THE KANTIAN THEORY OF AUTONOMY FROM ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE AND ITS THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES IN ISLAMIC MORAL EDUCATION

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THE KANTIAN THEORY OF AUTONOMY FROM ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE AND ITS THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES IN ISLAMIC MORAL EDUCATION

ABSTRACT

This research discusses the acceptance of the Kantian theory of autonomy in Islam and its implication on the objectives and methods of Islamic moral education. Most Muslim scholars have opposed Kantian theory, while those who support it do so from the *al-mu'tazilah* interpretation of Islam. The purpose of this study is to identify what the viewpoint of Islam is about this theory and what changes in the objectives and methods of Islamic moral education will occur based on the theory. The importance of this research is that modern education is based on rationality and freedom. These are embodied in autonomy which introduces the highest level of rationality and freedom and Islamic education should reveal its position on these two. The Islamic perspective of this issue outlines its policy on Islamic moral education. To achieve the purpose of the current study, a qualitative method has been used. A critical analysis is performed to respond to autonomy's objections from the Islamic point of view, as well as the inference method for gaining an Islam's view about this theory. The first achievement of this study is that, from the *al-'Aš'ariyya* viewpoint, autonomy is compatible with Islam and in such a way the path is not limited to the *al-mu'tazilah* viewpoint. In addition, this result which is a very novel and unprecedented result shows that based on all theological schools, the autonomy is consistent with Islamic teachings. We also find that, Islam has accepted freedom of will from external motives as it has been raised in the theory of autonomy. The second and third achievements of the present research are that, the admission of autonomy leads to influence on the sub-objectives and some

methods of Islamic moral education. The current research concludes that, the study of autonomy from the Islamic perspective is indispensable for Muslim thinkers.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant; Theory of Autonomy; Islamic Perspective; Islamic Moral Education.

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ABSTRAK

Penyelidikan ini membincangkan penerimaan teori autonomi Kant dalam Islam dan implikasinya ke atas objektif dan kaedah pendidikan moral Islam. Kebanyakan cendekiawan Islam menentang teori Kant, manakala mereka yang menyokongnya berbuat demikian berdasarkan tafsiran *al-mu'tazilah* tentang Islam. Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk mengenal pasti apakah sudut pandangan Islam tentang teori ini dan apakah perubahan dalam objektif dan kaedah pendidikan moral Islam yang akan terjadi berdasarkan teori ini. Penyelidikan ini penting kerana pendidikan moden adalah berasaskan kerasionalan dan kebebasan. Kedua-duanya terangkum dalam autonomi yang memperkenalkan tahap tertinggi kerasionalan dan kebebasan dan pendidikan Islam hendaklah menyatakan pendiriannya mengenai kedua-dua perkara ini. Perspektif Islam dalam isu ini menggariskan dasarnya mengenai pendidikan moral Islam. Untuk mencapai tujuan kajian semasa, kaedah kualitatif telah digunakan. Analisis kritis dijalankan untuk memberikan respons terhadap bantahan autonomi dari sudut pandangan Islam, dan juga kaedah inferens untuk mendapatkan pandangan Islam tentang teori ini. Pencapaian pertama daripada kajian ini,ialah, dari sudut pandangan *Ash'arī*, autonomi adalah bersesuaian dengan Islam dan dengan sebegitu rupa sehingga laluannya tidak terbatas kepada sudut pandangan *al-mu'tazilah* . Tambahan, hasil ini yang merupakan hasil yang sangat baharu dan tidak pernah berlaku dahulu, menunjukkan bahawa berdasarkan semua sekolah teologi, autonomi adalah konsisten dengan ajaran Islam. Kami juga mendapati bahawa Islam sudah menerima kebebasan kuasa memilih (*freedom of the will*) daripada motif luaran seperti yang telah

dibangkitkan dalam teori autonomi.. Pencapaian kedua dan ketiga daripada kajian masa kini ialah penerimaan autonomi membawa kepada pengaruh ke atas subobjektif dan sesetengah kaedah pendidikan moral Islam. Penyelidikan semasa memutuskan bahawa kajian autonomi dari perspektif Islam adalah amat penting bagi pemikir Islam.

Kata kunci: Immanuel Kant; Teori Autonomi; Perspektif Islam; Pendidikan Moral Islam.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1   Overview and Background

Immanuel Kant, born on April 22, 1724, in Königsberg Germany, was one of the most influential philosophers in modern philosophy(Copleston, 2008). He has been the most influential in ethics, philosophy, epistemology, and education(Kruse, 2003). His book *Critique of Pure Reason* counts as one of the three leading works of philosophy in history(Copleston, 2008). In moral education, Kant established the basis of his modern moral school on the theory of autonomy (moral independence) and as such is regarded an eminent philosopher of ethics and moral education(Riddett, 2012). He elaborated this idea in his book *Critique of Practical Reason*. Because of his efforts, autonomy is regarded as one of the most important topics in modern education.

The word autonomy originates from the Greek word "Autos" (self) and "Nomos" (law)(Johnson, 1977). It is interpreted as moral independence with the concept of self-making rules, individual authority in moral principles and obligation toward self-made rules, and the ability to make decisions freely(Jackson, 2007). Many researchers have sought to show the importance of this theory in education (Gass, 1994; Jackson, 2007; Knippenberg, 1989; Riddett, 2012).

Autonomy refers to human beings performing moral acts due to the dictates of reason. The result is ethical behaviour. It is when a person follows the law of his reason without external motives; otherwise, what is done is not ethical. Autonomy has been interpreted as self-regulation, as well as moral autonomy or self-reliance and self-governance. It is the freedom to make decisions in accordance with principles of wisdom(Zangwill, 2003). Autonomy has two main pillars, namely the ability of reason

to understand moral values and the freedom of will. Kant and supporters of the autonomous view believe that moral education should be carried out with the aim of bringing such trainees to a level of free obedience of the law of reason.

Recognising Islam's approach to dealing with autonomy is an essential issue in Islamic education. By accepting this theory, we will realise many changes in the methods and objectives of moral education. In the first stage, one should see whether Islam accepts this theory and it so what changes would occur in moral education.

Most of the scholars who have studied this subject from the Islamic perspective have rejected the compatibility of this theory with Islamic teachings. Fraenkel (2010) reported autonomy as a specifically modern issue that is certainly taken to be incompatible with religions like Islam. Hatina (2006) regarded autonomy as the big challenge in Islamic education. Bagheri and Khosravi (2006) emphasised the incompatibility of Islamic education with a modern education that is based on autonomy. Halstead (2007) identified challenges between Islamic moral education and Western moral values and introduced the challenge between Islam and autonomy as a significant part of these challenges. Halstead (2004) argued for the possibility of certain deductions or understandings of Islamic concepts or terms that contrast with autonomy. Tan. (2014) believed that the Islamic education does not emphasise rationality and wisdom in comparison to the Western education system, and the main challenge in his opinion is that the imperatives of rationality and independence have not been analysed or discussed in Islamic sources.

Khuram (2007) compares individual moral education between Islam and the Western world and points out the differences between the Western and Islam's point of view on moral individual education. Al-Attas (1996) mentioned that authors had discussed the challenges of Islamic and modern education. Parts of this book discuss the subject of

autonomy as an educational strategy and have shown its incompatibility with Islamic teachings.

However, some scholars have supported autonomy from the Islamic point of view, like Thibert (2012) who believes that some Western educational values especially autonomy can be included in Islamic education. Tan. (2014) argued that Sunnah promotes rationality and independence and supports the theory of autonomy.

The theoretical discussion of autonomy from the Islamic point of view is not limited to Islam's acceptance or rejection of this theory. However, we shall see whether important changes in moral education due to this theory are accepted by Islam or not because its acceptance leads to significant changes in moral education regarding educational methods and objectives. These changes should be studied. This topic is of great importance, and scholars have studied some of the effects of this theory from the Islamic perspective such as Thibert (2012), Sahin (2013) and Eickelman (2000). Although we will show that what has been done differs from what is considered in the current study.

1.2   Significance of the Study

The importance of this study comes from the significant consequences of accepting or rejecting autonomy in moral education. Autonomous ethical education has distinct differences with other moral educational systems. These differences are marked in terms of educational methods and objectives. That is why scholars took the theory of autonomy seriously. The reason for this is that autonomy introduces the highest degree of independence as the purpose of education. For example, Piaget (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013) and Kohlberg (1984) consider moral independence as the final stage of moral education. It is the stage at which a person can make choices regardless of the external factors and based on his or her reasoning.

Immanuel Kant is considered a leading figure in moral independence in education. After him, scholars who proposed autonomy include Nietzsche (Gemes & Janaway, 2006), Piaget (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013), Rawls (Taylor, 2005), and Kohlberg (1984) who have all been influenced by Kant and retained many of his original ideas.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that any ethical and educational theory (although beneficial) needs to be approved on the basis of Islamic teachings. Otherwise it cannot be used in the Islamic education area. Therefore, there is a need to study the theory of autonomy from the Islamic perspective. A theoretical study in the field of such theories has primacy over the practical studies because first, it is necessary to accept the possibility of accepting it in Islam and in order to take the next step with is the practical and operational stage.

A very important point that adds to the significance of this study is that, if we prove the acceptance of autonomy from the Islamic point of view, and if sufficient evidence can be found in the Islamic resources to confirm the main elements of this theory, then a valued result will be achieved, namely that Islam preceded Kant by hundreds of years.

1.3   The Statement of the Problem

The theory of autonomy first proposed by Kant is one of the most important theories e in modern education (Furedi, 2011). This theory has many supporters who are forerunners and significant figures in modern education. They believe that autonomy is the final stage of moral and educational growth and must be paid great attention to by the scholars of education (Kohlberg, 1984; Oesterdiekhoff, 2013).

Kant's theory is multi-dimensional in the field of education. It introduces moral independence, details its philosophical and epistemological foundations as an educational goal, while also deepening the meaning of moral independence. That is

why, despite the fact that the origin of this theory has been an ethical philosophy, it has attracted the attention of scholars in education, especially moral education.

However, the theory of autonomy is considered unacceptable by most of those who have studied it from the Islamic perspective. They have regarded the two elements of this theory, namely obedience to the reason and freedom of will as opposed to Islamic teachings. This is while; autonomy's acceptance has led to significant changes in Islamic moral education. These changes will resolve some of the problems encountered in moral education. Many believe that some of the weaknesses of the educational systems in Muslim countries are due to ignoring modern educational theories like autonomy (see,e.g.Cook, 1999). Weaknesses such as limited critical thinking, utilising methods like dictation or habituation (which are used extensively-as some scholars have claimed- in Muslim educational systems), weakening self-confidence and so on (Ibid).

If we can study this theory based on the Islamic teachings, and make it compatible with the principles of Islam, we will make an important step toward the development of the methodology and the purposes, as well as resolve the criticism of Islamic moral education.

Some writings that defend the theory of autonomy from the standpoint of Islam suffer from serious problems (we will see these problems in detail in the literature review). Therefore, a new study should be done regarding the problems and deficiencies of the aforementioned works.

1.4   Research Questions

1- What is the Islam's view on the Kantian theory of Autonomy?

2- What are the theoretical consequences of this theory on the objectives of Islamic moral education?

3- What are the theoretical consequences of this theory on the methods of Islamic moral education?

In the theoretical consequences, the theoretical discussion of the objectives or methods that are now being used in Islamic moral education should be done, because, some of these objectives and methods will change based on the acceptance of autonomy. As the acceptance of the theory of autonomy requires a theoretical discussion, an adaptation of these changes also needs theoretical debate.

In the current study, we will show that the content of Islamic moral education will not be changed due to its reliance on the Quran and tradition. We will see that this content is in perfect harmony with the theory of autonomy. For this reason, changes are only in the context of the methods and objectives that today's researchers use in moral education.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

The study investigates the Islamic view on the Kantian theory of autonomy, and at the same time reveals the theoretical consequences of this theory on Islamic education. Therefore, the research objectives are:

1- Understanding Islam's view on autonomy by discussing and examining the arguments of opponents and supporters of this theory.
2- To illustrate the theoretical consequences of the acceptance of this theory in the case of the objectives of Islamic moral education.
3- To illustrate the theoretical consequences of the acceptance of this theory in the case of the methods of Islamic moral education.

1.6 The Scope of the Study

Kant is one of the world's greatest philosophers and has presented various ideas and theories in different areas of philosophy. The current study is dedicated to one of his ideas in the field of moral education, namely autonomy.

The reason for choosing this theory as the subject of discussion is that there is a special connection between this theory with moral education. We will talk about this connection in detail in the second chapter when we discuss the relationship of this theory with moral education.

On the other hand, studies of this theory from the Islamic point of view have faced problems that we discuss in the literature review. The special connections of this theory with moral education, on the one hand, and the important shortcomings in previous research, on the other, make it necessary to discuss again this theory from the Islamic perspective. If the judgements (from the Islamic point of view) lead to the acceptance of this theory, it will open the way for changes in the methods and objectives of Islamic moral education. This is another reason for choosing to study this theory.

The scope of research is limited to theoretical discussions because we believe that, this theory, as well as its effects in the field of methods and objectives of Islamic moral education, should be approved by Islam before the practical examination of its effects. Without this confirmation, speaking of the practical effects, of a theory (although there are numerous benefits of it) is in vain.

1.7   Research Methodology

This is a qualitative research based on library methods. According to the research questions and objectives, we will use the inferential and critical method. The methods of research can be classified according to various criteria, including based on the purpose (such as basic and applied), based on the time of collection, based on the nature of the data (quantitative and qualitative) and so on (Kothari, 2004).

In design, this research is a qualitative study. In qualitative research, we do not seek to determine the sizes, numbers and quantities. The research field is sophisticated areas

that quantitative researches cannot achieve (Elman, Kapiszewski, & Vinuela, 2010). The method is used to create theory, while quantitative research tests theory (Kothari, 2004). Of course, it should be noted that an issue can be investigated both qualitatively and quantitatively (Ibid). Any research that can produce the results obtained from non-quantitative methods is considered a qualitative method (Ibid). The current study seeks to create an Islamic point of view of Kantian autonomy.

In qualitative research, four methods are commonly used: interview; inspecting; questionnaire; and studying documents (Fielding et al., 2001). We use the documentary method in the current study through library research.

One of the divisions of research is goal-based, according to which the research is divided into applied and basic (fundamental) research. The one is used to practice the theories, rules, principles and techniques that are provided in basic research to solve actual problems (Ibid). This research focuses on finding solutions to immediate practical problems. This research has practical implications (the results of this research are objective and specific) and usually researchers are involved in the application of the results (Ibid).

Fundamental research is devoted to discovering the laws and principles of science and seeks to develop them (Ibid). There may not be an objective and practical result at the time for fundamental research, but in the long run, it will be the basis for the development of knowledge and other research (Ibid). The results of such researches are often subjective and general (Ibid).

The essence of the current study is fundamental, and the method of collecting information is the library. We need fundamental and theoretical research regarding autonomy from the Islamic perspective because its acceptance has many theoretical

consequences for Islamic moral education. By bringing this theory into the educational environment, we will face theoretical changes in the objectives and methods of moral education. Before using the quantitative method and showing the positive effects of autonomy through the use of statistics and figures, when we look at this theory as a Muslim educator, we need to demonstrate its compatibility with Islamic teachings. In the first place, the theoretical infrastructure should be discussed. This goal can be achieved by conducting fundamental qualitative research.

Kothari (2004) describes fundamental research versus practical research and says: "Applied research aims at finding a solution to an immediate problem facing a society or an industrial/business organisation, whereas fundamental research is mainly concerned with generalisations and with the formulation of a theory" (p. 3). For this reason, research on the attainment of the Islamic perspective on the theory of autonomy is a fundamental study. In exploring this issue, our standard and criterion will be the Quran and Hadith.

Inference method

In order to understand Islam's view on autonomy, we should examine the evidence for this view. Achieving this aim requires an inference method. Inference is a technique related to documentary research. In the case of autonomy, the achievement of an Islamic theory requires analysing the existing evidence (verses, narrations, and the words of previous scholars). Therefore, the use of a purely descriptive method which struggles to discover and illustrate the nature, characteristics, and status of the subject matter and the research problem, will not help us in this regard. We should certainly use inferential techniques. At the features of the inference method used in the context of Islamic sources, we will discuss in detail in Chapter 3, when we talk about "Our Approach.".

Critical method

In order to ascertain Islam's viewpoint on Kantian autonomy, we have to take into account criticism raised by researchers from the Islamic perspective. This requires the use of the critical method which introduces the strengths and weaknesses of existing ideas (Felski, 2008). A critical method is a systematic approach in which an idea or theory is studied, and its problems are highlighted (Ibid).

In the current study, it is necessary to use a critical method to study the opinions expressed on autonomy from an Islamic perspective. These criticisms should be examined to highlight their weaknesses. There is a need for a standard criterion for a critical method. By this criterion, ideas and opinions are examined and tested to determine whether they are correct or false. In our critical method, the view that is acceptable to the majority of Muslim scholars will be the standard criterion.

1.8   Literature Review

There are plenty of sources that introduce Kant's theory of autonomy. However, a large number of these sources merely study Kant in the fields of epistemology, medical ethics or political philosophy. We have focused on the sources that study Kant regarding moral education. At the same time, we have to look at the works that have studied the theory from the Islamic point of view.

1.8.1   The study from the Islamic perspective

Studies that have discussed autonomy from the Islamic perspective can be classified into two groups.

1.8.1.1 The opponents

This group, which consists of the majority of the researchers, criticised the two pillars of autonomy (legislation by reason – freedom of the will) and found them incompatible with Islamic teachings. Halstead (2007) is among those who concentrated on the first element of autonomy. He believes that the fundamental problem of autonomy in Islam is the relationship between religion and morality. He believes there are many Quranic verses as evidence for such a connection. Including verses that put faith alongside righteous deeds.

The independence of Kant's moral theory from religion has been proclaimed by many writers like Reeder (1997), Ryan (2014), Louden (1986), and DiCenso (2007). We will discuss this critique in detail in the third chapter and show that this critique results from a misunderstanding of Kant. Kant's argument about the limited ability of theoretical reason to understand the unseen and supernatural concepts has nothing to do with the denial of these concepts. Rather, Kant believes in the existence of the unseen and the Hereafter. Therefore, there are no grounds for criticism of the theory of autonomy from this point of view.

Elegido (1996), Rachels and Rachels (1993), Halstead (2007), Thibert (2012) and Moad (2007) are among those who believe that autonomy is not compatible with Islam, since the first element of this theory introduces reason as the reference point for recognition of moral values, while in Islamic teachings, the Quran and the tradition are sources for recognition and determination of moral values. They point to the authority of the Quran and traditions in identifying moral values in Islam as the main critique.

Fraenkel (2010) has quoted Strauss's remarks that, the legality and the connection to Shariah distinguish not only in the ethical system of Islam but also in other Abrahamic religion. The origin of the Jerusalem reason is the fear of God that leads the person to

obey him. In these religions, subjection to God is central. Not only in the theory of autonomy, but in the Athenian ethos, reason directs the rationality of mankind.

Schneewind (1999) believes that Islamic morality is based on "obedience", while the core of the theory of autonomy rests on "self-reliance" (P, 4). Also, Khuram (2007) compares the subject of individual moral education between Islam and the Western world and points out the differences between the Western world and Islam's point of view on moral individual education and implicitly brings up the subject of moral independence. Based on this, we can put this article among those that accept the challenge between Islam and autonomy and know it to be unsolvable. They regard this as the main difference between Islamic and Western education. In his opinion, Western education results in losing sacred values.

The difference between these researchers and what we have done in the present research is clear. They simply claim autonomy and Islamic sources to be completely incompatible. While what we do is in addition to considering the critics of autonomy, we examine their reasons and conclude that there is a possibility of harmonising Islamic sources with the theory of autonomy.

As we have seen, the researchers have noted the conflict between Islam and the first element of autonomy (the ability of reason to understand moral values). However, autonomy's opponents have also considered the freedom of the will as being incompatible with Islam. According to Halstead (2007), Islamic moral education instils the motivation and enthusiasm in children and young people and makes them committed to doing good deeds. This contradicts autonomy, which refuses external motives and considers it in against of free will. Motahharī (2007) is also an Iranian scholar who specifically deals with the contradiction between the theory of Kant's deontology theory in morality and Islamic teachings.

Ahmad (2004) introduced the challenge in the field of educational democracy and Islamic teachings. He says that Islamic teachings discuss religious and theological norms and has neglected the social and historical aspects of education. The author believes the Islamic sources are silent on issues such as educational democracy and autonomy.

In the above research, no attention has been paid to the capacities available in Islam for acceptance of autonomy. The interesting point is that these capacities are signs of the primacy of Islam in this regard, and show that, hundreds of years before Kant, Islamic teachings have been presented that could be the basis for the deduction of autonomy. Without considering these capacities, these scholars have concluded with a primitive conflict between autonomy elements and some religious foundations. In the fourth chapter, we examine autonomy's pillars and show the capacities that exist in Islamic resources to accept the theory of autonomy.

1.8.1.2 The Proponents

Very few studies have been written with the aim of defending the theory of autonomy from the Islamic perspective. All the efforts of these scholars have been done to prove the compatibility of the two pillars with Islam.

(a) *The works in the first element of autonomy*

The efforts made in the first element of autonomy, namely the ability of reason to recognise morality are based on the two approaches.

The first approach: Argumentation by the verses and narrations that emphasise the position of reason in Islam.

Some scholars have sought to prove the first element of autonomy by presenting a series of verses and traditions that emphasise the high position of human reason in

Islam. Among the scholars who seek to defend autonomy with this method are Davids and Waghid (2016). Their work precisely with this approach considers autonomy as an acceptable theory in Islam. Tariq Ramadan (2009) also used this approach.

In my opinion, this approach does not solve the problem. The first element of autonomy is lawmaking by reason and the necessity of following it, and we cannot deduce it from verses and traditions. The issue of rationalism which is raised in these texts is different from the issue of legislation of reason that is the first element of autonomy.

The second approach: Relying on the *al-mu'tazilah* view.

Other autonomy defenders rely on the view of the *al-mu'tazilah* in rational good and evil (التحسين و التقبيح العقليان). These scholars have based their discussion on historical reports and stated that the acceptance of autonomy from the Islamic perspective is only possible based on the view of the *al-mu'tazilah*.

Rationality and autonomy from the enlightenment and Islamic perspectives is the research has written based on this approach by Tan. (2014). As well as Fraenkel, Carlos who compares the viewpoint of Islam with the Jews on the theory of autonomy. However, in his work, *Theocracy and Autonomy in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*, he made this adjustment from the side of Islam based on the *al-mu'tazilah*(Fraenkel, 2010). Rasch (2009) in his work *Enlightenment as Religion* also adopted this method. Eickelman (2000) and Sahin (2013) also discussed autonomy based on this doctrine.

What we have done in the current study in case of the first element of autonomy differs from what has been done in those researches. We discuss the issue based on the *Ash'ari* theology, and we will try to prove the compatibility of the first element of autonomy based on this school. If we reach this result, we will step forward and take several stages in this topic, namely the study of the autonomy from the Islamic

perspective, since the previous scholars have proved it only based on *al-mu'tazilah*, and we will prove it based on *Ash'arism.*

(b) *The works on the freedom of the will*

Some scholars have discussed the issue of free will and have tried to defend it based on Islamic arguments. They have addressed this issue using two approaches.

First approach: Lowering the interpretation: Some scholars based their defence on an interpretation of free will that differs significantly from that is meant by Kant. For example, Ramadan (2009) says: "Like rationality, autonomy is valued in Islam where the aim is to help all Muslims to enter into personal growth and consequently to become autonomous in their lives their choices and more generally in the management of their freedom" (p. 129). What Tariq Ramadan has called liberty of will is far from what is said in autonomy.

Among those who have followed a similar approach to Tariq Ramadan is Chaudhary (2005), Alamri (2016), MacDonald (2012), and Eickelman (2000). They interpreted it as freedom from external pressure and coercion, while the freedom of the will in the theory of autonomy is much deeper. In this commentary, you should even free yourself from the impact of personal benefit. That is why the critics see the passion of paradise and the fear of hell as being inconsistent with freedom of the will.

Second approach: Mistaking natural freedom with ethical freedom of the will: When Kant speaks of the freedom of the will in the moral act, he does not mean natural liberty, but freedom from regarding the motives. It is important to know that natural liberty is a theological topic against determinism, while freedom of will means that external factors and motives do not influence human beings during the conduct of a moral act.

Some scholars who have been asked for an Islamic stance to defend autonomy, have mistaken between the two concepts and have cited verses and traditions to prove the natural freedom of man, then concluded that these verses and narrations support the freedom of the will which is sought in autonomy.

Al- Najjār (2000) based his argument on the concept of the Vicegerency of Man (khalīfah) as raised in the Quran to prove the freedom of will from an Islamic perspective. Tan. (2014), Sahin (2013), and Resnick (2008) adopted a similar approach.

What distinguishes the current study from these works is paying attention to the difference between natural and moral freedom. Our approach to this critique is entirely based on the Quranic verses and traditions. We introduce concepts in the Quran and the Sunnah that are presented as motives for doing good deeds. These concepts are the same as the task that is proposed in the theory of autonomy as a criterion. Such concepts include meeting God, the satisfaction of God, the love for God, and so on. These concepts are not outside the essence of moral action.

1.8.2 The theoretical consequences on objectives of moral education

Many works have been done regarding the impacts of autonomy in the field of moral education's objectives. These works have focused on this subject from the educational point of view and discussed those results as the normal results of autonomy without considering these results from the Islamic perspective. The most significant works that can be mentioned in this regard are Piper (2010), Erdelack (2010), Kalinsky (2016),Riddett (2012), Hasselberger (2012), Helfand (2007).

Some of these works used the perspective of Christian or Jewish education. There have not been many works in regards the impacts and the results of autonomy in Islamic education. Most of these writings address the emerging challenge of the future and the need for solving this problem by educating planners and policymakers. For example, we

can refer to Byrd (2017) with *Professing Islam in a Post-Secular Society*, Westlund (2009) with *Rethinking Relational Autonomy* and Tareen (2013) with *Narratives of Emancipation in Modern Islam.*

Some of these works wanted to discuss the results of autonomy by focusing on autonomy's social effects and did not address the educational results of this theory, namely, the developments and changes will happen in education by applying this theory in Islamic moral education. Resnick (2008) and Alamri (2016) focus on the ethical notions of dignity and respect for autonomy to improve healthcare for elderly people in Muslim countries. Normand-Marconnet (2012), Khuram (2007), There are just a few works, that have raised the effects of autonomy in the objectives of Islamic moral education. Hefner and Zaman (2007) and Sahin (2013) are among the works that we can mention.

The difference between what is done in the current study with what was done in these researches is that, they have raised topics that are considered objectives of autonomous moral education but have not studied these objectives from the Islamic theoretical viewpoint. They claimed that autonomy's acceptance requires such objectives. While in our current study, we have studied these objectives from the Islamic perspective. In the fifth chapter, we explain the need for this study in detail.

1.8.3   The theoretical consequences on methods of moral education

Regarding the impacts of autonomy in methods of Islamic moral education, although there are some valuable works, they have attempted to address the issue that autonomy has the ability to perform in Islamic environments. Thibert (2012), Resnick (2008) researched the operation and implementation of autonomy in Islamic moral education

without examining the theoretical compatible from an Islamic perspective. This is an important difference between the current study and the aforementioned works.

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CHAPTER 2: THE THEORY OF AUTONOMY IN RELATION TO MORAL EDUCATION (CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS)

2.1   Introducing Autonomy

The word autonomy is derived from "auto" means self, while "nomus" means the law in Greek(Johnson, 1977). Kant regards his theory as being against "heteronomy", with the explanation that the will, if it is not the lawmaker will be based on "heteronomy" and follows rules that are set by others. The reason for using such a word to interpret Kant's theory of moral independence is that the ancient Greeks used autonomous to refer to people who followed their independent laws(Dworkin, 1981).

Kant's autonomy was raised in the philosophy of ethics. According to some writers, before Kant, the roots of the theory of autonomy (moral independence) are visible in Greek philosophical thought. The basis of this claim is how these philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle emphasised the element of human reason (Goldstein, 2012). Later, in the new philosophy with Spinoza, new roots were found for this theory. The views of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his emphasis on freedom have added to the theory of moral independence. However, the theory of autonomy was first introduced by Immanuel Kant as a doctrine of moral philosophy. After Kant, the theory found many supporters. It has the highest level and great position among ethical theories, and scholars have counted this theory within modern ethical views.

After Kant, much attention was paid to the theory of autonomy and many scholars, under the influence of Kant, presented their interpretations and definitions. We have based our study of autonomy on the Kantian interpretation, because, all the interpretations are presented by the influence of Kant, and he is considered the central point in this regard.

2.1.1   Infrastructure of Autonomy

Kant presented his ethical ideas that are centred on autonomy in the book of *Critique of Practical Reason*. He divides reason into theoretical and practical (Immanuel Kant, 2016), and believes that practical reason for the will of the human being is to do good deeds. Kant finds that there are two types of good deeds. First is conditional. What people often know as good such as intelligence, courage, wealth, and power, are in many cases beneficial, but not in all circumstances, and when they are in the service of a bad will, they are completely bad. Therefore, they are conditionally good. For example, the courage and intelligence of the criminal makes his crime heavier. Hence, they are decent in a certain condition, and not definite and absolute. Assets are good if used in the right way, not in a bad way, and knowledge is good if provided a means of prosperity, not misery. In one word, all good things are conditioned to be of good will (Ibid).

The second is the absolute good. It is good, but not conditionally. The absolute good is the "good will" from which we know that the goodness of everything (Ibid). Only the will of good determines that virtue is the absolute and unconditional good. Good will is decent under all circumstances, not because of its outcome or effects or its merit to achieve a desired purpose.

According to Kant, the will of good is to do good things merely for duty and task and nothing else (Ibid). If you do good deeds because your wisdom has ordered you to do so, your will is good (Ibid). In Kant's opinion, the duty and task is a law that our reason has absolute command of (Ibid). The absolute decree of reason is something that is autonomously and freely exported from the reason. That is to say, wisdom orders it without being influenced by external factors, aims and goals. It means that the will is the lawmaker universally and will rationally obey the rules that it sets (Ibid).

According to Kant, reason will lay down its law autonomously and freely. This law has four characteristics:

1. Generality: The moral law issued by reason applies to all situations for everyone, in all terms. The terms "all situations" and "all terms", means any similar situation that may happen to someone. For example, telling the truth where it is useful is always a rational moral law for anyone in such a situation.

2. Non-contradicting itself in the event of becoming a general law. The meaning of this factor is that if the absolute ordinance becomes a general law, it does not violate itself. Kant adds an example to explain this point. Note this: "It can be used the false promise to get rid of the problems"(Ibid). If you consider this statement as a general rule, it will be contradictory, because in this case, no one will accept anyone's promise by legitimising the false promise (since it is assumed to be false) Therefore, the function of the promise will be eliminated. So, the false promise does not have the ability to become a general law (Ibid).

3. Internal purpose: Humanity is the ultimate goal and should never be considered as a tool in its own person and others (Ibid). The internal purpose does not aim anything beyond the essence of mankind. Hence it is not incoherent with what was previously said about the good will.

4. Kingdom of Ends: Kant utilised an idealised term and named it the "Kingdom of Ends" where the reasons rule and govern. He has a well-known saying: "Act so that you can be a member of lawmakers of that hypothetical state by your maxims" (Immanuel Kant, 2016, p. 73). The Kingdom of Ends is pointing to a unitary system that acts based on the common rationality of

all rational beings (the ethical commonwealth). In this system, each member is determined by his will as a lawmaker, and is also responsible for other members (Ibid). The unity and the structure that governs the integrated system (despite of being all the members' law-makers) are because each member has the same law for himself and other members. Because the people are not members of this system, but the wisdom is its members, and every rational essence passes a law in which other rational essences will also pass in the same situation. For this reason, in the ideal system of ends, all members set the same ethical rules and maintain unified unity (Ibid). According to Peters, everyone is the same to others by having a rational dimension, so they are expected to have the same similarity in similar situations (Richard Stanley. Peters, 2015).

2.1.2   Definition of Autonomy

Based on Kant's theory of autonomy's human beings, without being influenced by external factors, according to his reason choose to do. The external factors of Kant are anything outside the pure judgement of reason. The term includes obeying the rules; obey the parents; obey the religious orders; follow the emotions and desires of the soul and so on. In Kant's opinion, only, in this case, a person's will is free (Gass, 1994). The term self-governance or autonomy originates from this point since, according to Kant, the agent, is living in obedience to the law that he has set.

It should be noted that the widening of the spectrum of external factors considered by Kant causes the theory of autonomy to be studied in a variety of contexts. If we consider the external factor to obey the rules, this theory is studied in law and politics (see, e.g.,Agné, 2011). From the point of view of religion, it needs to be discussed from the perspective of religious studies, especially religious education. Obedience to parents or

emotions and desires, this can be studied from the point of view of psychology and education (Luz & Agadjanian, 2015). Considering the role of external factors, autonomy can be studied in medicine (Mars et al., 2014). And economics as well (Torgler, Schneider, & Schaltegger, 2010).

Autonomy is based on two main foundations. First, reason's ability to recognise moral values. When Kant speaks of reason, he is talking about practical reason. In his view, the theoretical wisdom's task is understanding and perception of the facts, while being the practical wisdom is responsible for the person's choices and moral choices. What he calls "practical reason" is the "will"(Immanuel Kant, 2016).

The second: Freedom of the will. Humans will must be free and not affected by any foreign factor. This is one of the most important pillars of Kant's theory. In Kant's opinion, the subject of will is action and mind because the ability of rational beings to create things outside is considered as an action, while the effects that occur in the human mind by the will is subjective. According to Kant, if we assume that the freedom as an adjective for something, then it must be the will and the will is a kind of causation belonging to living beings because of which they are rational (Ibid).

He means by freedom a concept against necessity. So what he says is that the will is free when no other factor causes it to be necessary. The other is the external material factors as well as internal spiritual factors such as feelings and impressions arising from these emotions. On the other hand, according to Kant, when we accept the will as a cause, this concept implies the law on which the effect is created by wisdom (will). If the will is not imperative according to a rule, it will be based on an accident and chance, and then there is no longer free will. Will is deemed to be free if the rational law makes it necessary (Ibid). Kant believes that the rational law that is the basis of the will is

different from natural law. He said this for the purpose of bringing these two sides together (freedom of the will and the role of law as a base). Because, in his opinion, in nature, causation comes from the factors beyond the essence of the cause, and for this reason, every cause is at the same time caused by another cause.

Therefore, the law that exists in the will is not external, and this is self-governance. Thus, free will is base of the autonomy of the will. On the basis of the freedom of the will, human wisdom imposes ethical rules in various situations. These ethical rules are not affected by any external factor, as there is no motive besides ethical quality to motivate doing so, because otherwise the free will has been distorted. Kant believes that the free will is autonomous (Ibid). Therefore, human wisdom follows the rules that it has set itself. In such a person, the rational will is the basis of all actions. The important thing is that rules are general laws aimed at the rule that a person passes in a particular position on the basis of wisdom. It is the same as that everyone will lay down in such a situation since wisdom has been the basis of it. For Kant, all human beings have the ability to think and reason. The point is that, in Kant's view, heteronomy means that they are condemned to natural necessity.

However, heteronomy is not about human beings, in the same sense as it in objects and things, because in farmer, all acts (whether ethical or immoral) are free and human beings do so according to their will, but about animal it has its specific meaning(Ibid). In Kant's view all factors that restrict human freedom and cause a person to act on those agents will lead to heteronomy. Desires and feelings, as well as the importance of the outcome, etc., are among those factors. Freedom is provided when a person follows ethical rules based on his wisdom so that humans can act as human beings based on their rules even in immoral deeds (Ibid).

After Kant, concepts have been introduced as equivalent to autonomy. Self-determination (see, e.g.Wright, 1999) is used in the political sciences, as it is used in ethics and education as an autonomy's equivalent. In political sciences interpreted as the right for people in a particular area to govern in order to choose the kind of sovereignty they want. Other terms like self-controlling or self-governing or self-ruling are also used (Bittner, xfc, & diger, 2014). Among these equivalents, many writers prefer self-determination because the rest are considered to be negative since the words control and rule and governance include a negative dimension (Ibid).

Despite what they have said, it seems that self-determination is not an exact equivalent of autonomy. Autonomy relies on the independence of the decision from the outside and to be ascribed to the agent. While self-determination relies on ascribing decisions to the agent. Hence, the pivot point in the two concepts is not the same.

Discussing the scope of the concept of *self* is another point added to the interpretation of Kant and is critical to understanding the concept of autonomy. The principle of autonomy is that one decides for him/herself. Some writers have drawn attention to this point that the meaning of self is the absolute self that aims at being free from any external influence. Hence, the addicted person who decides to use a drug is not autonomous in his decision because he is compelled by an alien force (Frankfurt, 1988). It goes so far that drug is such an influential agent that a person subjected to its impress might not be considered accountable for their actions (Ibid).

This narrow interpretation is consistent with the view of Kant. In Kant's opinion, the meaning of self is a common reason between human beings. It means that the irrational basis of men is not subject to his view. In contrast, some believe that the concept of *self* must be expanded. Bittner wrote: "Why say it is not really you who is in charge, once

the passion carrying you away is uncharacteristic and makes your life go worse" (Bittner et al., 2014, p. 1332). He adds: "Passions, addictions, anxieties, that's all you; and whatever you do under their sway, it is no less you, and really you and truly you, who does it" (Ibid).

The basis of this view is to expand the concept of self-determination to determine whether it applies to someone compelled by an external force. In this view, voluntary obedience is consistent with self-determination because the concept is interpreted as self-making decision. In Kant's view, autonomy does not mean self-making decision, but it means being autonomous and absolute independence in decision-making. Absolute independence means that there is no motive of the act except being ethical; the motive is the essence of the act, nothing else. Obedience to the external agent is external to the essence. So voluntary obedience is counted as self-deciding, but not autonomous. (Miller, 2010) believes that voluntary obedience is a joint- decision-making, not individually and independent (p. 108). This view, which is far from the Kantian interpretation, is accepted by many. It differs from the Kantian interpretation since it reduces the autonomy to its lowest level. Joseph Ros (as quoted in Bittner 2014) says: "Ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their own life"(Bittner et al., 2014, p. 1333)

Alongside the points mentioned in completing Kant's definition, his interpretation of autonomy has been criticised by some researchers. According to some researchers, the paradox of the Kantian interpretation of autonomy is that obeying universal values conflicts with independence (Ibid). Based on the Kantian interpretation, one must follow their laws, while obeying the rules of universal values is not considered.

There are two responds are possible to this view. The first is that, in Kantian autonomy, a person follows the commands of his reason, and nothing anything external. Only his wisdom commands his actions. Nevertheless, the fact that the recognition and commanding of the reason are based upon universal values does not conflict with one's independence. The universal values are like the laws of physics, which human beings discover by experience and experiment. The universal values are the facts that exist. The reason discovers them.

Given that universal values are the facts that precede the understanding of reason, the duty of reason is the comprehension of universal values and its examples. On the basis of this interpretation, the reason is under the dominance of universal values and thus contradicts with autonomy.

Alongside this interpretation of Kant's theory, there is another interpretation that is consistent with the nature of his theory. According to this interpretation, universal values are not before the understanding of reason but come after it. Human reason does not discover the universal values, but creates them. The process of creating these universal values through reason is that, human reason has its moral judgments in different situations. Reason is hence shared among human beings, and the moral rules and judgements are the same for all. It means that all people in similar situations will have the same rules. Therefore, universal values are the consequences and the results of reason. In this interpretation, values are the same for all. These values go beyond the beliefs and lifestyles as well as the educational environment and other external factors. The values are in accordance with human reason. Therefore, universal values are the result of reason rather than its initiator. According to this interpretation, there is no need to say that there is no space left for the critique, because reason is not under the dominance of those values, but creates them.

One of the pivotal points in understanding the Kantian interpretation of autonomy is the legitimacy of the law. The complexity of Kant's texts should not be overlooked and plays an important role in raising misunderstandings in this regard. The Kantian statement that a person will follow his law raises the question of: why should he follow this law? (Ibid). Such a question arises from a study of the theory, regardless of its roots in Kant's work. If moral commands as an absolute judgement of reason were to be taken into account, then this question would no longer arise. The legitimacy of the law is based on what the common human intellect understands as examples of universal moral values.

The vagueness in the Kantian interpretation of autonomy is another critique. One of the issues raised is the ambiguity in the Kantian view of the relationship of autonomy and free will. Wilson (2008) believes that this relationship is not clear in Kant's words. In describing this ambiguity, he refers to a duality. In his opinion, sometimes the autonomy of Kant is dependent on free-will, and in other cases, he has introduced (autonomy - freedom of the will) as two separate concepts (p. 355).

This inconsistency has enticed many other scholars who believe that Kant's theory of autonomy contradicts his principles of natural liberty. Pereboom (2006) says: "Kant's theory is especially ambitious in that it aims to preserve these intuitions by developing a view of freedom akin to agent-causal libertarianism, while at the same time accepting an uncompromising scientific determinism about the natural world" (p. 543).

The root of this critique is that the concept of free will in Kant's interpretation is confusing when seeking to understand free will. It has been asserted as a base of autonomy. They matched it with the concept of free will in the context of determinism and free will as a subject in theology and not moral philosophy. Their meanings differ in

both sciences. On the issue of determinism and free will in theology, the question is whether the human deeds are under the supreme will, that everything is done according to it, and there is no power and authority for human beings to carry out their work. It is clear that whatever we choose (regardless of whether are deterministic or believe in freedom) we can ask the next question: is the moral deed done based on reason and its understanding of values? Is human action considered moral when it is done under external forces and factors? We may be fatalistic in theology, and support free will in moral philosophy. In theology, it is a matter of genesis. The point is whether the creation of acts and deeds due to the supreme will or the will of mankind.

The determinist views the choices and human actions determined by fate or God, the laws of physics, or the laws of logic, inheritance or the environment, the motives of the subconscious or the psychological and social conditions (Blanchard, 2013). According to this view, the prior conditions (such as God's will and his absolute knowledge, or the various causes and the laws of nature) cause human deeds (Werndl, 2012). Now assume that someone with such a deterministic view gets to ethical philosophy and the theory of autonomy. He claims that, with the human being, prior conditions are involved such as divine will, destiny or nature, which cause it to emerge by making the will of the act appear in the human mind. However, the role of these factors is hidden behind the cover of the universe, meaning that the agent does not know about them. Here, he may will, in two ways. First, a conscious will that is influenced by external factors such as obedience to parents, law, and so on. Second, conscious intention, which is not influenced by any external factor, and is merely based on what his reason finds about the valuable deed. It is clear that, in accordance with determinism, both of these are caused by prior conditions (divine will, nature, and destiny). However, the point here is that upon the emergence of a will, one realises the influence of external factors on his will, or he does

not consider the external factors. In the first case, his will is not autonomous and, in the latter, it is based on autonomy. As is evident, the Kantian theory of autonomy is consistent with determinism in theology because the domain of freedom in theology is different from freedom in autonomy.

It is precisely for this reason that while believing that we are under the control of nature's rules and subjected by them, Kant believes in autonomy regarding ethics. Kant believes that being governed by such a moral law is completely different from being subjected to the rule of nature(Immanuel Kant, 2016). The laws of nature impose on us from outside, and we cannot choose to obey them. On the contrary, according to Kant acting in conformity with the moral law is autonomy, which is being under the rule of law that we impose on ourselves and choose to obey or not.

2.2 Relationship with Education

2.2.1 The concept of Education

Scholars have come up with different assessments on how to define education. There are many concepts that are clear and comprehensible on the surface, while they have complications and need to be explained and clarified. Education is one of these concepts. "Training", "upbringing" and "pedagogy" can be found under education when referring to dictionaries, or the " process by which your mind develops through learning at school or college" (McArthur & McArthur, 1981). But describing its different aspects can be considerably arguable among scholars.

Socrates believed that education is contributing to the moral and social development, with the goal of achieving a foundation that could have an active and productive role in society (Mintz, 2014). However, Plato, who led the exploratory belief in education (Menn, 2002), and his *The Republic* is considered one of the most valuable classical works on the subject. He defined education as the discovery and development of natural

talents (Rorty, xe, & lie, 1998). Aristotle views education as a set of actions that are performed by the family (Curren, 2010) or the state to create moral and civic virtues in individuals (Ibid).

The difference in Plato and Aristotle's view is evident in the definition of education. The latter sees education as building and creating, while the former has improved the nature of education and believes that it will be discovered and flourished through training of the present talents.

