CHAPTER FIVE
Chapter Five

5. Foreign Policy of the Boumedienne Regime, 1965-1978

5.1 Houari Boumedienne

Houari Boumedienne was born in 1925 at Guelma in the department of Bone (Annaba) in 1925\(^1\) in Guelma, East Algeria. His real name was Mohammed Boukharouba, but he adopted the pseudonym, Boumedienne, during the Algerian war of independence from France.

He came from a family of poor farmers. After secondary education in a mosque school, he went on to al-Azhar Islamic University in Cairo where he met ardent nationalists such as Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella, and other activists who were planning a revolt against France. However, in 1954 Boumedienne joined the newly-formed National Liberation Front (F.L.N), and by early 1955, he was leading guerrilla raids in Algeria. He was made commander of an F.L.N military district in 1957 and was appointed commander in chief of all F.L.N forces in 1960.\(^2\)

However, just after independence in 1962, a split occurred in the leadership of the provisional government. Premier Ben Youcef Ben Khedda fired Boumedienne, who

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\(^1\) Arslan Humbaraci, *Algeria: A Revolution That Failed*, P.228, Published by Pall Mall Press LTD., 77-79 Charlotte Street, London W1, First published 1966. However, the new Encyclopedia Britannica said that he was born on August 23 1927, meanwhile America Encyclopedia Said that he was born on 33 February 1927.

\(^2\) *Encyclopedia Americana*, Volume 04, p. 342. copyright 1991

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favored Ben Bella’s more radical faction. However, Ben Bella made a successful bid for power and became premier in September 1962 with the help of Boumedienne, and he was named defense minister in June 1965. He seized power in a bloodless military coup on June 19 1965, and led Algeria as President of the National Revolutionary Council.

Boumedienne was a hardliner opposed to Arab accommodation with Israel and became a leading spokesman for radical Third World nations. He died in Algeria on December 27, 1978 without having a designated successor.

5.2 The New Tenets of Algeria after the Coup, 1965-1978

After the coup of June 19, a new circle in the political life at Algeria began. However, all political power was transferred to Boumedienne and his military-dominated Council of the Revolution. The constitution and National Assembly were suspended; Boumedienne was named President and Prime Minister, and his associates were named to the twenty other cabinet positions.

No political institution other than the F.L.N existed for the next ten years, and the objectives of the Council Revolution were:

1) To reestablish the principles of the revolution;
2) To remedy the abuses of personal power associated with Ben Bella; and

3) To end internal divisions and to create an “authentic” socialist Society based on a sound economy⁴.

However, Boumedienne was supported by all military and technocratic elites who believed in his gradual reformist program and they accused Ben Bella of “treason and given away our land”⁵ (territorial disputes with Morocco and Tunisia). On the other hand, Western Diplomatic Opinion warmly welcomed the new regime promises of a more moderate Diplomacy⁶.

Before talking about Boumedienne’s policy, the following has to be outlined:

**5.3 The Reactions of Ben Bella’s Allies after the Coup**

The coup was a blow to Algeria’s prestige and influence abroad, isolating the country from most of its former allies, especially the Revolutionary leaders of the Third World. However, other radical African leaders were acutely aware of the possibility of a military putsch in their own countries. President Kwame Nkrumah was so shaken that he did not allow the news of the coup to be made public in Ghana for four days. President Sékou of Guinea declared “the coup d’état in Algiers cannot leave us indifferent because our fate is closely tied to that of Algeria”⁷.

However, one of the best comments on the matter was made by the chief editor of *Jeune Afrique* (Youth Africa), Georges Henein, after a number of world-famed

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⁴Ibid.
⁵Arslan Humbaraci, *Algeria: A Revolution That Failed*, p. 230
intellectuals—including François Mauriac, Jean-Paul Sartre, Bertrand Russell and Lelio Basso—who had written to the UN Commission of Human Rights on Ben Bella’s behalf. Henein wrote:

There is a General malaise in the Third World, which is a malaise of liberty. It is easier to spotlight the misfortunes of a head of state or of a well-known politician than those of a little provincial teacher who fails to return home one night, or of an obscure trade unionist who disappears into the blue, or of a student picked up after a reunion, never to see the light of day again. Those who have fallen from power suffer so much in their downfall that the consequent discomforts are but secondary evils....their case is not as bad as that of the humble man who does not aspire to Command but merely wishes to say his piece. We cannot accept that the he should be punished merely for speaking out....

