

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE POWER INDUSTRY  
OF SELECTED STATES IN NIGERIA

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**ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE POWER  
INDUSTRY OF SELECTED STATES IN NIGERIA**

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# **ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN THE POWER INDUSTRY OF SELECTED STATES IN NIGERIA**

## **ABSTRACT**

Several administrative reforms in the power sector in Nigeria have not improved the electricity supply. The outcomes of reforms undertaken so far sharply contradict citizens' expectations (stable electricity supply). Worse still, the rate of customers' complaints about epileptic power supply rose from 47,127 to 109,048 between 2015-2016, while in 2019, 265,984 complaints were recorded. The study adopts the generic government sector reform model to analyse the factors contributing to the poor outcomes of the reforms. The model suggests critical component of the government sector reform is required to be integrated, coordinated to underpinning reform initiatives. For the purpose of this study, a survey questionnaire was used to study the relationship between political, bureaucratic support, communication strategy, willingness to changes, and success in government reforms. The study also investigates the relationship between professional and civil society organisations support and level of successful reforms, and the indirect relationship between reform decision, consultation and communication strategy. The survey research methods adopt a cross-sectional approach, employing a purposive sampling technique. Essentially, four hundred and sixty-three (463) copies of the questionnaires were administered to respondents selected from four states (population) with a yield of 401 responses. WarpPLS software, a variance-based Structural Equation Model (PLS-SEM), has been used to analyse the data. The structural model estimation findings reveal that four paths are statistically significant, which confirm the hypothetical relationship. Furthermore, evidence from the literature and the result of descriptive analysis of each measurement item in the model variables support the remaining three paths of the proposed relationship. However, structural model estimation could not statistically

establish proposed relationships in the model. Nevertheless, the research confirmed hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 based on the result of the structural model coupled with pieces of evidence from the literature. The findings contribute to the body of literature by filling the gap in terms of studies investigating why reform initiatives might have failed to produce the desired outcomes and make a significant contribution to improving the theory on service delivery, which is critical to good governance. The findings affirmed that political and bureaucratic supports are necessary prerequisite conditions for result-oriented reform programmes. Also, the study finds that the stakeholders' support required to drive a purposeful reform exercise was conspicuously lacking. The work suggested a strong alignment, collaboration, and cooperation amongst the stakeholders as a sine qua non to intended reform outcomes. For the government to achieve a desirable reform outcome, the study advocated an all-inclusive reform process.

**Keywords:** Administrative Reforms, Bureaucrats, Political Actors, Reform Outcomes

# **REFORMASI PENTADBIRAN DALAM INDUSTRI KUASA DI NEGERI- NEGERI TERPILIH DI NIGERIA**

## **ABSTRAK**

Kajian ini menganalisis mengapa pembaharuan pentadbiran dalam sektor kuasa di Nigeria tidak dapat meningkatkan bekalan elektrik. Hasil pembaharuan yang dijalankan setakat ini jelas sekali bercanggah dengan harapan rakyat untuk bekalan elektrik yang stabil. Kadar aduan pelanggan terhadap bekalan yang meruncing telah meningkat dari 42,127 kepada 109,048 antara tahun 2015-2016, manakala pada tahun 2019 sebanyak 265,984 aduan telah direkodkan. Model pembaharuan sektor kerajaan yang generik telah digunakan untuk menganalisis faktor-faktor yang menyumbang kepada kesudahan reformasi yang lemah. Model mencadangkan komponen kritikal bagi pembaharuan sektor kerajaan diintegrasikan, dikoordinasi untuk menjayakan inisiatif. Kajian menggunakan kaedah soal selidik untuk mengkaji hubungan antara tahap politik, sokongan birokrasi, strategi komunikasi, keinginan untuk berubah, dan tahap kejayaan dalam pembaharuan kerajaan. Kajian juga menyiasat hubungan antara sokongan golongan profesional dan organisasi masyarakat sivil serta tahap kejayaan pembaharuan; dan hubungan tidak langsung antara keputusan pembaharuan, konsultasi dan strategi komunikasi. Kaedah penyelidikan kaji selidik menggunakan pendekatan keratan rentas dan teknik persampelan purposif untuk mencapai mereka yang berkaitan dengan isu ini. Sebanyak 463 borang soal selidik telah diedarkan kepada responden yang dipilih dari empat buah negeri (penduduk) dengan memperoleh 401 jawapan. Perisian WarpPLS, Model Persamaan Struktur berasaskan varians (PLS-SEM), digunakan untuk menganalisis data. Penemuan anggaran model struktur mendedahkan bahawa empat laluan adalah signifikan secara statistik, yang mengesahkan hubungan hipotesis. Bukti daripada literatur dan keputusan analisis diskriptif bagi setiap item pengukuran di dalam model menyokong baki tiga laluan dalam hubungan yang dicadangkan. Namun begitu,

anggaran model struktur tidak dapat mewujudkan hubungan yang dicadangkan secara statistik dalam model. Walau bagaimanapun, penyelidikan mengesahkan hipotesis 1, 3 dan 4 berdasarkan hasil model struktur diganding dengan penemuan dari kajian lain. Hasil kajian ini menyumbang kepada sumber literatur dengan mengisi jurang mengenai mengapa inisiatif pembaharuan gagal menghasilkan hasil yang diinginkan. Kajian ini juga memberi sumbangan yang besar untuk meningkatkan teori penyampaian perkhidmatan, yang kritikal kepada tadbir urus yang baik. Hasil kajian menegaskan bahawa sokongan politik dan birokrasi adalah prasyarat yang diperlukan untuk program pembaharuan yang berorientasikan hasil. Tambahan lagi, kajian mendapati bahawa sokongan pihak berkepentingan diperlukan untuk memacu latihan pembaharuan yang bermakna, yang didapati masih kurang. Kajian ini mencadangkan penjajaran dan kerjasama yang kukuh dalam kalangan pihak berkepentingan sebagai satu keperluan dan *sine qua non* untuk hasil pembaharuan berkesan. Untuk mencapai hasil pembaharuan yang diinginkan kerajaan, kajian mencadangkan semua proses pembaharuan yang inklusif.

**Kata kunci:** Pembaharuan Pentadbiran, Birokrat, Pelakon Politik, Hasil Pembaharuan

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AARS	: Average Adjusted R-Squared
AFVIF	: Average Variance Inflation Factor
ARS	: Average R-Square
APC	: Average Path Coefficient
AVE	: Average Variance Extracted
AVIF	: Average Variance Inflation Factor.
CA	: Cronbach Alpha
CR	: Composite Reliability
CSO	: Civil Society Organisation
GoF	: Goodness of Fit
PLS	: Partial Least Square
PPP	: Public-Private Partnership
RSCR	: R-Square Contribution Ratio
SEM	: Structural Equation Model
SPR	: Sympton's Paradox Ratio
SPSS	: Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SSR	: Statistical Suppression Ratio
VIF	: Variance Inflation Factor

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## **CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION**

### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Nigeria is a developing country. It is also the biggest economy in Africa and the most populated, with 186 million people. The country is strategically located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea, covering 923,768 km<sup>2</sup> (356,669 sq. mi). More importantly, the nation is endowed with vast natural and human resources and geographically divided into six geo-political zones, devolved into 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The country is a multi-ethnic society characterised by diverse cultures, social values, economic activities, and languages.

The country depends heavily on hydro, coal and natural gas for electricity generation. Over the last 50 years, the annual average urban population growth was 6.5 per cent, which has triggered severe pressure on the demand for electricity (National Bureau of Statistic, 2018). Since 1886, the task of electricity generation, transmission and distribution has been solely managed by a government-owned company, run as part of government parastatal (Oladipo et al., 2018). From the mid-1970s to the 1980s, electricity generation capacity experienced significant expansion to cope with the increasing number of connections to the national grid by cities, towns and villages. However, findings revealed that in the 1990s, there was no substantial expansion of electricity infrastructures undertaken; therefore, by the year 2000, electricity generation capacity had dropped by 25.3 per cent of the operational capacity (NBS, 2018). Therefore, the trend had triggered the debate on the impact of the public sector on economic growth and national development, especially in developing economies, which became more intense in the last century. This renewed interest is an outcome of the failure of the government to move people out of poverty, especially in the post-independence era.

Consequently, an efficient public sector has been recognised as a valuable tool for society's advancement towards a sound and balanced development (Nasrollah, 2004). Most importantly in the area of provision of public goods and services, are: stable electricity, potable water supplies and other infrastructural facilities, which are the main purpose of a government.

Contemporary societies depend heavily on these public goods, particularly on electricity, for their survival (Larry et al., 2021). Therefore, providing these essential services in a stable, affordable, and reliable manner has remained crucial for attaining economic growth and the nation's social prosperity (Muyi, 2016). In 2017, a sum of USD 750 billion was invested in the electricity sector (World Energy Investment, 2018) in recognition of the greater attention accorded to electricity worldwide. However, it is noteworthy that the state of electricity supply varies across countries. While developed countries have made considerable progress, developing nations (Nigeria inclusive) have continually lagged behind in providing a stable electricity supply (SEAR, 2017). In Nigeria, evidence suggests that the government is still grappling with an erratic power supply (FGN, 2010).

Undoubtedly, the adequate provision of electricity supply was considered strategic to the nation's sustained economic growth and national development (Larry et al., 2021). There is a broad agreement stipulating that access to electricity services is a prerequisite for alleviating poverty, boosting shared prosperity and promoting economic development (SEAR, 2017; Stern et al., 2019). It further noted that a stable, reliable and affordable electricity supply is key to promoting economic growth, and overcoming poverty. Besides guaranteeing the expansion of employment opportunities, it also supports human development. However, the delivery of this vital service by the government has remained an arduous task.

For several decades, Nigeria has suffered from an inadequate power supply. Evidence indicates that out of 160 million Nigerians, 75 million lack supply of adequate electricity, which ranked Nigeria in the 2nd position amongst the top twenty countries with a high electricity deficit (SEAR, 2017). Further evidence also shows that poverty tends to be more prevalent in countries with the lowest electricity access, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (SEAR, 2017). Electricity is a critical factor in the production function, along with labour and capital (Stern, 2010). The power supply situation in Nigeria is problematically caused by frequent power failure (Oseni, 2011; Nkalo & Ogbonnaya, 2018). This critical issue has hindered anticipated economic progress and development. Also, the poor state of power in Nigeria is widely considered a key constraint to the nation's drive towards economic advancement (Joy, 2017). Available records indicate that Nigeria's power supply deficit can be estimated at 6000 megawatts as compared to the current 3500 megawatts average output production (Erik, 2011). Consequently, the long-standing supply deficit and poor supply quality have portrayed Nigeria as the world's largest market for diesel generators as an alternate power supply source.

According to Charles (2017), the analysis of the economic implications of the epileptic power supply revealed that Nigeria lost USD 25 billion (about ₦75 trillion at ₦305 per USD 1) yearly, which is attributable to an erratic power supply. Similarly, the World Bank (2021) report that poor electricity supply in Nigeria has resulted economic losses estimated at \$26.2 billion (₦10.1 trillion) which is equivalent to about 2 percent of GDP. Further evidence from literature affirmed that there is a sturdy correlation between electricity consumption and GDP growth (SEAR, 2017). Also, there is a strong link between energy use and the countries' GDP outlook (Becon & Kojima, 2016, cited in SEAR, 2017); to support the above arguments.

In 2018, the breakdown of economic outlook shows that Nigeria's GDP per capita stood at (USD 2,107) against other middle-income countries such as Malaysia (USD 11,237.4), South Africa (USD 6,459.2), Argentina (USD 14,043.7), and Brazil (USD 10,224.0), (Australian 'DOFA' 'Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade, 2018). In the same vein, the World Bank (2018) reported that Nigeria's GDP growth fell from (6.3%) in 2014 to (2.7%) 2015 and to (1.6%) 2016.

It is noteworthy that the government had previously established electricity utility companies to provide (generate, transmit and distribute) electricity supply for households and industrial consumptions nationwide (Okoye, 2014). Some of the earliest public utilities include the Lagos Public Works Department in 1946; The Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) in 1950; and The Niger Dams Authority (NDA) in 1962. More importantly, the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) later merged with the Niger Dams Authority, and became the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) in 1972. For this reason, the expectation at the inception and inauguration of the new utility company was to underpin the supply gap and meet the ever-increasing demand for electricity (Okoro & Madueme, 2004). Despite that, the National Electric Power Authority continued to provide irregular electricity services. In 2010, the Federal Government of Nigeria highlighted in its report that the problem of epileptic electricity supply emanated from operational and logistic issues (FGN, 2010). For example, the decaying electricity infrastructures, inadequate funding, and proper maintenance are vital obstacles confronting stable power supply. Electricity consumers have pressured the government to bridge the vast electricity supply gap and cease the debilitating condition that disrupted the industry.

Specifically, the citizens demand immediate and significant improvements in the service level (FGN, 2010). Consequent to the backdrop of the problematic situation that had characterised the electricity sector, the government's renewed intervention began with the National Electric Power Policy (NEPP) in 2001 to drive a far-reaching power sector restructuring programme. The ultimate aim was to facilitate improvement in the operational capacity of the power sector for enhanced service delivery (FGN, 2005). The hallmark of the reform initiative was the enactment of The Electric Power Sector Reform Act (EPSR) 2005, and subsequently, the establishment of the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) 2005, for post-privatisation electricity market regulation.

Also, in 2013, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), in synergy with the National Electricity Regulatory Commission, successfully delivered the privatisation programme. Apart from the pathetic state of electricity supply described earlier, the reform has also emerged from the context of the changing roles of the government facilitated by the financial crisis in the late 1970s and 1980s (Schacter, 2000). Furthermore, it is notable that greater private sector involvement and participation remains a critical component to stimulate investment (USAID, 2014). Notably, the strategic objectives of the reform include:

*“(i) the transfer of management and financing of their operations to the organised private sector; (ii) the establishment of an independent and effective regulatory commission to oversee and monitor the industry; and (iii) focusing the FGN on policy formulation and long-term development of the industry. The reform envisages (i) increased access to electricity services; (ii) improved efficiency, affordability, reliability and quality of services; and (iii) greater investment into the sector to stimulate economic growth” (FGN, 2005, p.7).*

Undoubtedly, the government's historic transfer of ownership of power companies to the private sector was considered a milestone and tangible progress towards power sector



reform (USAID, 2014). This submission was hinged on anticipated private sector investment towards electricity efficiency. The Bureau of Public Enterprises and the Federal Ministry of Power (FMOP) anchored and coordinated the transition programme (privatisation) from government ownership to new successor companies, and the programme was duly completed in 2013. The reform conspicuously marked a new threshold in the electricity delivery value chain (FGN, 2011). For instance, the three units (generation, transmission and distribution) hitherto monopolised had been unbundled (Erik, 2016). The implication is that different successor companies assumed the ownership, management of two units (generation and distribution) out of three units which was previously managed by a state utility company. Despite the reform exercise, the ownership, control and management of the transmission unit was retained by government. Before enacting the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, the Nigerian government had exclusive responsibility in policy formulation, regulation, operation, and investment in the Nigerian power sector (Erik, 2016).

The Federal Ministry of Power (FMOP) was mandated to provide policy direction, while the operational delivery of electricity service rests with the National Electric Power Authority (FGN, 2011). Nevertheless, poor operational and financial performance was entrenched in the management of the utility company (FGN, 2010). This was preceded by the amendment of the extant laws (Electricity and NEPA Acts) in 1998 to disentangle NEPA's monopoly and enhancing private sector participation (Ikeanyibe, 2021).

Additionally, due to the growing demand for stable electricity supply and the government's determination to address the ugly trend, the reform process was designed for implementation in phases: first was the initial creation of the holding company – Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) (Erik, 2016). This was subsequently unbundled into 18 successor companies as stipulated in the Reform Act (FGN, 2018),

comprising six (6) power generation units, 11 distributions (districts) and 1 Transmission Company of Nigeria (TCN). The new company incorporated in 2005 became operational in 2006 to oversee the unit for an efficient and effective transmission network (Ikeanyibe, 2021). Secondly, the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005 also mandates creating an independent power market regulatory body (NERC). The statutory mandate was to ensure sanity in the electricity market and other standard regulatory-related functions. Thirdly, the PHCN—a successor company, was incorporated to acquire assets and liabilities from the defunct NEPA. It is pertinent to note that the landmark and comprehensive reform ushered in a new era in the electricity generation and distribution value chain.

Consequently, power generation and distribution were eventually privatised in 2013, and only the transmission unit was retained. Aside from Nigeria, many middle and low-income countries have over time reformed their power sector to stimulate economic growth and development. Such countries include South Africa, Thailand, India, Bolivia, Uganda, Philippines, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, Malaysia and Namibia (USAID, 2014). Specifically, in Sub-Sahara Africa, development agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have developed strategies to improve power situations under intervention tagged as "power Africa project" to tackle electricity shortages in the sub-region. The reforms of the power sector have been conducted according to their own needs and circumstances. Nonetheless, the exercise has produced varying outcomes.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

Nigeria has a large population, and is the largest consumer of primary energy, which is growing at 2.6 per cent annually (Nnaji, 2011, World Bank, 2017). However, the Presidential Task Force on Power PTFP) raised a serious concern that the peak demand for electricity generation stood at 3,310.8 megawatts. In comparison, the electricity

demand peak stood at 10,200 megawatts, creating a shortage of 6,890 megawatts (FGN, 2005). The World Bank (2011) estimated that Nigeria's power supply deficit could be estimated at 6,000 megawatts. The report further affirmed that the long-standing supply deficit and poor quality of supply had turned Nigeria to be the world's largest market for diesel generators (Erik, 2011).

Nigeria's per capita electricity consumption is among the lowest globally and far lower than many other African countries" (FGN, 2010). The working paper by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) revealed that Nigeria's per capita electricity consumption is just 7 per cent of Brazil's, which generates 100,000 megawatts of grid-based generating capacity for a population of 201 million and just 3 per cent of South Africa's 40,000 megawatts of grid-based generating capacity for a population of 50 million people. The submission by Ndume (2015) summarised the feeling of an average Nigerian when he observed that the disconnection from the national grid and degeneration of power supply across the country had affected economic activities because of the collapse of several industries. He expressed concern that with an installed power generation potential of about 5000 megawatts, the output distributed today was about 1,950 MW of energy. Furthermore, Ndume (2015) remarked that it was disheartening to note that Iran, with 80.08 million people (based on the United Nations' 2016 estimates), generated about 42,000 megawatts, while South Korea, with about 35 million people, generated about 60,000 megawatts of electricity. He complained that the situation had grounded economic activities, adding: "I buy diesel to run my generator set, which costs me N10,000 every day. "No country can be said to be near development when there is no power". "For years now, a lot of money has been spent, but there is nothing to show for it".

