohamed established a state-owned Agricultural Development Corporation to control the local agricultural sector and, according to Abdi I. Samatar:²⁴⁸ “A marketing tactic (referring to A.D.C) imposed price controls and mandatory deliveries of rice and other crops.” The impact of this policy resulted in high prices and effectively stopped the expansion of rice cultivation. The peasants who were already cultivating the crop abandoned it altogether within two years. Within a few years, General Mohamed’s economic policy was failing. He had accused the local bourgeoisie of exploitation, despite the fact that the bourgeoisie never existed in Somalia. Therefore, the areas most affected were the agricultural and livestock sectors. Their product prices were determined by the state rather than the market. The net profit from production became

²⁴⁷Markakis, John. *Radical Military Regimes in the Horn of Africa*, 25.

²⁴⁸Samatar, Abdi I. *The Somali Challenges: From Catastrophe to Renewal*, 78.

less than the original investment; therefore, no incentive remained for farmers to continue farming. In fact, society perceived the state's pricing policy as oppression. From village to village trade became a crime, and security checkpoints were set up across the country in order to stop inter-village trading. This policy was not only against society's well-being but in fact created the culture of aid dependency.

Consequently, it was not surprising that the Central Bank's international credit rating was extremely low. Since the military regime nationalized all foreign companies' properties, including banks, insurance, and the energy sector, foreign currencies and food shortages were inevitable. Indeed, General Mohamed's hasty economic policy was against his people's way of life, and according to Peter Bridges:²⁴⁹ "General Mohamed's strengths never included a good understanding of economics. His Soviet advisors were encouraging scientific socialism, which in its early years enjoyed the support of many educated Somalis. By putting a lid on market prices, he seriously discouraged farm production, especially in central Somalia, which produced considerable amounts of sorghum and other crops." Another problem was that when any food shortage arose in the country because of General Mohamed's mismanagement, the Soviets were ready to supply free food. The Soviets purposely were covering up his hasty policies for geopolitical interests. The Soviets' main concern was to achieve their national interests. For many years, the Soviets' free food including free wheat, barley and cooking oil, consequently ruined Somalia's political independence. In reality, General Mohamed's scientific socialism as an economic model caused much problems and confusion and it was not easy to the ordinary Somali man to differentiate between the bourgeois and socialist economic models. Neither capitalism nor socialism had ever been part of the Somali way of life. Therefore, socialism as an economic model failed to achieve society's well-being as one

²⁴⁹ Bridges, Peter. Safiirka: An American Envoy, 99.

of the state's three pivotal goals. However, this study notes that a lack of primary data related to Somalia's economic record prevents us from assessing properly (in terms of statistics) scientific socialism's economic measures and negative impacts. Income-based measures such as state budgetary records and per capita income are unavailable for the two decades in question, and all state documents, including those from the Ministry of National Planning and Central Bank, were taken by criminals or purposely destroyed by the General's regime's officers prior to his disintegration in 1991. However, Luigi Pestalozza had this to say:²⁵⁰ "In the 1970s, Somalia was one of the most backward of all African nations with an annual average per capita income of 50 dollars, among the poorest in the world." Furthermore, Abdullah A. Mohamoud quoted from D. Latin and Said Samater:²⁵¹ "In terms of economic output, there was only a marginal difference between Somalia under the socialist regime and under the previous civilian regime. As a slogan scientific socialism evokes a vision of a major Soviet role and Soviet-style economic policies. The reality in Somalia does not quite stand up to this image."²⁵² It would therefore be wrong to conclude that scientific socialism led Somalia out of economic poverty." Therefore, to apply socialist's economic model to a nomadic society (like Somalia) was a great mistake committed by the Somali military ruler and his Soviet advisors.

3.4.5. The Soviet Style: One-Party System

As mentioned earlier, in 1970 General Mohamed abolished all political parties and promised to conduct an impartial election in the future. He devoted himself to establishing a progressive society through scientific socialism's political principles. Earlier he promised

²⁵⁰Pestalozza, Luigi. *The Somalian Revolution*, 36.

²⁵¹ Mohamud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 93.

²⁵²Ottaway, Marina. *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa*, New York: Published by Praeger publishers, 1982, 72.

to establish a one-party system in order to avoid a proliferation of tribal parties similar to those that had plagued civilian governments. To achieve this political goal, he set up a National Public Relations Office (NPRO) in 1972 and renamed the National Political Office (NPO) in 1974. The National Political Office was under General Mohamed's direct control. Moreover, the NPO utilized the state's political instruments, including the newspapers and Radio Mogadishu and security facilities to establish a wide-reaching network of Orientation Centers across the country. To fulfill his early promise to establish a one-party political system, in 1976, under Soviet advice, it was a suitable time to set up a Soviet-style socialist party to replace the National Political Office. As a result, on July 1, 1976, General Mohamed dissolved the SRC's political supremacy in order to establish the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) with civilian advisers, heads of ministries, and other prominent figures.²⁵³ The Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party came through a metamorphosis of the National Political Office. Its founding congress included about 3,000 members from the National Political Office's representatives, as well as its military and security branches, all of whom were nominated by the regional governors.²⁵⁴ With acclamation, the congress elected General Mohamed as its Secretary-General. As the star of this new period, the military ruler changed from military to civilian attire and congratulated the public on the end of military rule. He then proclaimed that Supreme Revolutionary Council members had relinquished state power to their beloved people. In other words, the SRSP (representing the beloved people) replaced the SRC. Thus, on July 1, 1976, the former Supreme Revolutionary Council Chairman officially became Somalia's President. In fact, the new party included all eighteen active Supreme Revolutionary Council members from the 1969 military coup, plus an additional fifty-six contemporary members, mainly but not exclusively drawn

²⁵³ Samatar, Ahmed I. *Somalia: A Country Study*, 45.

²⁵⁴ Markakis, John. *Radical Military Regimes in the Horn of Africa*, 25.

from military personnel.²⁵⁵ The Central Committee of 74 included 20 generals, 12 colonels and a solitary woman.²⁵⁶ The new party had Five Politburo Members: Secretary General (General Mohamed), General Mohamed Ali Samater, General Hussein K. Afrah, General Ismail Ali Abubakr, and General Ahmed Suleiman Abdulla. This Politburo is what formed the Supreme Revolutionary Council's core members. In reality, nothing had changed except for two things: (i) the name; (ii) former Supreme Revolutionary Council members now began to dress as civilians rather than military men. The civilian ministries and many public figures were also included in the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party's body, but in fact, the state's affairs were controlled by General Mohamed and his inner circle. The party's members were merely performing the role of a rubber stamp and never rejected General Mohamed's initiatives. In many ways, General Mohamed was trying to control the state's politics via the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. He enjoyed absolute power. The party members had to subscribe to its (his) belief system and rigorously defend the correctness of the party's ideology. It was a principal obligation for party members to advocate socialist ideology, which they claimed was fully compatible with Islam and the traditional Somali way of life, especially the sharing of wealth. In fact, it was a one-man show and nothing more than a formula for tyranny. The military ruler destroyed the country's constitution with a militaristic mind. He established his own Soviet-style party, the so-called Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party, as a political instrument to legitimize his political tyranny. The main propose of the socialist party was to use the party's platform as a rubber stamp for his interests. According to John A. Jacobson:²⁵⁷ The primary function of any political party is to win an election, therefore, if no elections are held, no political parties can exist". The socialist party was a copy-and-paste from the Soviets' political system. Socialism failed to produce

²⁵⁵As mentioned earlier, 2 generals were sentenced to death in 1971 by General Mohamed, 3 were dismissed and 2 generals Ali Matan Hashi and Mohamud Mire passed away naturally. Thus, after 7 years, in 1976, the SRC's members were only 18.

²⁵⁶Markakis, John. *Radical Military Regime*, 25.

²⁵⁷ John A. Jacobson. *An Introduction to Political Science*, Washington: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998, 273.

a progressive society.

3.5. The Failing Military Rule (1979-1991) as the U.S.'s Client

General Mohamed's second period wasn't a good period for the Somali people. The Ethiopian and Somalia war's effects weakened General Mohamed's leadership credibility, and he adopted new strategies in order to survive. Internally, he revived the colonial strategy of dividing the society along tribal lines and classifying the groups into friendly and enemy clans. In his first period (1969-1978), General Mohamed promised to root out tribalism. He failed to uphold his promise to eliminate tribalism and in fact, in his second period (1978-1991) he was openly relying on the three clans of Marehen, Ogaden and Dhulmahante, all sub-clans belonging to General Mohamed's large Daarod tribe.

Externally he had to sell Somalia's geopolitical location. Thanks to the Cold War's nature, Somalia's geopolitical location in 1979 was still sellable, and the U.S. was ready to buy it for the sake of the balance of power. Broadly speaking, after Somalia's war with Ethiopia, Somalia suffered many problems in different sectors and levels. The Somali people were hopeless. Greater Somalia failed during the Somalia and Ethiopian war, and in terms of diplomatic prestige, Somalia was something of a pariah state among friendly nations. For the economy Somalia's Central Bank went bankrupt. The army lost the war against Ethiopia and was almost decaying. The Somalis were blaming each other. As a result, the symptoms and characteristics of a failing state were clear, and in fact Somalia was in process of going from a weak state to a failing state and Rotberg I. Rober says:²⁵⁸ "Nation-states fail when they are consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants. Their governments lose credibility, and the continuing nature of the particular nation-state itself becomes questionable and illegitimate in the hearts and minds of its citizens." This statement is very

²⁵⁸Rotberg, Robert I. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004, 1.

true. In Somalia the state's vital institutions were decaying, and no economic, social, or political developments were taking place. In short, chaos ensued. Internal security institutions were failing to maintain public order. During the Somali and Ethiopia war a large numbers of small arms fell into the wrong hands; to disrupt domestic order in fact Ahmed I. Samatar grasped the point:²⁵⁹ "Bearing the triple burden of defeat in the war and the accompanying national humiliation, an economy on the skids, and a lack of superpower patronage, Somalia viciously turned inward." General Mohamed's decrees under these conditions were useless and his regime was in free fall. His relationship with the U.S. was something like a temporary marriage. In order to survive he adopted the brutal policy arresting or killing his political opponents. Hence, many intellectuals, journalists, army officers, businessmen, artists, Sheikhs and many more went into self-exile to escape his oppressions. These self-exiled elements criticized his misrule via the international media, including the well-respected BBC (Somali Language Section),²⁶⁰ which openly accused him of purposely destroying the state, but nobody heeded their warning that Somalia was going to fail.

On the other hand, the regime's friendly clans were freely plundering the state's properties, and according to United States of America's Ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges:²⁶¹ "By the 1980s, Siad Barre (General Mohamed) had put much of Somalia's export trade in the hands of family members and cronies." His divide-and-control strategy and favoritism (to friendly clans) split the society into two major groups. He was opening a so-called 'Pandora's Box', and in fact his colonial strategy of divide-and-control caused a lot of problems. There were those who were in line with his misrule and those who refused to bow to his misrule. All of this was in addition to

²⁵⁹ Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenges*, 120.

²⁶⁰ Almost all Somalis who had a shortwave radios listened to the BBC Somali broadcast. See: Peter Bridge's comments on BBC, 105.

²⁶¹ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 99.

widespread unemployment, a high cost of living, and pervasive criminal activity. In every aspect Somalia's state was failing in the United States of America's eyes, and there was no one to ask General Mohamed to stop this brutal policy against his people.

3.5.1. Road Map to Total Failure

Beside General Mohamed's lack of political legitimacy and Greater Somalia's failure, numerous internal factors were pushing Somalia into total state failure. This study refers to factors such as the abortive coup, the army's disintegration, economic decay, elites' factionalism, and tribal militarism. These internal factors taken together contributed to the failure of Somalia and in fact, during General Mohamed's second period, Somalia's state was at war with itself.

3.5.2. Army's Decay and Abortive Coup

Greater Somalia's failure created many problems in Somalia from 1978 to 1991. Collectively Greater Somalia's failure and the abortive coup of April 9, 1978 pushed Somalia's national army to disintegrate. Generally speaking, if political stability and economic well-being are the lifeblood of the state's stability, then the army is its cardiovascular system. In Somalia's case, since its independence on April 14, 1960, Somalia's army had a constructive professional doctrine aligned with a very clear political aspiration and purpose: to achieve Greater Somalia. This purpose directed Somalia's defense and foreign policy affairs for years and granted supremacy over other institutions' needs. Therefore, the army's top commanders needed only to show their readiness to fight for "Greater Somalia" in order to guarantee enough resources. Since 1960, Greater Somalia was a doctrine and instrument that allowed the army to get ready to regain missing territories. As a direct result, the army remained prepared for its national duty. However, after its failure to achieve its primary goal, in defeat and disarray (during

the war in 1977-1978) the army's doctrine and purpose of existence became meaningless. The army's top commanders were not in a proper position to justify demanding more resources. In addition, General Mohamed's opponents accused him of using the foolish attack on Ethiopia as a ruse in order to divert people's attention from his misrule. Somali analysts believed that the elites' utilizing the imagination of Pan-Somalism as a core value to maintain their political power, and according to Ruth Iyob:²⁶² "Pan-Somalism became a domestic and foreign policy that allowed the country to fall prey to the authoritarian rule of a strongman like Siad Barre (General Mohamed)." Hence, General Mohamed purposely used Greater Somalia to brainwash and mislead his people. Therefore, after the war the army became aimless. Additionally, General Mohamed and his top commanders failed to reframe any acceptable doctrine that might have revived the army's status. So due to the army's dissatisfaction with the regime's lack of vital doctrine, a group of military officers attempted a coup in April 1978 but failed. The coup attempt was followed by mass arrests and executions of numerous members of the military and police force. The coup leaders were Commanders of the 26th Army Corps, Colonel Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed and his kinsman, the Former Commander of the 60th Army Corps, Colonel Ahmed Sheikh Osman, better known as 'Colonel Ciro'. The coup was initially launched in the capital, Mogadishu. Units led by Colonel Ahmed Sheikh Osman and his colleague seized a few strategic military bases and arrested many high-ranking officers including the Commander of the army, General Omar Hajib Mohamed, among others.²⁶³ Nevertheless, General Mohamed used other units of the army to put the rebellion down within hours. The well-circulated propaganda of the coup's leaders promised to establish a broad-based government that would unite a people that had been systematically divided by General Mohamed. After

²⁶² Iyob, Ruth. *The Foreign Policy of the Horn: the Clash between the Old and New*, 116.

²⁶³ The army's commander, General Omar Hajji Mohamed was associated with the regime's clan Marehan; a medium clan belonging to the larger Darod tribe.

the aborted coup and a short trial by the National Security Court, 17 higher officers, including the Former Commander of the 60th Army Corps, Col. Ahmed Sheikh Osman were convicted of treason and publicly executed on October 26, 1978 by firing squad in Mogadishu. The list included 1. Col. Mohamud Sheikh Osman, (2), Major Said Mohamed Jama (3), Said Jama' Nur, (4), Capt. Abdisalam Elmi Warsame, (5), Capt. Ibrahim Mohamud Hirsi, (6), Capt. Abdullah Hassan Nur, (7), Capt. Abdullah Hassan Farah, (8), Capt. Mohamed Ahmed Yusuf, (9), Capt. Bashir Abshir Isse, (10), Capt. Abdulkadir Geele Omar, (11), Capt. Abdulrahman Ma'alim Bashir, (12), Capt. Abdi Ugas Osman, (13), Capt. Adam Warsame Yare, (14), Capt. Said Abdulle Gorod, (15), Capt. Abdiwahab Ahmed Hashi, (16), Farah Halwo and (17), the only civilian Abdi-Gaffar Warsame Yare. In addition, many businessmen, intellectuals and elders, including the well-known and traditional leader Hajji Musse Boqaor were locked up.²⁶⁴ Afterwards, domestic order deteriorated even further, mainly because the coup's leaders were mostly from the Majerteen clan and General Mohamed's collective punishment against them. The Majerteens are a very powerful clan family with prestigious political positions, including the Presidency and Premiership. Therefore, they were everywhere in the state's institutions, and to punish them collectively was a great mistake committed by the regime. A large number of military and police officers, including the Former Police Chief, General Abdullah Sheikh Mohamud (and better known as "Matukade") as well as other public figures were wrongly arrested or relieved of duty solely on the basis of their clan identity. Although these officers failed to overthrow General Mohamed, for the first time they had challenged his misrule. Somalia's Former Premier Ali Khalief Galaydh has this to say:²⁶⁵ "Many of the political elite, particularly the generals, who were extremely demoralized by the humiliating defeat in the war, directly challenged the top

²⁶⁴For more details see Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, *Halgan iyo Hagardaamo*, 114-116.

²⁶⁵ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 128.

ruling leadership and demanded representative government and responsible leadership.”

The army’s dissatisfaction and the attempted coup were key factors that pushed the army to disintegrate. In effect, it threw both military and civilian life into chaos by revealing an elite power struggle along clan/tribal lines against the oppressor. It also represented the first time a single clan in military uniform attempted to take over the state’s political power, as the majority of those involved were associated with the Majerteen clan, a powerful clan belonging to the larger Darod tribe, which included even the General himself. This predominantly Majerteen military coup went against the people’s common stand. Nevertheless, General Mohamed’s response was to accuse them of trying to establish a government dominated by them, despite the fact that he and his clansmen had done likewise. Other major clans or tribes including the larger Hawiye and Isaq groups, delegitimized the coup by claiming its intention was to replace the Marehen clan with the Majerteen clan. The problem in General Mohamed’s view was that the national army could not be trusted anymore. He had to set up his own army in line with his own kinsmen. So, although the coup leaders failed to achieve their political goal (regime change), they succeeded in dividing the army into pro-regime and anti-regime factions, which in turn reduced both the army’s quality and discipline. Consequently, General Mohamed could no longer trust the national army and because of this relied more on the MOD elements and additionally his sub-clan Marehan against others. He thenceforth covertly relied on the Marehan, Ogaden, and Dhulmahante clans. Many people ask why he selected these sub-clans among others. The answer simply is that General Mohamed’s father belonged to the Marehan clan, his mother’s clan was Ogaden and his son-in-law (General Ahmed Sulaien, member of Supreme Revolutionary Council and most feared of the National Security Service) belonged to the Dhulmahante clan. He was releasing (from the army and police force) non-friendly clans’ officers and recruiting more officers from friendly clans. As the level of state

insecurity increased, General Mohamed deactivated more non-MOD elements in the army and staffed more elements from MOD clans. In 1981 the armed forces had 50,000 personnel. By 1990, that number had increased to 65,000.²⁶⁶ In fact, these 65,000 men's primary duty and vision of serving remained unclear. The army's condition was as predicted by Steven Metz, who wrote:²⁶⁷ "For a while, most Third World nation-states will retain conventional militaries to diligently watch for foreign invaders that never come. Eventually, these armies will decay and disband." In Somalia's case, the best-equipped army in Sub-Saharan Africa gradually declined, even though its budget increased annually due to its larger size. However, nobody knew precisely how much the Ministry of Defense's spent during the 1980s, but according to the Department of State, the central government's 1984 budget was USD 380 million. A year earlier defense had accounted for 29% of government expenditures.²⁶⁸ The regime's main concern since the coup was how to establish its own army from the General's friendly clans, or so-called MOD. Hence, the Ministry of Defense blatantly worked with a bias that favored MOD officers. Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed said:²⁶⁹ "The regime transformed the trained national into tribe army and systematically destroyed the army's reputation." The favoritism disaffected non-MOD elements, and many well-trained officers were released because of suspicion. To fill the gap, the regime promoted underqualified men from MOD clans, which further undermined the army's reputation. The military apparatus, therefore, offers an excellent example of institutional decay as a result of state-sponsored patrimony.²⁷⁰ Historically, Somalia's Ministry of Defense was the state's most virtuous and prestigious institution.

²⁶⁶See Somalia; A Country Studies -Chapter 5, National Security. Available at http://www.mongabay.com/history/Somalia/somalia-national_security.html (accessed 12 Nov. 2011).

²⁶⁷ Steven Metz. *America in the Third World: Strategic Alternative and Military Implication*, published May 20, 1994. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB338.pdf> (accessed 21 October 2010).

²⁶⁸Somalia-U.S diplomatic Relationship and Treaties: Available at <http://www.statedepartment.gov.net>. (accessed March 2, 2010).

²⁶⁹Ahmed, Abdullah Yusuf. *Halgan iyo Hagardaamo*: 107.

²⁷⁰Compagnon, Daniel. *Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism, Refugee*, Vol. 12, No. 5, (Nov-Dec 1992), 9.

After the coup everything changed, and from 1978 to 1991 the Ministry of Defense's senior and sensitive positions were entrusted exclusively to the regime's children, son-in-laws and other relatives. At worst, General Mohamed and his MOD elements murdered or arrested their opponents as if the state was their own. The United States of America's Ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges said:²⁷¹ "He (General Mohamed after the coup) turned more repressive, more corrupted, and more centered on the interests of his own Marehan clan and the allied clans of the Darod group." After the coup of 1979, almost all of the army's top-ranking officers belonged to General Mohamed's associated clans. Over the years 1960-1990, the national army had one hundred and thirteen generals, sixty-five of whom belonged to General Mohamed's Darod tribe. All security agencies, including military, police, paramilitary, and National Security Services, had mostly MOD kinship commanders as well. For example, the army's Commander General Aden Abdullah Nur, the National Police Forces' Commander General Aden Abdi Du'ale, Pre-Military Commander General Abdulrahman M. Hussein, Air Force's Commander General Dhuudhi and at one time the Navy's Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman, all were associated with the regime's friendly clan of the MOD.²⁷² Accordingly, the regime's association with MOD clans had become institutionalized; therefore, such a divide-and-control strategy posed a serious threat to Somalia's state existence. As a direct result of this bias towards the MOD clans, well-trained military officers from non-MOD clans left for Ethiopia to form a clan-based militia for the purpose of ending General Mohamed's misrule.

Generally speaking, during General Mohamed's second period (1978-1991) the state's component institutions were not properly functioning, and Laurent Magesa had

²⁷¹ Bridges, Peter; Safiirka: An American Envoy, 99.

²⁷²For more extensive discussion see: Abdulqadir Aroma's Sababihii Burburka Somaliya, 279.

this to say:²⁷³ “When these components fail to work properly on their own or in coordination with one another, we have the conditions of a failing state.” Except for tribal bias, no common position remained viable amongst these institutions after the demise of Greater Somalia and the attempted coup. Ironically, the more the General kept favoring his friendly clans, the more the excluded elite abandoned the state in favor of their clans. The excluded and non-friendly elites simply went to Ethiopia to establish their own clan-based militia and during General Mohamed’s second period (1978-1991), the state’s prestigious institutions, including the Ministry of Defense, collapsed. In mid-1980, the army’s units were selling their weapons, and in the capital at nighttime it was possible to see civilian men carrying their own AK-4s7. Likewise. the gun shooting was normal to hear. The police force also was selling its equipment, including guns and ammunition, because of the regime’s failure to pay them enough money to survive. Normally, once the state’s security institution disintegrated, soon other state’s vital organs collapsed as well. If there is no security, there is no state at all.

3.5.3. Economic Decay

In 1980s, Somalia’s economy was very weak; however, non-filtered economic models’ applications were very vital. As mentioned earlier, General Mohamed applied a non-filtered socialist economic model in the early 1970s that caused abject poverty, and again in the 1980s he applied a non-filtered, capitalist model. Therefore, these sudden changes from the Italian economic model to the Soviet model and then to the U.S.’s economic model greatly contributed to the economic failure of Somalia. General Mohamed’s hastily economic models and non-filtered economic advice from global powers were pushing Somalia’s failing economy toward total collapse. In fact, the Somali shilling’s devaluation

²⁷³Magesa, Laurent. Failing States in Africa. News from Africa, July 2002. Available at http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_861.html. (accessed 13 Nov. 2011).

and uncontrollable inflations destabilized the nation. The economists all agree that economic stability and food security are key factors to every state's domestic order. If there's no food security, there's no stability, and even the state's political sovereignty will be in question. In fact, during the late 1980s Somalia's external doors were open to everybody. Victor Olorunsol and Dan Muhwezi describe such a case:²⁷⁴ "An unstable country leaves itself open to manipulation by third parties and foreign governments, which then became Somalia's perennial estate." For the period of General Mohamed changed his economic model (tied with the U.S.) in favor of the free market by claiming that the state should not control the market. He was denouncing his earlier economic model of socialism. He was adjusting his economic policy with the West. As a result, in 1979-1991, Somalia's economic policy was in line with the United States of America's economic model for foreign aid. The regime claimed this new economic model would bring more foreign direct investment. Surprisingly he never compensated those whose properties were nationalized in the early 1970s, during socialism. The U.S. and other Western countries were using their foreign aids as instruments to redirect Somalia's economic policies in favour of their free markets. In the early 1980s, Somalia and the U.S. signed an agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation in Mogadishu on October 13, 1981.²⁷⁵ Then, the U.S. encouraged Somalia to sign an agreement with the World Bank/IMF for more foreign aid. In fact, this encouragement to sign an agreement with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was a conditionality agreement,²⁷⁶ meaning that the U.S. says, I sign with you (Somalia) an Economic and Technical Cooperation with you, but you should sign an

²⁷⁴ Olorunsol, Victor A. & Dan Muhwezi. *Security and Stability Implications of Ethnicity and Religious Factors*; Brue E. Arlinghaus (ed); *African Security Issues: Sovereignty, Stability, and Solidarity*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, 141.

²⁷⁵ See US-Somalia's Treaty No. 33 UST 3975.

²⁷⁶ An agreement to loan IMF funds on condition that certain government policies are adopted is called an IMF conditionality agreement; implementation of these conditions is referred to as a structural adjustment program. See: Joshua S. Goldstein & Jon C. Pevehouse. *International Relations*, 488.

agreement with the World Bank/IMF. This study notes that Somalia was in no position to bargain during the discussions between Somalia and World Bank/IMF representatives, and in fact Somalia's position was near prostration. The World Bank and IMF's economic reforming policy included the provision that Somalia should apply a so-called Structural Adjustment Program. As a result, the U.S. pressured Somalia to accept the World Bank/IMF's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) measures. These institutions' main goal (as they stated at the beginning) was to reform Somalia's economic model and policies. To transform Somalia's decaying economy from scientific socialism model to free market model wasn't an easy job. Initially they asked the government to reduce its spending, devalue its local currency and liberalize its economic system. These proposed measures were pre-conditions to foreign aid from the U.S., and Somalia had little room to manoeuvre. Therefore, Somalia opened up its doors to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to apply the so-called Structural Adjustment Program.²⁷⁷ Thus, 1980 saw the beginning of a decade of substantial foreign aid from the U.S (direct) and loans (indirectly) through the World Bank/IMF. However, the World Bank and IMF's ill advice were not less harmful than the earlier Soviets' non-filtered advice. Again, the U.S's free food and the World Bank/IMF's loans were destroying the local agricultural production. As a result, the free food supplied by the USAID was weakening local agriculture as well. The World Bank/IMF's representatives pressured Somalia's Central Bank to devalue local currency. These two factors (free food and local currency devaluation), together increased the cost of living and finally led to uncontrollable inflation. Since then, Somalia was pressured to give up its economic sovereignty. George Ayittey had to say:²⁷⁸ "Even though Somalia received a substantial amount of foreign aid, its Gross National Product Per Capita

²⁷⁷ In fact, Somalia Joined the IMF on August 31, 1962. However, made a deal with IMF after its friendship with the U.S. in 1979-1990.

²⁷⁸ For more details see Ayittey, George B. N. *The Somali Crisis*, March 28, 1994.

grew at a miserable 0.3 percent a year, earning Somalia the title, the Graveyard of Aid. It declined by 2.7 percent per capita over the 1975-80 period and a further 1.3 percent from 1980-1985.” By 1987, consumer prices had risen 1,000 percent over their 1980 level. It is clear that the poor advice offered by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was not much different from the Soviets’ advice in 1970-1980. Within three decades Somalia’s weak and decaying economy experienced three different sources of bad advice: in 1960-1970, under Italy’s influence; in 1970-1980 the Soviets; and lastly from 1989-1990 under the U.S. In fact, history shows that both non-filtered models (socialist and capitalist) were a bad fit for Somalia’s economy.

3.5.4. Elite Factionalism

Several factors pushed Somalia into total state failure; however, internally, the elites’ factionalism is very vital. In 1980-1990, the failing state’s characteristics and indicators, including the regimes inability to control society effectively and institutional weakness, were observable and Alan Collin had this to say:²⁷⁹ “Weak states possess one or more of the following characteristics: infrastructural incapacity, evidence of weak institutions and the inability to penetrate and control society effectively or enforce state policies; lack of coercive power; and failure to achieve or maintain a monopoly on the instruments of violence.” In fact General Mohamed’s lack of coercive power and his failure to monopolize violence was a crucial threat to the state’s image and society’s daily life. As he faced all forms of insecurity, his main objective was to protect his own regime. The ideas of the state was missing, and according to Muthiah Alagappa:²⁸⁰ “ If the idea of the state, however, lacks broad societal consensus, then the physical base of the state and its organizing ideology and the legitimacy of the incumbent regime are frequently contested

²⁷⁹ Collins, Alan. *Contemporary Security Studies*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 432.

²⁸⁰ Alagappa, Muthia. *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons From Thailand*, Masschsetts: Aubur House Publishing Company Dover, 1987, 5.

and internal security became a primary concern.” The above statement is true, and General Mohamed’s primary concern became his personal safety rather than of the state. In order to survive, he surrounded himself with MOD clans, recruiting these clans’ young men against others. Bjor Moller has this to say:²⁸¹ “Now (in 1980s) the positions of real power were primarily filled by the members of the Marrehan, Ogaden, and Dhulmante clans (MOD), combined with systematic attempts at eliminating the elite of the other clans.” He armed the MOD elements against others and even the US’s Ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges has to confess that he personally befriended one of MOD’s members and, according to him:²⁸² “My friend was part of a small circle of well-placed Daarod people who, as the president was informed, met to discuss ways to advance particular Daarod interests.” It is very clear that the U.S. was aware but failed to ask General Mohamed to stop his systematic marginalizing of non-MOD clans. To prove General Mohamed’s misrule, these government compositions are enough to show his favoritism toward his Daarod tribe. For example, the composition of the Somali government appointed on February 7, 1980 with 27 members and clan representatives was like this: the regime’s larger Daarod obtained 43%, Dir 23%, Hawiye 18%, Digul & Mirifle 0%, and others or small clans all together 16%. The Daarod’s proportion was even larger than that of the combined Hawiye and Dir. General Mohamed appointed another government on February 25 with 27 members, and again he allocated his tribe Daarod 43%, Hawiye 22%, Dir 15% Digil & Mirifle 8 and others 12%. General Mohamed’s last government, appointed on February 1, 1990 was not much different from the previous ones, and his large tribe Daarod went with 40%, Dir 19%, Hawiye 18%, Digil Mirifle 9% and others 14%.²⁸³ The U.S was an eyewitness but never asked him to stop this factionalism.

²⁸¹Moller, Bjor. *The Somali Conflicts: The Role of External Actors*, DIIS Report, March 2009, p. 10. Available at <http://www.DIIS.org>. (accessed 2 March 2011).

²⁸² Peter Bridges, *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 135.

²⁸³For more details see on Osman and Abdi-Wahid Haji’s *Clan, Sub-clan and Regional Representation in the Somali Government Organization from 1960-1990: Statistical Data and Finding* on these pages 70-74, 76-77 and 84-85

The U.S was closing its eyes because of the Cold War; the U.S. was not much interested in human rights and democracy. General Mohamed was dividing the society along tribal lines to preserve his power and sowing seeds of social disharmony. He used a Machiavellian strategy against his people, and M. M. Yahye has this to say:²⁸⁴ “Ex-military dictator President General Mohamed kept manipulating Somali clans, rewarding handsomely some and severely punishing others, in order to perpetuate his rule which lasted over 21 years.” This systematic marginalizing of non-friendly clans was pushing the entire society to form a clan militia against the state. The MOD members were in control of the state’s overall political and security structure such as the Army’s Commander, Pre-military and Police Commander, Regional Governors, Government Agencies’ Directors, and the Diplomatic Corps. They controlled the state’s affairs and by the mid-1980s, the artillery and tank units surrounding the capital were under General Mohamed’s relatives. In total, fifty percent of the police and army commanders in the regions and districts and eighty percent of military sectors and army divisions were Darood.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, the MOD elements were jailing, torturing and murdering a countless number of innocent people (watch this video: youtube.com on “*Waraysi Xassuqii Jasiira*” Jazeera Mascara on July 14, 1989”, by Colonel Ibrahim Ali).²⁸⁶ On July after midnight the unit from the 77th Legion, commanded by the regime’s son General Maslah, took away 47 men (Isaq clan) from their beds and gunned them down south of Mogadishu at the Jazeera Beach on July 7, 1989. These 47 men were gunned down by the order of Colonel Ahmed Nur Hassan (better known as Dhega-Bacayr) and Colonel Dierie Hirsi, both

²⁸⁴Yahye, Mahamod M. The Cancer in our Minds!. The Article Published by Somali online news (Puntland.com) Available at <http://www.Puntland.com/Englishnewspaper.phd/articles>.(accessed February 1, 2011).