Those leaders of the new societies of the Third World who recognize that liberty has been sacrificed, or shelved for the time being, invoke their economic obligations: to create work, construct factories and provide bread. But there is something dangerous and serious in this bartering of human rights for a meal. It is impossible not to fear that, in the end, both the mean and the means of asking for it will be gone.

Real decolonization has not yet begun. For, to be truly decolonized, it is not enough to be a sovereign state. The people must be treated as responsible and of age, not as pawns and playthings. Better a law without police than without law.

The Middle East’s, first reaction was led by Gamel abed Nasser, president of Egypt, who dispatched Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer to Algiers with a message for Boumedienne, asking him to hand Ben Bella over to the custody of the Egyptian government. Boumedienne was naturally outraged by Nasser’s request, and even more so by Nasser’s underhanded maneuvers to get the Afro-Asian conference transferred to Cairo. However, four days before the conference was scheduled to begin, a bomb exploded at the conference site, and Boumedienne immediately blamed the sabotage on

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8 Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria: A Revolution That Failed, p.257
9 Jeune Afrique, December 26, 1965
10 David B. Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politic of a Socialist Revolution, p. 230

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Egyptian agents. A few days later, he decided to dismiss for security reasons all Egyptian military advisors and several hundred Egyptian teachers.

On the other hand, Algeria’s relations with Cuba after the coup were damaged especially when Castro considered Boumedienne’s accession to power the beginning of “military despotism” in Algeria and predicted that Algerians would rise up against the new regime and Castro recalled the Cuban ambassador to Algeria. In response, Boumedienne ordered the closing of the office of press Latina, the Cuban press agency, and the office of the Algeria Cuban Friendship circle in Algiers.

The Eastern communist bloc made their feeling clear by their prolonged silence, as they regarded the Revolutionary Council as anti-communist. But others observers like Patrick Seale reported in the Observer on July 3, 1963:

Many observers have argued that the eclipse of the European communist in Algeria has thrown the door open to china. Certainly a major obstacle to Chinese influence has been removed. Following the hostility of Cuba to the new regime and the Chilly reserve of Moscow and Bulgaria, Peking has rushed in with Warm expressions of Support.

The Chinese will spare no effort to turn these sentiments into political gains, but as yet thee is no real chance of an effective Peking-Algiers axis. The new Algerian regime does not want and cannot afford to take sides in international disputes. It has powerful over-riding material reasons for remaining on good terms with France, the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain.

On the whole, only three socialist countries - communist-China, Indonesia, and Syria - supported the new regime. China and Indonesia were interested at this point in saving the Afro-Asian Conference, while Syria welcomed the coming advent of an anti-Nasser regime in Algeria.

11 Ibid., 230
12 Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria; A Revolution That Failed., p. 260
5.4 Boumedienne’s Policy

Boumedienne’s policy objectives were founded on a multilateral framework rather than personal policies of Ben Bella did. However, Boumedienne had his own agenda for Algeria foreign policy:

a) On fostering diplomatic relations, Boumedienne’s government tempered the ambitions internationalism of Ben Bella’s foreign policy; he traveled less and was not much inclined to spontaneous policy pronouncements. Yet most observers agreed that the change of government had not significantly affected the foreign policy of Algeria.

b) Under the new regime, Algerian diplomacy intensified concern with the country’s role in the Arab World following the great impact of the Arab-Israeli six-day war.

c) Boumedienne’s regime focused its international relations more on the Middle East crisis than on African international affairs.

d) One significant policy change vis-à-vis African relations was the restriction of the Algiers operations of the opposition groups from independent African states.

e) The new regimes sensitivity to the charge of political illegitimacy made it less ambitious in its appreciation and adoptions of the principal of non-interference.

f) Despite Boumedienne commitment to the Rhodesian and Biafran crisis, the regime condemned itself by a stringent fidelity to socialism, *autogestion*, and anti-imperialism. Also the insistence and strong support of the Palestinian cause significantly contributed to the strains between the Arab and black Africa.
The new regime was facing one immediate problem as Assistant Professor Robert A. Mortimer\(^9\) pointed out; "the new regime leadership was looking for legitimacy. Recognition abroad was considered one way to win acceptance at home."\(^{10}\)