However, as of August 2010, the peak generation supplied by Nigeria's PHCN-initial holding company was just 3,804 MW, and as of March 2016, it had further dropped to 2,500 megawatts for a population of 150 million. Furthermore, the African Development Bank's (2014) Economic and Power Sector Reform reported that social indicators in Nigeria remained weak in general and were below the average for sub-Saharan Africa. The report further revealed that about 45 per cent of the population had access to electricity, but only about 30 per cent of their power needs were met. Indeed, the gap in the power sector has far-reaching implications for improving the business climate, and sustaining economic growth in the non-oil sector, creating jobs, reducing poverty, and improving the social well-being of Nigerians (World Bank, 2021).

It was outlined in the KPMG's (2013) report that despite various efforts, the state-owned utility, which operates as a monopoly, rarely provides electricity for the teeming population. Evidence from the report showed clearly that by the late 1990s, less than 40 per cent of the entire population had access to electricity supply. Nonetheless, in 2018, the World Bank reported that only 42 per cent in 2000; 46 per cent in 2004; 46 per cent in 2010; 54.2 per cent in 2012; 56.3 per cent in 2014; 59.3 per cent in 2016 and 57.7 per cent in 2017 had access to electricity. Recently, the World Bank (2021) report states that 85 million Nigerians population lack access to grid electricity. This amply represents 43 per cent percent of the country's population and makes Nigeria the country with the largest energy access deficit in the world. Similarly, electricity access remains challenging in other countries in the same sub-region, like Kenya 36.0 per cent and Cameroon 56.8percent. However, the report revealed a high rate of access to electricity in developed and some developing countries. For instance, the rate in Australia was 100 per cent, Brazil 99 per cent, Malaysia 100 per cent, Germany 100 per cent, France 100 per cent among others. The problematic scenario in Nigeria aptly implies that the government has failed to meet the electricity demand of the citizens. In like manner, the

Nigerian electricity system was unable to meet the essential requisite for a decent livelihood. Noticeably, the effects on other critical sectors of the economy have assumed a precarious dimension. For instance, electricity shortage and its persistent crisis have been linked to a high rate of unemployment and increasing poverty (ESMAP, 2005).

In 2010, the Oxford Business Group reported that over 70 per cent of Nigeria's populace survives on less than a dollar a day. This implies that a considerable population is still wallowing in abject poverty and other critical conditions such as increased infant mortality, maternal health, deprivations and social seclusion. Needless to say, this situation posed a significant threat to the attainment of Nigeria's vision 2020 (among the twenty most developed countries in the year 2020), a scenario that created a bottleneck to the country's vision and developmental drive. Not surprisingly, the UNDP's Human Development Index (2018) ranked Nigeria 157th position amongst countries with low human development with HDI 0.532 (HDI: a measure of a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living).

Over the years, the Nigerian government has shown a high commitment to develop the electricity sector, which was evident in the substantial financial investment but without commensurate results (FGN, 2010). For instance, between 1999 and 2015, the government allocated and disbursed USD 8.8 billion, equivalent to #2.7 trillion (at # 305 per 1USD) to the sector (Igali, 2015). Furthermore, Table 1.1 shows the breakdown of funds disbursed to the industry between 2011 and 2020.

As a result of the sector's operational failure, the Federal government graciously embraced reform as a policy option to repositioning the sector for optimal contribution to national growth and development.

**Table 1.1 Showing Summary of Fund Disbursed to Power Industry**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Amount (₦)</b>
2011	1.69 billion
2012	1.76 billion
2013	1.99 billion
2014	1.98 billion
2015	1.22 billion
2016	697.80 million
2017	1.13 billion
2018	n/a
2019	n/a
2020	n/a

Source: Budget Office of the Federation, 2020.

Despite several efforts taken at improving service delivery through strategic government interventions and restructuring exercises (from 2010-2018), the objectives behind the reorganisation programmes were not realised (Idowu *et al.*, 2019). According to Oladipo *et al.* (2018), the sector continues to be characterised by poor service delivery (epileptic, unreliable and unstable electricity supply). Additionally, Ikeanyibe (2021) affirmed that even after the transfer of ownership from the government to the private sector, it was evident that privatisation has not produced the expected improved supply, instead a persistent price increase. Ikeanyibe concurred with Wagner (2005) and Adiza (2011) that most post-privatisation ineffectiveness occurred because the privatisation process was poorly managed.

The crux of this study, therefore revolved around the significant difference between reform expectation and the actual outcome. Notably, the underlined justification for the reform was to improve the overall efficiency of electricity supply to end-users (FGN, 2010). However, reports suggest otherwise, that the envisaged objectives of the reform have not been realised. Some illustrations to bolster this argument are presented as follows: NERC (2016) indicated that in the last quarter of 2015, electricity consumers

had lodged over 47,127 complaints against electricity distribution companies. In addition, the quarterly report also shows that over 109,048 complaints were lodged by electricity consumers over interrupted and poor supply against power distribution companies in the third quarter of 2017 (NERC, 2018). Equally, 120,028 complaints were lodged against all distribution companies (11) in the first quarter and 145,959 in the second quarter (NERC, 2019). This aptly implies that one in every five customers was unsatisfied with the quality of supply. Apparently, the outcome of the power sector restructuring exercise was again a futile adventure, as is evident in the aforementioned NERC (2016, 2018, 2019) quarterly reports.

Papaefstratiou (2019) furnished insight into part of the problem when he asserted that the deficit of mutual trust amongst stakeholders, especially politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups, negatively affected the reform outcome. Admittedly, this problem was a by-product of the manner electricity companies were privatised. To further bolster this argument, the Governors of Ondo, Ekiti, Delta and Edo States, in their responses to the privatisation exercise, expressed their displeasure as reported thus: 'we reject the privatisation exercise because states were not allowed to participate in the process. In our region, you cannot succeed in operating the utilities without the participation of state governments' (Ibrahim, 2012, p.2). The bone of contention here aptly relates to components of Ouda's generic framework for a successful reform, which highlighted the essential requirement for a purposeful reform. For instance, factors such as political, bureaucratic support, consultation, professional, and civil society organisation support. Therefore, it appears that the way or manner the reform was conducted contradicted the underlining principles and Ouda's essential requirement for a successful reform outcome. Conversely, the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) had stated the conditions for supporting privatisation and subsequently staged a nationwide peaceful protest over inadequate electricity supply (Okoruwa, 2013). Furthermore, the power sector's patchy

service performance, even after reorganisation, has adverse effects on the citizenry by requiring them to invest in an expensive backup system (Akhaine, 2018). Undoubtedly, erratic power supply has been a major setback to Nigeria's economy and has negatively affected the country's GDP (405.1 billion, 2018) because the energy sector remains critical to developing all other sectors of the economy (FGN, 2010).

Sadly, the progress and success of the power sector reform programmes in Nigeria remain scant, though many efforts, in addition to resources, have been allocated to the sector. The service delivery capacities of the sector continued to be at the lowest ebb and continue to dwindle because most of the infrastructures are moribund, arthritic, self-serving, less able to achieve their core mandate, missions and less responsive: providing skeletal services against the expectations of the citizens (RMESR, 2010). While delivering a speech, the Vice-President, Yemi Osinbanjo, expressed great disappointment over the state of electricity supply in the country when he declared, as reported that:

‘The power sector has failed to deliver the desired result after years of privatisation. The sector remains stalled in delivering power to many Nigerian homes and businesses. We must act as a matter of national importance, and we are committed to do so, to work and re-engineer the sector for much more effective performance’ (Tony, 2019, p.1)

Moreover, the Speaker of the House of Representatives also expressed similar frustration over poor supply of electricity when he asserted, as reported that “Every Nigerian understands that the electric power sector in Nigeria is not performing optimally. Most people recognise that a situation where we cannot expect 24-hour electricity in our cities and many rural areas remain wholly disconnected from the benefits of access to electricity is unacceptable” (Baiyewu, 2021, p.1).

The persistent electricity crisis has weakened the industrialisation process, resulting in production stoppages and high opportunity costs, and significantly undermined the



government's efforts towards achieving sustained economic growth and development (Mohammed, 2014). Mohammed observed further that the supply of electricity, which remains critical to national well-being, is bedevilled with a consistent crisis as exemplified by such indicators as electricity blackouts and endless self-generating activities of electricity. Adoghe et al. (2009) also posited that instability in the power sector negatively affects the domestic and economic lives of the people.

Ejoh and Ibrahim (2015, p 1) observed that "the country's power supply affects the government's poverty reduction programmes". Likewise, Gana (2015) argued that for a country to eradicate poverty from its economy, the leadership must put an available and consistent delivery of power supply for businesses to thrive.

There is no gainsaying that the challenges of electricity supply to most of Nigeria's population are becoming enormous, weighing so adversely on the socio-economic activities across the country (World Bank, 2021). The absence of a steady power supply has contributed, in no small measure, to the high cost of doing business in the country compared to other developed countries or other parts of the world. This has affected business operations, generally, as businesses now provide their power and are expected to make profits (Chinedu, 2014).

In his inaugural speech, President Muhammed Buhari rightly observed, as reported that:

"No single cause can be identified to explain Nigeria's poor economic performance over the years than the power situation. It is a national shame that an economy of 180 million generates only 4,000MW and distributes even less. Continuous tinkering with the structures of power supply and distribution and close to \$20b expended since 1999 have only brought darkness, frustration, misery, and resignation among Nigerians. We will not allow this to go on. Careful studies are underway during this transition to identify the quickest, safest and most cost-effective way to bring light and relief to Nigerians" (Philip, 2015, p.1).

The power supply deficit has stifled the creation of jobs, impeded the growth of the non-oil sector, which are urgently needed in a country with a large and rapidly growing population. The erratic and unpredictable nature of electricity supply has engendered a deep and bitter sense of frustration across the country as a whole and to its urban centres in particular.

In the same manner, Saraki (2015) noted that besides corruption, lack of power supply had plunged the country into hardship. He said: "We thought that with the Power Reform Act and unbundling of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN), we will begin to see a relief concerning power supply; unfortunately, it is not so". Akpabio (2015) described the power situation as worrisome. He lamented that many companies had shut down due to irregular power supply and further noted that despite the financial contribution by some states in the South to improve power supply. Nigerians are still grappling with lack of electricity supply. "We cannot have employment without power, and Nigerians are complaining about the high cost fuelling generators and some localities which have not seen the light for months are asked to pay high tariff" (Akpabio, 2015, p.2). Existing literature have not adequately addressed failure of reform in the power industry; hence, the big question is: why have the reform initiatives and government interventions in the power sector failed to produce the desired result? Therefore, an empirical analysis of the power sector reform programmes is deemed desirable to unravel the issues associated with implementing the reform initiatives, and identify why it has failed to yield the desired outcomes and contribute meaningfully to the Nigerian economy and national development at large. In a nutshell, the power industry reform was initiated to reposition the sector to guarantee improved electricity supply to end-users.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The findings of Nasrollah (2004), Muiy (2016), Bello and Duhu (2020) revealed that public sector institutions play vital roles in the nation's drive towards progress and national development. Similarly, the provision of essential goods and services to all citizens was considered a critical impetus to actualise these national objectives. Needless to say that without administrative reforms, good governance and efficient administration will remain a wishful thinking. The report from the government of Nigeria (FGN, 2014) highlighted the benefits of reforms as part of the government's deliberate action to improve service delivery, efficiency and ensure value for money among others. This submission was hinged on the conviction that service delivery to the citizens remains the core responsibility of a functioning state. Within the context of this study and sequel to the issues highlighted in the statement of problems, this research addressed the following research questions:

- (i) Do political, bureaucratic support (PBS), consultation and coordination (CC) have a direct influence on the level of successful government reform (SGR)?
- (ii) Do communication strategy (CS) and willingness to change (WC) facilitate successful government reforms (SGR)?
- (iii) Do professional support (PS) and civil society organisation (CSO) support enhance successful government reforms (SGR)?
- (iv) How does reform decision (RD) moderate the relationship between consultation and Coordination (CC), communication strategy (CS) and level of successful government reform (SGR)?

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

Based on the arguments in section 1.2 above, the following vital issues can be deduced. These are: effective public sector institution is vital to promote good governance. To

actualise this, social amenities, such as electricity, water are key to individual survival, the nation's growth and development. Notably, where public service is characterised by abysmal performance, administrative reform could be instituted to enhance the quality of service provided. For instance, the study examined how political, bureaucratic, consultation, and coordination determine the level of successful reforms and determine communication strategy and willingness to change; professional and civil society organisation support and enhance successful reform. The main thrust of this research is to analyse administrative reform in the power industry in Nigeria. Having considered the nature of the problem and research questions, the specific objectives are to:

- (i) examine the relationship between political, bureaucratic support (PBS), consultation and coordination (CC) and level of successful government reforms (SGR);
- (ii) determine whether communication strategy (CS) and willingness to change (WC) facilitate successful government reforms (SGR);
- (iii) investigate the relationship between professional support (PS), civil society organisation support (CSO) and level of successful government reforms (SGR);
- (vi) discuss the moderating role of reform decisions (RD) in the relationship between communication strategy (CS), consultation and coordination (CC) and successful government reforms (SGR).

## **1.5 Research Hypotheses**

The research hypotheses developed in this study were stated in alternate forms, which align well with the research problem, research questions and the objectives of the study. The hypothetical statements below were fortified using the primary data collected from field surveys to either accept or reject the stated propositions. The research adopts

quantitative techniques. To answer the four research questions stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, the corresponding four research hypotheses are stated as follows:

*H<sub>1</sub>*: Political, bureaucratic support (PBS), and consultation and coordination (CC) approaches directly influence the level of successful government reform (SGR).

*H<sub>2</sub>*: There is a significant relationship between communication strategy (CS), willingness to change (WC) and level of successful government reform (SGR).

*H<sub>3</sub>*: There is a significant relationship between professional support (PS), civil society organisations (CSO) support and level of successful government reform (SGR).

*H<sub>4</sub>*: Reform decision (RD) moderate relationship between consultation and coordination (CC), communication Strategy (CS) and level of successful government reform (SGR).

## **1.6 Scope of the Study**

From public management perspective, this research focused on the administrative reforms in the Nigerian power industry. Moreover, attempt to align this study with public management is simplified by Pena (2000), as cited by Appiah-Adu and Bawumia, (2016), who classified public sector reforms into four core areas: administrative capacity building, policy capacity strengthening, institutional reform and civil service reform. Generally, study of this nature is broad in terms of context, scope and, requires quality time and a huge resource. Consequently, this study was restricted to previous institutional reform exercises that had been conducted in the key sector of the economy. Specifically, the study is limited to the "power industry" being one of the critical sectors of the Nigerian economy.

This research covered between 2007 and 2019. Practically, Nigeria returned to democratic governance in 1999 when pragmatic and holistic reform programmes were instituted to reposition power industry for improved service delivery. This period 2007 and 2019 was considered because the Electricity Power Sector Reform Act (EPSR), as a legal framework for power sector reform was enacted in 2005. Undoubtedly, this framework laid the foundation for power sector restructuring in Nigeria. The EPSR Act 2005 which evolved from the National Electricity Power Policy was adopted in 2001. The enactment of the Act marked the threshold in the power reform agenda of the government. Although Nigeria is made up of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, the study's geographical coverage was restricted to these selected states: Lagos, Niger, Osun, and Kwara. Moreover, the unit of analysis has been limited to the civil servants, electricity employees, civil society organisations and academia.

More importantly, the states were selected based on NBS (2019) criterion (Classification) which include: percentage (%) of household with electricity and number of household with electricity.

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

This research is significant for expanding the frontier of knowledge as well as the practical world. Specifically, the findings of this research hope to contribute to the body of literature through empirical work on institutional reform in Nigeria. Furthermore, result of the research would enable the government to improve future reform exercises in Nigeria. Moreover, this study intends to provide valuable contributions to the knowledge of researchers in the power sector, policy makers and practitioners in the public service. Undoubtedly, adequate power supply is key to Nigeria's development because of its multiplier effect on the nation's economy. However, a review of existing literature on the Nigerian power industry revealed that, there are rather a few empirical

studies that seek to answer why administrative reforms in the industry have failed to produce desired outcomes. This suggests existence of a gap in the literature which this study is poised to fill. As long this gap is unaddressed, the desired development would continue to elude Nigeria. In view of this, an empirical analysis of the administrative reforms became apparent to underscore the reason(s) why the reforms have failed over time. As a matter of fact, findings of this study hope to educate decision makers, hence facilitate improvement in the living conditions of the Nigerian populace.

In the context of public management, this research hopes to contribute by examining strategic efforts towards repositioning the power sector to improve service delivery. The study will advance effective and modalities essential for a successful reform exercise towards improving public sector performance in Nigeria, which were missing in previous researches. This study also hopes to help provide a database for further studies as well as serve as warehouse to policy makers and public management practitioners.

More importantly, the study intends to contribute to the ongoing intellectual dialogue on the public sector reform in Nigeria. There is a strong belief that the expected results and lessons to be learnt from this study will add to the empirical database to guide the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public sector reform programmes. The findings of structural equation model (SEM) which measured complex relationship between the variables as well as mediating effects suggest an interesting implication for quality theory and practices. This study hopes to provide a guide for future research in public sector management and for further search theory in different context and scope. This research intends to provide a better understanding of administrative reform, hence motivate future researcher to investigate further the theory in other service organisation for improved service delivery. Moreover, this study will provide a platform for

understanding the desirability of reform exercises, strategies, methodologies, and best approaches to the result-oriented public sector reform programmes.

## **1.8 Definition of Key Terms**

This study mainly examines administrative reforms with a particular reference to the power sector in Nigeria. For the purpose of clarity, it is highly imperative to define and explain the ways certain concepts were used from the outset to avoid ambiguities and misconceptions inherent in the use of the concepts. This is because, the same concept may be used to convey different ideas and different concepts may be used to mean the same thing.

**Public Sector Reforms:** Public sector reforms in this study are regarded as the process of restructuring or realigning public organisations to make them operate efficiently and effectively. Restructuring of public organisations is usually premised on the belief that the government has grown too big and is, therefore, cumbersome to manage and address the needs and demands of the citizens promptly using fewer resources (Joseph, 2008).

**Reform:** In this study, reform refers to a deliberate attempt to reinvigorate a system or institutions that has been marred by inefficiency, ineffectiveness, and low performance, which is preventing or slowing it down when providing quality service (Olaopa, 2012).

**Performance:** Performance within the context of this study can be conceived to mean the ability of the public authority to live up to its expectation in terms of timely delivery of goods and services or ability to discharge its statutory mandate expeditiously (Adoghe et al. 2009).