²⁸⁵ Daniel Compognan. Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism, 13n.

²⁸⁶ Watch Ibrahim Ali Barre Guuled (better known Colonel Canjeex) interview by Abdirizak Osman Fadal on July 7, 2008, In Damascus, Syria. Colonel Ibrahim Ali is a commander of Second Regiment under the Command the 77th Legion led by the General Mohamed’s son General Maslah and he is a testimony to confess the 77th Legion’s commanders committed the crime to mascara innocent Isaq clan’s men at Jazeera Beach on July 7, 1989.

General Mohamed's close relatives.²⁸⁷ As the level of disaffection increased, a few men from the top joined the public in calls for reform. As usual, General Mohamed was upset with those calling for political reform and immediately arrested them. The arrested included two from his close kinsmen, specifically Mohammed A. Sheikh, a prominent politician and former Minister of Information and National Guidance, and General Omar Haji, former National Army Commandant. Even worse, he arrested a fellow former Supreme Revolutionary Council and Politburo Member, a Vice President and member of the Central Committee of the Somalia's Revolutionary Social Party, General Osmail Ali Abokar. In addition, he arrested former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Omar Arte; both dignitaries were from the Isaq clan. He moreover, arrested the eminent former Minister of the Ministry of Finance, Colonel Abdullah Warsame Nur, and former Mogadishu Governor and member of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Colonel Osman Mohamed Jelle, both of the Hawiye clan. These unnecessary arrests extended as well to Warsame Abdullahi Ali (Juguf) from the Majerteen clan, who died during detainment. All of these men were members of the Central Committee of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party led by General Mohamed himself. The jailing of these prominent politicians naturally created a greater atmosphere of fear and tension. By the mid-1980s, the oppressed clans' elites escaped to Ethiopia for training and arms in order to fight against this hated regime. Unexpectedly General Mohamed's doomsday arrived. He was involved in a road accident on May 23, 1986 and the Saudi Kingdom sent him a special aircraft to fly him to one of the Saudi hospitals in Riyadh. He remained in Saudi Arabia for treatment for almost 45 days. During this period, a number of questions arose among his inner circle at home, especially those who had been monitoring the old man's capacity to lead the country. The public was speculating over his successor. He returned home to resume his duties but in a fragile health condition, and according to

²⁸⁷For more information please visit at <http://ramaasnews.com> (accessed on December 12, 2015).

London's Arabic News "Al-Tadamun", speculation and rumors about his health increased to such an extent that press reports claimed he may be unable to continue the tasks of the Presidency.²⁸⁸ Therefore, the public was asking who would be the next President. General Mohamed at the time was in his late seventies or early eighties, and also had chronic diabetes.²⁸⁹ The public feared that a power struggle might start soon among the top men if the regime failed to appoint his successor. As expected, an open power struggle ensued at the top, particularly between a remnant of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) and the regime's close family members. His family held the state's key institutions, including defense and foreign affairs. Somalia's long-time Foreign Minister, Abdurrahman Jama Barre (General Mohamed's first cousin and half-brother) wanted to succeed; however, General Mohamed's eldest son, General Maslah Mohamed, saw himself as his father's successor.²⁹⁰ Yet again the regime's family was sub-divided into two military and civilian camps: The civilian elite were in line with Abdurrahman J. Barre, Somalia's Foreign Minister; and the military elite were in line with General Mohamed's eldest son, General Maslah Mohamed, a powerful man who commanded the 77th Legion. He was commanding a quarter of the national army with the best training and equipped with the most sophisticated weapons in the country. The 77th Legion was located around the capital, Mogadishu. The dreaded Red Beret Unit and other strong military intelligence groups all belonged to the 77th Legion. Additionally, the Supreme Revolutionary Council's elements joined the race and struggle gradually shifted between two factions: the constitutional elite and unconstitutional elite. The constitutionalists were led by four Politburo members from the Supreme Revolutionary Council, including General Mohamed's First Vice-President, Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Samatar; Second

²⁸⁸ See London's "AL-TADAMUN", Arabic News Paper, 30 May 1987, 8-11.

²⁸⁹ General Mohamed was born into a nomad family in the Ogaden region at a time when birth records were unknown there. However, he claimed that he might have been born sometime between 1912 and 1920. See Peter Bridges, *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 77.

²⁹⁰ For further details see Ismail Ali Ismail. *Governance: The Scourge and Hope of Somalia*, 269.

Vice-President, Major General Hussein Kulmiye; and longtime Head of the National Security Service, Generals Ahmad Suleiman Abdullah and Colonel Ahmad Mahmud Farah. The First Vice-President, Brigadier General Mohamed Ali and General Ahmed S. Abdallah hailed from the regime's larger Daarod tribe, while General Hussein and Colonel Ahmed belonged to the Hawiye and Isaq tribes. As General Mohamed's memory was weakened due to the accident, he failed to mediate among his men, which affected the state's political control. Likewise, the MOD also disagreed among themselves, and their inner circle then fell apart. The Ogaden clan left the MOD's political circle.²⁹¹ As a result, General Mohamed finally became powerless as the free-for-all progressed between previously allied clans—mainly from the Daarod tribe and others, particularly the Hawiye and Isaq.²⁹² As mentioned earlier, many elites from non-MOD had escaped to Ethiopia to end General Mohamed's misrule. Nevertheless, none of these had a national vision other than to end General Mohamed's misrule and frankly, the public did not expect much else except to divide the country into many pieces.

From 1979 to the 1990s, not even one meaningful governmental policy was put forth. The regime had revived tribalism as a means to acquire more power; however, the marginalized and excluded tribes adopted tribal militarism and armed themselves, which finally led Somalia into total political chaos. In conclusion, with all these mistakes happening, General Mohamed showed no desire to implement his early promises of a road map to democracy and free elections or to relinquish power. In 1969, General Mohamed and his cohort came to power with the promise of eliminating corruption, rebuilding the economy and social institutions, returning to genuine democratic

²⁹¹Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein (interviewed, October 21, 2011).

²⁹²Many Somalis believe General Mohamed favored his Darood tribe, however, he actually mistreated all tribes including Darood. He used Daroodism solely for his own political interests as he murdered and/or tortured many Daarod intellectuals who rejected his misrule.

governance, and a revival of the national purpose.²⁹³ However, he never attempted to realize these promises. During the more than 21 years of his rule, he stubbornly rejected his people's calls for political reform. He was relying on the Soviets and the U.S.'s financial, military and diplomatic support in exchange for military bases.

3.5.4.1. From State Militarism to Tribal Militiamen

Several factors pushed Somalia into total state failure; however, internally, tribal militia was very vital. In 1980-1991, internally, the regime's most serious threat came from the non-friendly tribes, particularly the Majreten from the Northeast Province, the Isaq from the Northwest Province and the Hawiye from the Central Province, including the Capital, Mogadishu. These clans' elites escaped to Ethiopia to fight back in order to end General Mohamed's misrule. The dissident flanks of major tribes came to believe that the use of force was the only way to end his misrule. In fact, General Mohamed's misrule and his favoritism toward MOD clans produced nothing except to increase society's discord, especially after he unleashed a massive military operation against non-MOD clans. The non-friendly clans' main purpose was to establish a clan-based militia in order to defend themselves. However, there was an unseen problem as observed by Daniel Compagnan, who said:²⁹⁴ "These organizations (the SSDF, SNM and USC), which claimed to be fighting against a dictatorship and for a democracy, had no clear vision of what should be done to establish such a regime and rebuild the country." These clan-based militants (SSDF, SNM and USC) would root out General Mohamed's brutal regime, but fail to establish a democratic political system in its place. To have a very clear vision and to ask what should be done after General Mohamed's fall was the main and missing point.

3.5.4.2. Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)

²⁹³ Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Porcupine Dilemma: Governance and Transition in Somalia*, 57.

²⁹⁴ Compagnon, Daniel. *Political Decay in Somalia*, 10.

George B. N. Ayittey, an African scholar with family with Africa's military dictators said:²⁹⁵When dialogue is blocked, the inevitable result is confrontation and armed conflicts. Yes, General Mohamed blocked all channels of dialogue with his people. Subsequently, especially after the national army's disintegration, every major tribe established separate political-military organizations based in Ethiopia. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front was the first armed opposition against General Mohamed. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front was organized by Somali officers who fled to Ethiopia. The SSDF officially was founded as a political organization on February 8, 1979, and the founders included Colonel Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, the mastermind of the failed coup on April 9, 1978.²⁹⁶ However, the Ethiopians started earlier to train the SSDF's first unit on September 12, 1978 at Ethiopia's military training camp Erar Goota, near Diridhaba, 70 kilometers from the west.²⁹⁷ Since that day the Ethiopians trained a large number of militiamen and directed them to infiltrate specific regions. Ethiopia's strategy was to direct each clan's militia into his specific region. For instance, in 1982, the SSDF's militants in full scale (of course assisted by Ethiopia's regular units) attempted to disunite the country into two; the plan was to divide the country from Somalia-Ethiopia's border (Galdogob) to the Indian Ocean, possibly at the Hobyo area. Thus, the Central-Northeastern Provinces were viewed by MOD clans as an anti-regime zone. To defeat them, General Mohamed deployed his elite forces for collective punishment. His army, mostly from friendly clans, murdered many civilians, purposely destroyed villages and their walls, and systematically ruined public properties. These actions displaced thousands of innocent civilians. Nonetheless, General Mohamed's collective punishment strategy was counterproductive and many Majerteen youth joined the militants. This is natural and

²⁹⁵ Ayittey, George B. N. *Africa Betrayed*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, 324.

²⁹⁶ For further details see Adam, Hussein M. *Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination*, 116. Also see Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed's *Struggle and Conspiracy*, 150.

²⁹⁷ Ahmed, Abdullah Yusuf. *Halgan iyo Hargadaamo*, 127.

according to Steven Metz:²⁹⁸ “As states prove unable to offer basic daily protection to their citizen, those citizens will increasingly see the state as irrelevant and shift loyalties to some sort of sub-national defense organization that can provide basic protection.” The regime recruited more MOD members who were specifically equipped to oppress fellow Somalis and the Majerteen clan rather than to fight Ethiopians. Although the Majerteen clan, which belongs to General Mohamed’s much larger Daarod tribe, shortly allied with the Isaqs, a major tribe predominantly from the Northwestern Provinces. They used the idea that my enemy’s enemy is my friend. They collaborated briefly to resist forces led by General Mohamed’s sons and sons-in-law. In fact, the SSDF’s strategy was also hegemonic. They meant to overthrow General Mohamed under their leadership and no other’s. They had no wish for others, including the Isaq, to take credit for a successful rout of General Mohamed’s regime. Whatever the reason, the SSDF, even supported by the Majerteen, failed to defeat the regime. In the mid-1980s, a third powerful tribe, the Hawiye, began agitating and joined the race in favor of the Isaqs, and according to Somali tradition, both Isaq and Hawiye hail from the larger Irir tribe. The Hawiye and Isaq’s jointly collaborating was a threat to the large Daarod tribe; thus, the large Darood felt a real threat from the Irir Tribe. They saw them as working against their total interests. In response, MOD elitists adopted a fresh strategy by recommending that the larger Darod groups should be reconciled. This was because of the new threat from the Isaq-Hawiye alliance to Daarod tribe. The MOD clan’s elites pressured the regime to unify the larger Daarod for his own political survival. In 1985, General Mohamed attempted to bribe Majerteen’s elite with money and positions in order to unify the large Daarod against the so-called Irir tribe, and according to Ahmed Jama Warsame:²⁹⁹ A large number of former SSDF’s militia and several higher ranking officers quickly showed their readiness

²⁹⁸ Metz, Steven. *America in the Third World: Strategic Alternative and Military Implications* published 20 May 1994. Available at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB338.pdf> (accessed 11 May 2010).

²⁹⁹ Warsame, Ahmed Jama. (Traditional leader interviewed, December 27, 2010).

to turnabout and reconcile with the regime in alliance against the Isaq and Hawiye. Gradually the SSDF's militant wing collapsed, and as a result, on October 12, 1985, Ethiopia arrested the SSDF's Chairman, Colonel Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, because of his leadership failure. The MOD's strategy failed too because it was too late to unify the large Daarod against others. For the first time since the 1960s, the Isaq and Hawiye clans were working together and M. Hussein Adam observed that:³⁰⁰ By the mid-eighties he (General Mohamed) was able to divide and entice the bulk of the SSDF fighters to return and fight in the north and in the Mogadishu under Siad's Daarod hegemony clans. Unfortunately the Daarod's combined forces failed to defeat the Isaq and Hawiya's militants or so-called Irir tribe's militias.

3.5.4.3. Somalia National Movement (SNM)

The next major challenge to General Mohamed's absolute power came from the Isaq clan from the Northwestern Provinces. The self-exiled elite of the Isaqs met in London and devoted themselves to the overthrow of General Mohammad's regime by force. They set up the Somalia National Movement (SNM) on April 6, 1981, and drew support predominantly from the Isaq clan of ex-British Somaliland.³⁰¹ Their elite claimed they had been deprived by the regime, and as usual they escaped to Ethiopia where they were allowed to operate against General Mohamed. The SNM's operations increased levels of intra-state conflicts, and the General issued a decree of military rule over Isaq's provinces. In fact, all military commanders in Isaq areas belonged to General Mohamed's relative and his son-law and Isaq's grievances deepened more, especially after General Mohamed established a "Special Military Administration" (SMA) with the authority to conduct summary military trials followed by public executions. The Especial

³⁰⁰ Adam, Hussein M. *Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination*, 116.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 116

Military Administration's commanders had the authority to put to death or imprison anyone without legal recourse for the accused. Many politicians, businesspeople, religious leaders and young students simply vanished or were butchered.³⁰² The majority of the "Special Military Administration's" top commanders were not only from his friendly clans but his own family. These include General Mohamed Hashi (known as General Gani, General Ahmed Warsame, General Abdul-Aziz Ali Barre, and the more famous General Mohamed Hirsi Said (better known as General Morgan), General Mohamed's son-in-law. In addition, these generals had the power to confiscate public's properties, and the more the regime's forces punished more innocent civilians, the more the level of grievances increased. Therefore, the regime's "Special Military Administration's" security measures were counter-productive. The more his generals punished civilians, the more young men fled to Ethiopia, particularly from large cities including Hargeysa and Burco. Step by step the Isaq resistance that began as a spontaneous irritant became a mass uprising of angered citizens who referred to themselves as "Mujahedeen" (Holy Warriors) against a merciless regime. Ethiopians and Libyans lent a hand and consequently the Somali National Movement became the best organized and strongest of the insurgent groups mobilized against General Mohamed.³⁰³ In April of 1988, due to his defense's weakness, General Mohamed accepted a deal with his foe, Ethiopia's military ruler, Colonel Mengistu. In 1988, General Mohamed signed a peace treaty with Ethiopia, hoping the agreement would lead to disarming the SNM's militants based in Northeastern Ethiopia. However, the SNM's militia unilaterally decided to launch a full-scale war against General Mohamed's forces in the Northwestern Provinces, and on May 27, 1988, highly trained elements of the SNM militant wing penetrated the so-called national army's defense lines and captured Burca, the third largest city in Somalia. On

³⁰² Ayittey, George B. N. *Africa in Chaos*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998/99, 53.

³⁰³ Bridges, Peter; *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, p. 82.

May 31, 1988, they captured half of Hargeysa, the second largest city in Somalia. In retaliation, General Mohamed launched an indiscriminate counterattack and deployed all available forces including the national army, MOD militia, and former SSDF's militants with a view to defeat the SNM. The combined forces met hardline militants and failed to defeat them as quickly as expected. The SNM's militia fought house-to-house, and the battle was the fiercest confrontation between the SNM's hard-liners and the regime's combined forces. Uncounted civilians were killed and wounded, yet the combined forces failed to defeat the fearless SNM. As a final option, General Mohamed deployed the air force and heavily bombarded occupied areas. This was the first time the state's air force was unleashed with lethal force against civilians. He used prohibited weapons, including napalm. Finally, after a month of house-to-house operations and air bombardment, in June of 1988 the SNM forces were forced to withdraw from the occupied cities and retreat to bases in Ethiopia. Throughout the operation, many cities including Hargeysa and Burca, as well as many countryside villages, were purposely destroyed by the army. During the military campaign against SNM, thousands were killed and more than 300,000 Isaqs fled to Ethiopia as refugees. This result severely affected the regime's political image, and because of his heavy hand, the International Media, including the BBC and the *Human Right Groups* accused the General's regime of mass murder and displacement. Furthermore, *African Watch*, a New York based Human Right published this.³⁰⁴ In March of 1990, *Africa Watch* charged the regime with responsibility for the deaths of 50,000 to 60,000 civilians since the onset of hostilities between the regime's forces and rebels from the SNM. The *African Watch* and many more NGOs pressured their governments, including the U.S., to open their mouths and also asked them to stop financing the brutal regime. Fortunately, due to the end of the Cold War, the BBC reported that because of *African Watch's* effort and INGOs pressure, the U.S. froze all

³⁰⁴ Ayittey, George B. N. *Africa in Chaos*, p. 53.

promised aid to General Mohamed. In fact, the Somali National Movement failed to end General Mohamed's rule but in fact weakened him. Yet another faction, the United Somali Congress (USC) appeared in the race and quickly advanced to the capital, Mogadishu.

3.5.4.4. The United Somali Congress (USC)

The final challenge to General Mohamed's falling regime came from the Hawiye clan. The Hawiye's self-exiled elite met in Rome on January 1989 to establish the United Somali Congress (USC). As usual, they did as the SSDF and SNM's supporters did before them, and many of Hawiye's elite escaped to Ethiopia for training in order to end General Mohamed's misrule. The regime's master strategy was to divide and control the society; however, this time he failed to divide his foes as before, and Richard Greenfield has this to say:³⁰⁵ "Remembering that General Mohamed had been skillfully trained in Machiavellian tactics and used them to exploit Somalis along clan lines; he now became vulnerable to his own doings." In other words, his prior strategies finally turned against him, and his divide-and-conquer techniques failed. He had oppressed everybody; first the Majerteen, then the Isaq, and finally the Hawiye. From 1957-1969, the Hawiye's elite occupied many important positions, and among these positions were Somalia's First Premier, Minister Abdullah Esse, from 1957-1960, Somalia's First President, Adam Abdullah Osman, from 1960-1967, and the First Commander of National Army, General Daud Abdulla Hirsi from 1960 to 1965. However, since the coup of 1969, General Mohamed marginalized them, especially after he executed General Salad Gavaire and dismissed the two Hawiye Supreme Revolutionary Council members General Ahmed Mohamud Adde and Captain Bashir Elmi Yusuf in the early 1970s. The Hawiye's disaffection gradually

³⁰⁵ Richard Greenfield. *Toward an Understanding of the Somali Factor*; Peter Woodward and Murray Forsyth (eds.); *Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa*, London: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1994, 110.

increased over the years until there was no alternative except to arm themselves. Those who escaped to Ethiopia included a wealthy businessman, former civilian Parliament Members Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aided, Somalia's Ambassador to India.

The Ethiopians, ever mindful of their own national interests, understood the Hawiye's strategic geographical location and armed them well. Due to Hawiye's proximity to the Capital, and as planned by the Ethiopians, Hawiye militias suddenly appeared from the Middle-Shabelle provinces in December of 1990 and advanced to the capital, Mogadishu. The regime's friendly clans (MOD) had now to deal with two fronts, the Isaqs from the North and the Hawiye from the South. The Hawiye's elite gave the regime only two options: to relinquish power or be ready for total war. As expected, the General refused to relinquish power. He chose the tooth-for-tooth strategy; therefore, an eye-for-an-eye battle was unavoidable.

3.5.4.5. The Final Petition by the Manifesto Group and Regime's Collapse

Hence, a group of elders and intellectuals (so-called Manifest Group) attempted to convince General Mohamed to either reform the state's political affairs or resign. He refused their petition and even arrested them. The Manifesto Group was comprised of former civilian politicians, senior civilian servants and businessmen, and for the first time since 1969 they openly confronted General Mohamed to ask him to resign in favor of his people's peace. The Manifesto Group was a body of 114 eminent citizens from all clans and they tried to broker an agreement between him and his foes. Their objective was clear to General Mohamed. They proposed to General Mohamed either to relinquish power or to establish a post-regime Provisional Government, followed by free and fair elections as soon as possible. However, he was unfamiliar with such a proposal and ordered them to be arrested. He accused them of plotting against the state on behalf of foreign enemies

and on June 20, 1990, the *New York Times* reported this:³⁰⁶ “Somali authorities have arrested more than 40 people for distributing what the Mogadishu Government says are seditious pamphlets criticizing President Mohammed Siad Barre's rule.” The Manifesto Group’s Chairman was Dr. Ismail Jimale Ossoble, a prominent lawyer, writer and humanist. Although Dr. Ismail hailed from the Hawiye, the group members included a large number from General Mohamed’s own tribe, the larger Darood. Thus, the Manifest Group was different from all other opposition groups, as they represented all tribes.³⁰⁷ The arrested members were accused of plotting against the state in the National Security Court; as usual the public was expecting the Court to sentence them to death. But during the proceedings mass demonstrations surrounded the National Security Court, with shouts of death to General Mohamed himself. The Court then adjourned. Fifteen days later, on July 6, 1990, he attempted to deliver a speech to the populace at the main stadium in Mogadishu, but the audience shouted Down, Down, Down. Surprisingly, this was the first time that General Mohamed was personally confronted with the reality of the public’s anger. His elite Red Beret force, scared and frustrated, opened fire on the audience and murdered approximately fifty people and on July 11, 1990, the *New York Times* reported this:³⁰⁸ “At least 65 people were killed when security forces opened fire on the crowd at a soccer match in Somalia, diplomatic sources said today.” The Government had said that only three people were killed; however, according to one diplomat, 65 people were confirmed dead at the city's Digfer Hospital. July 6, 1990 was the last day General Mohamed was seen in public; from then on he remained in his fort or Presidential Palace, known as “Villa Somalia”, with military barracks to protect him from the people. On July 13, the paralyzed regime withdrew its

³⁰⁶The arrests were announced on Monday by Ahmad Suleiman Abdullah, Deputy Secretary General of the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party. *New York Times*, reported on June 19, 1990.

³⁰⁷ Many Somalis hoped that, Dr. Osmail would be the next President and unite the people, but he died before that dream was realized.

³⁰⁸ *New York Times* reported on July 11 1990,

accusation against the Manifesto Group and released them. On December 12, 1990, Jana Perlez sent this Special Report to the *New York Times*:³⁰⁹ “Until recently, one of Washington's well-financed Cold War allies in Africa, the Government of President Siad Barre, an octogenarian who grabbed power in a 1969 coup, is now "unable to function," the State Department Official said.” Two weeks later on December 26, 1989, the United Somali Congress’s militant arm launched a massive attack on the capital of Mogadishu and particular the State House, better known as “Villa Somalia”. The USC’s militia was under the command of three dissident generals from the national army, but General Mohamed had released them from the national army. They were General Mohamed Nur Galaal, General Ahmed Sheikh Mohamed (better known as General Nero), and General Mohammed Farah Aidied.³¹⁰ The regime’s Red Belt and the United Somali Congress’s militant fought a one-month-long street-by-street war, and on January 1, 1991, Jana Perlez sent his Second Special Report to the *New York Times*:³¹¹ “Heavy Fighting Erupts in Somalia’s Capital Mogadishu and according to the report: General Mohamed, unable to hold back three rebel movements operating in the north, center and south of the country, the President had virtually ceded power in most of Somalia and had become known as the Mayor of Mogadishu. Lastly, on January 26, 1991, at 7:30 p.m. (3:30 p.m. GMT) General Mohamed fled from the State House after 21 years and 69 days. General Mohamed’s regime finally fell on January 26, 1991, at 7:30 p.m. (4:30 p.m. GMT).³¹² Luckily General Mohamed managed to escape to his hometown, the Gedo Region in Southwestern Somalia. In reality, in 1991, Somalia failed to achieve all of its three pivotal goals: society’s well-being, Greater Somalia, and diplomatic prestige among other nations. The four obstacles that existed before Somalia’s

³⁰⁹New York Times, on December 13, 1991.

³¹⁰Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein (interviewed, October 21, 2011).

³¹¹Perlez, Jana. Heavy Fighting Erupts in Somali Capital’, December 31, 1990; Special Report from Nairobi (Kenya) to New York Times published 1 Jan. 1991.

³¹²The candidate was an eyewitness and remembered fully, from his own observation, what happened that evening of January 26, 1991 at 7.30PM, in Somalia’s Local Time.

state was born in 1960 posed challenges, making Somalia a model for failed states. From now onward, the rest of the research will focus on the external factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia.

University of Malaya

CHAPTER 4: EXTERNAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE FAILURE OF SOMALIA

4.1. Factors that Attract Major Powers to Come to the Horn of Africa

4.1.1. Geopolitical Factors and Balance of Power

During the Cold War, the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa's geopolitical location were in the center. This strategic position attracted major powers to come to the Horn of Africa. Therefore, this section will establish the relationship between the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa's geopolitical position and the impact of the Cold War's politics on Somalia. Patrick Gilkes says: ³¹³ "Geographically, the Red Sea is frequently seen as a dividing element cutting Africa off from Arabia, but it could be seen more as a factor for unity within the wider region comprising both the Horn of Africa and Arabian Peninsula." This area is very geopolitical since it has a linkage with the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, together with the gateway to the Arabian Peninsula and Indian Ocean to form a singular geostrategic entity. For the period of the Cold War this area is considered as the nervous system of the global sea lines. In a wider context, due to the region's vitality, global powers invested much effort in influencing the Horn's internal politics. Because of its long coastline, Somalia became a center for military and security purposes. Therefore, both the Red Sea and the Horn strategic positions attracted major powers to come to the Horn of Africa to balance each other. This balance would create another dimension, which was to export the Horn of Africa's military rule that again brought endless interstate conflicts into the Horn of Africa.

In reality, is Somalia one of those affected by the superpowers' conflicts over geopolitical location? The research divides Somalia's relationship with major powers into

³¹³Gilkes, Patrick. Geopolitical Dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea published by Ethiopia's Embassy in London (UK). Available at <http://www.ethioembassy.org.uk/articles/articles/focus%20electronic-00/Patrick%20Gilkes%20-%201.htm> (accessed January 5, 2011).

two periods, the civilian and military ruler periods, then again dividing the military rule into two periods as there were two major transformations during General Mohamed's twenty-one years in power. In the first period from 1969- 1978, he had ties with the Soviets and in his second period from 1978-1991, he had ties with the U.S.

4.1.2. The Major Factor that Attracted the Soviets to Somalia

By the end of World War II and for the first time, Soviets and Americans began playing decisive roles in defining the shape and patterns of global politics. Fearful of any armed clash with each other, the superpowers turned to surrogates and according to Alan Cassels:³¹⁴ “They avoided face to face confrontation but used others to fight on their behalf. From 1945 until 1989 international relations revolved around the resumed quarrel between the Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism and forces of capitalist liberal democracy. Scarcely an international episode in this period escaped the imprint of the East-West altercation.” Washington and Moscow were compelled to turn to twin surrogates. First, they had recourse to proxy wars in the Third World fought, initially at least, by clients of the superpowers guided by American or Russian advisers. The second alternative to a nuclear armageddon was to conduct the Cold War with words, using ideological slogans as a substitute for bombs and missiles—psychological warfare within a balance of ideologies. This Cold War (1945-1989) polarized the globe as nations aligned with the Americans or the Soviets and their respective allies. Mohammed Ayoob pointed out:³¹⁵ “There was a sustained policy of exporting Cold War conflicts to the periphery in order to preserve core stability for the international system, especially during the nuclear era. But all of this had extremely deleterious effects on any state-building enterprise in the Third World.” Now let us ask this: what are the major factors that

³¹⁴Cassels, Alan. *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World*, London: Routledge, 1996, 207-208.

³¹⁵Ayoob, Mohammed. *Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World*, 44.

attracted the Soviets to Somalia? The answer may be controversial; however, the Island of Diego Garcia's geopolitical effect is very dominant.

4.1.3. The Island of Diego Garcia's Factors

In 1960s, the United States' military facilities on the Island of Diego Garcia was posing a real threat to Soviet military expeditions in the Indian Ocean. In 1966, the British and Americans planned to turn the Island of Diego Garcia into a military stronghold.³¹⁶ The aim was to establish an advanced military communication station. That plan posed a threat to Soviet military expeditions in the Indian Ocean. These fears were fueled by another agreement in 1963 for the U.S. Navy to build a communications station at the North West Cape of Australia. The Soviets feared that the U.S. might use these bases as a launching area for Polaris and Poseidon submarines with nuclear capabilities. The Soviets were desperate to counter this fear and were ready to make a deal with Somalia for balance of power. Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa's geopolitical position. Besides the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa's geopolitical position had direct links with other vital regions, including the wider Middle East and Central Asia via the Indian Ocean, but the Island of Diego Garcia was an exception in the early 1960s. The Soviets paid a great deal of attention to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa's geopolitical position; therefore, they decided to make a deal with Somalia and Southern Yemen to obtain military facilities at the Red Sea's ports as written by Paul Kennedy:³¹⁷ "To respond to the U.S.-British threat, the Marxist regimes in Southern Yemen and Somalia provided naval-base facilities to the Russian navy, giving it a new maritime presence in the Red Sea". Hence, the Island of Diego Garcia's strategic significance forced the Soviets to befriend with Somalia in 1963. In a short time the Soviets established its

³¹⁶ Steel, Jonathan. *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy*, 24.

³¹⁷ Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House, 1987, 511.

first Navy Base at Berbera for military purposes and according to Peter Bridges:³¹⁸ “Berbera was the Soviet’s largest Naval/Military Base outside of the Warsaw Pact and held the longest runway in Africa as well as a concrete quay at the harbor.” Since then through the years Somalia and Soviets were working hand in hand against the so-called imperialists –the United States of America and its allies. Jonathan Steel said:³¹⁹ “The Soviets’ facilities at Berbera supported patrols in the Indian Ocean to counter the threat of U.S. Polaris submarines.” This heavy Soviet presence in the Red Sea region, particularly Berbera’s location (facing the Red Sea from African side), was very close to the American military facilities in neighboring Ethiopia. This closeness caused the United States of America to overreact to the Soviet presence in nearby Somalia and according to John H. Spencer:³²⁰ “The U.S. perceived a direct threat from the Soviet’s Naval Base in Berbera, northern Somalia. The Soviet’s military facilities also existed at Socotra, the Island off the tip of the Horn of Africa; at Aden and the airport nearby; at Hodeida on the Northern Yemen coast; at Umm Qasir in Iraq, and at Mauritius. In this manner, the entire northwest quarter of the Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden to Sri Lanka was surrounded by Soviet bases and facilities.”

This area provided the best coverage to protect Russia with a 2,500-mile missile range, and for this reason alone, Somalia was valuable to the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa; however, this presence posed a real threat to the United States of America’s geopolitical interests in the entire Middle East. Prior to the Ethiopian coup, the United States aligned with the Ethiopia’s King Haile Selassie while the Soviets were allied with Somalia. Therefore, until the mid-1970s, the Horn of Africa’s so-called balance of power was more or less stable. In many ways, the Horn of Africa was seen a strategic

³¹⁸ Bridges, Peter. *Safirka: An American Envoy*, 114.

³¹⁹ Steel, Jonathan. *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2 40.

³²⁰ Spencer, John J. *Ethiopia: the Horn of Africa and U.S. Policy*, 55.

chessboard for superpower competition. The more global powers contested over the region's geopolitical position, the more they shaped the Horn of Africa's internal security, particularly the role of the Soviets in Somalia's politics

4.2. The Impact of Cold War Politics on Somalia

4.2.1. The Role of the USSR in Somalia's Politics

In Somalia, both the civilian and military regimes established a friendship with the Soviets in different periods with different motivations and strategic interests. First, the civilian government established a friendship with the Soviets (1960-1969) and again Somalia's military ruler General Mohamed signed more treaties with the Soviets from 1969-1978. Therefore, the role of the Soviets in Somalia's politics covers both the civilian period (1960-1969) and General Mohamed's first period (1969-1978).

The principal question is how the Soviets' friendship with Somalia affected and shaped Somalia's domestic and foreign policies' priorities from 1960s to 1978. In other words, this is to examine how the Soviets' free weaponry and financial support were influencing Somalia's political process, particularly its call for Greater Somalia.