These two thoughts are reflected in contemporary educational works. Rousseau's *Emile* and John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, in addition to the educational articles by Spencer, John Locke, Kant, Hegel, and Herbart are considered prestigious sources in the field. According to Jean-Jacques Rousseau education is art or technology that serves as a guide, or to protect and guide nature, in accordance with the rules of natural growth, and with his own cooperation and to live(Rousseau, 2010). The definition of Rousseau has much to do with the definition of Plato. The exploratory nature in this definition is also considered. In John Dewey's view, education is the restructuring and organising of an experience that adds to its significance and depth, and develops the ability to guide the flow of experience (Holtz, 2002). According to him, the foundation of education is in cultural and social transmission. He believes that particular motivations and efforts of the novice must be controlled and directed, and this is the true role of education (Ibid). This definition of education is based on Dewey's philosophical point of view of pragmatism. Also, the purpose of this school is to add to the meaning of experience, especially social experience, so that a person can lead the process in future experiences. In any case, this definition, with the emphasis on the terms "reconstruction" and "organisation", takes the nature of education into account, in particular, the introduction of the deepening and guidance of experience as the goal of

education. Based on what Hahn (1982) has mentioned education can be defined as importing into the brain of man, according to the laws of nature. He does not mean the laws of nature, but only their means and forces; the title also includes human beings and methods.

The use of the word "import" brings this definition closer to the point of view of Aristotle, and his definition includes a type of creation in education. The definition of Peters has also given the creative nature to educate and follows Aristotle's school. He describes it as transmission of what is worth to those who become committed to it (Carr, 1986). By using the word "transmission", his view on education becomes clear.

Kant contributes to the second group in the controversy between the advocates of exploration and creation. He has written a part of his education proposal in a collection of his lectures published in 1803. According to Kant, only through education man comes to be, and man is nothing but what education trains and makes(Roth, Gustafsson, & Johansson, 2014). In the eyes of this great philosopher, man at the time of his birth has an animal's nature and animal tendency and is intrinsically rogue; therefore, if he is not trained, he will remain in animal rebellion (Ibid). What is quoted from Kant explains that in his opinion, education is of a creative nature, and not a purely preparatory process and exploration. Henceforth it can be attributed to Aristotle's definition, and this, in spite of Rousseau's educational views, influenced Kant. We already knew that Rousseau, like Plato, considered education as a discoverer of one.

In my opinion, the nature of education is not exclusively one of these two. Part of education is based on the exploration of talent in novices and the other part is the creation and transferring of values and beneficial teachings to him. None of the two

groups who have solely given the nature of exploratory or creativity to education can afford to.

We must keep in mind that a complete and comprehensive definition of education contains all the main elements of education. Referring to this point, (Al-Attās, 1979) mentioned three basic elements: method; content; and the recipient. He said that, in order to define the concept, these three should be considered in the definition. He believes that the displacement of these elements in the definition can change the focal point of the definition. For example, if we define the education as is a process of instilling something into human beings, The focus of the definition is the process (method). Moreover, if we change the definition to education is something progressively instilled into man, the focus of the definition will be on something which is the same as content(Ibid).

Al-Attas' definition is criticised because it does not mention the goals and objectives that are the most significant elements in defining education. According to Al-Attas, with the displacement of this element in the definition, the focus of education can be found in this principle. On the other hand, equating the process with methods is doubtful, because the process refers to a general scope of activities, while the method is the form of doing it. Therefore, the five following elements should be mentioned in the definition of the education: process; content; objectives; method; and recipient.

By summarising what was said in the definition of education, and taking the drawbacks and vagueness in the previous interpretations into account, a comprehensive definition of education could be: "Activities in the special form based on the mentor's values, in two aspects of physical and mental which are cause to discover and find the talents of the learner and develop them, or cause transferring the knowledge and

experiences of the instructor to the learner, and make them experienced and knowledgeable, so that, he reaches the stage of independence in experience and knowledge".

The features of this definition are: 1. The content is the values of the instructor: in all schools and educational systems, values are fundamental. These values have been taken from religious beliefs, ethical schools, and social norms.

2. Education's inclusion of both physical and mental aspects: education is not devoted to mental and spiritual dimension, but the body is also subject of education.

3. Regarding the exploratory aspect of education: Part of the training is the discovery and improvement of the learner's talents.

4. Attention to the creative dimension of education: the opinion which considers the exploratory aspects of education and ignores the other sides, neglects the important part of the education which is transferring the mentor's knowledge and his experiences to the learners. The learner does not know many things at first, and obviously they should be trained in the educational process. Of course, according to Plato's view regarding the nature of knowledge in which it is interpreted as recall and inspiration, education will have the essence of discovery and exploring for sure. However, the recent philosophers such as Rousseau, who do not believe Plato's theoretical doctrine in knowledge, cannot accompany him in this regard, and cannot recognise education only in an exploratory nature. Those like René Descartes have also accepted the nature of some sciences (Micheal, 2007). They cannot refer to Plato's definition of education and count it entirely as discovery.

5. Attention to the goal and aim of education: The goal is not merely the discovery of talents and the transfer of knowledge or experience to the learner. The goal is to educate the learner and train them based on this knowledge and experience so that they become decorous, experienced and perfect.

6. Containing the aforementioned five elements: In this definition, all five elements are referred to as, content (values), process (activities), objectives (making the recepient experienced and knowledgeable and reaching the stage of independence), method (special form), and recipient (learner).

2.2.2 The relationship between autonomy and education

Now that we understand the concept of education and its definition, we should discuss the relationship between this concept and the theory of autonomy. Although the origin of this theory is in the philosophy of morality, it has an important position in education. The educational importance of Kantian autonomy has led educational theorists to concentrate on Kant and his autonomic theory (Jackson, 2007).

The educational importance of the theory of autonomy is elucidated with regards to the characteristics of modern education and their relation to autonomy. For this reason, in the first step, we introduce modern education and its characteristics, and in the second step, we discuss the relationship between the modern theory of autonomy and modern education.

The history of human thought can be divided into three relatively different periods. These are: 1. Before the modernisation: During this period, which took place from 600 B.C. to the middle of the second millennium, the philosophy of idealism and religion were dominant. 2. Modern age: This period began after the Renaissance and heavily influenced the world until the 20th century, unlike the previous period; it emphasised

extremely on Experimentalism, positivism, and scientific methods. The dominant intellectual trend was called modernism. 3. Postmodernism: In this era, many of modernism's ideas were criticised.

The beginning of modernism is attributed to the Renaissance movement, or the advent of the philosophers of rationalism or the Enlightenment, in a time when social circumstances were influenced by philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and René Descartes. Many believe that modernity is the era of victory of human wisdom over traditional beliefs (mythical, religious, moral, and philosophical, etc.), the growth of scientific thought and credence of rationalism, and the prevalence of critical philosophical thinking, all of which are associated with the gradual domination of civil society.

According to this, modernity is a cultural, educational, political, economic, social, philosophical movement starting from around the fifteenth century until today or for a few decades before this. Modernism has many characteristics, one of the most important of which is rationalism. This point in the new era is dedicated to conventional wisdom, which is influenced by scientific-experimental developments. Different areas of human thought and life were influenced by modernism, and the field of education was no exception as well.

The most important features of modern education can be summarised as follows: 1) rationalism; 2) independence; 3) critical thinking; 4) the domination of technology and its culture. As is evident, all these developments revolve around the transformation that manifests about the issue of "human being" in modernism.

We are not going to go through the discussion of the contradictions between modernism and postmodernism and do not want to discuss the differences between

them. If we interpret postmodern in the sense of over-modernism and its critique, we can then consider postmodernism as a historical extension of modernism. Therefore, the meaning of modern education in this study is education that was inspired by the emergence of the Enlightenment philosophers and the Renaissance. Kant's theory of autonomy in the postmodern era remains a symbol of moral education. The emphasis placed on ethical independence in this theory is still respected by the scholars of postmodern education, although they may have some criticism. Kant's theory of autonomy has maintained its reputation in moral education throughout all this time by considering the goal of education, namely independence (Ozoliņš, 2015).

Abraham Maslow categorises human needs. He believes that after fulfilling basic needs, human beings face the need for independence. He presented his psychological theory as "the theory of human motives" in 1943 (Ibid). Maslow's hierarchy of needs is often represented as a pyramid. At the bottom of the pyramid with five levels, the most basic needs, and at the top of the pyramid are deeper and more spiritual needs. According to Maslow, the needs of higher levels are only considered when the needs of the lower levels are resolved (Taormina & Gao, 2013). These needs are as follows:

1. Biological (physical) needs are the most basic and primary needs, and how to meet these needs, have the greatest impact on the individual's behaviour. The biological needs of a human being for life are food, clothing and housing. As long as the basic needs are not satisfactory, most activities are likely to be at this level, and the rest of the needs will generate little incentive;

2. Security needs are the need to escape from horror, to provide life and not to be deprived of basic needs. In other words, human needs to protect the self in the present and future;

3. Social needs or feelings of affection and kindness; since man is a social being, and when social needs arise, a person makes a serious effort for meaningful relationships with others;

4. The need for respect. This respect is first of all in relation to oneself, and then the prestige that comes to you by others. If people cannot meet their need for respect through constructive behaviour, one may resort to subversive or indecent behaviour to satisfy the need for attention;

5. Self-actualisation. That is to blossom all the hidden talents of man whatever they may be. According to Maslow, what can be, it should be (Ibid).

In the Maslow's theory, independence is flourishing among the self-actualisation needs. He explicitly mentions one of the characteristics of self-raised man as relying on his judgements and experiences, independence, lack of reliance on culture and the environment around him for the formation of ideas and opinions. Maslow's theory of human needs is one of the centrepieces of education. In many educational studies, the educational goals and aims are codified in accordance with the human needs expressed in the theory of Maslow (Greene & Burke, 2007). Here we can point out the important role of Kant's autonomic theory in connection with Maslow's theory. Autonomy offers a greater degree of moral independence, and although it is only in the context of morality, it is a subset of the need for independence that Maslow has generally posed. For this reason, Maslow's educational theory could be explained by the Kantian theory of autonomy.

Piaget (Oesterdiekhoff, 2013) and Kleberg Kohlberg (1984) consider moral independence as the final stage of moral education. It is the stage at which a person can make choices regardless of the external impacts and based on his or her own reasoning.

The important point is that Maslow, Piaget, Kleberg and others, consider it possible to achieve moral independence through education. Therefore, it is considered an educational goal. This is the place that the role of Kant's autonomic theory manifests. Kant's theory is multi-dimensional in relation to this educational goal:

1. Defining and introducing moral independence: Kant defines the ideal moral independence in moral education. If we consider this definition as a base, then the orientation of education, as well as its methods will be completely transformed.

2. Providing philosophical and epistemological foundations for moral independence as an educational goal: Kant's theory of autonomy provides an epistemological basis for moral independence. The basis on which it is possible to justify the necessity of evolving education in order to achieve this stage of moral independence.

3. Deepening the meaning of moral independence: Kant's theory of autonomy desires the maximum level of moral independence-which is the ultimate purpose of education. So that independence is not conceivable beyond what Kant suggested. This theory introduces moral independence beyond the ability for reasoning, free decision-making, the responsibility of individuals for action and its implications, which are raised in other interpretations of moral autonomy. Hence the theory of autonomy proposes the highest degree of moral autonomy.

Given the three dimensions, it can be said that Kant's theory of autonomy is related to the levels of moral autonomy as the purpose of education. At the surface (definition), in-depth (maximum), Infrastructure (theoretical and philosophical basis).

After Kant's utmost attention was paid to the theory of autonomy, and many scholars under the influence of Kant, have presented their interpretations and definitions. We still

have based our study of the Autonomy on Kantian interpretation, because, as it is clear, all the interpretations existing in modernity are presented by the influence of Kant, and he is considered the central point in this regard.

The theory of autonomy has a high position in modern education. Nietzsche (Gemes & Janaway, 2006) Piaget (Feierstein & Town, 2014), Rawls (Taylor, 2005), and Kohlberg (1984), those proposed autonomy, were affected by Kant and retained the Kant's original elements despite some adjustments.

2.3. Relationship with Moral Education

We already mentioned how education has a broad meaning and how it is constant in all cases of application. However, sometimes we considered the education in a particular area and related to a specific field, thereby this term will be used relative to a special concept, For example, emotional education, social education, rational education, and so on. One of these cases (of relative concept) is moral education. The current study aims to discuss the theory of autonomy in moral education.

2.2.3 The concept of moral education

To understand this concept, we must know its main element which is "morality". In this context, we are faced with two different terms: 1. Ethics as human qualities; 2. Ethics as a specific science.

On ethics as a science, we must know that in the past, morals and education were not distinguished from each other. Morality was considered to be a subset of general philosophy. The forerunners of philosophy divided it into two theoretical and practical sections. The theoretical section consisted of three branches of theology, natural science, and mathematics. The practical part included three disciplines of politics; home

management; and ethics(see,e.g. H. Avicenna, 1984 p 3). At the beginning of the logic section of his great book *Al-shifā'* Avicenna says:

Practical philosophy: Either it concerns the teaching of ideas organised by the human participation in the public domain, known as the management of the city, and is called the science of politics; or it relates to the organisation of human participation in the private sphere, known as home management; or concerning purification of the human soul and is called ethics" (H. i. '. Avicenna, 1984 Vol. 1. p, 14)(Avicenna, 1984, Logic. Vol. 1, p. 14).

For this reason, the opinions of e ethics scholars on ethics should be defined under their philosophical texts within practical philosophy. Although some of them have written independent works in moral education.

Today, ethical studies are carried out in three areas: 1. Descriptive ethics that sociologists, psychologists, historians and anthropologists deal with. The purpose of this kind of studies is reporting, describing, and explaining, and recommendation or prevention is avoided (Meriac, Woehr, & Banister, 2010). Descriptive ethics addresses the ethics of nations and tribes, cultures or schools and religions, and issues and systems accepted by them are described and explained. The method of discussion in this type of studies is empirical or narrative (Ibid).

2- Normative Ethics or First-Degree Ethics. The term ethical science mostly refers to this kind of studies. The deeds of human concerning good and bad is the subject of such moral studies (von der Pfordten, 2012). For example, the statement of this type of study is telling the truth is good and lying is bad. This type of ethical study also discusses the theoretical foundations and the views that support ethical recommendations.

3. Meta-ethics. The analytical and philosophical studies of moral statements are called meta-ethics (Gong & Zhang, 2010). Other names of this kind of moral studies are theoretical ethics; philosophical ethics; the logic of ethics; analytical ethics; critical

ethics and epistemology of ethics. This type of moral studies does not include empirical or historical empirical research of ethics, nor addresses or defends any normative or special value judgement. It is different from the issues that are proposed in descriptive or normative ethics. The subject of this section of ethical studies is the statements and propositions that are presented in normative ethics (Ibid). That is why it is called second-order ethics. A scholar who studies ethical propositions is neutral to their truth or falsity; for example, the two statements "lying is bad" and " lying is good" are equal to him. His main task in this section is to examine the definition of "good" and "bad" and to analyse the ethical statement (Ibid).

In meta-ethics, moral statements are discussed in three respects: 1. Semantical questions in which, the concepts and phrases of the moral propositions are discussed and the analysis is mainly about words such as "good", "bad", "must", "not", "true" and "false", which are used to predict or domain of moral sentences.

2. Epistemological questions in which, issues such as the relative or absolute nature of moral judgements, the position of human reason; will be studied.

3. Logical questions in which the issues such as is "must" inferable from "is"? And what is the relationship between facts and values in general? And what is the relationship between among the moral statements? (Ibid). For example, as discussing how a deed is considered as moral and how is another counted immoral.

We know that there are different theories about the nature of moral deeds. Relativity theory which regards conditions, places and temporal situations in the essence of good or bad is one of them (Sturgeon, 1994). Consequent theories are another that consider personal benefits as the criterion for good or bad (Axtell & Olson, 2012) or concern social and public good and ultimately leads to good or bad judgements according to the

results of the deed (Ibid). The first is called "egoism" and the second "utilitarian". Virtue ethics theory considers the role of the deeds in the formation of personified virtues in human beings as the basis of the morality of deeds (Ibid). The theory focuses on how the deed should be instead of concentrating on what to do (Rachels & Rachels, 1993). All these views are known as criteria for determining the nature of the ethical deed.

The Kantian theory of autonomy is located in the sub-topics of deontology theory. This theory establishes ethics on the basis of duty. It is far from utilitarian theory wherein the benefits of the deeds are the instrument for recognising ethicality (Pratt & James, 1994). In deontology theory, the obligation is the basis of the ethical nature of acts. This theory relies on the rules of the human reason(Immanuel Kant, 2016). Kant, whose autonomous theory is evaluated under deontology theory, believes that every human being is able to find and understand moral values (Ibid). It seems that Kant sends messages to all people; never do something unless you are willing to have everyone do it (Ibid).

What was said is related to ethics as a science and knowledge, but ethics as human traits and attributes has another story. Prior to the Muslim scholars, Aristotle divides the virtues into rational and moral. According to Aristotle's definition, rational virtues are achieved through educating and teaching, and ethical virtues are with habit and training (Aristotle, 1963). He considers moral virtue as the middle ground between the two extremes (Ibid) and considers ethics to be the point of moderation and understanding of how to reach such level (Ibid, p, 278).

In Western philosophy, the middle age is a continuation of the Greek tradition in the field of ethics. With the advent of the Renaissance and in the later centuries, many

moral schools were founded in the West. In the West, what was explained regarding the definition of ethics as human attributes and his behaviour was based on the definition of good and evil (Bishop & Perszyk, 2011). Then they came to the explanation of the moral act and explained what is right and what is wrong.

There are two ethical approaches among Muslim scholars. First, a philosophical approach that follows the Aristotelian tradition in this regard. Aristotle's viewpoint on the definition of morality is evaluated in the number of rationalist views that seek to identify, analyse and evaluate ethical statements by wisdom. The pursuit of this tendency led us to *Al-Fārābī*, Avicenna, *Ibn Miskawayh*, among others.

In identifying the nature of ethics, Avicenna believed that true happiness (which was referred to in the traditional literature as the ethic's ultimate goal) is the achievement of the rational life, so that all material and spiritual life is ruled by his wisdom and morality as a steady state (malakah ملكة) [1] of his mind and his soul (H. Avicenna, 1984, p. 93).

Among Muslim scholars, *Tahzib Al-Akhlāq* by *Abū ʿAlī Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Yaʿqūb Ibn Miskawayh* had written with a rational approach to ethical issues. *Ibn*

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[1] In ancestors views the Entity was generally divided into two kinds of Substance (جوهر) and Accident (عرض). They have considered Accident to be an entity that its consistency and stability is depend on a subject, by contrast substance which is intrinsically independent. They divided the accident (عرض) into 9 types, and among them referred to Quality (كيف). From their point of view, Quality (كيف) means: a quality of a substance which is fixed in the substance - in contrast to motion (حركت), time(زمان), passivity (انفعال) and act (فعل) which is not constant in the substance- and at first and inborn is not divisible (versus the Quantity, which is divisible) and is not attributable (vs. The rest of the accidents that have a attributable nature). In the thought of the ancients Quality (كيف) had some types, and among them, is sensual. That is, the Qualities fix the human being. According to them, if these Qualities have stability and durability called stable state (malakah ملكة), otherwise called state (حال). According to their view stable state (malakah ملكة), means the static sensual quality in a person's soul, for example, if someone under the influence of the encouragement of others or influenced by the atmosphere does a courageously act, did not call him of courage, because to be someone called brave has to have the stable quality of courage (ملكة). Emphasizing on the words of the malakah (ملكة) in the definition of morality, which is widely seen in the literature of the ancients, is because they considered something morality if that was caused by the stable state (malakah ملكة) (Suhrawardī, 1996 Vol. 1, p 220- 235).

Miskawayh considers ethics to cover mental states that invite a man to do things without having to think about it (Ibn Miskawayh, 2011).

And it should be possible for books like *Ihyā' Ulūm-al-dīn*, or The Revival of the Religious Sciences by *Imām Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī*, as well as *Kimiyā -Yi Sa'ādat*, or The Alchemy of Happiness, by *Majd al-Dīn Abū al-Fotuḥ Aḥmad al- Ghazālī* to be based on a combination of rational and mystical basis, since *al- Ghazālī* has based his work on the rational concepts of Aristotelian morality. Like Aristotle, he divides morality into natural and adventitious (Al- Ghazālī 1985, p. 53), while at the same time chooses the Sufi method to achieve truth and salvation (Ibid, p 48). *Al-Ghazālī* regards ethics as a knowledge of good and bad, and humans can rely on it to cultivate good things and avoid the bad (Ibid). He also argues that these ethics are consistent with the abilities of human beings (Ibid).

The definition of morality in the works of other Muslim philosophers has also been taken into consideration. *Shahāb al-Dīn Yahyá ibn Habash Suhrawardī* defined ethics as the knowledge aimed to get rid of the factors involved in the human mind and to purify it from obstacles in the way of perfection (Suhrawardī, 1996. Vol. 2, p. 14). Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī interpreted ethics as: "The psychic state that makes it easy to do good deeds; because doing well is something and the ease of doing well is another. So, the state that makes doing well easy is called ethics (M Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 2000. Vol. 31, p 19).

In short, the philosophical and rational approach to the ethics regards happiness as the ultimate goal and the emergence of steady states الملكات النفسانية in human souls as the intermediate goals of ethics.

The second approach to ethics among Muslim scholars is the traditional النقلى approach that proposes ethics based on Quranic and Prophetic teachings. The traditional approach defines the goal of ethics as eternal prosperity, that is, an otherworldly view of the ethics. This approach introduces the teachings recommended in Islam as the content of ethics. It even takes the methods from religious sources like the Quran and Sunnah. This approach considers social behaviour as a part of Quranic and traditional ethics to the extent that in the most important Hadith books there are chapters consisting of these narrations under the title of *Al Adab* (الادب) (see, e.g. Al-Bukhārī, 1981 .Vol. 7, p. 68; Ibn Mājah al-Rab'ī al-Qazwīnī, 2003 . Vol. 2, p. 1206), or under the title of *Al ādāb* الآداب (al-Niyshābūrī, 2003 . Vol. 6, p. 169) which explains how to interact with others. Many other books have been written using this approach, for example Al-Shawkānī (1984), Ibn Taymīyyah (1999). According to this approach, ethics can be defined as the best principles and values based on Islamic sources (Mohammed, 2011).

Summarising the above, we can say: 1. Theoretical ethics is understanding the good and bad, Muslim scholars have considered two theoretical meanings for good and bad. First, it may be called good and bad and intended to perfection الكمال and deficiency النقص (Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, 1986 . Vol. 1, p 346). For example, "knowledge is good (perfection), and ignorance is bad (defection)". And a lot of human behaviour is good and bad in this sense, courage, generosity, patience, justice, equity and so on are good as a virtue and perfections of the human soul and strength in its existence. Their antitheses are evil because they degrade human beings and weaken their souls. Second, they may mean suitability الملائمة and disharmony المنافرة for the human soul (A. i. M. Al-Jurjānī, 1998 .Vol. 8, p. 192). They are also described in this sense for deeds and their objects and also for things. For example, when we say: this perspective is beautiful, or the sound of the nightingale is beautiful, we consider good as the description of the subjects

of acts. And when we say: sacrifice or devote are good and lying is bad, we attribute good and bad to the act. In this case, we regard something good because they are in accordance with the soul and the nature of man, and we consider something bad since they are disproportionate to the spirit and nature of mankind (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988 . Vol. 8, p 234). This is an important point that is very influential in future discussions. Therefore, when we ask whether reason has the ability to understand moral values or not, it is about whether reason has the ability to understand perfections and defecation, as well as suitability and disharmony.

2. The purpose of Islamic ethics is not only in worldly happiness, but also the Hereafter. Islamic ethics is concerned with providing human prosperity in both worlds. The existence of these two goals is due to the fact that according to Islamic beliefs, human beings have an eternal and continuous life, so that each stage of his life effects his next stage, and the soul of man after his death and transfer to the next world begins his worldly life with the properties, traits and stable states ملكة that he has gained during his lifetime. These properties and attributes ملكة are formed in his soul as a result of the behaviour, ethics and lifestyle, and are facts that exist in the next world and will have their special effects. As ṣadr al-Din al-Shīrāzī says:

> Then this human soul like a spiritual sperm fell from the core of the divine will in the format of the body and the womb of the world, needs to be purified and modified by good ethics and steady states. The food of this child (human soul) is knowledge and education and virtues, to become a subject for the flood of the divine spirit merged in the human soul after the evolution by the divine properties (al-Shīrāzī, 1981, p. 131).

After understanding the concept of ethics, the difference between education and ethics becomes a major argument to be considered. Education is a wide-ranging process and its scope extends to all aspects of human abilities and existence. Therefore there is a variety of education including physical education, rational education, religious

education, moral education, sex education, emotional education, mental education training, civil education, social education, etc. The ethical process is one of the many capacities of education. Thus, education has a general scope that embraces ethics (Dearden, 1974). Scholars have placed the moral deed against the natural deed and said that the moral is outside the limits of the normal framework (Kern, 2012). According to this statement, the process of education, including the natural act and normal behaviour is also covered in addition to the moral act (McKenzie, xa, L, & Kahan, 2008). The purpose of this statement is that, one of the areas in which education takes place is morality, as education deals with other things, emotion, rationality, sex, society, etc. Therefore, we can claim that education is broader than ethics, and as it can be attributed to the other existential aspect of man, it may belong to morality (traits and behavioural), in which, case the purpose of moral education is to cultivate and grow good traits and good behaviour in humans. Alternatively, we can say the purpose of moral education is education that seeks to cultivate and promote human beings in relation to moral virtues and vices.

One of the definitions of moral education is the practice of ethical principles, in such a way that, these concepts are converted into personal habits and that they will act in any position without thinking about them. This definition is, in fact, very close to what was the ultimate goal of ethics, which is to get to the stable state *malakah* ملكة. Therefore, ethical education is nothing but moral upbringing, and this is the ethics that target the acquisition of the stable state (*malakah* ملكة). Perhaps some Western scholars can be put in this category, i.e. those who are classified in different schools of thought such as Auguste Comte (Heilbron, 1990) and Émile Durkheim (Prus, 2011) who believe that the moral education is preparation for the learners so that they do such behaviour easily and automatically in any situation that requires moral behaviour. Durkheim has

explicitly stated that moral education does not mean the systematic embedding of moral virtues in the mind, but using appropriate methods and techniques of education to cultivate its talents or to create such talents and readiness in it (Ibid). It is in the making of such readiness that ethical behaviour can easily be addressed. From the readiness for ethical behaviour, Durkheim means the quality of socialisation, the free and independent will and the quality of being orderly (Ibid).

Another definition is that moral education is not about practising ethical behaviours and turning them into habits, but creating a person's moral recognition and intuition in a way that he will not need to induce or inculcate external moral concepts and values, to rely on the moral cognition that they have found themselves, so they can recognise the good and bad anywhere. Perhaps the most prominent scholar who considers this approach in the definition of moral education is Immanuel Kant. We will see how such an approach to moral education will lead to the formation of the autonomous In the future. However, the dissimilarity of this definition is clear from the previous definition. Nevertheless the difference between these two interpretations is clear since the formation of the habit and later the formation of cognition and intuition as a goal of moral education have been introduced in the former.

In other definitions, moral education means teaching and instilling the ethical concepts and values to learners (Schleifer, 1976). First of all, we should consider the distinction of this definition from the first because practice and application were emphasised in the first, and therefore the achievement of the moral education as the formation of good habits was introduced. In the third definition, the scientific and theoretic aspect of moral education is emphasised, and the ultimate moral education will be learning a set of morals and ethical values.

These scholars have taken note of the fact that knowing the concepts and values of good is the cause of their actions, thus distinguishing between the teaching of ethical concepts and the teaching of other subjects is that the knowledge of these concepts requires action. Such a view is proposed by Socrates (Copleston, 2008).

A serious critique of these definitions is that, instead of introducing the nature of moral education, they explain its purpose and goal. Introducing a science based on its goal and purpose will not help capture its true identity. The teaching of ethical concepts and values; the creation of the quality of recognition and intuition of moral values and the transforming of the ethical behaviour into habits and stable states *malakah* ملكة are among the goals of moral education. This is while moral education is one of the sub-topics of education and should be introduced and defined under the same title. Moral education is related to a particular area of education such as social education, political education, sex education, etc. relating to other areas of education.

For this reason, we introduce moral education in the field of education and out of the field of theoretical ethics that deals with the discussion of ethical concepts and values. Moral education is different from practical ethics and does not use educational methods. Encouraging, providing and applying educational tools and methods to receive moral statements will be completed in moral education. Identifying virtues and vices and grounding in creating attitudes and turning to good morals are other tasks in moral education. In moral education, learners achieve a goal that they see as ethical. These are different aspects of moral education, not its definition.

Considering what has been said and based on the definition we proposed for education, moral education can be defined as: "Activities in the special form, based on the mentor's values, which cause to discover and find the talents of learners in the field

of ethical and moral behaviours and develop them, or cause transferring the knowledge and experiences of the instructor in that field to the learner".

2.2.4   The relationship between moral education and autonomy

The three milestones from the relationship between Kant's theory of autonomy and moral education are:

1. The basis of ethics on reason: the origins of moral duty in Kant's moral theory are rational concepts. This viewpoint is a new and specific approach to moral education and is especially influential in regulating the relationship between moral education and religious education (Islamic). Moral education needs to be re-examined in this perspective.

2. The specific interpretation for the moral act: In Kant's theory action must be free from any moral obligation. This limitation will have a major role in the direction of moral education. To build the ethics on human reasoning and the specific interpretation of the ethical act, giving a special orientation that will differentiate moral education from similar moral systems. The differences maybe occur regarding the method, content and the goal of moral education. Based on the theory of Autonomy, the training of free human beings and a task-oriented human being will be the two goals of moral education. The provision of educational content that leads to self-regulation will be one of the most important features of moral education regarding methods and content.

3. Its implications in moral education: We will see that acceptance of autonomy leads to significant and impressive changes in moral education. Especially the changes that are in the field of methods and objectives. In this regard, there is a profound connection between the theory of autonomy and moral education; a link that is more important than

all theoretical and philosophical links. The result is that the theory of autonomy will be related to moral education in both theoretical and practical issues.

2.3 Relationship with Islamic moral education

As to whether Islamic education refers to a specific concept that is different from the general concept of education, we must point out the important thing. Islamic education can be examined from two angles.

2.3.1 Islamic education in its general sense

Sometimes Islamic education includes all aspects of education in a religious context, aiming at the child, adolescent or young Muslim who should be taught and educated in such a way that his personality becomes steady with the goals outlined in Islamic sources. In this sense, Islamic education is not restricted to religious issues but also includes cultural, political, economic, social, and emotional aspects. This general meaning of Islamic education has been intended in the current study as the majority of Muslim scholars who have raised Islamic education considered such a general meaning. So, it should be vital to consider whether Islamic education differs from non-Islamic education. We do not want to consider the differences between various educational schools with Islamic education, as we do not want to point out the comparison of Islamic education differences with modernism and postmodernism. Rather, we focus on the differences between Islamic and secular education.

The dominant view among Muslim educators accepts such differences. They point to the difference in the goals, methods, and content of education. The following elements have been introduced by Muslim scholars as the secular educational principles:

Rationality: Secular educators consider education as a commitment to rationality, not less nor more (Casanova & xe, 2009). According to this, educating and developing

rationality in children must bring them up to be critical and free, so that they can perceive any belief critically and not think of anything as the last truth. Secular extremist tendencies have gone so far as to say that it is unacceptable to teach the values to children or learners in the basics of secular education. In secular education, freedom of thought has sometimes been interpreted more visibly as being indifferent to belief. Some supporters of secularism believe that moral education should only seek to grow moral reasoning and power of choice and never seek to introduce certain values as moral virtues (Hindess, 1991).

Self-governance: Self-governance or individual autonomy is inseparable from the values of freedom and rationality in secularist education. The secular education is known as a thing that disperses a person out of all constraints (Bulle, 2017). Again, the modern tendencies have progressed so far that everyone is autonomous to the extent that thought and deeds in his life are only by referring to himself, namely, his "choice" and "argument", "plan", "judge", and "decision".

Equality of dignity: Secular education is in the fight against racial discrimination, and is against discrimination due to religion, nationality, social classes, and the like. However, they have interpreted this principle such that all encounters and interactions are the same, but it means that the diversity of views in the secular society is accepted (Ibid).

Equal opportunities: This principle is defined as the right of individuals to have equal access to resources, in such a way that none of the citizens in the future will be deprived of the life opportunities due to the inadequate access to resources (Ibid).

Some Muslim scholars believe that Islamic education opposes secular educational principles. For example, in Halstead's view, Islam is based on the values derived from

revelation and has a view of education that is in much contrast with secularism tenets(Halstead, 2004). According to him, the ultimate goal in Islamic education is to bring children and learners to live in faith. The goal is to make them good Muslims. Children and learners will never be encouraged to investigate and question the principles of their religion, but they are only expected to accept the religious foundations to follow their elders (Ibid). The incompatibility of Islamic education with the principles of secular education has been emphasised by many scholars who have viewed the topic from a traditional perspective. Al-Attas is one of those who emphasise the fundamental difference between the two educational systems in the context of the goal(Al-Attās, 1979). In his works, provision of prosperity and worldly happiness is the ultimate goal of secular education, but the ultimate goal of Islamic education is salvation(Al-Attās, 1979). In this view (an incompatibility of secular education with Islamic education), not only a commentary on the nature and purpose of Islamic education, but also on methods, Islamic education would be incompatible with secular education, because religious education (including Islamic education) consists of indoctrination. Many education scholars have accused religious education (like Islamic) of suppressing rationality, inducing stagnant and static values, brainwashing, and lack of tolerance against other values and ideas (Habib, 2013).

The extreme view of separating Islamic education from the general concept of education. In addition, the view that pursues the conceptual difference between Islamic education and secular, some groups have transcended and even believed that, in Islamic culture the word Education cannot be used as the title, but there are other titles as equivalent derived from the holy texts of Islam in contrast with Education. For example, Halstead (2004) believes that Muslim scholars have not considered differences among words: teaching, training, schooling, education, instruction, while Western educators

have paid attention to these differences. On this basis, it is concluded that the concept of Islamic education is different from that of Western educations. He writes: "The central meaning of the term in Arabic does not correspond very closely with the central meaning of 'education' as expounded by liberal philosophers of education in the West" (p. 519). According to this group of scholars, the concept of Islamic education refers to the following:

1. *Al- Tarbīyah (التربية):* Ramzi (1994) and Halstead (2004) are among those who have mentioned the term *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية as an equivalent of education.

The equivalence of *Al- Tarbīyah* has been criticised by some Muslim scholars (Saada & Gross, 2017). According to their opinion, the word *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية cannot substitute education, since it refers more to physical training, rather than mental and spiritual development, and even though the word "Rabb" includes having "knowledge" it does not mean the transfer of knowledge intended for education. Al-Attās (1979) specifically refers to the word *Rabbānī (ربانى)* used for the scholars of Judaism and Christians, which means the holders of science and knowledge(p. 4).

I have to add that, when considering and evaluating the statement above, it should be noted that the term *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية and its derivative *Al Rab* الرب, which is used for God, is an exception. God is the creator and the cause of all things in the universe. Therefore, in the case of God, when the word *Al- Rabb* الرب is used, it will include other aspects such as giving knowledge of the creatures. That is to say, this perception (inclusion in the granting of science and knowledge) is attributed to a belief in God and does not rely on the conceptual development of the word *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية. Therefore, many of the evidence have mentioned in this regard, are unacceptable. For example, according to some Quranic verses, they claim that the word *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية also

includes the meaning of knowledge (Bagheri & Khosravi, 2006). As the Quran says رَبَّنَا وَسِعْتَ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ رَحْمَةً وَ عِلْماً (40: 7). Meaning: our God, you embrace all things in mercy and knowledge. It is very bizarre to argue solely based on this verse to prove the inclusion of "knowledge" in the meaning of the word *Al- Rabb* الرب. In this verse, the word *Al- Rabb* الرب is used for God, but it is not clear that the spanning of his mercy and knowledge is attributed to the name of the *Al- Rabb* الرب. We know that Allah has many names and attributes, and each of His blessings and graces in the universe is related to one of His names and divine qualities. Perhaps the spanning of His mercy and knowledge is also based on other divine qualities and names. Therefore, it cannot be said that since the word used for "God" includes knowledge, then in all cases this is so. Yes, if the verse stated that God has trained all beings and has developed their knowledge for to his quality namely *Rabb*, such a claim would have been proven, but the verse does not mention such.

They also said that one of the semantic dimensions of the word *Al- Rabb* الرب is management and the management includes both dimensions of physical and mental training (Ibid). This is also not the case because the word management never encompasses both aspects.

They also argued that in some of the Prophet's narratives *Al- ta'dīb* التاديب, has been attributed to *Al- Rabb* الرب, and if the word *Al- ta'dīb* التاديب - according to the what will come next - implies the meaning of knowledge, then the source and presentation of knowledge to human, which is part of the meaning of *Al- ta'dīb* التاديب is also attributed to God (p. 5).

This argument is as weak as the previous one, because the word *Al- Rabb* الرب - as we said - refers to the sacred essence of Allah. Moreover, based on our belief that there

is no effective being in the world, but the God himself, which is one and only, Allah is the source of all favours and blessings. Therefore, if on one hand the word *Al- Rabb* الرب is used for God, and on the other hand, we attribute the word *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب to Him, knowing that the transfer of knowledge is inside the concept of *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب, we cannot conclude that in all cases transfer of knowledge is in the meaning of words such as *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية.

Also, we see that in the Quran, the Prophet asks for invoking of knowledge. The Quran says وَ قُلْ رَبِّ زِدْنِي عِلْماً (20: 114). Meaning: my God, increase me in knowledge. However, this verse also does not prove the involvement of the element of the transfer in the concept of knowledge. If the word *Al- Rabb* الرب which is used for God, contains a general meaning that includes the transfer of knowledge, what should be in terms such as *rabbi al-'ālamīn* رب العالمين? Is it possible to accept that God has transferred knowledge to all the creatures, including humans, plants, animals and objects, and then what will be the superiority of man over other creatures? Also, if we see that the word *Rabbānī* ربانى has been used in some verses of the Quran regarding the transfer of knowledge and science, it does not negate what we said about the word *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية. For example, the Quran says: وَ لٰكِنْ كُونُوا رَبَّانِيِّينَ بِما كُنْتُمْ تُعَلِّمُونَ الْكِتابَ وَ بِما كُنْتُمْ تَدْرُسُونَ (3: 79). Meaning: Be worshippers ربانيين of the God, because of your teaching the Book and your reading. According to *Sībawayh*, which is one of the most important Arab literacies, *Rabbānī* ربانى is attributed to and derivative from the word *Al- Rabb* الرب, so the redundant *Aliph* (الف) and noon (نون), that are used to attributes one to another, are the signs of exaggeration(المبالغة), like the words of *Raqbānī* (رقبانى), *Lahyānī* (لحيانى) and *Sha'rānī* (شعرانى) that are used respectively for the persons with a long neck, a long beard, and a long hair. If mere attribution -without exaggeration-, was intended, it

would be *Raqabī* (رقبى) instead of *Lahyānī* (رقبانى), *Lahawī* (لحوى) instead of *Lahyānī* (لحيانى) and *Sha'rī* (شعرى) instead of *Sha'rānī* (شعرانى) (Darwish, 1994 . Vol. 1, p. 546).

With this in mind, the verse does not mean teaching and instruction of the book, but the purpose of the verse is learning and acquisition of the book because such a thing makes one a religious person (ربانى). The evidence for this is the quotation *al Zajāj* from 'Asim: " 'Asim has said: the verse بما كُنْتُم تُعَلِّمونَ الْكِتَابَ means that, you will learn the book, namely, instead of تعلمون is تتعلمون that in Arabic means learning not teaching, then one of the two letter T(تا) has been deleted and then it has become 'تعلمون (Al- Zajaj, 1999 . Vol. 3, p 851). The great scholar *an-Nahhās* said the same thing. He remarks that *Abi 'Amr*, and the scholars of *Medinah* and *Kufah*, had read in this verse (تُعَلَّمون), with the Phonetic sign /ʊ/(_ُ) on (تا). *Mujahid* had read it (تَتَعَلَّمون) with the Phonetic sign /æ/(_َ) and with the strengthen on Lam (لام). The reason for *Mujahid* is the citation of *Shu'ba* from *Asim* from *Zeyd* from 'Abdallāh Ibn Mas 'ūd that he interpreted the verse (و لكِنْ كُونُوا رَبَّانِيِّينَ) to mean, be wise and an expert. *Zahhāk* interpreted it as be judicial and an expert. Al-Nahass concludes that we cannot claim: Be wise and experts by teaching. What we can claim is be wise and expert with knowledge. Therefore, the correct word is (تَعلمون) with the phonetic sign /æ/(_َ) (Al-Nahhās, 2000 . Vol. 1, p 168).

The same thing is mentioned by Al-Baydawī, he quoted from Ibn Kathīr, from Nafi',Abu 'Amr and Ya'qūb. According to this, (تعلمون) means: "Be wise and expert" (Al-Baydawī, 1997 . Vol. 2, p. 25). Eventually, according to what these great scholars have said, the purpose of the verse is:" you are worshippers of God, because you have learned the book and have taught it".

In addition to what Al-Attas has said about the incorrectness of the association of *Al-Tarbīyah* التربية with education, we can say in the word *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية, there is no

sacred purpose, That is, the cultivation of any creature for any purpose is an instance of *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية, hence the training of someone for the purpose of doing wrong and vile deeds is considered to be *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية. They also train dogs to keep their flock or obey their owner's commands. In the concept of education, there is a sacred purpose that does not refer to any kind of activity, but to a special training which is carried out for a particular purpose.

2. *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب: Among Muslim educators, efforts have continued to find the proper equivalent for education. Al-Attas does not accept the equivalence of *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية with education, but considers the term *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب the proper equivalent because it word refers to "knowledge" which is the basic element of education (Al-Attās, 1979).

This equation is not acceptable because by referring to the word and meanings of the word *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب, we find that sometimes it is used for non-humans such as camels (Al-Fayrūzabādī 2005). Additionally, the term *Al- ta'dīb* has two meanings of teaching and punishment (Al-Husaynī al-Zabīdī 1988 . Vol. 2, p. 331). Therefore, it does not only refer to education. So, although we accept that the word *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب refers to education and training- because part of *Al- ta'dīb* التأديب depends on the subject- we cannot accept it as the equivalent.

3- *Al- T'alīm* (التعليم) *and Al- Tazkīyah* (التزكيه): Some scholars use the term *Al- T'alīm* (التعليم) and *Al- Tazkīyah* (التزكيه) as education and cultivation. They argued the usage of these two words together in the Holy Quran (Al-Attās, 1979, p. 178). This does not seem to be correct. We know that in spite of the fact that in the Holy Quran the word *Al- T'alīm* (التعليم) is used 41 times and *Al- Tazkīyah* (التزكيه) is repeated 14 times, they are used together only 4 times in the Quran. These 4 times are as follows:

1. The Quran says: كَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا فِيكُمْ رَسُولاً مِنْكُمْ يَتْلُوا عَلَيْكُمْ آيَاتِنَا وَ يُزَكِّيكُمْ وَ يُعَلِّمُكُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَ الْحِكْمَةَ وَ يُعَلِّمُكُمْ مَا لَمْ تَكُونُوا تَعْلَمُونَ (2: 151). Meaning: As we sent a Messenger from yourselves to guide you to our signs, and to purify you, and teaching you our book and wisdom, so he teaches you what you did not know before.

2. The Quran says: رَبَّنَا وَ ابْعَثْ فِيهِمْ رَسُولاً مِنْهُمْ يَتْلُوا عَلَيْهِمْ آيَاتِكَ وَ يُعَلِّمُهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَ الْحِكْمَةَ وَ يُزَكِّيهِمْ إِنَّكَ أَنْتَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ (2: 129). Meaning: O, our Lord, send among our progeny a Messenger of Their own, who will retell to them your signs; and teach them your Book and Wisdom, then, purify them,

3. The Quran says: لَقَدْ مَنَّ اللَّهُ عَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ إِذْ بَعَثَ فِيهِمْ رَسُولاً مِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ يَتْلُوا عَلَيْهِمْ آيَاتِهِ وَ يُزَكِّيهِمْ وَ يُعَلِّمُهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَ الْحِكْمَةَ (2: 164). Meaning: Indeed, God conferred a favour to the faithful people when he sent a Messenger from themselves, to retell to them God's signs, and to purify them and teaching them the Book, and wisdom.

4. The Quran says: هُوَ الَّذِي بَعَثَ فِي الْأُمِّيِّينَ رَسُولاً مِنْهُمْ يَتْلُوا عَلَيْهِمْ آيَاتِهِ وَ يُزَكِّيهِمْ وَ يُعَلِّمُهُمُ الْكِتَابَ وَ الْحِكْمَةَ (62: 2). Meaning: Allah is who has sent among the illiterate a Messenger from themselves to retell to them His signs, to purify them and to teach them the Book and Wisdom.