5.4.1 Boumedienne's Foreign Policy, 1965-1970

5.4.1.1. In the Middle East

In the first five years of Boumedienne's rule, Algerian foreign policy changed radically, and the most significant shift in emphasis from Africa to the Arab world. Because Boumedienne was more attracted to the Arab world than to Africa, he blamed Ben Bella for having tried to suppress Algeria's identity as an Arab nation in order to make himself more acceptance as a pan-African leader;

He [Ben Bella] once talked to us in this manner; "We must not act in Africa as Arabs because Arabism is hated there, but only as Moslem Africans leaving aside any idea of Arabism." we reacted violently, declaring that this was an opportunistic policy. We are at one Arabs and Africans, and we must remain deeply attached to our Arabism in the sense of civilization and progress.\(^{11}\)

Boumedienne's regime had good relations with Syria, which had never enjoyed under Ben Bella's regime because Ben Bella was close to Nasser and openly disapproved of the Baath party in Syria. The Syrians hoped that Boumedienne would side with them in their effort to put an end to Nasser's domination of the socialist Arab states.\(^{12}\)

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\(^9\) Assistance Professor of Political Science, Haverford College


\(^{11}\) Boumedienne's interview with the Cairo newspaper Al-Ahram, October 8-10, 1965, reprinted in Revolution Africaine, No. 143, October 23, 1965.

\(^{12}\) David B. Ottaway and Marina Ottaway; Algeria, the Politics of a Socialist Revolution, University of California Press, Berkely and Los Angles. 1970p. 242

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However, many exchange visits were held between the two countries. In May 1966 Syrian foreign minister, Ibrahim Makhos, visited Algeria in which he enhanced the ties between Algerian government and Syria Baath party. On the other hand, several visits from the revolutionary council and the F.L.N Executive secretariat visited Syria.

The entente between Syria and Algeria worried the Egyptian leader and provoked him into seeking an understanding with Boumedinne. However, Nasser made his first rapprochement to the Algerian government when he invited the F.L.N delegation to visit Cairo in late July 1966 for talks with the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt’s only party.\footnote{Ibid., 242}

In August 1966, Boumedinne was scheduled to visit Cairo, but he postponed his trip after Nasser declared that he would not attend the Arab summit meeting, thereby forcing its cancellation after the collapse of that conference.\footnote{Nasser, who in 1964 had taken the initiative of calling the first summit meeting of all Arab leaders, had come to the conclusion that the annual gathering were useless. In 1966 saidi Arabia was promoting an “Islamic pact” among all Moslem countries. Nasser violently attacked the project which he regarded as a reactionary scheme, aimed at countering the socialist Arab leaders, particularly himself. In a speech given on June 16, 1966, in Cairo he denounced the “reactionary” leaders of the Arab world for their hypocritical participation in the Arab Summit meeting, and in July he announced that he would not participate any longer in the annual conference} Algeria, which had tried to avoid any split before the conference, was left with no choice but to join the Alliance developing among the socialist Arab countries.

In December 1966, Boumedienne visited Cairo where he and Nasser made peace, and the relations between the two countries were based on ties between the F.L.N and the Arab Socialist Union rather than on personal friendship.

In the early 1967, Algerian foreign policy was beginning to hold the personal imprint of Boumedinne:

His approach was not revolutionary or emotional, as Ben Bella had been, but rather legalistic. He did not encourage subversion of established regimes except to further the cause of national liberation Boumedienne did not try to export the Algerian revolution or to project himself as a leader of the Third
World. A broad as at home, he scorned “historic leaders” and “men with a sacred mission” who considered themselves the incarnation of revolution and in its name tried to impose themselves upon others. For this reason, he was always closer to the Syria leaders than to Nasser and showed more interest in bringing together representatives of parties than in uniting leaders of nations. Whereas Ben Bella had personally carried out his foreign policy, Boumedienne relied largely upon the F.L.N Executive secretariat to establish contacts and maintain ties with the Arab and African countries.¹⁵

However, the first success of Boumedienne in foreign policy was the organization of a “seminar of Arab socialists” which was held in Algiers on May 22-28, 1967. The goal of the meeting was to “advance the unity of revolutionary Arab forces.” Forty-three delegates discussed such issues as the liquidation of feudalism and the struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism.¹⁶

This seminar was the first of its kind; it was the first pan-Arab meeting in many years that Nasser couldn’t make.