4.2.1.1. Civilian Rule's Period (1960-1969)

Somalia, being adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula and Indian Ocean, naturally attracted global powers; first, the Soviet Union. Historically, the Horn of Africa attracted major powers because of its geopolitical location attracted major powers. Firstly, the Americans came and established a relationship with the Ethiopians. In response or challenge, the Soviets came too to establish a friendship with Somalia, as pointed out by Jeffrey A. Lefebvre:³²¹ "Moscow sought to challenge Western hegemony in the region by offering

³²¹ Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somalia-Soviet arms deals, 611.

economic and military assistance to developing countries, free from any political or military obligations.” The Soviets were new to the region, but they were adopting an aggressive policy against the U.S. Geoffrey Roberts has this to say:³²² “The post-WWII history of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy is intimately bound to the USSR’s involvement in the Cold War.” The U.S. and the Soviets divided the world and forced every nation to join one or the other camp. On this, Wan Gungwu wrote:³²³

The Cold War determined that leaders of the newly independent countries could look in at least two different political directions. Some chose to build their nations with the help of capitalism and liberal democracy. These would use the Western European models as the basis for nationhood and, for them, the best way to modernity was through an open market economy. Soon, they found the United States more than willing to help them along the route. Others chose to follow the socialist path, either against the capitalist democracies or seeking some kind of neutralism in the Cold War. These were encouraged by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China to contest the global economic and military power represented strongly in Asia by the United States.

Therefore, Somalia should choose to build its nations with the help of capitalism and liberal democracy or choose to follow the socialist path. These two options due to Cold War politics would determine Somalia’s domestic politics and its relations with others. Somalia’s military historian Colonel Ali Hussein Jaras has this to say:³²⁴ “In the 1960s, Somalia was on the radar as it should have been because of its geopolitical location.” Firmly because of its geopolitical location, the Soviets were making diplomatic overtures to Somalia’s future elite even before its independence, as mentioned by a British Member of Parliament, Bernard Braine, who visited Somalia in early 1958 and said:³²⁵ “Some months ago members of the Soviet Embassy staff in Addis Ababa visited Mogadishu and openly displayed interested in the problems and needs of the country.” The Soviets used preventive measures to prevent Somalia turning to the Western Bloc, and

³²²Roberts, Geoffrey. *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, London and New York: Routledge, 1999, 1-2.

³²³Cheah, Boon Kheng. *Malaysia the Making of a Nation*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, xiv.

³²⁴Ibid. Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein. .

³²⁵ Braine, Bernard. *Storm Clouds over the Horn of Africa..*, 439.

according to America's ambassador to Somalia, Peter Bridges:³²⁶ "The Soviets had probably paid for the construction of the Somalia embassy. Therefore, the Soviets' contacts with the Somalis' elite started during the Provisional Government under the Italian-UN Trusteeship". The Soviets' main objective was to try to prevent Somalia to ally with the West after its independence in 1960. Also, the United States attempted to prevent Somalia to ally with the Soviets' Bloc. Both were eyeing Somalia's geopolitical position and, because of this position they both established diplomatic relations with Somalia in 1960. The superpowers were ready to offer weaponry and financial support to Somalia in exchange for military bases. Somalia was ready to offer military bases in exchange for weapons and financial support in order to pursue their Greater Somalia. These mutual interests pushed them to establish a friendship and in fact, in the early 1960s, the Soviets were eager to use Somalia's military bases "for the balance of power" and Somalia was seeking the Soviets' weaponry "for Greater Somalia". Furthermore, besides Somalia's militancy mindset, during the 1960s to the Somalis' eyes, the West had obligated itself to protect Ethiopia's territorial integrity and opposed their call for reunification of Greater Somalia. Throughout its history, Ethiopia remained a key ally of the West and in April of 1960, even before Somalia's independence, the UK's Parliament approved Harold Macmillan's proposal to support Ethiopia's territorial integrity. Harold Macmillan disqualified Somalis' reunification and he advised his government:³²⁷ "Her Majesty's Government does not encourage or support any claim affecting the territorial integrity of French-Somaliland, Kenya or Ethiopia." In fact, these mentioned territories are Somalis' missing territories. The Somalis were asking to be unified while Harold Macmillan refused to support Somalia's claim against Ethiopia, Kenya and French-Somaliland, (Djibouti). The West accused Somalia of being a troublemaker in the Horn of Africa. In order to minimize the Horn of

³²⁶ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 77.

³²⁷ Aroma, Cabdulqadir. *Sabibihii Burburka Soomaaliya*, 191.

Africa's expected conflicts, on November 1962 the United States of America invited Somalia's Premier to meet the U.S. President. The Premier, Abdul Rashid Ali, paid his first official visit to Washington. The Premier met the U.S. President John F. Kennedy and asked him for military assistance. The President responded that the U.S. did not want to fuel the Horn of Africa's conflict. Ah, said the Somali Premier:³²⁸ "but you are supplying arms to Ethiopia." In fact, President Kennedy knew that if they armed Somalia, one day Somalia would use these arms against Ethiopia, an ally of the U.S. Nevertheless, after a long discussion, Washington replied to Somalia:³²⁹ "The United States, together with West Germany and Italy, offered Somalia ten million dollars to strengthen its internal security if it would promise not to seek military aid elsewhere." The offer was not only too small, but also bore the condition that Somalia would have no more than a 5,000-man army to maintain domestic order. Most Somalis were annoyed at this condition and believed the West to be totally pro-Ethiopia, whom the Somalis labeled Africa's imperialist. The Somalis realized that the West would not assist their reclamation of lost territories, which then forced them to turn to the Soviets. The Somalis adopted the idea that my enemy's enemy is my friend; as a result, Somalia turned to Moscow for friendship.

Somalia's Premier visited Moscow on July 1963 and held talks with the Soviets' higher-ranking officials including Nikita Khrushchev, on ways Somalia could get military assistance from the Soviets. Ibrahim Rashid said:³³⁰ The Soviet Government agreed to provide military support to Somalia and Khrushchev requested the Somali Government to send the head of the Somali armed forces General Daud Abdulle. In October of the same year, General Da'ud with other military delegates arrived in Moscow and discussed with the Soviets the kind of military assistance Somalia wanted and the agreement was later signed

³²⁸ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 64

³²⁹ *Ibid.* 64.

³³⁰ Rashid, Ibrahim. *The Last century and History of Somalia: Understanding the History of Somali Nation in General in the 20th Century*. City: N/A, published Nathan Hale, 2011, 35.

by both parties.”

The Soviets’ offer included a fifty-five-million-dollar program of military assistance: weapons, Soviet advisors to teach their use, and training programs in the Soviet Union for hundreds of Somali officers.³³¹ In less than one month, in dramatic form, as predicted the Soviets and Somalia signed on November 1, 1963, their first political and military Memorandum of Understanding, and the same day Somalia officially announced that the Republic of Somalia had refused an offer of Western military assistance valued at almost 5.5 million pounds in favor of Soviet military aid to the tune of nearly 11 million pounds.³³² The Soviets adopted a different view to ignore the West’s view and Jeffrey A. Lefebvre said:³³³ “The West, afraid if they supplied weapons to Somalia to back up their quarrel with Ethiopia and Kenya over borders was unwilling to help. The Soviets agreed to build up Somalia’s national army and to provide all necessary equipment.” Yes, it was true, Somalia wanted to receive much needed weaponry for Greater Somalia, but the Soviets were also in hurry to use Somalia’s geopolitical location to counter the U.S.’s hegemonic presence in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. Jeffrey A. Lefebvre said:³³⁴ “For their part, the Soviets were challenging Western hegemony in the region by offering economic and military assistance to developing countries free from political or military obligations.” From Somalia’s perspective, the Soviets’ assistance was given without conditions; for this reason, Somalis saw the Soviets as an honest friend offering help. Anti-imperialist slogans became attractive to Somalis.³³⁵ Needless to say, Somalia was pleased with the Soviets’ offer.³³⁶ From a strategic view, and to Jonathan Steel’s valuation:³³⁷ Somalia was valuable to the Soviets and they enjoyed facilities in the military base at

³³¹ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 65.

³³² For further discussion see on I. M. Lewis *A Modern History of Somalia*, 201.

³³³ Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. *The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somalia-Soviet arms deals*, 638.

³³⁴ Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. *The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somalia-Soviet arms deals: Containment and the balance of power in the Horn of Africa*. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Cambridge University Press, 36, 4 (1998), 611.

³³⁵ Abdullah, Abdurrahman M. (Interviewed, September 12, 2010).

³³⁶ The Somali army officially came into being on 11 April 1960, three months prior to independence, by vote of National Assembly.

³³⁷ Steele, Jonathan. *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy under Brezhnev and Andropov*, London: Michael Joseph, 1983, 240.

Berbera, which was aimed at supporting their patrols in the Indian Ocean against the threat of US Polaris submarines. Due to the Soviets' slogan (anti-imperialism) Somalia's Greater Somalia was in line with the Soviets global propaganda.³³⁸ Simply put, Somalia provided military bases to the Soviets; in return, the Soviets provided training and weaponry to Somalia's national army. T. Craig Murphy said:³³⁹ The Soviet support of Somalia was largely a reaction to the U.S support of Ethiopia. The Soviets' arms supplies, financial and economic support exceeded that of the United States of America's assistance to Ethiopia. From 1960s to early 1970s Somalia increased its army from 2,000 to 20,000 soldiers, and acquired MIG-15 Jet Fighters and T-34 tanks.³⁴⁰ Somalia needed these advanced weapons for offensive purposes and to achieve its Greater Somalia ambition.

In addition, during the civilian governments (1960-1969), many Somali students (military and civilians) were sent to Soviet universities and military academies for education and military training. As a result, the Soviets' philosophy (scientific socialism) and the Russian language became popular among the Somali elite. Suddenly on October 15, 1969, the President's personal bodyguard, Said Yusuf Ismail, shot him.³⁴¹ This killing brought many crises to Somalia's domestic policy, as well as to its relations with others. For more than a week the National Assembly failed to elect a new President. Hence, the civilian elite's failure paved the way for the military to take over on October 21, 1969. This marked the end of Somalia's civilian misrule and on October 21, 1969, a group of officers took power. The Commander of the army, General Mohamed, led the coup and he remained in power for more than two decades. General Mohamed during his first period was tied up with the Soviets and remained their ally until November

³³⁸Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein, (interviewed, October 21, 2011).

³³⁹ For more details see T. Craig Murphy's article "the Collapse of Somalia and Economic Considerations,

³⁴⁰ Ibid., 639.

³⁴¹The assassin, Said Yusuf Ismail, was tried and sentenced to death on 10 Feb. 1971. See Peter Glendenning, 294.

13, 1978.

4.2.1.2. First Military Rule's Period (1969-1977)

On October 15, 1969, the army, backed by the police, deposed the Premier Mohamed Ibrahim and established a revolutionary regime.³⁴² The coup was led by Major General Mohamed, the army's commander. In the early 1970s, besides General Mohamed's militaristic behavior, because of the Cold War he had two choices. He could choose to lineup with the capitalists led by the United States of America, or to ally with the socialist bloc led by the Soviets.³⁴³ For this reason, because of his militaristic view General Mohamed quickly became good friends with the Soviets. In fact, General Mohamed's hands were not empty. He was cashing in on Somalia's geopolitical location and as expected, one year after his coup on October 21, 1970, General Mohamed announced this:³⁴⁴ "We are convinced that the only way to solve our problems is scientific socialism." Soon the two countries signed more treaties and the Soviets were ready to increase its military assistance to Somalia for balance of power. The two countries' mutual interests were coherent. General Mohamed allowed the Soviets to upgrade a much-needed Berbera's Naval Base, as well as Somalia's airspace. In return, the Soviets were ready to supply more free weaponry, food and fuel and because of the Soviet assistance in the mid-1970s, Somalia became a regional power. However, General Mohamed's hasty application of socialism and militaristic views were creating many problems, both internal and external. The Soviets guided him to adopt certain views that were in line with scientific socialism's worldview. The question is how General Mohamed tried to adjust his political priorities with the Soviets present in the region.

³⁴² Bell, J. Bowyer. *The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies*, 23.

³⁴³ Jaras, Colonel Ali Hussein, (Interviewed on October 21, 2011).

³⁴⁴ See Peter Glendenning on the Somalian Revolution, 54.

4.2.1.3. General Mohamed's Foreign Policy and Militaristic Worldview

General Mohamed was smart enough at the beginning, and to achieve much needed diplomatic prestige among nations, he outlined his external affairs principles with Six Points:³⁴⁵ (1). Support for international solidarity and national liberation movements; (2), oppose and fight against all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism; ((3), struggle and maintain Somali national unity; (4), emphatically recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence between all peoples; ((5), continue to preserve a policy of positive neutrality, and (6), respect and recognize all legal international commitments undertaken by the Somali Republic.

These Six Points; in fact Article 1 and Article 2, were directly in line with the Soviets' worldview, which says to (1) support international solidarity and national liberation movements; ((2), oppose and fight against all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism. These two Articles were articulated well to match Soviet global propaganda. Article 3 was in line with the idea of Greater Somalia. In other words, in struggling to maintain Somali national unity, the Somalis were using "struggle" to fight against others for Greater Somalia. However, Article 4 and Article 5 were contradicting the Article 1 and Article 2, as they emphatically recognize the principle of peaceful coexistence between all peoples. and call for continuing to preserve a policy of positive neutrality. The problem was that if General Mohamed was going to support freedom fighters and national liberation movements, as well as opposing all forms of colonialism and neo-colonialism, then, one cannot expected coexistence between all people or preserving a policy of neutrality. In one sense, General Mohamed was ready to support a national liberation movement like the Somali Western Liberation Front (SWLF) to fight against colonialism (i.e., Ethiopia),

³⁴⁵ Somalia Today. Printed by the State Printing Agency, 46.

which countered Articles 4, 5 & 6. How could he achieve co-existence and preserve neutrality while he was ready to arm the Western Somali Liberation Movement? He also promised to respect and recognize all legal international commitments undertaken by the civilian governments, including adherence to the UN Charter that Somalia signed on September 20, 1960, which obliged all nations not to use force against independent nations, including Somalia's neighbor, Ethiopia. Therefore, General Mohamed's worldview was in great confusion, and Article 6, was the only acceptable concept "Article" for which General Mohamed expressed respect and recognition of all legal international commitments undertaken by the Somali Republic. He meant the civilian government's bilateral or unilateral agreements with other countries or international institutions including the United Nations, African Union Organization and Non-Alliance Movement. General Mohamed knew if he refused to respect and to recognize the previous governments' agreements, nobody would make a deal with him.

In fact, General Mohamed was maneuvering in between the Greater Somalia (for political legitimacy) and yet adhere to the United Nations Charter's principles for diplomatic prestige and financial support from the wealthy countries. His main strategy was a pledge to continue the civilian government's détente in the region but without relinquishing the idea of a Greater Somalia, which was impossible. The Horn of Africa's détente resulted when the former civilian government's Premier did not favor the idea of Greater Somalia. Earlier, in July of 1968, Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim took power and determined to reach détente with Ethiopia so that Somalia could get on with its development. For a while, there was no talk of Greater Somalia, and Somalia's diplomatic relations with its neighbors greatly improved.³⁴⁶ In a different view, General Mohamed was trying to redirect the state's energies from to coexistence to confrontation. As

³⁴⁶J., Bowyer Bell. *The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies*, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, INC., 1973, 23.

a military ruler, General Mohamed knew his lack of political legitimacy; therefore, he wanted to blind the public to Greater Somalia and clearly he was misleading the public. After the coup d'état, General Mohamed announced two contradictory pivotal positions at the same time, promising to honor the region's détente for diplomatic prestige and still seeking and ready to struggle for Greater Somalia. He claimed that in external affairs, existing treaties would be honored and the Somali struggle for reunification would continue, while further support would be given to liberation movements in their fight against colonialism.³⁴⁷ These two goals, to honor existing treaties and to give support to liberation movements, are inherently contradictory. He needed public support; therefore, he re-energized Greater Somalia as his essential goal, but still insisting on coexistence and neutrality. As mentioned earlier, the army's first obligation was to reclaim lost territories from the 19th century and at that moment, the army doctrine was in line with Greater Somalia. The army's nationalist doctrine, the regime's militaristic view and the Soviets' weaponry altogether would soon bring many problems to Somalia.

Firstly, General Mohamed globalized his worldview. Externally, he classified the world into two rival blocs, and in fact this view was in line with the Soviet worldview. Secondly, he redefined his people's enemy and according to Ahmed I. Samatar, General Mohamed said:³⁴⁸ Colonialism and neocolonialism were seen as the greatest threat to the welfare of the Somali people, and a promise was made to align the country with national liberation movements in the region and around the world." He was associating himself with so-called "national liberation movements", including the Somalia Western Liberation Front. The Somali national army was training and providing light weapons to Somali ethnic people from the eastern region of Ethiopia.

³⁴⁷ Lewis, I M. A Modern History of Somalia, 207.

³⁴⁸ Samatar, Ahmed I. The Somali Challenges: From Catastrophe to Renewal, 116.

In reality, General Mohamed was saying this: Somalia would not give up its objective of liberating Somali ethnic people under Ethiopia's colonialism. He was trying to kill two birds with one stone. Marina Ottaway said:³⁴⁹ "Somalia's foreign policy in the five years following the coup was quite complex and marked both by deep contradictions and a brilliant attempt to safeguard the autonomy of a very small and weak country while deliberately thrusting it into the arena of international politics. Siad (General Mohamed) preached peaceful coexistence with Somalia's neighbors but built up the army."

To stress Greater Somalia improved his image, and in Somalia, the elite used nationalism in order to incite the public. Therefore, sooner or later Greater Somalia and peaceful coexistence would clash under this incongruity.

4.2.1.4. Arms Race and the Middle East's Factor

Thanks to the Cold War, the Soviets' geopolitical interest increased in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea regions, and this was after the Sudanese President Ja'far Numairy expelled the Soviets' military experts and shut down its military base in July, 1971. Yet again, the Soviets faced another setback during the Arab-Israel War on October 6, 1973. The Soviets failed to support the Arabs and, as expected, Anwar Sadat announced the expulsion of the Soviets' military personal from Egypt. The Soviets failed to assist Egypt during its war with Israel. Geoffrey Roberts said:³⁵⁰ "The loss of the Egyptian connection was a devastating blow to the Soviet position in the Middle East." Therefore, these setbacks forced the Soviets to work more with Somalia's military ruler as an alternative to their lost bases in Sudan and Egypt. Basically the United States of America had incited Egypt's President Anwar Al-Sadat to expel the Soviets from Egypt, and according to

³⁴⁹ Ottaway, Marina. *Soviet and American Influences in the Horn of Africa*, p.71.

³⁵⁰ For more details see on the Soviet Union in the World politics on page 65.

Henry Kissinger:³⁵¹ “Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat dismissed all his Soviet military advisors and asked Soviet technicians to leave the country. At the same time, secret diplomatic contacts between Sadat and the White House began, though they were constrained, first by the American presidential election and then by Watergate.” The more American secret diplomacy succeeded, the more the Soviets’ chances to influence the Red Sea and Middle East’s peace process was decreasing.

For that reason, General Mohamed benefited more and in the mid-1970s, the Horn’s geopolitical value increased after the Arab-Israel War in 1973 and according to Jonathan Steel:³⁵² “More dramatic change took place, after the Arab-Israel War, in 1973 the Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat, announced in July that he was expelling most of the 15,000 Soviets’ military personal in Egypt. In two years the Soviets lost two military bases from the Red Sea areas.” As a result, in 1974 the Soviets needed more military bases and facilities in Somalia as an alternative to the Sudanese and Egypt’s lost military bases. Therefore, the Soviets intensified its strategic partnership with Somalia. The Soviets’ President Nikolai Podgorny paid an official visit to Somalia on July 11, 1974, Podgorny’s main goal was to show how the Soviets were serious about their relationship with Somalia. During the visits the Soviets and Somalia signed an all-encompassing Soviet-Somalia Friendship Treaty, which ceded access to Berbera’s Naval Base, located 20 miles from the Straits of Bab El-Mendab at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula. The Soviets established their largest naval military base in Berbera outside of Warsaw Pact soil, a base that included the longest airport landing field in Africa and a concrete quay at the harbor.³⁵³ In return, Somalia received additional military equipment from the Soviets and in 1974, the Soviets’ contingent and military advisors numbered in

³⁵¹ Kissinger, Henry. *Diplomacy*, New York: published by Simon & Schuster, 1994, 739.

³⁵² Steel, Jonathan. *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy*, 196.

³⁵³ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 114.

the thousands, and according to Peter Bridges:³⁵⁴ Soviet military personnel and civilian advisors were estimated at 3,600 at the time of the signing.

The World Bank's Report says this:³⁵⁵ In the context of the Cold War, the regime, led by Siyad Barre (General Mohamed), recast the coup as a socialist revolution and with funds from international partners he established one of the largest standing armies in sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia received from the Soviets advanced weapons including battle tanks and armored vehicles and provided highly needed combat aircraft (MIG 19s & 21s). The Soviet and Somalia Friendship Treaty was unique and for example, Article 4, (USSR-Somalia Friendship and Co-operation) states:³⁵⁶ "In the interest of strengthening the S.D.R's (Somali Democratic Republic) defense capability, the high contracting parties will continue to develop co-operation in the military sphere on the bases of the corresponding agreements between them. Such cooperation will provide, in particular, cooperation in the training of Somali military personnel and in the mastery of the arms and equipment supplied to the S.D.R. for the purpose of enhancing the defense potential."

Thus, although much had been achieved under the Soviets-Somalia Pact signed in 1963, Somalia received more advanced weaponry in line with this new Friendship Treaty. The Soviets had indeed been generous to Somalia, and according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS):³⁵⁷ "Russia supplied Somalia with 250 medium tanks of which 150 were older T-34 and 100 were modern T-54/55 tanks and also equipped the Somalis with more than 50 Soviets' made MiG fighters. These offerings made the Somali armed forces stronger than Ethiopia." For that reason, Somalia had become the Horn of Africa's regional power, and J. John Spencer said:³⁵⁸ "The Soviets supplied advanced

³⁵⁴ Ibid. 241.

³⁵⁵ World Bank Report: Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics.

³⁵⁶ Makinda, Samuel M. Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, London: Croom Hel Ltd, 1978, 220. See APPENDIX A: USSR-Somalia Treaty.

³⁵⁷ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. State Collapse, 115.

³⁵⁸ Spencer, John J. Ethiopia: the Horn of Africa and U.S policy, 4.

weaponry (1975) that exceeded what was made available to Ethiopia by the U.S. Some two thousand Soviet technicians and military advisers were also present, ready to assist if that military strength was employed in some foreign adventure.” For the first time, in 1973-77 Somalia’s army was more powerful than Ethiopia’s army, which had been assisted by the U.S. since 1954. Thus, Somalia and the Soviets’ strategic partnership was more effective than the United States and Ethiopia’s Defense Agreement signed in 1953.³⁵⁹ Due to this imbalance, Ethiopia’s King Haile Selassie visited the United States of America and on May 15, 1973 met President Nixon to explain the Horn of Africa’s strategic change due to rapidly expanding Soviet influence. Firstly, the King outlined the United States and Ethiopia’s common objectives, which included (a) peace and security, (b) freedom of navigation and access to natural resources (3) where there is prospect of oil, safeguard against enemy takeover. We are cooperating in these areas and our forces, which you support, have always been used in the cause of peace. The King said: “We have common peace and common objectives. Soviet influence is expanding broadly. The reasons are: (1) to supersede the West in influence. (2) to gain control of the Red Sea and the commerce and resources of the area. Their methods are to strengthen the Arab states and weaken Ethiopia.”³⁶⁰

Somalia and Ethiopia’s Strategic Imbalance

Number of weapons	Ethiopia	Somalia	
Tanks	20	200	
APC	54	310	
Anti-Aircraft Batteries	24	170	
Rocket Launchers	0	24	

³⁵⁹For more details see Jonathan Steel. World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy, 55.

³⁶⁰Memorandum of Conversation between the President of the United States Nixon and Ethiopia’s King Haile Selassie in White House on May 15, 1973. This Conversation is Classified Documents E.O 12058, SEC.35. and available 1552582 pdf, Adobe Acrobat Reader DC.

Radar	0	1	
Air Force	Over Age	17-21MiGs and IL-28's	

Furthermore, in the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union was increasing its military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.³⁶¹ The Soviets enjoyed showing their military muscle on Somalia's coasts, both in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets and Somalia's strategic honeymoon wasn't free from disrupters. Unexpectedly in 1974, something happened in Ethiopia. Without prior notice, the army ousted the King in 1974. Colonel Mengistu led the coup and he remained in power from March 3, 1977-May 28, 1991.³⁶² The coup brought many crises into the Horn of Africa's regional and international affairs. First, Somalia and the Soviets became enemies after Ethiopia's coup in the mid-1970s. Peter Bridges has this to say:³⁶³ Their strategic friendship served each other's military interests. Even so, in a dramatic way the Soviet-Somali friendship faced a severe challenge after Ethiopia's King Haile Selassie fell in 1974. In 1974 Haile Selassie was overthrown by a popular uprising, which was then usurped by the military. Ethiopia's coup leader brought down the Horn of Africa's prior strategic alliances. Therefore, Ethiopia's coup severe impacts deserved to investigate the coup's role to reshape the Horn of Africa's strategic alliances. Similarly General Mohamed also played a significant role. First of all, the Soviets disagreed with his nationalism against Ethiopia. As we mentioned earlier, in 1963, Somalia's main strategic objective in signing a friendship treaty with the Soviets was to receive weapons for Greater Somalia. Although the Soviets' were aware that Somalia would invade Ethiopia one day, they closed their eyes to this for strategic reasons. Nonetheless, during Ethiopia's revolution and the Horn of Africa's

³⁶¹ Selassie, Bereket Habte. *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, 198.

³⁶² Internal erupted among the top officers but ended on March 3, 1977, after the Colonel Mengistu dominated.

³⁶³ Ibid., 114.

strategic alteration in 1976-1978, the Soviets rejected the idea of Greater Somalia.

4.2.1.5. Ethiopia's Coup and the Horn's Strategic Alteration

To understand the Horn of Africa's multiple security crises, we have to establish a bridge between Somalia and Ethiopia's rivalry on one side and on the other side the superpowers' rivalry over geopolitical positions and their standoff during 1947-1989.³⁶⁴

Foremost among the claims of this study is that the superpowers' geopolitical contest in the Horn of Africa started much as earlier in 1950. They had contacted Ethiopia's King, Haile Selassie which directly allowed him to become involved in world politics, and according to I. William Zartman:³⁶⁵ "Ethiopia had always been the Horn of Africa's most mature international diplomatic entity and then, Ethiopia was amongst those nations who established the UNs Charter of 1945". Since then, the King's had good diplomatic and security relationships with the major powers, particularly with the United States of America. Firstly, in the early 1950s, the King established a good relationship with the United States of America and became an American client in the Horn of Africa. The United States was assisting the Ethiopian king since 1952-1974, and he received a total of USD 620 million and Andargachew Tiruneh wrote:³⁶⁶ "The amount of military aid provided is more than half the total U.S. military assistance given to all African countries during the same period; based on such a comparison, observers of Ethiopian politics often express surprise at the extent of U.S. support for Ethiopia." Nevertheless, in 1974 the United States failed to predict the King's fall. The King and most members of the state and royal family were killed, after which Ethiopia was besieged by endless troubles.³⁶⁷

³⁶⁴ A standoff is a situation in which neither of two opposing groups or forces will make a move until the other one does something, so nothing can happen until one of them gives way.

³⁶⁵ Zartman, I. William. *Superpower Cooperation in North Africa and the Horn of Africa*, 156.

³⁶⁶ Tiruneh, Andargachew. *The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1978: A Transformation an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autocracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, 19-20.

³⁶⁷ In 1974-1977, Ethiopia entered a period of profound political change accompanied by violence by the army in June 1974; a body of military men (about 120) took over. For more details see A. B. & Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh. *African Military History and Politics*, 136.

Unexpectedly in 1974, something happened in Ethiopia. Without prior notice, the army ousted the King Haile Selassie. Colonel Mengistu led the coup and he remained in power from March 3, 1977-May 28, 1991. The King was the United States' regional ally since 1950s, and his army had been trained and equipped by the United States. However, the United States failed to help him during the uprising.³⁶⁸ The army's coup leaders disagreed, however, and after three years of serious internal power struggle among the junta's top commanders, Colonel Mengistu Haile Maryam finally emerged as the undisputed military ruler. The United States disapproved of his leadership and suspended its military assistance to Ethiopia on grounds of human rights violations. In retaliation Colonel Mengistu swiftly shut down the United States of America's Communication Center (in operation since 1953) and expelled all U.S. military personnel. This swift change produced many problems, including the U.S. and Ethiopia's disagreement. Additionally, on February 3, 1976, Colonel Mengistu proclaimed scientific socialism and swiftly approached the Soviets, which again affected Somalia and the Soviets' cordial relationship since the 1960s. Yesterday's enemies became friends for strategic reasons and the balance of power game. Colonel Mengistu's main objective was to reverse Ethiopia's political direction from the United States' bloc to the Soviet bloc. This U-turn directly affected the region's strategic shape. The U.S. and Ethiopia disagreed. The Soviets and Somalia disagreed too. These disagreements created a lot of trouble in the Horn of Africa. For a long time the Horn of Africa's geopolitical location has been the driving factor of global and regional powers' military and diplomatic confrontations. This is what was happening in the mid-1970s in the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, in 1975, the U.S. was out of the Horn of Africa because of its failure to

³⁶⁸The King signed a Mutual Defence Assistance agreement with the US at Addis Ababa, June 13, 1952. See the list of Treaties in Force, Available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/17524.pdf> (accessed 11 Jan. 2012).

assist the King, and the junta's proclamation to adhere to scientific socialism. Anti-Americanism prevailed through the region and at that time the most two strategic nations were in line with Soviet interests. Just as General Mohamed had proclaimed in 1970, Ethiopia's new military ruler Colonel Mengistu proclaimed that the only way to solve Ethiopia's socioeconomic problems was to adopt scientific socialism. The Ethiopians' proclaiming for socialism, in fact, was disturbing Somalia's strategic partnership exclusivity with the Soviets in the Horn of Africa. The Soviets were aware of General Mohamed's concerns, and they therefore showed some reluctance to welcome Colonel Mengistu's proclaiming for scientific socialism. At the beginning the Soviets were in a great dilemma; both military regimes (Somalia and Ethiopia) were equally proclaiming to adopt scientific socialism.

On May 4, 1976, Colonel Mengistu made an official visit to Moscow for talks with President Podgorny and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. He was able to establish a close relationship with the Soviets and he obtained a USD 300 million arms agreement as pointed out by Francis Samuel:³⁶⁹

A report of the arrival in Ethiopia in May, of 20-40 T-34 Soviet tanks, an equal number of armored personnel carriers, and artillery, and light arms from the U.S.S.R was confirmed, and 80 T-54 tanks were reported delivered in June (1976), and again on December 1976, a military delegation from Ethiopia went to Moscow and obtained a secret agreement for the purchase of over \$100 million in arms.

In fact, this purchase was against the terms of the Soviets-Somalia Friendship Treaty's principles. Then the Soviet's main objective was to sabotage the United States and Ethiopia's possible reappraisal, and Thomas P. Ofcansky said:³⁷⁰ "The Soviets designed to end Washington's virtual monopoly on arms supplies to Ethiopia." Nevertheless, Somalia's military ruler, General Mohamed started to worry about the Soviets' and

³⁶⁹Samuel, T. Francis. Conflict in the Horn of Africa: published by the Heritage Foundation, Archived Document # 24, July 13, 1977. This information is available at C:\Documents and Settings\Compaq\Desktop\Conflict in the Horn of Africa.htm. (accessed on May 27, 2009).

³⁷⁰ For more details see on Thomas P. Ofcansky. Ethiopia: A Country Study, 293.

Ethiopia's close relationship. To know what is going on in Moscow he decided to visit Moscow, but failed to produce any meaningful deal with the Soviets. He asked for more weapons, but the Soviets refused.. The Soviets justified their rejection on the grounds that Somalia was planning to invade Ethiopia. In fact, Somalia wanted to take advantage of Ethiopia's internal volatility. On his return from Moscow, General Mohamed was preparing a total war against Ethiopia. Ethiopia after the military coup was suffering two correlated crises. 1. Ethiopia's army was less equipped than Somalia's. 2. The Junta's internal power struggle was ongoing for over three years. Therefore, General Mohamed was opportunistically trying to get advance on time. Since 1963, the Soviets had been training and equipping Somalia's army with nationalism doctrine.