Considering these verses, we find that the missions of the Prophets are referred to in these cases so that Al- T'alīm (التعليم) and Al- Tazkīyah (التزكيه) cannot be equivalent to education. In these verses, the purpose of Al- T'alīm (التعليم) is the teaching of divine verses, and the purpose of Al- Tazkīyah (التزكيه) is not a special task that corresponds to what is intended for the purpose of education. As the Holy Quran considers zakāh (زكاة) as an example of Al- Tazkīyah (التزكيه), needless to say that this is far from education. The Quran says: خُذْ مِنْ أَمْوَالِهِمْ صَدَقَةً تُطَهِّرُهُمْ وَ تُزَكِّيهِمْ بِهَا (9: 103). Meaning: O, Messenger collect their zakāh in order to purify and clean them.

To conclude this discussion, we can say that education in its technical sense has no particular Islamic equivalence, although Muslim scholars have proposed equivalents. The words proposed for this term such as *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية, *Al- ta'dīb* التاديب, *Al-T'alīm* (التعليم) and *Al- Tazkīyah* (التزكيه) are dimensions of education. *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية is the moral dimension *Al- ta'dīb* التاديب, defining the dimension of socialisation and *Al-T'alīm* (التعليم) is the dimension of knowledge acquisition (Bagheri & Khosravi, 2006). Therefore, we cannot make a special term as an equivalent of the word education regarding its conceptual scope. Perhaps we can claim that the best possible equivalence is to put the two words of *Al- T'alīm* (التعليم) and *Al- Tarbīyah* التربية.

After discussing equivalences, it is time to bring the definition of Islamic Education. As for the definition of Islamic education, achieving a clear definition of Islamic education is a matter of several researches and studies. Addressing the wider discussion of the comparison Islamic education, in particular with modern secular education, is beyond the scope of the present research and requires a broad independent study. But what is accepted in this section of the study is that Islamic and modern education share many consistencies. Many of the cases that seem to be incompatible and contradictory are reflected in incorrect or radical interpretations of some elements of modern education or statements in Islamic sources. As in the present study, one of these issues, namely moral independence in the form of the theory of autonomy- which was mentioned as an obvious example for incompatibility between the two systems- is being examined, and we attempt to bring the two Islamic and modern educational systems as close as possible to each other.

Aside from what we said earlier, we have also interpreted the concept of education as: "Activities in the special form based on the mentor's values, in two aspects of physical and mental which are cause to discover and find the talents of the learner and

develop them, or cause transferring the knowledge and experiences of the instructor to the learner, and make them experienced and knowledgeable, so that, he reaches the stage of independence in experience and knowledge". The same definition applies to Islamic education, without any additional element because the process of education is the same, and the difference is only in the way in which each system introduces its values and goals. So the definition is: "Activities in the special form based on the Islamic values, in two aspects of physical and mental which, are cause to discovery and finding the talents of the learner and develop them, or cause transferring the knowledge and experiences of the instructor to the learner, and make them experienced and knowledgeable".

The differences between modern and Islamic education may be in the goals and the subjects of transition. With the view that, what is transmitted in Islamic education is different from what is being transmitted in modern education. Although the goals or methods, as well as the values that are considered in Islamic education, are different from those of Western methods or values, this does not mean that there is a difference in the nature and concept of education. The foundation of Islamic education in regards to specific epistemology, ontology, theology, and anthropology does not alter the material of education. In both systems, education is a process in which the knowledge and values are transmitted to one another with specific goals and methods.

Islamic teachings and values are transmitted in Islamic education, but this does not change the concept of education. We claim that the concept of Islamic education is not distinct from its modern concept. Some scholars who consider Islam as having a distinctive essence believe that due to its distinctive nature, Islamic education includes some types as: theological education, ethical education, rational education, psychological education, social education, and sex education (Al-'ulwān, 1980, p. 75).

These are not the types of education, but subjects of education, and in all of these cases, the meaning is identical.

2.3.2   Islamic education in its particular sense

Alongside the general meaning of Islamic education that has been discussed, sometimes the Islamic education is intended to be in its specific meaning. In the specific sense of Islamic education, the theological and spiritual growth of the recipient is considered on the basis of Islamic beliefs. In this regard, religious education teaches children and youth the mainstream religious teachings, beliefs, practices, the ethical point of view of religion, and how it relates to other religious traditions. In other words, religious education is considered to be the expression of a religion that sees human beings in their relationship to the divine (God). The purpose of religious education is to activate this relationship in the private life of the believers and the social life. Every religious community projects according to its religion and their perception of God and divine affairs, but the nature of religious education is such, and it is not outside of this framework. In this sense, the purpose of Islamic education is to teach Islamic teachings in the fields of ethics, beliefs and laws, and so forth. In this sense, Islamic education is distinct from modern and secular education.

Now that we have understood the meaning of Islamic education in both of its concepts, we should also mention the difference between Islamic education and moral education. Regarding the general meaning of Islamic education, the purpose is a process that develops a person for a particular lifestyle based on Islamic principles, rules, and strategies. This meaning contains all aspects of education in a religious context. The subject of this training is not devoted to religious, spiritual and moral affairs, but it is meant to be developed in all capacities in accordance with what is confirmed by Islam. And the child, adolescent or the youth are trained to match their personality with the

Islamic goals. The difference between Islamic education and moral education in this term is very clear. However, sometimes it is meant as the specific concept. In this case, the growth of a person in the field of Islam (such as the Islamic sciences, spirituality, beliefs) is intended. In the second term, the distinction between moral education and religious education is the same as the difference between education in general and Islamic education. The first one, regardless of the religious rules and views, considers the person's moral and behavioural education, while the latter considers the education of a person in this field, but based on religious rules and regulations. So when we say Islamic moral education, we mean the cultivation of a person ethically based on Islamic views.

CHAPTER 3: KANT, HIS ETHICAL SYSTEM AND OUR APPROCAH TO THE STUDY OF AUTONMOY

In this chapter, we discuss the general approach to the study of the Kantian theory of autonomy. In addition to Kant's ethical system marked by autonomy, we become acquainted with the Kantian sources of this theory. On the other hand, we have to answer two questions:

1. Given the different approaches existing in Islamic studies, what is our approach to this theory from the Islamic point of view?

2. Why did we choose this approach?

These questions cannot be answered in the research methodology section which is presented in the introduction's chapter, because there are issues beyond the research methodology which are of great importance to this study.

For this reason, the content of this chapter is divided into three broad sections.

Part One: Kant's life and works;

Part Two: Kantian ethical system;

Part Three: Our Approach to the study of this theory from the Islamic perspective.

3.1 Immanuel Kant's Life and Works

Immanuel Kant is one of the greatest Western philosophers who came to the forefront of the Enlightenment and had a great influence on philosophy, ethics and education. As Frederick Copleston says, if we leave Kant's thoughts and opinions, we do not have to dwell on his biography and his life, because his life was free of events and interesting things(Copleston, 2008, p. 202). He was born on April 22, 1724, in the city of Königsberg, Germany. His parents were both religious and virtuous. During his childhood, and later in Friedrich's school, from 1732 to 1740, Kant passed religious

education (Ibid). The religious sect that his parents followed was more toward fanaticism in virtue and sanctity. Kant respected this religious spirit until the end (Ibid).

Kant taught Latin at school. In the year 1740, in Königsberg, he entered university. During this period, Martin Knutzen, the professor of logic and metaphysics, had the greatest impact on his thought. Martin Knutzen was a Wolfe student. He had a great passion for physics, mathematics and geometry. At Martin Knutzen's recommendation, Kant studied Newton's physics first. That is why his initial works were about the natural sciences. After working in the university, Kant worked as a visiting teacher for some time. This period lasted until 1755 (p. 203).

He received a PhD in 1755 and started teaching in the same year as an associate professor. He was interested in taking the teaching chair of his mentor Martin Knutzen, but the university's supervisors did not agree, and in 1764 he was offered poetry and literature, but he did not accept it. In 1770, he succeeded in obtaining university approval for teaching in the field of logic and metaphysics, which he liked. In that period, he worked as a deputy university librarian (Ibid).

The result of Kant's teaching in this 15-year period was a series of dissertations covering a variety of topics from logic and morality to physics and mathematics, geography, anthropology, mining, and education. According to those days, he would have chosen to teach a specific text, and for this reason, he chose Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's book. According to those who narrated Kant's life, he was critically teaching this text and criticised it repeatedly. During this period, besides teaching and doing scientific work, Kant also showed great interest in participating in friendly meetings and the acquisition of knowledge about the cultures and customs of different countries (p. 204).

At this time, he focused on reading and editing the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, particularly in education and thinking about reforming it. Reading Rousseau's works not only affected his educational ideas, but even influenced his political tendencies. The importance of this period is due to the fact that he presents much of the lectures related to education in this course. These lectures were edited and published in 1803 by his disciple, Rinck, entitled "Education". Philosophically, throughout this period, which is known as the pre-critical period of Kant, he followed Leibnitz-Wolf's philosophy (p. 205-206).

The second period of Kant's life is called the period of critique, which, according to (Copleston, 2008), cannot be precisely determined from its beginning, but symbolically, it begins by the year 1770 when he promoted to a university professor position. This is while the Critique of Pure Reason the symbol of his philosophy of critique, was published in 1781. However, all this 11-year period (between 1770 and 1781) is known as the part of his critique time (Ibid).

Kant's teaching ended in 1796, and it is interesting that, despite his critique of philosophy, he continued to use Wolf's texts for teaching. He taught physiography (natural geography) alongside philosophy. According to Kant, students of philosophy need to understand the position of experience in the formation and acquisition of knowledge in the human mind. He rejected knowledge without experience (p. 207).

After the year 1781, when he published his book *Critique of Pure Reason*, he published many books until 1797. In 1783, an *Introduction To Every Future Philosophy*; in 1785, *The Basis Of The Philosophy Of Morality* and *Groundwork Of The Metaphysics Of Morals*; in 1786, *The Early Metaphysical Foundations Of Natural Science*; in 1788, the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was published along

with the *Critique of Practical Reason*; in 1790 the *Critique Of Judgement*; In 1793, *the religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*; in 1795 *The Permanent Peace*; in 1797 he published the book of *Ethics Philosophy* (p 207-211).

With the publication of the book of *The Religion Within The Bounds Of Bare Reason*, government officials began to get involved with him. Although the first part of this book which was published in 1792, under the title "*the main evil in the human nature*", but the second part, titled "*The conflict of the good and evil*" was criticised by reviewers who believed that he had attacked Christian beliefs in this part. Of course, later this book was approved by the School of Theology of the University of Konigsberg and was published in 1794. In 1798, he wrote "*The Controversy Of The Powers Of Reason*", in which he sought to find a link between the Biblical materials and his philosophical critique. Kant passed away on February 13, 1804.

According to Copleston (2008), in the last few years, he was refreshing his philosophical expression and provided many notes and materials for a revised narrative of his philosophy. These notes were published in 1921 under the title "*Kant's post-mortem works*" with critical comments from Erik Adickes.

Our sources in the study of Kant's ethical theory, our sources are his two most important books, namely "*The Critique of Pure Reason*" and "*The Critique of Practical Reason*". Kant's ethical perspective, as well as his theory of autonomy, can be explained by reference to these two sources. We will report the content of these two books in the next section, when we are discussing the Kant's moral system.

3.2 The Kantian Ethical System

The importance of addressing this issue is due to its relationship to the theory of autonomy. Halstead (2007) believes that the fundamental problem of autonomy in Islam

is that Kant has provided a framework for morality that does not have any relationship with religion (p. 284). He believes there are many Quranic verses as evidence for such a connection including verses that put faith alongside the righteous deeds. Therefore, in the Muslim world, the concept of moral duty does not differ greatly from the concept of religious duty. The religious duty which is acknowledged through revelation explains the duties of human beings as well as the duties toward God (Ibid). Therefore, moral behaviour, instead of being expressed as statements, is formed in the form of divine commandments and rules. Regarding this point, when we compare Islamic morality with Kant's ethical views and other Western philosophers, we do not see similarities between the two. Kant and other Western philosophers have provided a framework for morality that does not have any necessary relationship with religion (p. 285). What is said has solidified the fact that the theory of autonomy should not be promoted in Islam and such a goal should not be taken into consideration by Islamic ethics and education (Ibid). Independence of the Kantian's ethical system from religion is radicalized in some other views. According to this extreme plan, Kant's ethical system is based on denial of religion and the supernatural affairs(see, e.g. DiCenso, 2007; Louden, 1986; Reeder, 1997; Ryan, 2014). The incompatibility of Kantian ethics with religion originates from the claim that Kant considers reason to be the source of ethics, not religion (Lockwood, 2014). Reliance on religion is against autonomy and self-governance (York, 2017). Also, some of Kant's statements have been taken as evidence for this claim. Note the phrase: "Ethical education should not be combined with religious education and worse than that is teaching morality as being subordinate and dependent on religion, on the contrary, the student must be faced with a pure moral teaching, that shows ethical principles derived from the efforts of reason itself"(I. Kant, 2007, p. 76).

Also, he says elsewhere: "The content of the Bible is considered as a valid revelation only when it is compatible with the rules that the authenticity of which is previously known based on mere rational reason." (Ibid, p. 53). He also says: "Ethics, in the sense that it is based on the concept of man as the agent which for the sake of his free will, obliges himself to the absolute laws by commandment of his wisdom and does not require another existence overhead in the sky to understand (know) his own duties, and do not need a motive other than the law itself, in order to fulfil his duty." (Ibid, p. 66).

In explaining the separation and independence of Kant's ethics from religion, the American philosopher Lewis White Beck mentioned three reasons. First, restricted ability of recognition in human beings for which man cannot understand more than worldly and material phenomena. Needless to say, the exclusion of God from the domain of theoretical reason. Second, the reliance of morality on God and religion is contradictory to autonomy. Third, according to Kant, moral statements are not regulated by the lawmaker and differences in understanding of God do not affect determining ethical duties(Beck, 1960).

In this view, the separation of ethics and moral education from religion is the cause of the opposition and incompatibility of Islamic moral education with Western education in general, and with the Kantian moral principles and its theory of autonomy in particular. According to this view, this separation is presented as the pivotal point in the theory of individual independence (autonomy). It is thereby inadmissible in Islamic education and ethics. If Kant's moral school and autonomy are based on the combat against religion, then any endeavour to reconcile autonomy with Islamic teachings will be in vain. This attempt is fruitful only when the Kantian moral school is not based on conflict with religion. Under this condition, we can talk about autonomy and its relationship to Islamic education.

Nevertheless, these researchers believe that autonomy is based on the view of denial of religion. Thus, speaking of the application of this theory to Islam is futile. We have to answer the critique in our discussion, which will focus on the analysis of the Islamic point of view of autonomy, and we have to prove that how autonomy is not based on putting religion aside.

This critique is not only against Kant's autonomy, but the entire Kantian moral system. It should also be acknowledged that in this critique, despite the conflict between the human's reason and religion, the first element of autonomy, namely the ability of reason, has not been the object of criticism and protest. In this critique, the ground for the emergence of the Kantian theory of autonomy has been criticised, and the critic's goal is to illustrate that Kant's autonomy has been formed in the context of the conflict with religion. Therefore, the significance of this critique should be taken into consideration twice. If Kant's moral system is based on the conflict with religion or the redundancy of religion, therefore speaking of reconciliation with Islam is futile. In my opinion, one of the slanders against Kant is the conflict of his ethical philosophy with religion and God. Unfortunately, Kant's difficult writings have been one of the causes of such an accusation. Those who have criticised as such, consider the views he has put forward in the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the basis of their perception. To clarify Kant's purpose, as well as the response to the critique of his moral theory, there is no other way than to retrieve the view from Kant's original text in order to prove the mistake of this perception.

We know that at the advent of Kant, thinkers were turning away from the metaphysical philosophy that explained the facts of the creatures and things through reason and rational arguments. It was during this period that two philosophical schools of thought emerged. First, the philosophical school of Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza

and Leibniz, who maintained the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition and considered rational proof to understand the realities and facts. They were called the companions of reason because they believed in correspondence of our perception with the external facts (Parigi, 2010). The other was the school of philosophers like Bacon; Hume and John Locke, who believed that by relying on our wisdom we only understand the accidents of the creatures whose correspondence with external facts is uncertain. In their opinion, the only way to understand the truths and facts is by experience and sense (Kail, 2008). This group was the companions of experience and scepticism because they were not sure of the correspondence of knowledge with the external existence (Ibid).

Kant chose a middle ground between these two philosophical schools. Kant believed that reason while being able to understand mathematical concepts, cannot understand philosophical concepts. He differentiated between mathematical and philosophical issues; that mathematical concepts are all products of reason, so they are understood by rational reasons, but the concepts that are explained in metaphysical philosophy are not products of reason and not even material ones. At the same time, Kant did not deny the concepts of the premier philosophy, such as God and the Hereafter and believed that these concepts, although not in the field of theoretical reason (the premier philosophy), are in the realm of practical reason and can be proved in this way. He proved God, the world of the Hereafter and the invitation to moral values through practical reason. What is known as Kant's philosophical and ethical view on religion and God is the result of a misunderstanding of the project that Kant pursued. Kant considered two axes: 1. Identifying a defined boundary for a reason and its ability; 2. Transmitting the concepts of God; the eternal; moral values; and so on, from the field of theoretical reason to practical reason. The second axis in Kant's thought is the result of the first axis.

The most fundamental idea of Kant's philosophy is "acquiring knowledge", which is specifically explained in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. To judge religion's conflict with Kantian ethics, the theory of "acquiring knowledge" must first be understood. Kant believes that the advent of science is based on "sense" and "understanding"(I. Kant, 2017). First, something must be realised in the mind. This realisation is dependent on a sense. We call this realisation "Experience" (that is, based on the sense)(Ibid). It should be noted that in Kant's opinion only accidental affairs of things come to mind, but their facts and originality do not. However, the advance of the accidental affairs of objects to mind is a process. Kant describes this process.

The material of the objects enters the mind and stimulates emotions, but only by the influence of the mind. These effects are scattered, and for the emergence of knowledge, they need to be connected in a system. This is where the mental idea forms this material in the moulds. The mental idea is already in the mind because, in Kant's system, our mind has some information that is prior to our experiences. Kant called this previous information "transcendental idealism". They are prior because they are before our experience, and rational because they are products of human intellect(Ibid).

According to Kant, prior knowledge that the wisdom has in itself are of two types. 1. Information that has been gained through experience, just as the wise knows beforehand that the wall frailty causes damage. 2. Information that is rational has not been obtained through experience, such as mathematical knowledge.

Nevertheless, the mental idea is among "transcendental ideals" that the mind has before itself, and the mind makes these mental ideas as the forms of material objects that have come to the mind through sense. For this reason, Kant believes that our perception does not conform to the external objects, but that external objects conform to

our mind and that our knowledge is in accordance with what our mind creates. That is, we do not know how they are because our minds have ideas (forms) to understand objects. It puts the objects into those ideas (forms), so human beings perceive things as they are in their minds, not how they are in reality. According to Kant, his Copernican Revolution occurs when the relationship between the object and our knowledge is reversed. That is, Kant considered the outside as dependent on the mind, not vice versa; it is the external outside that must be coordinated with our cognition (Ibid). He interpreted cognition as the combination of external substance and the mental form. He says: "Undoubtedly, our cognition begins with experience; otherwise, cognition cannot work, because in order to understand objectives that affect our senses, to create our own imagination and to act our intelligence, to compare and connect or separate those imaginations. So knowledge begins with experience" (p. 63). Moreover, the mind by giving it the form (mould) understands it. So, in terms of knowledge, it depends on sense and understanding. In understanding (granting the mental ideas), our mind unites the images and materials, then makes them into an integrated form, and this is how our reason decides and decrees things. The reason's command is that reason recognises that something is a component of a whole, for example, the substance is a subcategory of "Divisible" (Ibid).

Therefore, understanding means the power of judgement and attributing the predicate to the subject (i.e., the recognition of the relation of the predicate to the subject). The result of this part of Kant's thinking is that our knowledge is limited to tangible and empirical affairs because knowledge needs both mental idea and material. For knowledge, the effects of external objects are needed, which is considered to be the material. There is a need for material and mental ideas together, and it is not possible to have a container without content. So non-experiential affairs are not understandable.

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Therefore, non-experiential concepts are beyond the scope of our knowledge and understanding (Ibid).

In Kant's view, in terms of the nature of the concepts in question, there is a significant difference between divine sciences (theology), natural sciences and mathematics, which were the main branches of philosophy in the past. Kant believed there was prior intellectual information in the mind called transcendental ideals. Regarding this point, in mathematics, he believes that the concepts discussed in this science are transcendental ideals or prior rational concepts. Natural sciences, however, is mainly derived from the subsequent concepts (information that is based on experience and sense), but some of the principles of this science are transcendental concepts or prior rational concepts. However, the story of the first philosophy (premier and metaphysical philosophy) and divine science is completely different. Kant points to the difference in philosophical propositions with mathematical statements and states(Ibid).

Before Kant, the statements and propositions were divided into analytic and synthetic. In their opinion, if the predicate is implicitly contained within the subject, it is an analytic statement. The example of "oil is fatty" is an illustrative example of these types of statements, namely there is fat content inside the subject, i.e., oil. An important feature of analytic theorems is the independence from experimentation, they do not need to experiment and are provable by rational analysis. In contrast to the analytic cases, there are synthetic statements in which there is no predicate in the subject, and it is not verifiable by rational analysis but require testing and experimentation. "Earth has gravity" is a prominent example for such cases (Ibid).

Kant proposed a third type of statement he called "a priori synthetic judgement". This type is the middle ground between the statements above, which are not verifiable

pure empirical experiment and the predicate is not within the subject. These statements are called synthetic due to the need for testing and experimentation, as well as prior to the need for rational analysis. "Every phenomenon needs a cause" is an example of this kind of statements. This is not purely synthetic, since its predicate, namely requirement of causality cannot be verified by experiment because all the phenomena in the universe cannot be tested and checked in this field. However, it also is not purely analytic because the predicate (need for a cause) is not implicit within the subject. The correctness of this statement relies on the judgement of human wisdom. The mind derives such statements on the basis of the principles of pure understanding aimed at the pre-existing concepts in the human mind (Ibid). Mathematical theorems are examples of these type of statements such as the "direct line is the shortest distance between two things". The shortest distance is a "prior" concept as it is understood not from experience, but the reason understands it(Ibid).

So, we have two kinds of synthetic judgement (prior and subsequent). In the natural sciences, although the majority of the statements are subsequent, there are many prior principles, such as the principle of "cause and effect"(causality). The confidence in the natural sciences is caused by their judgements which are empirical, and the intellect adds only from (ideas) to gain knowledge(Ibid).

In the field of mathematics, the statements are rational, not experimental, but the confidence in mathematical judgements is due to the fact that those statements are made by reason (Ibid).

However, in the first philosophy (primary and metaphysical), subjects are not created by reason nor are they experimental. Therefore, neither the subsequent can be relied on nor the prior judgments and we have said that the analytical one does not give new information and is not the cause of knowledge.

Knowledge cannot be gained in the first philosophy, because what has been said about the advent of knowledge is only true of natural sciences and mathematics because their statements while being synthetic are based on the prior concepts. The first philosophy is not so because the subject is the essence of beings and the universe, while our knowledge is limited to the accidents of things, and we have no way of knowing things (Ibid).

This is where Kant proposes transcendental controversy and invalidates the argument that philosophers have made in order to prove the possibility of knowing God, the universe and the spirit. Kant's argument is that reason functions to recognise the cause through the effect. It realises that the cause is also affect and requires another cause. The chain continues for the sequence. Therefore, everything must return to a cause that is no longer the effect of another. Hence the reason achieves the three essences 1. Soul: for which reason is returning all that is happening within the mind, to the soul; 2. Universe: the reason is returning to it, everything happens outside of the mind; 3. God: reason is returning the soul and the universe to God. Kant called these three concepts Noman, in contrast to a phenomenon which refers to the essence of creatures and is not tangible and material (Ibid).

According to Kant's viewpoint, three knowledges are created to understand rational concepts (Normans) that are: psychology (theoretical and philosophical psychology, not empirical psychology), cosmology, and theology. The sum of these three branches forms the first philosophy (primary and metaphysical).

Philosophers believe that the power of reason can prove these three entities. Kant says that these cannot be proved and cannot be rebutted by the intellect and thought because the realm of theoretical reason is limited to accidents of things. Kant calls this

part of his philosophy transcendental polemic. He wants to say that the reasoning of philosophers is not an argument, but a controversy (Ibid).

In my opinion, the same explanation in *Critique of Pure Reason* is enough to know that Kant's view is not in conflict with God, religion, and the afterlife, as it has not rebutted the need for religion and God. He only denies the ability of the theoretical reason to understand unseen concepts like God and the Hereafter. God and metaphysical concepts are not identified by theoretical reason, according to Kant. He believes that cognition in the area of theoretical wisdom is the product of our faculties and intelligence. For this reason, it can be said that Kant's point is that the only means of theoretical understanding is sensory intuition, and within the limits of the understanding of theoretical wisdom, there is nothing beyond the senses. He believes that in order to understand these concepts, one has to rely on something other than theoretical reason.

However, what is the other approach that Kant suggests for knowing God and the Hereafter? He introduced it in his other book, *the Critique of Practical Reason*. He believes that anyone who takes careful consideration of his situation and the world around him will be faced with three questions: What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? (Immanuel Kant, 2016). According to Kant, the answer to the first question is given in the *Critique of Theoretical Reason*, and the answer to the second and third questions will be given in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. For the second question, we must also know that we have already answered this question from Kant's point of view when we try to define autonomy. He proposed his theory of autonomy to answer the second question, which, on the basis of that, practical reason instructs man to perform ethical tasks for the sake of duty. We saw that this command is absolute and unconditional. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, after the introduction of autonomy, Kant explains his opinion. According to him, the notion of conditionality is not that

human beings do not pursue their prosperity by doing their moral duties. On the contrary, the person acting on his duty can take his prosperity as an end. Because reason holds that anyone who acts in the law of ethics and has good will and behaves in duty, he can pursue his happiness; because he deserves such a blessing(Ibid).

It is clear that Kant sees happiness and prosperity in the essence of moral behaviour, not outside it. Hence, there are no contradictions with the second element of autonomy, which aims at the freedom of will from all external factors. He analyses the third question and believes that any hope depends on happiness. In his opinion, the result of this hope for the happiness guides us to knowing that there is something determining the eternal happiness (Ibid).

According to Kant, anyone who treats his moral duties deserves the absolute and eternal happiness. In the words of Kant happiness includes all spiritual and material pleasures and prosperity. In Kant's view, the human spirit is obliged to achieve absolute and eternal happiness, and it is clear that joy and happiness are not possible without virtue. Therefore, it is not possible to achieve absolute and eternal happiness in the material world; because in this world human beings are bound by nature, so it is not possible for him to achieve full and prosperous happiness, since he cannot coordinate the flow of the universe with virtue to achieve ultimate happiness. Therefore, in this world, happiness is not associated with virtue. After death, he is no longer bound by nature and can achieve absolute and eternal virtue. When absolute joy is gathered with absolute virtue, then the absolute happiness will be achieved (Ibid).

In other words, Kant views that the commitment made by the ethical law remains valid for the application of the special happiness of everyone, even if others do not comply with that law. It is unclear how the results of actions apply to happiness. The

essential connection between being happy with this effort that finds us worthy of happiness is not known by wisdom. It can be hoped when superior wisdom, coordinate the flow of the universe with virtue. The superior wisdom which simultaneously be constituted as the cause of nature. Kant calls it the most perfect moral will associated with eternal happiness and the cause of every happiness in the world and the "supreme good" (Ibid). Therefore, we must believe that the human soul remains after death in order to rectify the distinction and incompatibility between his reason and his nature and achieve perfection and absolute happiness in the process of reaching it. So, perfection-seeking is the reason for believing in the eternity of the soul. Achieving absolute perfection and happiness in conditions where the soul is bound by nature is not possible. According to Kant, this belief cannot be derived from arguments, but should be considered as an axiom.

The absolute and eternal perfection is the harmonisation of the moral law with the flow of the universe. This significant goal is not possible by one's person. There is no other way than to say that there is an existence who has absolute perfection and coordinate the flow of the universe with virtue and acting in accordance with his freedom and liberty and all are done according to his will. It is none other than the Almighty God.

The project of Kant in the realm of practical reason - like Copernicus - is the opposite of the other philosophers. The argument common among them was to prove the eternity of the human soul and moral duties through the proof of God, but contrary to them, he reaches God through morality and the eternity of the soul. Happiness is the state of a wise being in a world in which all things are done according to his will. So, there should be an inventory that is distinct from nature and ability to create harmony between nature and will and can fulfil happiness-based on virtue; that is God (Ibid).

Kant emphasises that the absolute command of reason that is the responsibility of a person for his moral duty is the command of God that comes to mind. I want to emphasise that Kant does not regard ethics from God, and does not fall into it through religion, but reaches God from morality and ethics. We conclude that Kant has devoted a significant function to religion, which is to strengthen the will of the good. The function is premised on a correlative relationship between happiness and obedience of the will to God. It ultimately becomes blissful, and this belief strengthens the good will (Ibid).

According to Barbour (2015), Kant believes in the beginning of religion from the moral obligation, not in metaphysical theoretical questions. That is, the practical moral issues make it possible to accept the existence of God as the underlying principle (p. 121). Ultimately, Kant leads his theory of autonomy and self-governance to God. Considering what we said, we conclude that Kant transmits the subject of God and religion from the field of theoretical wisdom to the field of practical reason. The result of this transition is not a denial of the need for religion, though it limits the domain of religion.

It is important to note that we do not intend to endorse Kant's idea about the ability of theoretical reason. It has been simply an emphasis on the fact that the theory about the inability of reason is an issue, and the claim of conflict or unnecessary religion that is attributed to Kant is a different matter. Kant does not conflict with revelation and the possibility of knowing these metaphysical creatures through revelation.

The result of what has been said is that, in spite of what researchers such as Hallstead have said, the Kantian ethical system does not cut its linkage to religion and ultimately

will end with it. The difference between Kant's method of proving metaphysical issues like God and the mortality of the human soul does not invalidate his moral system.

According to many Muslim scholars, it is unnecessary to use a particular method to know God. Differences in methods in knowing God is accepted by Islamic sources. The Quran says: وَ لِكُلٍّ وِجْهَةٌ هُوَ مُوَلِّيهَا (2: 148). Meaning: Everyone has his direction that he will take. *Al-Zamakhsharī* writes about this verse: "Every group has a pivot point in order to know Allah, they go for it, Muslim and others" (Al-Zamakhsharī, 1987 . Vol. 1, p. 205). And *Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al- Shīrāzī* who is one of the greatest Islamic philosophers writes: "The ways to God are many because it has virtues and many directions and every man has his direction to which he turns, but some of them are better and Brighter" (Ṣadr al-dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, 1981 . Vol. 6, p 12). *Ibn Kathīr* who is a famous scholar in the fourteenth century A.D. states: "What is meant by the *wejhah* وجهة is approach and way, and the meaning of the verse is that each nation has an approach and a particular way, because the religions are different according to the difference of time and people" (Ibn Kathīr, 1998. Vol.1, p 332).

The Quran also says: لِكُلٍّ جَعَلْنَا مِنْكُمْ شِرْعَةً وَ مِنْهَاجًا (5: 48). Meaning: For each group we have appointed laws and a road (5: 48). This verse is similar to the previous verse. If they mean that in the Kantian ethical system the source of the recognition and acknowledgement of moral values is our wisdom, and in religion is a revelation, this is another matter for discussion. So far, it has been argued that Kant's ethical autonomy is contradictory with religion and leads to the elimination of religion, which we have shown to be a false claim.

3.3   Our approach to the study of Kantian theory of Autonomy

The approach we chose in this research is moderate Islamic modernism. In this section, we explain what we mean by moderate Islamic modernism and why we chose this approach in the current study.

After colonialism and the domination of Western countries over the Islamic lands, which coincided with the weakness of the powerful Muslim states, especially the Ottoman Empire, an important question emerged for the thinkers, scholars and political activists that was: what is the solution to the weakness and degeneracy of Muslim countries?

There are two responses in this regard. The first was revivalism, which called for a return to the pure Islam of the immortal time of the Prophet. According to the scholars, this trend was based on the intellectual principles that were:

1. The necessity of the modelling of the Islamic community of the Prophet's time.

2. The necessity of clearing Islam from the heresies which were subsequently intertwined with this religion and should be addressed as the *bid'ah* بدعة.

3. The necessity of combating new interpretations and innovation of religion (Jung, 2016).

The Wahhabi movement, which is founded in Saudi Arabia and by Sheikh Mohammed Ibn *'Abd al-Wahhāb*, is one of the most prominent examples of this trend (Al-Rasheed, 2007). *Shiykh Ahmad Sir Hindī* (1564-1624) and *Shāh Walī Allāh Dihlavī* (1702-1762) can be regarded as the head of this intellectual movement in Asia (Lefèvre, 2012).

The second reaction is the Islamic modernist movement. Muslim modernists have redefined the Islamic civilisation and society in various fields of law, education, social affairs, and so on (Virani, 2011). The group's approach was the rational presentation of Islamic teachings in accordance with the wisdom and scientific achievements of mankind. Groups of Islamic modernists have tried to adapt the Islamic teachings to the values and achievements of Western civilisation. (Heyberger, 2010). Because of the importance of Islamic law in the life of Muslims, most of the efforts of Islamic modernists were focused on the modernisation of Islamic law. For this reason, less attention has been paid to areas such as education.

Islamic modernists can be categorised in different tendencies. The radical trend of Islamic modernist is considered to be Westernisation of Islamic Society. However, the main project of the Islamic modernists can be seen as reforming religious thought and Islamic teachings.

Among the Muslim modernists, there is a tendency to fill the gap between secular modernism and Islamic traditions and unite them. The beginning of this movement can be attributed to *Jamāl al-Din Asad Abādī*, an important and effective Iranian thinker. This trend recognises Western achievements in science and technology (Tareen, 2013). After *Jamāl al-Din Asad Abādī*, his movement was continued by his pupil *Sheikh Mohammed Abduh* and later by his disciples like *Rashīd Reḍā* and led to the emergence of new thinkers and intellectuals in the Arab world and the Middle East. The reconciliation between human achievements and Islamic resources is the main mission of this process. I believe it is suitable to introduce the main features of modernism instead of the repeated historical discussions surrounding these trends. Among traditionalist Muslims, there is a negative view of the Islamic modernist movement. In Islamic modernism is a trend in which there are different branches and thoughts, some

positive and some negative. Thinkers such as *Mohammed Abduh, Mahmud Shaltūt, Mohammad Al-Ghazali, Ibn 'Ashūr, Mohamed Said Ramadān Al-Boūti*, should be regarded along with people like *Nasr Abu Ziyd, Mohammed Arkūn, Mohammed 'Abid al-Jābri, Amīn al- Khūli, Ibrāhīm Fawzi*, and so on. Historically, Islamic modernism can be classified into categories, but the historical classification does not matter in our discussion. Also, the classification of Islamic modernists based on geographical areas and the grouping of modernists in Egypt, the Sub-continent, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran is not important. What matters is a classification based on intellectual orientation and theoretical approaches. Accordingly, Islamic modernist movements can be classified into the following groups:

1. Science-oriented (Opponents of philosophy and theology): In the group's opinion, the right method for rational attitude toward religion is by the knowledge of natural science and the use of sense and experience in understanding nature. The rational method emphasised by this category is the experimental tools for the discovery of natural science. For this reason, rationalism in this group refers to "Scientism". *Sayyid Qutb*, who is in the same group, says: "Reason is not created at all for the perception of the Unseen, because man does not need the knowledge of the unseen to perform his duties which he was created for, as the overlord on earth. It is meaningless that philosophers want to remove human reason from its nature and apply it outside the realm of its power (Qutb, 1991. Vol. 1, p. 106). He refers to the verses of the Quran and introduces the duty of reason to recognise the rules of nature, which conforms to the realm of natural and experimental sciences (Ibid). This tendency was specifically reflected in the interpretation of the Quran, and many interpretations were written based on this approach. The book *Al-Jawāhir* fi, tafsīr al Quran al Karīm, is one of the works

written by *Tantāwī bin Joharī*. They claimed that even theological and theoretical Islamic foundations are also verifiable by natural and experimental sciences.

2. Extreme modernists: this group is considered to be completely independent and do not accept any irrational source. They do not regard revelation independent of reason. They believe that it is the reason that determines its limits and that religion cannot determine the scope of wisdom. In this view, reason has absolute authority.

What makes this group extreme? Does their similarity to the modern Western rationality lead to this? Alternatively, do they accept the free and independent reason? These questions are determinative. In my opinion, the answer to both is negative. That is, neither the resemblance to the modern Western rationality nor the acceptance of the free and independent reason make it a radical one. What makes them radical and extreme in the case of the reason is their approach to the religious statements and their method of interpretation toward propositions. They bring originality to modernism and believe that Islam and Islamic teachings must conform to modernity and its elements and symbols, and they do not know any boundaries in this implementation.

What distinguishes this group is the method of studying religious propositions. That is, they do not believe in the traditional method of Islamic studies. Muslim scholars have used since the early ages of Islam for religious research an accepted method of dealing with the verses of the Quran and traditions. Interpreting in the context of Arabic words, science and its grammar; paying attention to the traditions of the Prophet and his companions and followers; considering the rules that they have stated in the science of *uṣūl al fiqh* as the method for the extraction from the texts and the methods and principles of jurisprudence, are the most important indicators of this method in dealing with the Quran. As well as in the approach to the narratives and traditions; considering issues related to the chain of narrators اسناد الروايات, keeping the rules of the *'ilm al rjāl*

علم الرجال and *ilm al-Hadith* علم الحديث, the rules for understanding the texts of narratives are also among their method's indices in the case of traditions. In order to be able to observe these rules, it is necessary to learn a set of knowledge. For example, Arabic grammar الصرف و النحو, the sciences relating to eloquence and rhetoric علوم المعانى و البيان و البديع, science of the Arabic linguistics; and finally jurisprudence *fiqh*.

This is despite the fact that, the extremist modernists group does not consider the traditional method of inference that has been accepted by Muslim scholars. They only use modern methods for their research, such as structuralism, hermeneutics, genealogy, and semiotics. Extremist Islamic modernists do not use these methods as complementary to the traditional method, but completely ignore the traditional method and thereby neglect the use of sciences and knowledge related to the inference from religious sources.

3. Moderate modernists: The moderate modernist refers to those who are the same as other modernists in their goal and aim (adapting the Islamic teachings to modernity), but they believe that when studying the elements and symbols of modernity, the Islamic teachings are the origins, and the only acceptable symbols and elements are the ones that agree with the study of Islamic resources using a traditional method. By traditional method, we mean the method known by former scholars that are utilised for inference from the holy sources such as the Quran and Hadith. If I specifically want to make a definition in this regard, I must say that; the application of the rules and laws that have been raised in Islamic sciences in relation to the deduction of the Qur'an and hadith. Methodically, they use the traditional method and the hermeneutic or other new modern methods only in a limited part and after the traditional method as complimentary, not alongside it. Moderate modernism is based on a fundamental principle, namely the existence of sufficient capacity in Islamic resources to adapt to modernity and

contemporary human needs. Therefore, they do not neglect the traditions. They accept the function of reason in the scope of *ijtihād* اجتهاد and the inference and maintaining the credibility of religious epistemic resources, including the Quran and Hadith.

Contrary to extreme modernism, the source of the Hadith and tradition is not excluded under the pretext that the hadiths are interim sources and have a historic role. Also, the text of the Qur'ān is not interpreted by hermeneutical interpretations. In moderate Islamic modernism, reason is not used against Naql النقل (revelation). As a result, the use of reason is for the understanding of Naql. Reasoning and thinking in this regard are indeed a religious action. Moderate Islamic modernism is a religious intellectuality with a genuine Islamist orientation and is based on the accepted method among Muslim scholars.

The most important features of the moderate Islamic modernism regarding a method that distinguishes it can be summarised in the following elements:

1. Belief in the necessity of the specialisation in case of inference and extracting from the Islamic sources. This specialisation is obtained through the acquisition of relevant sciences, such as Arabic literature (includes grammar, eloquence, rhetoric, linguistic), logic, the method of study of Sharia (*uṣūl al fiqh*) jurisprudence,, interpretation Quran Sciences(include *Tafsīr* and others), the Hadith sciences (like *'ilm al rjāl*, *fiqh al-Hadith* and others).

2 - Belief in the need for a rational view of the Islamic propositions: This group believes that there is no conflict between these statements and reason. In some cases where such a contradiction appears, it should be re-examined, and if the attribution of those statements to the Islamic sources cannot be denied, it should have been interpreted in accordance with reason and rationality;

3. Believing in the necessity of respecting the scientific achievements of humanity: Moderate Islamic modernism believes that humankind is reliant on the new science and knowledge that have gained many achievements both in the humanities and in the fields of natural sciences. Some of them are imperative and based on certain scientific and rational results. These attainments should be taken into account during the interpretation of the Quran and Hadith and have to be considered when approaching the religious sources. The purpose of this consideration is that Islamic teachings cannot be presented in such a way as to conflict with these achievements;

4. Belief in the necessity of using the traditional method of inferring Islamic teachings: The traditional method refers to a special method that is: (a). Applying and observing the rules that relate to the Islamic sciences (as mentioned above). (b). Acceptance of the authority of the Quran and tradition and not to leave the structure of these two sources (contrary to the extreme modernists, who relinquish a large part of the hadiths because they are not consistent with reason in their opinion; or consider them as a temporary and specific ruling of the time of the Prophet).

Moderate Islamic modernism emphasises the holiness of the Quran and Sunnah, and if we have to put certain traditions aside (in order to gain the compatibility with modernity), specific steps will be taken including the study of the chain of narrators. Also, in order to understand some traditions at the time of the Prophet, they argue based on evidence from Islamic sources like the Quran and Hadith. If the attribution of the narrative is proven, they will be interpreted and not abandoned. The hermeneutical method can only be used in this section. This is where we have said that hermeneutics is used in the shell of the traditional approach and not along with it;

5. *Ijtihād* for an understanding of the predecessor texts: Moderate Islamic modernism does not limit itself to the understandings of the past scholars and refrains from blind imitation. At the same time, he respects these texts and, tries to interpret and justify the words of the past in a manner consistent with the modern perceptions as much as possible. Therefore, one of the features of the moderate Islamic modernist approach is to consider texts written by former scholars.

Hence, Moderate Modernist attempts to establish new theories based on the ideas and viewpoints of Muslim scholars in the past. As we present in the current study. We will prove the theory of autonomy based on *al-ʾAshʿarīyyah* view about rational good and evil. A moderate modernist is not disconnected from his past.

Finally, one can say that, the moderate Islamic modernist views that there are institutions and capacities in Islamic sources that, by activating these institutions and capacities, there are many problems that can be solved by adapting Islam and modernity. Considering these institutions and capacities, there is no need to use methods such as hermeneutics.

CHAPTER 4: KANT'S THEORY OF AUTONOMY FROM AN ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of the current research is to explain how the Kantian theory of autonomy can be accepted in Islamic moral education. To do this, we must answer the following questions:

1. What is Islam's view on the Kantian theory of autonomy, is it possible to accept this theory from the Islamic point of view?

2. What will be the theoretical consequences of this theory in the objectives of Islamic moral education?

3. What will be the theoretical effects of acceptance of autonomy in the methods of Islamic moral education?

In the fourth chapter, we answer the first question, and in the fifth and sixth chapters will be answered the second and third questions respectively.

We have already said that autonomy has two main pillars: 1. Legislation of reason; 2. The freedom of the will from the external motives. Chapter 4 is divided into two main sections. The first section describes, argues and proves the first element of the theory, and the second part examines the second element of autonomy, namely, freedom of the will.

4.1 Study of legislation of reason from Islamic perspective

In the context of the legislation of reason and the necessity of following it, the main problems that many scholars have raised as a major obstacle for the acceptance of autonomy are that the principle contradicts the authority of the Quran and the Sunnah in Islamic ethics.

4.1.1 Explanation of the critique

According to Elegido (1996), ethics is a mission to live well and is understanding of the method for realising this goal (living well). Therefore, it is considered to be entirely based on a theoretical perspective. Since detecting what is good depends on the theoretical view, for scholars like Elegido, moral values cannot be understood without theoretical foundations and views. The consequence is that the theory of autonomy will be rejected as long as the theory does not recognise theoretical foundations in moral values.

According to *Al-Qaradāwī* (1985), Muslims have extracted their moral behaviour from the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. In his view, Islamic ethics is based on the theory of divine command, so the good and bad are determined by religion, something is good because of God's command and something is bad because of forbidden by him (Westlund, 2009).

Rachels believes that Islam ethics is understandable only in the realm of religion. In other words, there is no meaning of morality outside of religion (Rachels & Rachels, 1993). Others considered deontology unacceptable in Islam because the only Lawmaker for the overall Islamic system is God (Achrati., 2006).

The authority of the Quran and the traditions refers to the position of theoretical bases and their interference in the determination of moral values. It contradicts the theory of autonomy, which does not regard the theoretical bases. At the same time, the authority of the Quran and Sunnah also points to the legislation of God of moral values. They consider this issue as being contradictory with autonomy because in the theory of autonomy the lawmaker is our reason (Fraenkel, 2010).