However, on June 05, 1967, when war broke out between Israel and the Arab Nations, Boumedinne called it a war against the “Zionist hordes” which evoked a tremendous response. Tens of thousands of Algerians volunteered to fight against Israel or joined thousands of “vigilance committees” set up throughout the country. Algeria’s contribution was more than any other North Africa countries and even more than some of the Middle Eastern states; and the first Algerian troops left Algeria on June 05, followed by forty-eight Mig-fighter¹⁷. At the same time, Algeria carried out a

¹⁵ David B. Ottaway, and Marina Ottaway; Algeria, the Politics of a Socialist Revolution., P. 246

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 246

¹⁷ Algeria was believed to have sent two companies of light infantry, two companies of motorized infantry, a battery of artillery, and close to 100 Mig-fighter.
diplomatic offensive against the west ". On June 6, the country severed diplomatic relations with Washington, (it had already broken relations with London eighteen months before), and suspended the sale of gas and oil to England and the United States. Algeria also placed American and British oil companies under state control"\textsuperscript{18}.

However, the acceptance of the cease-fire accord by Jordan, Egypt, and Syria, was denounced by Algerian press as an act of treason, and Boumedienne declared that on June 10, that "Algeria would never accept the ceasefire and called instead for the total mobilization of Arab nations in preparation for a protected guerrilla style war against Israel". Boumedienne became the symbol of Arab intransigence, undefeated and determined to continue the struggle\textsuperscript{19}.

In the weeks following the war, Algerian diplomacy remained extremely active in favor of the continuation of the war against Israel by enhancing and supporting the guerrilla war.

In August 29 to early September, an Arab conference was held in Khartoum to discuss Arab strategy against Israel. At the conference, Nasser announced that he sought a negotiated agreement of the Palestinian question. In response to that proposal, Boumedienne backed by the President of Syria, El-Attassi, rejected Nasser's proposal, and declared that the only solution of the Palestinian people was struggle, and the elimination of all imperialist interests in the Arab world.

\textsuperscript{18} David B. Ottaway and Marina Ottaway; Algeria, the Politics of a Socialist Revolution,. P. 248
\textsuperscript{19} \url{http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/algeria/algeria164.html}

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To press his point, he declared the nationalization of five American oil-distributing companies operating in Algeria. Nevertheless, Boumedinne ultimately achieved very little, and he found himself in the embarrassing position of having loudly advocated a policy he was in no position to implement. As a consequence, in the fall of 1967, Boumedienne found his policy in the same position that he was in before the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War.

5.4.1.2. The Impact of Arab-Israel War on Algerian Foreign Policy

The third Arab-Israel war in 1967\(^{20}\) brought Algerian foreign policy to an international level especially between Third World countries. For instance, Fidel Castro apparently became convinced that Algeria was still in the front line of the anti-imperialist struggle. He relented in his hostility toward Boumedienne, and he normalized the relations between the two countries which had become strained ever since the over-throw of Ben Bella, and the cooperation between Cuba and Algeria in the fields of sport health and culture. In early November 1968, the Algerian Foreign Minister visited Havana for the reconciliation between the two states.

However, Algeria was also regaining its position in the center of the Third World. In October 1967, seventy-seven underdeveloped countries in Africa, Asia and Latin

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\(^{20}\) The first war was in 1948, and the second war was in 1956

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America met in Algiers to discuss what became known as the Algiers charters of the economic rights of the Third World.

On other hand, in mid July 1968, the O.A.U coordinating committee for the liberation of Africa pledged to aid the guerrilla movement in the rest of the colonies. In September, African chiefs of state met in Algiers for the annual meeting of the organization of African unity.

In July 1969 Algeria was chosen to undertake extensive and costly organizational efforts to ensure the successful celebration of Africa’s cultural heritage which was perceived as a force for revolutionary consciousness. In the event, in Boumedienne’s keynote address, he stated that:

“The investment was deemed sound, because culture was a political force for Algeria, and the festival an integral part of the struggle that we all continue to wage in Africa.”