**Efficiency:** Efficiency, as used in this research, refers to actual achievement compared with the cost of that achievement during a given period of time and can be measured by



the ratio of actual output or result to input or cost (Sorensen, 1993). In this study, efficiency is defined as all efforts geared towards getting “the most out of scarce resources to achieve whatever goal the organisation wishes to pursue”. Since there are two types of efficiency (managerial and economic efficiency), this study is mainly concerned with the former as it is a “ratio measure relating outputs to inputs” (Downs & Larkey, 1986)

**Service Delivery:** Service delivery in this context connotes prompt and timely service provision by public institutions in line with their core mandate to meet citizens' demand.

**Political and Bureaucratic Support (PBS):** In this research, political and bureaucratic support entails the ability of public managers to embrace and welcome changes (Scott, 1996).

Until this support is apparent, the anticipated improvement, which is the cardinal objective of every reform programme, will be challenging to achieve. Put simply, political and bureaucratic supports are critical to the attainment of reform objectives.

**Reform Decision (RD):** Undoubtedly, a reform decision is the starting point, which refers to a deliberate action to launch the reform process (Ouda, 2004).

**Professional Support (PS):** For clarity, professional support based on Ouda's (2004) classification sums up the professional or advisory role played by relevant technocrats through assistance rendered to the government sector in the design and implementation of reform programmes.

**Communication Strategy (CS):** Within the context of this study, communication strategy connotes the process of transmitting reform ideas, legislation, frameworks, and objectives to the public (Ball, 1994).

**Willingness to Change (WC):** This study aligned the concept of willingness to change to Ouda's (2004) clarification, who considered it as the human aspect of the reform process. This entails the ability of executors and end-users to imbibe new maintenance culture.

**Consultation and Coordination (CC):** As conceived by the United Nations (1984), Ouda (2004) said consultation and coordination refer to a deliberate action to obtain comments and suggestions from within and outside the government circle on how to improve reform outcomes.

**Civil Society Organisation (CSO):** Civil society organisation, as conceived in this study, refers to the organised interest or pressure groups that agitate and struggle for equity, and social and economic rights in the society (Kankya et al., 2013).

## **1.9 Organisation of the Thesis**

This thesis is organised into five chapters:

Chapter 1 is the introductory part of the study – Background to the study, the scientific relevance of the study, societal relevance of the study, statement of the research problem, research objectives, research hypothesis, scope of the study, and significance of the study.

Chapter 2: This chapter extensively discuss the thoughts and perspectives of scholars and authors who have contributed in one way or another to the field of public administration/management, in particular public sector reform. This research is guided by the concept and theory surrounding the topic of administrative reform. The objective is to critically review the literature of present and past researches undertaken in this area of study.

Chapter 3: This chapter describes the research methodology, were sub-divided into introduction, research design, sampling techniques, sample size, research instrument,

method of data collection and data analysis techniques. This chapter illustrates the scrutiny of data collection instruments.

Chapter 4: This chapter presents and analyses the collected and collated primary and secondary quantitative data using the statistical package for social science (SPSS) software, and subsequently analysed using WarpPLS software. Based on the data collected from the field, this study interpreted the results. Results to be obtained from the statistical analysis then determine whether the research hypotheses formulated are either accepted or rejected based on which major research findings will be drawn.

Chapter 5: This chapter is the concluding aspect of this study, which include the summary, conclusion and recommendations. The recommendations for this study were drawn from major research findings derivable from the analysis of the research results.

## **CHAPTER 2: A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Administrative reform is not a new phenomenon because it forms an integral part of public sector management and governance. Many conceptual and empirical studies have been conducted on various aspects of administrative reform and public management reform by many scholars among whom are: Aucoin (1990), Christensen and Lwogreid (1998), Farazmand (2002), Toonen (2003), Peters and Pierre (2008), Caiden (2011), Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017), Ingrams (2020), Boyd (2021), Klemsdal and Kjekshus (2021). This invariably suggests the existence of huge literature, different thoughts, perspectives and divergent theoretical exposition about administrative reform. An overview of empirical work on administrative reform suggests a multi-dimensional approach. The study analysed developments of administrative reforms. Also, the study encapsulates a conceptual analysis of administrative reforms as well as analysis of key determinants of a successful administrative reform. Additionally, the study further explains trajectories of administrative reforms and aligned this study within institutional perspectives of administrative reforms. More importantly, this research covers the reform in power sector of the economy. Also, a review of previous works was conducted on various strategies for reducing government role in power sector delivery. Subsequently, the study adopted a suitable theoretical model (theory) to underpin the research.

### **2.2 Development of Administrative Reform**

Historically, the universal recognition of administrative reform dates back to the 1940s. But, the issue attracted more global attention in the 1950s and became prominent between the 1960s-1970s (Caiden, 1979). According to Farazmand (2002), governments worldwide had since the ancient era conducted administrative reforms.

This implies that administrative reform is an old activity, and at the same time, a recurring action. He maintained that the first phase of development in this field occurred between the 1960s and 1970s. In that decade, the newly independent states struggled to make their administrative systems responsive to national objectives (Guma, 2012). Notably, the irresistible change was caused by the desire to reinvigorate their systems to accomplish ambitious programmes (Gable, 1975). This is so because the administrative system inherited from the colonial administration was found to be unstable and sluggish. The system was considered obstructive and resistant to innovation that might probably facilitate national development. This assertion was further supported by the UN International development strategy as cited in the findings of Henderso (1969), and Stillman (2020), which affirmed that the global attention to developing administrative capacities was largely on account of strong pressure from developed nations and support from scholars deeply involved in international technical assistance. From the 1970s to 1980s, the government assumed the dominant role in the provision of essential service. In addition, it became apparent that the big-government notion had preoccupied the governance of most independent states and this has expanded the role of government (Guma, 2012). For instance, new organisations and institutions were established in a drive to achieve national objectives. Moreover, most post-colonial states were over-centralised (Olum, 2003).

Furthermore, Olum posited that the over-dominance of states in the service delivery value chain in this era and the 1973 economic crisis aggravated their debt burdens. This ultimately caused a drastic reduction in the quality of public goods and services delivered. The appalling service delivery mechanism prompted the World Bank in 1997 to challenge the capacity of public institutions or State to deliver services to the populace effectively.

Most literatures on administrative reforms evaluated alluded to Caiden's (1991) submission that discussions on reforms from the 1980s focused principally on the attempts to induce systemic improvement in the public sector. The essence was to ensure improved operational performance of public institutions. Caiden ascribed these moves to the global recognition for alteration in the conduct of public business, as public institutions continue to grapple with citizens' demand. Previous studies also revealed that the administrative reform activities conducted between the 1980s and 1990s were as a result of pressure from the bilateral donors and multilateral agencies (Langseth, 1995, 1996; Kiiza et al., 2006; Laking & Norman, 2007). In the same manner, Azizuddin (2008) affirmed that, in an attempt to accelerate good governance through administrative reforms, many countries had sought assistance from international donors and bilateral agencies. This was expected because, at that time, many countries were grappling with financial stress caused by the economic downturn. As mentioned earlier, the large size of government being maintained also contributed to a huge financial burden; therefore, the newly independent states had to seek aid (Guma, 2012). For this reason, it is not an overstatement to say that the reorganisation exercise was foreign induced because reforms and reduction in the size of government became an important condition for aid from donor agencies and development organisations.

In the most recent decades, Killian (2008) explained that the World Bank had shown greater interest in administrative reforms as a key component of good governance. He further affirmed that since the 1990s, the structural adjustment programme- a reform strategy has played a crucial role in the bank's technical and aid assistance to member states. Killian emphasised that the influence of globalisation on the administrative system was irresistible. The argument offered is equally relevant in this context to describe globalisation mentioned earlier as a pattern of diversities and convergences in the world and how it shaped the development of administrative reforms.

For instance, emerging economies were pressurised to adopt and adapt to a new public management paradigm tagged "Washington consensus". Evidently, the new approach to economic management and policy was largely promoted by the IMF and the World Bank (Killian, 2008). Furthermore, Killian conceded that it became difficult for low-income countries to rebuff imposed reform measures as a key determinant for loan and aid assistance. At this juncture, it is imperative to note that administrative reform is a continuum; as it seeks to tackle the problem that emanates in each decade. Conversely, the World Bank has shown keen interest in developing the administrative capacities of emerging economies, which, according to Harrison (2008), is a prerequisite for attaining national development.

Like other scholars, Rocha and de Araujo (2007) provided more insights into the evolution and development of administrative reforms. They maintained that administrative reform had been a vital issue for several decades in Western countries. For example, Portugal, like other Western countries, has developed a compassionate interest in administrative reforms. Rocha and de Araujo affirmed that a contemporary Portuguese instituted administrative reform has gradually reduced state expenditure. However, they noted that the reform breeds proletarianisation of the middle class that lives off the State and encourages privatisation. The work sustained the argument by other scholars that administrative reform is more difficult in the legal systems.

Aucoin (1990) posited that literature on administrative reforms appeared early in the British, New Zealand and Australian administrative reform agendas. Obviously, the motivations were primarily driven by the need to bring to the fore expected government response to the financial challenges caused by the change in the global economic system. Also, more insights into the theoretical base for underpinning administrative reform had its roots in the top-down approach, often called the "purposive approach",

which was widely championed through the writings of Aucoin (1990) and Farazmand (2002). However, scholars now differ on notable ideologies on administrative reforms. In short, the nature of the phenomenon might probably be responsible for dissenting perceptions on the ideologies, which include the bottom-up approach, a public choice perspective which became popular in the post-1970 in USA and Europe, environmental dependency, likewise institutional perspective and lately generic reform theory. Regardless of the divergences that have characterised the meaning, adoptions, and implementation of administrative reforms cross-nationally, Nakamura and Koike (1992) argued that crisis in governance largely triggered the struggle for administrative reforms. This submission aptly summarises the reasons for reforms and also suggests ways to improve quality service and management practices. In Nigeria, administrative reforms have remained a routine activity and shared the same historical evolution with successive governments (Igbokwe, 2017). Likewise, other developing nations' attempts to attain improved public service delivery were recognised as an important driver for good governance and persistent administrative reforms in Nigeria (Mbah, 2016). Available literature reveals that before 1960, the Nigerian public administrative system was characterised by a transplanted British Westminster theory (Van der Westhuizen, 2005).

Also, in the post-independence period, successive governments sustained the adopted administrative arrangement. It is noteworthy that reforming the civil service has been far-reaching, being the centrepiece of governmental activities and performance (Aluko, 2007). However, the unstable political environment between 1962 and 1970, caused by a series of crises ranging from the civil war, intermittent military coups and census disputes, has significantly influenced the administrative system (Ayeni, 2002).



Moreover, these post-independence crises have been recognised as major contributory factors to the enormous problems confronted by the Nigerian nation during this decade (Adamolekun, 1999). This is so because the political impasse significantly affected the gradual evolution and development of public administration. To this end, the situation culminated in an increasing rate of unemployment, poverty, external debt, low growth rate and production level. It is noteworthy that the economic crisis that characterised the Nigerian economy greatly affected the entire public sector, which became unproductive, over-bloated, sluggish and ineffective (Van der Westhuizen, 2005). Consequently, this prompted the IMF/World Bank's agitation for a reduction in the size of government and the role of the State (Olukoshi & Nwoke, 1994 in Mbah, 2016). Most literature evaluated revealed that in 1985, the government embraced/accepted the World Bank/IMF inspired neoliberal policy of structural adjustment programme (SAP) to tackle the challenges bedevilling the entire public administration system and at the same time pursue the economic recovery programme (Falae, 1999; Obansa, 2005; Ogbonna, 2012; Ugoani & Ibeenwo, 2015, Mbah, 2016).

Notably, privatisation and deregulation of public enterprise emerged as one of the main reform strategies for the economic recovery programme (Ayeni & Adamolekun, 1999). Mbah (2016) affirmed that administrative reforms were instituted to swiftly respond to contemporary roles assigned to the private sector in the post-privatisation era. It became obvious at this period that the State was gradually interested in being disinvested in the provision of social services such as electricity, education, water supply and other social infrastructures (Iyayi, 2005). Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the reform instituted has opened a new paradigm in the Nigerian administrative system. This is evident in national economic empowerment and development strategies (NEEDS), which shows the government's commitment to a new reform programme. The component of the new reform strategy, amongst others, includes: "change the way

government does its work by creating responsive and efficient public sector.” Also, *a* deliberate policy to promote private enterprise and create a competitive private sector (NEEDS policy, NPC, 2004). To actualise this national objective, this important sector of the economy was subsequently privatised, deregulated, and liberalised. On the whole, it is vital to raise this puzzle which appears in the course of public service reform, where greater attention has been deployed to the public service as an institution but with less emphasis on the people operating this system.

### **2.3 Concept of Administrative Reforms**

The concept of administrative reforms is among the most discussed issues and common parlance in the public sector (Cheung, 2020). Scholars have made several attempts to provide a generally accepted meaning for this concept, but it has been challenging. Though, this is not peculiar to administrative reform as most concepts in the social sciences pose similar. Caiden (1991) observed that the concept of administrative reform had acquired divergent understandings because it means different things to different people.

Nonetheless, administrative reform has assumed a centrepiece in the lives of countries, whether developed or developing (Liviu, 2015). This is so because administrative reform serves as an avenue for reorganising institutions and structures considered ineffective or requiring innovations to provide better service. While some scholars analyse the administrative reform behaviour of bureaucrats in organisations, others discuss the concept from an institutional angle (Quah, 1976). Therefore, while administrative reform can be said to be concerned with the attitudinal aspect of administration, it is more concerned with institutional changes associated with reform processes.

Nevertheless, there is consensus amongst scholars on the expected reform outcome, which is to facilitate the efficient delivery of goods and services (Samokhvalov & Strelkov, 2020). Conversely, administrative reform has been acknowledged to be crucial not just to improve service delivery but also to prioritise and manage limited resources strategically, adjust the functions and roles of the State in the society to fix current government visions- the issue of “*what to do*”, and at the same time improve legitimacy and accountability of the State in carrying out these functions- the issue of “*how to do*” it (Kigaru, 2002; Therkildsen, 2008).

Nonetheless, Farazmand (2002) raised a crucial issue that the problem of administrative reform started from its divergent meanings. He categorised administrative reform into two. Firstly, from the perspective of developed and highly industrialised nations, most especially the USA and Europe. Perhaps, this might be the reason why he conceived the concept "as a process of change in administrative structures or procedure within the public service because they have come out of line with the expectation of the social environment."

Secondly, from the viewpoint of developing nations that strive to use administrative reform as a viable instrument for institutionalising change and society's modernisation. Put simply; administrative reform plays key roles in social and economic transformations in third world countries.

From the conceptual lens of power relations, Groves (2018), cited by Leemans (2018) stated that administrative reforms entail adjusting the interrelationship between the bureaucracy and other groups in the society through a carefully designed political process. The explanation by Groves is relatively weak because it focused mainly on interpersonal relationships. Nevertheless, this attempt succeeded in unveiling the roles of politics in every reform agenda.

Notably, public administrative reforms are among the contemporary issues and form part of the debate on governance. This is due to increased demand for the provision of better service from the government by the citizens. This might be the reason why Caiden (1991, p.1) conceived administrative reform as “the artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance -has existed ever since men conceive better ways of organising their social activities.” What is interesting is that this connotation touches on the core/main target of every reform initiative “removing obstacles and fashioning out better ways of doing things.” In a further argument, Caiden (ibid) described the link between politics and administration “as power politics in action.” Beyond that, he offered another distinctive explanation which depicted administrative reform as “an economic process (redistribution of resources and the alteration of the end product) or a psychological process (the alteration of behaviour pattern), belief, attitude, and individual actions.”

This clarification underscores the importance of behaviour as a key determinant of reform success. The position of Beh (2007, p.6) corroborates the previous argument. According to her, “difficulty in administering reform is that policies that threatened the livelihood of political actors, including bureaucrats with vested interests, will be much avoided. Evidence of this can be seen in the policies of deregulation, financial reform, and privatisation due to the political and economic clout”. In addition to the conceptual clarification, Caiden asserted that administrative reform can be broadly categorised into three dimensions: individuals, groups, and institutions. A Summary of identified variables in these categories includes:

- (i) **Individuals:** job satisfaction, mobility, security, skill, aptitude, practical ability, knowledge and information.
- (ii) **Groups:** power distribution, dependence, productivity.

- (iii) **Institutions:** structure, centralisation, concentration, size, function, monopoly, independence, economy, efficiency and productivity.

Conversely, Chimire and Ashraf (2016, p.79) offered more insights into the concept of administrative reform when they concluded that it "represents the elimination of endemic problems in the present system and establishes a new, improved system." In this sense, the conceptual clarification is aligned with the explanation provided by Caiden (2014) because it also recognised the purpose of administrative reform (better service). Admittedly, the synergy between politics and administration was also recognised as vital to engendering improved public service delivery (Cheung, 2020). In another way, Kim (2000) agreed that many nations embarked on administrative reforms with the central motive of reducing political influence in public service provision.

To this end, efforts were channelled towards reorganising public utilities, before privatisation, for efficiency and better service delivery. Similarly, Hussain (2007) asserted that administrative reorganisation, especially in the new era, usually encompasses internal practices alongside structural and organisational procedures.

On its own, Romzek (2000) stated that administrative reform implies a systematic approach to accelerate good governance and enhance overall national development. To achieve this, Campbell (1993) and Romzek (2000) reported that widely adopted strategies include public service restructuring, decentralisation, and red-tape reduction. Similarly, Farazmand (2002) opined that administrative reform involves modernisation and affects the social and economic transformation to change society. Although this viewpoint seems all-inclusive but is biased because this denotation relates to the administrative system in developing nations.

Likewise, Igbokwe (2017, p. 10) described administrative reform as a “mechanism for institutional transformation or change, transfusion of innovation, political control and achievement of efficiency and economy.” This connotation seems catchy because it views administrative reform as an avenue for re-evaluating governmental structures, organisational techniques and management practices. This assertion aligned with the perspectives of many scholars (Caiden, 1991; Adamolekun, 1999; Olaopa, 2012) on the essence of administrative reform, which is to engender efficient resource and utilisation. Mbah (2016, p.5) also viewed administrative reform as a “conscious, well-considered change that is carried out in a public sector organisation or system to improve its structure, operation or quality of its workforce.” Undoubtedly, this conceptual explanation captures the two main components of administrative reform: institutions and individuals, as enviably supported by Caiden (1991).

More importantly, Liou (2000) shared the same perception with Caiden (1991, p. 65) when he conceived administrative reform broadly “as artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance.” This notion can thus be understood when administrative reform has been simply interpreted from the perspective of intervention.