Fraenkel (2010) states that according to the majority of scholars, despite the differences in the interpretation of autonomy, Islam will not be compatible with the theory and its interpretations at any level (Ibid). The reason in his point of view is that in autonomy, God is not the legislator, but we are the ones who regulate it. This is also the point that has been repeated in the words of (Halstead (2007)) when he said: "Islamic ethics does not rely on experience and human intellect" (p. 12). Moad (2007) believes that Islamic ethics consists of three components that are an obligation; virtue; and value; in accordance with the three principles of Iman, Faith and Ihsan (p. 136).

According to Thibert (2012) in Islam, the concept of the good life is met by submission to the concept of will of God, and the goal of Islamic education is to reach the submission to divine will. While in the theory of autonomy, everyone must seek out the good life within them. In Islamic education, based on its goal, we must seek and obtain the good life from the Islamic traditions, namely the Qur'an, and the prophet's traditions. In the autonomy, a lifestyle which is not accordant with the autonomy, is not confirmed as the ideal model. The good life is the result of the critical point of view and the autonomous choice among multiple options (p. 68). Among Muslim schools, regardless of differences in identifying the basics of the religion, lifestyles need to be according to the Quran and Sunnah. However, Thibert's view can point to the difference in the reference point of moral values in Islam and autonomy, and refer to the stability and variability of moral values in Islam, which is another issue and beyond the scope of the current research.

The authority of the Quran and Sunnah in Islamic ethics and its contradictions with the infrastructure of autonomy is also expressed differently. The Islamic moral system is known to be related to a special legal system called the *Sharīah*. The law determines moral boundaries. The basis of Islamic ethics in the system of the *Sharīah* contributes to

the incompatibility of this theory with Islamic teachings. Carney (1983) believes that the presupposition of a discussion about the ethical system of each religion should be based on the existence of such a special system. Strauss (1997) claims that the legality and the connection to the *Sharīah* distinguish not only the ethical system of Islam but Judaism as well. In these religions, while relying on reason is accepted, the origin of the Judaic reason is the fear of God that leads a person to obey him. In these religions, the subjection to God is the central point. While not only in the theory of autonomy, but in the Athenian ethics also, this is the reason that directs the rationality of mankind.

According to Schneewind (1999), Islamic morality is based on "obedience", and the core of the autonomy is self-reliance. When the issue is obedience, we owe to the Lord and therefore, without knowing the cause and the reason for what we do as ethics, we carry them out as our duties and assignments from God, the promise of the reward of paradise and the threat of punishment of hell is the guarantor of the implementation of these duties (Ibid).

Halstead (2007) points to the importance of the term "right" الحق in Islamic ethics. Islamic ethics mean the fulfilment of the duties that are expressed in the *Sharīah*, and every task requires a right for the beneficiary, and when we speak of God's right حق الله and people's right حق الناس, we shall mean the same meaning. On the basis of this, he believes in the meaningless of autonomy in Islam. In his opinion, this theory ignores the authority of God and his position in the field of ethics. On the other side, this theory separates a person from the community of believers. In Islam, moral education is not a personal issue. Society has a duty to strengthen and protect ethical values and religious duties. Therefore, teaching ethics is a moral duty(Ibid). He also considers the understanding of the reason of duties as being unimportant in the moral education of Islam.

The differences between the source of Islamic ethics and autonomy have also been expressed by these scholars the educational essence of the Islamic moral education that is an obstacle to acceptance of autonomy. Some of them mentioned this as autonomy's barriers to Islamic moral education. Halstead (2007) considers one of the two important conditions for realising moral education in Islam, namely teaching the youth what to do and what they should not do. Thibert (2012) explicates the nature of the Islamic educational system which is based on teaching a particular and determined method and values. According to parents, children and adolescents should follow the direct way which is Islam. While autonomy insists on critical thinking toward all beliefs and thoughts. Based on the interpretation the planners in Islamic education must disagree with autonomy since based on the theory, children who are trained in the autonomic system can reject all beliefs. The educational essence of Islamic moral education is the same with that of the authority of the Quran and the Sunnah.

Another term used to express the obstacle of the authority of the Quran and the Sunnah in Islamic moral education is the stability of ethics in Islam that prevents the acceptance of autonomy. However, this criticism refers to the authority of the Quran and the tradition in the Islamic moral education, but it shows another aspect of this issue. This claim was strictly made by Halstead (2007), that is Islamic ethics derives from its original sources, namely the Quran and Sunnah. The moral values and content of ethical science which is referred to in Islam as the " 'ilm al-akhlāq " علم الاخلاق or "ilm Al Adab " علم الادب, has a fixed and constant essence that neither time nor spaces affect it. In this situation, the differences are more in structure, approaches and methods (p. 290). We will see in the future that such criticism originates from a misunderstanding of the position of reason in Islamic thought and tradition.

4.1.2 The responses to this critique

The efforts of Muslim scholars to respond to this critique follow two general approaches. In our discussion, we show that both methods are feeble and cannot resolve the problem.

4.1.2.1 The first method: showing the position of reason in Islam

Some scholars have sought to prove the first element of the autonomy by presenting a series of verses and traditions that emphasise the high position of the human reason, such as verses that invite people to reasoning and thinking, for example the Qur'an says: كذلك يُبَيِّنُ اللَّهُ لَكُمْ آياتِهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تَعْقِلُونَ (2:242). Meaning: Thus, does God make clear His signs in order that you may think or: إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّماواتِ وَ الأَرْضِ وَ اخْتِلافِ اللَّيْلِ وَ النَّهارِ لآياتٍ لِأُولِي الأَلْبابِ (3:190). Meaning: In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the difference between night and day, there are Signs of God Power for the wisdoms. Or verses that condemn people for not using reason; such as اِنَّ شَرَّ الدَّوابِّ عِنْدَ اللهِ الصُّمُّ الْبُكُمُ الَّذِينَ لا يَعْقِلُونَ (8:22). Meaning: The worst of wicked beasts in the Sight of Allah are those who are deaf and dumb from hearing and telling the truth [and do not use their reason;

Among the scholars who seek to defend autonomy with this method are Davids and Waghid (2016). Their work titled *The Quran and Individual Autonomy.* has dealt with the theory of autonomy with this approach. It is also possible to mention Ramadan (2009), as already discussed in the book *Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation* and Moustafa (1990).

There is no doubt that a large number of verses and narratives have pointed to the high position of reason, but can the first element of autonomy be deduced from these verses and traditions? Many interpreters of the verses and traditions have described them as invitations to thinking and reasoning in the context of divine revelation and the

instructions of the Prophets. They believe that, with the instrument of reason, one can understand the meaning of the divine message. The mission of human reason is this understanding, nothing else. In this interpretation, human reason is not a law-governor and ruler, but an instrument for understanding the revelations and the commands of God.

Those who consider the authority of the Quran and Sunnah as opposed to autonomy, have accepted this interpretation of the verses and traditions, but believe that the issue of rationalism which is raised in these texts is different from the issue of legislation of reason that is the first element of autonomy.

4.1.2.2 The second method: relying on the *al-mu'tazilah* view

Other defenders of autonomy rely on the view of the *al-mu'tazilah* on the theory of rational good and evil. Among Muslim scholars, there has been a long discussion of rational good and evil. The summary of this theory is based on believing that some things and some deeds have a good nature or a bad nature, and human reason is able to understand them without being sought out from the outside, whether or not religion has ruled or denied it, such as the goodness of justice and the badness of injustice (Al-Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 2, p. 282). Accepting the rationality of good and evil will open the way for the acceptance of the theory of autonomy. The first element of autonomy is the ability of human reason to understand moral values and to make rules in this regard. If we accept the theory of good and evil, then we have accepted the ability of human reason to reach this understanding without the help of religion.

According to historical reports, in regard to the subject of rational good and evil, Muslim scholars have been divided into two categories. The first group, which is the majority of Muslims, is *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* who are the followers of Imam *Abū al-Ḥasan*

Alī Ibn Ismā'īl Ibn Isḥāq al-Ash'arī. There is a well-known statement on which the *al-Ash'ariyyah* deny rational good and evil. The second group is the *al-mu'tazilah* and other intellectual schools such as the *Shi'a* and *Maturīdī.*

The group *al-mu'tazilah* was a group founded at the beginning of the second century (AH) and followed *Wāṣil Ibn 'Atā* and his followers. Famous scholars emerged in this group like *Muḥammad Ibn al-Huḍail, Abu-'l-Huḍail al-'Allāf; Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm Ibn Sayyār Ibn Hāni' an-Naẓẓām, Abu 'Ali Muhammad al-Jubbāī; Abu Hashim al-Jubbāī, 'Abd al-Jabbar Ibn Ahmad Ibn 'Abd al-Jabbar ai-HamaJani al-Asadābādi,* and so forth. The group *al-mu'tazilah* and the schools that share its ideas accepted the theory of rational good and evil. Based on the historical report on *al-'Ash'ariyyah* and *al-mu'tazilah,* we will not be able to prove the compatibility of autonomy with the *al-'Ash'ariyyah;* then we can adapt the theory of autonomy to the *al-mu'tazilah* view.

Some scholars have based their discussion on historical reports. They have explicitly stated that the acceptance of autonomy from the Islamic perspective is possible based only on the *al-mu'tazilah* view. Among the most prominent works in this field and by using this method include *Rationality and autonomy from the Enlightenment and Islamic perspectives* written by Charlene Tan. He has made great efforts to prove the theory of autonomy based on *al-mu'tazilah* doctrine(Tan., 2014). He bases the comparison of the view of Islam with the Enlightenment on autonomy, with a specific view of the *al-mu'tazilah.* Fraenkel (2010) compares the viewpoint of Islam with the Jews on the theory of autonomy. In his *Theocracy and Autonomy in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy,* he made this adjustment from the side of Islam based on the *al-mu'tazilah* view. Rasch (2009) in his *Enlightenment as Religion* has been using this method. Eickelman (2000) also discussed autonomy based on this doctrine in his *Islam and the Languages of Modernity.* Sahin (2013) discussed the same approach.

Anyway, defending autonomy based on the *al-mu'tazilah* view is a common approach, but the inadequacy of that is clear. The *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* and the group *al-mu'tazilah* have set forth many reasons to prove their point of view. Discussing the differences between these two theology schools, as well as their reasons, needs an independent study that is beyond the scope of this research. So, we do not want to judge these two doctrines. However, it should be borne in mind that autonomy's proof based on the *al-mu'tazilah* view is not a step forward. This step has already been done. Methodologically, this kind of study also has a problem, namely that the *al-mu'tazilah* are a minority among Muslims and we cannot claim to accept a theory from an Islamic point of view when it is based on a minority's doctrine. It is important to prove the theory of autonomy based on the viewpoint of the *al-'Ašʿarīyyah*. Since the previous scholars have proven it only based on the *al-mu'tazilah*, we will prove it based on *al-'Ašʿarīyyah*. By this action, we show the possibility of acceptance of autonomy based on all Islamic theological schools not only on the basis of the *al-mu'tazilah*. Considering this point, this part of the current study is of great importance and brings a point that has never been raised before. Also, the theory will be proved in accordance with the viewpoints of the majority of Muslims.

4.1.3 Our response to this critique

As we have said, our approach is based on the *Ašʿarī* theology. The central point of this approach is to prove that this theological school accepts rational good and evil in the scope that is necessary for the defense of autonomy. We will see that in order to defend the autonomy, we need to accept the theory of rational good and evil in a certain area. For this reason, this section focuses on the *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* point of view in this regard.

4.1.3.1 The historical overview

This is one of the most challenging and historic debates that have been raised among Muslims from the distant past. *Imām Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī Ibn Ismāʿīl Ibn Isḥāq al-Ashʿarī* has called the issue *Al Taʾdīl wa Al Tajwīr* التعديل و التجوير (Al-Ashʿarī, n,d., p. 114). There are many other sources which have discussed the topic with the same title (Al-Juwaynī, 1996, p. 107; Siyf al-dīn Al-āmidī, 2001. Vol. 2, p. 115). *al-muʿtazilah* sources have raised the issue under the same title (al-mu'tazlī, 2011. Vol. 6, p.3) and in *Al-husn wa al-qubh al-ʿaqliyyān* الحسن و القبح العقليان (Al-Māturīdī, 2006, p. 165). Perhaps the historical origins of this discussion may be linked to the second century AH. The evidence is that Shahrastānī (1992), when he quotes the Murji'ah (مرجئة) views on faith, says: "*Al-Thuʿbāni* considered faith to be a recognition of the submission to the Lord, the Prophets, and what the reason command it as obligatory" (Vol. 1, p. 243). From this quote, we find that, during this period, the issue of the rational good and evil was well proposed. The theory of rational good and evil is regarded among the most important beliefs. Shahrastānī (1992) writes to explain this theory:

All Muʿtazilites agreed that the knowing of Allah, and thanks for blessing is our duty, and required and there is no need for evidence from the Quran or narratives. The good and the evil must know by the human reason. And embrace the good, and avoid the bad is our duty as well (Vol. 1, p. 58).

By propounding the theory of rational good and evil by the *al-muʿtazilah* , the school of *Ahl al-Hadīth* اهل الحديث contradicted this theory (p. 235). These objections developed and expanded from *Imam Al-Ashʿarī* onward. The advent of *Imam Al-Ashʿarī* and his serious objections to the theory of rational good and evil made this issue one of the most crucial chapters of Islamic theology (Khaldūn, 1988. Vol. 1, p. 464).

The acceptance or rebutting of this theory will play a decisive role in the study of the Kantian theory of autonomy. As we have seen, the main element in the theory of autonomy is the ability of reason to understand moral values. The existence of independent values as well as the ability of reason to understand these values is the centre of their idea. Therefore, we should discuss this topic extensively. Due to the importance of this discussion and the necessity of referring to the main and original sources of supporters and opponents of the theory (rational good and evil), we will refer to classic books.

4.1.3.2 The meaning of good and evil

Good and evil are not used in one sense, but has three meanings. First, it may be called good and bad and intended to perfection الكمال and deficiency النقص. For example, knowledge is good (perfection), and ignorance is bad (deficiency). There are a lot of human behaviour that are considered good or bad in this sense, such as courage, generosity, patience, justice, equity and so on, are good as a virtue and perfections of the human soul and strength its personality. Their antitheses are evil because they decrease in human beings and weaken its soul (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 282).

Second: The other meaning of good and evil is suitability الملائمة and disharmony المنافرة for the human soul (Ibid). Good and evil in this sense describe acts, objects and things. For example, when we say: "This perspective is beautiful", or "the sound of the nightingale is beautiful", we consider good as the description of the subjects of acts. When we say: "sacrifice is good and lie is bad", we attribute good and bad to action. In this case, we regard something good, because they are in accordance with the soul and the nature of man, and we consider something bad, since they are disproportionate to the spirit and nature of mankind. Some Muslim scholars have described this meaning of

good and evil as interest المصلحة and damage المفسدة. For example, A. i. M. Al-Jurjānī (1998) says:

Those two – i.e. good and evil –sometimes expressed as interest المصلحة and damage المفسدة. They say 'good حَسَن is something has an interest, and the evil is something has damage, that does not include any of these, is not regarded as one good and evil" (Vol. 8, p. 192).

Third: The last meaning good and evil is praise المدح and blame الذَم. In this sense, these two words describe optional acts only. According to this sense, good means: the agent is deserving of praise and reward, and evil vice versa is deserving to blame and punishment. In other words, good is what, should be done, and evil should be left (Al-Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 282). Muslim scholars call this kind of rational perception "The command of reason". This term is equivalent of what's considered by Immanuel Kant as the "law of reason".

We must know that the first and the second meanings of the rational good and evil (perfection and defect - suitability and disharmony) are the authority of reason for recognition of these two concepts. Therefore, it is not flexible by the customs or the wills and tastes of individuals. If anything, according to reason, is recognised as a perfect, it will be so for everyone in every place forever, and if something is recognised as a defect, it will be likewise considered a defect for all. For suitability and disharmony, some Shia(Shī'ah) scholars were wrong when they said: "Customs and tastes are decisive and effective in the second meanings of good and evil" (Al-Muẓaffar, 2009. Vol. 2, p. 276). Perfection, defect, suitability and disharmony all based on the identification of reason, and the acceptance of the common reason is the same for everyone everywhere. This also applies to the third meaning of good and evil (praise and blame). So, there is no difference between the three meanings of good and bad in this regard.

4.1.3.3 The issue of these three meanings

Ash'arī theology does not seem to have a conflict of rational good and evil in the first and second meanings. This is a decisive point. It shows that we do not need to follow the *al-mu'tazilah* for the admission of autonomy. The rationality of good and evil in term of the first two meanings is self-evident and axiomatic, which is confirmed by realities and facts. Hence Ash'arism does not disagree with it. Some *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* explicitly state rational good and evil in these two meanings. *Al-Jurjānī* says:

> All the wise people are committed to being abused in injustice, harmful lying, the trinity, and unjust killing the Prophets. They also affirm that justice, useful veracity, faith and infallibility of the Prophets are good. And not that the assertion of the evil or the good based on the *Sharīah*, as the non-believer and those who do not know religion at all believe in that, such as Brahmanism. It also is not based on custom, since the custom differs with the nation, according to their differences, but all people are the same in it. All the wise people are committed to good and evil in this sense(suitability and disharmony). There is no dispute between us, since we accept that they are rational (A. i. M. Al-Jurjānī, 1998. Vol. 8, p. 192).

And *Al Taftāzānī* the Great scholar stated:

> It is known that in our opinion the good and evil are based on *Sharīah*, and in the *al-mu'tazilah* is rational. There is not a disagreement between us in good and evil in terms of perfection and defect, such as knowledge and ignorance. As there is not disagreement with them in the sense of suitability and disharmony, such as justice and injustice, and in generally speaking, we can say, anything that deserves- according to reason and habits- praise مدح or blame الذّم, will be understandable by reason, whether there is the declaration from the religion or not. (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 282).

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī believes that good and evil in the first two meanings is recognisable by reason, and there is no need for the command and expression of religion. He says:

> There is no conflict between us that, we know by our reasons, some things as suitable for our soul, and some of them in contrary to it. Since the pleasure and what leads to it is suitable, and the pain (suffering) and what leads to it is contradistinction to our nature. And there is no need to know this suitability and disharmony from the *Sharīah*. And also we know with our reasons that, knowledge is perfection, and ignorance is a defect (Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, 1986. Vol. 1, p 346).

The result of the discussion is that, among the three meanings of rational good and evil, *al-ʾAšhʿarīyyah* is the same with the *al-muʿtazilah* in the first two meanings. They believes in the rationality of good and evil. But the third meaning is where *al-ʾAšhʿarīyyah* and *al-muʿtazilah* theology differ.

4.1.3.4 *Ashʿarī* theology accepts the ability of reason to understand moral values

The first meaning of good and evil is perfection and defect. Perfection and defect have general meanings that include different domains and examples. In the field of moral and ethical behaviour, perfection is equivalent to virtue and value, as well as the defect is equivalent to vice and immoral behaviour. Therefore, if we believe in the ability of the reason to understand perfection and defect, we will consider it capable of understanding moral values and vices. The Muslim scholars have explicitly stated that moral values are examples of the first meaning of good, and vices are considered to be examples of the first meaning of evil (see,e.g.Hazm, 1996.Vol. 3, p. 261).

In the same way, the second meaning of good and evil, namely suitability and disharmony. As we have seen, the meaning of suitability is compatibility with the human soul, and the meaning of disharmony is an incompatibility with it. The Muslim scholars have interpreted this second meaning of good and evil as *Al-Maṣlihah* المصلحة and *Al-Mafsidah* المفسدة. For example, *Al-Qushjī* said: "Sometimes good and evil is also termed as interest المصلحة and damage المفسدة, and they say that, good is something preferable, and evil is something which damages" (Al- Qushji, n,d., p. 157).

However, it is not necessary to emphasise evidence from these scholars, because by paying attention to perfection and defect, as well as suitability and disharmony, it can be clearly seen that, these titles have in each case the suitable examples fitting themselves, and in the ethical terms, the moral values are the examples of perfection and suitability as the vices the examples of defect and disharmony.

4.1.3.5 *Ash'arī* theology accepts the legislation of reason

According to Ash'arism, in the first two meanings of good and evil, theoretical reason recognises good and evil. We know that the result of theoretical reason is related to "is" and for the practical reason, the result is "ought". The authority of theoretical reason in the first meaning is very obvious because the perfection and defect are considered to be two facts that exist outside the space of the mind. So, they are related to "is". Also, in the second meaning, the rational recognition is based on the existence of something outside the space of the mind that is compatible or incompatible with the soul. So, the subject relates to "is". In these two meanings, the reason does not command anything, but only recognises something. Therefore, we consider the field of theoretical reason in connection to "is".

On the other hand, the theory of autonomy refers to practical reason. The first element of the Kantian theory is the ability of reason to recognise moral values. Based on this pillar, he believes in the possibility of self-governance. If we deny this ability, there will be no room left for legislating by reason, and then the theory of autonomy will be eliminated. Kant speaks about the obedience to self-rules. He means that human reason has commanded ethical action. There is no doubt that this law is in the realm of practical reason because there is the talk of obedience. So there are three points: 1. Conceiving the reason of goods and evil is only in its first two meanings, namely, perfection-defect and suitability-disharmony; 2. These two are the field of theoretical reason; 3. Kant speaks of practical reason.

Based on these three points, it may be interpreted that *Ash'arī* theology cannot accept Kant's theory of autonomy. We will see later that such an outcome is incorrect, because according to Ash'arism, after understanding good and bad in the two preceding meanings that are carried out by theoretical reason, practical reason will command

actions accordingly to the perception of theoretical reason, since the practical reason that orders to do or leave acts, and does not order the unreasonable. The practical reason orders to do or leave in three cases. 1. When it finds that something is perfect or a defect; here the practical reason comes to judge the good or evil and command doing or leaving (Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, 1986. Vol. 1, P. 351-354).

2. In a position that finds something suitable or inappropriate for the human soul, either for individual or for the benefit of the public (Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, 1990. Vol. 1, p. 104).

3. When a human trait and its implications are taken into consideration by practical reason. For example, courage or benefaction الخير makes the practical reason to command doing the acts according to these traits and to abandon what is incompatible with courage and benefaction. Muslim logicians have called these types of statements as *al khulgīyāt* الخلقيات that is the human trait is the cause of the practical reason's order (Al-Muẓaffar, 2009.Vol. 2, p. 281). The cases in which the practical reason has the command to perform or abandon are only these three. In the first and second cases, the practical reason follows a diagnosis of theoretical reason. The recognition of the theoretical reason in the first case is on perfection or defect. In the second case, it is based on suitability and disharmony. These are the two cases that in which *Ash'arī* theology accepted the ability of theoretical reason. In these two cases, there is a practical command, and *Ash'arī* theology does not deny the command of practical reason in these two cases.

The opponents of Ash'arism like the Shi'a(*Shī'ah*) and the *al-mu'tazilah* have reported that the *Ash'arī* theology accepts the perception of theoretical reason on the first two meanings of good and evil (perfection and defect, and suitability and

disharmony), but do not accept the command of practical reason for doing or refusing. It seems that what is attributed to Ash'arī theology is not correct and does not fit with their point of view. The Ash'arī theology has accepted the understanding of theoretical reason and rational good and evil in the first two cases, and also has accepted the command of the practical reason after the theoretical reason's perception.

The first element of Kant's autonomy (legislation by reason on the moral values) does not differ from what Ash'arism has accepted. So, the first element of autonomy based on their opinion can be verified, as this element of the theory is provable based on the al-mu'tazilah. When we achieve this result, we will then come across the question: what is the difference between the al-'Ash'ariyyah and al-mu'tazilah in the context of the rational good and evil? Alternatively, you can say what does Ash'arī theology deny in this regard? Does their denial have an effect on the acceptance of autonomy?

The al-'Ash'ariyyah rest on three axes in the discussion of rational good and evil. All their opinions and reasons pivot on these three axes.

1. Denial of good and evil rationality in the field of divine acts and religious ordinances;

2. Negation of the intrinsic good and bad in the field of human actions;

3. Belief in the creation of man's deeds by God.

The project that I follow in this part of the current study is to show the compatibility of these three axes with acceptance of autonomy. None of these three is incompatible with the acceptance of the Kantian theory of autonomy, which is based on the belief in rational good and evil.

4.1.3.6 Ash'arī theology denies the rational good and evil in divine acts

Ash'arism opposes the rational good and evil in divine acts and religious commandments. Their view is consistent with Kant's autonomy, which leads to the

pursuit of reason in the context of human behaviour not in divine acts. The al-ʾAšʿariyyah believe that reason cannot determine what causes the Lord's praise and salvation (the reward in the world to come) and what causes His punishment (torment of hell). In other words, human reason cannot understand deserving actions in God's view, and what deserves to be left. Ashʿarī theology denies the ability of reason only in the realm of religion. However, their view has important implications on religious philosophy, but those consequences are not the focus of our study and should be studied elsewhere. In summary, there is evidence that shows Ashʿarī's opposition to the al-muʿtazilah is only in divine acts and orders.

1. The debate on rational good and evil and declaring Ashʿarī's opposition to the al-muʿtazilah been proposed along the lines of God's actions الافعال البارى. Al Taftāzanī says:

This topic has been discussed among the issues related to the acts of God, although al-ʾAšʿariyyah deny rational good and evil in divine acts. The reason is that, the opposing side of the discussion, namely, al-muʿtazilah, has expanded the topic to acts of Allah. We have put the discussion here, to demonstrate their belief in this regard and our view on it (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 282).

In most of original al-ʾAšʿariyyah's sources, the topic of good and evil has also been discussed in the divine acts (see, e.g.Siyf al-dīn Al-āmidī, 2001. Vol.2, p. 113).

There is no evidence more obvious in this regard than that of Imām al-Ashʿarī in Kitāb al-lumaʾ under the title Al Taʾdīl wa Al Tajwīr التعديل و التجوير. This topic is the sequel to the debate on al-istetaʾah الاستطاعة and al kasb الكسب that their relation to the divine act is clearer than required to be explained.[2] On the other hand, all the issues that Imām al-Ashʿarī has raised in this topic have a connection to the acts of God and

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[2] To study these two concepts al istetaʾah الاستطاعة and al kasb الكسب, see al-ʾAšʿariyyah's sources (see, e.g.Furak, 2005).

religious ordinances (Al-Ash'arī, n,d., pp. 114-122). What the *al-ʾAšʿarīyyah* have articulated in explaining the title of the discussion demonstrates that they only deny the rational good and evil in the field of God's acts. For example, in their view, according to the *al-muʿtazilah* theory, good and evil are the causes of divine deeds and his law, while good and evil are among the effects and results of divine acts and orders. *Al Taftāzanī* explains:

Perhaps, one asks: what difference is there between *al-ʾAšʿarīyyah* and *al-muʿtazilah*? In response, we say that according to our opinion (*Ashʿarī* theology) this is the divine command which leads to good and evil, so God has commanded something and after that it finds goodness الحسن for the divine command, or God has forbidden something and then it gets bad. But, in the view of *al-muʿtazilah*, divine command and prohibition, followed the rational good and evil, that is, something was rationally good, and God has commanded it, or something was bad, so, and God has forbidden it, the divine command or prohibition discoverer good and evil, not the causes of them (Al- Taftāzanī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 283).

In this regard, *'Abd Al-Jabbar al Muʿtazilī* stated that this issue relates to divine acts, and *al-muʿtazilah* have argued to prove the correspondence between divine acts and rational good and evil. He says: "In this discussion, we seek to prove that God only does what is reasonably good, and perform what is considered by reason to be obligatory" (al-mu'tazlī, 2011. Vol. 6, p. 3).

2. Some great *al-ʾAšʿarīyyah* scholars mentioned that when the case does not relate to religion and is in connection with human acts, habits and rational affairs, the practical reason orders to perform or abandon the act and commands praise and blame in such cases. *Al Taftāzanī* says:

In general, whatever it deserves praise, according to human reason or the habits of people, is good, and its goodness is rational has nothing to do with religion. Therefore, the difference between our views and *al-muʿtazilah* is in God's favour and in the acts of God, that is, the one who does the work (which considered as rational good), does he deserve a reward from the God? (Al- Taftāzanī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 282).

3. Many of the reasons that *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* have come to prove their point of view only applies to the acts of God and religious orders. Their arguments do not work in the field of human affairs and behaviour. We refer to these reasons.

(a). They believe in God as the owner of the world so that nothing can limit His ownership, power and authority (Al-Ash'arī, n,d., pp. 116-117).

(b). They argued by the Quranic verse وَ مَا كُنَّا مُعَذِّبِينَ حَتَّى نَبْعَثَ رَسُولاً (17:15). Means: We have never punished, without sending Our Messenger before. The reasoning by this verse obviously indicates that, the *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* focus on the good and evil regarding the religious law and the deeds of the Lord. They said that, if there is rational good and evil, then those who abandon the divine obligations and commit the divine prohibitions should be tormented in the day of resurrection. Whether religion has come from God or not? While Allah will punish only if the religious orders have been given to the people (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 285). According to *al-'Ašʿarīyyah*, in many religious commands and rules, human reason does not command to do so; while it seems, there are divine praise or blame (remuneration and torments of hell) (Ibid). This statement, like the previous ones, illustrates that the issue is divine acts and commands.

(e). *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* argued that, if the evil were intrinsic in lying, it would not change in any case, while in some cases lying is not only bad, but it is obligatory, as in the case of lying for the purposes of saving the life of the Prophet (PBUH). Other deeds that are sometimes obligatory and unlawful حرام such as killing, when it is performed as a religious punishment, is obligatory, and it is forbidden if is carried out in the face of oppression (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 286). It is clear in this regard; the issue is the divine acts and judgements because an act is sometimes forbidden and sometimes obligatory, as a lie to save a Prophet is obligatory. Therefore, they conclude that the acts

of God are not based on rational good and evil. Otherwise, there was no possibility of changing the religious order.

(f). *al-mu'tazilah* to prove the rational good and evil have argued that in the situation that if telling the truth and lying are both in the same condition, and there is no preferential choice, the people naturally choose the truth, and it turns out that the truth has an inherent advantage, which, in equal conditions, is chosen by man. *al-'Ašʿarīyyah*, in response to this argument, has explained that the truth is chosen in this circumstance due to the general and public motive and benefit, and because of suitability to human nature (p. 289). By this answer, the issue of disagreement between *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* and *al-mu'tazilah* is the acts and ordinances of God, and therefore they accept the rational good in such a way that there is a connection with the general and public motive and benefits.

(g). Some of the *al-mu'tazilah's* arguments made against Ashʿarism indicate the issue is divine acts and religious ordinances. Considering the responses of *al-'Ašʿarīyyah* to these arguments, the issue will be clearer. For example, the most important argument in the *Mu'tazilī* school is that all people regardless of religion or nation, understand the goodness in justice العدل and beneficence الخير, as they know injustice الظلم and ignorance الجهل to be bad and a defect. Even unbelievers and atheists in these cases accept both good and evil. It turns out that things and acts are good or bad intrinsically. In response to this argument, *Ashʿarī* theology has responded by referring this kind of things and acts to the first two meanings of good and evil. According to *al-'Ašʿarīyyah*, people believe good and evil in such things because they have found "justice" and "beneficence" suitable or perfect for human nature, as they found "injustice" and "ignorance" as a defect or incompatible with the human soul (p. 291).

This response shows that the *al-'Ašʿariyyah* do not deny rational good and evil, but deny it only in relation to divine commands.

In another argument *al-muʿtazilah* have focused on the God's acts. According to them if everything that God does, is good, it must then he will enable the person who falsely claims the prophecy to have a miracle. So that, no prophet can be confirmed, because it may be a false person that God has done the miracle in his hand (p. 292). This argument of the *al-muʿtazilah* itself indicates the issue that is God's acts.

In another argument of the *al-muʿtazilah*, one who has certainty knows the existence of God and knows his attributes and characteristics, if he becomes a polytheist and ascribed to God something should not be ascribed to him, such as wife, child, and defects, he will deserve punishment whether there is a religion or not at all. It turns out that, deserving torment does not have any relation to divine religions and is factual (Ibid, 293). There is no need to explain why this argument is indicative of the issue and that it is a matter of divine punishment and rewards. However, the *al-'Ašʿariyyah's* response makes it clearer when they linked deserving of divine punishment to religion. They believe that our minds have become alive with these religious expressions. If divine religions did not say such a thing, we would not have recognised deserving of divine punishment (Ibid).

We end this part of the discussion with the words of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. He has explicitly stated that *Ashʿarī* theology only denies the rational good and evil in the case of the divine acts, but they have accepted it in the course of human actions. He says:

> The *al-muʿtazilah* and *al-Karāmīyah* have accepted rational good and evil, and philosophers and fatalistic people الجبريون have denied it, but *al-'Ašʿariyyah* have accepted rational good and evil, about the work of human beings, they deny it only in the acts of God. (M Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 1987. Vol. 3, p. 289).

4.1.3.7 *Ash'arī* theology denies the inherent good and evil in human acts

Evidence indicates that according to Ash'arism, the intrinsic good and evil is not acceptable even in human acts. This view is not in conflict with the theory of autonomy.

(a). Some of the *al-'Ašʿarīyyahs*'s arguments have shown that they deny the inherent good and evil, but do not deny it in general. For example, they expressed that if good and evil were inherent, it would not be possible to go together in one case. While sometimes they both go together. Based on this, someone who says: 'I will lie tomorrow', in this case, the good and evil will come together because if he lies tomorrow, his statement will be good because it makes the previous one true, and at the same time it is evil because it is a lie (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 4, p. 284).

Even based on the view of the *al-muʿtazilah*, a lie is not bad in all situations. it considered as the cause المقتضى and depends on the circumstances. This causality may not be activated in some situations and conditions. Similarly, telling the truth is not inherently good and changes with the circumstances. Therefore, the denial of the intrinsic good and evil in these two statements does not mean denying good and evil in general.

According to the *al-'Ašʿarīyyah,* if good and evil were intrinsic, we would have to admit that an accident العرض exists by another accidentالعرض, while such a thing would not be possible. Good and evil are considered accidents because they are titles that may not be fulfilled in one thing or act, so it turns out to be the accidental affair الامورالعرضى. On the other hand, the action itself is an accident because the definition of the accident العرضcorresponds to it (p. 288). This targets the possibility of inherent good and evil.

One of the *al-'Ašʿarīyyah*'s arguments considers the inherent good and evil as incompatible with God's authority. According to that, if good and evil were intrinsic,

God does not have authority over his actions and orders. Commanding something that is contrary to reason is abominable and not acceptable. If God had to obey the rational good and evil, then God would have no power and freedom of the will (Ibid). In this this reason, though the subject is a divine act and command, the focus is the intrinsic good and evil.

(b). According to the plan, that has been made in some al-'Ašʿarīyyah's sources, for this discussion, the issue is inherently good and evil. Because they have explained the al-muʿtazilah's view, that is, the acts are divided into good and bad, but some of them are self-evident by human reason, and the second is known by theoretical reflection. The third cannot be known by the reason and is explained by religion (Siyf al-dīn Al-āmidī, 2001. Vol. 2, p. 117).

(c). According to Ashʿarism, good and evil is not intrinsic for acts, and cannot be recognised by the human reason (p. 121). They mean from the inability of human reason to understand good and evil, the intrinsic type, since as we have seen before that they explicitly accepted the ability of reason to understand good and evil. *Al-Amidī* commented:

> In the eyes of al-'Ašʿarīyya, the title of good and evil, refers to the factors outside of the essence of one thing or a one act. These factors, do not make the goodness or badness, inherent and in the within the thing (Ibid).

The result of what has been said is that, the al-'Ašʿarīyyah have denied the intrinsic good and evil. This does not conflict with Kant's autonomy, since, in Kant's view human reason perceives moral values and commands them in every situation regarding the certain status and condition. As Kant's theory suggests, an act does not necessarily need to be inherently good and evil. What is needed to prove Kant's theory is the ability of reason to understand.

4.1.3.8 *Al-'Ašh'arīyyah* believe in the position of God's in creation of man's deeds

Al-'Ašh'arīyyah believe that human acts are created by God through *al-kasb* الكسب. This view is based on the fact that all events and acts are created by the will of God (Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, 1962, p. 268). According to this view, what we consider to be the causes of the events and acts are not the causes. There is not cause except Allah. To illustrate this view, *Qaḍi' 'Aḍd al-Dīn al-'ījī* in his book *al Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-kalām* states:

> The acts of men come only with the power of God, and human power does not have an effect on the realisation of those things. God's creates the power and the will in man, which, if there is no obstacle, God, at the same time as human power and will, creates the act. Therefore, what a man does, is God's creation and is acquired by man. The meaning of the theory of 'Gain' الكسب is that, the act will be done simultaneously as human power and will, but human power and will, have no effect on the emergence of the act. This is the theory of *shiykh Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī* (Al-'ījī, 1999, p. 311).

Some *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* consider good and evil in the field of human reason in contrast to their view on the human acts and creation by God. According to them, how can we consider what a person does as a good or bad, while his act was created by God? (see, e.g.Al- Taftāzānī, 1988.Vol. 4, p. 285; A. i. M. Al-Jurjānī, 1998.Vol. 8, p. 163). Can such an opinion be reconciled with Kantian autonomy?

By analysing the view of *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* on the creation of human acts by God, we find that, this view is inconsistent with the intrinsic good and evil. This third axis refers to the negation of the inherent good and evil which was the second axis. The second one accepted the good and evil based on situations, conditions, circumstances and factors. It also refers to the negation of good and evil in divine acts and accepting it in human statements. The result is that, *Ash'arī* theology is balanced, and there is no incompatibility in its components. In the *al-'Ašh'arīyyah*'s view, human acts are created

by God, so they cannot be classified as good and evil. It means that, the human actions cannot be inherently good or bad, but they can be good and bad under the influence of factors, conditions and other incidental things.

According to *al* Siyf al-dīn Al-āmidī (2001), all human acts are created by Allah Almighty. If the good and bad exist in the substance and essence of their acts, it is not possible to be created by God, since Allah Almighty does not create evil and bad, as the *al-mu'tazilah* believe. If the evil is something added to substance and essence of human acts, the problem remains as either it is an attribute for acts or not. We thus have three options: 1. Evil is not an attribute for the human act, then our reason cannot understand it; 2. Evil is an existing attribute, then an existential thing will be an attribute of a non-existent thing when we leave a good act. 3. Evil is a non-existent attribute in this situation, but then the evil cannot be the attribute of the human acts because we cannot ascribe the non-existent to an existing one. All of these problems come when we consider good and evil as intrinsic, and if we do not do so, these bugs do not come about (Vol. 2, p. 125).

Al-'Ašʿarīyyah's sources show that believing in the creation of human works by God denies the intrinsic good and evil in these works and does not relate to the foundation of good and evil. For example, they have put together a question and answer. The question is that, God's deeds are always good, so if we believe that human activity is created by God, then human actions are always good, so how do we characterise some of the works of human beings as wrong and bad? In response, they answer, God creates the power of doing the act in mankind, so the human activity is related to the power of human beings created by God. Or based on another theory in *Ashʿarī* theology, that is, the theory of gain *al kasb* الكسب good and evil are relate to the gain *al kasb* الكسب and not related to divine creation (Siyf al-dīn Al-āmidī, 2001. Vol.

2, p. 124). This response clearly shows that the *Ash'arī* view of the creation of human actions by God is compatible with the good and evil in the field of human acts.

The *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* also compared good and evil with other traits, and raised the question of: how can the creator of human statements be God and at the same time defines human verbs as such traits like being known المعلوم, possible الممكن, feasible المقدور, and the likes, but the creator of human actions cannot be God and classified these acts as good and evil? In response to this question, they separated attributes such as aforementioned traits from good and evil and explained that these kinds of traits are not intrinsic, but connected to the circumstances and considering different factors and situations. If the *al-mu'tazilah* believe in good and evil in the same way(connected to the circumstances and considering different factors and situations), it will be acceptable by *Ash'arī* theology (p. 126).

Perhaps we cannot find clearer evidence than *Al Taftāzanī* when he explains the issue in his famous book *Sharh al 'aqāiyd al-Nasafiyah*: "The good and evil of human acts, are two things that God creates knowing them in man's mind"(Taftāzanī, 1987, p. 16). Hence, *Ash'arī* theology rejects the intrinsic nature of good and evil, and is not opposed to the rational understanding of good and evil that is caused by divine creation.

4.1.3.9 The difference between Ash'arism and *al-mu'tazilah* regarding the ability of reason

We have seen the ability of reason to understand moral values based on the idea of good and evil that Muslim scholars (whether *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* or *al-mu'tazilah*) have asserted. But to what extent is the scope of this ability? In this regard, *al-'Ašh'arīyyah* separate from *al-mu'tazilah*.

The *al-mu'tazilah* believes in this ability in an absolute sense. In their view, human reason can legislate in the field of law as well as the field of ethics. Because, they believe in the rational good and evil of divine acts and commands. Therefore, the religious commandments, as well as the acts of God, are included by the authority of human reason (al-mu'tazlī, 2011. Vol. 6, p. 3). *Hassan Al Hanafī*, a new *Mu'tazilī* scholar, explains:

The five religious orders الإحكام الخمسة can be understood by reason. Therefore, although the obligatory الواجب and forbidden الحرام is prescribed by God and the *Sharīah*, but the human reason can understand them, even the rules that are between obligatory and forbidden, that is, the supererogatory المستحب and the adverse المكروه are also understood by the reason (Al- Hanfī, 1988. Vol. 3, p. 407-408).

Other scholars also have pointed to this. Martin, Woodward, and Atmaja (as quoted in Charlene Tan, 2014) stated:

The *Mu'tazilī* theologians (from the 8th to 11th centuries) even maintained that reason, not revelation, was the starting point for human beings to know about God's existence, salvation and their moral responsibility. They held that 'speculative reason (*nazar*) was theoretically even prior to faith – a tool for bringing rational human beings to Islamic faith, from which they could discover the benefits of accepting God's revealed religious duties' (Tan., 2014, p. 334).

Due to the *al-mu'tazilah* view on the absolute ability of reason, they reached the conclusion that one could be independent or free from religion in the field of ethics. They believe that, reason is capable of understanding and recognising all things. Although the *al-mu'tazilah* have tried to show themselves to be in need of religion, their arguments are not compatible with any sort of limitation in terms of wisdom's capability. The *Maturīdī* is like-minded and said:

If good and evil were based on religion, it would have been a blatant and unproductive task for the people, to send the Prophets and bring religions, because the people were free to do anything in the past, they came to curtail the people. However, if good and evil are rational, related to the essence of things and do not have to do with the expression of religion, then, regardless of religion, people will

not be free to do anything, therefore, sending out religions and Prophets that restrict freedom of the people is not considered fair" (Al-Māturīdī, 2006, p. 163).

But according to *Ash'arī* theology, reason only in the field of human acts is capable of understanding of perfection, defect, suitability, and disharmony. These four concepts are equivalent to moral values and their opposites. Therefore, according to the *Ash'arī* theology, reason is able only in the field of ethics and moral values.

4.1.3.10 According to *Ash'arī* theology, ethics needs religion

To what extent does Islam accept the ability of reason to understand moral values? Does the human reason have the absolute and unlimited capacity? If so, then what is the need for religion in the field of morality? Can we say that among the three parts of religion aim of belief (theology), law, and ethic, we do not need religion in the third section (ethics)? If we need religion in the field of ethics, then is it consistent with the theory of autonomy?

Islamic ethics pursues two main goals: 1. To adorn man to the values that regulate its relationship with God and the supernatural غیب. This part of ethics is considered to be a cause of human happiness in the afterlife. This part pertains to metaphysical affairs and the day of resurrection. Islamic worship is a significant example of this part of ethics. 2. To deal with the moral values associated with this worldly life and the provision of its happiness. When we speak of the worldly life, it covers a wide range, includes human relationships with others and society.

The existence of these two goals is due to the fact that, according to the Islamic beliefs human beings have an eternal and continuous life, so that each stage of his life affects the next stage. These properties, attributes and stable states ملکات are formed in his soul as a result of behaviour, ethics and lifestyle. The soul of man after his death and transferring to the next word begins his other life with these properties. According to

Sadr al-Din al-Shīrāzī famous Muslim philosopher, the soul of man is like a foetus that is placed into a human being by the grace of God. It needs to be adorned with good values and moral behaviour. These values and behaviour feed and fertilise the soul and form properties and steady states الملكات النفسانية. By this, a person will be ready for divine grace (Al-Shīrāzī, 1981 p. 131). He says in his other book: "Stable states الملكات النفسانية in the human soul become cause the bliss or torment of the human soul in the next world" (Ṣadr al-dīn Muḥammad al-Shīrāzī, 1981 . Vol. 9, p. 293).