During the festival, Boumedienne emphasized the relationship between culture and politics:

Our continent, three-quarters liberated but in full control of its destiny is undertaking in this first Pan-African cultural festival the greatest assemblage of arts and letters in its history, continental in scope and expressing the full range of its achievement. It undertakes equally a new stage in its consistent struggle against every form of domination... the festival ... is at once the primary affirmation of African unity inn its thought spirit, and soul, and recognition of the

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21 The Algeria’s charter was used as the common platform of the underdeveloped countries at the United Nations conference on trade and development held in New Delhi in March 1968.

role that this Africannes has played in the preservation of our national personalities and in our liberation struggles.\textsuperscript{23}

Boumedienne believed that “Africa cultural achievement was a weapon to destroy colonial alienation. It was a source of pride around which Africa could rally to complete the process of genuine independence it’s was a measures of Africa’s ability to express herself and to develop without cultivating Europeanization.”\textsuperscript{24}

5.4.1.3. Boumedienne’s Foreign Policy With his Neighboring States

Algerian relations with Moroccan and Tunisia were very loose and difficult, since Boumedienne’s fervent nationalism was a barrier to the solution of border disputes that strained relations between Algeria and its neighbors. However, in the wake of June 19, 1965 the Revolution Council which had accused Ben Bella of a “high treason” because he had shown a willingness to cede parts of the disputed territory in order to put an end to the controversy declared that they would not negotiate Algeria’s borders.

This tough policy of Algeria forced Morocco and Tunisia to turn to Washington for more army and military assistance, thereby increasing tension in North Africa. By this time, the president of Tunisia realized that Tunisia was too small to resort to the use of force, and he preferred to use diplomatic ways for resolving any disagreement. Indeed in the early 1967, Algeria finally agreed to solve the border issues, and after several months of unpublicized negotiations, an accord was finally announced on May 19, 1967.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 383
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., P. 383

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On the other hand, in the western Algeria border, the tensions between Algeria and Morocco were very high, in which the most serious accident under Boumediene regime occurred in May 1966 after Algeria nationalized the Gara-Djebiltet iron mine, located in territory claimed by Morocco. However, the King of Morocco requested the O.A.U intervene and revived the ad hoc commission set up in November 1963 to mediate the border dispute\textsuperscript{25}, but this effort was unsuccessful.

In the fall of 1966 another problem arose between the two countries, that of the Spanish Sahara\textsuperscript{26} especially when King Hassan demanded that Spain withdrew from the region and relinquished the Spanish’s Sarah to Morocco. The ambassador to the United Nations subsequently declared that his government considered the future of the Spanish Sahara of vital interest to Algeria\textsuperscript{27}. However, King of Morocco was trying to mobilize international opinion in support of his claim, and he accused Algeria of arming itself for a violent showdown. He also called up on the United Nations to set up a special commission to supervise the disarmament of Algeria and Morocco, but the king failed to get international support for his position. On other hand, the Algerian view was in accord with the O.A.U charter, which stated that; “the borders established by the colonial powers should be accepted.”

However, the two countries stayed enemies as long as Morocco persisted in her expansionist policy. Tensions may have also linked fundamental ideological differences

\textsuperscript{25} David B., Ottaway and Marina Ottaway; Algeria, the Politics of a Socialist Revolution., P 243
\textsuperscript{26} A mineral rich territory bordering on Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania
\textsuperscript{27} David B. Ottaway and Marina Ottaway; Algeria, the Politics of a Socialist Revolution., P. 244
between the two governments. Indeed, in 1967, despite the creation of numerous permanent consultative committees to further cooperation among the four North Africa countries, the unity of the Maghrib was still a long way as the distance was perhaps best measured by the fact that, the four North African leaders never met in the first five years of Algeria's independence.

5.4.2 Boumedienne's Foreign Policy, 1970-1978

In this period of time Algerian foreign policy was influenced by the new system that emerged in the early 1970s under the name of "the new international economic order" (N.I.E.O). However, Algeria under Boumedienne's regime controlled its national oil for the sake of economic development as the example that the Third World should follow in its relations with developed countries. This in turn led to Algeria's advocacy of a new world economic order based on equality between developing and developed countries.