On the other hand, Siedentop (1982), as cited in Liou (2000, p.5), systematically explained administrative reform as an “organisational instrument or problem-related change of government and state-owned institutions to swiftly respond to environmental demands and requirement.” Farazmand (2002) explained that the severity of problems bedevilling the public sector was mainly for the massive adoption of administrative reform. Evidently, this argument affirms the justification for administrative reform as a catalyst for improving public sector service delivery and better performance.

In the same vein, Brunsson (2006) explained that administrative reform refers to dramatic organisational changes meant to solve administrative problems. He claimed further that every administrative reform is more targeted at an organisation's stability than at changes and is mostly driven by problems and solutions. Brunsson was quick to acknowledge that reform is a common practice in modern times. In their contribution to reform ethics, clarifications, Klemsdal and Kjekshus (2021) agreed that maintaining trust is key to managing administrative reform implementation.

From a theoretical perspective, previous literature has acknowledged the existence of many theories, namely, top-down, bottom-up, institutional economics theory, and recently generic government sector reform theory (Caiden, 1991; Aucoin, 1994; Bellamy, 2001; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Andersson, 2006; Joseph, 2008; Ouda, 2008). These theories have been consistently adopted to underpin the reform process or activity in an organisation (Farazmand, 2002). For instance, Aucoin (1994) offered more insights into various approaches to underpin administrative reform, which can be broadly classified into – purposive (top-down) theory, environment (bottom-up) model, and traditional models.

This analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the approaches to and motives behind administrative reforms and underlines the principles behind any government reform agenda in a political system. Likewise, Aberbach and Christensen (2003) argued that the new institutional economic model had gained global acceptance in explaining the roles of institutions in providing a solid foundation for virile economy.

The study of Jamasb (2006) aligned with Ouda's argument because it reinforces the adoption of the generic reform theory as a theoretical base for public sector reform.

Evidence from Jamasb's study shows that this theory was used to evaluate reform experience and lessons learnt to developing countries, especially from privatising participation and reform action. In the same way, Andersson's (2006) work also adopted the same theory for assessing and comparing the success of electricity reform in Namibia and Mozambique. For instance, unlike the top-down approach, which requires little or no input from other key stakeholders in the body polity (Chester & Wilson, 1968; Peters, 1994; Seidman & Gilmone, 1986), the generic reform theory was more inclusive in approach, reform decision making and mode of implementation (see Figure 2.1). However, the generic government sector reform theory, put forward by Ouda (2008), emerged as a new theory that is gradually being accepted as an instrument for underpinning government sector reforms.

To Ouda's (2008), thought, generic sector reform seems to be a crossbreed of Pollitt and Bouckaert's Public Management theory (2004) and the basic requirement theory in addition to practical reform experience from New Zealand. The theory was rooted in the assumption that specific processes must be integrated and well-coordinated for a successful reform activity. Likewise, certain actors, the elites, influential individuals, or authorities, before reform exercise, have a specific purpose in pursuing reform and restructuring plan. However, it is imperative to emphasise that the underlining principle in this theory is that the successful implementation of reforms and reorganisation are always determined by sustained efforts by several parties "stakeholders," such as government, politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups.

Kim's (2000) evaluation revealed that reform exercise in most situations had been monopolised by the facilitator (government) and executed in a top-down approach. He emphasised that administrative reforms were conducted in a top-down approach between 1998-1999.



Additionally, he stated that the period remains the best for the reform, and an attempt to change the reform approach has failed severally. Further evaluation of previous studies revealed a new and more holistic theoretical base for public sector management reform.

Ouda's (2008) analysis found the generic reform theory most suitable for evaluating government sector reform in New Zealand. The generic reform theory was a vital instrument of argument in the works of Heeks (2001) which focused on reinventing government, with particular reference to the information age in the IT-enabled public sector reform. Andersson, Ouda, and Heek's theoretical expositions on public service reform were contrary to those of Walker and Ling (2006), who adopted efficiency and public choice theories to analyse institutional reform and public service delivery in Hong Kong. They maintained that efficiency theory seems to gain wider adoption amongst the two theories when focusing on improving public service. In a nutshell, the study found the efficiency theory to be more suitable to support institutional reform, especially the Hong Kong case.

In another instance, Karunasena, Deng, and Karunasena (2011) studied the service delivery in Sri Lanka. They adopted the structural equation model, and statistical tools to measure government effort to deliver quality public service. Evidence from the investigation revealed that most citizens favour the governments strive to improve public service delivery through various reform programmes. The investigation by Ullah, Arentsen and Lovett's (2017) revealed considerable slow progress in Pakistan's electricity sector reform. The study adopted the new institutional economics theory to interrogate the failure of the exercise to achieve the desired improvements.

Furthermore, this inquiry revealed that these factors are major contributors to the failure: unfavourable political environment, institutional weakness, and poor governance structure.

### **2.3.1 Determinants of a Successful Administrative Reform**

Many studies have identified the basic requirement for a successful reform, which subsequently formed an important component of Ouda's (2008) generic reform theory. Caiden (1991), asserted that unsuccessful administrative reforms are often caused by many factors, namely, lack of resources, incessant social conflicts and high level of maladministration as universal factors that often hinder successful administrative reforms. Caiden further categorised them into the following factors: political factors, which include lack of consensus, rigid constitutional arrangements, weak and divided governments, personality clashes. Secondly, there are also geographical factors such as poor communication, size of the country, debilitating climate, low mobility, physical barriers, scattered settlements. The third category of factors are historical factors which include traditionalism, past reform failures, colonial legacy, biculturalism among others. The fourth category includes culture, diversities, indiscipline, tribalism, corruption, paralysis of public will, religious fundamentalism and linguistic barriers. The last category includes low managerial skill; monopoly, bureaucratism; low saving and investment.

On what Ouda (2008) termed willingness to change (WC), Thompson's analysis apparently summarises common anxiety about administrative reform that it rarely "works" as intended by its sponsors. Then, it focuses on one of the root questions about change and change processes-whether and to what extent large organisations and the behaviours of those therein can be shaped according to the intentions of one or more actors. Alternatively, whether change proceeds according to certain "natural processes" are substantially immune to human interference. Nonetheless, designers of reforms must successfully devise a means of "amplifying" those processes in ways congruent with their reform objectives. Towards the end, their success might lead to fundamental questions about the construct of administrative reforms. Briefly, Emovon et al.'s (2018) study

strengthened Thompson's (1999) submission, which affirmed poor attitude to government property as a contributory factor to the energy crisis in Nigeria and advocated that consumers must completely change their attitude.

Evidence from the submissions of scholars such as Zamor and Khator (1994), and Liou (2017) highlighted that most reform decisions in developing countries are often foreign induced. This lack of local contents has, invariably, challenged the sincerity of various reform initiatives. In supporting this argument, Carle's (2000) study revealed that many of the reform exercises conducted in Mexico, Chile, and Jamaica resulted from external pressure (foreign induced), especially from the IMF. Also, in most cases, the reforms are influenced by the USA mainly because of its dominant role in the region but raised concern that administrative reforms in these countries have not produced a meritocracy capable of facilitating economic development. In this context, Carle (2000) shared the same viewpoint with Garcia-Zamor and Khator (1994) on the fact that most of the reform exercises in developing countries were foreign induced and, in most cases, championed by multilateral organisations (IMF & World Bank).

Bennell's (1997) work also relates political support (PS) to what Ouda considered as an essential ingredient of successful reforms. The illustration offers useful insights into why most reform strategies like privatisation achieve limited results. He attributed some to a lack of commitment on the part of political actors compounded by stiff opposition from vested interest such as public sector workers (job security) and senior bureaucrats in particular. Also, Zhang and Kurkpatrick (2002) emphasised that appropriate design and execution of reforms coupled with institutional situations in the reforming countries are key determinants for the success of the reform agenda. He stressed that it is against this backdrop that part of that proposition in this study was built around this assertion. Analysing the factors that determine the success of administrative reforms, Beh (2007)

cited that the cooperation of every political actor is a key determinant of successful reforms. Seidman and Seidman (1994) supported this argument that in developing countries, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats tends to be indistinct, and the accord between the ruling class and high-ranking personalities often creates an oligarchic power scenario. Beh's assertion provided more insights that politicians and bureaucrats with vested interest are likely to avoid implementing reform decisions and policies that threaten their livelihood.

Damir's (2008) analysis recognised the process of administrative transformation within the European Commission and unveiled the reality between expectation and reform outcomes. Damir's argument unveiled a substantial gap between the rhetoric of the reformer and the reality of implementation. This seems to suggest that a poor understanding of reforms might be responsible for unexpected outcomes (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2007; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Levy, 2000; Cini, 2004). As such, it would have altered the pace of implementation. This also contributes to unintended reform outcomes.

In the same vein, Schedler and Schmucki (2009) stated that sufficient political support is a *sine qua non* to result-oriented administrative reforms and a key determinant of successful reform initiatives. In addition, politicians' backgrounds and mind-sets account for their attitude towards administrative reforms cross-nationally. They declared that evidences abound in the literature about the pros and cons of various theories and approaches to administrative reforms. Nevertheless, there seems to be less interest in the political process, which determines whether or not administrative reforms are implemented at all. From this assertion, it became clear that more literature has shown more concerns on public sector reorganisation, and this might be the reason for this claim. Also, Laguna (2009) explained the paradigm shift in the discourse on comparative

administrative reforms since the last decades. Although, he affirmed the landmark progress in descriptive, informative, and even analytical terms, he maintained that omissions and biases had constrained the capacity to offer convincing causal inferences, explanations, conceptualisations, and generalisations.

Studies by Kim and Han (2015) revealed that reforms had largely failed to attain their ultimate goal, i.e., significant weakening of the traditionally strong elite bureaucracy in policymaking. This is due to a situation where the reformers were expected to reform themselves because of perceived deficiencies that had resulted in numerous incidences of sabotage, delay, obstruction, and distortion of the reforms. However, it was suggested that reforms must be domesticated in terms of initiatives, adoption, interpretation, acceptance, and how they have been structured for implementation. Kim and Han's (2015) work lessened the high expectations from reform exercises when they maintained that administrative reforms often produce unintended consequences.

Therefore, to achieve meaningful reform outcomes, those whose mandate entails designing and implementing reform measures were supposed to be part of reform target. They reiterated that the essence of this approach in a reform exercise would be to eliminate incidences of sabotage, delay, obstruction, and distortion of the reform. To this end, it is crucial to reflect local content in the reform initiatives, adoption, interpretation, acceptance and concretised for implementation. Equally, reform supporters must develop popular oversight mechanisms outside the bureaucracy at various reform processes, such as citizen monitoring or civic participation.

While commenting on administrative reforms, the UN world public sector (2015) reiterated the benefits of creating synergies, coherence and integrity between the implementation process and goals of proposed reorganisations. Scholars have raised a poser that “implementers need to engage with all stakeholders (politicians, bureaucrats,

and civil society organisations), take account of responses, perceived problems and influence towards their desired outcome” (Cheung, 2020). The UN (2015) noted that issuing instructions may achieve some degree of compliance but might not generate long-lasting results or desired outcomes.

According to the UN report, citizens’ engagement, participation, and involvement in the reform process increase accurate problem diagnosis. Not only that, they also facilitate problem-solving, ownership, public accountability, public confidence, and trust in the reform exercise, which invariably influence reform outcomes. This assertion relates to the central point of this work, upon which the study provides a theoretical explanation for the reform process in the power sector. It is evident that the bottom line in any administrative restructuring exercise lies in the changes. Therefore, it is important to reiterate the significance of discourses on administrative reforms because of the dynamic nature of the operating environment of administrative activities, which have a significant influence on the reform outcomes.

Igbokwe (2017), in his contribution to the discourse, alluded to part of what Ouda (2008) classified as an ingredient of successful reforms, and identified a lack of clear definition of goals and implementation strategy and a lack of proper communication and consultation as part of the major obstacles to administrative reforms. For instance, the management of reforms often acts tricky, thorny and unstable about the best approach to the reforms. Therefore, this creates doubt about the genuineness and sincerity of the reform. Although, key determinants to successful administrative reforms found in the literature are not exhaustive but have succeeded in providing useful insights. Analoui (2009) concurred with Ouda (2008) on a successful government reform (SGR) used in this study as a dependent variable. The scholars agreed that reform in both developing and developed countries faced many challenges. This includes appropriate structure,

behaviour and attitude, lack of skill and competence, visionary leadership and legislative support. Additionally, Ukwandu and Ijere (2020) submitted that effective and meaningful reform depends largely on its consistency and transparency.

From a literal perspective, Liguori, Steccolini, and Rota's (2018) study seconded the best strategies for public sector reform by suggesting comprehensive evaluation as an appropriate strategy to investigate how reform design is directly related to reform decision and regulations that shape reform exercises. Obviously, the new reforms in the public sector sometimes face slow implementation and even difficulty. Still, they might achieve reasonable success when they accommodate the nation's peculiarities, and recognised by extant laws. Liguori, Steccolini, and Rota believed that for politicians and civil servants to accept new ideas and reorganisation, government must make concerted efforts to reassure the stakeholders on the desirability and genuineness of the proposed reform theory.

### **2.3.2 Relevance of Politico-economic Environment to Reform Outcomes**

Empirical studies have revealed divergent reform outcomes from both developed and developing economies. Notable amongst the studies include Burns' (1993) investigation that affirmed China's short-term success after 40 years of organisational reform. However, it also identified issues that had undermined the reform agendas: political, economic, and institutional problems. Amongst the issues highlighted, which are too important to be ignored, include conflicting elite priorities, cycles of economic centralisation and decentralisation, the interdependence of government agencies and economic enterprises. Also worthy of note is the lack of incentives to economise. It further submits that organisational reform management institutions are fragile. In this sense, the successful implementation of organisational reform in the future would largely depend on the state of economic development.

In addition to Burns (1993), Ji's (1998) work also examined China's administrative reforms from the 1980s. The Chinese authorities have made a concerted attempt to overhaul the country's obsolete administrative system. Similarly, Burns (1993) affirmed that the exercise achieved only marginal results. Notwithstanding, it is imperative to mention that despite the little success achieved in the period under review. China made giant strides in 1992 when a new theory of administrative reform was launched based on ownership reform of the state sector. It is also evident that this signalled a new paradigm and substantial restructuring of the government's economic bodies. The study submits that the new model for China's administrative system emerged, and in the process, most ministries at the centre and regional bureaus were either transformed or removed. Moon and Ingraham (1998) explored the nexus between administrative reform and governance. This work admitted that governments most often faced multiple internal obstacles such as fiscal stress, distrust of bureaucracy and higher demands for public services. This was reiterated in Peters and Savoie (1995). Even so, further evidence revealed that the external factor is the main stimulus for the restructuring (Cheung, 2020). For instance, the governments had during the period become more sensitive to global issues and inclined to be more influenced by international environments (Garcia-Zamor & Khator, 1994; Ingrassham & Romzek, 1994).

In short, most of the works evaluated agreed that initiation of administrative reform was primarily aimed at enhancing governmental performance and improving the administrative system through technological advances, managerial improvements, administrative innovations and continued enhancement of administrative capabilities (Caiden, 1991). Rodriguez -Padilla and Vargas (1996) reported that though the energy sector was liberalised for private capital investment, political and economic factors hindered the effectiveness of the liberalisation exercise.



Similarly, Hesse (2005, p.5) identified critical factors that mostly influence successful reforms to include the following: “(1) strong political will and support from elites; (2) logical organisation of proposed innovation programmes; (3) a reasonable, well-capitulating modernisation process; (4) designed innovation within critical policy areas; and (5) change of attitude of the government, value reorientation, competency, knowledge-driven, improve participation and accountability.”

Similarly, Alex’s (2006) study discussed the problems associated with previous reform exercises, including poor leadership, political instability, excessive government interference, lack of accountability, and inadequate delegation of power to the tiers of government from central government. It is greatly acknowledged that there is a dire need to deploy more resources for an institutional building to engender institutional effectiveness and to pursue result-oriented developmental objectives. Ahmed (2009) also supported the previous studies of Hesse (2005) Alex (2006) that the absence of political will throughout the policy initiation and implementation was found to be responsible for the anomalies for persistent setbacks in the drive to accelerate efficient delivery of essential utilities such as electricity and water in Karachi. Admittedly, institutional re-arrangement to improve the operational status and performance level produced an unintended result.

The UN’s report (2010, p.10) endorsed the earlier explanation on administrative reforms which implies that “specially designed efforts to induce fundamental changes in the public administration system by way of a nationwide restructuring of other measures were initiated to facilitate the improvement of one or more of its core elements, such as administrative structure, personnel and process”.

Precisely, Cprian, Gabriela and Dimba (2010) agreed that administrative reform entails deliberate and conscious efforts to reorganise public institutions to optimise and improve

the service delivery capacity of public institutions. This amply concurs with previous studies which conceived administrative reforms alongside the underlining objective and rationale behind administrative reforms. Similarly, the study by Mas (2010) revealed that administrative reform was principally directed as a solid desire to modernise administrative services. That is, providing the State with indispensable mechanisms for proper functioning in accordance with the principle of efficiency and competition. Obviously, this declaration is in tandem with the views expressed by Liou (2000; UN, 2010).

Furthermore, Fuller (2010) added that institutions must always rise to cope with the changing local and global environment, i.e., political, social and economic. This insight clearly substantiates the views expressed earlier by Cprian, Gabriela and Dimba. Furthermore, Caiden and Sundaram (2004) maintained that administrative reform exercise has long-lasting implications on building the capacity of public sector organisation. This position was supported by Van Wart and Kapulu (2011) when they observed that administrative reform facilitates institutional strengthening for improved performance, hence increases their ability to provide essential services. Also, the works of Joskow (2008) supported this assertion when he maintained that reform initiatives are capable of facilitating capacity building process.

Many scholars have agreed that once reform is adopted, the administration becomes more effective in reducing corruption and attracting investment (Mendez & Bachler, 2011; Imasato, Martins & Pieranti, 2011; Neshkova & Kostadinova, 2012). They maintained that, despite the challenges, delays and difficulties in the implementation process, the adoption of reform is essential in any country to attain desirable national objectives. However, sceptics argued that administrative reforms face serious challenges of economic liberalisation, insufficient capacity for modernisation, and cultural legacies of

the past. For instance, Dornan (2014) acknowledged varying results from electricity reforms in developing countries despite implementing similar reforms in many developed countries. He further stressed that political obstacles on many occasions had significantly hampered the effective implementation of donor-led reforms.

Liviu (2015) highlighted the diversities inherent in administrative reforms globally. This work gives credence to Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011), who identified various dimensions to administrative reforms; thus reorganising public institutions considered strategic to reinvigorating and bolstering the national economy. This submission is of utmost significance to this study because it relates to the central argument and the subject matter of this work. It is assumed that the main target of the reform basically is to instil prudence in management, planning, operational management and performance management. Another important aspect of the administrative reform, as explained by Pollitt and Bouckaert, was human resource management centre, a deliberate attempt undertaken to streamline and reduce the cost of functioning the public bureaucracy.