So the first part of ethics is the moral values associated with this worldly life. Those provide worldly happiness and set our ethical communications with others and social groups, as well as shaping our mental and spiritual well-being. We only need our reason to understand and recognise these moral values. However, there is another part of ethics includes moral values effect in the afterlife and on our relationship with God and the supernatural. This part is something that our reason cannot understand. This is where we need religion and its guidance to explain how our behaviour and acts will affect our life after death, and how they shape the relationship with our Lord. It is true that reason can identify all the moral values associated with the worldly life, but there are also many of these ethical values which cannot be discovered by reason and have effects on the afterlife. Human reason is unable to understand how to discover these values and their effects. For example, reason cannot understand the effects of worship such as ṣalāh (صلاة). Or what does fasting (صيام)have as a result, in the world after death. In these sections we need religion. Otherwise, wisdom can be just fully developed in the context of ethical values and behaviour that have come to work for the prosperity of this world and make us as morally beings in this world.

We can be ethical and moral by relying on reason, as we can behave ethically and follow the rules guided by our intellect, but only in the part of ethics relating to the

material world. The Kantian theory of autonomy does not claim more than this. Kant's perspective is about being ethical in this world. Ethicality in this world requires wisdom and nothing else. The authority of reason to be ethical and prosperous in this world and the authority of religion for ethical and prosperous living in the next world is the result of aligning autonomy alongside religion. In the following, we discuss the reasons which indicate the view of Islam on the division of ethics into the material world and the afterlife, as well as the function of reason in the former and the need for religion in the latter.

(a). In the *Ash'arī* theology, reason can understand moral values but not when it concerns the religious and divine rules. Accordingly, reason can understand moral values relevant to the material world. By accepting this idea, there is no alternative to the theory of division of ethics into two parts of the material world and the afterlife.

(b). There is no statement in Islamic ethics that relates to the material world that is not understandable by reason. Perhaps you ask, how such a claim can be posited, while many of the Islamic moral statements cannot be understood by the reason? For example, the intellect does not understand the prohibition of wine, as it does not understand the prohibition of the usury.

We must notice the different nature of, legal and moral statements. Those that are not understandable by reason, are not moral rules, but legal rulings. In Islamic law, there are statements that cannot be understood by reason, for instance, the quality and execution of Islamic punishments are often not understandable by reason. The prohibition of wine and usury are legal, not moral.

Scholars have pointed out in the science of law, the difference between these two types of statements, and have noted that the characteristics of the legal rules is the

guarantee of implementation that the moral rules lack. The guarantee of the implementation of the prohibition of wine and usury is their religious prohibition الحرمة الشرعية, which makes these statements are not considered as the ethical rules.

The difference between moral and legal statements was not an issue in the past (Kīrah, 1993). Today, it it considered a serious issue addressed in the field of law (Faraj al-ṣūddah, 1979). Researchers (Western and Muslim) have expressed differences in terms of the nature and purpose of these two statements.

Also, one of the most important differences between moral and legal statements is that the former's purpose is prosperity, while the purpose of legal statements is to regulate social relations and manage the society (Ibid). Accordingly, the statements that prohibit actions are legal and not moral area, and for this reason, they are forcibly imposed on Muslims. And they will be punished if committed these acts. All these (force and punishment) are signs of the legality of the statement.

Law cannot be extended to the field of ethics. Moreover, we have already seen that the difference between the viewpoint of the *al-ʾAsh ʿarīyyah* and the *al-muʿtazilah* is the extending the ability of reason to the Islamic law in the *al-muʿtazilah*, and the restriction to the field of worldly ethics in Ashʿarism.

(c). The ethical conscience is an institution within a person who encourages him to perform good deeds and blames him for bad (Lobo, 2015). The belief in such an institution among the old philosophers was commonplace (Atkins, 2014). In Western moral philosophy, despite admitting the existence of conscience, there are different views about its nature. In Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and David Hume, conscience is considered an inner sense of mankind (Herman, 2012). Others consider the

conscience as human reason. Perhaps Immanuel Kant is considered one of the most prominent philosophers with such an opinion about conscience (Shuster, 2011).

Muslim philosophers also proved the existence of conscience based on common reason among human beings. In the Islamic sources, there is evidence for moral conscience as a power in a person that orders him to do good things and guides his behaviour.

The Quran says: وَ لَا أُقْسِمُ بِالنَّفْسِ اللَّوَّامَةِ (75:2). Meaning: And I do swear by the reproaching soul. In interpreting this verse, many commentators have said that it refers to the soul what we call "conscience," and commands on doing good deeds and to avoid bad deeds(Al-Alūsī, 1995. Vol. 15, p. 152; Al-Shawkānī, 1993. Vol. 5, p. 403; Al-Zamakhsharī, 1987. Vol. 4, p. 659; Ibn al-Jawzī, 2002. Vol. 4, p. 368; Ibn Jazī al-Kalbī, 1996. Vol. 2, p. 432).

The Quran says: وَ نَفْسٍ وَ مَا سَوَّاهَا فَأَلْهَمَهَا فُجُورَهَا وَ تَقْوَاهَا (91; 7-8). Meaning: And by the Soul and the One Who fashioned it, so he inspired by it both its evil and its good. Many commentators have stated that God has given the power of recognising good and evil of human beings (see, e.g.Al- Tabarī, 1992. Vol. 30, p. 134; Al-Baydawī, 1997. Vol. 5, p. 315). According to Al-Alūsī (1995), based on the verse, God teaches man the way to prosperity, and besides the means of destruction and misery, and he can distinguish happiness and evil on the groundwork of this natural teaching (Vol. 6, p. 356).

In the traditions of the Prophet, there are narrations that show the existence of a person's power that can guide him and make him know good and evil. For example:

وابصة بن معبد رضي الله عنه أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال له: جِئْتَ تَسْأَلُنِي عَنِ الْبِرِّ وَالْإِثْمِ فَقَالَ نَعَمْ فَجَمَعَ أَنَامِلَهُ فَجَعَلَ يَنْكُتُ بِهِنَّ فِي صَدْرِي وَيَقُولُ يَا وَابِصَةُ اسْتَفْتِ قَلْبَكَ وَاسْتَفْتِ نَفْسَكَ ثَلَاثَ مَرَّاتٍ الْبِرُّ مَا اطْمَأَنَّتْ إِلَيْهِ النَّفْسُ وَالْإِثْمُ مَا حَاكَ فِي النَّفْسِ وَتَرَدَّدَ فِي الصَّدْرِ وَإِنْ أَفْتَاكَ النَّاسُ وَأَفْتَوْكَ (Hanbal, 1991. (Vol. 4, p. 228

Meaning: The Prophet said to a man named Wabeṣah: "Have you come to ask me about good and evil?" The man said: "yes". The Messenger gathered his hand and calmly put it on the man's chest and said:" Ask your soul! Ask yourself in your heart" (it is repeated three times), The good is that your soul commands and accepted by your heart, and evil is to affect your soul (that is, your soul will dislike it). This narrative requires no explanation; since it is clearer than to need explicating.

In another tradition: الْبِرُّ حُسْنُ الْخُلُقِ ، وَالْإِثْمُ مَا حَاكَ فِي صَدْرِكَ ، وَكَرِهْتَ أَنْ يَطَّلِعَ عَلَيْهِ النَّاسُ (al-Niyshābūrī, 2003. Vol. 8, p. 7). Meaning: The good is being good-tempered and the evil is what your heart considers it as a bad, and you do not like to inform others about that. In this narrative, two important points have been raised as a criterion for identifying bad deeds. First, when your heart and soul recognises it as evil, and second, to considered by other people as evil and bad, both of these two points are based on the principle that inside human being is the power that knows evil.

The Prophet stated: الْبِرُّ مَا سَكَنَتْ إِلَيْهِ النَّفْسُ وَاطْمَأَنَّ إِلَيْهِ الْقَلْبُ ، وَالْإِثْمُ مَا لَمْ تَسْكُنْ إِلَيْهِ النَّفْسُ وَلَمْ يَطْمَئِنَّ إِلَيْهِ الْقَلْبُ ، وَإِنْ أَفْتَاكَ الْمُفْتُونَ (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 4, p. 194). Meaning: The good is that the soul and the heart of man accept it, and the evil is that not accepted by the human soul and heart.

In another famous narration, the Prophet said: الناس معادن، خيارهم في الجاهلية خيارهم في الإسلام (Al-Bukhārī, 1981. Vol. 4, p. 122). Meaning: People are mine. That is, the roots of morality, and they can extract good and evil by referring to their nature. Those who have been good during the period of ignorance Jahilīyah الجاهلية are also good, at time of Islam (that is, good and evil something everyone can get in his inside). This part of the narrative only makes sense when we accept the existence of a power in the human's inner that can independently recognise the good and bad. In this case, the period of

ignorance *Jahilīyah* الجاهلية and the era of Islam is the same, but if we do not accept such a power in the nature of man, those two times are different because a person will not be able to distinguish between good and bad independently in the period of ignorance *Jahilīyah* الجاهلية.

An important point to be made about this narrative is that this tradition is interpreted in two ways. First, people are different, just like the mines are different. Some mines are for precious and valuable gems like gold, and some mines are for worthless things. Also, some people are good and some bad. Second, mines have the material people need, just like inside a person is the root for good and bad.

According to the second interpretation, the relationship between the narration and our discussion is very clear, since it confirms the power of the human being can give them to good and evil. But based on the first interpretation that divides humans into good and bad, the tradition will not be relevant to our subject. It seems that, the second interpretation is correct, because if dividing of people was indented as the division of mines, it should be said: humans are like mines كالمعادن, while it was said people are mines معادن. This statement directly means that, there are the basic material and the root of good and evil in the essence of humans. Therefore, we based on the second interpretation.

In another case the Prophet said: أَنَّ الأَمَانَةَ نَزَلَتْ فِي جَذْرِ قُلُوبِ الرِّجَالِ. ثُمَّ نَزَلَ الْقُرْآنُ. فَعَلِمُوا مِنَ الْقُرْآن وَعَلِمُوا مِنَ السُّنَّةِ (Al-Bukhārī, 1981.Vol. 7, p. 188). Meaning: The duty التكليف is something that was in the hearts of the people, then the Quran came, and people found what they had in their hearts in the Quran. The narrative includes the word *Al amanah* الإمانة which we translated as task (duty), because the great commentators of the hadith,

have translated such(see, e.g.Al-ʿAsqalānī, 2005, p. 80; Al-Nawawī 1987 a.Vol. 2, p. 168).

Although among these verses and narrations, some of them have a general context to express the ability of moral conscience to recognise values, but it is essential to consider the content of these traditions in regards to ethics concerning the material world. It is necessary to refrain from expanding the content of these verses and narratives to the other part of ethics, which relates to the relationship between man and God, as well as the supernatural affairs. Because we have already made it clear that, in this section we need the religion and that, moral conscience or practical reason does not suffice. This conclusion will be drawn in relation to another category of Islamic evidence, which emphasizes generally that the way for recognition of ethical values is religion and its guidance. Thus, we are faced with two categories of verses and narratives: a group that considers the ability of reason and conscience, and a group that sees the only way to recognise morality as referring to religion.

For example, in the prayers by the Prophet to begin his ṣalāh (صلاة) he says: و اهدني لأحسن الأخلاق، لا يهدي لأحسنها إلا أنت (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 1, p. 94). Meaning: O God, guide me to the best of ethics, that nobody but you can guide me to the best of ethics. According to this tradition, it is only by referring to divine guidance one can know the best of ethics.

Or, the Quran says: و قالوا لو كُنّا نَسْمَعُ أَو نَعْقِلُ ما كُنّا في أَصْحابِ السَّعير (67: 10). Meaning: And they (those who disbelieved in their creator) shall say:" Had we listened to messengers of God or applied reason, we would not have become the inhabitants of the Hell. In this verse, two things have been introduced to save humanity from the hell: 1. Listening to the what the divine messengers have said; 2. Reasoning and thinking.

Based on the literal meaning of the verse, we must conclude that there is no need for religion. We can comment and interpret reasoning in this verse as thinking about divine messages (see, e.g.Ibn 'ashūr, 1984. Vol. 29, p. 25). In this way, independent reason is not intended, and the theme of the verse will be exactly the opposite of the evidence concerning the ethical power in human beings.

If we can combine these two categories, we have to say that, each of these is related to a part of ethics. The moderate approach can reconcile these two contradictory categories by considering the first group (which implies the implication of inner power in man) in connection to material and worldly values, and the second group (which identifies religion as the source of ethics) related to religious values.

In *Ash'arī* theology, we have seen that, on the one hand, they have accepted the ability of reason to understand good and evil in terms of perfection and defect, and also the field of suitability and disharmony, and on the other hand, they believe that reason is not able to understand in the domain of religion, divine acts and commandments. The existence of these two bases inevitably leads us to accept such a moderate solution.

Perhaps now easy to understand the words of Tariq Ramadan (as quoted in Tan, 2014), he says: "While the Quran and the Sunnah are still upheld as sources for norms of behaviour for Muslims, their scope is confined to spiritual and moral matters for the individual"(Tan., 2014, p. 334). However, Ramadan should correct his sentence and say "Another source is reason, which extracts worldly ethical values".

4.2   Study of freedom of the will from Islamic Perspective

In the last section, we discussed the first element of autonomy, namely the ability of reason to understand ethical values and legislation. We also responded to the conflict between autonomy and the authority of the Quran and Sunnah.

In the current section, we address the second element of autonomy, namely freedom of the will. Kant's freedom of the will refers to external factor not affecting the will.

4.2.1 Explanation of the critique

There are different theories about the nature of the moral action. All these views are known under the topic of the criteria for determining the nature of ethical act. Relativism theory regards conditions, places and temporal situations in the essence of good or bad (Björnsson, 2012). Consequences theory considers personal benefits as the criterion for good or bad or social and public benefits (Lee, 2017), and ultimately leads to good or bad judgement (Ibid). The first one is called "egoism" and the second is utilitarian. Virtue ethics theory considers the role of deeds in the formation of personified virtues in human beings as the basis of the morality of actions (Cullity, 1999). The theory focuses on how an action should be performed (Ibid).

The Kantian theory of autonomy is a subset of deontology. This theory posits ethics on the basis of duty. Kant believes that every human being is able to find and understand the universal moral value (Immanuel Kant, 2016).

This difference in theories has been introduced as the cause of rejection of Autonomy in the Viewpoint of Islam. According to Halstead (2007), Islamic moral education instils the motivation and enthusiasm in children and young people and makes them committed to doing good acts. This contradicts autonomy which refuses external motives and considers it contrary to free-will. Halstead notes that the issue of motive that attracted the minds of many Western researchers of the education has not been complicated by the Islamic moral education scholars (Ibid). Islamic moral education equally emphasises internal and external motivations (Ibid). He believes that, in Islamic moral education, internal motivations include the acquisition of divine satisfaction and

love for Muhammad the Prophet of Islam. The meaning of the latter is to invite a person to imitate the Prophet's behaviour. The external motives also comprise a wide range of economic, social and cultural benefits, including solvation that is the remuneration of the day of resurrection (p. 291). Halstead quotes Wilson: "Moral motivation is a matter of encouraging students to take seriously the entire form of life or thought that we call morality, to appreciate it for its own sake and to want to become a part of it." (Ibid). According to many scholars, the inclusion of autonomy in deontology makes it possible to separate this idea from Islamic education and ethics.

4.2.2   The responses to this critique

Most of those who have defended autonomy from an Islamic perspective has focused on the first element, and the freedom of the will has often been neglected. However, a few scholars have discussed the issue of free will and have tried to defend it based on Islamic arguments.

4.2.2.1 The first method: minimalist interpretation

Some scholars based their defence on an interpretation of the free will that differs from that intended by Kant. For example, Tariq Ramadan says:

> Like rationality, autonomy is valued in Islam, where the aim is to help all Muslims to enter into personal growth and consequently to become autonomous in their lives, their choices and more generally in the management of their freedom" (Ramadan, 2009, p. 129).

What Tariq Ramadan has called freedom differs from autonomy. Ramadan relied only on the freedom from external pressure and coercion, while the freedom of the will in the theory of autonomy is much more than this. In this commentary, you should be free even from yourself and the impact of personal benefit. That is why the critics see the passion of paradise and the fear of the hell as being inconsistent with freedom of the will.

4.2.2.2   The Second Method: Natural Freedom instead of Ethical Freedom

When Immanuel Kant speaks of the freedom of the will, he does not mean natural freedom, but freedom from regarding the motives. It is important to know that natural freedom is a theological topic against determinism. Proponents of determinism believe that the superior will (such as God or nature) creates human acts, and man is forced to do them, and he has no authority and will in his deeds. On the contrary, there are supporters of natural freedom which considers a person to be free and powerful in his acts. The freedom of the will in autonomy regards human beings as not being influenced by external factors and motives during the conduct of moral action.

Some scholars who have asked for an Islamic stand to defend autonomy have mistaken between the two concepts and have cited verses and traditions to prove the natural freedom of man. The mistake seen in this approach is the confusion between natural and ethical liberty. In this view, man is created free to follow his instincts and desires and can obey the divine orders. He chooses each of these two options freely. Al-Najjār (2000) bases his view on the concept of the vicegerency of man (*khalīfah*) as raised in the Quran to prove the freedom of the will from an Islamic perspective:

Trust on the basis of free will is the only path for growth and perfection. Being given the choice to follow the self's desires and be subjected to base (lower) motives, or to pursue the divine instructions and long for higher aspirations, enables individuals to overcome the soul's Hawa… and achieve sublimation. It is a kind of psychological jihad leading to gradual growth and perfection through interacting with the universe, during which human beings observe Allah's injunctions by enjoining right or refraining from wrong. This jihad climaxes with the realisation of khalifah (p. 24).

Tan. (2014), is another one who base on such an interpretation of freedom of the will, is considering the autonomy in accordance with Islamic teachings. He believes that: "due to human freedom, he can adapt to the various changes in social,

technological and other conditions in modern societies, so he will find new ways to obey God's commands and rules" (p. 331). In addition to the confusion between natural and moral freedom, his conclusion is also wrong because he has reduced autonomy in selecting autonomously and freely a way for the obedience of the law. However, the freedom of the will in autonomy is beyond this and is not limited to obeying the law.

These researchers ultimately admitted that such an incomprehensible interpretation of freedom of the will and rationality is not the same as freedom of the will in autonomy (Tayob, 2016; Thompson, 2010).

We should differentiate between natural and moral freedom in study of Kant's theory of autonomy. Failure to recognise this significant point will lead to fundamental mistakes. As well as what many Western scholars have done in the interpretation of autonomy. Wilson (2008) believes that this relationship is not clear in Kant's words. In describing this ambiguity, he refers to a duality. In his opinion, sometimes the autonomy of Kant is independent of the free will, and in other cases, Kant has introduced autonomy and freedom of the will as two separate concepts (p. 355). This perception is seen in the works of many other scholars who believe that Kant's theory of autonomy contradicts his principles with natural liberty. For example, Pereboom (2006) says: "Kant's theory is especially ambitious in that it aims to preserve these intuitions by developing a view of freedom akin to agent-causal libertarianism, while at the same time accepting an uncompromising scientific determinism about the natural world" (p. 538).

Whatever we choose (regardless of we are deterministic or believe in freedom) we can ask about the moral deed: Is human action considered as moral when it is done under external forces and factors? We may be fatalistic in theology, but support free

will in the moral philosophy. For in theology the point is that, is the creation of acts and deeds due to the supreme will or the will of mankind. The determinist sees the choices and human actions determined by fate or God, the laws of physics, or the laws of logic, inheritance or the environment, the motives of the subconscious or the psychological and social conditions (Blanchard, 2013). Now assume that someone with such a deterministic view gets to ethical philosophy and the theory of autonomy. He claims that, with the human being, prior conditions are involved such as divine will, or destiny or nature, and cause it to emerge, by making the will of the act appear in the human mind. However, the role of these factors is not known to us since the agent does not know about them while he is doing the action. What he does is to choose to do, nothing else. Here, he may choose based on conscious will that is influenced by external factors such as obedience to parents, law, and so on, or a conscious intention not influenced by any external factor and is merely based on what his reason regards as being the correct action. In determinism, both are caused by the prior conditions (divine will, nature, and destiny).

Upon the emergence of the will, one realises the influence of external factors on his own will, or he does not consider the external factors. In the first case, his will is not autonomous, and in the latter, it is based on autonomy. Thus, the Kantian theory of autonomy is consistent with determinism in theology, because the concept of freedom in theology is different from that in autonomy, and they have nothing to do with each other. For this reason, while someone believes that we are under the control of nature's rules, he can believe in autonomy regarding ethics. Kant believes that being governed by such a moral law is completely different from being subjected to the rules of nature (Immanuel Kant, 2016). The laws of nature impose on us from outside, and we cannot

choose to obey them. On the contrary, according to Kant acting in conformity with the moral law is autonomy that we impose on ourselves and choose to obey or not (Ibid).

4.2.3   Our response to this critique

The main challenge of autonomy is the issue of religious motives such as the rewards of paradise and divine punishment (hell) and the intention of obeying the divine command (as the motive for moral acts). Critics regard all of these cases as external motives (outside of the essence of moral duty and task) and believe that the basis of autonomy is incompatible with Islamic teachings.

The main question is: what is the motivation for doing ethical acts in Islamic teachings? The answer to this question will eliminate all the problems that have been raised in this regard. Islam has a subtle and precise view of the issue of motivation in the pursuit of ethical acts. Also, the theory of autonomy offers a top rate motivation for moral deeds. So, the alignment of Islamic teachings with the Kantian theory of autonomy places ethics and ethical behaviour at the highest level.

In Islamic culture, moral behaviour and good acts are described as "righteous deeds". One of the ways in which the desirable motive in the sight of Islam can be discovered is referring to these verses and narratives. With this reference, one can find out which motive is related to righteous deeds has been raised. Those who, based on motives such as fear of hell and the passion of paradise have criticised the Islamic ethics, and have argued that in this religion, low-level motives are advised, have not paid attention to the high-level of Islamic motives. Therefore, the mistake of people like Halsted is that, the two categories of motives that have been raised in Islam are considered in the same way and together, while these two categories are in the hierarchy. If it is supposed to compare the Autonomy- that is the highest level in moral motives- with the Islamic

motives, it should be compared the autonomy with the highest levels of motivation exists in Islam.

But before that, need to mention an important point, which is, we have already said. Autonomy has been raised only in the part of ethics that relates to the material world that regulates human communication with others in this world. Autonomy does not relate to the part of ethics that deals with human relationships with God and the supernatural. This is despite the fact that the concepts that are presented as great motives in Islam, are all related to God and worship. So how do we connect these two?

Islam accepts motivations such as fear of hell and the passion of paradise only at the lowest level of faith. For the higher levels, Islam introduced the motives that are higher even than the task-orientation (deontology) in autonomy. Paying attention to these supreme motivations makes it possible to find in the worldly part of ethics such a great motives can be accepted by Islam. Because Islam did not deny high-level motives such as task-orientation (deontology). The low-level motivations in the field of worship and communication with God, has been related to low levels of faith.

4.2.3.1 To meet Allah (لقاء الله)

The Quran has introduced this concept as a motive. It says: فَمَنْ كَانَ يَرْجُوا لِقَاءَ رَبِّهِ فَلْيَعْمَلْ عَمَلاً صَالِحاً و لا يُشْرِكْ بِعِبَادَةِ رَبِّهِ أَحَدا (18:110). Meaning: Whosoever is anxious to Meet His Lord should do righteous deeds. Some commentators have interpreted the meaning of (To meet Allah لقاء الله) as divine rewards in the day of resurrection (Ibn Kathīr, 1998. Vol. 5, p. 183). Most commentators often think of this to obtain divine satisfaction (see, e.g.Al-Tabarī, 1992.Vol. 16, p. 32; Al-Alūsī, 1995. Vol. 8, p. 373). If we want to interpret the meaning of this term (To meet Allah لقاء الله) in the sense of divine reward, we must believe in the deletion of something before the word Rabb رَبّ. As if we interpret the

term (To meet Allah لقاء الله) as the fearing the retribution of God, then we have to interpret the word anxious يرجو which is mentioned in this verse in the sense of dread (Al-Zamakhsharī, 1987. Vol. 2, p. 751).

The first thing introduced as the motive of good works in the Quran is divine satisfaction. Divine satisfaction is not heaven and hell. It is the joy and happiness of the Lord who created us. Doing work for divine satisfaction is not a contradiction with the duty and intrinsic motive. We explain this Point under the following title, which deals specifically with Love to god. This concept has also been repeated in other Quranic verses. For example, in another verse, it says: استعينوا بالصبر و الصلاة و انها لكبيرة الا على الخاشعين الذين يظنون انهم ملاقوا ربهم و انهم اليه راجعون (2: 46). Meaning: Seek help for yourself through patience and prayer; it seems a difficult task indeed, except for the humble ones and those believers in their meeting with Allah and their return to Him. This verse explicitly states that, doing task is hard, but it is easy for those who are motivated by meeting with their God. That is, for those who carry out their task for other motives, there is the difficulty of doing duties. The important point of this verse is that, God has proposed the meeting with Allah as the acceptable motive for performing divine worship (al ṣalāh الصلاة) and did not devote it to doing good works.

The concept of the meeting Allah in many traditions is also considered as the highest level of human perfection. For example, in the famous prayers of the Prophet Muhammad, it is narrated that: اللَّهم... أسألك لذة النظر إلى وجهك، وأسألك الشوق إلى لقائك (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 4, p. 264). Meaning: O, God, I want the pleasure of your visit, and I want you to give me the pleasure of meeting you. In another tradition, the Prophet says to one of his companions: إِنِّي قَدْ أُوتِيتُ مَفَاتِيحَ خَزَائِنِ الدُّنْيَا وَالْخُلْدَ فِيهَا ثُمَّ الْجَنَّةَ، وَخُيِّرْتُ بَيْنَ ذَلِكَ وَبَيْنَ لِقَاءِ رَبِّي - عَزَّ وَجَلَّ - وَالْجَنَّةِ. (Ibid, Vol. 3, p. 489). Meaning: I was given the keys of all the treasures

of the world, then I left free to choose between these treasures together with the eternal life in this world and paradise, or meeting the Lord, and I chose the Lord's visit.

4.2.3.2 Love for God

The concept of "love for God" has been widely stated in our religious sources. For example: قُلْ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُحِبُّونَ اللَّهَ فَاتَّبِعُونِي يُحْبِبْكُمُ اللَّهُ وَ يَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ ذُنُوبَكُمْ وَ اللَّهُ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ (3:31). Meaning: Say O, Messenger, "If you love Allah, follow me, God will love you and forgive your sins; and Allah is the forgiving Merciful". Or he says: وَمِنَ النَّاسِ مَنْ يَتَّخِذُ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ أَنْدَاداً يُحِبُّونَهُمْ كَحُبِّ اللَّهِ وَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَشَدُّ حُبًّا لِلَّهِ (2:165). Meaning: Yet there are some people who take for worship other things equal, to God, they love them as one should love God. But those of believers are overflowing in their love for Allah. Or he says: يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا مَنْ يَرْتَدَّ مِنْكُمْ عَنْ دِينِهِ فَسَوْفَ يَأْتِي اللَّهُ بِقَوْمٍ يُحِبُّهُمْ وَ يُحِبُّونَهُ (5:54). Meaning: you who believe! If any from among you turns away from his faith, should know that Allah will soon bring a people, whom Allah loves them, and they love Allah.

Some commentators have interpreted the concept of love for God as obedience to God. According to *Ibn āshūr*, some scholars have considered the love and affection for God in the true sense (its literal meaning) to be impossible. In their opinion, it should be interpreted as obedience to God, because love and kindness means willing and seeking, and desire is only given to something that is suitable to human nature and enjoyable for him, and pleasure is not attributed to intangible things such as God (Ibn 'ashūr, 1984. Vol. 2, p. 90).

This is not the correct opinion since the actual usage of love for God, has been repeated in many cases of the Quran and traditions. It says: وَ مِنَ النَّاسِ مَنْ يَتَّخِذُ مِنْ دُونِ اللَّهِ أَنْدَاداً يُحِبُّونَهُمْ كَحُبِّ اللَّهِ وَ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا أَشَدُّ حُبًّا لِلَّهِ (2:165). This is certainly an actual usage, because the sentence أَشَدُّ حُبًّا لِلَّهِ implies that love for God has a hierarchy and there are intensity

and weakness, and this affection is more severe in believers than in the idolaters. Given that, the love for God means submission to him, then the meaning of the verse is so: The believers obey (God), and the disbelievers also obey (their idols), but obedience of believers is considered to be more than that of disbelievers.

Another reason is confirming that the use of the "love" for God is actual, not figurative. The Quran says: قُلْ إِنْ كَانَ آبَاؤُكُمْ وَ أَبْنَاؤُكُمْ وَ إِخْوَانُكُمْ وَ أَزْوَاجُكُمْ وَ عَشِيرَتُكُمْ وَ أَمْوَالٌ اقْتَرَفْتُمُوهَا وَ تِجَارَةٌ تَخْشَوْنَ كَسَادَهَا وَ مَسَاكِنُ تَرْضَوْنَهَا أَحَبَّ إِلَيْكُمْ مِنَ اللَّهِ وَ رَسُولِهِ وَ جِهَادٍ فِي سَبِيلِهِ فَتَرَبَّصُوا حَتَّى يَأْتِيَ اللَّهُ بِأَمْرِهِ وَ اللَّهُ لَا يَهْدِي الْقَوْمَ الْفَاسِقِينَ (9:24). Meaning: Say O, Muhammad!: If your children, brothers, spouses, relatives, the property that you possess and the trade you fear may decline and the buildings in which you delight, are to you more beloved than God and His Messenger and fighting in Allah's way, then wait until Allah of brings about his command and Allah does not guide the disobedient people. Because the love for God and the love for the Prophet (PBUH) and love for the fathers, children, property and other things mentioned in the verse, are in the same kind and nature of love, since he said: "If your children are more popular than God", and we know that, comparative and superlative adjectives such as better, more popular, warmer, cooler... are used where two things are essentially identical in the meaning, but one of them is more, and the other one is less, for example, we say that, something is warmer than others. Therefore, in the verse in question, in the sight of those whom Allah blames; Allah is loved, just as business is beloved, but they love commerce more than Allah.

The characteristic of the acts done for the sake of love is that the agent (person who does the act) will be satisfied by the act (Ibn 'ashūr, 1984. Vol. 2, p. 91).

The concept of love for God, as expressed in the Quran, is an excellent and high-ranking concept that goes beyond all the inner and outer motives of man. And even is

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beyond the motive of gaining a divine reward, or being immune from the punishment of God (Al-Alūsī, 1995. Vol. 1, p. 432). It is also worthy to quote *Abū Ishāq Ahmad ibn Ibrāhīm Tha'labī al niyshābūri*, who writes:

> God has said that the love of believers in God is more than the idolaters; because the love of the idolaters is due to being sentimental, while the love of believers in God is due to rationality. It can also be said that, the love of the idol worshippers is due to imitation, but the love of believers is based on argument and reason (Al-Tha'labī al- niyshābūrī, 2001. Vol. 2, p. 34).

As stated above, love for God is not an external motive, and is consistent with what Kant called "eternal happiness". Therefore, when we compare the freedom of the will in Kant's opinion with what has been proposed in Islam, we should regard the love of God as an Islamic motive. Then we will see that Islamic ethics is not based on external motives in which the agent or other benefits is considered. In this way, Islam has no conflict with autonomy. According to Kant, everyone who respects his moral duties deserves the absolute and eternal happiness. Complete bliss means includes all spiritual and material pleasures and happiness. The human spirit sees itself obliged to achieve the absolute and eternal happiness, and it is clear that joy and happiness are not possible without virtue (Immanuel Kant, 2016).

The concept of love for God as a motive for performing good deeds is not just proposed in the Quran, but there are many traditions that advocate it. *Ahmed ibn Hanbal* has narrated from Anas ibn Malik has said: ان رجلا قال لرسول الله: متى الساعة؟ قال:" و ما اعددت للساعة؟" قال: لا، الا انى احبّ الله و رسوله. قال:" فانت مع مع من احببت". قال انس: فما فرح المسلمون اشدّ مما فرحوا به (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 3, p. 168). Meaning: A man asked the Prophet, what time it will be the day of resurrection? The Prophet said: "Have you provided something for that day"? The man replied: "I did not, just love God and His Messenger". The Prophet said: "So, that day, you will be with the ones you love." *Anas*, who is the narrator of this Hadith said: "Muslims were exceedingly happy." The important point in this narrative is

that the man stated in response to the Prophet, the only thing he has provided for his next life is divine love, and the Prophet confirmed it as an acceptable motive.

In another tradition has quoted from the Prophet, he said: لا يحق العبد حق صريح الايمان حتى يحب الله (Ibid. Vol. 3, p. 430). Meaning: Man does not believe verily unless he reaches the love for God. This narrative explicitly states that the only acceptable motive is love for God.

In the other tradition, *Anas ibn Mālik* narrated that the Prophet said: ثلاث من كن فيه وجد حلاوة الإيمان: أن يكون الله ورسوله أحب إليه مما سواهما، وأن يحب المرء لا يحبه إلا لله وأن يكره أن يعود في النار الكفر كما يكره أن يقذف في النار (Al-Bukhārī, 1981. Vol. 1, p. 9). Meaning: There are three things that, if everyone had them, they would taste the sweetness of faith: that God and his Messenger will become more pleasant to him than anything; to love others for the sake of God; and no tendency to return to the disbelief. This narrative, like the previous one, explicitly states that at all the sweetness of faith and its truth is nothing but affection for God, and one who has not attained this level of divine love for the motive of his actions does not have the sweetness of faith. It is interesting to note that the love for God has been introduced not only as the motive for good behaviour, but also as the motive for all human actions and reactions so that even friendship with others should be based on God's favour. *Al-Nawawī* wrote about this tradition: "This is an important narrative, which expresses one of the Islamic principles. According to Muslim scholars, the meaning of sweetness of faith, enduring hardship and obedience to divine orders only for the satisfaction of God" (Al-Nawawī 1987 a. Vol. 2, pp. 13-14).

Narratives about love for God and this motive for human behaviour, are a lot, we confine to some of them. Thus, the motive that Islam emphasises is not something that contradicts the freedom of the will in autonomy.

4.2.3.3   The hierarchy of motivates in Islam

Affection for God and other concepts are superior motives in Islam. People are not the same, so in the early stages of faith, everyone cannot be expected to do good things with such motives. Some Islamic sources have declared that the degrees of faith differ such that it is possible for someone to someone to be at the high level and someone at a lower.

By referring to Quranic verses, it is possible to obtain different degrees of faith. It says: قَالَتِ الْأَعْرَابُ آمَنَّا قُلْ لَمْ تُؤْمِنُوا وَ لَكِنْ قُولُوا أَسْلَمْنا وَ لَمَّا يَدْخُلِ الْإِيمانُ فِي قُلُوبِكُمْ وَ إِنْ تُطِيعُوا اللَّهَ وَ رَسُولَهُ لا يَلِتْكُمْ مِنْ أَعْمالِكُمْ شَيْئاً إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ (49:14). Meaning: The Bedouin Arabs say: We Believe. Tell O, Messenger! To them:" You have not believed", so you only should say that say: "We submitted to Islam"; since in fact, belief has not yet entered your hearts, but if you obey God and His Messenger, nothing will be reduced from the reward of your deeds; verily, God is the Merciful Forgiving". According to this verse, the first level of faith is the expression of Islam and its acceptance, which it may still have not believed in its religion heartily. This first stage of faith leads to the acceptance of man at the divine sight and deeds, although he has not yet found certainty in his heart. The second level of faith is subordination by the heart and spiritual submission. At this stage, the person accepts this tradition and adjusts his behaviour accordingly. As the Quran says: يا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا ادْخُلُوا فِي السِّلْمِ كَافَّةً (2:208). Meaning: O who believe, submit yourselves and enter into the will of God completely. At this time, motives other than the love for God may lead to the actions of the believer, such as reaching paradise or fear of hell. The third level of faith is the same as we have previously mentioned, in which, man is seeking to receive the divine pleasure and the love for God. In this stage, man is intrigued with the inter motive and has no motive other than Allah.

The Quran explicitly refers that divine satisfaction is higher than paradise and divine reward. It says: وَعَدَ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتِ جَنَّاتٍ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ خَالِدِينَ فِيهَا وَ مَسَاكِنَ طَيِّبَةً فِي جَنَّاتِ عَدْنٍ وَ رِضْوَانٌ مِنَ اللَّهِ أَكْبَرُ ذَلِكَ هُوَ الْفَوْزُ الْعَظِيمُ (9:73). Meaning: God has promised the believers, men and women, Gardens wherein in Streams flow, forever they will live and in the excellent mansions of the Gardens of Eden, but God's pleasure is more important than all it is the supreme triumph.

In some traditions, there are inspirational themes that have set forth the guidance of the Lord and his companion as the highest motive, and even put it precisely against motives such as fear of God's retribution or the passion of paradise. For example, Ali (May God blesses him) has said: إن قوما عبدوا الله رغبة فتلك عبادة التجار وإن قوما عبدوا الله رهبة فتلك عبادة العبيد و إن قوما عبدوا الله شكرا فتلك عبادة الأحرار (Ibn abī al-Hadīd al-Mutazilī 2008. Vol. 19, p. 68). In Ali's opinion, those who worship God only for thanks and duty are considered free, and that the worship of those who are motivated by the passion of paradise or fear of hell is not free. It is good to remember Kant's words that the freedom of the will is when one does his duty for the sake of duty and nothing else. Has Kant seen the words of Ali? Did Kant get these Islamic resources when he spoke of free will?

Al-Ghazālī refers to a narrative on which Jesus Christ saw a group that was distressed and unpleasant. Jesus asked why you felt this way. They answered: "we have fallen into this situation due to fear of God's retribution". Jesus prayed that God would make them safe from torment grievance. Then he saw another group that they were bad and distressed, and when Jesus asked their condition, they said: "We have come to this, from the passion for paradise". Jesus also prayed for them. Then he left them and visited a third group who were most unpleasant, but their faces were bright and clear. Jesus asked their condition, and they said: "We fell in love with God". Jesus said to them:

"You are God's friends, and God has commanded me to deal with you and be like you" (Al- Ghazālī 1985, p. 76).

Therefore, in the Islamic moral system, there is a hierarchy of ethical motives that begins at the lowest level which is the eagerness of heaven and the fear of hell and rises to the highest levels, namely the love of God and to meet Allah. Those who view the Islamic moral system as incompatible with the autonomy have considered the lowest stage of this hierarchy and have not considered its higher levels. While, for the comparison between autonomy and the Islamic moral system, we must consider the highest levels of this system because, in Kant's ethical system, autonomy is the highest level and the perfect goal of moral education.

CHAPTER 5: THE THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AUTONOMY ON THE OBJECTIVES OF ISLAMIC MORAL EDUCATION

5.1   Introduction

The effects of accepting autonomy will manifest in the objectives and methods of moral education.[3] Acceptance of this theory will not affect the content of Islamic moral education.

5.1.1   Constancy of the Islamic moral education's content despite the adoption of the autonomy

The reason is that, autonomy is advocated only in the part of the ethics that relates to the worldly connections of mankind, and guarantees the moral living in this world .Only in this part our reason has the ability to understand morality and legislation. In what provides for the prosperity of the afterlife and the regulation of human communication with the supernatural world and God, reason has no such ability, and it falls outside the scope of autonomy.

On the other hand, in the worldly part of ethics, religion has no distinct and independent moral ordinance. In this field, religion directs our attention to the commands of reason. In the fourth chapter, we discussed the broad reasons for this claim. One of our most important reasons was that there are no religious or moral

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[3] In the current study, autonomy is intended only in the field of moral education, so other parts of education are outside the scope of our study. Now that we are studying the effects of autonomy's acceptance, we are only pursuing these consequences in the field of moral education, and we do not do anything in the other parts of education.

statements in this section that cannot be understood by reason. As there is no religious moral statement makes confrontation with the reason in this section. That is why; acceptance of autonomy has no effect on the content of the material section of Islamic ethics.

An important point about the content of moral education: It is now worthwhile mentioning one of the most important points about the content. we divide morality into two parts of the worldly and afterlife, and because we consider the function of the autonomy only in the first part, that is, the worldly part, therefore, the ethical content which is presented in this system, is the same and integrated for all, aim at, this content includes the same moral values, because the source for determining this content is the common reason between human beings. This is one way to solve several issues in moral education, but is such a system feasible?

In the field of educational content, the moral values and norms are taught that the common reason among human beings, regardless of religions, cultures, ethnicities, etc, is confirmed. So, instead of choosing these values and norms from the resources of each nation, they are based on common wisdom, and then universal values are taught globally.

The integrated content of moral education has nothing to do with what has been called globalisation and global citizenship in recent decades. Globalisation education and citizenship seek to design an integrated system while respecting those differences. Oxfam [4] stated that the global citizen is aware of the wider world, has a sense of role as a global citizen, and at the same time they respect differences and varieties. Therefore, it

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[4] The International Confederation composed of 15 organisations working in 98 countries around the world, working with partners and allies around the world, is working to find sustainable solutions to poverty and injustice.

should be noted that the integrated content of moral education, is not to be mistaken with globalisation nor with the global citizenship.

As we mentioned before, *Ash'arī* theology *believes* in the ability of human reason to recognise good and evil in the field of human acts. Hence, the integrated content of moral education can be developed based on a common reason among human beings. Therefore, if it is possible to understand the commands of wisdom in this area through rational consensus based on common human wisdom, there will not be differences between people in the case of moral values. If moral values attributed to wisdom can be ensured, as well as knowing there is no impact from the milieu, lifestyle, and other conditions, it would not conflict with Islam.

Content is the values and norms that are to be transmitted to the learners and followers during the process of education. In the integrated content of moral education, the same values and norms are taught that are based on the shared common wisdom among human beings. Therefore, differences in people will not lead to differences in ethics.

5.1.2   The situation of the Islamic moral education's objectives and methods

The situation is different in terms of objectives and methods. The goal of education is to attain the desired status of educational activities. One of the resources to identify educational goals is considering human needs. We refer to the Maslow pyramid in this regard. John Dewey has said that the objectives of education should be based on the needs of the individual (Beckett, 2018). Thus, one of the most important parts of educational studies is identifying and determining the goals of education.

When it comes to the goal of moral education, we must recognise that we are facing two concepts. First, the concept of the main and final purpose of moral education.

Second, the phases and sub-objectives of moral education (McDowell, 2004). The ultimate goal of moral education is based on the foundations of belief of the moral system has been based on. We know that Islam believes in life after death, and human beings during his worldly life gain some states that will affect his life in the Hereafter. Therefore, the final goal of Islamic moral education is related to both the material life and the afterlife.

Achieving the ultimate goal of moral education is possible if steps have already been taken, because the ultimate goal is not attained at once. These steps, are goal-oriented or sub-objectives. Stage goals are ways to reach the ultimate goal, and they are not relevant.

Although Muslim scholars have derived the stages of education from Islamic sources, the difference between this section and the content of Islamic moral education is that the statements of content in the worldly part of ethics are clearly and explicitly align with human reason. So, if we want to build moral education based autonomy, then there won't be any problem in this section. But relating to the objectives of each phase of moral education, there are some statements among the Islamic sources, which the scholars have extracted and explained the stages of the Islamic moral education and its phase. Some of these sub-objectives seem to be inconsistent with the autonomy. Moral education, and the scholar of Islamic education, who has accepted the autonomy, should consider these issues and discuss them.

By studying these statements and their objectives, we have found that they refer to different levels of moral growth. Nevertheless, with the acceptance of autonomy in Islamic education, the goals of each phase differ while the ultimate goal remains. Then, the highest level should be introduced as a phase goal. In other words, their lower and

minimum stages are in fact the sub-objectives for achieving the highest and uppermost level of the goals.

The acceptance of autonomy affects the sub-goals of Islamic moral education, but does not affect the ultimate goal. Its effects are confined to sub-objectives and stages.

Based on these sub-objectives some educational methods will change. So in the next chapter (Chapter 6), we will see the changes in some common methods of Islamic moral education.

The changes that occur in the sub- objectives and methods require a theoretical discussion to determine the view of Islam in this regard before it comes to practice. For example, when we talk about the necessity of abandoning habituation as a method of moral education, we should know what is the position of Islam about this educational method and its alternatives.

5.2   The final goal and sub-objectives of the Islamic moral education

Muslim educators have extracted the final goal and stage objectives, by referring to the Quran and Sunnah. The identification of the final goal is different from identifying the sub-objectives. The final goal of moral education is recognisable according to the nature and purpose of ethics. Moral education implies the growth and development of a person's morality. Hence the final goal of moral education is to achieve an ethical life. The various ethical schools do not affect the final goal because they share in the moralisation or achievement of an ethical life. Of course, ethical life is an interpretable concept, so every ethical school, comment on it in accordance with their foundations and beliefs, but, for all of them, the final goal is to achieve the ethical life. They identify the sub-objectives because each ethical school, according to the interpretation of ethical

life, provides steps to achieve the final goal. Thus, different ethical schools have a significant impact on the identification and introduction of sub-objectives.