In 1976, the Soviets still had diplomatic contacts with Somalia and were aware of Somalia's preparations to invade Ethiopia, and as final effort to find out a possible solution (for containment) they mandated the Cuban leader Fidel Castro to carry out shuttle diplomacy. Fidel Castro visited the two rivals' capitals, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. Castro's main diplomatic instrument was to use scientific socialism as a diplomatic instrument to solve the two brotherly (Somalia and Ethiopia) states' disputes. He suggested that Somalia, Ethiopia and Southern Yemen form a socialist federation on both sides of the Red Sea. Straight away as Peter Bridges said: ³⁷¹"General Mohamed told Fidel Castro and Colonel Mengistu that Somalia would continue its course towards struggle as long as all Somalis have not yet received freedom." General Mohamed also was in a great dilemma. If he accepted Castro's diplomatic solution, he would be in trouble with his people. Since he came to power in 1969, he had portrayed himself as the champion of Greater Somalia's struggle and promised to use all necessary means, including force, to recapture lost territories. His people were very ready to sacrifice

³⁷¹ Bridges, Peter; Safiirka: An American Envoy, 65.

everything to achieve Greater Somalia, and now Somalia's army was well-armed than the Ethiopians. As well, if he refused Castro's suggestion he would be in more trouble with the Soviets. Therefore, Castro's diplomatic mission failed, but Somalia and the Soviets' friendship treaty still persevered. At the same time, the United States was establishing another secret diplomatic mission to the Horn of Africa to counter Castro's mission. The United States mandated the Saudis to carry out shuttle diplomacy to the Horn of Africa. They asked Saudi Arabia to persuade Somalia's military ruler to shut down the Soviets' military bases in Somalia in exchange for weaponry and cash from Washington and Riyadh. The Saudis were also feeling threatened by the Soviets' heavy presence in the Red Sea area. They worked very hard to sabotage the Soviets both in Somalia and Ethiopia. They developed an active policy of using petro-dollar diplomacy to pressure Somalia's military ruler to drive the Soviets out of Berbera's Naval Base, and they promised millions of dollars if he shut down the Soviets military bases in Somalia.³⁷² The Soviets were aware of the U.S. and the Saudis' sabotage, and according to Kenneth G. Weiss:³⁷³ "Saudi Arabia renewed its long-standing offer to give Mogadishu 300 million dollars to expel the Soviets." Then, the Soviet Union was expecting Somalia to nullify the Soviet and Somalia Friendship Treaty signed in 1974. Saudi Arabia convinced General Mohamed to close the Soviets' Naval Base in Berbera, and Habte Selassie Bereket has this to say:³⁷⁴ "When the Somalis failed to convince the Soviets to support them in the Ogaden, the convergence of interests, encourage by Saudi promises of limitless cash. As result of the Saudi and the United States of America's shuttle diplomacy on November 13, 1977, Somalia renounced its Soviet Friendship Treaty and severed its diplomatic relations with Cuba, which favored

³⁷²Weiss, Kenneth G. The Soviet Involvement in the Ogaden War. For more information see Steel, Jonathan' Steel's work on World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy, 240.

³⁷³Ibid. Weiss, Kenneth G.

³⁷⁴Selassie, Bereket Habte. Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1980, 157.

the U.S.'s interests in the region. Since then, the Horn of Africa's strategic alteration reshaped the Horn of Africa's geopolitical contest, its domestic politics, and the region's strategic alliance over years to come. The Soviets allied with Ethiopia, while the U.S. allied with Somalia. Yesterday's enemy is my friend today, it would seem. Nobody knew why the Soviets preferred Ethiopia over Somalia but in fact, the Ethiopians were very diplomacy-minded and Colonel Mengistu was a very progressive leader, and Mohamed Omar Osman has this to say:³⁷⁵ "Ethiopia's leader, Colonel Mengistu, wished Ethiopia to make a rapid transition towards socialism."

In reality, the Horn of Africa's strategic alteration was far greater than Somalia and Ethiopia's ability. The game was played out by superpowers and their agents, Cuba and Saudi Arabia, representing Western and Eastern blocs. The more superpowers contested over the Horn of Africa's geopolitical position, the more its geopolitical value increased. Thus, the Horn of Africa's strategic changes increased levels of conflict across the region for the next decade (1979-1989). The Soviets and the United States of America were providing weapons and cash to their respective regional allies.

As a result, Somalia's military supremacy and Ethiopia's internal political crisis together brought many problems to the Horn of Africa. Firstly, Ethiopia was in political crisis after the unexpected military coup in 1974. Secondly, the Soviets' advanced weaponry in Somalia created a strategic imbalance between the two countries, and in the mid-1970s Somalia was preparing to invade Ethiopia for Greater Somalia. Now let us to look at how these two factors (strategic imbalance and Ethiopia's coup) incited Somalia to go to war against Ethiopia and to attempt to challenge the Soviets during the invasion of 1977-1978.

³⁷⁵ Omar, Mohamed Osman. *Somalia A Nation Driven to Despair: A Case of Leadership Failure*, New Delhi, Somali Publications Co. Ltd, 1996, 13.

4.2.1.6. The Impact of the Horn of Africa's Strategic Change on Somalia

As mentioned earlier, to counter the Soviets' heavy presence in the Horn, President Carter's administration traded with Somalia's military rulers in exchange for military bases. For a few months after Soviets-Somalia's disagreement a complete diplomatic revolution took place in the Horn of Africa, with the United States replacing the Soviet Union as primary arms supplier to Somalia. Even before Mengistu's expulsion of MAAG on April 23, 1977, according to Bruce D. Porter:³⁷⁶ President Carter had instructed his Secretary of State and his National Security Advisor, to move in every possible way to befriend Somalia and then worked hard to convince Somalia to abort its friendship with Soviets in return for U.S. military and financial support. In July 1977, the United States announced its willingness to send Somalia defensive weapons, and according to Jonathon Steel's view:³⁷⁷ "This promise of weapons was a major factor that encouraged Somalia to challenge the Soviets." The United State of America's strategic objective was to try to kill two birds with one stone. First, they designed to end by all means the Soviet-Somalia Friendship Treaty, and second, to prevent the Soviets' grand strategy of confederating Somalia and Ethiopia. On September 23, 1977, *Newsweek* reported this:³⁷⁸ "A covert campaign was largely conducted through the mediation of Saudi Arabia and in July (1977) led to Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia with tens of thousands of troops, tanks and warplanes, and according to the report Somali President Mohamed had received secret U.S. assurances that the U.S. would not oppose further guerrilla pressure in the Ogaden and would consider sympathetically Somalia's legitimate defense needs." This *Newsweek* report demonstrates that Somalia mounted a major offensive in Ethiopia because of the U.S.'s promises via Saudi Arabia. Due to these

³⁷⁶Porter, Bruce D. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980*, 207-208.

³⁷⁷ Steel, Jonathan; *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy*, 241.

³⁷⁸Rozoff, Rick. *Cold War Origins of Somalia's Crisis and the Control of the Indian Oceans*. .

promises, Somalia deployed regular forces to invade Ethiopia, fully expecting the U.S. to supply arms just as the Soviets were supplying weapons to Ethiopia. Although controversial, substantial evidence shows that the U.S. offer was a part of a much larger global strategy, and according to Rick Rozzof:³⁷⁹ “In the beginning, the Carter Administration had barely moved into the White House when it began to bribe the governments of Somalia, Afghanistan, Egypt and Iraq into entering political and military alliances and in several cases giving notorious ‘green lights’ for military invasions of other nations.” In fact, the U.S. green-light and Somalia’s willingness to invade Ethiopia were taken as coincidentally common strategic interests.³⁸⁰ In 1977, Somalia was ready to retake its lost territory and on July 13, Somalia’s national army carried out a total offensive against Ethiopia.

Although Ethiopia’s army was larger in number (47,000) than the Somali army with 35,000, Somalia was better equipped. As we mentioned earlier, the Somali army outnumbered the Ethiopians in terms of tanks, combat aircraft, artillery, armor, and Armored Personnel Carriers (APC). The Ethiopians were not only less equipped, but much of their weaponry was inferior. Tareke Gebru said:³⁸¹ “Somalia had nearly three times as many tanks (250 T-35s & T 55s), which had larger guns, better armor, greater range, and more maneuverability than Ethiopia’s aging M-41 and M-47 tanks; in addition, Somalia had twice as many APCs.” In September of 1977, the Somalis’ army captured the key town of Jigjiga and the way lay open to the traditional Somali cities of Harar and Dire-Dawa, whose loss would be disastrous to Ethiopia. In less than three months (July-September 1977), Somalia’s army, using hundreds of Soviet tanks, showed superiority and captured most of the contested area, an area of Eastern Ethiopia inhabited by Somali

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰The Carter administration adopted the legally correct position that it would send Somalia no arms until it withdrew behind international borders. See more details: Dunbabin, J.P.D. 390.

³⁸¹ Gebru, Tareke. *The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited*, 638.

ethnic people.

On October 19, the Soviet ambassador in Addis Ababa announced that the Soviet Union had announced new arms shipments to Ethiopia.³⁸² Two days later, on October 21, 1977, Somalia's military ruler condemned the Soviets' decision to arm Ethiopia and in November of 1977, Somalia's Mission at the United Nations issued the following statement:³⁸³

The Soviet Union has unilaterally violated the letter and spirit of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 11 July 1974. The Somali government had no choice but to declare the Treaty invalid; revoke the land and naval facilities accorded to the Soviet Union; ask all Soviet military experts or civilian technical staff to leave the Somali Democratic Republic; ask for mutual reduction of embassy staff in Mogadishu and Moscow and to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Somalia was playing a great game of risk with the Soviets.

A few days later General Vasiley I. Petrov, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces, arrived in Addis Ababa to re-direct the war against the Somalis.³⁸⁴ By this time Somalia's forces occupied many cities; then the Soviet decided to defeat Somalia swiftly and to display extensive capabilities and in a very short time period. The Soviets supplied to Ethiopia eighty aircraft, 600 tanks, and 300 APCs with an estimated value of US \$1 billion, surpassing in a matter of months all United States' aid to Ethiopia over a period of twenty-five years.³⁸⁵ The Soviet's supply was very aggressive, and according to Richard Greenfield:³⁸⁶ "Special satellites were launched to guide the airlift and gather intelligence. The materials supplied included ground-to-ground missiles, howitzer batteries, Stalin-organs (40-122 MB-21 rocket launchers mounted on Ural 375 trucks) and other artillery, T55 and T62 tanks, radar towers and mobile radar equipment, airlift

³⁸²See Bridges, Peter; Safiirka, 66. The same day, October 19, 1977, the Soviet ambassador to Ethiopia issued a statement announcing the formal cessation of arms deliveries to Somalia.

³⁸³Ridiker, Ezekiel. The Ogaden: A Microcosm of Global Conflict, published in The Concord Review, 212. Available at http://www.tcr.org/tcr/essays/EPrize_Ogaden.pdf. (accessed 1 Mar. 2011).

³⁸⁴Weiss, Kenneth G. The Soviet Involvement in the Ogaden War.

³⁸⁵Rinehart, Robert. Ethiopia's National Security, (edited by) Nelson, Harold D. & Irving Kaplan; Ethiopia a Country Study, Washington: Library of Congress, 1991, 262.

³⁸⁶Greenfield, Richard. Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor, 112.

construction equipment and electric fencing, Sukhoi fighter bombers, MiG 21s and 23s, helicopter gunships and massive quantities of fuel, rockets and ammunitions.”

In addition, on the ground between November 1977 and February 1978, about 15,000 Cuban troops and 1,500 Soviet advisors were sent to Ethiopia, and by the end of March 1978 they had liberated the contested areas.³⁸⁷ For this period of the Somalia-Ethiopian War, the Soviets displayed its muscle to show this war was not a war between two Third World countries; it was, to the contrary, a superpower showdown. Besides the massive Soviet support, the Ethiopians also received military assistance from other socialist nations, including East Germany, North Korea, Southern Yemen and Libya. On March 19, 1978, General Mohamed announced that Somalia’s regular forces had withdrawn from Ethiopia. He accepted defeat. The damage was too huge, both in terms of cost of human life and military equipment, and according to Rick Rozzof’s estimates:³⁸⁸ “Somalia lost one-third of its army, three-eighths of its armored units and half of its air force.” Somalia was defeated diplomatically and militarily. Initially General Mohamed and his advisors failed to properly assess the Cold War’s underlying factors, which included not rocking the boat by changing international boundaries by force. Superpowers agreed not to change any political boundary by force. General Mohamed’s vital mistake was belittling the Soviets’ grandeur by trying to undermine their global prestige. Also, General Mohamed and his close generals misread the U.S.’s signals as a sign of willingness to arm Somalia. Kenneth G. Weiss says they failed to evaluate and simply believed the U.S. was saying:³⁸⁹ “Go ahead and we are ready to supply arms if you shut down the Soviet military bases in your country”. America’s main objective wasn’t to arm Somalia but rather to sabotage its friendship with the Soviets. To some analysts, the U.S. betrayed Somalia, but still this view is controversial. Although the U.S. disagreed with Ethiopia’s

³⁸⁷For further details see on Young John and John Kent. *International Relations since 1945*, 469.

³⁸⁸ Rozzof, Rick. *The Crisis in Somalia*.

³⁸⁹For more details see Kenneth G Weiss.

military regime, it was not ready to support Somalia's nationalism. During the War in 1977-1978, the United States of America and Somalia's diplomatic views were not congruent. The United States remained neutral through the conflict, and its neutrality was directly in line with Ethiopia's political interests.

In contrast, Ethiopia's military ruler, Colonel Mengistu, was smart enough to maneuver diplomatically to isolate Somalia's military ruler. In fact, Ethiopia's military ruler understood that his rival's irredentism was not in line with either Moscow's or Washington's foreign policy at all. Furthermore, the Soviets and Ethiopia signed a Twenty-Year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in November 1978.³⁹⁰ In reality, Somalia and Ethiopia could never have fought such a war without the superpowers' military and economic support in exchange for military bases. It is to be understood that the Soviets spent millions of dollars to build up Somalia's army over 15 years; however, it then destroyed Somalia's army in three months for the sake of its own strategic interests. In due course, the Soviets accused Somalia of transgressing the United Nations Charter's principles and in fact, the Charter rules out the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state.³⁹¹ In fact, to abort the Soviets-Somalia Friendship Treaty during the war was a vital error, and of course to go to war against Ethiopia without a proper guarantee from the U.S. was a grave mistake.

4.2.2. The Role of the U.S. in Somalia's Politics

4.2.2.1. Geopolitical and Balance of Power Pursuit

Somalia and United States of America signed a treaty of friendship during General Mohamed's Second Period (1979-1991). In the Horn of Africa, the U.S. had always been an ally to Somalia's neighbor Ethiopia. However, after the coup many including

³⁹⁰ Ofcansky, Thomas P. Ethiopia: A Country Study, 294.

³⁹¹ Bennett, A. Leroy. International Organizations, the United Nations' Charter, see Article VII.

the King, royal family members and senior officials were killed by the military ruler, Colonel Mengistu. On February 24, 1977, the U.S. Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, proposed to the Senate Foreign Relation Committee that military aid to Ethiopia should be reduced because of human rights violations (the murder of the King and royal family). In response, on April 23, 1977, Ethiopia's military ruler ordered the expulsion of the entire MAAG (US's Military Advisory Assistant Group in Ethiopia) and closed the Kagnew Communication Station Center which, at the time, was the largest communication station in the world. The U.S. developed facilities and manned them with 4,000 military personal in order to monitor the Soviets' radio communications throughout the region.³⁹² A week later, Colonel Mengistu flew to Moscow to formalize new relations with the Soviets.³⁹³ The U.S. then tried to reappraise its position and attempted to increase its economic and military aid to Ethiopia, but failed to prevent Ethiopia's turn towards the Soviets.³⁹⁴ Colonel Mengistu rejected the United States' attempt to restore the two countries' diplomatic relations. Moreover, the Russians had steadily increased their military presence by proxy near the strategically vital Arabian Peninsula (notably in Ethiopia and Southern Yemen), blandly disregarding the U.S's. concerns.³⁹⁵ Then, the United States of America was out of the Horn of Africa; therefore, the U.S. was very ready to make a deal with General Mohamed in 1979. President Jimmy Carter publicly asked his senior advisors:³⁹⁶ "to move in every possible way to get Somalia to be our friend, with an offer of arms assistance founded on an optimistic premise that the Soviet Union would be unable to ride both Somalian and Ethiopian horses." Luckily, General Mohamed was more ready than anybody else to make a deal with the U.S.

³⁹² See History of United States of America's Relations with Ethiopia', published online by the All GOV. Available at <http://www.allgov.com/nation/Ethiopia>. (accessed 10 Jan. 2112).

³⁹³ Porter, Bruce D. The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local War 1945-1980, 207-208.

³⁹⁴ See Bruce D. Porter. The USSR in Third World Conflicts, p. 205.

³⁹⁵ Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle: Memories of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981, New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983, p. 316.

³⁹⁶ Spencer, John H. Ethiopia: the Horn of Africa and US Policy, p. 62.

Historically, Somalia-U.S diplomatic relations can be divided into two periods, from 1960-1978 for normal relations, and 1979-1989 for strategic friendship. For the first period, the U.S. made diplomatic contacts with Somalis during the UN/Italy Trusteeship and opened its first consulate in 1957 three years before Somalia became independent. Immediately in 1960, the U.S. established formal diplomatic relations with Somalia and appointed Andrew G. Lynch as Charge“ d“Affaires ad Interim. Four days later he was promoted to Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.³⁹⁷In the early 1960s, Somalia needed U.S.’s foreign aid, while the U.S. was interested because of its geopolitical location. The U.S.’s main interest towards Somalia was to prevent the Soviets gaining a foothold in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, they were not free from the Cold War’s geopolitical contests. The Soviets also were eyeing Somalia’s geopolitical location. Somalia was caught between Moscow’s and Washington’s strategic courtship; for a short period, Somalia was neither pro-West nor pro-East. However, gradually Somalia was turning to the Soviet bloc for weaponry to achieve Greater Somalia. As mentioned earlier, in November 1962, Somalia’s Premier Abdul Rashid Ali paid his first official visit to Washington. The Premier met the U. S.’s President Kennedy at the White House and asked him for military assistance. However, the U.S. offered only US 11 million in financial assistance and refused to offer any meaningful military assistance. The Premier wasn’t happy with the U.S.’s offer, and as expected he turned to the Soviets. As a result, Somalia and the U.S.’s diplomatic relations were kept at a very low profile. The U.S.’s rejection to arm Somalia was justifiable, as the U.S. had already signed a Defense Agreement with Ethiopia in 1953, which obligated adherence to it. In addition, Somalia’s nationalism with Greater Somalia against Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and

³⁹⁷Peter Bridges America’s Ambassador to Somalia in 1984-86 said: most of our African embassies in Africa had at one point or another been headed by a political appointee, but all eight of our previous ambassadors to Somalia had come from career Foreign Service. 57.

the U.S.'s favoritism to Ethiopia caused widespread belief among Somalis that the U.S. was arming Ethiopia against Somalia. In fact, in the early 1960s, the U.S. was supporting Ethiopia and according to Peter Bridges:³⁹⁸ U.S support and the large scale of her aid for Ethiopia- more than any other African state. For this reason, in the early 1960s, there had been a demonstration against the U.S.'s embassy in Mogadishu because of its military aid to Ethiopia. Since then, the U.S. and Somalia's diplomatic relations remained minimal (1960-1979). Somalia aligned itself with the Soviets for military assistance, but surprisingly also maintained a reasonable relationship with the U.S. for financial aid. In 1969, after the military seized power, Somalia became a purely pro-Soviet state and after three months in power, General Mohamed expelled the America's Peace Corp, after which the U.S. cut off all economic aid to Somalia in May of 1970.³⁹⁹

The U.S. maintained a low profile with Somalia, leaving it to the Soviets. Hence, for many years, Somalia did have a good relationship with the United States of America until the Horn of Africa's strategic alteration in 1977-1978.

Luckily, Somalia annulled its Friendship Treaty with the Soviets, and General Mohamed was ready to make a deal with the U.S. Interestingly, the U.S. was eager to replace the Soviets, and according to Christopher Clapham:⁴⁰⁰

Because of the Cold War; rulers in zones of high insecurity, such as the Horn, did indeed have some choice over which superpower to align with, but not over the possibility of aligning with neither. In calculating their policies, they therefore had to consider the advantages and costs of commitment to one side or the other within their own specific situation.

In this respect, Somalia's military ruler and the U.S made a deal that allowed the United States of America to take over Berbera's Naval Base in exchange for financial and military support.

³⁹⁸ There is no doubt whatsoever that the Americans regarded Ethiopia as a safe bastion for the West. We were privileged to visit Ethiopia and have an audience with the Emperor and meet all leading politicians. See: Bernard Braine's prophecy on Somalis suspicions as to western favor for Ethiopia, 44.

³⁹⁹ For more details see John Markakis on Radical Military Regimes in the Horn of Africa, 22.

⁴⁰⁰ Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the International System: The Political Survival, 140.

4.2.2.2. The Arc of Crisis's Geopolitical Factor

What is the major factor that attracted the U.S. to Somalia? The answer may be controversial; however, the Arc of Crises' geopolitical factor is very dominant. In 1979, the Soviet military invaded Afghanistan, and then the Arc of Crises' geopolitical views come out. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan was posing a real threat to the U.S.'s military and economic interests in the Middle East. Therefore, The U.S. was desperate to overcome this problem and was ready to make a deal with Somalia for the balance of power in 1979.

Generally, while the U.S. was contemplating making a deal with Somalia's General Mohamed, suddenly the Shah of Iran fell in 1979, followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Therefore, 1979, was a year of fear. On January 16 the Shah fled, and two weeks later on February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini flew from Paris to lead the revolution and on February 11, 1979, the Shah's fall was secured. Almost one year later on April 7, 1980, the U.S. broke its relations with Iran, and on April 17 additionally declared economic sanctions against the new Iran regime.⁴⁰¹ Meanwhile, nearby Afghanistan was occupied by more than 100,000 Soviets' troops, and the new Iranian government became a radically anti-American fundamentalist regime that seized fifty-two American officials as hostages in the embassy in Tehran.⁴⁰² These events created many difficulties, including the possibility that may the Soviets could now move freely from Afghanistan through to the Arabian Gulf Oil States, the West's source of energy. Fears were also heightened by a series of Soviet military exercises that had as their objective a postulated invasion of Iran and subsequent march to the Gulf.⁴⁰³ The Arabs asked the U.S. to do something, as they rightly feared the Soviets' invasion via Iran because prior to the

⁴⁰¹For more details see Zbigniew Brzezinski on Power and Principle, 402.

⁴⁰²Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, 763.

⁴⁰³Jonson, Thomas R. American Cryptology during the Cold War, 251.

Shah's fall, Iran had been a buffer or shield against the Soviets. The U.S. reassessed the greater Middle East's geopolitical dynamics. The Arc of Crisis' geopolitical importance was identified. Therefore, thanks to this Arc of Crisis, from the military view, the Horn (Somalia) became the best position for U.S. Central Command's (CENTCOM) military operations. Somalia's geopolitical location was within the zone of operations of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). CENTCOM's responsibility for military operation included Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁴⁰⁴ Thus, the Arc of Crises is an area stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the Horn of Africa. As such, in order to overcome this immense threat, the U.S. should establish a good military relationship with Somalia's military ruler, even though the Department of State felt that if the U.S. made a military deal with Somalia, inevitably the U.S. would become involved in a dispute with Ethiopia (now backed by the Soviets) and Somalia. From a different viewpoint, the U.S.'s National Security Advisor Brzezinski advocated that the U.S. make a deal with Somalia, for the balance of power is very strategic, however, Peter Bridges said:⁴⁰⁵ "that the Soviets had a grand design for Africa and the Red Sea region was not a shared perspective by others in Carter's Administration; notably, Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance". Later Zbigniew Brzezinski coined the phrase: Arc of Crises. The regional debate now centered on efforts to solve complex problems in the Horn via traditional methods. In different views: one side was concerned with the Horn's interrelationships with global geopolitical concerns while others sought to evaluate U.S. policy options within the regional context.⁴⁰⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski lobbied "the Arc of

⁴⁰⁴Kemp, Geoffrey and Robert Harkavy. *Strategic Geography and Changing Middle East*: Brooking Press, 1997, Reprinted by Brooking Institute Press. Available at http://acc.teachmideast.org/texts.php?module_id=4&reading_id=120&print=1 (September 11, 2015).

⁴⁰⁵ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 63.

⁴⁰⁶Yohannes, Okbazghi. *Eritrea: A Pawn in the World Politics*, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1991, 230. Also see Marina Ottaway: *Soviet and American influence in the Horn of Africa* and Henry Bienen, *perspectives on Soviet intervention in Africa*, *Science Quarterly* (95), No.1 (Spring 1980), 29-42.

Crises” vitality to emphasize the possible links between the Soviets’ presence in the Horn and its invasion of Afghanistan. His major argument was that the Soviets’ military expedition from Afghanistan through to the Persian Gulf and Horn of Africa was vital to the Soviets’ grand strategy, comprised of flanking maneuvers that threatened Western interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. His position only added to the tensions and brought no resolution.⁴⁰⁷ In fact, the Soviets had numerous military bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen, and he stressed that the Soviets’ major motivation included control of the so-called Arc of Crisis and undermining U.S. influence throughout the entire Arabian Peninsula. In fact, in the 1980s, the Middle East’s balance of power was in favour of the Soviets’ strategic interests; furthermore, the Cold War eclipsed the detente of the early 1970s. Therefore, the newly elected President, Jimmy Carter, demanded a reversal of the invasion of Afghanistan and threatened the Soviets:⁴⁰⁸ “Unless you draw back...this will inevitably jeopardize the course of the Soviet-U.S. relationship throughout the world.” Yet again, in 1980s, another scenario appeared. The three states of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan were all unstable internally. If the Soviets succeeded in Afghanistan and the long dream of Moscow of having direct access to the Indian Ocean had been fulfilled. it could bring the Soviet presence right down to the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulf.⁴⁰⁹ Thus, the Soviets’ presence both in Afghanistan and Ethiopia was a direct threat to the U.S.’s strategic position in the Arabian Peninsula. All these fears taken together pushed the U.S. to ally with Somalia’s military ruler, and according to the U.S. ambassador to Somalia:⁴¹⁰ “We could not ignore the Soviets’ presence in Ethiopia and Southern Yemen, at the southern approaches to the Red Sea and to the Suez Canal. This means that Brzezinski’s views and analyses were accepted by the U.S.’s. think

⁴⁰⁷ Kremenyuk, Victor A. *The Cold War As Cooperation: A Soviet Perspective*, London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1991, 51.

⁴⁰⁸ See the Innocents Aboard: American Presidents and Foreign Policy. Available at <http://library.thinkquest.org/C006287/jcinc.htm> (accessed on May 12, 2012).

⁴⁰⁹ Dunbabin. J.P.D. *The Cold War: The Greater Powers and their Allies*, 395.

⁴¹⁰ Bridges, Peter; Safiirka: *An America’s Envoy*, 67.

tanks, and the U.S. truly feared that the Soviets might outflank them in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. For the first time, the entire region of the Greater Middle East had come under imminent risk. The Middle East's oil and geopolitical position were vitally important to U.S. national interests, both economically and militarily. In addition, at the southwest tip of the Arabian Peninsula is Southern Yemen, the only Arab communist country that provided the Soviets with a naval base on its island of Socotra. When added to communist Ethiopia, the Soviets then possessed the theoretical ability to close the Bab Al-Mandab and cut traffic through the Suez Canal.⁴¹¹ Strategically, if the U.S. ignored this risk, its regional allies (rich Arab oil producers) would view America as impotent, and the price of oil would increase. Previously, the northeast frontier of Turkey and northern frontiers of Iran and Pakistan, as well as the neutral buffer of Afghanistan, had created a formidable barrier that was now pierced when Iran ceased to be an American ally.⁴¹² As a result of this pessimism, U.S. security strategists viewed the Horn of Africa as a possible location for launching military campaigns in the Middle East.⁴¹³ In his State of the Union Address in January of 1979, President Jimmy Carter said:⁴¹⁴ "Let our position be absolutely clear ... an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force." The Red Sea oil trade and Arc of Crises' links were extremely complex, and America worried that the Soviets might decide to make a military push into the Indian Ocean and encircle the Arabian Peninsula's energy resources. The U.S.'s ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges said:⁴¹⁵

We need to keep in mind that any American supply facilities in the Horn of Africa would be a good fifteen hundred miles by sea from Baluchistan, in southern Pakistan, the likely site of confrontation with the Soviet army if it moved towards sea. Yet Baluchistan was only

⁴¹¹Roskin, Michael and Nicholas Berry. *An Introduction to International Relations*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1990, 244.

⁴¹² Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle*, 356.

⁴¹³ Murphy, T. Craig. *The Collapsed of Somalia and Economic Considerations*.

⁴¹⁴ Jonson, Thomas R. *American Cryptology*, 251. (Ibid).

⁴¹⁵ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 134.

four hundred miles from nearest railhead and supply bases inside the Soviet Union. We would therefore be at a serious logistical disadvantage in a conflict, and the value of possible American supply dumps or other facilities in Somalia was, to say the least, very questionable.

It is very clear that the U.S. wanted Somalia's naval bases, especially if a third global war was launched. Somalia's geopolitical location was within the zone of operations of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), created on 1 January 1983 to command Rapid Deployment Forces. This special force was established to defend the oil-rich region, and America's Ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges has this to say:⁴¹⁶ "I knew that CENTCOM had ideas about a possible United States buildup in the Horn of Africa, in the context of our possible need to contest Soviet forces on the ground in southwest Asia and Berbera's Naval Base would also be available for possible use by our military, as our agreement with the Somali government provided, if an international crisis ever came." In fact, as T. Craig Murphy pointed out, the U.S.'s policy in Somalia in the late 1970s and 80s was focused on its strategic proximity to the Middle East.⁴¹⁷ Somalia faces the Red Sea, and its geopolitical location was an ideal location for U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to prevent Soviet moves from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea.

As a consequence of Brzezinski's geopolitical interpretation of his Arc of Crises' dynamics, the Cold War's theater shifted from Europe to the Indian Ocean, and Chandara Prakash had this to say:⁴¹⁸ the Cold War's theatre shifted from Europe and East Asia to West Asia, the Indian Ocean, and finally, to the Pacific region. All of these complex dynamics (at regional and global levels) pushed the U.S. into signing a military agreement with Somalia's military ruler. The game was very complex. The logic was this: if Washington lost then Moscow gained and vice versa. Consequent to all of these dynamics, Somalia became a hot cake.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., 114 & 134.

⁴¹⁷ Murphy, T. Craig. *The Collapse of Somalia and Economic Considerations*.

⁴¹⁸ Prakash, Chandra. *International Relations*, 18.

4.2.2.3. Somalia and U.S's Military Friendship

Mutual Interests

As no global strategist can ignore the Horn's geopolitical importance, the bargaining started quickly and Somalia and the U.S. signed a Strategic Friendship Agreement on April 29, 1978.⁴¹⁹ This agreement took place only after 128 days after the Soviet-Somalia Friendship Treaty's failure. The United States offered economic and military aid to General Mohamed in return for the use of Berbera by its Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.⁴²⁰ And according to James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver:⁴²¹ "The U.S. announced a cost of over US \$150 million to purchase military base rights in Somalia". The U.S. maintained a military presence in the Somalia for the next ten years (1979-1989) and General Mohamed then enjoyed the reprieve of friendship status with the Americans.⁴²² Thus, as the Horn of Africa's value increased, Brzezinski's worldview dominated the global scenario and some measure of policy coherence was achieved.⁴²³ In fact, in his first period, (1969-1978), General Mohamed's public support primarily was because of his promise to achieve Greater Somalia. However, this aspiration evaporated after Somalia's army lost the war under his leadership. His opponents were accusing him of plunging the state into a political abyss by throwing Somalia into an aimless war. In fact, General Mohamed during his first period was inciting the people to fight for Greater Somalia, and Ruth Iyob has this to say:⁴²⁴ Pan-Somalism became a domestic and foreign policy that allowed

⁴¹⁹Ibid. U.S. State Department's official website.

⁴²⁰Ibid. Meith, N. The State of Environment in Somalia: A Desk Study by the United Nations Environment Programme".

⁴²¹Jammes A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System, 73.

⁴²²Ibid. Perlez, Jane. 'Heavy Fighting Erupted in Somalia Capital',

⁴²³ Jammes, A. Nathan & James K. Oliver. Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1983, 72.

⁴²⁴Iyob, Ruth. The Foreign Policies of the Horn: the Clash between the Old and New; also Khadiagala, Gilbert M. & Terrence Lyons (ed.); African Foreign Policies: Power and Process, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2001, 116.

the country to fall prey to the authoritarian rule of a strong man like Siad Barre (General Mohamed). Therefore, after the failure to rchieve Greater Somalia under his leadership, General Mohamed faced numerous challenges from different directions; at the domestic level, the public was expecting him to step down because of his leadership failure. At the regional level, the Ethiopians started to arm his political enemies, and lastly at the global level, General Mohamed became a pariah regime after he disagreed with the Soviets. Therefore, in 1979, there was nothing else left for him to do except to make a deal with Washington, offering military bases in exchange for financial and military support. General Mohamed in his second period was a in weak position and was very close to collapse; nonetheless, the United States' financial and military support enabled him to remain in power for another 10 years. The United States of America was offering additional aid to General Mohamed if he confronted any obstacles as described by Peter Bridges:⁴²⁵ "Our total aid to the country was running at around US\$ 120 million a year, the largest set of American aid programs in sub-Sahara Africa". Therefore, from 1980 to 1989, General Mohamed's regime received from the U.S nearly over one billion dollars for financial aid and military support in exchange for use of Berbera's Naval Base. In fact, he was happy with his diplomatic courtship with the U.S. and thanks to his country's geopolitical location, he was just cashing in.