More recent attention has been devoted to the synergy that existed between reform and the system of government. For instance, Mbah (2016) agreed that political and economic development depends on an effective administrative system. He asserted that this is important to attain the developmental preference and needs of the populace. Gao and Tyson (2017) established a link between administrative reform and improvement in public governance. He stressed that the transfer of government functions allows innovations and breeds efficiency in public administration, hence improving public service provision. In the same vein, Muhhina (2018) recognised the interface between institutional-building and public administrative reforms. He justified that the linkages between foreign induced reform exercises and the advancement of democratic governance in beneficiary countries are considered to have constituted a blind spot in our

understanding of democratisation. He further explored the nature of externally supported administrative reforms in relation to the substantive content of democracy being advanced.

Montgomery (1990), Summer and Thomas (1993), cited in Liou (2000), Beh (2007), investigated administrative reform policies with an emphasis on the restructuring of the civil service, public budgetary control system, and the reorganisation of state-owned enterprises. Interestingly, a keen interest was shown in the restructuring and adjustment of policies in privatisation, deregulation and decentralisation. What is important is that it amply acknowledged traditional concerns for improving management and operational issues in state-owned institutions for a new dimension on good governance for accelerated development. Moreover, Liou's work summarises the rationale behind any reform agenda; he posited that the essence of administrative reforms is basically to engender the operational efficiency and performance of public sector institutions. As a matter of fact, this initiative can only be realised when there is an alteration in the status quo, irrespective of the strategies and methods adopted in the reform exercise.

Brans, De Visscher and Vancoppenolle (2006) classified global trends in administrative reforms into organisation, personnel, strategy, and finance. This position is strongly supported by Brans et al. (2006). They highlighted factors that explain the variations in administrative reform in Belgium into differences in institutional continuity, policy entrepreneurship and policy diffusion. Furthermore, they raised a puzzle that aggregated indicators of differences in political culture that do not convincingly explain differences in public sector reforms. In the same vein, Rocha and de Araujo (2007) acknowledged the existence of huge literature on administrative reforms, especially in Portugal, which they stressed might likely increase the level of the understanding and success of administrative reforms.

Christensen, Lisheng, and Painter (2008) confirmed that administrative reform in China was primarily driven by internal and contextual factors rather than under the sway of a particular global reform theory such as New Public Management. This work contradicts the previous assertion by Garcia-Zamor and Khator (1994) and Carle (2000) that most reform decisions are externally induced. Trefon (2010) identified the underestimation of complexities of political culture as obstacles to administrative reforms in the Democratic Republic of Congo that emerged from two major wars (1996-97 and 1998-2002). The Wars largely hindered the reform efforts and more negatively was its effects on state-building. More so, administrative weaknesses and the peculiar nature of public service provision in Congo also constitute overwhelming obstacles to state-building. It is noteworthy that all these bottlenecks and encumbrances have overbearing effects on administrative reforms. In sum, it can be deduced from the study that people's political culture has significant effects on reform outcomes.

Mas (2010) analysed the administrative, social, and political implications of reforms in the executive branch of three Brazilian states. He affirmed that, in most cases, reform would act as a leverage for the promotion of economic development, which would constitute the legitimisation of the traditionalist project designed by the government. In another way, Meyer-Sahling and Yesilkagit (2011) compared three differences between administrative traditions in Eastern and Western Europe and argued that these differences matter for a tradition's reproductive capacity. For instance, the degree to which an administrative tradition can act as a persistence-breeding force for contemporary administrative developments. They submitted that the reproductive capacity of administrative traditions is likely to be lower for Central and Eastern Europe than for Western Europe. This is because, (i) the long-term stability versus instability of administrative traditions, (ii) the internal consistency versus inconsistency of ideas, institutions and practices as the three constitutive levels of an administrative tradition,

and (iii) the dependence versus autonomy of an administrative tradition from external, mainly foreign, pressure and influence-seeking.

Evidence from a comparative study conducted by Cheung (2012) revealed that neither Hong Kong nor mainland China is democratised, yet both have been active administrative reformers, having achieved significant changes. It, however, continued to operate within systematic and institutional constraints shaped by path-dependence. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the system of government adopted in the two countries contributed immensely to the level of success of the administrative reform. The literature further showed that within three decades, China had been transformed from a centrally planned economy into a thriving market economy in the name of 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' - a form of market authoritarianism. Similarly, Hong Kong had prospered as part of the 'East Asia miracle' and has been an enthusiast of public sector reform in the new public management' fashion. This is to say that the path and logic of reform have never been entirely straight forward, displaying compromises and uneasy hybrids (more so in mainland China). Admittedly, the reform had confronted with rising political challenges to governance; both are arguably still 'success' types in their own right. The political context surrounding the two reform trajectories has run in arguably totally different patterns. However, one similarity, and uniqueness of this study was that - administrative reforms were implemented in an authoritarian setting and had embraced a strong agenda of substituting political reforms.

Undoubtedly, Belle and Ongaro's (2014) study on administrative reforms and public service has further galvanised the empirical development of comparative literature on the interrelation between trajectories of administrative reforms and changes in factors that motivate public servants. Guo (2017) investigated several aspects of the latest administrative reform, including streamlining government institutions and decentralising

administrative powers, transforming government functions from command and control to providing service, maintaining market order, and modernising the government's administrative methods. McCulloch, Sindou, and Ward (2017) stressed the need for a clear understanding of the political context within which a reform decision emerged. The viewpoints aroused from the literature on donor programmes and power sector reform analysed revealed that most reforms were unsuccessful because of the failure to manage local politics. Arguably, the intent and pattern of power sector reforms make the exercise susceptible to intense politics in all countries and, if not carefully managed, can derail the reform agenda. As part of the strategy to guarantee the success of a particular reform exercise, McCulloch, Sindou, and Ward suggested that reform design should incorporate political context in the power sector implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. In conclusion, what has been classified as the key determinants of successful administrative reforms was discussed in subsection (2.2.1), and the politico-economic environment discussed in subsection (2.2.2), in addition to other issues illustrated earlier, which might amply be the real issues that have become detrimental to Nigeria's reform initiatives. It is worthwhile to interrogate the reform process because the relevance of these issues to the purposeful reform agenda can only be ignored at the peril of national progress and development.

#### **2.4 Trajectories of Administrative Reforms**

Recent trends have led to the proliferation of studies that attempt to classify administrative reforms. In the first instance, Sangita (2002) stated that administrative reform was widely conceived to stimulate good governance in terms of better delivery of essential goods and services. This argument is relevant because it paves the way for a broad classification of administrative reforms based on the following criteria: principles, values, mechanisms, approaches, means and outcomes. Accordingly, a subdivision of administrative reforms includes managerial, ethical, democratic, market, and participative reforms. It is imperative to note that these administrative reform pathways /dimensions are not entirely

distinctive because they often overlap. Notwithstanding, a critical analysis of the reform dimensions found managerial, market and participative reforms most relevant to underscore the main thrust of this study. Analysis of this reform trajectory/paths became exigent to underpin reform in the electricity industry.

According to Sangita (2002), most literature has traced the early development of market reform to administrations: UK-led by Margret Thatcher and USA- Ronald Reagan. It became prominent in the 1990s and was subsequently embraced by other countries like Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong. He maintained that evidence from the literature unveiled that the US Vice-President Al Gore developed a policy framework, "creating a government that works better and costs less," which shared the same philosophy with market reform. This presupposes lesser government regulation, better public service delivery and a lower budget. The crux of market reform is to run government activities and public service on the business line. And for this reason, countries that concurred with this principle have, over time, privatised their public enterprise (Greve & Jseporson, 1999; Johnston & Callender, 1999).

However, scholars have raised some fear about this reform process, which cannot be ignored; that is the inability of vulnerable groups to access this essential commodity because essential goods such as electricity and water provided by the private sector may not be affordable to the poor. In addition, it was emphasised that this reformed system would probably undermine democracy and citizens' rights under full private sector dominance. It is, therefore, imperative to say that the cardinal principle of this reform made it suitable to provide the theoretical foundation of this study because of what transpired in the electricity reform exercise, which amply aligned with the principles of market reform.



Moreover, the literature further showed that managerial reform is a subdivision of administrative reform. In this perspective, Sangita (2002) stressed that the management principle based on Weberian bureaucracy was essentially the guiding principle for better, efficient and effective administration. Recently, this reform category was rooted in private and business orientation and the principle had largely been adopted in public administration. Notable scholars have attributed the emergence of this reform model in the 1990s to many prevailing factors: waves of globalisation, democratisation, fiscal crisis, and the need to respond to growing demands for efficiency in the public sector (Kamarch, 2000; da Cunha Rezende, 2008). They submitted that managerial reform was conceived to facilitate the effective functioning of the State in terms of service delivery. Bangura (2000) concurred with Kamarch and da Cunha Rezende and provided more insights that the reform was developed to tackle the following issues: fiscal crisis - including privatisation of public function, decreasing public expenditure; and ensuring managerial efficiency. Therefore, it is not surprising that the failure of public institutions paved the way for the government's decision to transfer the ownership of its enterprises to the private sector to streamline public expenditure and achieve efficient service delivery.

Recently, participative reform has been recognised as an important instrument for increasing citizens' full participation in public policy initiation, formulation, execution and evaluation (Sangita, 2002). This reform underscores inclusiveness in the policy process and power relations amongst stakeholders in a political system. However, participative management structure: a component of this reform paradigm, stressed the importance of stakeholders' organisation serving as a watchdog, advisers and collaborators to guarantee an efficient administrative system. For instance, recently, civil societies have emerged as significant partners in promoting good governance. This

argument is relevant to challenge previous theories that have failed to recognise this emerging subsector as a crucial stakeholder in reform processes.

## **2.5 Institutional Perspective**

From a conceptual viewpoint, Aiyede (2001: p. 4) conceived the meaning of institutional reform as “enduring collections of formal laws and informal rules, norms, customs, code of conduct, and organised practices that shape and govern human interaction”. He alluded to the fact that institutional reform is mostly initiated to improve the workings of institutions. This is, in addition, to foster a dynamic partnership with the private sector and civil society organisations to accelerate the pace of service delivery and improve social responsibility. Aiyede (2001) explained that the essence of institutional reform is to strengthen the way the public sector is managed by tampering with the organisation to enhance performance.

Caiden (2009) recognised institutional reform as a component of administration. This assertion serves as the cornerstone to align/ situate this study within the purview of institutional reform as a component of administrative reform. Since the 1990s, many scholars have studied the concept of institutional reform. These scholars include Hahm and Kim (1999), who revealed the effects of democracy on institutional reform and recognised democracy as a major setback to institutional reform with limited reform outcome. Hahm and Kim affirmed that the issues that characterised the democratic process often hampered successful institutional reforms. In the 2000s, Kunneke (2008) argued for coherency between institutions and technological practice to guarantee suitable electricity infrastructural performance. The work affirmed that in the case of reform in the electricity sector, the institutional structure has over time transformed from a public-driven electricity market to a new paradigm market-driven system.

Nevertheless, innovation and technology that can propel that change remain undaunted. The research submits that the differences between technology and changes in the institutional framework hampered the effective functioning of the electricity sector. Tuozzo (2009) identified several dimensions that have characterised institutional reform approaches: donor-driven designs for project reform, reliance on technical approaches, and restricted forms of decision-making in project initiatives. While commenting on the approach to institutional restructuring that has conditioned domestic reform in Argentina over time, Cuozzo submitted that institutional changes were piecemeal. Cuozzo argued further that the World Bank's approach in Argentina can be traced to robust strategies derived from entrenched institutional practices and philosophical background within the institution that challenged their capacities to promote purposeful reforms. Hook (2009) emphasised that a better understanding of the State's capacities is key to positive reform outcomes, without which the reform exercise is prone to failure.

In addition, the evaluation of alternative policy approaches to policy execution and implementation process was also considered pertinent to achieving desirable reform outcomes. Cheon, Dowall, and Song (2010) investigated the relevance of institutional reforms on the achievement of organisational efficiency between 1991 and 2004. It revealed that ownership restructuring contributed to total factor productivity gains. In another way, Blomquist, Dinar and Kemper (2010) elaborated on the restructuring exercise geared towards devolving resources management to stimulate stakeholders' involvement and improve the effectiveness and sustainability of resources. The study suggests that reform plans should accommodate key stakeholders to guarantee sustainability.

Moreover, attention was shifted to the institutional environment and conceived a reform theory where Tankha, Misal and Fuller (2010) described the institutional environment in

India's power distribution sector. The study was quick to state that the institutional reforms were based on idealised theories which were constrained or stalled by the pitiable institutional environments, a self-serving political orientation that has characterised large infrastructure delivery systems in developing countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that most reforms produced limited outcomes because right from design and implementation, key stakeholders have shown varying interest that can provide valuable and immediate benefits. For a purposeful reform, the work recommended strategic stakeholder analysis and strategic coalition-building in order to avoid rigid positions based on idealised theories. Spanou and Sotiropoulos (2011) compared two distinct reform paths: institutional building and economic management. They observed a high level of variation in the reform implementation and that policy decision on reform and reported that decentralisation was more often than not political than administrative. For instance, institutional reform was considered successful, while economic, managerial reform was otherwise; nonetheless, they reported that reform and modernisation can guarantee the rights of the citizens and improve service delivery.

In the contribution of Mina (2012), he identified various theoretical expositions and approaches to reforming institutions as recognised by Rodrik (2008), this was premised on the context of public management. Mina opined that the best approach comprised strengthening institutional functions. While Sambu and Tarhule (2013) affirmed that despite the reform exercise, access to essential services like water and electricity in Kenya was still limited, and an effort to create equity in access was hindered by the global financial crisis of the 1980s, and the same scenario repeated itself in the 1990s. Pezzola's (2013) study brings to the fore the role of political institutions in any reform agenda. He maintained that what determines reform and policy outcomes depends on a country's political institutions. This invariably explains how political institutions shape government reform outcomes. Willis and Prado (2014) stressed the importance of inclusive reform as

the key to purposeful institutional change. As the method can reinforce the objective of the reform process, Fossetol, Breit, Andreassen, and Klemsdal (2015) explored how public institutions respond to institutional reform. It further yields that political culture and the reform process shape organisation's response to restructuring. Jetschke (2017) elaborated on what motivates institutional reforms in Asia. In short, the study posited that though there are differences in the conventional approach to institutional reforms, as there appears to be a common ground on the underlining reasons for reform in the Asian region. The most recent study by Allen (2018) investigated public sector reform in Uganda, emphasising best practices, laws and structures. Allen admitted that many reform outcomes are limited. He further suggests adjustments in reform agendas to address these limitations and bridge the gaps between what Uganda's system looks like and how it functions. He reiterated that the adjustments must incorporate problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA), which requires Ugandans to work together actively on their reforms, coming to terms with limits and engaging iteratively to find and fit ways to overcome these limits. Such gains, however, produced new forms that function poorly (laws are often not implemented and processes poorly executed). In the light of the above, Rwamigisa, Birner, Mangheni, and Semana (2018) revealed a mismatch and ideological collision on the pattern and method of the reforms as reasons for the limited success of reforms in Uganda. They observed that the exclusion of gradual reform in the initiation, design, and eventual implementation made the reform vulnerable to political capture and created governance problems.

In another perspective, studies have shown increased attention to the factors that often induced institutional reforms. For example, Peters (1990) admitted that in the early 1980s, the intent of reform exercises was primarily hinged on the desire to respond to financial problems occasioned by the volatile world economic system. Subsequently, Peters (1998)

declared that Britain and New Zealand had been recognised as the frontrunner in the new wave of public management reform with concrete intent.

In most of the literature evaluated, there seems to be a common front or direction on what inspired reforms globally, especially in the power sector. For instance, the work of Becon (1995), Czamanski (1999), APERC (2000), Beacon and Besant-Jones (2001), and James et al. (2005, cited in Zhang et al., 2006); and Zhang et al. (2008) are all reference points.

The findings of Fischer et al. (2003) on power sector reform in Chile noted that in the 2000s, the reform intended to engender more investment in the sector through private sector participation. This was achieved through the enactment of a legal framework, establishment of regulatory institutions, which paved the way for privatisation without vertical or horizontal unbundling. In the same way, the World Bank (2005) stressed that two factors facilitated reforms in the power sector in Africa: (i) the urgent need to attract new investments in the sector to enhance the security of supply; and (ii) the desire to meet future demands or projected consumption. But, more importantly, the need to introduce competition, improve financial performance, commercial and technical performance of the public utilities constitute valid reasons for instituting reform exercises. Therefore, it became imperative for state institutions providing mundane services to succumb to holistic reorganisation at this juncture. In addition, the common argument adduced to explain for the power sector reform revolves around persistent rising public expenditure profiles over a particular period. Therefore, states intend to overcome this financial challenge through deliberate public policy (privatisation, corporatisation, and commercialisation), which encourages private sector involvement in delivering social services.

James et al. (2005), as cited in Zhang et al. (2006) aligned with the above argument but shed more light on the forces behind the reform in the power sector. Zhang categorised

the driving force into “*push*” and “*pull*” factors. Among those factors highlighted as push factors are: poor performance of the electricity sector market dominated and monopolised by government-owned institutions, unsteady or unreliable electricity supply, and insufficient electricity supply expansion. According to James et al. (2005) the pull factors entail impressive reform outcomes from the pioneering reorganisation of the power sector in Chile, England and Wales, and Norway in the 1980s and the early 1990s. In addition, it is noteworthy that unrestricted pressure on developing countries for institutional reforms by donor institutions such as the World Bank and (IMF) through aid (condition for financial) cannot be underestimated.

The UNDP/World Bank (2005) highlighted the imperative for reform as an instrument to pave the way for competition in the service delivery chain. They, however, maintain that the intent in most cases is rhetoric than realities as previous experiences revealed that, in reality, there is the need for new investment in the areas of supply security and system upgrade. At the same time, financial, commercial and technical performance (to reduce cost and relieve the strains on public finance) must constitute the core intent of the reform, which overshadows what was assumed to be the initial intent. Similarly, studies on the main reform intents in Tanzania, India, Zimbabwe, Pakistan and Mali also revealed that the restructuring were deliberately targeted at instilling competition, imperative to improve service delivery and institutional performance.

Likewise, Anderson (2006) reported that the intent of power sector reform in Namibia and Mozambique was to reduce public spending, address the rate of inflation, reduce foreign debt and the issue of a budget shortfall. The strategy adopted was the privatisation of state-owned utilities. Joseph (2008) seemed to share the same standpoint with Peters on the evolution of administrative reforms, which saw Britain and New Zealand as the front runners.