5.2.1   The interpretation of final goal in Islamic moral education

The interpretation of final goal in Islamic moral education is based on Islamic ethics. Ethics are divided into two parts. The first aims to provide for the well-being of mankind in the material world and the other seeks his prosperity in the Hereafter. Providing human prosperity in each is done through regulating human communication with others based on ethical rules. In the material world, other humans, animals, creatures of God, and man are the parties of communication. So, the goal of providing human prosperity in this section means that human communication with these beings should be based on morality. In the second division, Allah and the supernatural are the parties such that the relationship of man with his Creator should be regulated based on morality for happiness in the afterlife.

Accordingly, the final goal of Islamic ethics is human happiness in life and the Hereafter. This final goal will be done by adorning the person with good traits and behavior, which guarantees man's welfare in this life and the next. So, the final goal of Islamic moral education is to bring man to ethics and behavior that guarantees the welfare of man in his life and hereafter. By accepting autonomy in Islamic moral education, the final goal depends on autonomy, which sub- objectives should be adjusted accordingly.

5.2.2   Sub-objectives of Islamic moral education

The final goal of moral education is to bring a person, to the traits, attributes and ethics that provide the happiness of worldly and the afterlife. Therefore, sub-objectives (phases) should be aligned with this final goal, and steps should be taken to bring the

person to those traits and ethics. For both the worldly and eternal goals, the sub-objectives and phases must be proportional to the final goal. Moral scholars have not raised the stages of each of the two parts of ethics independently, but have set out a collection of educational objectives where some of them have worldly functions, and others aim for the afterlife. In these sources, cultivation of the soul, *al-tazkīyah* التزكية, the creation of the spirit of brotherhood, the guidance for the provision of needs and instincts, are some of the stages of moral education (Kinsey, 1982).

In our view, in order to be able to chart the stages of moral education, first we must determine this issue in accordance with the final goal of each part of ethics. Then, according to the final goal of each part, the sub-objectives will be identified independently. When we come to worldly moral education, and consider its dependence on autonomy, we should regard the sub-objectives of this section in proportion to autonomy.

In the secular part of ethics, autonomy rules that observance of reason and freedom of the will are essential. The consequence is that, in moral education, the sub-objectives should be the pursuit of reason and freedom of the will. The otherworldly aspect of ethics is governed by religion, and then the stages and sub-objectives of this section must also be determined in proportion to what causes human prosperity in the afterlife. We are not talking about the phases of this section (the otherworldly part of morality) due to the scope of autonomy, since it does not appear in this section, so the autonomy in this section does not work and has no function.

Since autonomy is based on the two pillars, the sub-objectives and phases of worldly ethics are also determined by these two pillars. But the sub-objectives of the Islamic moral education in its current state are not so.

It should be noted that Muslim scholars have emphasised two objectives for the moral education. These two axes are 1. The main purpose of education is the Hereafter, and the worldly life is a tool and for attaining the prosperity and happiness in the life after death. 2. The main goal of education is obedience and adherence to religion.

Professor Syed *Muhammad Naquīb bin Alī Al-Attās* comments:

The modem secular education decides its final goal as happiness in this world while Islamic education considers life, as the means to attain happiness in Akhirah' (the life after death). This simply suggests that Islamic education lay stress on life after death (Al-Attās, 1979, p. 177).

As for the purpose of obedience to religion as the main goal of education, professor *Al-Attās* points out that education is a process aimed at embedding Islamic beliefs in the hearts and minds of the recipient (Ibid). There is a central point in this definition, as well as the similar definitions given among Muslim scholars about education, that is, the role of the learner and recipient is subordinate. In view of this, the recipients are constantly called for adherence due to the relationship that education has with Islamic beliefs. Perhaps the next statement by professor *Al-Attās* describes this view better. He writes:

Thus, the essence of education in Islam is religious. It makes man conscious of the fact that the mind he possesses and which affects his life and activities is not perfect and can attain perfection only when it works under the guidance of the supreme mind (p. 178).

Elsewhere he says: "The sole aim of bringing harmony and solidarity in man's physical, mental, emotional and moral aspects of life is to make him able to discharge the great responsibility of God's vicegerency" (p. 179).

The phrase that *Al-Attās* has quoted from the first world conference on Muslim education represents this central point of view:

Education should aim at the balanced growth of the total personality of man through training of the human spirit, intellect, rational self, feelings and senses. The training imparted to a Muslim must be such that faith is infused into the whole of his personality and creates in him an emotional attachment to Islam and enable him to follow the Quran and Sunnah and be governed by Islamic system of values willingly and joyfully, so that he may proceed to the realisation of his status as Khalifatullah to whom Allah has promised the authority of the universe(p. 180).

The emphasis of Islamic education scholars on these two axes as the main goals of education has led other scholars to view Islamic education as being incompatible with autonomy and its values. Halstead (2007) Says:

From an Islamic perspective, personal and moral autonomy (whether based on theories of rights or on Kantian individualism) is a kind of nonsense, for two reasons: First, it involves usurping God's own position as the judge of good and evil; and second, it cuts the individual off from the community of faith (p. 289).

It should not be forgotten that some interpretations of Muslim scholars have also fuelled such views. For example, consider these words of professor Al-Attās (1979) "This consciousness of the weaknesses of the human mind is awakened through education" (p. 178). *Al-Attās* emphasises that the mission of education is to inform a person that his intellect and mind are not sufficiently capable.

The perception of scholars such as Halstead is that, Muslims see intellect and religion as opposing forces. This misunderstanding has not only occurred in the context of the objectives associated with the first element of the autonomy (law of reason), but there is also such a misconception in connection to the second pillar, namely the freedom of the will. For example, Halstead (2007) says:

The Quran makes it clear that everyone is responsible for their own actions… and that all humans will receive rewards and punishments from God in the Hereafter based on their actions in this world. These approaches to motivation would be unlikely to be judged satisfactory by many Western experts (p. 292).

To this end, the current study should introduce and discuss the sub-objectives of moral education that are fully compatible with autonomy in order to prove that these

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stages are approved by Islamic teachings. The sub-objectives are presented in accordance with both pillars of autonomy.

Theoretical discussion from the Islamic perspective on these sub-objectives is not just about the disambiguation about the Muslim scholars' purpose in moral education, but there is a need for studying and proposing solutions due to seemingly opposing evidence in Islamic sources.

5.3 Autonomy's compatible sub-objectives

As we have said, since there are two main pillars in autonomy, the sub-objectives of the moral education are also according to these two. The first element is the following of the reason, and the second pillar is the freedom of the will.

5.3.1 The Autonomy's compatible sub-objectives, related to the first pillar

Before the time comes to follow the law of reason, the commensurate sub-objectives must take place so that human beings reach the stage of the legislation of reason.

Kant used the symbolic term "The Kingdom of Ends" where reason rules and governs. He has a well-known saying: "Act so that you can be a member of lawmakers of that hypothetical state by your maxims (Immanuel Kant, 2016, p. 76). The Kingdom of Ends is pointing to a unitary system that acts based on the common rationality of all wise beings. In this system, each member has a determining role of his will as a lawmaker and is also responsible for other members (Ibid). The unity and the structure that governs the integrated system (despite being all lawmakers) are because each member has the same law for himself and other members. The people are not members of this system, but wisdom is its member, and every rational being passes a law in which others will also pass in the same situation. For this reason, in the ideal system of ends, all members set the same ethical rules and maintain unity (Ibid).

Kant advises everyone to become a member of the Kingdom of Ends. Membership in this system is a sub-objective of being autonomous. Reaching the stage of legislation of reason occurs in the event that some important steps are taken in moral education. Without these actions, it is impossible to achieve the stage of the legislation of reason. The first step is to release the thinking and the second step is providing the moral content in the initial stages of moral education and confining this tutorial to the early stages. The third step is recognising and understanding the difference between the commandments of reason and instinctive pleasures.

5.3.1.1 Unlimited releasing the thinking by achieving the productive thinking

Releasing the thinking means removing all boundaries and constraints from thinking and letting people think whatever they can, and use their unlimited power of thought. In the event that human thought is released and becomes independent, rational power becomes available, and the person is gradually prepared for the stage of legislation of reason. This is a difficult process which depends on achieving productive thought.

(a) *Different styles of thinking*

There are different styles of thinking. Some scholars have mentioned 13 thinking styles categorised into two groups (Sternberg & Zhang, 2005). 1. Simple Styles: In these styles, simple information is processed. The executive style (which is based on the commands and obedience), local thinking style (which addresses the specific dimensions and characteristics of a particular subject), single axis style (which is based on the focus on the specific command), and conservative thinking style (which is based on the preservation of existing conditions and observance of the status and rules) are classified among simple thinking styles (Ibid). 2. Productive Thinking Styles: People who use productive thinking styles seek to challenge norms and accept risk. There are several styles classified in this genre, namely includes legislative style (based on the

tendency to invent, design, and do things accordance with the special method that the agent has chosen), judicial style (based on the tendency to judge phenomena and others), general style (based on the tendency to the overall approach to phenomena and abstract beliefs), hierarchical style (based on tendency to the prioritisation of phenomena and pyramidal thinking about them) and liberal thinking style (based on opposition to the conventional beliefs and presenting new methods) (Ibid).

The scholars also refer to four other styles, which are an internal and external tendency to anarchy, and internal and external tendency to grouping (Lacki, 2003). These four styles cannot be categorised in one of the two categories (simple and productive), because sometimes these styles fall into the simple style and sometimes the productive (Shokri, Kadivar, Farzad, & Daneshvarpour, 2008).

(b) *Productive thinking*

Except for the legislative and liberal style, that is based on the introduction of the new model, the remaining productive styles are not acceptable because none of these styles presents a new model, but judge for a phenomenon (in the case of judicial), or prioritisation of phenomena (in the hierarchical style), or focusing on the general form of a phenomenon and its abstract idea (in the general style). Therefore, none of these can be considered productive thinking. On the other hand, we assume that, the legislative style has no distinction from the liberal style, and in fact, it is one of the examples of the liberal thinking style. So it can be concluded that, the productive style is unique in which is so-called liberal style.

Then thinking styles can be categorised into three parts: 1. Simple thinking styles. 2. Analytically-oriented thinking styles (including judicial, general and hierarchical styles). 3. Productive style (liberal thinking). Moreover, it must also be concluded that

the anarchic style of thinking cannot be conceived in any way as productive because it does not lead to the presentation of a new model, but aims at the collapse of the existing order. As well as the group-oriented style, which cannot really be considered as a thinking style, this term actually reflects the motive of thinking and does not refer to a particular style. This context and motivation can be considered as the environment of formation of the thought, as it can be the environment for forming simple thinking or analytic thinking. So, basically, we do not count this title into thinking styles.

The result is that, all forms that have been proposed as productive thinking are not included in our definition of productive thinking. Rather, we define it as creative and liberal thinking.

All people have somewhat creative thinking, but, like the rest of the talents, the amount of this attribute varies from person to person (Clinton & Hokanson, 2012). Creativity has four components of fluidity, expansion, invention and flexibility. Fluidity means the ability to provide various solutions to solve problems. Expansion is the ability to plan and organise in the execution of different affairs. The element of the invention is to get away from obvious issues, in other words, to break the relationship with habitual thinking. Flexibility refers to the ability to create a new pattern of thinking and not rely on existing thinking patterns (Martiniano, 2016).

(c) *Difference between productive thinking and critical thinking*
We find that productive thinking differs from what is now considered critical thinking and is a tool for reaching productive thought. Productive thinking has the power of birth and creativity and can recognise good and bad in every situation and circumstance. Identify the values and understand the vices. Productive thinking has a positive side, while critical thinking has a negative one. Even if we interpret critical thinking in the

sense of independent thinking without interacting with others(Sean A. Mckitrick & Barnes., 2012), it still has a negative aspect and includes that the influence of others conflicts with the critical thinking.

In order to explain what has been said, it is good to know critical thinking so that we can understand the difference between these two. The history of critical thinking is old. Socrates in 2500 BC emphasised the significance of searching for evidence and reason for all beliefs (Boghossian, 2006). Paul Halpern (as quoted in Lampert 2007), expresses his definition of critical thinking: "Using cognitive skills and tricks that increase the likelihood of achieving a satisfactory result. Critical Thinking is purpose-based thinking which is in accordance with the reasoning. And also is guided thinking"(Lampert, 2007, p. 26).

Concluding the comments from more than 40 researchers has led to the formation of a comprehensive definition of critical thinking by Facione. He describes it as: "A deliberate and self-observer judgement that is the result of interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference. Moreover, judgement, based on the explanation of the evidence, rational methodological considerations. Critical thinking is an indispensable tool for research" (Facione & Facione, 2007, p. 40). He adds:

An ideal critical thinker used to be, informed, optimistic, intelligent, flexible, and fair in assessing what he is doing. Also, an ideal critical thinker, faces honestly with personal prejudices, has cautious judgements, willingness to revision, decisive regarding complex disciplines. He has persevered in seeking information, has reasonable standards of choice, centralised at the research, and is a consistent with research progress as far as the subject matter under study, and the existing conditions allow him" (Ibid, p. 41).

All the features that have been expressed in the definition of critical thought are passive and explain the privileges of this kind of thinking toward beliefs. This is its negative aspect.

Contrary to critical thinking, productive thinking does not seek merely judgement about beliefs, but the production and creation of new beliefs and rational orders. Before reaching the level of productive thought, there is a need for free and critical thinking, as researchers have noted a relationship between liberal thinking and critical thinking from one side, and with productive thought form another one (Kourany, 2014). This relationship is not between two types of thinking, rather, the relation of one step to the next. A person who does not have critical thinking cannot have productive thought.

(d) *The position of productive thinking in Islamic moral education*

Now that we are well versed in the definition of the subject matter and its elements, we will return to our discussion. The main question is how is the position of productive thinking in Islamic moral education? Here, like the mistake we have already seen about the confusion between the pattern of ethics and law, has raised about the pattern of moral education and the pattern of religious education. We have repeatedly said that, our reason does not apply in the realm of religion and it cannot recognize the criterion of religious law, and therefore cannot be a source of Islamic law. Hence, those who consider reason as a way of discovering the rules of sharia and religion have gone wrong. The function of productive thinking in the domain of religion is limited to understanding the sources of religion, namely the Quran and the Sunnah, and the extraction of the commandments of these sources. Productive thinking in the sense of moral education is not the same with productive thinking in the realm of religion.

1. The methodical limitation in productive thinking in the field of religion: There is a particular method for using productive thought in the field of religion. The interpretation of the Quran and the understanding of the Prophet's Hadith are subject to certain criteria(Abū Zahrah, 2010). Now we do not want to enter this discussion at all, and do not talk about the method of deducing religious sources. Our goal is to show that

the limitation of this method is exclusive to the field of religion, and does not relate to the field of worldly ethics.

2. Limitation on the domain of thinking: In some Islamic narrations, there is evidence showing opposition to thinking about certain topics. For example, *'Alī ibn Abī Talib* stated: اتى رجل على بن ابى طالب فقال: اخبرنى عن القدر؟ فقال:" طريق مظلم فلا تسلكه". قال:اخبرنى عن القدر؟ فقال بحر عميق فلا تلجه". قال: اخبرنى عن القدر؟ فقال:" سرّ الله فلا تكلفه. Meaning: A man came to *'Alī* and asked him about the fate القدر *'Alī* replied: "It is a dark road, do not enter it" (do not think about it). The man asked him again about the fate القدر *'Alī* replied: "There is a deep sea, do not enter it". The man asked him again, and *'Alī* replied: "This is a divine secret, do not bother yourself to know it" (Ibn abī al-Hadīd al-Mutazilī 2008. Vol. 19, p. 181).

Needless to say that the subject of fate القدر is a religious issue, which is not understandable without referring to religious sources. It is not possible to rely on reason for knowing this subject in depth. On the other hand, referring to religious sources and the extraction of these resources requires expertise and the use of a special method. For this reason, *Alī* has forbidden the questioner to comment on this issue. Therefore, productive thinking in the realm of religious issues is subject to limitations because of the need for the use of relevant knowledge. It cannot be concluded that Islam is opposed to productive thinking in non-religious matters.

Two exceptional cases in religious matters: At the same time, even in religious matters, Islam does not have any limitations on the thinking for those who have the required knowledge and expertise and face the topics with a scientific point of view.

As well as Islamic recommendations on using productive thinking in case of choosing religion. We know that in Islam, the choice of religion must be made with

deliberation and after great consideration (Ibn abī al-ʻizz al-hanafī, 1997, p. 19). According to Islamic teachings, everyone must think and discuss religion, and choose a religion based on consciousness and thought (Hazm, 1996. Vol. 2, p. 329). Based on this Islamic principle, no one can choose their religion based on emotions and imitation of others, even their parents (M Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 2000. Vol. 3, p 653). *Al-Jurjānī*, believes that there is no disagreement among Muslims in this regard (A. i. M. Al-Jurjānī, 1998. Vol. 1, p. 251).

The choice of religion based on argumentation has been proposed in several verses and some narrations such as: قُلِ انْظُرُوا ما ذا فِي السَّماواتِ وَ الْأَرْضِ (10: 101). Meaning: Behold and notice what is in the heavens and in the earth. And says: فَانْظُرْ إِلى آثارِ رَحْمَتِ (30: 50)اللَّهِ كَيْفَ يُحْيِ الْأَرْضَ بَعْدَ مَوْتِها إِنَّ ذلِكَ لَمُحْيِ الْمَوْتى وَ هُوَ عَلى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ. Meaning: Behold and pay attention to the marks of God's mercy, how He will quicken the earth after it was dead, surely, He revives the dead. According to *Al-Jurjānī*, Muslim scholars have interpreted the Arabic word "انظروا" (behold) as: thinking and using the argument (A. i. M. Al-Jurjānī, 1998. Vol. 1, p. 252). The Quran also said: شَهِدَ اللَّهُ أَنَّهُ لا إِلهَ إِلَّا هُوَ وَ الْمَلائِكَةُ وَ (3: 18)أُولُوا الْعِلْمِ قائِماً بِالْقِسْطِ لا إِلهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ. Meaning: God testifies that there is no God but. He and the angels, and men possessed of knowledge. Regarding this verse the Prophet of Islam has said: ويل لمن قرء هذه السورة ثم لم يتفكر فيها اى فى خلق السموات و الارض Woe, to anyone who listens to this verse and does not think to find signs of God" (Al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, 1981. Vol. 1, p. 570). It also says: فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ لا إِلهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ (47: 19). Meaning: Know (Muhammad) that there is no God, but Allah. In this verse, *Al Taftāzanī* says: "God has commanded to know the truth about him. The commandment of God is obligatory, so we have to know God by knowledge" (Al- Taftāzānī, 1988. Vol. 1, p. 265). The Quran says: لِيَهْلِكَ مَنْ هَلَكَ عَنْ بَيِّنَةٍ وَ يَحْيى مَنْ حَيَّ عَنْ بَيِّنَةٍ وَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَسَمِيعٌ عَلِي (8:42). Meaning: Those who perished might perish by a clear proof, and by a clear sign he might live who lived. In the famous narrative from the Prophet, he told his companion

Muādh ibn Jabal - when he was sent to Yemen - teach the people about God, and after their knowledge of God, then teach them about Islam and its rules (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 1, p. 233).

The result is that Islam does not disagree with productive thinking in material affairs. It also does not constrain such thinking in the domain of religious affairs when adopting a scientific and methodological approach. Productive thought is the first step toward the advent of the legislation of reason.

5.3.1.2 Allocating the teaching of moral content in the initial stage of moral education

As one of the keys to reaching reason as the moral legislator is to have knowledge of moral values. In this discussion, we will oppose the two groups. 1. Radical Western autonomous supporters who viewed moral education as being opposed to autonomy. They claim that teaching ethical values does not lead to being autonomous in recipients. 2. Some Muslim scholars who believe that the presentation of moral content is not limited to the initial stages of moral education, and it must be done continuously and in all stages. Ethical teaching should be conducted, and one should follow these teachings. The first group considers the provision and teaching of moral information to children and adolescents as opposed to autonomy, and believe that, in this way, the children and student follow the values he has learned the values of their teachers and parents. The second group argue that Islam recommended unlimited ethical teaching for all stages of education until the end of life; hence, at no stage should these tutorials be stopped. So the discussion with each of these two groups should be pursued individually and separately.

(a) *Providing ethical content in the early stages of education does not conflict with autonomy*

The conflict between the provisions of information relating to ethical values is assumed in the teaching and training of these values. Opponents consider the teaching of these values, as opposed to the authority of self-choice and the legislation of reason. On the basis of self-reliance, we consider a person self-regulating when the cause of his choices is internal. This is not consistent with the teaching of ethical content because a person is influenced by outside education and external training.

This incompatibility is believed by many fans of autonomy. For example, Kohlberg (as quoted in Saunders, 2010) believes that teaching moral content prevents a person from becoming autonomous. According to Kohlberg, education should be allocated in the form of rational ethic and should not include moral content(Saunders, 2010). Other supporters of autonomy have also rejected ethical teaching and considered it incompatible with being autonomous (JOHNSTON, 2007; Löfström & Pyhältö, 2017).

The viewpoints of those who considered ethical teaching to be incompatible with autonomy is not acceptable. Autonomy is the final stage of moral education. When we talk about the autonomic system, do not mean that in the first stage of training everyone has the ability to behave autonomously and independently on the basis of rational identities. However, the purpose is that the educational system should move to the point where the people reach this ability. Regarding this important point makes it clear that education is a process and the achievement of autonomy has to take place step by step.

At an early stage, actions such as teaching and providing information on ethical values are necessary. Because at this stage the recipient has not reached the stage of self-determination so that he can lay down his moral law and follow it.

Having information in each subject is a prerequisite for thinking about the subject. Therefore, in ethics, in order to be able to reach the stage of legislation of reason, we must have the necessary and relevant information. So we will be able to deal with it in the next stage, and regulate and pass our law in accordance with the circumstances and conditions.

Attention to this point has led to the emergence of a view among the supporters of the theory of autonomy, which agrees with the teaching of ethical content (Munson, 1976; Schmenk, 2005; Smith & Smith, 2013). For example, we mention Peters. Although Peters is a pioneer in defence of autonomy in education, he believes in teaching moral content (R.S. Peters, 1974). Peter believes that the presentation of ethical content based on the common and public heritage of humanity does not limit the freedom and autonomy of man. In his opinion, the guidance of others, the common traditions and the recommendations are given regarding content, does not prevent human growth from becoming autonomous (Ibid). Peters considered the initial stages of moral education. In these stages, the presentation of ethical content and its teaching does not conflict with freedom and autonomy.

Peters provides three reasons for the need to teach ethical content. His first reason is that understanding ethical principles (moral values) without the knowledge of the ethical content is not possible (Ibid). This reason, in fact, points out to the same matter that we have already said, that is, the need of information to think about it. The second reason is that the teaching of ethical principles will protect children in the early stages and, as a result, their health, as well as that of the community, will be preserved (Ibid). Perhaps Peters means that children in the early stages do not have a high degree of reasoning and understanding, and they are not able to correctly identify good and bad in different situations and positions, so they cannot act ethically on the basis of their own

reason's instructions. Therefore, if our children are left in these stages without the necessary teaching, and in conditions that they still do not understand good and bad, while they are unable to legislate based on their reason, then they are at risk of being subjected to unethical behaviour. These behaviours will be harmful both to themselves and society. The third reason is that ethical content teaches children to behave morally in the early stages and gradually become cognizant of ethical principles and conduct. They will become morally disciplined, and an ethical life will be easier for them in the future (Ibid). We are not in agreement with this third reason. This reason accepts the use of the habituation method and suggests that early ethical behaviour causes the child to become accustomed to such behaviours and will soon become easier for him to live a moral life. This is while; we will see in the future, that, the habituation is exactly the opposite of the autonomous spirit. What we emphasise in the early stages is teaching ethical content rather than getting children to behave ethically. There is a lot of difference between these two things, which is not considered in the third reason for Peter.

An important point in the work of people like Peters is that, in the autonomous education system, the teaching of ethical content in the early stages has its specific characteristics. That is, ethical content should be presented in a way that is consistent with the strength of the student and child's rationality. This is because the child in the next step can evaluate what he has learned and decide on their reason for he. Therefore, parents and educators must provide ethical content in a rational way (Ibid). I think one of the conditions for rationalising the presentation of moral content is that all statements that are presented should be accompanied by a rational justification for good or evil.

(b) *Providing ethical content in the early stages of education is acceptable in Islam*

We have seen that the presentation of ethical content in the primary stages is not in conflict with the autonomy. However, the continuation of such education is at odds with the highest levels of autonomy. Because at the highest level, one has to follow the law of his reason, and no external factor should affect him. For this reason, ethical teaching in the final stage of moral education is not acceptable from the standpoint of autonomy and should be limited to the initial stages of education.

Those who oppose such a restriction and believe that the teaching of ethical content should be done forever, continuously, have argued based on evidence in the Islamic sources.

1. **Traditions that recommend teaching and learning**: For example, there is a well-known narration from the Prophet "طلب العلم فريضة على كل مسلم" (Ibn Mājah al-Rabʿī al-Qazwīnī, 2003. Vol. 1, p. 81). Meaning: Acquisition of knowledge is the duty of every Muslim. Or he says:"الدنيا ملعونة، ملعون ما فيها، إلا ذكر الله تعالى وما والاه وعالم أو متعلم" (AL- MUNĀWĪ, 1995. VOL. 4, P. 487). Meaning: The world and all things there, are cursed, except the thing that reminds of God; the scientist and the person who is learning science: من سلك طريقا يلتمس فيه علما سهل الله له به طريقا الى الجنة (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 5, p. 196). Meaning: Everyone goes in a way of acquiring knowledge; God will pave the path to heaven for him. And he says: ان فضل العلم خير من فضل العبادة (Āl- HĀkim al- niyshābūrīʾ, 1986. Vol. 1, p. 92). Meaning: virtue and dignity of science is more than the virtue and honour of worship.

In the study of these narratives, what is proposed in these traditions, as well as some verses, which recommend learning and acquisition of knowledge, deals with the subject of teaching and learning and do not have anything to do with moral education? On the

basis of Islam's recommendation, man must always be learning. But does this mean that a person has to learn moral values during his life and has a role as a student and recipient forever? One must be trained in such a way that he ultimately can discover moral values and adapt them in different ways. This is the legislation of reason emphasised in autonomy. If an individual has to learn moral values until the end, then he will remain in the first phase of ethical education, and no steps have been taken.

Even in the case of teaching and learning that does not relate to moral education, scholars have also suggested moving to create thought, after completing learning in a particular period, to produce the intellectual products(Motahharī, 2007). They believe that whosoever is constantly learning and never had an opportunity for creativity and production and initiative has not taken a proper course in learning (Ibid).

This point is also mentioned in the Islamic sources. The Prophet (PBUH) said: العلم علمان: علم فى القلب فذاك العلم النافع، و علم على اللسان فذلك حجة الله عزوجلّ على ابن آدم (Al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, 1981. Vol. 10, p.182). Meaning: knowledge is in two sections. The knowledge that is in the heart and the knowledge that is on the tongue. And what is beneficial is the knowledge that lies in the human heart. Many scholars have interpreted this Hadith and said that the meaning of knowledge in the heart is what is rooted in the mind of a human and his creativity and not heard from others, but is the product of his thinking. Therefore, learning is also to be combined with thinking and creation.

2. **The position of preaching and advice in religious sources**: The second argument against those who do not accept the limitation in presenting moral content is the emphasis placed in Islamic sources on preaching and advising. For example, the Quran says: ادْعُ إِلَى سَبِيلِ رَبِّكَ بِالْحِكْمَةِ وَ الْمَوْعِظَةِ الْحَسَنَةِ (16:125). Meaning: Call mankind to

the path of your Creator With wisdom and good Preaching. And there are many traditions that report the preaching of the people by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

We do not want to quote these reports here. As well as we do not want to enter the discussion on the position of preaching and advice in Islam. This is an independent discussion that requires the writing of an extensive book on this subject. What is relevant to our discussion is that preaching and advising are different from teaching and learning. In preaching, the listener remembers what he knows and learned before. Everyone needs these reminders, and this reminder is not in conflict with the observing the law of reason and autonomy. That is why, in the Islamic sources, we see that the elder companions of the Prophet (PBUH) asked each other to preach (Al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, 1981. Vol. 16, p. 207-208).

To sum up, we find that Islam does not disagree with the limitation of the teaching of moral content to the initial stages of education, and there is no reason to prove that Islam has recommended the teaching of moral content until the last stage of education. What is in Islamic sources is related to learning and teaching, or about preaching and advising, which are different issues from the subject we are discussing.

5.3.1.3 Distinguishing between the orders of reason and instinctive pleasures

One of the sub-objectives to be considered in moral education according to the first element of autonomy is to reach the stage of distinguishing between the commandments of reason and the instinct's pleasures and desires. The significance of the issue will be clear regarding the opposition of many Muslim scholars in this regard. Muslim scholars have criticised the theory of autonomy due to confusing between reason's orders and instinct desires (Ahmed, 2018; Saada & Gross, 2017). They claim that autonomous training leads human beings to follow oneself. And this concept (oneself) is beyond

their reason. When his instincts call him somewhere, it is he who commands himself. Therefore, autonomous education makes a man comes to a point where he follows his instinct (Waghid & Davids, 2014).

In contrast to this claim, the goal of autonomous education is to bring one to a level to differentiate between the command of reason and the will of his instinct. People are composed of the body and soul, and each has their special requirements. The human body needs instincts to guarantee its survival. The instinct of lust, selfishness, fear, and so on, are necessary for human survival.

Everything created by Allah Almighty has its characteristics that are embodied in their nature and existing structure. For example, salt with the quality of salinity and sugar has been created with the trait of sweetness. These attributes are embodied in their nature and existing structure. We call this inherent property their "nature", and in animals, it is called instincts. In plants, there are special features that are completely different from those of non-living organisms, namely, growth, development and reproduction, and a particular type of reaction to environmental factors. This power considered to be vegetable nature. The existing structure of animals, in addition to the vegetable nature and characteristics, has the animal characteristics, that are called as instinct (Saad, 2013).

In the human being, because his body is a natural being, there are natural properties; and because it has the property of growth and development, it has vegetative properties; and because it has an animal aspect, it has a series of instincts. In addition to instincts, man has the power of reason that distinguishes him from other animals. For this reason, scientists sought to provide the exact definition of human beings, have said that "human is a rational animal" الحيوان الناطق. They described the talker الناطق in the sense of being

able to understand and know general concepts. This ability was equivalent to reason (H. i. '. Avicenna, 1984. Vol. 1, p. 293).

Man is commanded by both instincts and reason. Human reason and his instinct call to do or leave things. That is why we have a practical reason that refers to the aspect of command and ordering of reason. We also have the sensual soul (النفس الإمارة) which invites to do things in accordance with instincts. For example, the Quran states: وَ مَا أُبَرِّئُ نَفْسِي إِنَّ النَّفْسَ لَأَمَّارَةٌ بِالسُّوءِ إِلَّا مَا رَحِمَ رَبِّي إِنَّ رَبِّي غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ (12:53). Meaning: I do not think myself free from Guilt, since the human soul inclined to evil, Except for those to whom my creator and Nurturer has granted his mercy upon them, my Lord is surely the Merciful and Forgiving.

In the theory of autonomy we talk about being autonomous and observant of self-governance, it means to follow the law of reason. The system of autonomy is governed by reason not by individuals. Therefore, we find that it is necessary to distinguish between the commands of reason and those of human instincts. We must know the difference between these two. Moral cognition occurs when a person understands the difference between them and can recognise that what is happening is the command of the reason or instinctive desire. For this reason, one of the sub-objectives of moral education is reaching this point.

Mistaking the commands of reason with instinctive inclination is a challenge in today's societies, especially Western countries. In many cases, what they perceive is based on reason and rationality, is based on instinctive desires and pleasures. Therefore, separating these two from each other is a very important issue not only in the study of the theory of autonomy but also in other contexts. The important question that emerges here is, whether there is a way to this separation? Do we have an indicator in which we

can separate the rational achievements of human beings from that based on its instinctive desires? This question is not just about autonomy, but generally in our encounter to the modernity and its elements. How one can distinguish between the achievements of the reason and the sciences of human beings, and of what is based on the emotions and instincts of mankind today? Therefore, this question is very important and deterministic, and the theory of autonomy is one of the places that affected and influenced by the answer of this question.

One indicator to differentiate between the two is to determine is that, whenever the wise of the world accept a theorem and the acceptance of the theorem is not affected by the dependence on a particular religion, country, nation, culture, race, and so on, then the statement is rational and is based on the reason of human beings. Otherwise, the statement cannot be considered rational and the rule of reason. For example, the impermissibility of oppression is a statement accepted by all the wise of the world, regardless of religion, culture, country, nation and race. This is a rational statement. However, homosexual marriage (which is also legal in some Western countries) does not have that character, that is, it is not universally accepted. Such a thing cannot be considered rational and based on reason.

This is a clear and precise indicator, but the next question is, whether there is a way in which we can determine which statement is accepted by all the wise of the world (regardless of the particular affinities), and whether the cases are the result of their particular dependencies ?

Referring to what the Muslim scholars have given in the past in the science of logic, one can obtain a significant indicator to identify rational theorems. The rational

statement is universally accepted regardless of their particular dependencies. To this end, we must refer to the topic of the "statements" القضايا raised in logic.

The indicator in the science of logic for identifying reliable rational findings: Scholars of logic divide statements القضايا into different types. They believe that some statements are rational irrespective of the dependence on specific factors. On this logical basis, whenever something enters the minds which one doubts whether it is rational, they should ask whether it is universally accepted by the wise of the world. This is an easy way to detect rational findings others. Such statements include the following:

1. Certain statements اليقينيات: Certain means a one hundred per cent belief, which is in accordance with facts and is not doubted (H. i. '. Avicenna, 1984. Vol. 2, p. 79). There are different types of certain statements:

1.1. Primary statements الاوليات: They are statements in which the mind believes them without reason beyond themselves, that the perception of the parties with the consideration of ratio between them is sufficient in the judgement and in believing in it (Ibid). This kind of statement is acceptable at all times and for all individuals such as "the whole is larger than its component" (Ibid).

1.2. Observable statements المشاهدات: That the mind is governed by the sense. Our sense has two parts: (apparent) which are five types of vision, hearing, taste, smell and touch. The issues identified by these senses are called sensory statements الحسيات such as "The sun is bright". The second type is the inner sense, and the issues that are known by it are conceivable الوجدانيات, such as our knowledge of our thought, or our attention to pain and pleasure (A. a.-Q. Al-Jurjānī, 1992, p. 5).

1.3. Experimental statements المجرَّبات: These are the issues that the mind governs by the repetition of experience such as "Fire is hot" (Suhrawardī, 1996. Vol. 2, p 234). This kind of judgement is based on two invisible syllogisms in thinking. The first is: If this result were accidental, it would not always have happened, but it has always happened. Hence, this result is not accidental. The second syllogism is any consequence that is not accidental is caused by a cause, and the effect never separates from its cause. This result can never be separated from its cause (Ibid).

We do not mean that all experiences are followed by a true imperative judgement. Many judgements are wrong based on experience since people consider something as a cause, while it is not. The reason for their mistake is that their observation of their experience is not accurate enough to validate the first syllogism, because the effect might not be permanent, but they consider it to be permanent.

1.4. Successive statements المتواترات: Issues conveyed by innumerable people with a slightly different phraseology that imparts the same meaning (p. 41).

1.5. Surmised statements الحدسيات: Issues for which reason is a strong intuition that eliminates doubt. These statements الحدسيات are the same as the experimental statements المجربات due to repeated observation and invisible syllogisms (Ibid).

1.6. Innate statements الفطريات: The issues that their syllogisms (reason) do not accept them by the mere perception of the two parties, but based on a syllogism (reason) which is not beyond the mind. So whenever the mind considers the subject accept the statement. For example, "Two is one-fifth of ten" (H. i. ʾ. Avicenna, 1984. Vol. 2, p. 22).

2-Generally Accepted Statements بالمشهورات Issues that have become general among people and are popular with all or most of the wise (Ibid).

3-Agreed Statements بالمسلّمات Principles that are agreed based on a science. Logicians call these principles "axioms" الاصول الموضوعة(Ibid).

Whenever we come up with a statement (in our mind or outside the mind) that includes the six sub-headings of the certain statements البقينيات, generally accepted statements المشهورات, or agreed statements المسلّمات, they considered rationally and based on reason. And does not affect in the acceptance of these statements specific religion or race or nation or culture. In return, if we encounter a statement that is not one of these cases above, it cannot be attributed to the rationality of the wise. Therefore it cannot be rational.

The discussion of the stages and sub-objective of the moral education related to the first element of the autonomy (legislation of reason) has come to an end. Now it is a turning point in the discussion of the sub- objectives corresponding to the second element of the autonomy, namely, the freedom of the will.تا این جا

5.3.2 The Autonomy's compatible sub-objectives, related to the second pillar

The difference between this section and the previous one is that, there are some sub-objectives corresponding to the first element of the autonomy, namely, the releasing the thinking, provide moral content in the initial stages of moral education, and Getting to the stage of recognizing the difference between the orders of reason and instinctive pleasures. But in the current section, there is only one sub- objective that should be considered in moral education in proportion to the second pillar. This sub- objective is releasing the motivation. The reason that we are faced with only one sub-objective is that, we do not need to do more than release the motive for the freedom of the will.

The main question of our discussion is how does Islam evaluate being free of external motives (as embodied in the theory of autonomy. Motahharī (2007) is an Iranian scholar who specifically deals with the contradiction between the theory of deontology and Islamic teachings. Motahhari's question is whether it is possible to be free from all external influences (p. 69). He considers the basis of Kant's theory of autonomy to be unacceptable since it is not possible for a person to do something in which there is no motive other than the duty and task (p. 71). In this critique, human act because of the benefits although it has a wide range of benefits and cannot be allocated to a particular instance. *Motahharī* commented on the Kantian view and stated that the base of Kant's theory is freedom of the will, namely moral action must be absolute. If Immanuel Kant intended free from self-benefits, his idea would be valid, but if his purpose is aimed at all benefit, even those go to others, then it is invalid. They conclude that the basis of the Kantian theory of autonomy is not acceptable (Ibid). Some claimed that there is always a personal benefit in human actions. In explaining this, they say: When a person does something, does he enjoy or not? How is he if he abstains it? Does it suffer or not? If he does not enjoy doing it, nor does not suffer from refraining, it is impossible to go to it. This enjoyment is regarded as a personal benefit (p. 75).

We argue, in Islamic sources the highest level of ethics is to reach a point where we are motivated by no external motives. This goal in Islamic mysticism can be simulated in moral education. We introduce the concept of Mystic, that has been raised in the Islamic mysticism, that is, a person who is empty of the external motives, and then in the next step, and how it is adapted as a sub-objective in Islamic moral education.

5.3.2.1 The Islamic concept of "Mystic"

To release motivation means freeing the will from any external motive beyond the essence of the moral act. Such motivation can be achieved by training a person like a

mystic, which is discussed in Islamic mysticism and philosophy. This can be achieved through several steps.

(a) *The concept of mysticism in Islam*

Among the Islamic sciences, there is a special science called mysticism العرفان. This science, in both its subject and method, is completely different from that of education. Addressing these differences and explaining the science of Islamic mysticism العرفان الاسلامى is beyond the scope of the current study. Here we just try to point out that when we introduce the training of people like the mystic as the sub-objective of moral education, our aim is not to replace mysticism with Islamic education. However, we want to say that, one must consider the mystic's motive and what he aims at the sake of perfection. Moral education should aim at the same motive and lead people to do good and ethical acts with a similar motive. Then, we will achieve the objective of releasing the motivation. Therefore, instead of discussing the Islamic mysticism, or the characteristics and features of Muslim mystic, we only focus on a specific point, that is the recognition of the motive of the Muslim mystic.

(b) *The mystic's motive?*

Muslim scholars have talked about this subject in a broad debate. They have raised this topic in philosophical and mystical books. In the current study, we integrate Islamic mysticism into Islamic moral education to identify the sub-objective of Islamic moral education appropriate to the system of autonomy. This is the important point that distinguishes this current research from other studies. By doing so, we have been able to extract the sub- objective of Islamic moral education appropriate to the system of autonomy from the sources of Muslim scholars. Since Avicenna has made the best scientific explanation on this subject in his great book *Al-Ishārāt wa l-tanbīhāt*, we based our study on his interpretation, as well as the commentators of his works.

Avicenna points to three concepts in the following: ascetic زاهد, worshipper عابد and mystic عارف. According to him, the ascetic is one who avoids the pleasures of the world. The worshipper is a devotee, who carries out religious worship, and the mystic is the one who directs his thought and mind to the realm of pure الجبروت, and his heart is illuminated by the light of truth (Avicenna, 1996, p. 143). *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī* writes:

> For the blissful people, there are three situations. The first, to leave all things except God, this is asceticism الزهد, and the middle to go to God, this is worship العبادة, the last is to access to God, this is mysticism العرفان (M. Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 2005. Vol. 2, p. 592).

What *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī* has said, is a good description of how to go to the final level, because everyone when seeking God first discontinues his attention from other things (this is the stage of asceticism), and then, he tries to do things that bring him closer to the God (this is the level of worship), and in the end, to achieve the goal(God), that it is the mysticism, the stage when nothing but its purpose (God) is the motive. Avicenna deals with the differences between these three in case of motives. He writes:

> The asceticism of a person who is not mystic is like buying Hereafter by the commodity of the material world. When a mystic person is inattention to anything that distracts his heart from God, and being superior to anything other than God (Avicenna, 1996, p. 143).

According to Avicenna, worship for someone who is not a mystic is like working in the world for a wage for the Hereafter, and for the mystic is an attempt to practice his mind and thought to discard it from motives other than Allah and the world of truth (Ibid). He explicitly discusses the mystic's motive and points out his difference in this regard with others. Based on his view, the mystic wants God and nothing else. He does not prefer anything on accurate knowledge of God, and he worships because God deserves worship. He worships because he assigns him to God. He does not worship with fear, as he does not worship for the sake of heaven. . If a person fears the hell or

eager for the paradise, in fact, his motivation is the fear and enthusiasm. In this case, the goal, will not be God, but the other is the goal (Ibid).

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī explained Avicenna's view such that the motive of the ascetic الزاهد is to get his reward in the Hereafter. The mystic's motive is that his mind and body are ready for the ultimate goal. In the ultimate goal, man does not look at anything other than God, and he does not do anything but at the sake of God. This is where the body submits to the mind of man, as if in his obedience, whereby the human body is the tool of doing good deeds (M. Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 2005. Vol. 2, p. 593).

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī continues on both the ascetic الزاهد and worshipper عابد. He regards them similar since their motive is to gain pleasure after death. The ascetic الزاهد wants to achieve his purpose by leaving the pleasures of the material world, and worshipper عابد wants to achieve his goal by doing hard and difficult tasks. The first is a salesperson because he sells the pleasures of a material world for later pleasures, and the second is the lessor because he rents himself to do things to gain an advantage (Ibid). *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī* 's remarks show that such motives, although religious, are outside of the reach of the righteous deeds and are considered to be profitable deeds.

(c) *The internal motive of a mystic person regarding the moral education*

The internal motive within the mystic person and his attention's centrality to the main purpose of God has a significant effect in the field of moral education. This effect is due to the fact that the mystic does not see his connection with the people around him; apart from his ultimate motive and ultimate purpose that is God. For this reason, the mystic person sees human beings as the manifestations of God, and hence, in relation to others, always considers humans with dignity. One of the most striking examples of this attitude can be seen in the positive thinking toward others' attitudes. The mystic always

interprets the behaviuors of others in the best way and even in cases where the behavuior of others seems to be of mistake or wrong, the mystic person views them with an accurate and acceptable interpretation in his mind.

This approach has been raised in Islamic sources titled as the principle of positive perception towards others or "aṣl al-ṣiḥḥah". This principle has been strongly recommended and emphasized by the Leaders of the Islamic religion. Among which there is a famous narration from 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb which is said:" ضع أمر أخيك على أحسنه ... و لا تظنن بكلمة خرجت من امرئ مسلم شرا و أنت تجد لها في الخير محملا"(Al-Muttaqī al-Hindī, 1981.Vol.16, p 261). Meaning: "Justify in the best way what your brother has done, and if you hear a bad word from him, do not presume, you have to try to justify it as much as you can"

Given this point, has led to the important result, that is, the internality of the mystic's motive is the source of the great effects regarding the social ethical education.

(d) *The internal motive of the mystic*

The external motives are rejected in autonomy, and the freedom of the will in deontology is having the pure motive without the influence of external factors. As for the relationship between deontology and Islamic mysticism, they share in their emphasis on motives free from external factors. When it comes to external factors, it means any factor outside the essence of moral action. This interpretation is clear in deontology since there is no incentive other than duty. The task is within the essence of moral action, not out of it. This interpretation is consistent in the case of the mystic because his motive is inward and not outward. He is looking for nothing for himself. Paradise is not a motive of his actions but he seeks the essence of the Lord.

The questions that may be asked are that, someone who is seeking God's satisfaction can claim that his motive is inward? God's satisfaction does not relate to the inside and the essence of the task. On the other hand, the person has again made something between himself and God, one who gives his motivation to obtain the satisfaction of God, does have a pure and inward motive?