However, the close relationship between Algerian internal development and external orientation was illustrated by Robert Mortimer, a specialist on Algerian foreign policy, in which he summarized this relationship as follows:

More than many other countries, Algeria has perceived its national development as integrally linked to international politics. During its prolonged struggle for national independence (1954-1962), Algeria development a radical outlook in which Third World solidarity and militant anti-imperialism were closely allied. For the Algerian political independence was but a first victory in a longer term struggle against the prevailing international economic structures that reproduced much the same dependence that the Third World has known under colonial rule.

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28 Ibid., p. 245
Algeria has needed the diplomatic solidarity of others to achieve independence, and saw Third World political solidarity as equally necessary to break the post-colonial system of structural dependence\textsuperscript{29}

However, despite many divisions that characterized and divided the Third World political system, Algeria continued to pledge support the support the struggle over the reallocation of the Third world's Wealth. On the other hand, morality and world wide public opinion were two pivots that Algeria believed worked in its favor and allowed a basic restructuring of the existing international political economy\textsuperscript{30}

To some Algerians, the view point over the international economic system was unfair to the Third World and that system served the interest of western industrialized countries. John P. Entelis outlined this view:

"The general agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT) and the international monetary Fund (I.M.F), are considered structures of the second category in which by design and definition, the economically strong are favored. In short the international monetary and multilateral trading system that evolved during the postwar decades served the interest and objectives of the western industrialized nations. Developing nations have largely been outside this privileged circle, with many coming to view the existing economic structure as inimical top their interest and perpetuating their underdog status"\textsuperscript{31}

Algeria believed that the history of colonialism of the Third World was behind the misery of developing nations, because the economic exploitation, deculturalization, and physical destruction were the causes of Algeria's underdevelopment. Thus the decrees of 1971 in which Algeria nationalized its resources was a political act of independence, an act of economic necessity, and as a real demonstration of the link between domestic and in

\textsuperscript{29} Robert A. Mortimer, "Global Economy and African Foreign Policy; the Algerian Model" African Studies Review 27, no 1. (March 1984).
\textsuperscript{30} John P. Entelis, Algeria; the Revolution institutionalized chapter 7. P.188. copyright 1986 by Westview Press, Inc
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 188
international politics. On the other hand, the 1971 decrees of nationalizations showed to the other developing countries how they could manage their own home, regardless of the dominations of western countries on the new international economic order.

5.4.2.1 Boumedienne’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Boumedienne and his strong commitment to the Palestinians people was a vital issue of Algerian foreign policy. However, he made rapprochement with Egypt in order to harmonize the relations which were affected by the defeat of June 06 1967 with Israel. In early May 1971, he called for a summit meeting in Algiers which was attended by President Sadat and Colonel Gaddafi. In the end of the meeting, they came out with three decisions:

1. that the Palestinian résistance movement must be unified to face the hegemony of Israel and to regain the lost Arab territories;

2. that head of states agree to meet regularly to coordinate the plan for the struggle with Israel; and

3. that international matters be discussed.

In an interview quoted by Reuters on 20 April, Boumedienne declared that “a politically flexible approach to Israel was no longer acceptable: I do not believe that the

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32 Ibid., p.189
Arab lands can be liberated without a heavy price... a tough line must be adopted... Egypt must adopt the same policy as that of Vietnam.”

However, close contact with the Palestinian’s guerrilla movement was maintained and Yassir Arafat, chairmen of the Palestinian Liberation organization, visited Algeria and the positions of the guerrilla were the major topic. On the other hand, the Israeli government accused Algeria through the Israeli newspaper, “Haaretz,” of training pilots of the Palestine Liberation Army. However, more Palestinian delegations visited Algeria in the early 1970 in order to get support for their struggle; indeed on 23 June the F.L.N gave a cheque for 1,234, 123 Dinars (Pound 105,480) to the P.L.O (Palestinian Liberation Organization).

Mohamed Yazid, the ambassador to Lebanon played an important role in establishing relations with the guerillas in October 1972 when he was credited with successfully mediating between rival factions in Fatah. He also offered the leaders of one group sanctuary in Algeria.