## **2.6 Changing the Pattern of Power Delivery**

Corkery (1999), cited in Sangita, (2002) stated that, in the 1990s, both developed and developing nations had, over time, initiated administrative reforms to promote good governance. He pointed out that social variables such as culture, history, socio-political and economic developments were largely responsible for divergent approaches and strategies cross-nationally. To connect administrative reforms with privatisation, the works of Sangita (2002) and Sekwat (2017) were useful because they identify corporatisation, privatisation, and managerial autonomy as part of the underlining principle of administrative reforms.

In the same way, Caiden (1991) opined that socio-economic realities in both developed and developing countries were largely responsible for the reforms in administration. Consequently, Caiden recognised a recent reform approach to cover a wide range of privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation, downsizing, fiscal reform, efficiency and business-like management practices. For this reason, Sangita and Caiden's analyses are relevant to underpin the key activity that accompanied electricity reforms in Nigeria viz; the transition from government dominance to a private sector-driven electricity delivery system.

Convincingly, its basic argument was to guarantee citizens' satisfaction in terms of efficient delivery of goods and services. Suding (1996) and Byrne (1997) suggested that a carefully crafted regulatory framework for the power sector has the potential to advance the public interest in matters of technical, economic, social and environmental complexity. They mentioned further that bringing about a strong regulatory mechanism depends on the quality of decisions taken, which always depend on the quality of the decision-makers and the extent of public awareness and activism.



Upadhyay (2000) acknowledged considerable restructuring exercise in the Indian Power sector in the 2000s. Further insights show that the electricity industry was largely driven by ideological considerations in some developed countries and by a fiscal crisis and power shortages in the middle-income countries. In the same vein, Rajan (2000) posited that from the early 1990s, dramatic changes have been taking place in the structure of the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) worldwide. However, the rationale for electricity sector reform has been different in industrialised and developing countries. To support this argument, Rajan (2000) summarised the factors responsible for instituting reforms into three. The first is the contextual factor which comprises the performance of the utility and the conditionality. In simple terms, it is the primary driver for initiating reforms. The second factor is the trigger factor. This involves the inability of the government to continue to support the utility. It is the determining factor that creates a compelling necessity to undergo restructuring. The last is the facilitating factor. Essentially, it acts as the facilitator for initiating reforms, support of the government, absence of a powerful lobby, and the support of the top management are facilitating factors. Therefore, without any contradiction, Rajan (2000) corroborated with Jamasb et al. (2004) as cited in Zhan et al., (2006); and that of Upadhyay (2000) but failed to shed more lights on vague areas through broad categorisation. The work was mutually reinforced in all ramifications on the underlining reasons for electricity reforms and their variations in the two different systems (industrialised and developing).

Andrews-Speed and Dow (2000) believed that the power industry requires considerable reform as a prerequisite for sustained economic growth. They affirmed that increasing capacity to deliver power, increasing end-user efficiency, and minimising environmental damage should form the main objectives of the power sector reforms. They suggested that concerted attempts should be geared towards restructuring the industry in a manner that will pave the way for fair competition that might set in power generation, distribution as

well as setting up a regulatory institution. In fact, these issues have the potential to be thwarted by a range of vested interests at different levels of government and industry. This viewpoint expressed by Andrews-Speed and Dow (2000) was similar to Manoj's (2002) position, which bolsters the standpoint of the World Bank when he submitted that the immense contribution of the sector to national development could not be overemphasised. Undoubtedly, this accounts for the priority accorded to this sector. The World Bank (2005) concurred with the main argument for the electricity sector to be restructured globally. For instance, it was intended to facilitate an improved and reliable supply of electricity most especially in Africa. Therefore, he emphasised that the ultimate motive for the pressure on the government to restructure lies with the strong conviction that reform exercises are capable of reducing the cost of doing business, improving efficiency, and stimulating growth for small and large-scale enterprises. Aside from that, it is envisaged that this, in turn, translates to a positive impact on people's lives arising from improving socio-economic activities and more job creation.

A study conducted by Sekwat (2017) identified crucial elements of countries' administrative reforms to include: decentralisation, civil service reform, accountability and privatisation. Xu and Chen's (2006) argument supported the government policy to open the electricity market for private participation and a fair competition. Joskow (2008) shared the same understanding with Xu and Chen (2006) when he reported new trends in knowledge development in this direction. More importantly, Lin and Wen (2007) examined the imperatives of power system restoration for ensuring improved power supply to end-users. They noted that restructuring in the power sector had been undertaken worldwide over the years to address new challenges in the electricity market. On another hand, Bel and Fageda (2007) linked the justification for privatisation in the UK to fiscal stress and the desire to reduce cost. Admittedly, the contribution of the power sector to the country's national development cannot be underestimated, most especially,

when development is measured in terms of per capita consumption of electricity, which in turn depends on the electricity generated (Rahi, Thakur, & Chandel, 2008). This is important because when per capita energy consumption is quite low, it amply indicates a fairly low level of industrialisation in the country. Therefore, to address this challenge, there must be a carefully designed implementation framework, organisational reform, and new regulatory schemes as a deliberate attempt to provide intervention and incentives to improve the efficient operation of electricity utilities. They further stressed that reforms are conceived to facilitate competition in the electricity supply industry. Arising from this, there seems to be a consensus on the significant relation between universal access to electricity and economic growth because Rahi, Thakur and Chandel (ibid), likewise UNDP/World Bank (2005), shared the same standpoint on the critical role of the power sector to economic development and shared prosperity.

Christensen et al. (2008) revealed that reform in China was largely motivated by internal influence rather than theoretical expositions or a global paradigm shift on new thinking about public management. A holistic review of previous works unveils that the pattern of reform in China was not entirely different from reform theories adopted in other Western countries. Apart from the content resemblance of administrative reorganisation, the theory, design and character of the reform in China and the Western countries in the last 20 years depicted a corresponding pattern. For example, the externally induced reform has been successfully domesticated into the reform process. Mothusi (2008) noted that Governments throughout the world have embarked on some form of restructuring or realignment of public agencies with the main intention of enhancing productivity and efficiency.

Rosnes and Shkaratan (2011) sustained the previous arguments that power reforms have been pervasive in Africa like in the other continents. It is observed that the cardinal

objectives involve creating healthy competition in the market hitherto monopolised, reducing strain on the public budget, and enhancing the performance of the publicly-owned facilities. Not only that, other processes must follow, such as the enactment of a legal framework, establishing regulatory institutions to pave the way for private sector participation in the form of privatisation or other restructuring patterns considered as the best option. This seeks to usher in the desire for significant government intervention to attain the ultimate change objective (DECC, 2012).

The studies by Nepal and Jamasb (2012) emphasised vertical separation or unbundling. This model was premised on the belief that monopolising the electricity supply industry limits delivery capacity, as competition is required to facilitate efficient and quality services (Joskow, 2006, as cited in Nepal & Jamasb, 2012).

Nepal and Jamasb recognised the need for the pivotal contribution of the private sector as a key player in the industry. They were convinced that the private sector possessed the capacity for better distribution and utilisation of dwindling resources for purposeful service delivery. This argument seems to support the passive role of the government in terms of electricity delivery. They suggested a paradigm shift to the privatisation of state utilities to disentangle monopoly in the sector. The viewpoint expressed in the report by Beant-Jones (2006), as cited in Rosnes and Shkaratan (2011) on power sector reform was not entirely different from other works evaluated but only suggested that restructuring in the power industry to facilitate competition be narrowed to states that are large enough to accommodate multiple generating operation at an efficient scale.

In what appears to be a clear attestation, Oluseyi, Akinbulire and Awosope (2012) agreed with previous viewpoints expressed by scholars on the nexus between the electricity industry and national development. They affirmed that the idea behind the reforms in the industry was to open a lot of opportunities for potential investors. It is not an

understatement to say that the high volume of the literature on reforms in the electricity industry cross-nationally is a veritable pointer to the strategic nature of this sector. Analysis conducted by Balza, Jimenez and Mercado (2013) underscored the relationship between institutional reforms, active private sector participation and performance. The trio discovered that irrespective of the level of private sector participation, stable and well-designed institutions are vital requirements for improving electricity sector performance.

From empirical perspectives, since the 1970s, many writers have evaluated the electricity sector reforms in developing economies; among whom are Bergara et al. (1998), Drillisih and Reichmann (1998), Zellner and Henisz (2000), Wolak (2000), Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), Ruffin (2003), Jamasb et al. (2004) and Rosnes and Shkaratan (2011).

The works of Holborn (2001) and Zhang et al. (2002) also subscribed to the writing of the scholars mentioned above. Jamsab stressed that there are substantial empirical evidence and documented cases of electricity reorganisation in Ukraine, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, Peru, and the Philippines with variations in the reform outcomes.

Johnson (1992) analysed private investments in the power industry in the 1990s to accelerate economic development. This improvement was facilitated by the market-driven policies occasioned by the reforms but came with undesirable side-effects in the power industry. Similarly, Flavin elaborated on restructuring, which occurred in the Electric-Power Industry. They opined that in the future, most of the vertically integrated utilities might possibly be reorganised and managed separately to engender efficiency. Notably, a new paradigm was driven towards deregulation and transformation under the transformation agenda to produce quality service.

From another perspective, Byrne (1997) analysed the power sector reforms in India, affirming that a carefully drafted regulatory framework for the power sector is capable of promoting public interest on issues of environmental, technical, social and economic complexity. Haugland, Ingeberg and Roland (1997) explored the World Bank as a facilitator of reforms in the power sector. Haugland, Ingeberg, and Roland asserted that the report on the assistance significantly impacted on four countries as against other developing countries since the 1980s.

In a broader sense, this might be responsible for increasing the World Bank's geographical operational areas, thereby promoting reforms to support improved service delivery in countries with low electricity access. Andrews-Speed and Dow (2000) agreed that a substantial reform in the power industry was required to sustain economic growth in the 2000s. However, evidence revealed that what was conspicuously missing was a clear reform objective, which should entail an attempt to increase the capacity of power utilities to deliver improved service, ascertaining the constrained cost, promoting the efficiency of end-users and reducing ecological destruction. Furthermore, it is believed that this issue of competition and viable regulatory framework, if not adequately addressed, has a great potential to thwart efficient and effective service delivery in the industry.

Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) evaluated the transition from a government monopolised system to a liberalised and privatised power sector in less developed countries (LDCs). They declared that available data suggest that reform intervention had immensely impacted positively on electricity coverage and stability. Similar to Bacon and Besant-Jones, Turkson and Wohlgemuth (2001) analysed the power sector reforms in sub-Saharan Africa. They found a common objective for adopting liberalisation and restructuring of the power sector industry amongst countries in the sub-region. Admittedly, the work noted that it became highly imperative for countries to institute

reform as a strategy to facilitate improved access to electricity by the huge segments of the population.

Kayo (2002) enumerated the challenges confronting the electricity sector in Zimbabwe to include: inadequate revenue to finance new electricity infrastructures and deteriorated state of operational performance. As a result, government intervention to open the electricity market for private sector investment became important to increase the participation of local private investors. He noted that this remains a key issue that must not be underestimated. In addition, the government must put in place machinery to create incentives for more participation. The available literature on power sector reforms in Africa revealed that the underlining reasons, behind power sector reforms, were rarely queried by their decision-makers (Karekezi & Kimani, 2002). This shows that reform decisions on power sector reform were most often accepted without hesitation and preceded by focusing on measures that can fast-track the reform process.

Consequently, Karekezi and Kimani, believe this scenario undermines the possibilities of developing concrete and cogent alternative ideas capable of addressing regional characteristics and institutional and managerial peculiarities. It was found that reforms have immensely accelerated the capacity of electricity generation and at the same time improve the financial capacity of state utilities. Interestingly, it affirms that an increase in local participation for power sector reform is significantly linked to increased electrification to the poor.

Kennedy (2002) identified Kazakhstan as a front runner in the power sector reforms among the countries under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) with an adopted partial theory of privatisation and liberalisation. Notwithstanding, the sector is still characterised by a series of reform challenges in its privatisation and regulation process, likewise market competition. He further

recommended the privatisation of the remaining distribution units as a strategy to mobilise more funds. In turn, he anticipated a lot of gains from regulatory changes, promoting regulatory autonomy, and altering regulatory rules to enhance risk allocation and reinforcing incentives. Teferra (2002) analysed access to electricity in Ethiopia and found the sector to be more attractive compared to private sector participation. Although comparison of demographic data shows that access to electricity favour urban inhabitants against rural and small-town dwellers.

Evidence from literature also shows that an adequate legal and regulatory framework largely determines the willingness of private sector investment in the industry. Petrecolla and Romero (2003) examined radical deregulation and liberalisation approach to electricity sector delivery in Argentina. They discovered negative effects of the radical approach adopted in the deregulation, thus raised concern that countries with similar energy crisis need to exercise caution before applying this pattern. Alternatively, Wamukonya (2003) confirmed that there is a mismatch in the process of power sector reforms in developing countries. He asserted that the restructuring of the power industry in developing countries was adopted as a deliberate action to redress the electricity deficit. He noted that the justification for the reform seems to be overwhelmingly supported by key actors. The justification for the reform, the reform model and the process were, however heavily queried by player in the field. Although reform still fails to achieve part of its set goals attributable to social and economic challenges, it has, for the time being, produced positive outcomes as designed when subjected to verifiable performance indices. Therefore, the paradigm of the reform process must be shifted to address development pathways.

Park and Moon (2004) acknowledged the rapid facelift in the Korean electric power industry regarding structure arising from privatisation and deregulation exercise, which



assumed a global phenomenon. Interestingly, substantial success was recorded in the electricity supply. This was due to the adopted free-market competition and the concerted efforts on improved investment. To corroborate this and other previous submissions, Weisser (2004) maintained that, persistent agitations for improved electricity services forced government in developing countries to embark on power sector reforms. Therefore, what became vague was a lack of conviction on whether reform option could deliver the best-desired result. On the contrary, evidence from this work discourages the full privatisation of power utilities.

The empirical analysis conducted by Alam, Kabir, Rahman and Chowdhury's (2004) revealed that, since independence, several electricity reforms in Bangladesh have failed to bring the desired improvement. This is because the three units: generation, transmission and distribution, were still characterised by heavy system loss and poor collection performance. The review offers more insight that the distribution system seldom got the priority in the reform initiatives. Therefore, the envisaged benefits from the reforms will be difficult while leaving out part of the strategic component (distribution system). This aptly implies that priority in reform must be given to the distribution as well as other critical units. Like other scholars, Bacauskas and Bikulcius (2004) alluded to the poor state of electricity supply in Lithuania that the structure of the Lithuanian power industry and the market regulatory mechanism were not in order. A similar concern was raised when they maintained that the electricity market in the country was becoming inefficient, and it became imperative for actors in the power sector to develop proactive strategies for an efficient electricity market. Trivedi and Bhatt (2005) provided insight into situations that led to the unbundling of the power sector in most developing countries. Ayamolowo *et al.* (2019) attributed these problems to the existing large gap between electricity demand and generation, inadequate transmission infrastructure, poor distribution network, and poor revenue drive. Furthermore, a comparative analysis found that

electricity reforms in India were successful, while in Orissa, the deregulation exercise was considered a failure. Similarly, Jannuzzi (2005) recognised substantial changes in the Brazilian power through privatisation, establishing regulatory institutions, and creating opportunity for fair competition. It was further declared that regulatory measures assisted in promoting public interest and helped to enhance concerted efforts to promote efficient energy and investment in the sector. Moreover, having explained the process of change and the aftermath, the study suggests increased commitment by developing countries to meet energy demand suitable for domestic consumption.

Ikeme and Ebohon (2005) deliberated on the relevance of electric power sector reform to the actualisation of poverty reduction drives and economic development strides. Apparently, that signifies a clear justification for instituting the reform programme by the government through the privatisation of the state Utility Company. The study submits that efforts should be channelled towards the corporatisation of the electric power industry, with the ultimate intention to accelerate improved access and delivery. Additionally, Ikeme and Ebohon (2005), Byabortta, Lahiri, Chowdhury and Banerjee (2005) stressed that the modern power industry reorganisation had paved the way for a new mechanism of electricity market occasioned by the New Indian Electricity Act. It is noteworthy that the migration took cognisance of the viewpoint of notable leading electricity market models that had been successful in other parts of the world, which can be conveniently harmonised with local issues and the country's peculiarities. Andersson (2006) affirmed that the power sector had changed from a centralised organisation and public-dominated ownership to the new ownership of power utilities to vertical "unbundling," private management/control, government regulation and progressive competition among service providers. This position was also aligned with previous studies on what motivates the reforms, that is, to facilitate competition in terms of electricity transmission and distribution.

Zobaa and Naidoo (2006) in their analysis showed that energy development and distribution in the continent had remained highly uneven. Previous studies have admitted that countries in Africa, like other continents in the world, have positively responded to the global paradigm shift in the power sector delivery system. However, insight into the reform agenda in Africa as evidenced in this work revealed that the much-expected benefit of the reform has not been realised. Therefore, it is pertinent to evaluate past shortcomings and build on past experiences when initiating future reform programmes. Singh (2006) established that the persistent commercial leakages and unstained subsidy regime, which have hindered efficient electricity supply in India were largely responsible for the reforms. This argument to justify the restructuring programme was due to the poor investment that fell short of consumers' demand (growing demand).

In what appears to be a similar evaluation, Sakri, Nagabhushan and Khaparde (2006) elaborated on power sector reforms in Karnataka. This work fully subscribed to Singh's (2006) analysis of the power sector, which was also conducted in India. What is responsible for the similarity might not be unconnected with the same study contents and geographical area. But, it added that the unbundling of the State Electricity Board (SEB) and the establishment of regulatory institutions influenced accelerated power development initiatives. Palamarchuk and Voropai (2006) examined the Russian power industry alongside its radical approach to structural and managerial reformations. What must be noted here is the varying approach to cross-national reforms. For instance, Japanese electricity reform undertook a gradual process of change as in the case of Russia, whose reformation exercise was radical. Kurihara (2006) assessed the stages of the electric power industry restructuring in Japan. He suggested that evaluation of reform exercise must be conducted with caution, as some assessment might be too early but noted that the result of the Japanese power sector reform is being felt gradually.

Bajaj and Sharma (2006) investigated whether power sector reforms had addressed the vital issues and challenges that confronted the Indian sector. They discovered varying degrees of success in the various federating states after full implementation of the reform template between 1991-2005. Hammons, Barroso, and Rudnick (2006) showed that government transformation programmes in the sector occasioned increasing interaction between government agencies and the power sector. They further emphasised that the state's policy plays a significant role in the regulation and liberalisation of the industry. The study suggests a strong regulatory framework to maintain fair competition and enviable market sanity in the industry.