Thus, in the early 1980s, the U.S.-Somalia diplomatic relationship became more cordial and then even stronger during President Reagan's tenure (1981-1989). Through the years the U.S. agreed to support Somalia's national army in various ways such as providing training and supplying equipment. On June 6. 1981, the U.S. and Somalia signed an agreement concerning the Provision of Training related to defense articles under the United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program.⁴²⁶ This plan was to

⁴²⁵ Bridges, Peter; Safiirka: An American Envoy, 60.

⁴²⁶ See U.S.-Somali"s Treaties and Agreements.

upgrade Somalia's defense leadership and train them in the use of U.S. military weapons. In mid-1980s, the Cold War escalated after President Reagan's administration announced the Star War's Program. This announcement gave the Horn of Africa even more strategic value. General Mohamed was in trading in and the two national armies were working closely. Furthermore, General Mohamed made an official state visit to Washington and met President Reagan with a full state welcome and one-to-one talks.⁴²⁷ As a result, the U.S. and Somalia's military cooperation increased after a delegation led by the Deputy Defense Secretary and high military officials visited Somalia and reached agreements with Somalia's Ministry of Defense to forge co-operation for defense. Top U.S. military officials visiting Somalia included: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Taft; two successive CENTCOM commanders, General Robert Kingston and George Crist; and the Commander of the Seventh Fleet, Admiral Paul McCarthy (based in Japan).⁴²⁸ Besides Berbera Naval Base, the U.S.'s top military generals identified another strategic location at the tip of the Horn of Africa, Ras Hafun. CENTCOM's Commander-in-Chief General George Crist visited the site twice and according to the US Ambassador, General Crist's staff suggested building a large military base at Ras Hafun, which was barren, but the tableland was flat and protected by cliffs and sea, and would afford good security. The idea was to create a major logistical base that could support operations further east, presumably against Soviet forces.⁴²⁹ Also, to strengthen their relations, America and Somalia agreed to establish a Somalia and U.S. Military Coordination Unit whose key role was to identify defense and intelligence matters. Within a short period, Somalia's senior military officers were sent to the U.S.'s military academies for further military education. At home, both armies held annual joint military

⁴²⁷ Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 101.

⁴²⁸ *Ibid*, 96.

⁴²⁹ The problem was that the U.S.'s military generals didn't inform General Mohamed of their military survey on Somalia's strategic locations, thus, this military survey was dishonoring Somalia's sovereignty. See Peter Bridges, *An American Envoy*. 166.

exercises in Somalia. In August of 1985, the Annual Bright Star Joint Military Exercise invited regional forces, notably Egypt.⁴³⁰ Additionally, the Pentagon agreed to build a High-Tech Command, Control and Communication Center in Mogadishu. This project's main strategy was ostensibly to strengthen Somalia's defense capability. The U.S. ambassador said:⁴³¹ We are helping Somalia defend itself against Ethiopia, whose large units of troops and tanks along the border were a serious threat. In other word, because of its geopolitical location, the U.S. was generous to Somalia's army, as the U.S. poured in more than \$50 million of arms annually to prop up Somalia's military ruler.⁴³²

4.2.2.4. The U.S's Non-Military Aid to Somalia

The U.S. non-military aid to Somalia began earlier, and the U.S was supplying a large quantity of free food and financial grants or credits to Somalia's Central Bank. However, the U.S.'s non-military assistance increased during the period of U.S and Somalia's friendship, 1980-1990. The aid increased after Somalia accepted the U.S.'s instruction to accept the World Bank and IMF's Structural Readjustment Program as a condition for receiving more aid. The roles of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank are defined as follows:⁴³³ "The IMF's main concern is short-term adjustments of a country to external disequilibrium; in that case, the IMF grants loans so that the country in question may correct the disequilibrium in its balance of payments. The World Bank also endeavors to support growth and economic development. To this end it extends loans for specific capital investment and development projects". These institutions appear to have been founded by powerful states to deal with Third World economic problems by taking measures that presumably include reforms towards effective economic development. In the 1980s,

⁴³⁰Ibid., 96.

⁴³¹Ibid., 80.

⁴³²For more details see Stephen, Zusen, Somalia as a Military Target, published by Foreign Policy on Focus, 11 Jan. 2002.

⁴³³ Borchert, Manfred & Rolf Schinke. Conclusion on the Present International Debt Crisis, International Indebtedness, London and New York: published by Routledge, 1990, 251.

Somalia was categorized by the World Bank/IMF as absolutely poor; a term used by the World Bank to describe developing nations whose peoples are forced to below statistically calculated subsistence levels.⁴³⁴ Throughout the 1980s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund's institutions overwhelmed Somalia's financial institutions. They advised Somalia's Central Bank to follow strict instructions in accordance with their Structural Adjustment Program. The IMF and World Bank imposed on Somalia what can only be described as disgraceful terms.⁴³⁵ Somalia bowed because of the support given by Washington. It was claimed that the Structural Adjustment Program would strengthen the local currency against foreign currencies, but what happened was the exact reverse. The U.S. was ignoring the World Bank/IMF's ill-advised warnings given throughout the 1980s by Somalia's economists. They adopted wrong economic measures that plunged Somalia into economic chaos.⁴³⁶ These institutions focused more on the exchange rate as their main instrument of support for Somalia's failing economy, or so they claimed. But what actually happened was that they steadfastly increased their power to weaken the Central Bank's ability to resist their demand to determine the local currency's value against the US dollar. The entire Structural Adjustment model was premised on a single-minded, anti-statist premise that included direct and indirect attacks on the social expenditures of the state.⁴³⁷ Gradually, the local currency was losing its value. From 1980 to 30 June 1981, the Somali shilling exchange rate was 16.50/1USD, however, by 1 Jan. 1990, it was 929.50SS/1USD; and on 31 Dec. 1990 it was 3,470 SS/1USD.⁴³⁸ Clearly the Structural Adjustment Program was, in reality,

⁴³⁴Tetzlaff, Rainer. LLDC's: Least Developed Countries: The Fourth World in Debt Trap; Altvater, Elmar, Kurt Hubner, Jochen Lorentzen, Raul Rojas. (trans. Terry Bond). *The Poverty of Nations: A Guide to the Debt Crisis—from Argentina to Zaire*, London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd, 1991, 159.

⁴³⁵ For extensive discussion see Christopher Clapham's *Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival*, 163-186.

⁴³⁶ For more details see Stephen, Zunes. *Somalia as a Military Target*.

⁴³⁷ Olukoshi, Adebayo O. *Economic Crisis, Multipartyism, and Opposition Politics in Contemporary Africa; & The Politics of opposition in Contemporary Africa*, Stockholm: Printed in Sweden by Elanders Gotab, 1998, 21.

⁴³⁸ Schuler, Kurt. *Somalia: Tables of Modern Monetary System*. Available at <http://users.erols.com/kurrency/so.htm> (accessed 2 Oct. 2010).

designed to destroy quickly Somalia's decaying economy. John Perkins, one of the World Bank and IMF's experts, has this to say in his *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man*:

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We seldom resort to anything illegal because the system is built on subterfuge, and the system is by definition legitimate... However, if we fail, a more sinister breed steps in ... the jackals: men who trace their heritage to earlier empires. They are always there, lurking in the shadows. When they emerge, heads of state are overthrown or die in violent accidents'. And if by chance the jackals fail ... then the old models resurface and young Americans are sent in to kill and to die.

There is no reason to deny John Perkins' declaration of guilt, since he knew what kind of advice they provided. For instance, because of the World Bank and IMF's bad advice, in less than seven years Somalia's shilling was devalued from USD 1 = 16.50 to USD 1 = 3,470. The Somali shilling lost almost 210% of its original value. Somalia's local currency became worthless, and according to Benjamin Powell and Ryan Ford:⁴⁴⁰ "During the late 90s, Somalia's Central Bank expanded the amount of currency in circulation from 3.8 billion Somali Shillings (SoSh) in 1985, to more than 155.7 billion SoSh in 1990." The shilling's devaluation halted public services and led to hikes in the price of fuel, fertilizer and sundry other farm equipment. The impact on agricultural products was immediate, particularly in grain-fed agriculture as well as in regions requiring irrigation.⁴⁴¹ But the worst thing was when the U.S. supplied free food to compensate for shortages, a kind of welfare system that destroyed what little local agricultural incentive remained. Even worse, in 1985 Somalia's external debt burden exceeded 1.5 billion.⁴⁴² How strange it was then, after a seven-year marathon of bad advice from the World Bank and IMF's staff, that Washington)accused Somalia of being unable to meet

⁴³⁹ *Confessions of an Economic Hit Man* by John Perkins, Penguin, 2006, page N/A.

⁴⁴⁰ Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford and Alex Now. Somalia of the State Collapses, *Journal of Economic Behavior*, Vol. 67 (2008), 657-670.

⁴⁴¹ Chossudovsky, Michael. *The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order*, 96.

⁴⁴² *Africa South of the Sahara: the Burden of Debt Tables* (1985). For more details see *On the Poverty of Nations*, 266-268.

their demands and based on their own assessment, they withdrew from Somalia in 1987. Somalia went bankrupt because of its economic weakness and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's ill advice in the 1980s.

4.22.5. General Outcome

As we mentioned earlier, we divided General Mohamed's military rule into two periods. His first period (1969- 1978) was tied up with the Soviets and signed a military treaty and again in his second period (1978-1991), he was tied up with the U.S. and signed military treaty with the U.S. These ties with global powers were affecting Somalia's domestic politics. This research first assessed the role of the Soviets in Somalia's politics. The research then investigated the Soviets' free weapons, financial support and strategic advice's effects on Somalia's domestic affairs, particularly society's makeup, economic policy, the security sector and the establishment of the Soviet-style one-party system. Secondly, the research also assessed the role of the U.S in Somalia's politics (1979-1991). The research investigated how the U.S.'s military, financial support and strategic advice affected Somalia's domestic politics. Similarly, the research asked how General Mohamed's regime attempted to adjust his domestic policies with his patrons, the Soviets and the U.S. For General Mohamed's second period, of course, Somalia already was in crisis since 1977-1978. In fact, Somalia was nation at war with itself from 1978-1991. General Mohamed was concerned with multiple challenges from different levels, but Ethiopia's arming his enemy was exceptionally troubling. The Ethiopians were training General Mohamed's political foe and allowing them to operate from Ethiopia to end his military rule. Besides his problem with Ethiopia and his lack of political legitimacy, the U.S. pressured the General (1) to reduce his defense spending, (2) to accept the free market and (3) to recognize Ethiopia's territorial integrity; accepting these were pre-conditions for US's financial support and weapons. It's clear the U.S. remained committed to the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and opposed Somalia's

irredentism in the Horn.⁴⁴³ The U.S. was pressuring Somalia to abandon its nationalism against Ethiopia. Essentially, the U.S. again was trying to advise Somalia to stop demanding Greater Somalia against Ethiopia. In the early 1960s, Somalia had the option to reject the U.S.'s advice, but in 1979-1991 the times had changed. The problem was that neither the Soviets nor the U.S. were ready to support Somalia's Greater Somalia against Ethiopia. Therefore, General Mohamed had no space to maneuver but to bow and consequently, he revised his first period's political model in order to adjust to the U.S.'s political interests. Simply he accepted (1) the impossibility of achieving "Greater Somalia" within the current nation-state system; (2) he abandoned his socialist economic policy and accepted the free market; (3) the U.S. did not pressure Somalia to accept a multiparty political system. The U.S. conveniently closed its eyes to allow him to freely oppress his people. However, after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. opened its eyes to his human rights violations and stopped financing him. In less than one year, General Mohamed's regime failed.

3.4. The Impacts of Regional Politics on Somalia's Failure: Somalia and Ethiopia's Rivalry

The Horn of Africa's military rivalry is very vital, particularly Somalia and Ethiopia's rivalry. Therefore, it is very vital to examine how this endless rivalry contributed to the failure of Somalia. The region's rivalry originated from two broad areas. First, the rivalry began between two or more states in the region, say Somalia and Ethiopia. Secondly, the rivalry began as the superpowers' geopolitical rivalry however, this section deals with the region's own rivalries, and in this regard, let us first highlight the Horn of Africa's physical shape and its geopolitical position or location.

⁴⁴³ Lefebvre, Jeffrey A. The United States, Ethiopia and the 1963 Somalia-Soviet arms deals, 643.

4.3.1. The Horn of Africa's Physical Definition

The Horn of Africa is a term given to the northeast corner of Africa that juts into the Indian Ocean. The Horn has three definitions: broad, medium and narrow. First, the broad definition adopted by J. Bowyer Bell.⁴⁴⁴

The Horn of Africa is a vast spearhead, spreading into the Indian Ocean south of the Arabian Peninsula. Politically, the area comprises four states: the Somali Republic along the coast of the Indian Ocean; the French Territory—better known as Djibouti—an enclave at the southern end of the Red Sea; the Ethiopian monarchy in the center; and the Sudan at the base of the spearhead stretching deep into the Sahara and north to Egypt...scattered across the Horn a region almost the size of Europe—is a mixed and diverse, December 1992 population of different races, religion, languages, traditions and attitudes, all united only by geography and the consequences of history.

The medium definition encompasses Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia as well as Eritrea; when narrowly defined it is the area populated only by Somali people. This includes Somalia, Djibouti, the northern part of Kenya, and the Ogaden portion of Ethiopia.⁴⁴⁵

This study prefers the medium definition with its limited scope of Somalia and Ethiopia from 1890 to 1990. As we mentioned earlier the region's military rivalry created many problems, and this research is investigating if this rivalry in fact contributed to the failure of Somalia. Somalia and Ethiopia were in rivalry throughout the years. However, this rivalry took many forms, and this chapter classifies it into two major areas—namely, the state-to-state level and local dissidents' arming for political interests. This is to identify and discuss the region's major sources of rivalry. The aim is to integrate individual states' political views (Somalia and Ethiopia) into one entity. The perspective is to interconnect

⁴⁴⁴ Bell, J. Bowyer, the Horn of Africa, 1-2.

⁴⁴⁵ Gomez, Arthur. The Horn of Africa, Virginia, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1994. M.A. Available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1994/GA.htm>. (accessed on May 12, 2012).

individual states' political views and the societies' political identities. To achieve that goal, the study first attempting a brief modern history of the Horn of Africa in order to understand the region's role in the rivalry, particularly that between Somalia and Ethiopia.

4.3.2. The Sources of Rivalry

To examine the impact of regional politics on Somalia's failure means to inquire into the region's sources of rivalry since the 19th century. Therefore, it is very vital to revisit Ethiopia's role in dismembering Somalia along with the Europeans. In the late 19th century during the Europeans' scramble for the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia was the only political entity in the Horn; all other races, including Somalis, were tribal entities or stateless societies. As a result, the Europeans accepted Ethiopia's political sovereignty and even invited Ethiopia to attend the Berlin Conference. and Paul B. Henze has this to say:⁴⁴⁶ "Ethiopia was the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that met most of the criteria for nationhood." It succeeded in maintaining its independence and in fact, Europeans not only helped to preserve its political independence, but also Britain and France supplied advanced weapons to occupy others' as they were handing over Somali territories to Ethiopians. For instance, in 1897 Britain handed over some 25,000 square miles of Western Somali territory to Ethiopia. Additionally, in December of 1906 the Europeans including Britain, France and Italy signed a Grant Concession to Ethiopia in London, whose most important principles included the following:⁴⁴⁷

Art. 1. France, Great Britain, and Italy shall cooperate in maintaining the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by the state of affairs at present existing...

Art. III. In the event of rivalries or internal changes in Ethiopia, the Representatives of France, Great Britain, and Italy shall observe a neutral attitude, abstaining from all intervention in the internal affairs of the country...

⁴⁴⁶ Paul, B. Henze. *There Hope for the Horn of Africa: Reflection on the political and Economic impasses*, Santa Monica, published by the RAND Co. 1988, 47.

⁴⁴⁷ Ghebre-Ab, Habtu. *Ethiopia and Eritrea: A Documentary Study*, Trenton: the Red Sea Press, Inc., 1993, 17-18.

Art. IV. In the event that the status quo laid down in Art. 1. is disrupted, France, Great Britain, and Italy shall make every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia.

The Europeans were making a deal with Ethiopia's Kings against Somalia and assisted them in occupying what had been, traditionally and for centuries, Somalia's western region. The Europeans established Somalia and Ethiopia's current political boundaries, as explained by Edmond Keller:⁴⁴⁸ The current boundaries of the Ethiopian state were given standing in international law through treaties with the European powers operating in the Horn region. The Europeans' "Grant Concession" to Ethiopians was against Somalis interests, as J. Gus Liebenow pointed out:⁴⁴⁹ "One of the most serious cases of fractured nationhood with both regional and international ramifications is that of the Somali people on the Horn of Africa." As a result, Somalis and Ethiopians had long been enemies in the Horn of Africa and had fought many wars.

As a result, Somalia and Ethiopia's rivalry originated from the Europeans' colonialism and their Grant Concession to Ethiopia. It is easy to cite examples of the Europeans' pro-Ethiopian stance and in 1843, the French and Ethiopian Kings (Louis Philippe and Sahle Selassi) signed a Political and Commercial Treaty that stated:⁴⁵⁰ Considering the uniformity in religion existing between the two nations, the King of Shoa (Ethiopia) hopes that, in case of war with the Muhammadans (Muslims) or other foreigners, France will look upon his enemies as her own. From that time forward, the Europeans never adopted any policies that favored Somalia over Ethiopia. The British historian I. M. Lewis has this to say:⁴⁵¹ "The Europeans and Ethiopians together dismember Somalis' well-defined traditional territories:" "the territory covering almost 400,000 square miles in the northeast corner, or Horn, of the Continent facing Arabia.

⁴⁴⁸ Keller, Edmond. *Self-Determination and Regional Security in Africa* Mimeo, 10 May 1991.

⁴⁴⁹ Liebenow, J. Gus. *African Politics: Crisis and Challenges*, 51.

⁴⁵⁰ Omar, Mohamed Osman. *The Scramble in the Horn of Africa: History of Somalia 1827-1977*, Mogadishu: Somali Publications Co. Ltd, 2001, 579.

⁴⁵¹ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and the State in the Horn of Africa*, (4th edition), London: James Curry Ltd, 2002, 1.

From the region of the Awash Valley in the Northwest, this often arid land occupied by the Somalis stretches round the periphery of the Ethiopian highlands and along the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean coasts down to the Tana River in northern Kenya.” This region forms a well-defined geographical and ethnic unit, which Somalis see as a natural base for a sovereign state.

The Ethiopians were not only occupying Somali traditional territories, but also desecrating their holy places, including mosques. For instance, in January of 1887, Ethiopia’s King Menelik II personally led an army equipped by Europeans’ advanced weaponry against Emir Abdullah, the Somali Ruler of Harar, and according to Robert I. Hess:⁴⁵² Harar had become a symbol of Ethiopian expansion into the Somali Peninsula. Ethiopian forces occupied and desecrated Harar’s Mosques and turned them into Churches. The history of Christian and Muslim rivalry in the Horn of Africa is not a part of this study’s inquiries. However, the rivalry between modern Ethiopia and Somalia has been heavily influenced by their particular faiths. The Somalis, no matter how weak, were not ready to surrender to the Ethiopians. In the 1960s, for more than 130 years after their colonial partition, the new state’s major goal was to fight for Greater Somalia. Bernard Brain explained why they resisted:⁴⁵³ “Despite the division of the Somali people among five administrations and their own intense tribal rivalries, they feel themselves to be one people. They speak the same language, share the same customs, and practice the same faith. They desire unification and feel, not without some justification, that they have been held apart by the machinations of the great powers.”

⁴⁵² Ibid: Collecting the History of the Somali Clans Hawiye.

⁴⁵³ Braine, Bernard; “Storm Clouds over the Horn of Africa,” *International Affairs*, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, (1958), 436.

In the 1960s, large numbers of ethnic Somali people resided outside the Somali state and presently, colonial legacies and Somalia's nationalism became the major sources of the Horn of Africa's rivalry, particularly that between Somalia and Ethiopia.

4.3.3. Somalia and Ethiopia's Rivalry (1960-1991)

This study notes that it is nearly impossible to separate Somalia and Ethiopia's domestic problems; for example, Somalia's intra-state conflict is in fact an inter-state conflict too. Simply put, Somalia and Ethiopia's internal and external issues are interrelated in many forms. Therefore, the greatest challenge is how to separate their domestic and regional problems. This view is in line with the D. David Laitin and Said S. Samatar, who say:⁴⁵⁴ "It is necessary to investigate a broad range of disputes between Somalia and Ethiopia: nationalism, territorial claims, countering sovereign territorial integrity, dissidents and many more factors combined to make the Horn of Africa one of the world's principal trouble spots."

For instant, there is an unsolvable dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia over a Somali-populated ethnic region. The Somalis are claiming that the region belongs to them and they call it Somalia's Western Region; by contrast, the Ethiopians deny this claim and they name it Ethiopia's Eastern Region. The region traditionally belonged to the Somali ethnic people, but the Ethiopians occupied it by force. In 1960, both countries were in a great dilemma. The modern state in the Horn of Africa suffered severe effects from colonial legacies and nationalist sentiments, and according to Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed's view:⁴⁵⁵ "The Somalis are believing their new state will never be a perfection state unless they retain lost territories. Somalia was a state seeking nation-hood while

⁴⁵⁴Laitin, D. David & Said S. Samatar. *Somalia: Nation in search of State*, London: Westview Press, 1987, III.

⁴⁵⁵Ahmed, Abdullah Yusuf, *Halgan iyo Hagar daamo*, 87.

Ethiopia was a nation seeking statehood. Ethiopia, a contrived multi-ethnic nation, fought to preserve its territorial integrity while Somalia, a unique and unified ethnic group in the Horn of Africa, but divided by colonialism, is ready to fight to reunify identical ethnicities into a single nation-state. As Hussein M. Adam indicated:⁴⁵⁶ “Somalis’ nationalism was rife not only in the British and Italian Somalilands but also in Western Somalia and Northeastern Kenya.” Greater Somalia occupied the central focus of political discourse. In 1960, colonial legacies became problematic as Abdulsalam Salwa indicated:⁴⁵⁷ “Over one century later, in Africa and elsewhere, basically the boundary issues were considered as a serious threat to the existence of many African states.” In fact, colonial powers simply established a set of very artificial political boundaries; therefore, these artificial boundaries posed serious threats to peaceful co-existence. Yusuf Jama Ali Duhul pointed out the following:⁴⁵⁸ “The Europeans imposed boundaries that haphazardly divided tribes and people are familiar to anyone with a nodding acquaintance of Africa.” Jonathan Steele also observed:⁴⁵⁹ the boundaries of modern nation-states were often drawn with complete disregard for the inhabitants. As a result, Somalia’s civilian and military regimes were trying simply to ignore these artificial boundaries. Somali clans, families and first cousins discovered to their horror that their inherited lands had been divided between two or more countries with diverse ethnicities which, at best, had little experience of cooperation with each other and, at worst, had histories rife with strife. Somalia simply disregarded these manufactured boundaries. It must be understood that the Somalis are a singularly unique African ethnicity, as Yusuf Jama Ali pointed out:⁴⁶⁰ “Africans themselves, on the whole, consisted more of tribes than of nations, but the

⁴⁵⁶ Adam, Hussein M. *Somalia: federalism, and Self-determination*, 106.

⁴⁵⁷ Salwa, Abdulsalam. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, 87.

⁴⁵⁸ Duhul, Yusuf Jama’ Ali. *Appraisal by a Somali*; Leonard W. Doob, (ed.) *Resolving Conflict: Fermeda Workshop*, Roma, Yale University Press, 1970, 41.

⁴⁵⁹ Steel, Jonathan. *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. N/A.

⁴⁶⁰ The term “Somali”, here includes all Somalis, whether in Somalia or in the dispute territories. For more details see Yusuf Jama Ali Duhu, *Appraisal by a Somali*, 41.

Somali territory was more of a geographical and ethnographical whole,” even more so than any other large area in Africa. Somalia’s case is therefore clearly exceptional and, according to Fran J. Mahoney:⁴⁶¹ In contrast to the rest of Africa where states are struggling to become nations, the Somali people represent a nation struggling to become a state. Furthermore, the Somali ethnic inhabitants of Ethiopia do not consider themselves to be Ethiopian citizens, but rather strongly believe they are Somalis. In addition, these artificial boundaries were never properly demarcated, and according to Lee Yong Leng:⁴⁶² “Since most of the maps used different demarcations, it is not surprising that boundary lines drawn during colonial times have not, everywhere, been accepted by post-colonial states”. For instance, Somalia and Ethiopia share a 1,800-kilometer border and Chege Michael has this to say:⁴⁶³ Conflicts arise because nowhere are territorial boundaries co-extensive with the natural boundaries of those nationalities that inhabit the area. In 1960, Somalia’s conflicts with its neighbors were inevitable because of the Somalis’ calling for reunification. Moreover, the preamble to Somalia’s constitution (1961), provided citizenship for all ethnic Somalis no matter where they resided, according to the Premier of Somalia, Dr. Abdi Al-Rashid, who wrote:⁴⁶⁴

Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbors. Our neighbors are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary arrangements. They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture, and the same traditions and he asked: how we can regard our brothers as foreign? He asked.

On this account, therefore, it was reasonable to believe Somalia would fight against its neighbors, and according to Benjamin Miller:⁴⁶⁵ “Revisionist/irredentist states desire to

⁴⁶¹Mahoney, Fran J. *An American Anthropologist*, (I made the quotation on back page cover, see *A Modern History of Somalia*, I. M. Lewis.

⁴⁶²Leng, Lee Yong. *Southeast Asia Essays in Political Geography*, Singapore, Singapore University Press, 1982, 5.

⁴⁶³ Michael, Chege. “Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, (Ed.), Emmanuel Hansen, *African Perspective on Peace and development*, London: United Nation University, Studies on Peace and Regional security, 1987, 88.

⁴⁶⁴ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 179.

⁴⁶⁵Miller, Benjamin. *States, Nations, and Great Powers, The Sources of Regional Wars and Peace*, New York, Melbourne and Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 107.

liberate what they view as oppressed minorities, to unite with their kinsmen in order to make whole a national people. The new state's core vision was to bring home lost territories and kin folk." For this reason, the country's national flag has a white five-pointed Star of Unity representing Somalis found in the ex-Italian, ex-British, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopian colonies. The African thinker Martin Meredith wrote this:⁴⁶⁶ "Despite the extreme poverty of Somalia and its lack of resources, the main energies of the Somali government at independence were on focused on unification." Richard Greenfield also observed this:⁴⁶⁷ "The demise of colonialism did not end, in the Horn of Africa, in institutions where the decolonization process has been contested, such as in Eritrea and Somalia, the principle of self-determination of peoples directly confronts that of the territorial integrity of established states." Somalia was demanding the return of Somalia's western region, a region that equaled 289,396.25 square kilometers representing 25% of Ethiopian territory.⁴⁶⁸ As we have seen, the colonial imposition is the main source of Somalia and Ethiopia's rivalry throughout history. Consequently, from the Somalis' political perspective, it was impossible to accept that their literal brothers, sisters, and their cousins were to remain forever under Ethiopia's rule.

4.3.4. The Lack of Mechanisms: Organization of Africa's Unity's

Now let us briefly examine Africa's Continental Organization, or the so-called Organization of African Unity, and its weakness in resolving Africa's inter-state conflicts. The organization's main purpose was to end the colonialism and somehow to assist African states' to stand collectively against external powers. In Somalia's case, its nationalism was not much in line with the Continent's primary concerns. They saw Ethiopia's occupation of Somali territory as equal to European colonialism. Therefore,

⁴⁶⁶Meredith, Martin. *The State of African: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, London: Free Press, 2005, 466.

⁴⁶⁷ Richard, Greenfield. *Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor*, 263.

⁴⁶⁸ For more details see A. Leroy Bennett, *International Organizations Principles and Issues*, 500.

Somalia's relations with African countries, particularly its neighbor Ethiopia, have not been friendly. Generally speaking, they have little or nothing in common except geographical approximation with a history of rivalry. When the quarrel renewed itself in the 1960s, it was assumed that a dispute derived from the colonial legacy at the Continental level should be resolved through the OAU's diplomatic mechanism. Despite its impotence, the Organization of African Unity's efforts deserve some attention. The Organization of African Unity was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital.⁴⁶⁹ Its primary duty included the promotion of peace and solidarity among African countries by acting as a collective voice for the African continent. Nonetheless, one of the greatest challenges to African brotherhood has been Somalia's self-determination and Ethiopia's resistance. Philosophically, the problem between Somalia and Ethiopia involves the definition of a people's identity. Somalia capitalized on this with a concept of identity based on origin via the two Rs of Race and Religion, while Ethiopia responded with the modern concept of a people's manufactured identity or so-called national identity. Somalia's primary instrument was to use race in favor of self-determination. In the process, the concept of self-determination became an integral component of its rhetoric at the Organization's conferences. In the course of these discussions, the right of self-determination was widely interpreted as an end to all forms of colonialism. Somalia's main purpose was, of course, to Africanize in its self-determination to end Ethiopia's unjustifiable colonialism as similar to European colonialism. In response, Ethiopia used the idea of a territory's integrity in order to disqualify Somalia's nationalism. Naturally their diplomatic positions had no solution, but they attempted to balance claims and counterclaims. From the beginning, the Organization of African Unity (1963) collectively accepted colonial boundaries, except

⁴⁶⁹ It was disbanded on 9 July 2002 by its last Chairperson, South African President Thabo Mbeki, and replaced by the African Union (AU).

for those of Somalia. Why? To try and rearrange them would have led to virtually every country making some sort of claim on its neighbor, and from thence, felt the leaders, to further conflicts.⁴⁷⁰ Therefore, in order to avoid further inter-state conflicts, the Organization's founders proposed two methods for ridding the Continent of colonialism. First, it would defend the interests of independent countries and help pursue the benefits of liberty for the still-colonized. Secondly, it would remain neutral in matters of world affairs, and prevent its members from being controlled by external powers.⁴⁷¹ In 1964, African leaders held their Second Meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo, and they passed a resolution recognizing colonially inherited borders (including those between Ethiopia and Somalia) as a basis for defending the territorial sovereignty of statehood and according to Scott Thomas:⁴⁷² "A key provision of the Organization of Africa Unity's Charter called for the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of existing states (Article III)." This was done, it was said at the time, to promote the political stability of the Continent. All Africa's leaders accepted this principle except for Aden Abdullah, the President of Somalia, and a representative from Morocco.⁴⁷³ Somalia, in the eyes of many African countries, was thereafter considered the aggressor trying to impose its territorial boundary on Ethiopia by force.⁴⁷⁴ In fact, Africa's views fell in line with Ethiopia's national interests and, according to Richard Greenfield:⁴⁷⁵ Ethiopia successfully campaigned for Organization of Africa Unity's political support by arguing that to adjust any African boundary would invite continental chaos. Somalia then became a pariah among the politically correct friendly nations, as Somalia's self-determination and Ethiopia's territorial integrity competed for propaganda's first place

⁴⁷⁰ Alagiah, George. *A Passage to Africa*, London: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2001, 271.

⁴⁷¹ The OAU's Charter is available at <http://Organization of African Unity>. (accessed on May15, 2011).

⁴⁷² Thomas, Scott. *Africa and the End of the Cold War: an Overview of Impacts*; Akinrinade, Sola and Amadu Sesay (ed); *Africa in the Post-Cold War International System*, London: A Cassell Imprint, 1998, 5-6.

⁴⁷³ Selassie, Bereket Habte. *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, 4.

⁴⁷⁴ Salwe, Abdulsalam. *The Collapse of the Somali State*. 87.

⁴⁷⁵ Greenfield, Richard. *Towards and Understanding of the Somali Factor*, 108.

trophy. King of Ethiopia Haile Selassie met with African leaders to endorse maintaining the status quo. The King used the Organization of African Unity's Charter much as its monarchy used the imaginations of King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba to emphasize non-intervention in order to safeguard its own impositions on Somali occupied territory as the status quo. In addition, the location of the Organization of African Unity's Headquarters in Addis Ababa, along with a preponderance of Ethiopian staff, greatly assisted the protection of all Ethiopian interests.⁴⁷⁶ The majority of African leaders simply ignored Somalia's demands. Somalia's First President, Aden Abdullah Osman, was very defiant and at the front of the African leaders said that his people:⁴⁷⁷ "never gave up and asserted that he would only be satisfied when Somalis outside of the republic had the opportunity to decide their own status for themselves and according to his own declaration in 1965, reunification of all Somalis is the very reason of life for our nation." He was trying to use the principle of self-determination, which is included in the Organization of African Unity's principles. According to Robert Garner, Peter Ferdinand and Stephanie Lawson, self-determination means:⁴⁷⁸ "A doctrine that emerged in the early twentieth century in relation to the right of 'people' (nations) to determine their own political future, thus embodying elements of democracy and nationalism." Therefore, in line with the self-determination principle, the Somalis were calling for self-determination to determine their own political future.