34 Ibid., p. 8
35 The Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Fatah) was founded in the early 1960s by Yasser Arafat and friends of his in Algeria Fatah was originally opposed to the founding of the PLO which it viewed as a political opponent. Backed by Syria, Fatah began carrying out attacked against Israeli targets in 1965, launched from Jordan Lebanon and Egyptian-occupied Gaza (so as not to draw reprisals against Syria). Dozens of raids were carried out each year, exclusively against civilian targets. Fatah’s popularity among Palestinians grew until it took over control of the PLO in 1968. Since then it has been the PLO’s most prominent faction, under the direct control of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. "Fatah" is a reverse acronym of the Arabic, Harekat at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyah al-Falastiniyyeh. The word "Fatah" means "conquest by means of jihad [Islamic holy war]."

36 Africa, Contemporary Record; Annual Survey and Document., p. B8
Algerian diplomacy played a grand role in Yemen when a delegation visited both countries in January 1972, and a delegation from Yemen (Aden) visited Algeria from 17 to 21 April in which Algeria expressed her support for the two Yemen. To establish cooperation, and harmony of opinions and mutual respect, the two sides signed an agreement to unite on the 18th anniversary celebrations of the outbreak of the Algerian revolution on November 01. President Yemen (Sanaa) congratulated Algeria’s constructive role in these events.

5.4.2.2 Declarations of the Arab Summit Conference at Algiers

The year of October 1973 marked the fourth Arab-Israeli War, and showed the Arab nation's determination to liberate its occupied territories at all cost. The cease-fire in the field meant in no way that the struggle had ended, and illustrated an impressed solution that can be imposed upon the Arab nations. “So long as the causes of the war of aggression and expansion, which put the world on the edge of a generalized conflict, are not eliminated, there will be in the Middle East neither a lasting peace nor true security”37. However, in the last week of November 28, 1973, Arab heads of States met in Algiers at a summit conference. At the conclusion of the conference, a declaration was issued by the kings and heads of states in which they pledged to continue their struggle against Israel, and to give all support to Palestinian people, both materially and morally.

37 http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/ag/Algeria

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The Conference resolved that the goals of the current phase of the common Arab struggle were:

1. The complete liberation of all the Arab territories conquered during the aggression of June 1967, with no concession or abandonment of any part of them, or detriment to national sovereignty over them.

2. Liberation of the Arab city of Jerusalem, and rejection of any situation which may be harmful to complete Arab sovereignty over the Holy City.

3. Commitment to the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian people, according to the decisions of the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole representative of the Palestinian nation. (The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan expressed reservations.)

4. The Palestine problem is the affair of all the Arabs, and no Arab party can possibly dissociate itself from this commitment, in the light of the resolutions of previous Summit Conferences.³⁸

On the other hand, the Algiers summit pledged to give solidarity and full support to Egypt, Syria and the Palestinian nation by providing means for all military and financial support to both fronts - Egyptian and Syrian - to strengthen their military capacity for embarking on a liberation campaign and standing fast in the face of the great amount of provisions, and unlimited aid received by the enemy, Israel. The summit also

³⁸ Ibid.,
vowed to maintain support of the Palestinian resistance by all possible measures, in order to ensure its active role in the battle.

5.4.2.3. Declaration of Algiers Non-Alignment Summit, 1973

The constitutions and the National charter of Algeria explicit the commitment to the principal of nonalignment. Article 90 of the 1976 constitution, for instance, states that Algeria, “faithful to the principles and objective of nonalignment, is working for peace, peaceful coexistence, and noninterference in the internal affairs of others states.” However, by the early 1970s Algeria had adopted militant anti-imperialism as an alternative for nonalignment as an organizational principle.

However, the declaration of Algiers non-alignment summit in 1973 was a great success for Algeria’s foreign policy, if one used the level of representation as indicator to measure this interest. At the first summit, Heads of States or Government constituted 84 per cent of all the representatives; at the Second Summit this percentage declined to 72 percent and was down to only 41 per cent at the Third Summit. However, at the Algeria Summit, the downward trend was reserved for the figure went up to 76 percent.\(^{39}\) This is why the Fourth Summit’s Final political declaration stated, not without self-congratulation, that; “the number and the level of participants and the general tenor of the

meeting are an indicator of the vitality and dynamism of non-alignment." On other hand, this Summit was a real success to Algeria Foreign Policy, for instance, le Monde stated that: "at the heat of most of the debates was the necessity for the third world to organize itself to assure its independence. Never at any of the preceding Non-Aligned Summit Conference was this theme dealt with such vigour and lucidity." Furthermore, Algeria seemed to be "going too fast in this direction, for pushed a proposal to establish a non-aligned secretariat with headquarters in Algiers, but the Summit was unable to agree on it."  