God's satisfaction does not mean the fear of God, which, if it were, the motive of the person was external, and he had acted externally under pressure and influence. God's satisfaction means that God is pleased with the work done, and the agent gets peace from fulfilling the task. The joy of God and the achievement of tranquillity is not outside the essence of duty. The essence of this motive is to achieve calm and perfection. The one who has such an incentive does not seek profit for himself. He is looking for the tranquillity that comes with the task. One who cares for such a relaxed attitude is worthy of such an achievement. According to the mystic, God is not like the other creatures, but is absolute perfection and absolute existence and hence pursuing Him is to pursue perfection.

On the other hand, reason is seeking God's satisfaction. We have seen in the words of Kant, in the definition of duty, duty was what the reason ruled out, and the obtaining of God's satisfaction is also the rule of reason. Muslim scholars have referred to this as "Thanks to the benefactor "شكر المنعم". According to this rule, we have to give thanks to the one who gave us pleasure (see, e.g.M Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 2000. Vol. 1, p. 197; Siyf al-dīn Al-āmidī, 2001. Vol. 2, p. 192). Muslim scholars rely on this principle to prove that the acquisition of accurate knowledge of God is obligatory, and therefore, one should go to theological discussions to get acquainted with God and his attributes (M Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 1987. Vol. 3, p. 299). On the basis of this principle, when reason commands seeking divine satisfaction, this is a kind of thanks to someone who

has given us blessings. Therefore, if a mystic sets his motivation to obtain the satisfaction of God, he does his duty as dictated by reason. Then, the motive of the mystic person is deontological.

So far, we have responded to the first question and made it clear that, how one can interpret the mystic's motive in accordance with deontology. Now, it turns to the second question that is; the person who is motivated to obtain the satisfaction of God, does not have a pure and inward motive, because he has made a mediator between himself and the absolute perfection of the Lord through the divine satisfaction. Muslim scholars have stated that the mystic worships God for God and no other reason. This is where some scholars have criticized. *Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī* has explained this critique. Accordingly, the will is only related to contingent things الممكنات. In the process of willing, one of two sides is preferred over another, and such a situation can only be conceived of in reference to contingent affairs. Therefore, one cannot imagine that the mystic wants God himself, because God does not count on the possibilities and contingent affairs. Rather, when we say that the mystic wants God, we mean that he wants the love of God and His satisfaction. On the other hand, everyone who wants something, in fact, wants to complete himself with that thing and to eliminate a defect. As such, whoever wants the satisfaction of God, he wants to complete himself and fix his imperfection(M Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī, 1987. Vol. 2, p. 599). In this regard, the pure and intrinsic nature of the mystic motive has been criticised. Based on the critique the mystic is searching for his benefit. *Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī* has responded to that. According to him, theologians and philosophers believe that man can only ask God for nothing, and he has no other motive. Their argument for their opinion is that perfection is desirable. Therefore, as we seek perfection, it becomes more desirable and its desirability increases. So as much as popularity and desirability gain more prominence,

the person's attention becomes more and more diverted from other things. For example, one can say that when a person sees a beautiful face, he gets unnoticed by other beautiful faces, and whatever the beauty of that face enhances, so too does the inattention to other beautiful faces. This enthusiasm could reach a state where fulfilling desires becomes the only aim. So that, , the person forgets and does not see himself and even he does not care about his own passion, and the only thing that he sees and wants is his popular and desirable (Ibid).

Fakhr al Dīn al Rāzī refers to a tangible example. He points to the romantic relationship as an illustrative example. In this relationship, the lover does not see and want but his beloved. This story is the same in the case of human beings toward perfection. That is, the mystic does not pay attention to the enthusiasm toward perfection, and does not pay attention to the love that he has in perfection. He only sees God. Love for God is different from love for other things, and their opinion that is the "will" only relate to contingent things is unreasonable because we have seen that it is also occurring toward God (Ibid).

5.3.2.2 The sub-objective of Islamic moral education is to educate a person like a mystic

We said in the past, ethics has two parts that have different functions. In the first part, human relationship based on morality and ethical life is explained. In this part, our reason is efficient and we can fix our moral need in this part by relying on our intellect. In the other part, ethics regulates human relationships with the world of the unseen, supernatural, and God. In this part, ethics provides the moral life in this regard, and the human happiness in the hereafter world is the goal of morality. Autonomy is only has put forward in the first part of ethics. In the second part we need religion, and the autonomy has no claim in this section. On the other hand, the mystic person is the one

who has no motive other than God and divine satisfaction, and then the mystic is the title in the second part of morality, that is, the section related to the unseen, the hereafter and God. Hence we cannot talk about the mystic person in the first section, that is, the worldly part of the ethics.

We should note that, we did not raise the training of mystic as the sub- objective of moral education, but we used another title. The title we used was:" To educate people like the mystics that is an Islamic concept in philosophy and mysticism". The reason for this symmetry is that, the task-oriented person is like a mystic. In order to explain this point, the theory of deontology should be considered.

Deontology is a combination of two words "Deonto" means "task" or "duty" and "logos" means "cognition" (McHugh, 2012). In the philosophy of ethics, this concept refers to a set of ethical theories emphasising the intrinsic value of the acts (Ibid). Deontological theories evaluate acts from within.

Immanuel Kant believes that every person should behave according to his duty. Things that are contrary to duty, although they are beneficial, are ethically incorrect and worthless. For example, if a businessman treats people with justice and fairness to attract a customer or to grow and prosper, his practice is not worthwhile and not in accordance with his moral duty (Dierksmeier, 2013).

According to Kant's point of view, one who is educated on the basis of autonomy is a task-oriented person. The likeness of such a person to the mystic is that his motive returns to the nature of the action, as is the motive for the mystic's action is the perfection that exists within the action and causes him to draw near to God. A person who is educated on the basis of autonomy behaves ethically in the context of worldly relations, but his motive is nothing beyond the essence of the act.

CHAPTER 6: THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KANTIAN AUTONOMY ON THE METHOD OF ISLAMIC MORAL EDUCATION

6.1 Introduction

The consequences of autonomy in Islamic moral education can be studied in terms of objectives and methods. Accepting autonomy implies the sub-objectives of Islamic moral education. We discussed those changes in the chapter 5. The current chapter studied the developments taking place in educational methods.

The Kantian theory of autonomy has two principles. Accordingly, the opposing methods that were discussed are separated from each other. Some of them are incompatible with the first principle, and others are opposing the second one. But, regarding each of the two elements of autonomy, we have studied two common educational methods in Islamic moral education. Needless to say that, there are plenty of examples for these methods. However, our discussion is the theoretical study of the methods in general; addressing practical examples of each method requires different independent investigations.

6.1.1 The nature of educational methods

Educational methods are used by educational policymakers and administrators to transfer values and educational content to learners and to guide them to the objectives(Smogorzewska & Szumski, 2018). These methods have an instrumental role in conveying values and content (Al-Attās, 1979). When it comes to methods, we need to consider the milieu, psychological, natural, inheritance and other benefactors. Considering these factors, we examine which method is most appropriate (KELEMEN, 2010).

Choosing the methods of education is not a religious matter, but a scientific issue. Therefore, the choice of methods should be based on human scientific achievements. It cannot be abstracted from religious resources. For this reason, in order to determine the methods, scholars do extensive studies nowadays. Muslim scholars have also approved this scientific nature of the discussion of educational methods.

(a). Educational methods have an empirical nature. In the view of Muslim scholars, experiences, *al-Mujarrabāt* المجربات include things brought about by experience and wisdom, such as knowing the effectiveness of a particular drug for the treatment of a special disease (Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, 1990. Vol. 1, p. 347; Suhrawardī, 1996. Vol. 4, p. 176). Therefore, in the empirical case, the conventional way for Muslim scholars was to use intellectual reasoning, experience and observation. All methods and techniques have empirical nature, and they are chosen according to the experience (H. i. ʿ. Avicenna, 1984. Vol. 2, p. 225).

(b). In the realm of empirical issues, the knowledge of human beings has authority: For religious affairs, we must refer to religious experts for topics such as *ṣalāh* صلاة, *Siyām* صيام, and *Hajj* حج. The duty of religious experts is the expression of a religious statement. But according to the Muslim scholars, in recognition of scientific subjects, we need to refer to subject experts. Non-religious subjects should be guided by subject experts. Muslim scholars say that, even in simple subjects the reference point is not religious experts, but the custom, aim at, public understanding of the people and the customs of society, let alone for sophisticated and compound subjects (Al-Khaṭīb al- Shirbīnī, 1978. Vol. 1, p. 145).

Imām Ahmad ibn Hanbal narrated that the Prophet (PBUH) encountered a group of people above the date trees and asked: "What do they do?" The Companions of the

Prophet answered: "They are fertilising trees by putting branches of the male trees inside the female trees!" The Prophet said: "I do not think that this is useful and good". His audience retold the Prophet's words to the ranchers, and they abandoned such a technique for fertilisation. When this news was given to the Prophet, he said: "If I tell you what I think or give you my suggestions, do it if it is of your benefit it, and leave it if it is not, but if I tell you something from God, do it, for I do not recite lies from Allah" (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 1, p. 162). According to *Imām Muslim Bin Hajjāj* and *ibn Mājah*, the Prophet (PBUH) said: "You are more knowledgeable than me in worldly affairs" (al-Niyshābūrī, 2003. Vol. 7, p. 197; Ibn Mājah al-Rab'ī al-Qazwīnī, 2003. Vol. 2, p. 825). *Al-Nawawī* quoted the Prophet (PBUH): "I am neither a farmer nor a tree holder" (Al-Nawawī, 1987 . Vol. 11, p. 353). *Al-Munāwī* says: "Though the Prophets are better known for the revelation and the Hereafter, they are not so much in the worldly affairs" (Al-Munāwī, 1995. Vol. 3, p. 66).

According to this result the educational methods are considered among these kinds of affairs. Given the above, in educational methods, one should refer to the relevant specialists.

6.1.2   Why we discuss educational methods from Islamic perspective?

We have found that, the methods of education do not have a religious aspect, and if we change the traditional methods and replace the new ones based on the theory of autonomy, will not be in conflict with Islamic teachings. So what is the justification for the theoretical discussion based on Islamic point of view?

Muslim scholars rely on verses and traditions and claim that Islam has recommended or accepted certain methods in moral education that are not compatible with autonomy. We should discuss this and clarify whether Islam really has introduced this kind of

educational methods and has it accepted those? We cannot believe in acceptance of autonomy from the Islamic perspective, and at the same time, attribute the incompatible educational methods to Islam. By assuming the acceptance of autonomy in Islam, these methods should be changed and replaced by alternative methods.

6.2   The incompatible methods with the first element of autonomy

The methods that, instead of adhering to the law of reason, invite a person to follow other ways, which are against of legislation of reason, are incompatible with autonomy.

Here are the two of the most important methods with this incompatibility. Most of the other methods that are considered to be incompatible with the first element of autonomy are the examples for these two general methods and refer to them.

6.2.1   Habituation

One of the methods emphasised by Islamic moral education is the use of habituation so that they learn to behave morally instinctively through practice. Habit is an automated, orderly and coordinated relationship between all the spiritual activities of the individual (Singh et al., 2015). It is encouraging someone to accept a habit in such a way it regulates his behaviour in the long run(Kerr, 2011). One can also define habituation as "learning the excellences of character through engaging in virtuous behaviour and avoiding non-virtuous behaviours" (p. 644).

6.2.1.1   An Overview of the Habituation method

Achieving a steady moral state (*malakah* ملكة) is done by using normalisation and habituation. Using this method as a moral education method returns to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the habit simplifies action and eliminates suffering (Singh et al., 2015). In his view, repetition produces habits and habits produces inclination, and

desire, in turn, gives rise to action. The result of this is a kind of knowledge. Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics:

> Virtue cannot be found except through habit. Our nature has given us several talents. We convert these talents as a steady state through the use of them and their continued usage. Because nobody can do anything good unless he continually does it. The most importance belongs to the habit; so a person needs to get used to good behaviour from the beginning of a childhood. Because virtue is virtuous divided into rational and ethical, and rational virtue is acquired through learning and therefore requires experience and time. But moral virtue comes from the way of habit and nature (Aristotle, 1963. Vol. 1, p. 27).

Muslim thinkers influenced by the Aristotelian tradition chose habituation as the most important form of education (Attaran, 2015). *Al-Gazalī* says:

> Anyone who repeats good behaviour consistently becomes accustomed to the good manner. As a child, who is afraid of teacher and tries to escape from school, but after being forced to go to school and become accustomed to it, will interested in going to school and learning (Al- Ghazālī 1985, p. 432).

According to what he opined elsewhere, good ethics have three causes. The first, is the principle of nature, and it is the grant and grace of God. The second is to do good things until it becomes habit. The third is to deal with the good people so that they are influenced by them (p. 434). According to *Al-Gazalī*, moral education is equivalent to habituation. *Al-Gazalī* classifies habits according to the sphere of influence, and divided it into four parts: 1. physical habits (like habit of eating, wearing, playing, etc.), 2. rational habits (like religious and jurisprudential insights and attitudes), 3. conscientious habits (related to human emotions), 4. moral habits (piety, patience, moderation, courage, etc.) (Ibid). He considers the stages of habit formation in two stages of "creation" and "stability". The creation stage is a stage in which human behaviour is not easy and psychologically performed, but with tolerance and difficulty. The stage of stability is such that behaviour and actions become practical and easy (Ibid).

This method has been raised in the moral and educational issues of Muslim scholars for the creation of a steady moral state (*malakah* ملكة). They mean from the steady state, the constant and permanent psychic and spiritual states of the human soul. *Al-Fārābī*, after pointing out to the *malakah* ملكة among the various states of the soul, explicitly emphasises that this state *malakah* ملكة, comes through habits (Al-Fārābī, 1987.Vol. 1, p. 51). He considers education and ethics as being produced by habit and with the formation of a *malakah* ملكة in the human soul (Ibid).

Emphasis on the use of the habituation in moral education was not limited to *Al-Fārābī* and *Al-Gazalī*. We can also refer to *Shahāb ad-Dīn Yahya ibn Habash Suhrawardī* the most important supporter of this method. He divides the perfections of the soul into two kinds of tangible محسوس and intangible غير المحسوس, and among the intangible virtues refers to the two types of state and *malakah* ملكة (Suhrawardī, 1996. Vol. 1, p. 10). He considers the *malakah* ملكة to be a constant and permanent state of mind. According to him, it is not necessary for the *malakah* ملكة be consciously awarded to the person, but the measure is that a person does it without realising and thinking about it (Ibid). In these words, *Suhrawardī* explicitly emphasised that the human state when reaches the level of *malakah* ملكة does not require thinking about doing.

This point has also been repeated in other Muslim scholars. They have stated that the behaviour which is based on *malakah* ملكة is done without thinking. It takes place unconsciously based on the steady state that has been formed through repetition and becoming accustomed and habitual to the human soul. Avicenna wrote:

And among the steady states *malakah* ملكة are sciences and virtues. We do not mean good and praiseworthy behaviour from the concept of virtues, but the mental and spiritual states that produce the praiseworthy acts, as easy as natural, without the need to thinking and choosing, so that, if they want to do antithesis of those acts, it will be so difficult and harassed them. This is like the steady state of justice and chastity. Also the moral vices, which are opposites and antithesis for

virtues, sometimes are steady states *malakah* ملكة. For example, an unjust person, it is not possible for him to act chastely so that, being virtuous causes his trouble. For such a person, sin and immoral behaviour is very easy and natural, because in his spirit a steady state has been created that makes him guilty and immoral (H. i. ʿ. Avicenna, 1984. Vol. 1, p. 182-183).

Muslim scholars believe that, for moral education, a person has to do something based on his steady moral state in such a way that his moral behaviour is because of these states, that is, without the need for thinking and decision, and even without awareness of these behaviours. Therefore, in the Islamic moral education, it has always been talked about the steady states ملكة concerning the human traits. For example, the state of courage, generosity and so on. From their point of view, the educated person is one whose virtue is in him as a steady state ملكات.

Many Muslim scholars have mentioned worship such as *ṣalāh* (صلاة), *ṣiyām* (صوم), *dhikr* (ذكر), and so on, as evidence for acceptance of habit as one an educational method in Islam (Al- Ghazālī 1985, p. 435). According to them, habit has a lot of capacity to be used as an educational method. They believe that habit includes accompaniment, perseverance, and protection which are essential because continuity without constructive protection is not useful, and the protection of your constancy is not at all constructive, because although it is transcendental, it will disappear (Suhrawardī, 1996. Vol. 1, p. 198). *Al-Khaṭīb ash-Shirbīniy* said: "Righteousness العدالة is a steady state that prevents a sin from being committed, even if it is a minor and also prevents from permissible unbecoming acts" (Al- Khaṭīb al- Shirbīniy, 1994. Vol. 2, p. 72).

6.2.1.2 Habituation conflicts with autonomy

According to the scholars, the use of this method leads to the weakening of the power of reason (Kerr, 2011). Other researchers believe this method is useful in moral education. Although in the current study we are seeking to understand the view of Islam on this method, discuss what these scholars have done in defending the habituation method.

Hence we provide a ground for the next step to examine Islamic evidence. The scholars who have sought to defend habituation could not ignore its disadvantage, which is undermining the rationality and independence of the individual. For this reason, they have tried to divide habits into good and bad. In the next step, they attempted to allocate the disadvantages to bad habits, and conclude that good habits are free of such flaws.

Some of them have divided habits into mechanical and cognitive (Jimenez, 2015; Nieuwenburg, 2004; Vasiliou, 1996). These scholars insist that practice and repetition must be carried out consciously. Nancy Sherman (as quoted in Kerr, 2011) says: "The exterior moment of action cannot be isolated from the 'interior cognitive and affective moments which characterise even the beginner's ethical behaviour" (Kerr, 2011, p. 648).

In my opinion, the division of habits into mechanical and cognitive cannot solve the problem of incompatibility of the habituation method with moral autonomy. The two types of habits are different only in the sense of the exercise and practice, but they share a common goal which is to take a person to the point that he performs good deeds by habit. What confirms our opinion is the view of many scholars who have considered the lack of decision-making and previous thinking as the main indicator of habit (Ersche, Lim, Ward, Robbins, & Stochl, 2017). The critique is that this method ignores the position of human reason, and what a person does is not based on reasoning and following the law of wisdom. The critique of the habituation method in both mechanical and cognitive is exactly at this final stage (thinking-decision). In this method, the first and most important element of moral autonomy is abandoned, and the person performs his or her behaviour in a normal way without being based on previous thinking.

Other scholars divide habits into active and passive (Motahharī, 2007). In their opinion, the active habit is when people are not influenced by an external agent, but do things in the form of repetition and continuity. Motahharī says: "Writing is a habit, not knowledge. Our ability for writing is caused by habit. By practising we get used to writing gradually" (p. 57). He believes that Islamic education, in the sense of habituation and creation of steady states الملكات النفسانية, is related to this kind of habit (Ibid). He stated his view:

> The steady state (الملكة) is an example of active habits. For example, the courage is a steady state that is formed by repeating positions and situations. Someone when repeatedly confronts a dangerous situation and shows his stability, he will reach the steady state of courage (p. 58).

According to Motahharī, these types of habits have no problems, and their use as an educational method is not wrong. Because in this kind of habits, someone does not get accustomed to a particular act, but he only strengthens the resistance toward the phenomenon, that is, until he is not used to it, his will is weak against this phenomenon, and after he becomes accustomed, his will becomes stronger (Ibid).

The nature of active habits is not different from the nature of passive habits. In either case, human nature becomes accustomed to a particular task or a phenomenon, and it is not done based on decision and thought. What emerges in the field of active habits as a reinforcement of the will is the same in the passive habits. Those who defend the habituation as an educational method emphasise the impact of this method on strengthening the will (Abdulrahmān M. & Al-Zahrāni, 2015; Trenberth, 2005).

Motahharī also regards these habits like art and techniques (Motahharī, 2007). This is also incorrect as art and techniques are types of practical skills and essentially different from morality and moral education. As in the example of writing, we learn how to write different words and lines which is a form of learning and education.

Although the method of learning in theoretical science is different from the practical sciences, since in order to learn in this type of knowledge, the organs must also accompany the mind, this does not make the nature of these skills identical to the nature of ethical habits. Attention to practical knowledge along with theoretical knowledge is the focus of most of the scientists who have studied this field (Katajavuori, Lindblom, xe, nne, & Hirvonen, 2006). So ethical issues and moral education are fundamentally different from those of practical skills, and *Motahharī* made a mistake by mixing the two.

It seems that *Motahharī* does not have a proper perception and interpretation of the concept of habit. He says:

> Imagine someone becomes accustomed to getting up early. It's hard for a man to get up early before this habit. He tries to make it easy. For a while, he practices, then he becomes accustomed to rising early in the morning, and it's nothing but getting it easy. In other words, it was previously captured by nature. By virtue of this habit, a force is found equal to the force of nature, and it gets free between the two forces, then it deliberates with its wisdom and decides to sleep or wake up. This cannot be harmful (Motahharī, 2007, p. 58).

In the example that *Motahharī* mentioned, the person has not yet reached habit. If he is in the habit, he will be woken up naturally in the early morning. We cannot say that he is in pre-habit which encourages him to sleep is equal to the force of his habit that wakes him early. The fact is that when a person needs to use the power of reason and thinking to wake up or sleep, it means that he has not yet reached a habit. Habit makes doing things naturally without thinking and making decisions.

In *Motahharī*'s view, habit is a secondary nature of man, and one should not weaken his nature to strengthen the power of reason and his will. He says: "This is like eradicating the human instincts to strengthen the faith and ethics, as some do by sterilising themselves to prevent sexual provocations" (p. 59). This illustrates

Motahhari's incorrect understanding of habit. How can we get used to doing something, and at the same time decide on the basis of free will and thought? He himself acknowledged that the habit is considered as the secondary nature of man, so the act which is done based on habit, as well as other natural acts of human being, is exported.

According to *Motahhari*, passive habits are habits that human beings acquire under the influence of an external agent. Like smoking, that is, man always wants to smoke. The passive habits usually make man accustomed to things (Ibid). Our critique of the habituation method does not relate to the source of the habit, but related to the nature and the function of habit. It does not matter that the habit is shaped by the external factor or the inner influence (practice and repetition). The significance is leading the person to a stage that it is done naturally without the need for thinking and decision-making which contradicts moral autonomy.

Hence the method of habituation conflicts with the strengthening of the rationality and the power of thought. Because of this, the use of habituation in moral education has been criticised. For example, Jean-Jacques Rousseau believes that the habituation approach even in religious education to child-rearing does not increase the child's religious dimension and his commitment to religion, but reinforces hypocrisy and lying(Rousseau, 2010). Therefore, in the case of Emile, "The mentor will not try to raise him in a particular cult, but he will try to educate him so that when he grows up, he chooses a religion he desires" (p. 114). However, the critique that comes from the standpoint of autonomy is that this method ignores the position of human reason, and what a person does is not based on reasoning and following the law of wisdom. In this method, the first and most important element of autonomy is abandoned, and the person performs his or her behaviour without being based on previous thinking.

According to autonomy, the purpose of education is the development of reason and moral will, and mankind should not be accustomed to anything, because once it is used to it (even to good habit), it governs man and he is no longer governed by reason. Autonomy considers education as a strengthening of the soul, reason and will.

6.2.1.3 Habituation in the Islamic sources

We are confronted with two sets of Islamic evidence. Many of them have been prohibited. However, in some of them, the use of this method is recommended. We should study these two categories and resolve their apparent contradictions and conflicts in order to obtain the position of Islam in this regard.

(a) *Traditions that apparently accept the use of habituation*

Many narrations have been quoted from companions of the Prophet (PBUH). For example, *Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd* emphasises the use of habituation and said: فان الخير عادة (Al-Haythamī, 1988. Vol. 1, p. 295). Meaning: The good will come from habit. Or has quoted from *Alī ibn Abī Tālib*:عَوِّدْ نَفْسَكَ فِعْلَ الْمَكَارِم (Al-Tamīmī Al-Amudī, 1987, p. 232). Meaning: Get used to doing good things. Or:عَوِّدْ لِسَانَكَ لِينَ الْكَلَام (p. 435). Meaning: Get used to your tongue to say good things. Or: كَفَى بِفِعْلِ الْخَيْرِ حُسْنُ عَادَة(p. 105). Meaning: The habit of doing good is enough to make a person good. Or: عَوِّدْ أُذُنَكَ حُسْنَ الإِسْتِمَاع وَ لَا تَصْغِ إِلَى مَا لَا يَزِيدُ فِي صَلَاحِكَ اسْتِمَاعُه (p. 215). Meaning: Use your ears to hear good words, and avoid listening to bad words.

We do not want to discuss these narrations in term of their sources. So, assuming we can accept these narratives, we will discuss their content. The purpose of the habituation method is being automatically active, without thinking. What has been said in these narratives is the continuation of its practice and its continuous pursuit, which does not necessarily mean automatic behaviour without thinking.

Someone may continuously behave in his lifetime but always on the basis of previous thinking, always taking it on the basis of the task, in which, he or she feels, and doing it with conscious thought. This is a desirable Islamic moral education, not blind, automatic behaviour based on habituation. This is an important point in understanding the narrations that seem to support the habituation method. All these narratives emphasise the continuity and duration of action, and there is no reason to recommend habituation in such a way as to act without thought.

The narratives that we mention in the following reinforce this interpretation. For example, *Abū Hurairah* has quoted the Prophet (PBUH): كلفوا من العمل ما تطيقون فان خير العمل ادومه (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 2, p. 350). Meaning: Make yourself do your tasks because the best thing is that have more continuity. And *Bukhārī* has quoted from *Āʾishah* from the Prophet: كان احب الدين اليه ما داوم عليه صاحبه (Al-Bukhārī, 1981. Vol. 1, p. 16). Meaning: God's most beloved is that its doer does it more and more. And in another a narrative quoted by *Bukhārī*, the Prophet says: أحب الصلاة إلى الله صلاة داود، وأحب الصيام إلى الله صيام داود، وكان ينام نصف الليل ويقوم ثلثه وينام سدسه، ويصوم يوماً ويفطر يوما (Al-Bukhārī, 1981. Vol. 2, p. 44). Meaning: The most popular prayer in the sight of God was David's prayer, and the most popular fasting in the sight of the Lord was also the fasting that David did. He sometimes slept half of the night and left one third of it worshipping, and sometimes he slept one sixth of the night, and David would fast for a day and not fast another day.

Based on this tradition, David did not allow worship to become his daily habit and to lose its effect. It is an interesting point that *Al-Ghāzalī*, who is a serious supporter of the habituation method in moral education, describes this tradition in the same way. According to him, the reason for the popularity of David's prayer is that it was not based on his habit. *Al-Ghāzalī* (as *al-Munāwī* has quoted) says:

The reason for the popularity of David's worship is that, a person who fasted for a long time, usually fasting becomes his daily habit, and then he does not feel the effects of fasting in his heart. The fasting will make a difference when one feels that he does not get used to fasting, and it will not have any effect when he is practising fasting. Like doctors recommend that one should not be used to taking medicine, and they say that it is not beneficial for someone who is accustomed to the medicine. Because his temperament is accustomed to the medicine and it no longer influences (Al-Munāwī, 1995. Vo. 1, p. 22).

Al-Munāwī accepted it as the best interpretation that can be presented about this narrative (Ibid). The interesting point is presenting of this interpretation by those who are themselves proponents of the habituation method in moral education. These scholars have no choice but to interpret the purpose of the Prophet (PBUH) as being against habituation.

The result of the investigations is that, it cannot be relied on narrations and claim that Islam has recommended habituation as a method. These traditions can be interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with the continuity and frequency of the act, rather than becoming accustomed to it.

(b) *Traditions that refute the use of habituation*

Narrations that seem to recommend the method of habituation are all justifiable and interpretable, and they consider repetition and continuity of action rather than it becoming a habit. The advocates of the habituation method cannot argue with these narratives in order to prove the acceptance of the habituation method in Islamic teachings.

Contrary to the aforementioned narrations, there are traditions that recommend not using the habituation method. These traditions are abundant and we only quote some examples. For *Alī ibn Abī Tālib* said: العادة عدو متملك (Al-Tamīmī Al-Amudī, 1987, p. 322). Meaning: Habit is an enemy that dominates the human being (and takes his freedom). Or: غالبوا انفسكم على ترك العادات (p. 243). Meaning: Get rid of your habits, then

gain your control and get your freedom. Or quoted that the Prophet Muhammad
(PBUH) said: وَ ،لِذلِكَ اسْتَوْحَشَ تَرَكَهُ فَلَوْ اعْتَادَهُ ءٌ شَىْ ذلِكَ فَانَّ سُجودِهِ وَ الرَّجُلِ زُكوعِ طولِ الى لاتَنْظُروا
اما نَتِهِ اداء وَ حَديثِهِ صِدْقِ الى انْظُروا لكِنِ (Āl- HĀkim al- niyshābūrī', 1986. Vol. 1, p. 231).
Meaning: Do not pay attention to the prayers of a person, because he often does this
worship according to his habitually. The habit which leaving it is annoying, so pay
attention to the truth and honesty.

With these narratives, we understand the interpretation we have made about the
earlier category of traditions (which were apparently supportive for habituation), and it
turns out that, the habituation raised in those traditions is intended to be continuity and
frequency of the action.

The use of the habituation method has to be stopped in moral education according to
the Islamic evidence. Insisting on the continuation and repetition of the desired
behaviour of the student or child and adolescent, is among the most prominent examples
of the habituation method. This is used extensively in Islamic education, especially
religious schools. The purpose of this repetition is the formation of habits in children
and students, which is incompatible with moral autonomy and Islamic teachings. The
repetitious ritual for the purpose of habitation does not lead to the formation of ethical
behaviour based on reasoning and intuition, and eventually leads to impersonal
continually repeated ritual acts.

We conclude that this method in moral education should not be used, because in
addition to incompatibility with autonomy, it weakens the rationality and the power of
human thought. It is useful in some areas of education such as physical education, but
not in moral education.

6.2.2 Imitation

Imitation means to follow others without reason (Burdett, McGuigan, Harrison, & Whiten, 2018). Sometimes people follow others because there is a compelling reason. Such things cannot be called imitation. It is like measuring the other's behaviour with the criterion of our wisdom and finding it good, we then do it. In these cases, we have followed a discipline that supports our judgement about the other's behaviour. However, sometimes we follow a person for no reason. For example, because of parenthood or because he is a teacher and mentor, or because he is our head and guardian, or because of his high social status, and so on. Such cases are examples of imitation (Zaghlawan & Ostrosky, 2016).

6.2.2.1 Advocates of the imitation method

They believe that conscious and desirable imitation is an important and inevitable thing in the life of all human beings. Because of this, it is also discussed in various sciences such as jurisprudence, the psychology of learning, social psychology education, and religious education. Although modelling comprehensively extends to human life, but because the main stage in the formation of human personality is youth, imitation in this period is more important and emphatic (Kimanen, 2016). In the opinion of these advocates of imitation, imitation is defined as the active reproduction of the quality and characteristics of the behaviour of others (Burdett et al., 2018). Accordingly, imitation is not wrong but is a useful method.

Muslim scholars have accepted the use of imitation techniques in moral education (Ahmed, 2018). In the view of Muslim scholars, those who support imitation as an educational method, some concepts and words such as adherence التبعية, following الاقتداء, obedience الإطاعة, and like are used as equivalents (Khan, 1981). A positive and supportive view of imitation can be found by referring to other sources written by

Muslim scholars in Islamic education. There seems to be a difference in the scope of acceptance, but the common point amongst all these researchers is that they do not reject imitation and recommend using it as a method of education, although some of them see the scope of imitation as being broad, others view it as being more limited. To see such a supportive view of imitation, we mention Al-Attas (1996), Kaloti (1975), Al-Attās (1979), Husain and Ashraf (1979) and Rajab (2009).

6.2.2.2 The evidence of advocates

Those who accepted imitation as a moral education method and attributed it to Islam have argued by some verses and narrations. We present these evidences and show that, none of these cases are related to moral education and did not raise imitation as an educational method.

(a) *The evidence for referring in religious affairs*

Some Islamic statements state that people should refer to the Prophet (PBUH) and his companions and learn religion from them. They are all about observance in the field of religion, means learning religion from those who have authority in this field and are aware of religion.

The following those who have the authority in religious affairs, is not the subject to the title and definition of imitation. Imitation, as we said, means accepting the idea and behavior of others without asking for its reason. Referring to religious affairs, is commanded by the Islamic sources like the Qu'ran and Sunnah, so there is a strong reason called us for that. The Quran says: أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ هَدَى اللَّهُ فَبِهُدَاهُمُ اقْتَدِه (6:90). Means: Those were the Prophets; Allah has guided them; so you O, Muhammad follow their guidance. If we want to link this verse to imitation, we must say that referring to the Prophet is an imitation of him. This is while, following the Prophets in religion and the

domain related to God does not mean imitation of them, but it means obeying religious orders.

In another verse, the Quran says: وَ مَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ إِلاَّ رِجَالاً نُوحِي إِلَيْهِمْ فَسْئَلُوا أَهْلَ الذِّكْرِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ لاَ تَعْلَمُونَ (16: 43). Meaning: And before you were the men we sent men whom we revealed to them, so ask those who know the heavenly books if you do not know. This verse has nothing to do with imitation but is related to the observance of religious orders. We have repeatedly said that religion cannot be discovered by reason. In this area, we need guidance that God sends to us through His messengers. In this verse, it is also a matter of asking people who know the heavenly books and the religious orders. This has nothing to do with imitation. Great commentators have said that this verse is about following the instructions of the Prophets and religious scholars (see, e.g.Al-Baydawī, 1997. Vol. 3, p. 228).

The Quran also states: وَ مَا كَانَ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ لِيَنْفِرُوا كَافَّةً فَلَوْ لاَ نَفَرَ مِنْ كُلِّ فِرْقَةٍ مِنْهُمْ طَائِفَةٌ لِيَتَفَقَّهُوا فِي الدِّينِ وَ لِيُنْذِرُوا قَوْمَهُمْ إِذَا رَجَعُوا إِلَيْهِمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَحْذَرُونَ (9:122). Meaning: And all believers should not go out to war; from every group why should not, some people stay and seek to acquire the Knowledge of Religion? And after that they guide and warn their people when they return to them; may they get aware of their duties they will have fear of Allah. This verse also has nothing to do with imitation as a method of education but refers to the necessity of obtaining science and expertise and for those who do not know religious matters, it is necessary to refer to those who are specialists in this field. Most commentators interpreted this verse about jurisprudence and even refrained from extending its content to other sciences (Al- Sa'dī, 1987, p. 405).

On the other hand, we must know that, this group of evidence has no contradictions with autonomy, because even if we associate this category with the issues of education,

still, there will be no problem in the field of autonomy, since, we have already said that autonomy does not apply to religious issues. Therefore, assuming that this evidence relates to imitation, but the evidence was in religious affairs, so there is not conflict with autonomy.

(b) *The evidence for referring to the experts*

A lot of evidence in the Quran and the tradition recommends referring to the experts and knowledgeable people for things do not know. The Quran says: يَا أَبَتِ إِنِّي قَدْ جَاءَنِي مِنَ الْعِلْمِ مَا لَمْ يَأْتِكَ فَاتَّبِعْنِي أَهْدِكَ صِرَاطًا سَوِيًّا (19:43). Meaning: O, father! It has come to me the knowledge which has not reached you, and then follow me, I will guide you to the way that is straight.

One of the most important reasons in this regard is the well-known principle that is the referring of ignorant people to the wise person. This principle relies on the "human nature" and "wisdom". We know that, human knowledge, sciences and professions are extensive, and each knowledge has many specializations for itself. So that, every human being alone cannot specialize in all of them. But only in one line or a limited range of them is able, and in others, there is no capacity, but has to refer to the specialist. Therefore, the reason commands refer to the expert.

Referring to the expert takes place in three forms. 1. Applied fields: In this case, the ignorant person refers to the expert, so that the specialist will actually solve his problem and make a diagnosis for him. As the patient goes to the doctor, the doctor diagnoses the illness and prescribes medicine. 2. Educational reference: In this sense, the ignorant person refers to the expert in order to learn, so the expert will teach him how to obtain science. In fact, the ignorant is a student in this case. 3. Consultation reference: When

the ignorant wants to use the specific knowledge of the expert, the ignorant will ask the expert's advice.

As you can see, this type of referral (referring to the expert) also does not relate to imitation as a method of education. As an educational method, it does not have supportive evidence in Islamic resources. Therefore, with the assumption of autonomy's acceptance, this method should be abandoned and replaced by alternative methods.

It is also possible to come to a different conclusion and say that, even if we consider the two cases that have been raised in Islam, as imitation, it can be concluded that, the Islam-approved imitation only in these two cases. So, it cannot be extended to other cases. These two cases do not have any relationship with autonomy. Because the first case is religious affairs, in which, the autonomy does not occur at all, and the second, is to refer to the specialist and we have seen that, learning is a completely different area with the moral education that is considered as the ground for autonomy.

6.3   The incompatible methods with the second element of autonomy

The methods that, instead of adhering to freedom of the will, invite people to do for the external motives are incompatible with autonomy.

Here are the two of the most important methods with this incompatibility. Most of the other methods that are considered to be incompatible with the second element of autonomy are the examples for these two general methods and refer to them.

6.3.1   Coercion

Another common method in moral education which should not be used is coercion. We are confronted with the questions of how the fate of this method in Islamic moral education? How can this educational method be studied based on Islamic teachings? By

abandoning these educational methods, alternative educational methods- based on the theory of autonomy – should be introduced and extracted from Islamic sources (Quran and Sunnah).

6.3.1.1 The concept of Coercion and Conflict with Autonomy

Coercion in moral education means that the mentor forces the recipient to carry out good behaviours and moral deeds (Eberle, 2011). This action is carried out in the form of a verbal command or prohibition and behavioural command or prohibition. In the former, the instructor orders the recipients, and in the latter, he pushes them virtually and practically. Researchers call the first "coercive threat" and the other "physical coercion" (Klitzman, 2013).

Coercion has obvious conflict with autonomy. Lee (2014) believes that in the coercive method the person in is not treated as a human being, while the center point in autonomy and moral independence is respect the person as a human being. According to him: "insofar as we are talking about an agent as 'self-governing' or 'self-determining' in some sense or another, then, this requires that the agent in question is independent of the external influences of others in some sense or another" (p. 849).

We can explain the conflict between autonomy and coercion method by considering the basis of the theory where one acts according to the free command of his reason. However, some have claimed that coercion does not conflict with autonomy. Scanlon (as quoted in Lee, 2014) says: "A coercer merely changes the considerations which militate for or against a certain course of action; weighing these conflicting considerations is still up to you" (p. 850). On this basis, coercion is not contradictory with the autonomy because, in this case, the agent might choose coercion. Because in this case, the agent chooses the option of the coerciver, maybe by his own discretion;

but this does not conflict with the two principles of autonomy (following the command of the wisdom; freedom of the will). It is clear that, in this statement, the two issues are raised mistakenly. Sometimes there is a mild coercion that the agent does not have to do, and only he finds himself hesitant in the middle of two options: one is his own decision, and the other is a coerciver's request. In this case, the Scanlon's idea is correct, which implies that coercion only changes in the central consideration of the agent. But sometimes there is coercion in a stage that the agent does not escape the execution of a coerciver's request. In this case, coercion is contradictory to autonomy.

6.3.1.2 Study of coercion from the Islamic point of view

Autonomy's acceptance and verification by Islamic teachings will alter the educational methods that are inconsistent with autonomy and results in their replacement by the methods that are compatible with the theory. And as we mentioned about the habituation method, the change in these methods should also be approved by Islam from the theoretical point of view.

Among Muslim scholars, there is a view that considers the use of coercion permissible in moral education. Before examining their reasons, it must be said that, the detailed discussion of these reasons, as well as the study of coercion from the Islamic point of view, in general, requires an independent study that is beyond the scope of this research. So, in this section, we just look at these reasons and provide a general answer to them. In this answer, we will try to interpret the verses and narrations that these scholars argue with them. By this interpreting we show that these verses and narrations do not support the use of coercion as a method of moral education which is the area of autonomy. This interpretation can be considered along with the interpretation given in order to prove the acceptance of coercion, and the result is that, these verses and narratives can be interpreted in such a way that it does not conflict with autonomy.

(a) *The Qur'anic command to take care of family*

One of the Islamic principles is the necessity of taking care of family members and saving them from hell. As such, the father can force his family members to perform their duties. The Quran says:" يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا قُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ وَ أَهْلِيكُمْ نَاراً '' (66:6). Meaning: O, you believers secure yourselves and your families from the Fire.

According to some scholars, the head of the family is obligated to save his family members from doing bad acts, so if they were given advice and speech and invitation and they acquiesced the purpose has been achieved, otherwise, they should be forced to stop doing bad things (Al-Jaṣṣās, 1984. Vol. 1, p. 243).

This is despite the fact that many of the great commentators have a different interpretation of this verse. They said that the purpose is to educate and teach family members with our good behaviours. That is, the meaning of the verse is not coercion, but showing an ethical attitude and familiarising them with the correct manners (see. e.g.Al-Baydawī, 1997. Vol. 5, p. 225; Ibn Kathīr, 1998. Vol. 8, p. 188).

(b) *Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong* الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر:

Another reason that apparently confirms the acceptance of coercion as a method of education is the verses and traditions behind the Islamic concept of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر. For example, the Quran says: وَ لْتَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ أُمَّةٌ يَدْعُونَ إِلَى الْخَيْرِ وَ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَ يَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَ أُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُفْلِحُونَ (3: 104). Meaning: There should be group among you who invite others good deeds and command what is virtue and prohibit What is wrong; and they will have salvation.

It also says: وَ الْمُؤْمِنُونَ وَ الْمُؤْمِنَاتُ بَعْضُهُمْ أَوْلِيَاءُ بَعْضٍ يَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَ يَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ (9:71). Meaning: The believers, men and women are each other's supporters; they command good and prohibit committing evil.

(22:الَّذِينَ إِنْ مَكَّنَّاهُمْ فِي الْأَرْضِ أَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَ آتَوُا الزَّكَاةَ وَ أَمَرُوا بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَ نَهَوْا عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ :And 41). Meaning: Those who if given power on the land, will establish worship God pay the obligatory and religious task and enjoin what is good and forbid what is evil.

As we have said, there are so many traditions about the enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر We refrain from mentioning them in order to not talk too long.

The apparent interpretation of these arguments is that a Muslim can command another to do good and abandon bad works. Based on this, a Muslim can force another in this regard. The basis of this argument is that *Al-Ma'rūf* المعروفincludes all good that religion advocates by custom or reason (A. a.-Q. Al-Jurjānī, 1992, p. 54; Al-Nawawī, 1991). It is the duty of every Muslim to command others to do good deeds, as it is the duty of any Muslim to deter others from doing the wrong things (Al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī, 1978. Vol. 2, p. 280). Therefore, anyone can persuade another to do good and leave bad, this is the meaning of coercion.

It is clear that, there cannot be here a detailed discussion of the issue of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر, which itself requires a wide and independent discussion. Therefore, we summarize this in a brief, to make it clear that, the enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر does not mean coercion, and there is no conflict with autonomy.

There are three levels to enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر :1. In the heart: it is the duty of every Muslim to despise the bad deed and admire good acts, and on the basis of this, he has to avoid those who do bad things. 2. By the tongue: including advice, hint and warning, etc., 3. By action (Al-Dimashqī al- Dumyātī, 1997. Vol. 4, pp. 208-209).

The first stage is by no means coercive because in this situation, the first person gets upset about what the second person has deed, and he is unhappy in his own heart. The unhappiness and discomfort of a person never causes pressure on the second person to do anything, nor to be obliged to leave a job that the first person was upset about. In this situation, if the second person considers the certain considerations or respects the first person's feeling, he or she is based on his/her interests and the basis of his/her decision does so. The second person is not compelled to do so.

The second phase, namely, the verbal stage is not coercive. Verbalising a command does not force a person to compel and obey him. In this case, if the second person acts, he has done based on his/her personal decision and desire. Jurists have accepted the wide range of verbal stage, which includes the expression of harsh words and threats (Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, 1984. Vol.1 , p. 647). If the verbal level involves threats and insult, one cannot be free in doing and leaving, because individuals may act in the face of their dignity or in order to prevent the harm that is threatened.

Rude words, threat, or frighten, are not included in the second level, namely commanding and prohibiting with tongue. Those who believe this kind of remarks as examples of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر have not provided a reason to prove their claim. However, in such cases, we have to refer to the general rules and principles of Islamic law. According to *Abdullāh ibn Umar*, the Prophet (PBUH) said: (Al-Haythamī, 1988. Vol. 6, p.254) من نظر الى مسلم نظرة يخيفه فيها بغير حق اخافه الله يوم القيامة Meaning: Everyone who fears another (without the right to have such a fear) God will scare him on the day of resurrection. Also, narrated that a man has hidden someone else's shoes to make a fun, the Prophet said to him: لا تروعوا المسلم فان روعة المسلم ظلم عظيم (Ibid). Meaning: Never make anyone worried, because making worried is great oppression. Also, *Abdullāh ibn Umar* has narrated in another

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Hadith that the Prophet said: من اخاف مومنا كان حقا على الله ان لا يومنه من افزاع يوم القيامة (Ibid).