Zhong and Kang (2007) found that after the power sector unbundling, the system's reliability had increased drastically and guaranteed reliable operation in the restructured power system. In other words, Won's (2007) evaluation revealed an increase in return on equity, a significant increase in interest and performance now than before restructuring. He attributed the positive reform outcomes to improved financial inflow into the electricity industry. The analysis conducted by Mehta, Rao, and Terway (2007) linked progress achieved in the power sector to structural changes implemented in the selected Central Asian region. They recognised the underlining justification for the reform, which entails improving the transparency of operations of power utilities, and improving incentives for distribution companies to enhance their operational performance. In view of this achievements, more structural reforms were advocated in the other sector of the economy. Mwasumbi and Tzoneva (2007) agreed that Tanzania had faced electricity problems that negatively impacted their socio-economic activities and the environment. They further affirmed that institutional efforts and capabilities had produced limited results; therefore, promoting an alternative energy source has become imperative.

In another perspective, Mursitojati, Ozveren, and King's (2007) work to elaborate on emerging issues in the post-reform era include generation adequacy, market design, transmission operation, regulation, and retail competition. Obviously, these have been recognised as a key determinant on the success or failure of a particular reform process. In the same manner, Bhattacharyya (2007) acknowledged a series of electric power sector reforms introduced in South Asia, but unfortunately, the much-expected progress so far has not been realised. For instance, the region barely had a notable case(s) or instance(s) of a successful reform programme in the power industry. He further summarised the factors that contributed to the limited reform outcomes, which include: poor overall acceptance, slow adaptation, instability of rule-makers, slow adaptation and poor transition management.

In the same manner, Ouda (2008) maintained that pieces of literature evaluated also confirmed variations in the result of power sector reform cross-nationally but agreed that there is consensus on what constitutes the cardinal objective of the reform, that is, to improve the economic efficiency of the institutions. This is to be achieved through various interventions and initiatives such as private capital formation, liberalisation of the power market, and an autonomous institutional regulatory framework. From the works of Andersson and Ouda, it became clear that there was no ambiguity whatsoever on modalities to achieve reform objectives and the anticipated benefit from the institutionalised reform with privatisation, promotion of competition and strengthening governmental regulation of monopoly. However, they referred to issues raised above as the ingredients of purposeful reforms, noting that successful execution of government sector reforms demands collective actions and proactive efforts by several different parties.

Ouda found the reforms in New Zealand to be a successful exercise and suggested that positive reform outcome requires a crystallised programme integrated as a whole, and the pieces must be linked together. Pieces of evidence from Ouda's study show that international experience has revealed that some governments have successfully put the pieces together reasonably, while others failed. Notably, internal coherency and consistency were also considered an essential conceptual framework that is capable of facilitating a swift implementation process.

Arising from this work, available literature indicates that states of electricity sector reforms, most especially in emerging economies, reveal a considerable number of government efforts to reinvigorate the sector with a common cardinal objective to improve efficiency and ensure fair pricing. At the same time, the studies identified privatisation as the most common pattern of electricity sector reforms in the country studied (Pollitt, 2007). As evidenced in the public management writings (Jamash et al., 2005; Andersson, 2004; Pollitt, 2007) notably amongst scholars whose works have focused on electricity reforms in the developing nations and South-East Europe to develop a theoretical base to engender result-oriented reform outcomes in the electricity sector.

Gratwick and Eberhard (2008) rightly mentioned the gradual demise of the standard theory of power sector reform. The study brings the account of continuous pressure on developing countries to unbundle their electricity industries and ensure private sector participation and competition. The study of Gratwick and Eberhard revealed that no specific theory had been accepted in developing nations even after 15 years of reform exercises in developing countries. Ekeh's (2008) study revealed that the motivations for reforms are to attain improved service, fair competition and reliable services. Ekeh's work

drew attention to the opportunities and challenges of restructuring electric service in a depressed economic system like Nigeria.

The author maintained that the lack of stable power supply had driven many entrepreneurs out of business and made it difficult to create jobs for teeming graduates. For the country to achieve a great feat in uninterrupted electricity supply, the study suggested that greater action should be put in place to increase indigenous private sector participation, appropriate policy framework, affordable tariff regime, and provision of adequate security for the electricity infrastructures.

An empirical study conducted by Wara, Abayomi-Alli, Umo, Oghogho and Odikayor (2009) to assess the effects of the Nigerian power sector reforms indicates a failure of the reform to improve power supply. It suggested that power infrastructures should be rehabilitated in a guided manner to allow the participation of core investors.

Mathavan (2009) acknowledged the successes and challenges that have characterised the reform exercises, which extended the electricity market for foreign investment and more private participation. Similarly, Gboney, Cubbin and Dassiou (2009) recognised the vital contributions of the private sector participation and involvement of independent power producers. They suggested that regulatory institutions should be established at least three years before the privatisation of generation units. Yadav, Padhy and Gupta's (2010) investigation acknowledged the gradual transformation from a regulated electricity market to a deregulated system to engender efficiency and improve performance. It is noteworthy that the new paradigm was anchored on increased private sector participation, hence productive competition in electricity delivery. The Indian electricity reform pattern has remained a model for most countries in Asia, which have, over the years, restructured the power industry to policy and regulatory system to increase economic performance.

In what appears to be a contradictory result, Totare and Pandit (2010) identified the lack of fund and commercial inefficiency to be the major driver of the reform in the early 1990s. It is imperative to note that the State utility company has passed through various stages in the process of restructuring the utilities. As practised by other reforming countries, the Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) introduced reforms in 2005 by unbundling the State utility companies into four. The study reported the achievement of an enviable milestone in the post-reform exercise. The analysis of Skyner (2010) differentiated between rhetoric and reality in the reform patterns. It revealed that the sectors that had been vertically integrated were disaggregated and privatised to create fair completion. Notwithstanding, it succeeded in revealing structural weakness and the existence of a financial crisis.

Nagayama's (2010) study revealed that crucial efforts to attain reliable electricity were facilitated by the establishment of regulatory agencies, unbundling of generation and transmission units and liberalisation, which allows the participation of independent power producers (IPPs). The study suggests that the diversities of countries in economic activities have directly shaped the varying electric industry's reform, as the level of sectoral performance largely depends on reform policy and independent regulatory institutions. Nepal and Jamasb (2012) attributed ineffective power sector reforms to the failure of inter-sectoral harmonisation. They further affirmed that appropriate inter-sectoral reform synchronises the key to a successful power in developing countries.

Considerable reform processes have been undertaken in the electricity industry in the last three decades globally (Erdogdu, 2014). Erdogdu posited further that the main driving force was to facilitate private investment in the electricity delivery value chain, promote reliable electricity supply and ensure that the operation of the electricity industry is in compliance with the tenets of sustainable development.



Moreover, he suggested that the low private sector investment in the electricity supply has triggered the enviable improvement achieved towards electricity market reform. In recent years, in spite of the obstacles, the reform has achieved a modest level of success, and the power sector reform pattern now adjudged a model for all developing States in the small islands in the Pacific. This study asserts that achieving success in a hostile political environment cannot be guaranteed because it requires time, though tough and challenging, but achievable. Therefore, it further suggests greater attention be directed towards political drivers behind reform to harmonise political motives that perhaps shape the power sector reform.

Valitov, Myznikova and Bannikova (2015) evaluated the performance of power industry reorganisation. Indication emerged from his work that loss of power during transmission remains the main setback for anticipated economic growth and development. Analysis of methodology and approaches to power sector modernisation reveals the neglect of externalities that affect industry performance and reforms. Potluri and Abikayeva (2015) reported dramatic changes in all facets of the Kazakh power industry. Moreover, it was found to have immensely contributed to the country's economic development in the last two and a half decades.

Salgotra and Verma's (2016) inquiry recognised the dominance of Indian's economic policy discourse on independent power regulatory framework, unbundling of State utilities, and subsequent privatisation of State utilities to promote efficiency. It became apparent that the unbundling of vertically integrated utilities had to be disaggregated to pave the way for genuine private investors in the three electricity units. As the reform was conceived to alleviate the restrictions that hitherto characterised the reform process, the study suggested a re-examination of the power sector reform process to ascertain the efficiency of the reforms attaining the set objectives.

Khan, Thopil and Lalk (2016) asserted that despite the trends in global restructuring, the electricity supply remains a vertically integrated monopoly in South Africa. As evident in the study, several attempts to increase electricity have been stalled by the monopolistic nature of electricity supply. The investigation found that improvement in some specific aspects of the electricity industry were largely influenced by techno-economic industrialisation and policies in the apartheid era. What remains unique in the reform was the retention of a vertically integrated electricity system, even after transformation. This research suggests that though restructuring the electricity supply industry will not guarantee the reduction of electricity tariff, it seeks to enhance system efficiencies, economic performance, and promote private sector participation.

Cheng and Urpelainen's (2015) inquiry elaborated on the varying uncertainties that have characterised economic reform programmes as they often generate winners and losers. It, however, maintained that over the years, empirical works had devoted less attention to the group of silent citizens (indifference) in any research activity. For instance, a survey on electricity privatisation in rural India revealed that inefficiency has much larger effects on rural livelihood. Therefore, the basic yes or no survey questions cannot appropriately form a good opinion. Similarly, the lack of adequate information often creates wider opposition to reform agendas. Urpelainen and Yang's (2017) study sustained earlier arguments on the significance of good infrastructure for economic growth. In the same vein, the research reiterated the importance of viable legislation as a catalyst to increase private sector investment in electricity delivery. From the analysis of variables in developing countries, it is worthy of note that positive results can be derived from reforms supported by strong political will and policies.

Agrawal, Kumar and Rao's (2017) work aligned with previous positions emphasising the lack of significant structural changes, which resulted in the poor state of electricity

delivery in India. Despite the reform, the sector continues to struggle with persistent power shortage and the challenge of private sector participation. The study affirms that the legal framework has not adequately addressed some critical issues: funding of distribution utilities, and infrastructural decay. The research recommended a third generation of reforms to address challenges plaguing the distribution units to achieve efficiency in power delivery.

Ullah, Arentsen, and Lovett's (2017) recent review revealed the poor and inefficient state of electricity supply in Pakistan. It was evident from the inquiry that the reform introduced in the 1990s aimed at improving the sector made no significant impact because of the slow progress and performance. Further analysis reveals that weak governance structure, sectoral endowment, inefficient regulator, unfriendly political context and unspecific political institutions largely contributed to the failure of the power sector reform. Part of this finding was similar to what the study of McCulloch et al. (2017) revealed. Therefore, the need for a vibrant institutional mechanism capable of supporting a market-based power supply was strongly recommended. An inclusive stakeholders' engagement and contractual agreement to reduce opportunistic behaviour were equally recommended.

In the same manner, Owusu-Manu, Parn, Kutin-Mensah, and Edwards's (2018) investigated the impact of power sector investment in developing economy of Ghana. The study is unique because it evaluates power sector reforms from where it unveils the lacuna between the attainment of policy objectives and policy execution. Urpelainen, Yang and Liu's (2018) analyses indicated that the reform outcomes from privatisation often fell short of expectation. This invariably lessens the anticipated landmark reform outcome. Apparently, reform decision seems to serve as a viable platform to address challenges militating against economic growth.

Godinho and Eberhard (2019) in their study on electricity reform in Kenya revealed substantial improvement in operational efficiency and increasing private sector participation. Kenya adopted partial privatisation, which suggests the pivotal role of state investment in the sector. In the same manner, Meyer, Eberhard, and Gratwick's (2018) study revealed early adoption of power sector reform and private participation in electricity investment in the African region. What became paramount in the research was the careful identification of the main drivers of reforms, the reform processes, and the established institutional framework(s) which shaped the pattern of Ugandan's reform. The study suggests policy instruments that hope to create a favourable environment for the private sector's participation in the electricity industry.

#### **2.6.1 Strategies for Reducing Government's Roles in Power Delivery**

Many scholars have deliberated on the rationale for reducing the size of government (Sheshinki & Lopez-Calva, 2003). It was mentioned in Chapter 1 of this work that reforms can be conducted in various forms: rationalisation, rightsizing/downsizing, privatisation or unbundling. In the light of this, the studies under review indicated that many scholars consented to privatisation as part of the strategy and as a common phenomenon to both developed and developing countries (Besant-Jones & Hoskote, 1995). Deoliveira and Mackerron (1992) posited that unfavourable economic crisis and poor performance were largely the main justifications for the reduction in the size of government in the 1990s, hence privatisation as a reform strategy in developing countries.

From another perspective, Friedländer *et al.* (2021) argued that the selfish behaviour of bureaucrats, political actors, powerful interest groups and inappropriate pricing were part of the justification for privatisation. Manning (2019) summarised two reasons for privatisation globally: to promote efficiency and to raise revenue. Notably, the privatisation strategy was mostly championed by the World Bank to reposition the

electricity system in the affected countries (Wamukonya, 2005; Gore et al., 2019). The reform initiative was hinged on the conviction that public fund was inadequate for electricity financing; therefore, private capital was needed to revamp the sector for optimum performance. In the same way, Tenenbaum, Lock, and Barker (1992) stressed that the paradigm shift to the privatisation of public utilities has emerged as one of the landmarks of political and economic issues in the decade. They emphasised a purposeful regulatory framework, proper structure and fair competition as an important factor for the lasting success of the initiatives.

Ranganathan (1993) shared the same viewpoint with Tenenbaum, Lock, and Barker when he argued that developing nations embraced the privatisation initiative to support public resources, whether local or foreign, induced by the World Bank as a definite strategy to stimulate efficiency. In another perspective, Bacon (1995) discussed the privatisation of electricity supply and suggested the separation of electricity companies hitherto integrated. Ranganathan's (1996) study sheds more light on the deregulation-privatisation of the electricity system. He affirmed the great misconception on market competition within the electricity supply systems. Ranganathan (1996) reemphasised that many reasons have been adduced for privatisation initiative, the most cogent amongst them is the need to relieve the government of high public expenditure arising from economic downturn, the inefficiency of public utilities, citizens' agitation for better services and the promotion of a fair competition.

Parker (1997) agreed that power sector reform has succeeded in reducing the public expenditure profile on electricity service providers and other utilities. Al-Alawi's (1998) analysis aligned with the positions of previous scholars (Deoliveira & Mackerron, 1992; Tenenbaum, Lock & Barker 1992; Ranganathan 1993) on what constitutes the main objective of electricity reforms in many countries, most especially, the developing

countries. Al-Alawi's standpoint reinforced earlier held opinions that privatisation was ultimately instituted to ease the government's financial burden. This invariably implies that there is a consensus that the government is financially overwhelmed and is failing in terms of efficient service delivery, hence the need for privatisation. Alongside this argument, Dorfman and Harel (2021) agreed that the basic justification for privatisation was centred on the efficient provision of quality goods and services to the populace. Friedländer *et al.* (2021) agreed that the inefficiency of state institutions was responsible for privatisation. However, Al-Alawi questioned the rush to the privatisation of public entities. Evidence from the review indicates that this might be the reason why he stated that the privatisation drive had been characterised by various impediments that have limited the achievements of its goals in many countries. Other things recognised as critical to the privatisation process include: political, social environment likewise management, tariff and employee. Plane (1999) discussed the privatisation of electricity supply in Cote d'Ivoire. While consenting to the economic benefit of privatisation, he stressed that the institutional overhaul had stimulated improved efficiency as against the pre-privatisation era. In the year 2000, privatisation programmes largely gained prominence as one of the fundamental components of the structural reform programmes globally (Sheshinki & Lopez-Calva, 2003). This was largely due to the growing agitation for a lesser role for the government in the delivery of essential services championed by Smith (1776), as cited in Sheshinki & Lopez-Calva (2003).

The work reaffirmed giant strides made by scholars who offer theoretical arguments to support the need to increase the private sector's participation in the economy, starting from the macroeconomic perspective, which sees privatisation as a mechanism for enhancing revenue generation (Hadizadeh, 2010). The new thinking on the minimal role for government became prominent during the era of the industrial revolution in the second half of the 18th century. Literature has vividly reported the writings of the classical

economist, Smith, as a strong voice in support of a free-market economy, and the works of Heeks, an advocate of the laissez-faire policy, who canvassed for non-government interference in the economy.

The notion that supports privatisation is also rooted in normative perspectives, which directly relates to the microeconomic activities of government: that is, deliberate efforts to reduce the size of public finance, i.e., reduce borrowing (debt profile). Generally, power sector reorganisation within the realm of public sector management has been understood as a series of steps and deliberate action that move verticality-integrated utilities towards breaking the monopoly. Hitherto, this was enjoyed by state-owned institutions to pave the way for the competition, which might occur either as restructuring/unbundling, divestiture, corporatisation (Adamantiades, Besant-Jones & Hoskote, 1995; Bacon, 1999; Besant-Jones, 2006; Gratwick & Eberhard, 2008; Williams & Ghanadan, 2006; cited in Rene et al., 2018).

From the viewpoint of Joseph (2008), privatisation and commercialisation of institutions hitherto owned by the government have been acknowledged as the most contemporary pattern of reforms in developing countries. In his submission, Joseph maintained that Africa and other parts of the world had embraced privatisation and commercialisation as pivotal instruments to facilitate market-oriented approaches to attain the desired economic development. In the same manner, he reiterated that privatisation and commercialisation have remained an integral part of administrative reforms in the former welfare centrally planned societies, developing national and post-industrial countries. Amongst the countries that began public sector reorganisation in the earlier era was the UK and New Zealand. Since then, many countries have instituted one reform or the other either with success or failures.

Empirical studies on privatisation have spanned over decades. Friedländer *et al.* (2021) noted that the effect of empirical studies on privatisation suggests mixed result. From the early 1990s, many scholars have made concerted efforts to expand the horizon on knowledge in this field. Amongst them is Bradburd (1995), who analysed public enterprise reorganisation and regulation for better performance. His work highlighted the main purpose of privatisation of public utilities: poor performance, financial loss, the dire need to create a favourable environment for investment, and the failure to meet contemporary citizens' demand for better service. Given these purposes, his work reiterated that it became inevitable for governments to change the service delivery model from a full government monopoly to a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement.

Similarly, Wood and Kodwani's (1997) work was aligned with the global trend on the privatisation of public enterprises. They contended that India followed the paradigm shift to public sector liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation as a policy option to re-energise the ailing public utilities. Among the critical issues that attracted some scepticism were the reform model (pattern), process, duration, and appropriate time for the reform. As the significance of electricity sector reforms to improve economic development cannot be downplayed, Indian electricity reform drew considerable lessons from the British model of energy reform.