Since the President's call for reunification and the application of the principle of self-determination were not in conflict with the Organization of African Unity's Charter goals, he then demanded a referendum to end inter-African colonialism. Nevertheless, the new African elite of the Organization of African Unity was unprepared to view

⁴⁷⁶ Ibid: 109.

⁴⁷⁷ Lyons, Terrence Lyons. *Crises on Multiple Levels: Somalia and the Horn of Africa, The Somali Challenges: From Catastrophe to Renewal*, Ahmed I. Samatar (ed), London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994, 192.

⁴⁷⁸ Garner, Robert, Peter Ferdinand, and Stephanie Lawson. *Introduction to Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 493.

Ethiopia as a colonizer. Their excuse was that the principle of self-determination should only be used against European colonialism. In other words and according to Iyob Ruth:⁴⁷⁹ “What is significant in the African case is that the right of people to self-determination was limited to those under European rulers.” As a result, the campaign for Somali self-determination was legally if not morally nullified, and this was despite Somalia’s calling to the Organization of African Unity’s attention the following: that the treaties (between Ethiopia and Europeans in 1906) ignored all earlier (a) agreements made with Somali clans (1886) that had put them under British protection, (b), that the Somalis were not consulted on the terms of the treaties and, in fact, had not been informed of their existence, (c), that these treaties and events (in which Ethiopia was complicit) violated the very principle of self-determination.⁴⁸⁰ Consequently, Somalia did not achieve its political goal via the Organization of African Unity’s diplomatic measures but, to the contrary, became a justifiably dissident pariah among African states. The Organization’s efforts to resolve or ease the Somali-Ethiopian dispute failed to produce any meaningful result.

In addition to the Organization of the Africa Unity’s weakness the United Nations Security Council was in no better position than the Organization of African Unity. The Security Council avoided getting involved with Somalia and Ethiopia’s disputes. In February 9, 1964 the Somalis requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council. The Somali request for a Security Council meeting was not favorably received at the United Nations.⁴⁸¹ The Security Council was expecting the Africans to solve their own inter-state conflicts. The problem was that the two countries’ views were uncompromising. Somalia was overemphasizing the self-determination principle while

⁴⁷⁹ Ruth, Iyob. *Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa*. The Journal of Modern African studies, Cambridge University Press, 31:2 (1993), 263.

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid: These Main Events of Somalia were featured on mudulood.com - March 15, 2004.

⁴⁸¹ Touval, Saadia. *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa*, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1972, 216.

the Ethiopians were overstressing territorial integrity. These two principles were somehow contradictory. For instance, the United Nations Charter principles may be read as favoring Ethiopia's position because it denies the use of force against others for territorial gain. On the other hand, the Charter's principles may align with the Somali position, which calls for Somali self-determination as a human right. For instance, Article 1, Paragraph 2 states: to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appreciable measures to strengthen universal peace.⁴⁸² The Article's problem is that both Somalia and Ethiopia can utilize Article 1, Paragraph 2 as a diplomatic instrument to empower their respective discourses. Those in line with Ethiopia's view may advise or ask Somalia to develop a friendly relationship with Ethiopia based on respect for its territory's integrity; in response, those who are in line with Somalia's position may suggest that Ethiopia accept the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. Benjamin Miller says to employ the principle of self-determination against an oppressor is very meaningful and he said:⁴⁸³ "National self-determination is a major norm legitimizing sovereignty in the international system, and a powerful motivation for people to fight for their independence." Since the 1960s, Somalia was using this principle as the major norm of international consensus and was asking Ethiopia to respect the right of Somali ethnic people in Eastern Ethiopia to determine their self-determination. On the other hand, Somalia had no right to infringe on Ethiopian territory, as pointed out by Abdul Ghafur Hamid:⁴⁸⁴ International Law recognizes the supreme authority of every state within its territory. All member states, including Somalia, after signing the Charter should therefore adhere to its principles.⁴⁸⁵ Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter says:

⁴⁸² Bennett, A. Leroy. *International Organizations*, 467.

⁴⁸³ Miller, Benjamin. *States, Nations and the Great Powers*, 5.

⁴⁸⁴ Hamid, Abul Ghafur. *Public International Law: A Practical Approach*, KL: Prentice Hall, Pearson Malaysia Sdn. Bhd.2007, 109.

⁴⁸⁵ On September 20, 1960, Somalia joined to the United Nations but wasn't ready to adhere to the Charter principles because of its irredentism.

all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of forces against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations.⁴⁸⁶ The Security Council avoided involvement with the Horn of Africa's internal conflicts because of the colonial legacies' elements in the disputes.

Consequently, the Organization of African Unity's and the United Nations' unwillingness to become involved in the Horn of Africa's rivalry also contributed to the Horn of Africa's endless wars, particularly in Somalia and Ethiopia. The Soviets and the United States were entrusted in 1945 by the charter to ensure global security. Nonetheless, during the Cold War these superpowers became highly politicized in order to achieve their respective interests within their blocs. In fact, both superpowers used their allies to advance their influence in less developed countries, and according to Abdullah A. Mohamoud:⁴⁸⁷ both (the Soviets and U.S.) were often forced to back these allies in unpleasant struggles, and both often blamed the other superpower for creating problems. They failed to demonstrate higher regard for international order or set good examples. In fact, for more than thirty years, the Security Council never attempted to solve the Somali-Ethiopian dispute. Therefore, this study is arguing a connection between the international institutions' failure to resolve Somalia and Ethiopia's endless rivalry over the course of thirty years. Usually diplomatic failure will cause or create a condition that eventually leads to use force against your enemy. Somalia did the same against Ethiopia in 1977-1978.

⁴⁸⁶ Bennett, A. Leroy. *International Organizations*, 468.

⁴⁸⁷ Young, W. John & John Kent. *International Relations since 1945*, 471.

4.3.5. Somalia and Ethiopia's War (1977-78)

In actual fact, General Mohamed in his first period was seeking leadership legitimacy, and therefore he was inciting the people, as Ahmed I. Samatar pointed out.⁴⁸⁸ He (General Mohamed) had promised to end colonialism and neocolonialism, considered the greatest threats to Somalia's welfare." Besides General Mohamed's "promise to end colonialism", four other factors contributed to the Horn of Africa's regional war in 1977. Firstly, Somalia's ultra-nationalism, Secondly, the Horn of Africa's historical hostilities, artificial boundaries originated from colonial legacies, diplomatic failure to resolve Somalia and Ethiopia's disputes, and fourthly the superpowers' rivalry in the Horn of Africa all together incited Somalia to invade Ethiopia in 1977. It is indeed customary to use force after diplomatic failure as a means to resolve an irreconcilable impasse, especially on the part of the aggrieved. For seventeen years, Somalia patiently tried to solve its dispute with Ethiopia by diplomatic means, all of which failed to produce meaningful success. Therefore, the diplomatic stalemate and Ethiopia's internal crisis during the revolution after its military coup offered Somalia an opportunity to overrun Ethiopia's decaying army.

In July of 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia's eastern regions to occupy the long-contested areas. In the beginning, Somalia purposely associated itself with a so-called liberation movement. Early on, Somalia had formed the so-called Somalia Western Liberation Front operating from Somalia against Ethiopia. In 1977, it became obvious that the Somali Western Liberation Front's militants were inadequate when confronted by Ethiopia's army. Somalia then deployed plainclothes regular army troops to augment the Western Somali Liberation Front and finally, in July of 1977, General Mohamed openly deployed the regular army in a full-scale invasion of Ethiopia. Somalia and

⁴⁸⁸Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenges: From Catastrophe to Renewal*, 116.

Ethiopia fought the heaviest war ever fought in Sub-Saharan Africa, with repercussions felt far beyond the continent.⁴⁸⁹ In the process, from July of 1977 to March of 1978, Somalia's National Army captured Ethiopia's Eastern Region (the Somali-speaking region). Somalia's army was better armed than Ethiopia. The war claimed approximately 30,000 casualties on both sides and was remarkable in that forces from more than eight nations fought; according to Robert F. Gorman:⁴⁹⁰ "In many respects, the Ethiopian-Somali war of 1977-1978 was one of the most intriguing conflicts that has occurred since World War II."

Somalia's main aim was to reincorporate or to annex areas occupied only by the Somali ethnic people. Somalia used the principle of self-determination to justify its massive invasion in view of nearly two decades of failed diplomatic attempts. However, Somalia's incursion and occupation of Ethiopia's eastern region was viewed and portrayed by the superpowers as an actual threat to global security. In addition, Somalia's actions were also portrayed as a contravention of the United Nations Charter, Article Two, Paragraph Four, stating:⁴⁹¹ that all member states shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. All members, in order to ensure to all of them the right and benefits resulting from membership shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the Soviet-Somalia friendship deteriorated, and Somalia annulled its strategic friendship with the Soviets on 13 Nov. 1977. The Soviets lined up with Ethiopia's military ruler against General Mohamed's ambition to annex

⁴⁸⁹ Gebru, Tareke. *The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977*, 635.

⁴⁹⁰ Gorman, Robert F. *Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa*, New York: Praeger, 1981, 1.

⁴⁹¹ For more details see the United Nations Charter, Articles 1&2.

Ethiopia's Eastern Region inhabited by Somali ethnic people. The Soviets set up a coalition of "socialist forces" to assist Ethiopia. Therefore, Somalia's successful campaign had a short lifespan because of the external powers' involvement, and according to Tareke Gebru:⁴⁹² "The invasion ignited a major war of attrition that involved several external players who brought Somalia extremely close to realizing its strategic goals." The Soviets were angered by Somalia's disobedience to its warning not to attack Ethiopia. It must be remembered that the Soviets had been supplying weaponry to Somalia in order to pursue Greater Somalia. Jonathan Steele:⁴⁹³ "claimed that in spite of almost a decade of Soviets' supply weapons to Somalia; there was no evidence that the Soviets ever encouraged Somalia to pursue Greater Somalia against Ethiopia." But in reality it was no secret in 1963; the Somalis were seeking Soviet weaponry for Greater Somalia against Ethiopia. Whatever the reason, in the beginning the Soviets tried to assist Ethiopia's military to defend itself, but failed to push the Somalis out. Then, the Soviets deployed its own masterful generals to conduct counteroffensives against Somalia. On November of 1977, the socialist nations included the Soviets, Cuba, Southern Yemen, Libya and East Germany assisting Ethiopia's army. Two months later in January of 1978, the coalition forces launched a counteroffensive against Somalia's army and by early March of 1978, they relentlessly drove the Somalis back over the border.⁴⁹⁴ The socialist armies' purpose was clear: to expel Somalia's army from the occupied territory of Ethiopia's eastern region, and they succeeded. Somalia's army was forced to withdraw to the border drawn by the Europeans in the 19th century. On March 9, 1978, General Mohamed announced that his army was withdrawing from the contested area.⁴⁹⁵ Diplomatically, the United States was indirectly involved the region's war and as a face-

⁴⁹² Gebru, Tareke. The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited, *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 33/3, (2000), 635.

⁴⁹³ For more discussion see Jonathan Steel. *World Power: Soviet Foreign Policy*, 240

⁴⁹⁴ Dunbabin, J.P.D. *The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies*, 390.

⁴⁹⁵ Ofcansky, Thomas P. *Ethiopia: A Country Study*, 297.

saving gesture, the United States of America asked the Soviets to inform its ally (Ethiopia) not to cross the border into Somalia's undisputed territory. William Zartman wrote:⁴⁹⁶ "In February 1978, as the Ethiopian armies pressed the Somali invaders back towards their border, the United States of America intervened diplomatically to keep the pursuers from crossing the frontier and reversing the aggression. Somalia's military ruler was lucky because the Ethiopians accepted the Soviets' request not to cross the border." As a result, the war's outcome was in favor of Ethiopia's territorial integrity, marking a total victory for Ethiopia's military ruler against General Mohamed.

Somalia lost the war and nearly half of the equipment delivered by the Soviets (1963-1975).⁴⁹⁷ Somalia's military equipment was either destroyed or captured by the Ethiopians and their allies.

In reality, the Soviets ruined Somalia's dream of achieving Greater Somalia. Since then, from 1978 to 1991, Somalia was a failing state. The problem was that General Mohamed misread the Cold War's nature. He thought the war would be fought solely between Somalia and Ethiopia's armies. He ignored the United Nations' Charter's Principles, and completely overlooked the international system's modern nation-states' principles. He was trying to get credit at home for bringing back the lost territory. However, his domestic demands, including "Greater Somalia" and global powers' strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, were incoherent. In fact, Ethiopia's military ruler Colonel Mengistu was smarter than Somalia's military ruler General Mohamed.

To the contrary, over the years Ethiopia excelled at public relations and was always portrayed as a moderate and well-liked nation.⁴⁹⁸ Ethiopia's military ruler won

⁴⁹⁶Zartman, I. William. *Superpower Cooperation in North Africa and the Horn*, 162.

⁴⁹⁷For more details see *Somalia's Defense Capability Prior to the Somali-Ethiopian War in 1977-1978*. This information is available at <http://history1900s.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm>. (accessed 21 Dec 2011).

⁴⁹⁸The Russians gave substantial military and moral support to Ethiopia in order to expel Somalia's army from contested areas. To some analyst, Russian support of Ethiopian demonstrated an Orthodox Christian brotherhood and according to I. William Zartman: Soviet interests in the region are historic and for more details see page 158.

the hearts and minds of global powers after showing his readiness to adhere to the United Nations' Charter principles. He thereafter worked very hard to isolate General Mohamed, all the while grasping that any war would be one of proxy between East and West blocs as part of a much larger contest between the Soviets and the United States of America. In short, Ethiopia's military ruler was wiser and possessed greater diplomatic skills and statecraft than did Somalia's unschooled military ruler; hence, the war's outcome favored Ethiopia.⁴⁹⁹ The problem was that General Mohamed mistakenly expected more assistance from the Americans, simply assuming that the United States of America would confront the Soviets for the sake of the balance of power. According to some analysts, the U.S. purposely misled General Mohamed, as Abdulsalam Salwa said:⁵⁰⁰ "In the course of the war and as a form of inducement while exploring the possibility of further influencing Somalia's leaders, America sent signals that it might supply arms. Then, Somalia's military ruler misread signals or inducement, assuming the United States of America will supply an army to counter its global rival, the Soviets. Whether the United States of America misled him or not, the war's outcome badly affected General Mohamed's diplomatic credibility and leadership legitimacy at home, which directly transformed Somalia from a weak state to a failing state. Earlier sections of the study have detailed their sabotages during the Horn of Africa's strategic alteration in 1977-1978. The superpowers' diplomatic shuttles, inducements, sabotages, free weapons and financial support to their respective clients altogether increased the Horn of Africa's rivalry, particularly that between Somalia and Ethiopia.

⁴⁹⁹ Dhere, Ambassador Esse, (interviewed, November 12, 2011).

⁵⁰⁰ Salwa, Abdulsalam. *The Collapse of the Somali State*, 87.

4.3.6. The Horn of Africa's Semi-Cold War: Arming Rebels

Generally speaking, the Horn of Africa's proxy wars and rivalries came in many forms. At the top, superpowers may have their own global rivalry, and Somalia and Ethiopia (state to state) also have their own regional rivalry, but the Horn of Africa's military rulers also have or had another form of rivalry. This is the Horn of Africa's so-called Semi-Cold War, in which the Horn of Africa's military rulers were sponsoring their own proxy wars and arming rebels to weaken each other. As a result, the Horn of Africa's rivalry has taken three forms:

1. Global powers: United States and the Soviets' rivalry over the region's geopolitical value and their major goal was to balance each other.
2. Somalia and Ethiopia's rivalry over a disputed area: a Somali ethnic people's region in eastern Ethiopia. The region was occupied by the Ethiopians since the late 19th century.
3. The Horn of Africa's Semi-Cold War: both Ethiopia and Somalia's military rulers were sponsoring rebels. Their major purpose was to weaken each other.

These different rivalries have had different effects on the Horn of Africa's political shape and security architecture. Over the years, Somalia was arming Ethiopia's political dissidents; in reverse, Ethiopia was also arming Somalia's political dissidents. The military rulers' political objective was to weaken each other. Arming rebels created many problems in the Horn of Africa; therefore, it is very vital to discuss how arming these rebels contributed to Somalia's political failure. In the case of Somalia, the elite factionalism, which has been manifested in clan or tribal supremacy forms, became very complex after Somali's elites escaped to Ethiopia, which in turn drew Ethiopia into Somalia's domestic conflict. Also, Somalia was assisting Ethiopia's political dissidents and the two military rulers were accusing each other of supporting his enemy. Ethiopia has been accused of

supporting General Mohamed's enemies, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and Somali National Movement (SNM). In the same view, the Ethiopians were accusing Somalia of supporting the Eritrean fighters for independence from Ethiopia.

In fact, General Mohamed had provided a diplomatic shield and support for Ethiopia's rebellious militants, including the Oromo ethnic rebels who operated from within Somalia to sabotage Ethiopia's domestic order. Somalia also supported, politically and diplomatically, the Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF) later known as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF as of 10 March 1989), led by Ethiopia's former Premier Meles Zenawi. Formed in 1975, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) dedicated itself to the overthrow of the Mengistu regime. In addition, he provided a diplomatic shield for and financial support to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).⁵⁰¹ In 1960 Eritrean exiles in Cairo/Egypt founded the Eritrean Liberation Front, which was dedicated to ending Ethiopia's occupation. In 1972, it was renamed the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), led by the Eritrea's then-current President, Issayas Afewerki. All these Ethiopian political dissidents were provided with offices in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu. These rebel groups operated within the western and northern regions of Ethiopia's purloined sovereign territory but could not operate from or within Somalia. Thus, General Mohamed's support to these Ethiopian rebels was limited to a diplomatic shield and financial support.

There is a tendency to regard these rivalries as purely internal issues. This is a major mistake. The Horn of Africa's arming rebels for political purposes must be seen as related to external factors. Therefore, this study is considering the Horn of Africa's Semi-Cold War as a source of regional rivalry, in which arming rebels is a continuation of Somalia and Ethiopia's rivalry throughout the years, which directly contributed to Somalia's

⁵⁰¹ Mohamed, Abdulwali Hassan. *Mxaaa Hortaagan Dowladnimada Soomaaliya*, (what are the major challenges to Somalia's State), 43.

failure. In fact, General Mohamed's political mismanagement pushed many Somalis (both civilian and military) to escape to Ethiopia and become political dissidents against his misrule. He never honestly attempted to negotiate his foes' political demands. This example will suffice, on May 30, 1987, the Al-TADAMUN Arabic Paper (based in London) asked him: do you expect to initiate a dialogue with the opposition outside Somalia? He replied:

We believe that there is no need to initiate such a dialogue with men who have betrayed their country. What dialogue could we attempt with such men, what concessions can we make to them, and what language can we use in speaking to them when they have abandoned their nationality and fought against their own people? I do not see any benefit in talking to them. If serious possibilities of dialogue existed, then we would welcome them. We have thus declared an indefinite pardon for this reason, so if there is anyone wishing to return to his country, we would say to him: welcome ...return to your country. Those who return will not be put on trial, although the law provides for trying anyone who betrays his country. But by virtue of the powers vested in me, I have proclaimed a general pardon and opened the door to those who wish to return.

In any political language the above statement demonstrates General Mohamed's political interest, prepared only for a tyrant's didacticism rather than dialogue with a people who once called him "Father of the Nation". Truly General Mohamed's strategy to divide the society along tribal lines created many problems at home. He failed to make any attempt to bring about consensus between the state and society in order to set out acceptable terms to his people. It is therefore reasonable to expect his political rivals should escape to Ethiopia to set up their own clan-based militia against his misrule.

In the 1980s, the region's rivalry escalated to a very critical level. Imagine that State A sponsored political dissidence in state B; in retaliation, state B did likewise. For instance, if Ethiopia sponsored Somalia's dissidents, in retaliation Somalia supported Ethiopia's dissidents. Earlier, the region's conflict traditionally was between the two nations with understandable objectives; Somalia was calling for Greater Somalia and Ethiopia was asking to respect its territorial integrity, and resolutions via diplomatic means, as in 1964 and 1978, were possible. As a result of Somalia and Ethiopia's major

war in 1977-78, in late early 1980s up to the end of the Cold War the region's major rivalry was the growth of armed insurgencies originating in remote areas of the countryside. This phenomenon posed a new and serious challenge to the entire region's order. Somalia and Ethiopia's military rulers' arming rebels to weaken each other was devastating, as pointed out by Ruth Iyob:⁵⁰² "Although there were always outsiders who did just that, the chief sources of threat usually came from within the region."

In Somalia, the regime was very oppressive, and Somalia's brain trust was either in prison or self-exiled to Ethiopia for military and political assistance. Ethiopia's military ruler took the opportunity to invest much in arming Somali political dissidents to weaken his regional foe. However, the Ethiopians were assisting Somalia's political dissidents along well-delineated tribal lines, taking full advantage of Somali's clan rivalries. For instance, the Ethiopians provided a diplomatic shield and direct support for Somalia's numerous insurgent groups, including the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, (SSDF), Somali National Movement, (SNM) and the United Somali Congress (USC). First, the Ethiopians formed the SSDF led by Colonel Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, who led the abortive coup on April 9, 1978. He and his militants belonged to the powerful Majerteen clan. The Majerteen were situated in the northeastern provinces and Ethiopia trained thousands of SSDF militants, supplied them with weapons, and additionally allowed them to operate from Ethiopia's military bases. Furthermore, in July of 1982, the Ethiopia purposely used the SSDF banner to cross the border and capture several districts and villages, including Balumbale and Galdogob in central Somalia. Ethiopia's major objective was to split Somalia into southern and northern sections; they desired to force General Mohamed into abandoning his Greater Somalia ambition as a condition for withdrawing their proxy forces from Somalia. General Mohamed's army was able to stop

⁵⁰² Iyob, Ruth; "Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.31, No.2 (1993), 107.

their advance to split Somalia into two, but nevertheless they posed a serious threat to Somalia's territorial integrity. Earlier, Somalia was in an offensive position but since 1978, Somalia had become a failing state, which allowed the Ethiopians to change their position from defense to offense against Somalia. The more General Mohamed oppressed his people, the more people escaped to Ethiopia. In early 1982, Ethiopia's military rule provided assistance to the newly formed Somalia National Movement (SNM) of the powerful Isaq clan, an undisputed dominion situated in Northwestern Somalia. The SNM was founded by a group of self-exiles in London and soon moved its headquarters to Addis Ababa to better receive Ethiopia's military assistance. As a result, more of the Isaq elite fled to Ethiopia, and, according to America's ambassador Peter Bridges:⁵⁰³ the Mengistu regime had been pleased to complement its own army's forays into Somalia by arming and outfitting a force of Isaqs to conduct sporadic raids across the border. To some extent, the SNM's motivation differed from the SSDF as they sought total independence from Somalia, and hence waged a fierce war in an effort to divide Somalia into two states aligned with inherited colonial boundaries. Besides the SSDF and SNM, Ethiopia also armed the United Somalia Congress (USC) militants, who belonged to the Hawiye tribe. The Hawiye were situated in central Somalia with a strong hand in the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopia's strategic objective was to divide Somalia's people more along tribal lines. Therefore, they directed every clan/tribe's militia according to its region of domicile. They directed the Somali National Movement's militants to the northwest provinces where the Isaq were situated, and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front's militants were directed to the northeast provinces where the Majerteen were situated.

⁵⁰³ Bridges, Peter; *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 114.

The sponsored rebels' hit-and-run approach escalated into total war and on May 27, 1988, highly trained elements belonging to the Somali National Movement penetrated the army's defense lines and captured Burca, the third largest city in the northwestern provinces. Three days later on May 31, 1988, they captured half of Hargeysa, the second largest city in the northwestern provinces. In retaliation, General Mohamed launched an indiscriminate and merciless offensive of artillery and infantry; however, these forces met hardline militants and failed to defeat the militia as quickly as expected. The SNM's militia fought house-to-house, and the battle was the fiercest confrontation to date between the General Mohamed army and militia. As a final option, General Mohamed deployed the air force and heavily bombarded occupied areas. This was the first time the state's air power had been deployed against an internal enemy. Some say the air force used prohibited weapons, including napalm, but this has not been confirmed. After one month of air bombardment, in June of 1988 the militia was forced to withdraw from the occupied cities and retreat to their military bases in Ethiopia. The SSDF and SNM militias' failure to overthrow General Mohamed was because of their field operational regions; the northwestern and northeastern provinces are far from the capital, Mogadishu. Finally, the Ethiopians sponsored the United Somali Congress.

4.3.7. A Somali Rebel Sponsored by the Ethiopians Overthrew General Mohamed

After more than one decade of arming rebels, finally, a Somali rebel group sponsored by the Ethiopians overthrew General Mohamed's military regime on January 26, 1991. In Italy, a group of self-exiles belonging to the Hawiye tribe founded the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989, just two years before General Mohamed's fall. As usual they went to Ethiopia to receive military assistance from Ethiopia. The Ethiopians reviewed

their old strategy and come to the conclusion that they should sponsor the Hawiye political dissidents. Hawiya's regions include the capital, Mogadishu.

General Mohamed oppressed everybody: first the Majerteen, then the Isaq, and finally the Hawiye. The Hawiyes' disaffection gradually increased over the years until their dissidents did the same as the Majerteen and Isaq tribes did earlier: escape to Ethiopia. Those who went to Ethiopia included Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a wealthy businessman and former civilian Parliament Member, and General Mohamed Farah Aided, Somalia's Ambassador to India. The Ethiopians, ever mindful of their own national interests, understood the strategic geographical location of the Hawiye and armed them well. The Hawiye occupied the central-south provinces of the country, which areas extended to Mogadishu. Due to this proximity to the capital and as planned by the Ethiopians, Hawiye militias suddenly appeared from the Middle-Shabelle Provinces in December of 1990, only 90 kilometers north of Mogadishu, and they were advancing on the capital. General Mohamed attempted to divide the Hawiye clans but failed. In fact, his old tricks were too well known by then. The regime's decaying forces had now to deal with two fronts controlled by dauntless archenemies: the Isaqs from the North and the Hawiye from the South, who challenged them openly and vowed to end the dictatorship. If the regime failed to relinquish power, house-to-house war in the capital was unavoidable, and General Mohamed's fall was guaranteed. But there was an unseen problem as described by Daniel Compagnon:⁵⁰⁴ "These organizations (the SSDF, SNM and USC), which claimed to be fighting against a dictatorship and for a democracy, had no clear vision of what should be done to establish such a regime and rebuild the country." Thus, after General Mohamed's fall, these tribally based dissidents failed to form any viable state or government. This is most likely what Ethiopia's military

⁵⁰⁴Compagnon, Daniel. *Political Decay in Somalia: From Personal Rule to Warlordism*, Refuge: Canada's Periodical on Refugees, published by Centre for Refugee Studies, Vo 12, No 5, (1992), 10.

ruler Colonel Mengistu was planning to dismember, and, therefore, Colonel Mengistu's subversion strategy against Somalia succeeded. The United Somali Congress' militia that overthrew General Mohamed on January 26, 1991 were using weapons supplied by Ethiopia's military ruler; hence, the Horn of Africa's arming rebels directly contributed to the failure of Somalia.

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CHAPTER 5: THESIS FINDINGS

Without a proper understanding of both the internal and external factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia, it is not easy to answer the question of what caused Somalia's state to fail. The factors are complex and interrelated in different ways. While a number of accusations have been leveled at Somali tribalism and the misrule of their elite, very little has been said about the effects of external factors, including Western colonialism, a divide-and-control strategy adopted by the colonialists, Somalia's uneasy road to independence, the impacts of the Cold War's politics on Somalia, particularly the role of the Soviets in Somalia's politics, as well the role of the United States in Somalia's politics and of course, the most important: the impact of the Horn of Africa's rivalry and endless conflicts, particularly those between Somalia and Ethiopia's military rulers. In contrast to the conclusions drawn by previous studies, this study attempts to reinterpret Somalia's history and to shed a light on the interplay of factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia. Hence, an effort has been made here to widen the scope in order to investigate how the colonial powers divided and controlled, as well as how the superpowers' Cold War involvement negatively affected Somalia's state formation before and after its independence. Hence, this study's major task is to address what are/were the real internal and external factors that collectively contributed to the failure of Somalia. These internal and external factors are numerous; however, this study has identified the five most fundamental factors. Three factors are internal in nature, including (1), poor leadership and tribal politics, (2) the legacies of the divide- and-rule policy of the Western colonial powers, and lastly (3) foreign aid dependency and economic mismanagement. Similarly, the study identified two external factors, including (1) Somalia as chessboard of global majors since the colonial era through the Cold War, and (2) the impacts of the Horn of Africa's rivalry. In a different view, Somalia's failure was originated not only on the domestic level; rather it's geopolitical location, colonial

powers' partitions, Cold War politics, the Soviets, the United States of America's geopolitical contests, their poor advice, the Horn of Africa's colonial legacies, inter-state wars, and region's Semi-Cold War marked by arming rebels all together played crucial roles in the failure of Somalia. In sum, this study is shifting from an internal exclusivity to an interplay inclusiveness model, the details of which are:

5.1. Somalia As A Failed State: Internal Factors

5.1.1. Poor Leadership and Tribal Politics

Somalia is a nation with a cohesive cultural tradition and shared history of nationalism, which is supposed to make it the most stable state in Africa due to its society's commonalities. If a state like Malaysia or Ethiopia is hosting different races with different languages, faiths and histories, that state can be expected to suffer societal rift. One may say, on the other hand, that diversity is better than homogeneity. Jean-Germain Gros said this:⁵⁰⁵ "It was once thought that ethnic heterogeneity facilitated state failure, while homogeneity correlated strongly with success. The case against this argument has become considerably stronger in recent years." Maybe this is true; however, this research is not a competitive study, and we should know properly what made Somalis became engaged in rebellion against the state. Was the state against society, or society against the state? Mark Bradbury and Loan Lewis claimed:⁵⁰⁶ the clan-based logic of politics in Somalia played a large role in its collapse. They attributed the failure of the central Somali state to attempts by Westernized elitists to impose an ill-suited European system of governance that did not encourage political collaboration among the main clans at the grass-roots level. Considering this view, let us investigate if the logic of clan-based politics in Somalia played a real role in pushing

⁵⁰⁵Gros, Jean-Germain. Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti", *Third World Quarterly*, 17:3, 455-472, 464.

⁵⁰⁶Wall, Nicolas Van De. Reviewed on *Becoming Somaliland; Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, by Bradbury, Mark & Lewis, Loan, published on *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2009.

Somalia to fail. Mark Bradbury and Loan Lewis's statement underlines two important issues: The Westernized elite attempted to impose an ill-suited European system of governance, and most vitally this system failed to encourage political dialogue among the main clans. Then, what is wrong with Somali society if they refused that ill-suited system? From the onset, this study had stated earlier in Chapter 3 that the Europeans had disrupted society's collective consciousness. The colonials, once they arrived, quickly sidelined the trusted traditional elders and Sheikhs and divided the society into friendly and enemy tribes. They armed the so-called friendly tribes or clans against the enemy tribes and clans. This divide-and-control strategy was in line with Europeans' political agenda to reshape society's pre-European shape. They purposely weakened society's collective will and cognitive function. Indirectly they were forcing them to abandon their original shape. Robert I. Hess pointed out:⁵⁰⁷ "The Italian administrative system was, in fact, superimposed on the tribal political structure." They employed a so-called warrant chief against the people's will. In fact, from the late 19th century European powers were enforcing or imposing unelected leaders on the Somalis while sidelining the much-trusted traditional leaders (Sultans and Sheikhs). In so doing, Europeans dishonored the indigenously elected Sultans, Imams and trusted Sheikhs in favor of an imposed European penal codes and warrant chiefs. This brought a completely radical change to Somali society's way of life, as their new warrant chiefs were in favor of the colonial agenda. All in all, this divide-and-control strategy subsequently made the society vulnerable to internal conflicts along tribal lines. Making matters worse, colonialists not only divided the society into friendly and enemy clans, but armed the former against the latter. A few examples: in the early 20th century the Somali clan of Biyo-Mal resisted Italy's occupation and to put them down, the Italians armed another clan.

⁵⁰⁷ Hess, Robert I. *Italian Colonialism in Somalia*, 184.