In the whole, the declarations of Algiers Non-Alignment Summit in 1973 was a great success for Algerian Foreign Policy for it illustrated the hard line that Algeria undertook to fulfill its Commitment to the Third World which were under colonialism. This Summit made Algeria a leading figure to the underdeveloped countries. Indeed the kings and chiefs of States that attained the summit vowed to boycott Israel, in political, economic and military matters, and instructed Algeria, in its capacity as chairman of the Conference, to convene a special high-echelon meeting for the application of the said resolution. The summit also pledged to work for ensuring the continuation of support by these nations for the Arab struggle against Zionism, using every possible means.

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41 Le Monde, 11 September 1973
42 New York Herald Tribune, 10 September 1973
5.4.2.4 Algeria Relations with its Neighboring States in the 1970s

Algerian relations in the 1970s with its neighboring states were very calm, especially with Tunisia after the agreement of 19 May 1967. In January 1970, a border treaty between the states was concluded, and two years later, Boumedienne and Bourguiba made official state visits to each other’s countries. Libya-Algeria relations in the 1960s were tense and uneasy in spite of the obvious concurrence of both regimes in Afro-Arab and Third World Issues. However, the Arab-Israel conflict encouraged both states to cooperate within OPEC, to form an alliance against Israel, and to coordinate their efforts in supporting the POLISARIO in its struggle against Morocco in the Western Sahara; so the Boumedienne government was very much closer to Libya than to either Tunisia, or Morocco.

Conversely, in the west border, the situation was in high tension as various forces in Morocco maintained that colonial France had cut off the eastern part of the country’s territory. In the name of “Greater Morocco,” which for some of them, included Mauritania, the rightwing parties in Morocco- Istiqlal in particular – laid claim to a substantial part of Algeria stretching to Mostaganam in the north and Bechar in the south. Those on the left, more sensitive to social and economic reforms, saw border disputes more in the light of Maghrib unity.43

43 http://mondediplo.com 1999/12/06algm
However, in 1972, an important event which marked this year was the two conventions, which Morocco signed in Rabat at the OAU summit conference, the first dealt with a long-standing border dispute, and provided for joint exploitation of the Gara-Djebilet iron ore deposits (in the mid west of Algeria across the border with Morocco).

On other hand, the border conflict, which caused a desert war between the two states in 1963, had apparently been resolved by the renunciation of Moroccan claims to Tindouf and surrounding areas. Boumedienne and the King of Morocco called the agreements a contribution to the building up of Maghrib solidarity. Despite this agreement between the two states in the early 1970s, the rivalry did not come to an end because Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara was to put an end to the policy agreed at two summit meetings at Tlemcen 1967 and Ifrane 1971. As Boumedienne saw it, this annexation was motivated by phosphate miming in Western Sahara, giving the monarchy the financial means it needed to survive.44

Boumedienne did not support this position; he reaffirmed, on one hand, this refusal to interference in Morocco’s political affairs and, on the other, his support for the Saharawis’s right to self-determination. He gave military and political support to the Polisario Front. “This proved a deep disappointment”, as the monarchy managed on the contrary to use the Western Sahara question to forge a sacred union of all political forces dedicated to the historic task of “finally achieving national liberation”.45

44 http://mondediplo.com
45 Ibid.,
On the other hand, Boumedinne believed that the social and economic changes in Algeria had to be extended throughout the Maghrib. He said, "Our Moroccan brothers helped us rid ourselves of France, and shall helped them in return to have done with a feudal monarchy that is in hock to the western power like the United States and France." However, Boumedinne did not like King Hassan and saw him as the major obstacle to the Maghrib Unity. There was no respect for the king until the death of Boumediene which marked the end of Algeria’s revolutionary and ambitious politics.

In sum, Boumedinne augmented Algeria’s influence in inter-Arab affairs, and he was not obsessed with regional or even continental political ambitions that had occupied his predecessor, Ben Bella. He sought to show to the Third World Countries how Algeria was dealing with the international issues without interfering in other countries’ policies. Algeria’s foreign policy would be concerned with the respect of the greater regional, continental and international organizational context.

46 Ibid.,
47 Ibid.,