Meaning: Whoever frightens a believer, God will not save him from the terrors and dreads of the day of judgement. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī comments:

> The second level of enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر has to be with the kindness and preaching. At this time, the use of threat and violence should be avoided because threats make the people motivated to continue their acts (Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, 1986, p. 54).

In the third level which is to use force and coercion, according to *Imām Abū Hanīfah*, this level is limited to governmental authority and only permitted by official officers (al-Hanafī, 1997. Vol. 8, p. 225). Therefore, the phase is essentially in the legal area and has nothing to do with the field of private relations between individuals, so it is not matter of ethical issues and training method. Although the opinion of some other jurisprudents is that ordinary people can do this third grade, the theory of *Imām Abū Hanīfah* is good support for us in this regard.

In summary, there is no reason to prove that Islam has prescribed coercion for the fulfilment of moral duties. Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر, does not involve coercion in its two first levels, and in the third stage, which includes coercion, there is no compulsion in the private relations between individuals and in the field of ethical duties, but the compulsion is to carry out the tasks defined by the law. Hence, in this third place, the government is responsible to carry out the enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, not ordinary citizens.

6.3.2 Corporal punishment

Another method that has been said to be accepted from the Islamic point of view is corporal punishment. There is no doubt that this method is in contrast with autonomy. Many Muslim scholars have accepted the use of this method of training and education. For example, *Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī* has said: "And the teacher can hit the boys to

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discipline, as *Al-Athram* said: '*Ahmad* was asked about the beating of the boys by the teacher and he answered as much as their sins" (Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, 1984. Vol. 6, p. 119). He criticised *Shafi'ī* who has forbidden beatings of children and writes: "the *Shafi'ī's* opinion, it is not acceptable" (Ibid). *Al-Qurtubī* is one of those who explicitly accepted the use of this method. He discussed only the amount, conditions and terms of using this method, but the permissibility of it is considered definitive and imperative in his opinion. He said: "The child must be beaten softly" (Al-Qurtubī, 1985. Vol. 5, p. 172). *Al-Nawawī* also accepted the use of this method in education and says: "The husband and teacher should not beat in such a way as to cause damage, otherwise they will be held accountable for it" (Al-Nawawī, 1991. Vol. 5, p. 384). The most interesting of all these is *Ibn Miskawayh's* advise. He is a moral person whose book of ethics is famous and well-known. He not only permits the use of corporal punishment in moral education, but also recommends for children and young people a moral code that when given by the teacher or parent through physical punishment, they cannot lift their voice and endure the pain without whining and shouting (Ibn Miskawayh, 2011, p. 76).

6.3.2.1 Corporal punishment in Islam as a legal term

There is no doubt that, in Islam, there are some statements that indicate the corporal punishment of sinners. So in order to explain our idea in the field of moral education, we put forward the statements that exist in Islam about corporal punishment, and, without going into the detailed discussion of these statements, we will adapt our idea to them. We just want to know, these statements are related to moral education or not. By referring to Islamic sources, it becomes clear that, the most of them are about corporal punishment is a legal term.

This kind of punishment is applied in the context of citizenship relations and on the part of the government to govern the community. We do not want to discuss my main

opinion here, and we do not want to consider the prohibition of violence and corporal punishment in the private relations of citizens. We just in the field of ethical education will discuss this idea.

In ethical education, according to the Muslim jurists, the father has the right to punish his child who has committed abusive acts that when done by adults merits severe punishment(Al-Khaṭīb al-Shirbīnī, 1978. Vol. 2, p. 182). Al-Māwardī (1989) believes that only in this case the responsibility for the execution of the punishment is shared between the government and a person outside the government (father), and this is an exceptional case (p. 230). In this regard, corporal punishment is not a method of education, but a punishment.

Therefore, our view is that corporal punishment is not in the field of moral education and is not accepted by Islam as a method. Those who attribute this as a method of education to Islam have confused between Islamic law and Islamic education. This is a mistake that has arisen in other cases and has expanded to other areas such as ethics and education.

The educational method is an action aimed directly at educating, for which reason, although punishments include educational aspects, they are never studied by educational researchers as educational methods. Another point worthy of note in this regard is that the executor of the punishment is one that is subject to the rule of law and has a legal responsibility in this regard. Therefore, it should not be mistaken that Islam has confirmed physical punishment as a method of education. The world of law differs from moral education.

6.3.2.2 Corporal punishment in the area of worship

We already said that in order to explain our idea in the field of moral education, put forward the statements that exist in Islam about corporal punishment. In the last section we found that the most of these statements relate to legal term. There are other statements which relate to the worship.

In this case, the children and adolescents will be forced to perform religious worship, and the father can beat them to do so. Worship is related to ethics, but as we said in the past, Islamic ethics has two parts. The worldly part is dedicated to providing a moral life based on values in this material world and the context of human communication with others. Moreover, the next part seeks to provide a happy life (the life which is the result of living ethically) in the Hereafter, as well as in the context of human communication with God and the supernatural.

Worship is related to the second part of ethics, and autonomy does not have anything to do in this section. The worship is full of mysteries that are incomprehensible to the human reason. So, if we see in the Islamic sources that coercion or punishment is recommended for the fulfilment of worship, it cannot be concluded that in the first part of ethics (that is relevant to the material world), coercion and corporal punishment are also recommended.

The only tradition about beating the children by the father (in the absence of a legal matter) is related to worship. This is a narration in various forms and quotes reported from the Prophet (PBUH). This is the quote of *Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal*. He has quoted from the Prophet (PBUH): مروا صبيانكم بالصلاة اذا بلغوا اسبعا ، واضربوهم عليهااذا بلغوا عشراً ، وفرقوا بينهم في المضاجع (Hanbal, 1991. Vol. 2, p. 180). Means: Give orders to your children at age seven to do their prayers, and when they reach the age of ten, beat them for that and

separate the girls from the boys in bed. Some jurists have found from this narrative that beating children over ten years of age is acceptable in Islam (Al-Hattāb al-Ru'ayanī, 1996. Vol. 2, p. 54)

We do not discuss the authenticity of this tradition regarding its chain of narrators, although discussions can be made in this regard. The reason is that, among the four ways, in which, this narrative is quoted, the way of *'Amr Ibn Shu'ayb* that is from his father and grandfather, is accepted by most scholars. Then we are discussing this tradition with the assumption that, its authenticity is confirmed

It cannot be said that this narrative and the like are related to the legal term because the ten-year-old child has not yet reached the age of puberty and is not subject to legal titles. However, this narrative is in the domain of worship. On this basis, when it is said in connection with worship that, physical punishment is permitted (if we accept this narrative), it cannot be inferred the same rule in the part of the ethics and moral education associated with the material world. Perhaps there is a special feature in worship, that must be done in any way and punishable by corporal punishment. Reason does not understand this special characteristic and the inability of reason to perceive this point, does not conflict with the theory of autonomy.

6.4   Alternative Methods Compatible with Autonomy

In this section, we have dealt with ways which should be highlighted in the autonomous system. These ways are introduced as the methods in moral education, which are consistent with autonomy. These methods are actually educational policies that can take many examples. Therefore, these few educational methods can be substituted for the those common educational methods mentioned before, such as habituation, imitation,

corporal punishment, coercion, because by identifying the examples of these methods, we can meet the needs of the moral education regarding the method.

6.4.1 Situational simulation

I must point out that, the content of this discussion has been taken from the Qur'an, but the title is an adaptation of a term which some researchers have put forward on the subject of management issues. Watkins and Mukherjee (2009) said:

> Situational models allow decision-makers to organise situational information using domain-specific knowledge, thus helping them prioritise trade-offs that lead to effective decisions. This is specifically relevant to domains, where there can be more than one "correct" decision and the effectiveness of decisions are not immediately obvious (p. 177).

According to the content of this method which is derived from the Quran, this can be seen as an example of the presentation of a method of education based on Quranic teachings. This method involves placing the person (child, adolescent, and student) in a situation that should be based on the decision-making process. For example, instead of mechanically accustoming a person to avoiding lie, the instructor places him in the position of truth-telling and lying and guides him to know the command of his intellect and the voice of law that is made by reason. By using this method instead of accustoming him to something, we will direct him to the situation and the command in which the wisdom is given.

In situational simulation, the instructor's attempt to lead the person to know about his responsibilities and to understand his task to decide based on his reason without the behaviour being based on habit formation. Regarding the educational teachings of the Quran, one can find that the method of situational simulation can be done in two ways.

6.4.1.1 Mental Situational simulation

In this case, the person will be placed in a situation to be informed of the status of other people who are in the same situation. Then the person will know the decisions that other people did in those circumstances and the consequences of their decisions. By doing so, he mentally falls into the position intended by the instructor and can find the right decision in this situation and the outcome.

Mental situational simulation is considered by the Quran as a method of moral education. This has been done in the form of Quranic stories. . Educating through the mention of stories related to the subject, is a typical example of the mental Situational simulation that has been done. The Holy Quran considers the use of this method as having different educational capacities and considers the various aspects of the use of stories in education.

(a) *Reinforcement of thought and intellection*

The Quran says: فَاقْصُصِ الْقَصَصَ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَفَكَّرُون (7:176). Meaning: O, Messenger tell them these stories perchance they will think.

(b) *Indirect guidance*

The Quran has pointed in some cases to its aim, which by expressing the stories, indirectly intends to preach and guide, so that the listener finds the truth and falsehood from the tale of the story without having to direct the audience. For example, the Quran says: كُلاًّ نَقُصُّ عَلَيْكَ مِنْ أَنْبَاءِ الرُّسُلِ مَا نُثَبِّتُ بِهِ فُؤَادَكَ وَ جَاءَكَ فِي هَذِهِ الْحَقُّ وَ مَوْعِظَةٌ وَ ذِكْرَى لِلْمُؤْمِنِين (11:120). Means: O, Muhammad We recount all The stories of the Messengers, and by this, We will strengthen your heart, in them there comes to you the truth, with good advice and reminders to believers. And it says: كَذَلِكَ نَقُصُّ عَلَيْكَ مِنْ أَنْبَاءِ مَا قَدْ سَبَقَ وَ قَدْ آتَيْنَاكَ مِنْ

لَدُنَّا ذِكْرًا)(20: 99). Means: Thus Messenger! We relate you the stories of what happened before and we have sent you a reminder from us.

(c) *Learning Lessons*

This method has the function which expected in corporal punishment, so there is no need to use punitive methods in moral education. The Quran says: وَ نَبِّئْهُمْ عَنْ ضَيْفِ إِبْرَاهِيمَ (15:51). Meaning: Relate them the story of the guests of Abraham. And the Quran following this verse says: إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لَآيَاتٍ لِلْمُتَوَسِّمِينَ (15:75). Meaning: Indeed, in this story, there are signs for intelligent people.

The narration of the stories of the Prophets and their peoples gives the audience the opportunity to measure and compare their situation with the Prophets and people in the past, and to correct and reform their behaviour. The Quran emphasises that this ability will be stronger in those who use their wisdom. The Quran says: لَقَدْ كَانَ فِي قَصَصِهِمْ عِبْرَةٌ لِأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ مَا كَانَ حَدِيثاً يُفْتَرَى وَ لَكِنْ تَصْدِيقَ الَّذِي بَيْنَ يَدَيْهِ وَ تَفْصِيلَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ وَ هُدًى وَ رَحْمَةً لِقَوْمٍ يُؤْمِنُونَ (12:111). Meaning: In their story, there is instruction for people with understanding. It is not an invented tale, but is a confirmation of what exists before it, and has a detailed explanation for everything, as well as it is a guide and grace to those who believe.

At the end of all the Quranic stories, God has paid attention to their knowledge of the Quran and called on people to think about these verses and stories and correct their lives.

6.4.1.2 Practical situational simulation

The second example of the situational simulation method is to position the recipient (student-children-adolescence and so on) in a situation where he sees and experiences the phenomenon. In the early stages of training, the practical situational simulation means that the child or teenager observes the effects and consequences of decisions that

others have taken in a similar situation. The role of the mentor here is to invite them to experience and to think about this experience. The difference in practical situational simulation with the mental situational simulation is that the person directly and without intermediaries is dealing with the effects and consequences of decisions taken in this situation.

This method (practical situational simulation) has been emphasised frequently in the Holy Quran. It says: أَفَلَمْ يَسِيرُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ فَيَنْظُرُوا كَيْفَ كَانَ عَاقِبَةُ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ وَ لَدَارُ الْآخِرَةِ خَيْرٌ لِّلَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا أَ فَلَا تَعْقِلُونَ (12:109). Meaning: "Do they not travel in the land, to see how was the end of those lived before them? But the Hereafter is better, for those who do righteous deeds. Will you not understand?" In this verse, at first, the element of observation and experience is emphasised, and people are invited to travel abroad and see the works left behind by their predecessors. It is clear that observing the works of relatives and gaining experience in this field is recommended. The purpose is mentioned in the final part of the verse, namely reasoning and thinking. That is, they must think in these works, as well as in events and consequences. Considered the similarities between their situation and them, and knew the right decision in these situations.

In short, the method of situational simulation is an alternative method that is adaptive to autonomy and can be used in moral education instead of the incompatible methods discussed previously.

6.4.2 Self-control (*al-Murāqibah*) and self-appraisal (*al-Muhāsibah*)

One of the Islamic methods of moral education, which is completely internal and in no way influential from external factors, is self-control, which is called in Islamic sources *al-Murāqibah*, and *al-Muhāsibah*. The Islamic concept of *al-Murāqibah* means protecting and caring, and its application as a method of self-control implies a metaphor

since a person protects himself in order to avoid mistakes and wrong behaviours that are inappropriate and immoral. The term refers to supervision, investigation, and observing something (Al-Shawkānī, 1993. Vol. 2, p. 109). This term is used in the field of ethics for "self-caring". We can use this in moral education because supervision comes from the inside, not from the outside. By using this template, we can find several examples of this method, which are precisely aligned with the autonomous moral education.

6.4.2.1 Self-control (*al-Murāqibah*) in Islamic sources and its adaptation to moral education

Al-Murāqibah is based on the belief that man is constantly in the hands of God, and God is witnessing and presenting. Therefore, he should not commit injustice and wrong deeds in God's presence. There is a lot of evidence in the Quran and in the traditions that emphasise this perception about meditation. For example, the Quran says: أَ لَمْ يَعْلَمْ بِأَنَّ اللَّهَ يَرَى (96: 14). Meaning: Does he not know that God sees everything? Or it says: يا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَ لْتَنْظُرْ نَفْسٌ ما قَدَّمَتْ لِغَدٍ وَ اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِما تَعْمَلُونَ (59:18). Meaning: you believers! Fear of God; and any man has to see what he has done in his future, then fear of God; indeed, God is Aware of what you do. And has quoted from the Prophet (PBUH) that he said: الاحسان ان تعبد الله كانك تراه فان لم تكن تراه فانه يراك (HANBAL, 1991. VOL. 1, P. 27)

There is a problem, that is, these verses and narrations point to the communication between self-control *Al-Murāqibah* with the external factor, so the meditation is the same as God's presence. According to A. a.-Q. Al-Jurjānī (1992) Muslim scholars have also provided a definition for this concept that is in relation to the Lord's supervision (p. 91). So, how do we consider this method an internal way?

In Islam, *Al-Murāqibah* has been introduced as the divine presence and respect to this presence. This motive does not affect the nature of *Al-Murāqibah* and its modality and quality. *Al-Murāqibah* is an internal control in which a person controls himself without being controlled by a foreign agent. The external or internal nature of a method should be considered according to its quality and how it is done.

The respect for the divine presence and considering ourselves in the presence of God does not have contradictions with the freedom of the will, because in the freedom of the will the topic is the motive of the moral act and in *Al-Murāqibah* is the motive of method for training. However, we have explained in detail in the past that, the motives that go back to the Lord are in fact consistent with the deontology that is the ground of autonomy. Kant does not speak of a divine motive in autonomy because he believes that God and the Hereafter are provable by practical reason, that is, the moral consequence of living. Therefore, before entering the area of ethics, God is not verifiable by the theoretical reason. Kant gains and sets forth God in the result of ethics, not at the beginning of it.

6.4.2.2 Compatibility of self-control (*al-Murāqibah*) with autonomy

The internal nature of this method causes the control of all aspects of human being, even his mind. The *Al-Murāqibah* process makes the human mind under its control. It expands the domination of reason over the mental and physical aspects of man. Therefore, *Al-Murāqibah is* considered to be in the direction of the first element of autonomy, namely legislation of reason.

Internal control also leads to the strengthening of the will. When a person carries out surveillance from within, his motivations are internalised. Because in this way, no force is monitoring from outside. External supervision leads to external motivations.

6.4.2.3 Difference between meditation and self-control (*al-Murāqibah*)

One of the methods that are commonly used today for dealing with human psyche is meditation. The roots of this method come from Eastern traditions such as Hinduism and Buddhism (Joo, 2011). It attempts to strengthen the power of the mind by focusing on a specific thing or emptying the mind from thought (Ibid). This focus can take place on a phrase, sound, invocation, object, image, or thing. The purpose of meditation is awareness, relaxation, and stress reduction. In the opinion of the advocates of this method, meditation techniques make the body, mind and emotions easy to coordinate and focus (Haynes, 2004). Although the history of meditation refers to Eastern traditions such as Hinduism, it has been particularly popular in the West from the 60s (Joo, 2011). Western youth use meditation as a means of relaxation.

In *Al-Murāqibah*, instead of emptying the mind from thinking or focusing on a particular thing, the person takes control of his self and cares for it, so that it will not commit wrong and immoral behaviour. *Al-Murāqibah* differs from meditation in Eastern cultures, as well as what is now popular in the West today. *Al-Murāqibah* is a training and ethical method leading to the health of the soul, mind and body through a moral life, while the conventional method of meditation is a therapeutic method aimed at relieving stress and achieving relaxation. Many doctors recommend meditation as a useful therapeutic approach to be more relaxed and even lower blood pressure and better respiration for asthma patients (Haynes, 2004). In some cases, medication is recommended for a complementary therapist along with treatment. So basically, these two (Islamic method of self- control *Al-Murāqibah* -meditation) have nothing to do with each other.

It should not be forgotten that, what is commonly used in the regular and common meditation method, and in particular the western type, is recommended in Islam in the

form of religious worship. Islamic worship pursues the same goal as meditation. The Quran has stated: الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا وَ تَطْمَئِنُّ قُلُوبُهُمْ بِذِكْرِ اللَّهِ أَلا بِذِكْرِ اللَّهِ تَطْمَئِنُّ الْقُلُوبُ (13:28). Those who are faithful and whose hearts comforted and confident in Allah's remembrance. Remembrance of God makes the heart peaceful. Thus, Islam has not neglected the mental peace of humans and his relaxation, but this is another issue that is beyond the scope of our study. We just want to emphasize that, when we talk about the self- control *Al-Murāqibah* we should not confuse it with the meditation method.

6.4.2.4 Completing self-control (*al-Murāqibah*) with self-appraisal (al-Muhasebe)

In Islamic sources, *Al-Murāqibah* is completed with *al-Muhāsibeh*. All people will attend the presence of God in the day of resurrection for evaluating and answering. Therefore, in the course of life and during that, they must evaluate themselves.

This is Islamic term used widely in both the Quran and traditions. The Quran says: يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ وَ لْتَنْظُرْ نَفْسٌ ما قَدَّمَتْ لِغَدٍ وَ اتَّقُوا اللَّهَ إِنَّ اللَّهَ خَبِيرٌ بِما تَعْمَلُونَ (59: 18). Meaning: O, you believers Fear God; And any man must see what he has Forwarded for his future, fear Allah, God is Aware of what you Do.

According to many commentators, this verse is one of the Quranic reasons that prove the necessity of *al-Muhāsibeh* because everyone must carefully consider what deeds they have performed and what he or she have provided for their next life (Ibn Kathīr, 1998. Vol. 8, p. 106). *'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb* said: حاسبوا انفسكم قبل ان تحاسبوا تزينوا للعرض الاكبر و انما يخف الحساب يوم القيامة على من حاسب نفسه فى الدنيا (Al-Tirmidhī, 1982. Vol. 4, p. 153).Meaning: Evaluate yourself before being evaluated by the divine almighty and improve yourself to present in God's presence, indeed the almighty's evaluation will be light on whom has often evaluated himself in this world. *Meymūn ibn Mehrān* said: لا يكون العبد تقيا حتى تحاسب نفسه كما يحاسب شريكه من اين مطعمه و ملبسه (Ibid). Meaning: Man will

not be counted as the righteous ones unless he evaluates himself the way he would evaluate his partner constantly that from where his food and clothes are provided.

Although in the Islamic sources, the method of *al-Muhāsibeh* is related to God and the Hereafter, the nature of this method and what we consider to be a method of education is internal. So a man instead of responding to a power outside, he is responsive to himself.

In summary, *Al-Murāqibah* and *al-Muhāsibeh* are beneficial methods of moral education that preserve and strengthen the liberty of the will as much as possible, and increases thinking and decision-making regarding ethical conduct. So, instead of incompatible methods with autonomy that undermines the rationality and power of creativity of a person or conflicts with his free will, the method of *Al-Murāqibah* and *al-Muhāsibeh*, provide the expected beneficial results.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The summary of the current study is based on the 12 findings. The results of this research are categorised into three general categories according to the research questions and objectives: 1. The results in the study of autonomy from the Islamic perspective. 2. The results in the theoretical consequences of autonomy in the objectives of Islamic moral education. 3. The results in the theoretical consequences of autonomy in the methods of Islamic moral education.

In the current study, before to entering the main discussions, it is required to establish foundations for the main research topics. These foundations, of course, in their turn, are a form of achievements for the study, but since they are not considered as the research objectives, hence not being introduced as the results. The foundations are:

1. The Essentiality of Considering the Kantian theory of autonomy in Islamic moral education

In the current study, this point has been proposed and proved from three perspectives

1.1. The essentiality of considering the theory of autonomy in the Islamic moral education regarding the elements of the theory.

The theory of autonomy is based on two fundamental principles. 1. The observance of the law of reason; 2. The freedom of the will. In this theory, rationality and freedom are the criteria of the morality of human acts. Rationality and freedom are the foundations of modern education. For this reason, in all the educational theories presented in the era of modernity and afterwards, these two elements are considered as the fundamental basis.

Islamic education cannot be indifferent toward the two main principles of modern education. Without commenting on them, the possibility of dialogue between Islamic education and modern education will be eliminated.

In the area of moral independence, the interpretation of Immanuel Kant (Autonomy) is considered to be the central point. Other scholars, who have proposed autonomy such as Nietzsche, Piaget, Rawls, or Kohlberg, all have been influenced by Kant and retained the main original elements of Kant's. The highest interpretation of the rationality and freedom that has been proposed in the Kantian theory. If Islam accepts Kant's theory of autonomy, then the highest level of these two elements has to be considered as a goal for Islamic moral education. This is a significant point, since many schloars have criticised the Islamic education for not paying attention to these two factors.

1.2. The essentiality of considering the theory of autonomy in the Islamic moral education regarding the theoretical consequences in the objectives and methods.

Autonomous ethical education has distinct features. These features are marked regarding educational methods and sub-objectives. That is why the theory of autonomy was taken very seriously by scholars after Kant.

Islamic moral education seeks to adorn people with virtues and good ethics as well as avoiding evil and vice. To achieve this final goal, a set of sub-objectives and phases are considered. The sub-objectives are the stages that have to be passed in order to achieve the final goal. The acceptance of autonomy affects the sub-objectives of Islamic moral education. Based on these objectives, the educational methods are regulated. Since, after that and according to the sub- objectives, some changes will occur in the field of moral education method.

1.3. The essentiality of considering the theory of autonomy regarding the particular relationship with education.

The definition given in the current study for education is: " Activities in the special form, based on the mentor's values, in two aspects of physical and mental which are cause to discover and find the talents of the learner and develop them, or cause transferring the knowledge and experiences of the instructor to the learner, and make them experienced and knowledgeable".

On the other hand, education involves different areas one of which is moral education. In each of these areas, the definition of education is reserved, so independence is considered the goal of moral education. With this definition, it becomes clear that the theory of autonomy is related to the purpose of moral education. Islamic moral education cannot be indifferent to this theory.

2. The compatibility of Kant's ethical system with religion

This foundation is very important, since autonomy is the product of Kant's moral system, and this system is accused of being based on the negation of religion. If Kant's ethical system negates religion, then the research of autonomy from the Islamic perspective would be meaningless.

Kant views theoretical reason as being unable to understand God and supernatural concepts. He believes that philosophy cannot prove God and the Hereafter. However, he believes that our practical reason leads us to prove God and the Hereafter. In the present study, it has become clear that Kant does not deny God and the Hereafter; he only believes that, in order to prove these concepts, instead of theoretical reason, the practical intellect should be followed.

This substructure will prepare the ground for the study of the theory of autonomy from the religious perspective. Following the preparation of the foundations, the current research has entered the main topics, with its achievements.

7.1   Findings

The current study has 12 major achievements and findings that distinguish this research from other studies. A part of these achievements appears in the field of study of autonomy from the Islamic perspective, and others connected to objectives and methods of autonomous moral education.

7.1.1   The achievements in the study of the theory of autonomy from Islamic perspective

Autonomy has two main pillars, namely observing the law of reason, and freedom of the will. Therefore, in the study of the theory, each of these two pillars must be studied. In each case, we will have certain achievements.

7.1.1.1 Prove the compatibility of autonomy with Islam based on *Ash'arī* theology

In the first element, the main criticism from the Islamic perspective of the autonomy is that it conflicts with the authority of the Quran and traditions in Islamic ethics. In autonomy, human reason has the ability to recognise moral values. The responses that are presented focus on this critique. All research done on the theory of autonomy have attempted to answer these important critiques.

So far, there has been very little works to demonstrate autonomy's compatibility with Islamic teachings. These works were considered inadequate in regards to the first pillar of autonomy. Some scholars have sought to prove the first element of autonomy from the Islamic perspective by presenting a series of verses and traditions that emphasise the high position of human reason. While the first element of autonomy cannot be deduced

from these verses and traditions. The issue of rationalism which is raised in these verses and traditions is different from the legislation of reason in autonomy.

Others rely on the view of the *al-mu'tazilah*. These scholars confined the acceptance of autonomy to the view of the *al-mu'tazilah*. Methodologically, it should be borne in mind that autonomy's proof based on the *al-mu'tazilah* view is not a step forward. The problem of *al-mu'tazilah* is a minority among Muslims, and one cannot claim to accept a theory from an Islamic point of view when it is based on a minority's doctrine.

It is important to prove the theory of autonomy from the viewpoint of *Ash'arī* theology. The previous scholars have proved it only based on the *al-mu'tazilah*, and we will prove it based on *Ash'arī* theology. The summary of our discussion is as follows:

1. The rational good and evil, which is the issue between the *Ash'arī* theology and the *al-mu'tazilah* have three meanings. First: perfection and defect الكمال و النقص; second: suitability and disharmony الملاءمة و المنافرة; third: praise and blame المدح و الذم.

2. The *Ash'arī* theology accepts rational good and evil in the two first meanings (perfection and defect and suitability and disharmony).

3. Perfection and suitability in the field of morality are equivalent to ethical values and virtues, and the defect and disharmony are equivalent to vices and immorality.

4. Considering that *Ash'arī* theology has accepted the ability of reason to comprehend perfection-defect and suitability-disharmony, we conclude that they have accepted the ability of reason to understand moral values.

5. The practical reason commands doing or leaving acts in three cases. Two of those cases are after recognising of perfection-defect and suitability-disharmony through theoretical reason.

6. Given that the *Ash'arī* theology has accepted the comprehension of the perfection-defect and suitability-disharmony by the theoretical reason, then we conclude that they admit the commands of practical reason in these two cases.

7. The issue in the first element of autonomy is the ability of reason to understand moral values and commanding practical reason. We find that this pillar is accepted by *Ash'arī* theology.

8. *Ash'arī* theology disagrees with the *al-mu'tazilah* in the issue of rational good and evil concerning divine acts, intrinsic good and evil and man's authority and power in the creation of his acts. None of these three disputes affects the acceptance of autonomy.

9. The difference between the acceptance of autonomy based on the *al-mu'tazilah* and its acceptance on the basis of *Ash'arī* theology is clear. The first viewpoint believes in the ability of reason fully and completely in all areas of religion, and ultimately religion is replaced by reason. While based on *Ash'arī* theology, this ability is only in the field of ethics because divine acts are not in the domain of rational good and evil. Therefore, according to them, reason is not an alternative to religion.

10. Although reason in the field of ethics has the ability to understand values, it does not mean disconnecting ethics from religion. Since human beings have a life after death and have a connection with the supernatural affairs and God, reason is not able to understand anything in this area. Therefore, reason has the function only in the part of the ethics that applies to its worldly life and in connections with other human beings.

Therefore, ethics are divided into worldly and the otherworldly. The reason is applicable only in the case of the material world. This aligns with Kantian autonomy.

7.1.1.2 Prove the freedom of the will based on transcendental Islamic motives

In this section, the main criticism from the Islamic perspective of autonomy is that it conflicts with the existence of external motivation in Islamic ethics. Since accordance with autonomy the moral agent has not had any external motives.

The works have done to demonstrate the autonomy's compatibility with Islamic teachings are inadequate. Most of them have focused on the the first element of autonomy, namely, legislation of reason, and the freedom of the will has often been neglected. Some scholars interpreted free will differently from Kant such as personal growth. They relied only on the freedom from external pressure and coercion, while the freedom of the will is much more than that. Some others have mistakenly took these concepts and have quoted some verses and traditions to prove the natural freedom of man, then concluded the confirmation of the freedom of the will which is sought in the autonomy from the Islamic perspective.

The freedom of the will, which is raised in autonomy means that external factors and motives do not influence human beings during the conduct of a moral act. When Kant speaks of the freedom of the will in the moral act, he does not mean natural liberty, but freedom from regarding the motives. It is important to know that natural liberty is a theological topic against determinism. The mistake in this approach is the confusion between the two concepts of natural and ethical liberty.

This study used a different approach to respond to the criticism and defend the theory of autonomy. We discuss Islamic concepts that have been raised as motives in Islamic teachings such as love for God, divine satisfaction and so on. These concepts are

supreme and original motives beyond the motivation of craving for paradise and fear of hell. These align with Kant's deontology. Islam accepts different levels of the faith, and the concepts above are the highest levels of faith. The motives such as fear of hell or craving of paradise are low levels of faith. This aligns with autonomy since according to Kantian theory; autonomy is the highest degree of ethical education.

7.1.2 The achievements of the current study in the field of theoretical consequences of autonomy in the objectives of Islamic moral education

To achieve the final goal of moral education, a series of sub-objectives must be taken. Autonomy's acceptance in the context of the sub-objectives of moral education has been affected. Some of the sub-objectives are commensurate with autonomy and should be considered by the education planners. Before the study of these sub-objectives in the practical field, we must prove acceptance of them from an Islamic point of view in a theoretical discussion. Therefore, we discussed the sub-objectives from the Islamic perspective. These sub-objectives are:

7.1.2.1 Introducing unlimited releasing of the thinking as the objectives of moral education

The process of releasing thinking must first achieve productive thought which is creative and liberal thinking. In this section, we discussed Islamic traditions that appear to limit thinking. The result of the discussion is that all of these narratives are related to religious affairs. They are not related to moral education. Therefore, we concluded that freedom of thought as an educational objective is absolute in Islam.

7.1.2.2 Allocating the teaching of moral content in the initial stage as the objective of moral education

In this discussion, we oppose two groups. 1. Radical Western supporters of autonomy who viewed the teaching of moral education as being opposed to autonomy. They claim that teaching ethical values does not lead to being autonomous. 2. Some Muslim scholars who believe that the presentation of moral content is not limited to the initial stages of moral education, and it must be done continuously and in all stages. Ethical teaching should be conducted, and one should follow these teachings. The research achievement in this field is that providing ethical content in the early stages of education does not conflict with autonomy, and providing ethical content in the early stages of education is acceptable in Islam. Here is some evidence in Islamic sources that seemingly recommend the teaching of ethical content throughout the educational process in all stages. We study the evidence and conclude that, they relate to teaching and learning, which has nothing to do with ethical education, or relate to preaching and advising, which further implies there are no contradictions with autonomy and moral independence.

7.1.2.3 Distinguishing between the orders of reason and instinctive pleasures as the objective of moral education

One of the sub-objectives to be considered in moral education is to distinguish between the commandments of reason and instincts. One of the findings of the current study is to provide a criterion in this regard. This indicator and criterion are derived from what the Muslim scholars have provided in logics. Accordingly, whenever the wise of the world accept a theorem not based on a particular religion, country, nation, culture, race, and so on, that statement is rational and is in fact sheer command of the reason.

The specific and definite result in this section is that, criticism of many Muslim scholars on the theory of autonomy- That this outcome of the theory is following instincts and desires of the human soul- is false and incorrect.

7.1.2.4 Educating a person like a mystic as the objective of moral education

This is the fourth achievement regarding moral education objectives, regarding the second element of autonomy, namely, freedom of the will. Our achievement in this section is to illustrate that, in Islamic sources; the highest level of ethics is to reach a point where there are no external motives. This goal is raised in Islamic mysticism and can be simulated in moral education.

The current research's innovation is that, by referring to the rich and valuable sources of Islamic mysticism, especially the writings of Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, there is tremendous potential in Islamic resources for the alignment of autonomy. Both denied exterior motives and the inner and pure motives are far beyond what Kant suggested. The supremacy of Islam in this regard and the depth of the capacity of Islamic resources are thus emphasised.

7.1.3 The achievements of the current study in the field of theoretical consequences of autonomy in the methods of Islamic moral education

The first element of autonomy is following the law of reason and the second is freedom of the will. Based on these principles, the use of methods that invite a person to follow the ways which are against legislation of reason, as well as, the methods that are in conflict with free will, is not acceptable. The results of the current study in this regard are:

7.1.3.1 Eliminating habituation in moral education

The use of habituation is recommended by many Muslim scholars such as *Al-Ghazālī* and others. In the current study, due to the incompatibility of this method with the autonomy, we studied the method from the Islamic perspective, and the purpose was answering whether this method is recommended and approved by Islam.

The narratives that seem to be in connection with the habituation method are about continuously repeating the good deeds, rather than reaching the habit of doing things without thinking and making decisions. Therefore, the content of these narrations is far from what is meant in habituation.

The habitual method has no confirmatory evidence. Hence, we conclude that this method should not be used in moral education because, in addition to incompatibility with autonomy, it weakens the rationality and the power of human thought. Of course, the use of this method is efficient in some areas of education such as physical education, as this method can be used in teaching and learning.

7.1.3.2 Eliminating Imitation in moral education

Imitation means to follow others without reason. Many Muslim scholars have accepted the use of imitation techniques in moral education. In the opinion of these advocates of imitation, it is defined as the active reproduction of the quality and characteristics of the behaviours of others.

In our view, what is seen in Islamic sources as the reason for imitation is categorised into two groups that have nothing to do with imitation as a moral education method.

Group. 1. The evidence put forth referring to religious affairs. For example, the Quran says: وَ مَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِكَ إِلاَّ رِجَالاً نُوحِي إِلَيْهِمْ (6:90). And: أُولَئِكَ الَّذِينَ هَدَى اللَّهُ فَبِهُدَاهُمُ اقْتَدِهْ

فَسْئَلُوا أَهْلَ الذِّكْرِ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَ (16: 43). These verses have nothing to do with imitation but are related to the observance of religious orders. We have repeatedly said that religion cannot be discovered by reason.

Group. 2. The evidence that recommends referring to the experts and knowledgeable people. One of the most important reasons in this regard is the well-known principle of referring to wise people. This type of referral (referring to the expert) also does not point toward imitation as a method of education.

It is also possible to come to a different conclusion and say that, even if we consider the two cases that have been raised in Islam, as imitation, it can be concluded that, the Islam-approved imitation only in these two cases.

7.1.3.3 Eliminating corporal punishment in moral education

Many Muslim scholars have accepted the use of this method of training and education, such as *Ibn Qudāmah al-Maqdisī, Al-Qurṭubī, Al-Nawawī, Ibn Miskawayh.*

The result of the current study in this regard is that there is no corporal punishment in Islamic education. Evidence of corporal punishment is related to two specific issues, which do not relate to education, in general, and moral education in particular. Those issues are. 1. Legal terms that are applied in society on the part of the government to govern the community. Those who attribute this method of education to Islam have made confused between Islamic law and Islamic education. The educational method is an action aimed directly at educating, for which reason, although punishments include educational aspect, they are never studied by educational researchers as educational methods. 2. In the area of worship. In this case, the children and adolescents will be forced to perform religious worship, and the father can beat them to do so. The Prophet (PBUH) said: مُرُوا صِبْيَانَكُم بِالصَّلَاةِ اذا بَلَغُوا سَبعاً ، واضربوهم عليها اذا بَلَغوا عَشراً ، وفرّقوا بينهم في

المضاجع. Meaning: Give orders to your children at age seven to do their prayers, and when they reach the age of ten, beat them for that and separate the girls from the boys in bed. Worship is related to the second part of ethics, a part in which our reason does not apply as worship is full of mysteries that are incomprehensible to the human reason. Autonomy does not have anything to do in this section.

7.1.3.4 Eliminating coercion in moral education

Coercion has obvious conflict with autonomy. Among Muslim scholars, there is a view that considers the use of coercion permissible in moral education. This view argues by evidence from Islamic sources. This evidence is two principles of the protection of the family, and enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامر بالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر In the case of the protection of the family, the Quran says: يا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا قُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ وَ أَهْلِيكُمْ نَاراً (66:6). Meaning: O, you believers Secure yourselves And your families from the Fire. It has been interpreted that the father can force his family members to perform their duties. However, the result of the examination of this principle in light of the interpretations of the great thinkers is that the purpose is to educate and teach family members with our good behaviours. That is, the meaning of the verse is not coercion, but exemplifying good behaviours and familiarising them with the correct manners.

As for enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر there are three levels, namely in the heart, verbally, and physically. We concluded that Islam had not prescribed coercion for the fulfilment of moral duties. Enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong الامربالمعروف و النهى عن المنكر does not involve coercion in its two first levels. There is no compulsion in the third stage, which includes the coercion, aaccording to *Imam Abū Hanīfah.*

In the third stage, which includes the coercion, aaccording to *Imām Abū Hanīfah*, there is no compulsion in the private relations between individuals and in the field of ethical duties, but the compulsion is to carry out the tasks defined by the law. For this, in this third level, the government is responsible for carrying out enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong and not ordinary citizens.

7.1.3.5 Raising and reinforcing alternative educational methods that are consistent with autonomy

In this section, we have dealt with ways in which the autonomous- centered system, should be highlighted. These ways are introduced as the methods in moral education, which are consistent with autonomy and should replace the aforementioned methods. It is necessary to note that, these methods are actually educational policies that can take many examples.

(a) *Situational simulation*

Situational simulation along with guidance to the command of reason involves placing the person (child, adolescent, and student) in a situation that should be based on the decision-making process. By using this method, instead of accustoming him to something, we will only direct him to the situation and the command in which the wisdom is given. The content of this discussion has been taken from the Quran, but its title is an adaptation of a term some researchers have put forward on the subject of management issues.

In the current study, we divide the method of situational simulation into mental and practical and introduce the stories of the Quran as an example of the use of this method in its mental form. We consider the Quran's invitation to travel in the land as emphasising this method in its practical form.

(b) *Self-control (al-Murāqibah) and self-appraisal (al-Muhāsibah)*

We also advocated for self-control (*al-Murāqibah*) and self-appraisal (*al-Muhāsibah*) as Islamic methods of moral education, which is completely internal and in no way influential from external factors. It means protecting and caring, and its application as a method of self-control implies a metaphor since a person protects himself in order to avoid mistakes and behaviours that are inappropriate and immoral.

The internal nature of this method causes the control of all aspects of the human being even his mind. The *al-Murāqibah* process brings the human mind under its control and expands the domination of reason over the mental and physical aspects of man. As such, *al-Murāqibah* aligns with the legislation of reason in autonomy.

These methods support moral education methods and, at the same time, and preserve and strengthen the liberty of the will as much as possible, as it increases thinking and decision-making power.

The total results of this study can be found in the following list:

1. Prove the compatibility of autonomy with Islam, based on Ashʿari theology

2. Prove the freedom of the will based on Islamic Transcendental Motives

3. Introducing unlimited Releasing of the Thinking as the objectives of moral education

4. Allocating the teaching of moral content in the initial stage, as the objective of moral education

5. Distinguishing between the orders of reason and instinctive pleasures as the objective of moral education

6. Educating a person like the mystic as the objective of moral education

7. Eliminating the habituation in moral education

8- Eliminating imitation in moral education

9. Eliminating coercion in moral education

10. Eliminating corporal punishment in moral education

11. Introducing the Situational simulation as a consistent method with Autonomy

12. Introducing the Self – control (*al-Murāqibah*) and self-appraisal (*al Muhasibah*) as a consistent method with Autonomy

7.2 Reflection of the results of this research

The objectives that have been studied in this research in three areas of autonomy from the Islamic perspective, its effects on Islamic moral education's objectives, and methods, have important reflections that we mention in the following.

7.2.1 Reflections of the research results in the study of autonomy from the Islamic perspective

The important reflection of the achievements in this part of the study is presenting the capacity of *Ash'arī* theology to conform to modernity and rationality. What has been attributed to this School of thought, upon which, *Ash'arism* does not accept the function of human reason, is not correct. The incorrectness of this imputation is clarified according to the results of the current study.

This important reflection has significant implications in educational studies. Because many elements of modernity in modern education require study from the Islamic point

of view, and the reflection of the current study in demonstrating the great capacity of the *Ash'arī* theology provides a very available ground for conducting these studies.

7.2.2 Reflection of the results of research in the consequences of autonomy's acceptance in Islamic moral education

In this section, we have specifically used the capacity of Islamic mysticism to explain the sub- objectives of moral education. The reflection of the achievements in this section is further proving the necessity of exploring Islamic education with mystical approach. Therefore, the door has been opened for the mystical approach in educational studies. The Islamic mysticism is one of the richest cultural and scientific heritages with great potential for deepening educational researches. The results of the current study in the field of moral education objectives, shows this reflection.

7.3 Recommendations for the future

As a researcher in this study, I must point out that, the present research has provided the theoretical basis for the acceptance of the autonomy as well as its effects on Islamic moral education. Therefore, I suggest conducting practical researches on the autonomy from the Islamic point of view. These practical researches should reflect the autonomy's function in Islamic moral education. According to this suggestion, the following points should be considered:

7.3.1 Practical research on the status quo of the Muslim countries in relation to moral education objectives

As stated in the current study, the autonomy's acceptance in moral education, requires the designation of some objectives in accordance the autonomy. There must be qualitative and quantitative researches in this area. This research should be carried out to answer the three main research questions:

1. What is the current status of Islamic countries in relation to the autonomy's proportional objectives? For example, evidently the current situation of Islamic regions and their educational system toward unlimited liberation of thought, or the training of person like the mystics, or toward the limiting the presentation of moral content to the initial stages of education.

2. How can we compare the current situation of Islamic countries in relation to the autonomy's proportional objectives, with the status of non-Islamic countries that claim to be modernized?

3. To what extent is the function of the proportional objectives? For this purpose, investigation should be conducted in the form of interviews, observation, and other information collecting methods and techniques.

7.3.2 Practical research on the status quo of the Muslim countries in relation to moral education methods

As seen before in this research, some educational methods are incompatible with autonomy. In the current study, these methods were studied from a point of view of Islam. We tried to explain the Islamic perspective in this regard. There is a need for practical studies in the future. Practical research in this field should be carried out to answer the three main research questions.

1. What are the examples of incompatible educational methods that are common in Islamic countries and in their educational systems? This identification should be done scientifically, and based on standard data collection methods.

2. What are the functions of the incompatible educational methods? The shortcomings of these methods and the drawbacks in practice should be investigated and compared with the probable benefits, and then fair judgments shall rise in this regard.

3. What are the examples of compatible educational methods? This identification should be carried out with comprehensive research in various schools and in different educational settings, especially in secondary and higher education level.

As a result, we can conclude that, after the current study, which provided the theoretical basis for the discussion of autonomy from the Islamic perspective, we need 9 practical researches to illustrate the functional aspect of this issue.

It is clear that, entry into fieldwork and practical research has not been possible before the current study. As mentioned many times, as Muslim scholars, we must first prove the conformity of a theory with Islamic teachings. Without this step, there won't be the grounds for admitting the theory in the Islamic education. Therefore, the current study is a prerequisite for conducting the 9 practical researches in the field of autonomy in Islamic countries. The current study, paves the path to to continue the research. I suggest that the investigators arrange their researches in these 9 ways.

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