Robert Hess has this to say:⁵⁰⁸ Bimal clan revolt was easily put down with the aid of Somali allies among the Geledi clan. Both the Bimal and Geledi are neighboring two Somali clans from the lower Shabelle region, south of Mogadishu. The Italian Government befriended the Geledi Sultan and armed him against the Bimal because the latter clan had rejected Italy's misrule. This strategy inevitably brought blood feuds and fueled continuing tribal conflict. Another good example is in Southern Somalia in 1908 when the Italian came to administrate; first they divided the society of just a few tribes into 577 sub-clans with 577 chiefs on government payrolls with salaries ranging from six to fifty rupees.⁵⁰⁹ Nobody knew the population's size in 1908, but by the mid-1950s, according to Paul B. Henze:⁵¹⁰ "The population of Southern Somalia was estimated at 1,267,964". If we assume no change took place, we can ask why the Italians created so many sub-clans. And what was the logic behind paying off 577 sub-clan chiefs? It becomes clear that the Italians had a grand strategy that was intended to destroy society's internal coherence in favor of tribalism. If we divide the society of members per chief, the result is amusing in that each chief would be looking after 2197.5 persons. In the northern provinces, Great Britain did the same and according to Mohamed Omar Othman: although the Isaq tribe is one entity, Great Britain subdivided them into three sub-clans and promptly signed separate commercial and friendship treaties with each:⁵¹¹ On February 28, 1886, in one place Britain concluded a Peace, Commercial and Friendship Treaty with Isaq's sub-clans Habar Awal, Habar-Garhajis, and Habar Tol-Jeclo. Additionally, Great Britain did the same with other clans including the Gadabursi and Issa, both belonging to the large Somali Dir clan. The aim was to break up the society's shape into a new form that would be in line with colonial political interests. It becomes clear then that

⁵⁰⁸ Hess, Robert L. *Italian Colonialism in Somalia*, London and Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1966, 181.

⁵⁰⁹ Abdullahi, M. Abdurrahman. *Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam*, 53.

⁵¹⁰ Paul H. Henze. *Is There Hope for the Horn of Africa: Reflections on the Political and Economic Impasses*, 4.

⁵¹¹ Osman, Mohamed Omar. *The Scramble in the Horn of Africa, History of Somalia (1827-1977)*, 527-577.

Europeans had purposely seeded intra-state and inter-clan conflicts two generations before Somalia's independence in the 1960s. Rashid Ibrahim has this to say:⁵¹² "Colonialism only strengthened clan identification and intensified antagonism." This splitting (of a single ethnicity) into many was a death sentence to the Somalis' zeitgeist or glue. The main goal was to erase their sense of national identity and communality. This misrule continued from the late 19th century until the 1960s. In fact, the Europeans had been sowing the coming crisis and societal rifts for almost six decades.

For the second time since independence, Somalia has been ill-served by its poor leadership, whose misconduct played a significant role in causing many problems. Yes, it is true, the elite did not only fail to cure the diseases inherited from colonialism, but instead they were fueling these diseases more. The civilian elite are a good example; in the early 1960s, Latin D. David said:⁵¹³ "In Somalia, the South's Parliamentary structures were established in 1956 and remained very fragile at the time of independence and the North was even more of an infant." The South's political views originated from the Somali Youth League established in 1947; in the northern provinces the Somali National League (SNL) was the major political structure. The National Assembly's 123 members, 90 of which were from the South and 23 from the North, lacked any semblance of cohesion. In the southern provinces, the Italians during the United Nations Trusteeship had divided the Somali Youth League into pro- and anti-Italian factions and favored the pro-Italian faction. From the northern side, the elite also divided themselves into two major factions: the Somali National League (SNL), representing the Isaq clan-family that constituted a numerical majority in the British Somaliland regions, and the United Somali Party (USP), supported largely by non-Isaq partisans, particularly the Dir and the Daarod clans of British Somaliland. Furthermore, another problem arose

⁵¹² Rashid, Ibrahim. *The Last Century and the History of Somalia: Understanding the History of Somali Nation and that of Somalis in General in the 20th Century*, 2011, 99. Available at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/58284500/The-Last-Century-and-the-History-of-Somalia#>. (accessed 4 Mar. 2012).

⁵¹³ For more details see David, D. Laitin. *Politics, Language, and Thought*, 81.

as Northern Daarod clan members aligned with their fellows from the Daarods' larger tribe against the Isaqs, which then decreased Isaqi's political power. The Isaqs did not have many kinsmen in the south and in fact were marginalized. They were friendless among friendly clans.⁵¹⁴ The civilian elite failed to overcome this early political factionalism. The problem prior to independence was that colonial powers, particularly Italy, had favored its handmade pro-Italian group who, in turn, played a crucial role in factionalizing the new state's political shape. In fact, factionalism, corruption and looting public property were major political business, and I. M. Lewis has this to say:⁵¹⁵ "The National Assembly was no longer the symbol of free speech and fair play for all citizens. It was now widely regarded cynically as a sordid market-place where, with little concern for the interests of those who had voted for them, deputies traded their votes for personal gain." Thus, the elite were pursuing individual rather than national interests. The worst political parties proliferated, from less than four parties in 1960 to sixty-plus in 1969. It became a period of one man equals one political party, and indeed the Parliament became a house of nepotism and factionalism. They formed so many political parties that the 1969 general election witnessed over 64 parties contesting for 123 seats. The election thus became moot and Hussein A. Admen had this to say:⁵¹⁶ "What followed was a rush to join the leading party (SYL) in order to obtain ministerial positions." Hence, the parliamentary system became meaningless and finally, prior to the military coup in 1969, the civilian elites' political aim was to misuse public funds for their own political interests, and Ahmed I. Samatar says:⁵¹⁷ "Perhaps the most telling actions were these: (1) open raiding of the state treasury (about U.S. \$ 8 million); (2) pressure on the Chief of

⁵¹⁴Although the Hawiye (the largest tribe in Somalia) had some sympathies for the Isaq, because there is common belief that both belong to larger Samale and the Somali name originated from the first Samale. However, it is a matter of debate since there is no written record.

⁵¹⁵Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of the Somali*, 206.

⁵¹⁶Adam, Hussein M. *Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination*, 69.

⁵¹⁷Samatar, Ahmed I. *The Somali Challenges from Catastrophic to Renewal*, London: Lynne Rinner Publisher, 1994, 115.

the National Police Corps, General M. A. Muse, to use his forces and their resources to help those Somali Youth League candidates who were campaigning in tightly contested districts; (3) a modification of electoral rules to favor the S.Y.L; (4); the more than 1,000 candidates put forth by over 60 parties for the 123 seats; and (5) the death of nearly forty people, making the election Somalia's bloodiest."

For the military regime, General Mohamed is a good example of factionalism. In his early period, (1969–1978), General Mohamed promised to end tribalism. Consequently, according to Ahmed I. Samater:⁵¹⁸ "During the early 1970s his regime embarked on massive political reforms which included zero tolerance for tribalism. Tribalism was therefore condemned as the most serious impediment to national unity." Yet General Mohamed favoured his kinsmen, despite claiming zero tolerance for tribalism. In fact, he was dividing the society into friendly and non-friendly clans. His public words and actions were contradictory and in reality, he was openly relying on the three clans of Marehen, Ogaden and Dhulmahante. Many asked why he selected these three sub-clans instead of others, and the answer is simply that General Mohamed's father belonged to the Marehan clan, his mother's clan was Ogaden and his son-in-law General Ahmed Sulaien, a member of Supreme Revolutionary Council and head of most feared of the National Security Service, belonged to the Dhulmahante clan. The United States of America's Ambassador to Somalia (1980s) Peter Bridges said: "He (General Mohamed after the coup) turned more repressive, more corrupted, and more centered on the interests of his own Marehan clan and the allied clans of the Daarod group."⁵¹⁹ In the early 1980s during General Mohamed's second period (1979-1990), all state security agencies, including military, police, paramilitary, and National Security Services, had mostly MOD kinship commanders—for example, the army's Commander General Aden

⁵¹⁸Ibid., 39.

⁵¹⁹ Bridges, Peter; Safiirka: An American Envoy, 99.

Abdullah Nur, the National Police Forces' Commander General Aden Abdi Du'ale, Pre-Military Commander General Abdurrahman M. Hussein, Air Force's Commander General Dhuudhi and one time the Navy's Admiral Mohamed Omar Osman, all of whom were associated with the regime's friendly clan of the MOD.⁵²⁰ In fact, General Mohamed's strategy wasn't new to the Somali people; he was simply applying the colonial powers' old strategy of dividing the society into friendly and enemy lines. He had been trained by the Italians in the early 1940s and again by the British in the late 1940s. He was a good student of his colonial masters' strategy to divide the society into friendly clans and enemy clans. He was trying to prolong his regime's period of rule.

Accordingly, in the 1980s and 1990s, inter-clan animosities during the upheaval were direct results both of colonial legacies and the elite's failure to reach agreement among them. During this time Somalia witnessed a great upheaval that brought many problems and confusion. The regime was trying to impose his friendly clans' hegemony with the hopes of prolonging his regime's hold on power.⁵²¹ Consequently, all marginalized clans armed themselves against his brutal regime, and Nur Ali Qabobe has this to say:⁵²² "Our leaders persistently overlooked or were ignoring the fact that a tribal society is the most dangerous to lead because the population could at any time disown and divorce themselves from the concept of whole nationhood and revert to the tribes as a refuge. Thus the individual can look to the tribe for protection as an alternative to the state, putting the state in a secondary position as a source of help." In fact, most intra-state and inter-clan wars were proxy in nature, inflamed by either external powers or bad elites.⁵²³

⁵²⁰ For more extensive discussion see: Abdulqadir Aroma's *Sababihii Burburka Somaliya*, 279.

⁵²¹ For more details see Hussein M. Adam. *Somalia: Federalism and Self-Determination*, 118.

⁵²² Qabobe, Nur Ali. *Somalia: From Nation-State to Tribal Mutiny*, New Delhi: Pharos Media & Pub. Pvt. Ltd., 2002, 23-24.

⁵²³ Externally, as the study stated earlier (the Horn of Africa's arming rebels), the Ethiopians were arming General Mohamed's foes, additionally, he was too arming his friendly clans against others.

Richard Greenfield observed this:⁵²⁴ “In the 1980s General Mohamed encouraged the clans of the north to fight each other, with bribes, investments and arms.” It is true that General Mohamed was arming his friendly clans, including the Dhulmahan, Wrasangali and Gadabuursi, against the Isaq clan. Of course, in retaliation, many Isaq escaped to Ethiopia to arm themselves against General Mohamed’s friendly clans. In truth, we do not mean all Dhulmahante, Warsengeli and Gadaburse from the northern provinces were in line with General Mohamed’s divide-and-control policy.⁵²⁵ Therefore, for instance, it is very reasonable to argue that the establishment of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali National Movement (SNM), and the United Somali Congress (USC) was not against the Somali state as much as they were against General Mohamed’s misrule. Clearly, Somalia’s intra-state wars, inter-clan conflicts and mistrust are direct results of colonial legacies and elites’ misrule both of which used divide-and-rule strategies.

As a result of poor leadership the proliferation of clan- or tribal-based political factionalism, Somalia’s political process produced nothing except tribal militarism, mistrust, and of course state failure. The elite failed to frame a sound policy to lead the country, instead preferring factionalism for personal gain. There was no balance or relationship between people’s political rights and new elites’ political interests to obtain or to seek political power. They used tribalism as a mechanism to acquire political power. Additionally, during the Cold War, the United States’ of America’s role in assisting General Mohamed was a vital mistake. He was using U.S. aid to prolong his misrule and in fact, in 1988, during the uprising against his misrule, he used deadly weapons supplied by the

⁵²⁴Greenfield, Richard. *Towards an Understanding of the Somali Factor*, 110.

⁵²⁵Of course many Dhulmahante, Warsengali and Gadaburse’s intellectuals, artists, Sheikhs and traditional leaders refused General Mohamed’s divide and control strategy’. Exceptional thanks goes to distinguish traditional leader Garaad Abdulqani and of course Somalia’s superstar, Saada Ali Warsame. She is great lady who represented the voice of justice against General Mohamed. In 1990s, Ms. Saada Ali challenged General Mohamed’s misrule and played her famous songs including SOO BARI GALAY and WAR DUQOW in the Stadium at Mogadishu and Mogadishu’s National Theater. She became a Member of Somalia’s National Parliament on 2012 and died on July 23, 2014. On July 23, 2014, Saada and her driver were gunned down by terrorist group *Al-Shabaab* in Mogadishu, Somalia. I love you Saada Ali.

United States to destroy the second largest city in Somalia, the beautiful city of Hargeysa. The ambassador Peter Bridges admitted:⁵²⁶

We also provided him (Somalia's regime) two dozen TOW antitank missile systems and about sixty 106-mm recoilless rifles that, mounted on jeeps which could also be used against Ethiopian tanks. The list also included seventy-five 81-mm mortars, 106 40-mm grenade launchers, two dozen machine guns, three thousands M-16 rifles, 130 trucks, a half dozen 155-mm howitzers, and a number of other items. The howitzers are the only item that I regret having furnished. They were never used against invading Ethiopians; instead, some of them were used a couple of years after I left Somalia to batter the city of Hargeisa in the north of Somalia, which was held by the anti-regime Isaq clan. At the beginning of 1991, the howitzers were used against dissidents in Mogadishu itself.

Honestly speaking, for over a decade, the United States' financial and military assistance to Somalia failed to achieve any of its five goals, including (a) security, (b) improved defense capabilities of allied governments (military), (c) political influence for Washington, (d) relief of human suffering (humanitarian), or (e) promotion of economic growth (development).⁵²⁷ In truth and generally speaking, poor leadership and tribalized politics adopted by the elite destroyed Somalia. Therefore, they directly contributed to Somalia's political factionalism and lastly to the failure of Somalia in 1991.

5.1.2. Divide-and-Rule Policy of the Western Colonial Powers

This study is assuming that the inheritances from the divide-and-rule policies of colonial powers played a crucial role in causing the Horn of Africa's inter-state wars. From a historical prospective, as we have seen, at any given time Somalia was in conflicts with others, and these conflicts were directly affecting Somalia's state formation. Colonial powers divided them, since Somalis were in conflict with others. For instance, during the pre-colonial era, Somalis were ordered into tribes and sub-clans who claimed a common ancestor and Muslims, which produced a unified religious character. Throughout the centuries they had developed a common consciousness that

⁵²⁶Bridges, Peter. Safiirka: An American Envoy, 81.

⁵²⁷ Doug, Bandow. A New Aid Policy for a New World, Cato Institute Policy, No. 226.

involved race, language, religion and land. They completely distinguished themselves from non-Somali peoples in the Horn of Africa. As we have discussed in Chapter 3, the colonial powers including France, Italy and Great Britain had determined their fates. They divided them into five pieces. However, because of their collective consciousness they reacted to the Europeans' insults, first led by the Sheikhs who organized them through Islamic teaching to reject European occupation. The Sheikhs incited society's zeitgeist, which allowed them to actualize jihad (holy war) against those who occupied their lands, and they were obliged to free themselves from European colonialism. The society accepted the Sheikhs' leadership. Society's loyalty allowed the Sheikhs to challenge the Europeans from the 1890s to 1930. The Sheikhs were asking the society to adhere to Allah's Laws. In fact, the true Muslims must adhere to Allah's Law and fight by all possible means to defend their people and territories. Therefore, in the early 20th century, political Islam was the first instrument used by the Sheikhs that allowed them to fashion the people's political awareness.

Over the thirty years when the Sheikhs were standing up against the invaders, large numbers of them were killed or jailed by European soldiers. The Sheikhs were many, but a few were exceptional, including Sheikh Hassan Barsane, as well as Biyomal and Wacdan Sheikhs. These Sheikhs were from the southern part of Somalia. Sheikh Hassan Barsane was an intellectual, and therefore his role was an exceptional one. He was not only a good fighter, but also a very skilled articulator. The colonialists were communicating with him through an exchange of letters to justify why they were in Somalia's territories, and he responded to justify his resistance with reasons. One good example: in March of 1924 he received a letter from Italy's Fascist Governor De Vecchi Val Cismon, and he wrote back to the Fascist Governor:⁵²⁸ "Your government has its laws, and we have ours. We

⁵²⁸Ibid. Collecting the History of the Somali Clans of Hawiye.

accept no law other than ours. Our law is the law of Allah and his Prophet. We are not like other people, none of us has ever enrolled in the Zaptie (colonial forces), never and if you come to our land to fight against us, we will fight you with all possible means.”

Although the Sheikhs fought ferociously, they failed to drive out the occupiers. The Europeans finally shattered them using modern weapons like automatic guns, while the Sheikhs were using Somali traditional weapons including spears, swords, arrows and knives. As result, many Sheikhs were killed or imprisoned, including Sheikh Hassan Barsane, who died in prison in 1929. In other words, the defeat of the jihadists represents a major turning point in modern history of Somalia. The Italians were very fascist; however, their political slogans incited the Somalis. To display their supremacy, the Italians were using the term “Grand Italy”, as a show of power. The Somalis imitated this by using “Greater Somalia” as a joke, at least in the beginning. In the 1940s, it occurred to them to use “Greater Somalia” as an alternative motivation for resistance—meaning that, to some degree, Somalis’ resistance was a reaction to the Italians’ idea of “Grand Italy”. However, their political awareness gradually increased, and thirteen young men came up with the ideas to establish a Somali Youth Club (SYC) in May 15, 1943. Their main goal was to establish a forum or club for the youth to discuss political affairs. However, the youth forum dramatically transformed itself into a political structure with political aspirations in 1947. Since then, nationalism came to replace political Islam from 1940 to 1977. The nationalists’ core objective was to reunify Somali ethnic people across the Horn of Africa in order to establish their own state of Greater Somalia. The nationalist symbol, adopted on October 12, 1954, was the national flag with a five-pointed star to represent the five regions. This flag with a five-pointed star would guide Somalia’s political process over the next forty years. By the time Somalia was preparing for independence in 1960, the nationalist organized a General Congress in Mogadishu in 1959 to foster Greater Somalia; the largest gathering on record

of pro-Greater Somalia supporters, hundreds of participants came from the five regions to discuss Somalia's future. They made a commitment to fight for Greater Somalia by all means, including war. The participants were great in number; however, Mohamoud Harbi was an exceptional orator and extraordinary nationalist and among the elite was widely recognized as a national hero. Mahmoud Harbi struggled for his country's independence and was the most ardent propagandist for Pan-Somalism until his death in 1960.⁵²⁹ Hence, during the independence of the 1960s, it was also a time to fight for Greater Somalia.

In 1960, the nationalists realized their political objectives to some extent when two portions out of five gained independence from Italy and Great Britain. Indeed, three pieces were still missing therefore, in 1960, the new state's core policy was to bring back the missing territories. Then the new states' polices, both locally and externally, were militarized. In 1960, elite embraced nationalist sentiment against its neighboring states rather than focusing on building a new state.⁵³⁰ From 1960-1977, both the civilian and the military regime's major policy were framed in line with Greater Somalia. Terrence Lyons has this to say:⁵³¹ The elite was symbolized by the five-pointed star on the state flag, and completely dominated all political discourse." In terms of details Ronald K. McMullen and Augustus Richard Norton wrote this:⁵³² "The five-pointed star on Somalia's flag represents the five regions inhabited by the Somali nation (northern Kenya, Ethiopia's Ogaden region, Djibouti, and northern and southern Somalia) and symbolizes the irredentist objectives of the pan-Somali movement." In fact, this was the public's first demand, and it was enshrined in the 1960s' constitution. This ultra-nationalism

⁵²⁹ For more details see Editorial Views, the Horn of Crisis Source, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, July 1987, ix-xiv.

⁵³⁰ In mid-19th century in Europe; the nationalism gave rise to most European countries that exist today and nationalism played a crucial role to the Italy's reunification in 1861 and Germany in 1871.

⁵³¹ Lyons, Terrence. Crises on Multiple Levels: Somalia & the Horn of Africa, 192.

⁵³² McMullen, Ronald K. and Augustus Richard Norton. Somalia and Other Adventures from the 1990s, Current Affairs, Vol. 92, No.573 (April 1993), 171.

bought many troubles and Saadia Touval pointed out:⁵³³ “Greater Somalia’s imagination and facilitation produced nothing other than conflict at both regional and international levels and failed to solicit political support from other states.” To the contrary, it only served to isolate Somalia. Somalia’s First President, Aden A. Osman, declared in 1965 that the reunification of all Somalis was the very reason of life for the nation.⁵³⁴ Furthermore, Somalia’s First Premier Abdul Rashid was more aggressive when he described the situation as misfortune, and he wrote:⁵³⁵ “Our neighboring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbors. Our neighbors are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by in-discriminate boundary arrangements.” Indeed, these boundaries with Kenya and Ethiopia are artificial, as pointed out by I. M. Lewis:⁵³⁶ the creation of the republic excluded Somali nationals living in French Somaliland, in the contiguous Eastern Region of Ethiopia, and in the Northern Front District of Kenya. The problem was the new state’s political boundaries, and its people’s political aspirations were not in line with those of Somalia’s neighboring states or, of course, the views of the global powers.

Thus, Somalia’s militarism was a real threat to its neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia. Ethiopia occupied a large region with Somali ethnic inhabitants since the late 19th century.⁵³⁷ Additionally, the Soviets’ advanced weapons obtained from 1963-1975 was inciting Somalia’s nationalism and in fact sponsoring Somalia’s revisionist behavior, while the Western powers, including the United State of America, were in

⁵³³ Touval, Saadia. *The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa*, 236.

⁵³⁴ Terrence Lyons. *Crises on Multiple Levels: Somali and the Horn of Africa*, 192.

⁵³⁵ Lewis, I. M. *A Modern History of Somalia*, 179.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.* I. M. Lewis, 178.

⁵³⁷ In 1897, Ethiopia and Britain signed the Treaty of London, which handed over some 25,000 square miles of Western Somali territory to Ethiopia

line with the Horn of Africa's status quo against Somalia. Indeed, global powers' geopolitical seeking and of course their exporting conflicts into peripheries, including the Horn of Africa, also contributed more to the Horn of Africa's military rivalries. Hence, without any doubt, colonial legacies and the Cold War's arming client states directly contributed to the Horn of Africa's political rivalry, which again contributed to Somalia and Ethiopia's total war in 1977-1978.

Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977-1978 and occupied its missing territories. However, the Soviets assisted the Ethiopians in finally shattering Somalia's dream to achieve Greater Somalia.

For the first time, in 1978, the Somalis were in great trouble with themselves. The trouble was that there was nothing else left to encourage unity; not religion nor patriotism. Their great aspirations had all gone. The global powers and Ethiopians had ended or erased their collective aspirations, and because of their hopelessness they adopted tribalism in 1978. This is precisely what was happening in 1978 and continues now. Hopelessness was ascendant in the midst of abject chaos; the state became irrelevant and of course had to fail. Therefore, the divide-and-rule policy of the Western colonial powers (i.e. colonial legacies) directly contributed to the failure of Somalia.

5.1.3. Aid Dependency and Economic Mismanagement

Paul Collier, the author of "The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It", asked if aid actually makes things worse.⁵³⁸ The answer is very controversial and it depends on whom one asks. At the outset, let us investigate if the global powers' aid from Italy (1960-1969), the Soviets (1963-1976), and the United States of America (1980-1990) was actually harmless to Somalia's people

⁵³⁸Collier, Paul. *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are failing and What Can Be Done About It*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, 104

or very harmful to them. In theory, foreign aid is very controversial. For the aid policy, Mark Duffield focuses on the relationship between aid policy and complexity and according to his view,⁵³⁹ “Aid adds to already complex situations, and such complexity does not end with its arrival or indeed absence.” On the one hand it can be accepted as a positive asset that will help the recipient economy, but on the other, one can characterize it as an actual threat to the recipient’s political independence.

The author of “Dead Aid”, Dambisa Moya, has this to say:⁵⁴⁰ Aid dependency only further undermines the ability of Africans, whatever their station, to determine their own best economic and political policies.” This study defines “foreign aid” as a gift or transfer from a wealthy and powerful state to a weak and less wealthy state that permits the wealthy state to interfere in the weaker state’s domestic and socioeconomic affairs. Of course this is not in line with the U.S. definition, and in fact the U.S. officially defines its foreign aid as:⁵⁴¹ “A voluntary transfer of public, concessional resources (with at least a 25 percent grant element) from one government to another government of a low-income country, or to an international organization, or NGO working in such a country; one purpose of which is to further development in the recipient country.” In Somalia’s case, wealthy states’ foreign aid to Somalia was intended to influence its domestic affairs, and in fact was a real threat to its political sovereignty. This threat was accomplished in two abusive ways. First, the powers used foreign aid to empower a brutal dictatorship, and second, they used aid to reduce Somalia’s political sovereignty. Hence, the Soviet Union and the U.S. used foreign aid as a political instrument to exploit Somalia for

⁵³⁹ Peter, Lawyer. “The Ethics of Postmodernism”, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (ed.), the Oxford Handbook of International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 388.

⁵⁴⁰ Moyo, Dambisa. *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How there is Another Way for Africa*, London: Penguin Books, 2009, 67.

⁵⁴¹ See Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav & Robert L. Ayres: *Short of the Goal: U.S. Policy and Poorly Performing States*, Washington D.C: Center for Global Development, 2006, 285.

their respective national interests.⁵⁴² Michael Roskin and Nicholas Berry said:⁵⁴³ “Donors rarely give aid out of charity but rather give it to win friends and influence countries.” Usually, in the case of Third World military rulers, the more these dictators receive the more they deny their people’s rights. Why? Bandow Doug has the answer and according to him:⁵⁴⁴ “The more aid a country receives, the less the government of that country has to answer to the people.” This accurately describes Somalia’s foreign aid dependency and its political repercussions.

Since independence in 1960, Somalia’s little educated elite faced a great dilemma as to which socioeconomic political system would be best for them. Moreover, Somalia’s new state was born during the Cold War’s peak, and at first it was not clear which side would be taken.⁵⁴⁵ As a result, the civilian government had adopted a variety of socioeconomic models. In 1960-1969 Somalia was somehow applying contradictory socio-economic models; the state’s economic and political system were in line with the Western model, while the state’s defense and foreign policies were in line with the Soviets’ views. Therefore, for more than a decade Somalia was somewhere between the East and West. In 1969, after the coup, General Mohamed rejected the civilian government’s mixed policy in favor of the Soviet model. General Mohamed claimed:⁵⁴⁶ “We are convinced that the only way to solve our problems is scientific socialism.” The question is who convinced him that the only way to solve his country’s problems was to apply scientific socialism. In reality, General Mohamed was born around 1919 to a nomadic Somali family and in his twenties was trained by the Italian Fascist as a police constable in 1941. He had never received a

⁵⁴²For more details see Bandow Doug; A New Aid Policy for a New World, Cato Institute Policy No. 226.

⁵⁴³Roskin, Michael & Nicholas Berry. An Introduction to International Relations, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inn, 1990, 363.

⁵⁴⁴Bandow, Doug. A New Aid Policy for a New World.

⁵⁴⁵The term Cold War first was used by an American political leader Bernard Baruch, who in speech on 16 April, 1947 remarked. Since scholars used the term to describe post-World War II relations between the Eastern bloc and Western bloc 1945-1989. See Chandra, Prakash; International Relations: Foreign Policies of Major Powers and Regional Systems, 8.

⁵⁴⁶See Peter Glendenning on the Somalian Revolution, 54.

formal education. In 1950, when Somalia was returned to the Italian Administration (under United Nations' Trusteeship), he was sent to Italy's military academy, and after he came back became Mogadishu's Police Commissioner. He was transferred to the national army when it was formed (1960) and by 1966 he held the rank of Major General and had become commander-in-chief, and in 1969 led the coup. The point is that General Mohamed never studied socialist economic philosophy; in fact, the Soviets convinced him that the only way to solve his country's problems was to apply scientific socialism as a state policy. J. Bowyer Bell says:⁵⁴⁷ "Soviets' economic assistance has waxed and waned, but after a visit by General Mohamed to Moscow in 1971, there has been renewed Soviet interest. Since the first grants, a total of USD 87 million in economic aid has been extended to date." The Soviets' major aim was to influence and establish a close relation with Somalia's military ruler, and as a result George Ayittey said:⁵⁴⁸ "The government was centralized under 'Supreme Revolutionary Council' and Somalia turned to the Soviet Union for tutelage from 1970 to 1977. No one else in Africa seemed to enjoy the Soviets' friendship as did Somalia's military ruler, General Mohamed."

In line with the Soviets' economic model, Richard Greenfield said:⁵⁴⁹ The banks, insurance companies, electrical power production, petroleum distribution, sugar estates and the refineries were all nationalised, but not the banana plantations, in which there were substantial foreign interests." Nonetheless, these new measures were against the Somalis' economic nature as a nomadic society. Therefore, there was a big gap between socialist economic philosophy and the way it was implemented in Somalia. To cover up or overcome the economic faults of socialism, the Soviets were ready to supply free food and fuel and only after 4 years in 1974, the Soviets' aid to Somalia was 400 percent higher than when General Mohamed had assumed power. However, after Ethiopia's revolution

⁵⁴⁷Bell, J. Bowyer. *The Horn of Africa's Strategic Magnet in the Seventies*, 42.

⁵⁴⁸ See George Ayittey's Article published by the Cato Policy, "Time for an African Solution", in 1994.

⁵⁴⁹ Greenfield, Richard. "Obituary: Mohamed Siad Barre, published by *Independence* on January 3, 1995.

and the Horn of Africa's strategic alteration the Soviets suspended supplies to Somalia in favor of Ethiopia, which forced Somalia to annul its friendship with the Soviets on November 13, 1977. For a second time, Somalia's military ruler aligned himself with the United States of America and signed numerous treaties, but the most important result was on August 22, 1980, when Somalia permitted the United States' military to use Somalia's military facilities. The United States of America asked Somalia's military ruler to adopt the capitalist free-market economic model. Thus, for the second time Somalia became an America and Western economic experts' experimental field to apply capitalist's economic model to nomadic society. In fact, General Mohamed's U-turn from Moscow to Washington was for an economic aid and he has to redirect his socioeconomic model in favor of so-called free market. This overnight change badly affected Somalia's economy, already decaying under the Soviets' bad advice. In 1980-1990, the United States of America pressured General Mohamed to accept the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's Structural Adjustment Programmes. The program's instructions included state properties' privatization, trade liberalization, higher interests rates, etc. This meant that the economic direction of each country would be planned, monitored, and controlled in Washington. For instance, the World Bank assistance for helping a poor country involves a country-by-country investigation, with a meeting with begging Finance Ministers who are handed a restructuring agreement that is "pre-drafted for voluntary signature".⁵⁵⁰

Within a short time period, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's poor advice led Somalia's already decaying economy towards total failure. Patrick Bond says:⁵⁵¹ "Ironically, IMF researches including - the then chief economist, Kenneth Rogoff- finally admitted in 2003 that severe damage had been inflicted by two decades

⁵⁵⁰For more details see "the IMF and World Bank are Major Cause of Poverty in Africa", published by 'Global Envision' Exploring Market-Driving Solutions to Poverty', available at: globalenvision.org (accessed on December 18, 2015).

⁵⁵¹Bond, Patrick. *Looting Africa: the Economics of Exploitation*, London and New York: university of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2006, 51.

of financial liberalization.”

The World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s financial advisors produced nothing except a client state dependent on American foreign aid for survival, and according to Michel Chossudovsky:⁵⁵² “By the 1980s, following recurrent austerity measures as imposed by Washington, wages in the public sector collapsed to three dollars a month”. Furthermore, Christopher Clapham has this to say:⁵⁵³ “the creation and survival of the Somali state wasn’t dependent upon its ability to secure the obedience of its population, but rather its ability to extract resources, finances, military, and diplomatic support from the international system.” It is clear that aid and economic advice provided by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (to apply Structural Adjustment Program) were making Somalia worse, and this was after Somalia and the United States signed in an agreement on August 22, 1980 that permitted the United States to use military facilities at the port of Berbera.⁵⁵⁴ Since then, the United States of America and its allies were providing aid and economic advice, and Somalia received over one billion dollars in the period from 1980 to 1990. Abdullah A. Mohamoud revealed this:⁵⁵⁵ “During that period, Somalia received between USD 300 and USD 400 million annually of Gross Official Development Assistance or about USD 55 to 70 per capital and despite the shaky power position of the ruling class availability of this foreign assistance enable it to use the public funds for patronage purposes in order to remain in power.” In actual fact, this foreign aid was something like phantom aid. Even with this massive aid assistance, the Somali people never benefited, and Abdullah A. Mohamoud quoted from

⁵⁵² Chossudovsky, Michel. *Somalia: The Real Causes of Famine*, published Online by the Global Research for Center on Globalization, July 21, 2011. Available at <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=25725>. (accessed 21 Aug. 2011).

⁵⁵³ Christopher Clapham. *The Global-Local Politics of State Decay*, (Ed.) Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003, 77.

⁵⁵⁴ Ayittey, George B. N. *the crisis of Somalia: Time for an African Solution*, Paper published by Cato Policy Analysis No. 205, March 28, 1994.

⁵⁵⁵ Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 122.

Michael Maren.⁵⁵⁶ “For ten years before the 1992 famine, Somalia was the largest recipient of aid in Sub-Sahara Africa, in some years the third largest in the world behind perennial Egypt and Israel. . . . Aid money went to Somali bureaucrats whose primary skill was in earning money by dealing with foreign charities.” This is a sad story in which it seems all the donors, the charity organizations and the regime were working together to loot the aid collected or donated in the name of the Somali people.

In reality, Somalia’s dependency on foreign aid and its internal economic mismanagement both contributed to the failure of Somalia. Somalia’s shifts from one socioeconomic model to another for foreign aid had a severe impact on the state’s overall political shape and direction. In 1989, when the Cold War ended, the foreign economic aid for Somalia stopped as well. Consequently, the abrupt end of external aid gravely diminished the wealth of the economy in the country, as Abdullah A. Mohamoud said.⁵⁵⁷ Somalia was selling its geopolitical position since its independency and therefore, as we have stated earlier, there was a direct link between General Mohamed’s political survival and the United States’ foreign aid, as John Young and John Kent also argue:⁵⁵⁸ “The immediate foreign aid cut-off was one of the primary causes of Somalia’s state collapse.” In 1989, as soon as the U.S. stopped its foreign aid to Somalia, General Mohamed’s brutal regime collapsed in less than a year. Through its foreign aid and in one decade, the U.S. transformed Somalia from an independent state to one of abject dependence. Frankly, the U.S.’s foreign aid was far more harmful than that of the Soviets, as Somalia became far more impoverished by the mid-1990s and the regime was more oppressive than previously. The answer to the question of whether aid actually makes things worse, in Somalia’s case, was that foreign aid dependency actually pushed Somalia to fail. Ambassador Peter Bridges honestly accepted the United States’ contribution to its failure

⁵⁵⁶ Ibid..

⁵⁵⁷ Ibid. 122.

⁵⁵⁸ Young, W. John & John Kent. *International Relations since 1945*, 616.

and according to his own words, he said:⁵⁵⁹ “In Somalia (1980-1990), the government comes begging to the aid trough and we fill it. We have led them to a new dependency, not to independency.”

The problem was that because of its foreign aid dependency and economic mismanagement, Somalia was like an “experimental object” to the Soviets and the United States. The economic advisors for both powers, after their respective arrivals in Mogadishu and without wasting any time, straight away were advising Somalia to apply their own economic perspectives. The Soviets’ economic advisors were encouraging Somalia to apply the socialist economic model as the best in order to free themselves of the so-called bourgeoisie, at a later time, the United States’ economic advisors were encouraging Somalia to liberalize its economic policy in order to receive more financial support from the U.S., and to encourage a much needed foreign direct investment to come. In fact, the Soviets and the United States’ economic advisors were ignoring the risks involved in their suggestions, and according to Art Jervis:⁵⁶⁰ “Economists who suggest that all countries must adopt Western institutions to achieve Western levels of income often failed to consider the changes and political risks involved.” In fact, a poor country like Somalia has to obey its patrons’ bad advice, because compliance was a precondition for receiving additional financial support from Moscow or Washington. In fact, neither the Soviets’ socialist model nor the World Bank and International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programme was relevant to Somalia’s nomadic society and, therefore, its flip-flop between the Moscow and Washington for foreign aids led Somalia into total economic mismanagement throughout its nationhood, from 1960-1990. Honestly, Somalia is a country that, because of its poor leadership, the major powers led or transformed from independence to foreign aid

⁵⁵⁹Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka* (Ambassador): An American Envoy, 200.

⁵⁶⁰Scott, Bruce R. “the Great Divide in the Global Village”, in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (ed.) *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, (10th Ed.), New York and London: Pearson Education, Inc., 2011, 199.

dependency rather than assisting to remain independent. To sum up, aid dependency and economic mismanagement over thirty years directly contributed much to the failure of Somalia.

5.2. Somalia As A Failed State: External Factors

In 1947 a new era dawned in Africa's Horn that hailed the departure of old colonial powers and the arrival of new powers: the Soviet Union and the United States of America.⁵⁶¹ The greater the proclivity of one or both of these powers in support of antagonistic regimes only aggravated extant post-colonial inter-territorial conflicts. Therefore, again the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa witnessed the Soviet and American geopolitical contest through the Cold War (1947-1989). Geoffrey Roberts defined the Cold War as:⁵⁶² "a term that refers to the state of tension, hostility, competition, and conflict which characterized Soviets-Western, and more particularly, Soviets-American relation for much of the postwar period." Therefore, the Cold War's contested areas include the Horn of Africa because of its geopolitical location. As we mentioned earlier, the Red Sea could be seen as a connecting geographical link between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. William Zartman has this to say:⁵⁶³ The Horn is practically part of the Middle East, the Soviet Union's border region and home of United States' economic and political allies, thus, the region draws much of its interest to the United States and the U.S.S.R from its maritime relations, as the western shore of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. This area is a very geopolitical region. The Red Sea forms a singular geostrategic entity in a wider context, Somalia, Ethiopia and the Gulf States have not come under total control of a hostile power because this region is producing much-needed oil, and the Red Sea

⁵⁶¹ Bell, J. Bowyer. *The Horn of Africa*, 10-11.

⁵⁶² Roberts, Geoffrey. *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991*, London and New York: published by Routledge, 1999, 2.

⁵⁶³ Zartman, I. William. *Superpower Cooperation in North Africa and the Horn*; Kanet, Roger E. & Kolodziej (eds.); *The Cold War As Cooperation: Superpower Cooperation in Regional conflict Management*, London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, 1991, 156.

is a passage for oil to the West. The oil is vital to Western industrial development, and this requires making sure that the region is secure.

5.2.1. Somalia as Chessboard of Major Powers

The Soviets and the United States of America adopted the practice of proxy wars to avoid a total war and constrained themselves as observed by Victor A. Kremenjuk:⁵⁶⁴

(a) No direct use of force against each other, since it would be too dangerous, unpredictable, questionable and, hence, counter-productive; (b) don't rock the boat, that is, maintain the post-war world structure, since the consequences of sudden change could bring results which would be dangerous to the self-interest of both sides; (c) conversely, while both sides could count on each side to observe these constraints, both felt free to use all other means to achieve victory.

The Horn of Africa was subsequently effected by the exported conflict, particularly Somalia and Ethiopia, and Buchita Beri has this to say:⁵⁶⁵ “During the Cold War period, the struggle by the superpowers for influence, control and access to military bases as part of their competition for ideological control of the world, contributed to the increasing militarization in Africa.” Therefore, the Horn of Africa, because of its immense geopolitical importance, attracted the USSR and the United States to contest it throughout the Cold War as a hotspot for the balance of power. The Horn of Africa became a hemorrhaging example of problematic geopolitics. Ruth Iyob had this to say:⁵⁶⁶ “One of the things that permits us to speak of the Horn of Africa, besides its Horn-link perch on maps of continental Africa, is that its geography determines its policies as much as anything in its history or social makeup.” Furthermore, the United States’ strategic thinker Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser for President Jimmy Carter, has since claimed that:⁵⁶⁷ “the conflict in this remote desert region was what

⁵⁶⁴ Kremenjuk, Victor A. *The Cold War As Cooperation: A Soviet Perspective*, 35.

⁵⁶⁵ Beri, Ruchita. *Militarization and the Search for Security in Africa*, *African Security Review*, 1996, Vol. 5, 5. Available at <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/5No5/Beri.html>-1 Sep. 2005.(accessed on May 11, 2012).

⁵⁶⁶ Iyob, Ruth. *The Foreign Policies of the Horn: the Clash between the Old and the New*, 107.

⁵⁶⁷ Zunes, Stephen. *Somalia as a Military Target*, *Foreign Policy in Focus*, published on 11 Jan. 2002.

sparked the end of detente with the Soviet Union and the renewal of the Cold War.” This remote desert region mentioned by the former National Security Advisor is the Horn of Africa. In fact, the high level of superpower military involvement earned the sub-region a nickname as the Horn of Conflict ‘globally’.⁵⁶⁸ They played out their great game in this remote desert region. Throughout the Cold War, one of its key defining characteristics was the continuum of a superpower supply of free advanced weaponry. Christopher Clapham said this:⁵⁶⁹ the African Horn was no different and its states were forced to choose a bloc with little concern for their well-being on the part of their new patrons. They transported their conflict to the Horn of Africa because of the region’s geopolitical value. They avoided face-to-face conflict but provided weapons to respective clients who fought proxy wars; however, the result was only to internationalize and magnify the intensity of otherwise negligible inter-state hostilities. In that way, the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical value gave the region’s military rulers, particularly those of Somalia and Ethiopia, a major stake in the Cold War and, according to David Latin and Said S. Samatar:⁵⁷⁰ “Today there is a contest between the United States and the Soviet Union for military bases and other strategic stakes in the Horn region.” Global powers throughout the Cold War were ready to make a deal with the Horn of Africa’s dictators for strategic gain. George Alagiah pointed out:⁵⁷¹ “During the Cold War, from a strategic viewpoint, the United States of America and Soviet Union fought over it, competing for a presence in the strategic Horn of Africa.” Thus, the Cold War’s conflicts, both geopolitical and ideological, provide us a way to understand the game. The United States’ ambassador to Somalia (1994/5), Dan Simpson, admitted this:⁵⁷² With the exception of

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid. See note: Mohamoud, Abdullahi. A. State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa, 15.

⁵⁶⁹ Clapham, Christopher. Africa and the International System: the Political Survival, 134.

⁵⁷⁰ Latin, D. David and Said S. Samatar. Somalia: Nation in Search of State, III.

⁵⁷¹ George Alagiah. A Passage to Africa, 90.

⁵⁷² Simpson, Dan. Hung Up on the Horn of Africa: We Should Let the Fractious Region Go its Own Way, published by Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, republished Hiiraan.com on 15 Sep. 2010. Available at [www.hiiraan.com/op2/2010/sept/hunguponthe Horn of Africa](http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2010/sept/hunguponthe%20Horn%20of%20Africa) (accessed 16 Sep. 2010).

countries the United States has wrecked through wars (Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan), the area where we have done the most damage in recent years probably is the Horn of Africa.

The superpowers' conflicts eventually were exported to the Horn of Africa. They aligned themselves with the Horn of Africa's military rulers and signed friendship treaties for military bases in exchange for arms and financial support. These friendship treaties produced nothing except to increase the Horn of Africa's intra- and inter-state hostilities. Thus, Somalia and Ethiopia became a chessboard used by the Soviets and the United States as a battleground for proxy wars.

5.2.2. Regional Rivalry: Somalia and Ethiopia

Ethiopia and Somalia are located in the heart of the Horn of Africa. Somalia's strategic location along the Bab El-Mandeb to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal attracted foreign powers that vied for position in the global power struggle.⁵⁷³ The region acts as the bridge that links the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea. The effects of the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value are paramount during the Cold War, as explained by Henry F. Jackson:⁵⁷⁴ "In the Cold War era the Horn attracted much attention in global politics when the superpowers scrambled for strategic advantage and elevated military assistance as the prime instrument for achieving these ends." Thus, one immediate impact of the bipolar competition on inter-state relations was to increase divisiveness among the countries. As a result, Somalia and Ethiopia's military regimes received billions of dollars and advanced weapons, which allowed them to sponsor intra-state wars, as well as to attack each other, which was actually part and parcel of the superpowers' grand strategy.

⁵⁷³Ibid. Meith, N. *The State of Environment in Somalia*.

⁵⁷⁴ Jackson, Henry F. *From the Congo to Soweto: the U.S. Policy Toward Africa Since 1960*, NY: Quill, 1984, 225.

For that reason, the Horn's geopolitical value had thus far in the modern age proved a curse rather than a blessing, and according to Ahmed I. Samatar:⁵⁷⁵ "The relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies had developed into a tighter embrace, with more military equipment pouring into Somalia and, in the process, creating one of the largest armed forces in black Africa." On its own, Somalia had insufficient resources to build such an army. For the period of the Somalia-Ethiopia war, Somalia owned the larger (for Africa) air force of 52 combat aircraft, including 24 MiGs and 21s. Somalia by itself could not buy these airplanes. According to a Canadian Report on the Somalia Commission of Inquiry:⁵⁷⁶ "Superpower rivalry supplied arms to power groups in the region, fanning regional conflicts. The Horn's per capita consumption of weapons was higher than in any other part of Africa. Nowhere in Africa was militarization more than the Horn of Africa." The region's armies were not built up by the region's wealth, and Marina Ottaway has this to say:⁵⁷⁷ "During the 1970s no area of Africa underwent more sudden and startling internal upheavals and foreign policy turnabouts than did the Horn of Africa, and no region went more dramatically from relative neglect to intensive courtship by superpowers." The United States and the Soviets spent billions to arm the Horn of Africa's military regimes. After all, the Soviets' role was exceptional as they sent US \$13 billion in military assistance to the Mengistu regime.⁵⁷⁸ Somalia is the same; Julius O. Ihonvbere has this to say:⁵⁷⁹ "Somalia had served the interests of the Soviet Union and the U.S. and unfortunately, it did not benefit from its spasms of allegiance to either bloc and at the end of the Cold War, and during General Mohamed's fall, there was more ammunition in Somalia than food and medicine." Unbelievably, General

⁵⁷⁵ Samatar, Ahmed I. The porcupine Dilemma: Governance and Transition in Somalia," *Bildhan, An International Journal of Somali Studies*, Vol. 7, (2007), 39-90, 57.

⁵⁷⁶ Report of Somalia Commission of Inquiry, the Situation in Somalia. Available at <http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c11e.htm>. (accessed 11 Nov. 2011).

⁵⁷⁷ Ottaway, Marina. *Soviets and American Influence in the Horn of Africa*, New York: Praeger Publisher, 1982, p.v.

⁵⁷⁸ Ofcansky, Thomas O. *Ethiopia: A Country Study*, Washington: Library of Congress Catalog-in-Publication Data, 1993. 291.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibid. Julius O. Ihonvbere. *The World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Programs and the Somali Crisis*.

Mohamed's stores were filled up more with ammunition than food. This ammunition was not made in Somalia, but was instead supplied by the Soviets and the U.S. They knew General Mohamed would use those weapons to oppress or kill his people, yet the U.S. closed its eyes. In January 2000, the World Policy Institute reported this:⁵⁸⁰

Due to the continuing legacies of its Cold War policies toward Africa, the US bears some responsibility for the cycles of violence and economic problems plaguing the continent. Throughout the Cold War (1950-1989), the US delivered over \$1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa. Many of the top US arms clients- Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC), have turned out to be the top basket cases of the 1990s in terms of violence, instability, and economic collapse.

In their own way, the Horn of Africa's military regimes complicated the matter by exploiting the situation. They were ready both to fight proxy wars on behalf of their sponsors and to oppress their own people. The Horn of Africa was similar to a "no man's land", and John Stremlau has this to say:⁵⁸¹ "Before the end of the Cold War, United States' policy aimed primarily at gaining and holding reliable allies, but what went wrong within those allied states hardly mattered. For example, the Soviets accepted Colonel Mengistu's demands for advanced weapons and knew his intentions. Likewise, the United States was ready to accept General Mohamed's demand for weaponry yet knew he intended to oppress and kill his own people. Through the years the proxy wars were the best profitable business to make a deal with superpowers. The continued policy of the major powers as witnessed clearly during the Cold War had destructive effects on the state-building enterprises throughout the Third World."⁵⁸² Throughout this time the Soviets and United States were allying with the Horn's military rulers in exchange for military bases; this rivalry increased levels of both intra- and inter-state violence. Therefore, the Horn's conflicts were vicarious hostilities fueled by superpowers, which G. R. Berridge

⁵⁸⁰ D. Hurtung William & Bridget Moix. *Deadly Legacy: U.S Arms to Africa and the Congo War* published by Arms Trade Resource Center, REPORT: Weapons at War, January 2000. Available at <http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm> military. (accessed on 4 March 2011).

⁵⁸¹ Stremlau, John. *Ending Africa's Wars*, published online by Foreign Affairs, vol. 74. No.4 (July/August 2000).

⁵⁸² Ayoo, Mohammed. *Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World*, 44.

describes as:⁵⁸³ “The arms build-ups thus generated an arms race, alliances provoked counter-alliances and bids on the part of a state to expand its influence into regions hitherto ignored, which led its rivals to do the same.” Additionally, because of an abundance of free weapons and cash, the Horn of Africa’s military regimes failed to seek legitimacy via internal institutional frameworks, and preferred to rely on assistance from patrons with dubious intentions. As a consequence of their proxy war, they misspent resources on these wars instead of on much needed public infrastructure. In fact, nobody knew exactly how much in total was spent on their defense sectors, both Ethiopia and Somalia, but according to the Department of State’s Report:⁵⁸⁴ “The central government’s budget for defense in 1984 was USD 380 million.” This number is extremely high for a poor country like Somalia. Likewise, Ethiopia’s defense spending was also extremely high and according to Toy Addison and S. Mansoob Murshed:⁵⁸⁵ “Ethiopia, in 1989-91, defense spending averaged 46.6 per cent of total current expenditures, whereas social spending accounted for 17 per cent; a sad testament.” The major question is who was paying for all this so-called defense spending and for what reason? The global powers paid it for geopolitical interests. In fact, they were sponsoring killers, and Baffour Agyeman-Duah has this to say:⁵⁸⁶ “The disintegration of the Ethiopian and Somali states in the early 1990s was caused largely by militarization which was aided and abetted essentially by the Cold War’s warriors.” This reality stands firm. Somalia and Ethiopia’s War of 1977-1978 was a direct result of the region’s militarization by external powers. They were setting up rivals to fight each other, and the Soviets and the United States’ exporting their conflicts into periphery regions, including

⁵⁸³Berridge, G. R. *International Politics: State, Power & Conflicts since 1954*, (3rd (Ed.)), New York and London: Prentice Hall, 1997, 72.

⁵⁸⁴ For more details see —Somalia-U.S diplomatic Relationship.

⁵⁸⁵ Addison, Tony and S. Mansoob Murshed. *The Fiscal Dimensions of Conflict and Reconstruction: Discussion, I Paper No. 2001/49*, August 2001. Available at <http://www.wider.unu.edu/stc/repec/pdfs/dp2001/dp2001-49.pdf>. (accessed May 7, 2009).

⁵⁸⁶ Agyeman-Duah, Baffour. *The Horn of Africa: Conflict, Demilitarization and Reconstruction*, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Volume 16, Issue, 1996. 3.

the Horn of Africa, directly contributed to the failure of Somalia on January 26, 1991.

5.2.2.1. The Ending of the Horn's Geopolitical Value

In 1989, the region's geopolitical value decreased after the Soviets surrendered. This is very vital to the Horn of Africa's political rivalry. In early years, both the Soviets and the United States were assisting and holding together the region's weak regimes and their societies. Many weak states that failed like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia were each regarded at one time or another as important pieces on the Cold War chessboard. However, in a dramatic way, in 1989 the Soviets surrendered and declared its readiness to withdraw from Afghanistan and to stop assisting its client states cross the globe. As a result, the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value decreased and then, in 1988-1989 both superpowers asked their respective clients to use non-military means to reduce the Horn of Africa's rivalry. This was after a summit on October 12, 1986 between the United States' President Reagan and the Soviet President Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland. At this historical summit, Soviet President Gorbachev accepted the U.S's global supremacy. The two leaders put aside their client states' disagreements and agreed to ask them to settle their quarrels peaceably. Therefore, on April 14, 1988, the Soviets announced plans to reduce military assistance to combat zones, including the Horn of Africa, and two months later, on July 26, 1988, President Gorbachev informed Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia that the Soviet Union was unwilling to increase its military assistance to Ethiopia and alternatively asked him to seek a "just solution" to the dispute in northern Ethiopia.⁵⁸⁷ The Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988 and successfully ended on February 15, 1989. On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall, the symbolic boundary between the East and West, fell to mark the end of the Cold War.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁷Ofcansky, Thomas P. Ethiopia: A Country Study, 296.

⁵⁸⁸ Rosenberg, Jennifer. The Rise and the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Available at [http://history1900sabout.com /od /coldwa1/a/berlinwall.htm](http://history1900sabout.com/od/coldwa1/a/berlinwall.htm). (accessed 2 May 2010).

Subsequently, the United States abandoned its military bases in Somalia, as the Soviets were no longer threatening the sources of energy and military interest in the Arabian Peninsula. This meant that both superpowers were no longer ready to bribe their clients. On this account, Eric E. Wolf wrote:⁵⁸⁹ “As we know, the end of the Cold War witnessed not only the implosion of the Soviet bloc but also the end of superpower patronage and supervision over political and military clienteles.” As a result of the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, freed from Cold War constraints and abandoned by former sponsors, a number of weak states fragmented or collapsed entirely.⁵⁹⁰ As we discussed in Chapter 4, the Soviets’ offensive in Afghanistan had a direct link with the Horn of Africa’s geostrategic value, i.e. the Arc of Crises, meaning that the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan was a key factor in devaluing the Horn’s geopolitical position. The United States had terminated its treaty with Somalia in January 1991 and in one month General Mohamed’s regime collapsed on January 26, 1991, and Bandow Doug has this to say:⁵⁹¹

With the end of the Cold War, the survival of allied governments in small nations around the globe was no longer important, or even relevant, to U.S. National security. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact made the military justification for funneling billions more dollars into the hands of regimes that were often the worst sorts of kleptomaniac autocracies completely disappear.

The U.S.’s Ambassador to Somalia Peter Bridges honestly acknowledged:⁵⁹² “In 1984 our military was emphasizing the strategic importance of the Horn.” Yes, in 1991, neither the U.S. nor the Soviets desired to obtain or to use Somalia’s geopolitical location for the balance of powers, as they did before the end of the Cold War. Therefore, it can be argued that the Horn of Africa’s rivalry was partially the superpowers’ rivalry on geopolitical

⁵⁸⁹ Wolf, Eric R. Comments on State, Identity and Violence; R. Brain Ferguson (eds.), *The State, Identity and Violence*, London and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2003, 64.

⁵⁹⁰ Dobbins, James. *Learning the Lessons of Iraq*, Fukuyama, Francis; *Nation Building beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*, Baltimore: the John Hopkins University Press, 2005, 219.

⁵⁹¹ Doug, Bandow. *A New Aid Policy for a New World*,

⁵⁹² Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, 62.

contesting, and once the superpowers stopped their rivalry, the Horn of Africa's rivalry subsequently ended in 1990s. However, the previous rivalry's consequences played a crucial role in the failure of Somalia and Ethiopia and Abdullah A. Mohamud has to say about them:⁵⁹³ "In 1991, both highly prized superpower client states collapsed." Indeed, the more superpowers contest for geopolitical gain, the more their client will earn from their patrons. In reverse, the more they relax, the less their state client will earn. The superpowers' geopolitical contest increased the Horn's geopolitical value, and the end of the Cold War decreased the region's geopolitical value. Either way, the problem has had severe effects on the Horn of Africa's inter-state relations.

5.2.2.2. The Military Rulers' Collapse

The Horn of Africa was a region of rivalry, especially between Somalia and Ethiopia's military rulers, Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia and General Mohamed of Somalia. At the end of the Cold War, their patrons abandoned them and both fell within a very short time period. In fact, both failed to achieve core principles that had been underscoring their political slogans. For instance, Ethiopia failed to preserve its territorial integrity, and it lost Eritrea. The division of Ethiopia into many states was one of Somalia's goals. Eritrea announced its independence from Ethiopia on April 27, 1993.⁵⁹⁴ As for Somalia, they not only failed to achieve Greater Somalia, but also failed to remain a viable state. On January 26, 1991, Somali militants supported by the Ethiopian military ruler overthrew General Mohamed, whereupon Somalia immediately disintegrated. A few months later the EPRD, supported for years by Somalia, overthrew Ethiopia's military ruler, Colonel Mangestu in May of 1991. The final battle for the capital occurred

⁵⁹³Mohamoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa*, 15

⁵⁹⁴For more details see at the U.S. Department of State: *Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in Force January 1, 2009*.

on May 28, when the EPRDF entered the city of Addis Ababa in the morning.⁵⁹⁵ The Horn of Africa's long-time military rivals fled into exile: Colonel Mengistu of Ethiopia fled to Zimbabwe, while General Mohamed fled to Nigeria where he passed away in 1993. By and large, these military rulers' rivalry had direct links with the Cold War and with the Horn of Africa's colonial legacies. As a result, the Cold War's, the Horn of Africa's geopolitical position, Somalia's nationalism against Ethiopia and Ethiopia's calling for status quo, all together created a very hostile environment that allowed the region's military rulers to engage in rivalry behavior. The Horn of Africa's geopolitical value had so far proved itself a curse rather than a blessing, as per Samuel T. Francis:⁵⁹⁶ "A conflict within the Horn of Africa thus appears to be profound and chronic and affects both the internal stability of the regional nations and their external relationships." In fact, as we mentioned earlier, the region's sources of rivalry were multiple; however, colonial legacies, the region's geopolitical position, and the global powers' exporting conflicts into peripheral regions facilitated the Horn of Africa's rivalry. Therefore, besides the military rulers' willingness for rivalry, the Cold War's effects are exceptional. To sum up, once the Cold War was over, the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value decreased, and neither the Soviets nor the United States were interested in supporting it in the 1990s.

⁵⁹⁵ Ofcansky, Thomas P. *Ethiopia: A Country Study*, 310.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibid*: Samuel T, Francis. *Conflict in the Horn of Africa*,

5.3. CONCLUSION

This research's main goal has been to investigate both the internal and external factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia. In other words, the aim is to examine the effects of interplay factors rather than to reiterate internal factors and domestic issues' role. In other words, without a proper understanding of Somalia's interactions with regional and global powers (pre-state and post-state), it is impossible to identify the sources of its failure as a state. The external effects on weak states including Somalia are far greater than assumed, and Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi said this:⁵⁹⁷ "To underrate the external behavior of states requires more than merely examining factors internal to the state. One must first grasp how the structure of the system actually conditions and predisposes certain actors to act in certain ways." Also, a Somali politician and member of the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (1976-1991), Omar Salad Elmi, says:⁵⁹⁸ "The negative impact of the World Bank and IFM's SAP on Somalia must be considered as one of the most important factors that dramatically contributed to Somalia's failure." In fact, Somalia failed to act in certain ways and therefore, to identify the factors that contributed to the failure of Somalia, we must examine Somalia's interactions with others since the late 19th century.

Thus, this research assumes that Somalia's failure can be traced back to the impacts of Western colonialism, its partition, Somalia's uneasy road to independence, the weakness of the civilian governments, and military misrule, as well as the role of the Soviets and the United States of America and finally, the Horn of Africa's rivalry, particularly that between Somalia and Ethiopia.

To arrange the factors, this research argues that in 1960, Somalia's state was born with these four challenges: first, to govern an artificially divided society comprised of many clans. Over

⁵⁹⁷ Viotti, Paul, R. & Mark V. Kauppi. *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, 9.

⁵⁹⁸ Elmi, Omar Salad. *Millions of Somalis Endangered by Deep and Widespread Poverty*.

six decades of colonial rule, colonial powers were dividing clans into friendly and enemy clans and had armed friendly clans. This divide-and-control strategy created a situation in which turmoil, instability and destruction prevailed.⁵⁹⁹ Additionally, in the 1960s the Somali population was estimated at 2.2 million; in the southern regions the population was estimated at 1.6 million inhabitants, 70% of whom were nomadic or semi-nomadic, and the northern regions' population was estimated at 600,000 persons, 85% of whom were nomadic or semi-nomadic, and on the whole, 73% of the population depended on animal husbandry and its byproducts for its livelihood.⁶⁰⁰ This means that at least 73% of the Somali population in the 1960s were nomadic and lacking in any form of political education and, therefore, they had difficulty understanding the concept of statehood in the 1960s. Secondly, the Somali elite during the intendance (1960s) were not trained properly to govern the country but instead were handpicked by the colonial powers to serve them, and Peter Glendenning has this to say:⁶⁰¹ "The new state's political elite had been handpicked by colonial powers and in fact UK and Italy chose cronies who favored self-interest and foreign powers as a representative frontline for neo-colonialism." Thirdly, Somalia's new state was born during the Cold War, and because of its nature Somalia aligned itself with the Soviets (1963-1978) for weaponry and financial support in exchange for military bases, and later aligned itself with the U.S. (1979-1990) for the same purpose. They used Somalia as a chessboard and they transformed it from independence to dependency on their foreign aid. The U.S's ambassador to Somalia from 1984 to 86 put it thusly:⁶⁰² in Somalia the government comes begging to the aid trough and we fill it. We have led them to a new dependency, not to independence. Fourthly, we come to the Horn of Africa's endless crisis. In the 1960s, Somalia's new state was born

⁵⁹⁹ Similar few see Mohmoud, Abdullah A. *State Collapse*, 61.

⁶⁰⁰ Konczacki, Z. A. "Nomadic and Economic Development of Somalia: the Position of the Nomadic in the economy of Somalia", *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Nov., 1967), 163-175, 163.

⁶⁰¹ Glendenning, Peter. *Somalian Revolution*, 46.

⁶⁰² Bridges, Peter. *Safiirka: An American Envoy*, p. 200.

from a divided nation as in 1897, Somalis in the Horn of Africa were partitioned into five pieces by Italy, France and Great Britain. Then, the elite sought to overcome that colonial legacy and adopted nationalism in favor of Greater Somalia. In fact, Somalia's nationalism was a serious threat to its own existence. Attempting to achieve Greater Somalia brought many conflicts at all levels but mostly between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as Somalia and the global powers. Altogether these four factors finally pushed Somalia to fail.

In line with these four factors' contribution to the failure of Somalia, the data survey analysis showed statistically their respective percentages with these points:


In terms of society, due to its internal tribal structure, both colonial powers and local opportunists (poor leadership) can easily manipulate the people in an exploitative way. Simply because of the peoples' lack of education and political awareness, the colonial powers and bad elites were easily able to divide them into many sub-clans. Given that, some may argue that the Somalia Members of Parliament society is not blameless. Therefore, the survey says society's role is very high and the current Somalia Members of Parliament believe the society's tribal structure is very fragmented and that this strongly contributed to the failure of Somalia as much as 32%.

In terms of the elites' role, the elite not only failed to frame sound policies, they also adopted political factionalism and clan politics. Their role was very crucial and, therefore, the survey says elites' role is very high and according to the Somalia Members of Parliament, the elites' factionalism and their poor leadership contributed to the failure of Somalia as much as 28%.

From the colonial legacies and the Horn of Africa's role, the impact of the Horn of Africa's colonial legacies, militarism, political instability and rival political behavior all together played a crucial role in the failure of Somalia. From a historical perspective, the Horn of Africa's cultural rivalry, particularly between the Ethiopians and Somalis, is very paramount. The two nations were at war since the 14th century; however, during the Cold

War, the level of rivalry increased. Somalia and Ethiopia's military rulers were attempting to weaken or overthrow each other, which directly contributed to the failure of Somalia. Therefore, the survey says the Horn of Africa's colonial legacies, inter-state wars, sponsoring of political dissidents, and the region's lack of crisis management pushed Somalia to fail. According to the Somalia Members of Parliament view, the Horn of Africa's endless military and political rivalries contributed to the failure of Somalia as much as 22.7%.

The Cold War's negative impact on Somalia was very profound. First, Somalia is located in a very specific geopolitical position; as a result, that geopolitical position attracted or invited global powers to come to Somalia for balance of power. As a consequence of its geopolitical position, the colonial powers came to divide Somali ethnic people into five groups; yet again, during the Cold War, Somalia's geopolitical position attracted the Soviets and the United States. Both powers signed Friendship Treaties with Somalia at different points in time, which allowed them to become involved in Somalia's domestic affairs. They used Somalia's geopolitical position as a chessboard to balance each other. Besides security and military affairs, they both involved paid advisers to help manage Somalia's economy. In fact, their economic advice produced nothing except to lead Somalia into dependency on foreign aid. Therefore, the survey says global powers' rivalry and Somalia's geopolitical location played a great role in pushing Somalia to fail. According to the Somalia Members of Parliament view, the Cold War's geopolitical rivalry contributed to the failure of Somalia as much as 17.3%.



Hence, this study rejects the conclusions drawn by prior studies because of their failure to give sufficient weight to the effects of external factors. Therefore, this study makes a fresh and significant contribution to studies on Somalia by enlarging the scope accordingly and to give proper weight to previously ignored external effects, including the factors of colonial legacies, the Horn of Africa's geopolitical value, superpowers' chessboard game with the Horn of Africa's geological position, and the Horn of Africa's inter-state rivalry, particularly that between Somalia and Ethiopia. This research is arguing that external factors' contribution to the failure of Somalia is very significant, and in fact the data analysis reflects this with 40% blame assigned to these external factors, which is very high. This fresh interpretation, therefore, arrives at a different conclusion. Nevertheless, this conclusion is open for discussion and in fact should enjoy more research and debate. Somalia's elite should know properly the sources of state failure in order to avoid it in the future. Great is the Almighty.

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