In the year 2000, several studies reported wider adoption of this reform strategy because most of the states in developing countries had undertaken various patterns of privatisation in the area of power generation and distribution in Chile, Argentina, Philippines, Turkey, Mexico, Thailand, Venezuela, Malaysia and Korea (Farazmand, 2001). Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) stated that the privatisation and liberalisation of public enterprises were key to the power sector transformation in developing countries. This assertion points



to a common factor that stimulates the power sector reform in most developing countries: the underperformance of the state utilities and the high cost of management. Also mentioned is the limited access to electricity service, epileptic supply, poor funding, desire to attract more investments and reduced government expenditure burden. The study submits that power reform can facilitate the expected transformation in the industry but suggests that government and electricity regulators need to be wary of unexpected challenges that are likely to predate the adoption of radical reforms such as down-sizing of the workforce, unproductivity, citizens' dissatisfaction and pruning the amount of subsidy. The study of Nancy and John (2003) observed that there was a stalemate in the privatisation programme in Mexico because of the criticism and public outcry that greeted the exercise. Similarly, it further unveiled strong scepticism and apprehension on the multiplier effect of the privatisation exercise against the fundamental objective of the state principle. Sarker (2007) investigated the appropriateness of privatisation as a measure to revive the ailing and dying state enterprise. The evaluation unveils what appears to be scepticism about privatisation. It is instructive to note that against the government's expectation, the action failed to produce a purposeful result.

In the same way, Vlah, Soric, and Rosenzweig (2008) maintained that a key determinant of a successful privatisation programme lies in the ability of the government to select good core investors. In addition, the selection of the core investors must be done through competitive bidding, adherence to due diligent principle, and developing a decision-support process developed by Vlah et al. (2008). Zhang (2008) stressed that the nature of relations that exists amongst the stakeholders determines the level of involvement in reform decisions and hence reform outcomes. Arguably, the manner of relations between the government and people determines the acceptance and outcomes of reforms. This assertion aptly implies that greater participation in the reform process shows acceptance, ownership and builds more confidence, which influences the success of the reform or

otherwise. Okpanachi and Obutte (2015) appraised the progress of public enterprises privatisation in Nigeria since 1999. Against the backdrop of high expectations and enthusiasm that greeted the programme, the outcome was considered a colossal failure. Empirical works affirmed that what stimulated the privatisation programme, efficiency, and improved customer satisfaction has not been achieved. Studies have equally identified the factors that hampered the programme's success to include: weak regulatory framework, weak institutional structure, adoption of foreign ideology and elite's hijack, for example, the attitude of the self-centred political and economic elites (Friedländer *et al.*, 2021).

Wesanga (2017), as cited in Rene *et al.*, (2018), described the state of the power sector delivery system in Uganda before the sectoral reform and expressed a disappointing view. The investigation revealed that the sector had been marred with underperformance, mismanagement, under finance and poor service delivery. However, Wesanga raised a serious concern about the uncertainty of the reform after seven years of its execution. According to Rene *et al.* (2018), privatisation in developing countries has proved to be challenging and most likely to generate unexpected outcomes. They further maintained that privatisation is always accompanied by its controversies. Notwithstanding the various misconceptions and ambiguities inherent in privatisation programme, there seems to be a consensus on what constitutes the rationale for or cardinal objective of privatisation programme anywhere. The objective is to engender and instil efficiency, improving service quality, streamlining expansive public sector, reducing government borrowing, widening share ownership, and enhancing competition in the whole economy. The following scholars, amongst others, are proponents of this standpoint (Pitelis &

Clarke, 1993; Asmeron, 1994; Farazmand, 2000; Zhang *et al.*, 2002; Jamasb *et al.*, 2004; Mota, 2004; Friedländer *et al.*, 2021).

### **2.6.2 Challenges of Service Delivery and Citizens' Satisfaction**

Since the 1980s, several studies have been carried out on the restructuring and reforming of public institutions in developed and developing countries. Kelly (1988), Kettl (1997), Thiel and Leeuw (2002) noted that it was during the late 1970s and the early 1980s that people who were looking for a better future started to assert that government and businesses needed to be more efficient. The agitation for a paradigm shift emanated from the observation that public sector agencies were failing to meet the needs and demands of the citizens. Scholars have made several attempts to justify the necessities for improved service delivery. Notable amongst the writers include Bateson (1979), Hoffman and Beteson (1997), Gronroos (1989), Kotler and Keller (2009) who supported the works of Kimenyi and Shughart (2006), and reported that the quality of public service delivery could be measured on dimensions such as access, affordability, appropriateness, effectiveness and timeliness. The study, argued further that the extent to which the delivery of service meets the customers' expectations and satisfaction is referred to as service quality, and researchers have made numerous attempts to measure this using various parameters. Ali, Olley, and Cotton (1999) investigated the states of service delivery in India in the 1990s. They acknowledged public sector institutions as a key stakeholder in service delivery. Aside from public institutions, recent realities have unveiled the need to promote good synergy among inter-agencies now that the private sector and non-governmental organisations play active roles in the delivery of services to the citizens.

Bardhan (2004) affirmed that in broad terms, institutional context differs when compared with service delivery in developing and developed societies in the 2000s. And

that most of the review on the existing theoretical and empirical works were focused particularly on the question of local accountability. Similarly, studies by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), Jamasb et al. (2004), and Overman (2013) raised concerns that despite the tremendous efforts and resources allocated to reforms, little progress has been made.

Many African countries have not come close to their goal of developing and transforming their societies to the same standard as the developed countries. Therkildsen's (2001) study strongly lent support to the cardinal objective of every reform agenda (improve efficiency) by emphasising the issue of efficient service provision, which became the overriding aim of public sector reform in most African countries, as it is the ultimate goal of reform efforts. The apprehension by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000), Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), Jamsab et al. (2004) and Overman (2013) also resurfaced in Jones and Kettl's study (2003, p. 23) who stated that:

“Critics have alleged that governments are inefficient, ineffective, too large, too costly, overly bureaucratic, overburdened by unnecessary rules, unresponsive to public wants and needs, secretive, undemocratic, invasive into the private rights of citizens, self-serving, and failing in the provision of either the quantity or quality of services deserved by the taxpaying public.”

Banerjee et al. (2007) reported the critical problems that have characterised public goods provision in developing societies which amongst others include improper project implementation strategies, deviation from implementation template and a huge variation in public goods quality. Besley and Ghatak (2007) stressed the necessity of cooperation between public and private sectors in the task of public service delivery. At the same time, the critical roles of politicians and bureaucrats, by evaluating public service delivery was basically to measure the government's adherence to the principle of accountability. In the 2010s, Deng (2011) found that an effective way to remediate poor service delivery is collaborative governance. Meanwhile, collaborative governance will

remain an illusion until key issues, strong institutional platform, participant structure, and dynamic administrative system are resolved. Thus, the arduous task for better service performance from public sector institutions has taken centre stage cross-nationally. As it is evident in the works of Taher, van den Heuvel, Koussouris, and Georgousopoulos (2011)) when they restated the benefit of enhanced service delivery to an improved cordial relationship between the government and the citizenry. They emphasised that improved service delivery can strengthen the relationship between the government and the people and that the lack of enhanced service delivery can strain the relationship. The study, therefore, suggests an inclusive service delivery model for providing better services.

Xiong and Zhao's (2013) inquiry unveiled that service delivery in the public sector has transformed from a hierarchical model or network mode to a market mode. It is pertinent to note that globalisation has turned the world into a global village, which facilitates easy and frequent interactions across borders. Therefore, society experiences more complexities, dynamism and increases diversities in values. Hence, a single delivery model is deemed inappropriate in a dynamic sector like the power industry.

Thus, the author suggests a blend of the three modes: hierarchy, network and market mode, to meet contemporary service delivery and achieve efficiency. Brinkerhoff and Wetterberg's (2013) work affirmed that agitation for better service performance from public sector institutions had gained prominence globally amongst analysts, managers and policymakers, from both empirical and theoretical perspectives.

Notably, it is envisaged that performance-based initiatives remediate service delivery failures without a practical yardstick and clear theoretical boundaries. The review submits that decentralisation largely influenced service delivery, and improved performance can be achieved when incentives for executing the reform programme have

been strengthened. Also, recognising political and economic factors is key to addressing governance and service delivery related issues.

A study by Rasul and Rogger (2013) found huge variation in the manner services were provided in Nigeria, and described service provision in the post-reform period as unsatisfactory. Rasul and Rogger's study cannot however, be conceived as pioneering, because, in terms of methodology and approach, it is found to align with previous studies conducted by Bloom et al. (2012, 2013), and further supported by Rene et al. (2018). In the same vein, Akinboade, Mokwena, and Kinfack (2014) investigated the level of citizens' involvement in service delivery in South Africa. Their inquiry found that the citizens were dissatisfied with the low electricity services provided by the state utilities. The study suggests that concerted effort be made to increase service delivery in order to build citizens confidence. Moreso, Ohemeng and Grant (2014) analysed collaborative public service delivery in Canada. The study noted that the service delivery paradigm has shifted to a mixed pattern (public and private), contracting and outsourcing methods. The study unveils that collaborative methods have facilitated competition, enhanced efficiency, increased effectiveness, and promoted good governance. More significantly, the research emphasises that collaborative service delivery has proved to be better than a single mode of service delivery when compared with others.

In their work, in which they analysed the relationship between people's trust and public service delivery, Sriram and Bhayani (2015) acknowledged the contemporary tripartite service delivery model (collaborative service delivery: public-private partnership), and recognised the failure of the government to solely provide adequate infrastructures. They argued that the failure has been attributed to inadequate resources, favouritism, lack of technical knowledge and corruption. The inquiry unveils that effective service delivery has a greater influence on people's trust in the government. This assertion clearly implies

that accountability and efficient service delivery are crucial to enhance citizens' popular participation in government activities, which invariably promotes democratic rights. This assertion also aligns with Kugonza and Mukobi's (2016) work, who investigated how improved service delivery, accountability, and popular participation enhance citizens' consciousness. The author argued that access to information and the level of awareness are the key factors increasing citizens' participation in governance. The study found the aforementioned factors to be significantly relevant to building citizens' trust and effective participation. Therefore, it became paramount for the government to ensure adequate provision of infrastructural facilities for the citizens. Dey, Thommana, and Dock's (2015) work affirmed citizens' demand for improved service delivery from public agencies in the 21st century. It is worth noting that improved technology has significantly influenced citizens' expectations. Conspicuously, the high expectations and increasing demands for improved services had challenged the existence of institutions that had failed to perform optimally. Bedman's (2015) study on public service governance has not only indicated a slack of public service delivery in most developing countries, but also, service delivery improvement research has attracted scholarly attention worldwide.

For example, Vladimir, Elena, Vladimir and Andrei (2016) assessed the Russian Public Service Delivery System (RPSDS). It was found that service delivery has drastically reduced access to government services. More practically, Zhu and Peyrache (2017) investigated quality service delivery and efficiency in the United Kingdom and Chinese public service. The empirical work adopted the same parameter in analysing the two countries where it found that most of the issues that account for inefficiency in the United Kingdom relates to effects of the reallocation of expenditures, but the result on the Chinese public service indicates that inefficiency was occasioned by the breach of best practice principles.

Kundo's (2018) study emphasised that the agitation for accountability and improved service delivery has gone beyond rhetoric. Notably, the issue has emerged as a widely discussed one within the purview of public sector management. Evidence from this work revealed that citizens service delivery Charter has laid the foundation for improving service delivery and accountability, but people are most often ignorant of the provisions in the Charter.

Das, Friedman and Kandpal (2017) explored the implications for the non-inclusion of stakeholders in public service delivery. The author stressed that the contemporary public service model entails a partnership between the government and other interested partners with a common objective to enhance the quality and efficiency of public service delivery. Revelation from this review shows that programme outcomes vary significantly from two instances (1) when the key actors were included, and (2) when the key actors were excluded from the public service delivery process. The outcomes were successful when the key actors were included in the service delivery process. On the other hand, it was a failure when the key actors were excluded. Therefore, as noted in Das, Friedman and Kandpal's submissions, it became expedient that non-state actors must fully support the arduous task of efficient service delivery in contemporary times. Blair's (2018) empirical work on India has unravelled the intrinsic relationship between improving public service and the promotion of good governance. The study suggests that improved service delivery remains a prerequisite for empowering people and improving their wellbeing.

## **2.7 Gaps in Literature**

Many studies on administrative reforms in Western countries have gained prominence and are well documented in public administration literature (Campbell & Peters; 1988; Savoie, 1994; Halligan, 1996; Peters & Savoie, 1995; Hammerschmid et al., 2016; Zang & Sun 2018). Existing works was mainly based on experiences in the West. In fact,



Peter and Savoie observed a similar lacuna when they evaluated administrative reform literature on Asia.

It, therefore, seems that the availability of huge literature on the Western countries might not be unconnected with the historical epoch of administrative reforms. Nevertheless, the issue on administrative reform transcends national boundaries, even to the extent that many Asian and African countries now have developed their administrative reform trajectories to improve public efficiency and productivity (Burns, 1994; Zhijian De Guzman, & Reforma, 1992). Furthermore, scholars acknowledged divergent perceptions and theoretical approaches to administrative reforms (Aberbach & Rockman, 1987; Heady, 1996; Peters, 1996; Lampropoulou & Oikonomou, 2018). For this reason, it became an arduous task to develop a single administrative framework to tackle administrative problems cross-nationally. To this end, the gap identified must be filled to add to the empirical database, guide design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public sector reform programmes.

Studies on improving the public sector capacity for quality service delivery have attracted global attention (Wisniewski et al., 1996; Uddin et al., 2002; Reinikka & Svensson, 2004; Ahmed et al. 2005; Foley, 2008; Bedman, 2015). Most of the previous studies on administrative reforms in Nigeria have concentrated more on restructuring the civil service as an instrument for delivering service. Notably, the limited studies on administrative reform still failed to investigate sharp difference between the anticipated and actual reform outcomes in the power industry. For instance, Okoro and Chikuni's (2007) work only examined the opportunities and challenges in the power industry reforms. It is the same for the work of Ohemeng and Ayee (2016), which examined a new approach to public sector reform. Conversely, despite decades of research, however,

existing literature revealed the existence of limited empirical works, which investigated why Nigeria has yet to see the ultimate benefit of power sector reforms.

The literature reviewed only showed mere expression of general opinion or perceptions on power sector reform outcome on whether or not the reform has facilitated improved service delivery in Nigeria. There divided perception that is, those who believe and those who do not believe that the reform has led to an improvement in service provision.

Previous studies not only succeeded in providing evidence to affirm that the reform has led to an increase in revenue generation, improvement in return on investment, but also indicated that the reform has not translated to an increase in power supply in the country. The studies further emphasised that the reform initiatives have facilitated an increase in investment in the sector. Although there are many studies on public sector reforms, these previous works analysed have not adequately addressed the critical issues on "why the power sector reforms failed to provide the desired outcome" (improved and steady electricity supply).

Therefore, this concern is considered highly imperative and raised the gap in the literature that this thesis is poised to fill. Undoubtedly, there is a need to carry out a further empirical enquiry on the true state of the issue because all the literature reviewed could not emphatically account for the impact of the reform exercise on the power delivery system. Hence, a clear indication of a research gap from previous studies versus the present study prompted a critical investigation to unravel reasons for unsatisfactory reform outcomes. This study intends to contribute to the ongoing intellectual dialogue and the search for effective strategies for raising the public service delivery system in Nigeria and the global community at large. Also, it represents an effort to present a holistic review of previous reform exercises, lessons and how it could reshape or fast track future reform agenda.

## 2.8 Theoretical Framework

In order to guide this study, this research was anchored on a generic government sector reform theory adapted from Ouda (2008). Although the argument of notable scholars (Zhang et al., 2002; Mota, 2004; Jamsab et al., 2006; Joseph, 2008) on government sector reform suggests a top-down, bottom-up approach and new institutional economics models, a detailed view of the entire reform process, however, suggests otherwise. In the first instance, evidence from the literature reviewed suggests that the nature of the relationship between stakeholders such as political class, bureaucrats, and other interest groups is the key determinant of reform success (Zhang, 2008). Consequent to this assertion, a painstaking review of the construct in the modified generic theory captured all issues identified as the key determinant of successful reforms.

Also, Beh's (2007, p.5) work is relevant to support the adoption of this theory when she stressed that "State structures, prevailing administrative culture and diversity of channel of advice have an effect on the choice of reform to be adopted and feasibility of implementing certain types of reform". As a matter of fact, the theory explains the lateral relationship between the political class, bureaucrats, and other key stakeholders in the society in reform initiation and implementation (see Figure 2.1). It emerged recently that the contribution of civil societies as a stakeholder in the business of governance could not be underestimated. Hesse's (2005, p.5), cited in Khan (2013) is relevant to support this argument, which rightly affirmed that:

“most important, it is necessary to recognise that government reform is like a marathon, not a sprint. The government should recognise the inevitable roles of the civil society organisation in the mainstream of democratic governance. This has to be demonstrated by providing a concrete opportunity for civil society organisation to participate meaningfully and positively in the national decision-making process. Bringing in civil society – technical, financial and logistic support for grassroots monitoring of most reform measures. Also,

civil society has roles to play in educating local communities on the provision and implementation in engaging with political actors on their accountability to the citizens."

The Generic reform theory was adopted because of its strength to provide a more comprehensive and holistic explanation of the entire reform process. Not only that, the theory is least tested and most suitable to critically evaluate the reform process. Ouda (2008) stated that despite several studies in public management which have attempted to model essential element of government sector reform, the generic theory has emerged as a new paradigm of the theoretical underpinning of government sector reform. This is because the evaluation of previous studies revealed the non-existence of the reform theory from generic perspectives. Therefore, the argument, as advanced by Ouda, is that the generic model was developed based on the New Zealand reform experience in addition to the basic requirement theory (Public Management Reform) propounded by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000). The generic reform theory has been a hybrid of two thoughts, which offers a more comprehensive explanation about government sector reform and a vital ingredient for underpinning the reform process.

The development of a generic theory was conceived as a noble attempt to expand the horizon of knowledge and close the gap identified in the theoretical approaches to sector reform. The generic theory underscores the fundamental requirement for a successful reform agenda and also analyses the various key components of the government sector reform. As highlighted earlier, the advocates of the theory were informed by the realities of the reform exercise instituted in New Zealand, which had served as a vital instrument for specifying the component of government sector reform and what should be reformed in the sector to engender socio-economic objective and achieve efficiency, effectiveness, improved institutional performance, promote accountability and judicious utilisation of government resources.

### 2.8.1 The Premise and Tenets of the Generic Theory

The cardinal objective of the generic theory is to direct the attention of governments from the outset to the critical component of the government sector reform required to be integrated, coordinated to underpin those reform initiatives. According to Ouda (2008), the following are the cornerstone and the underlining principles of the generic reform theory.




Figure 2.1: A generic model for government sector reform

Source: Ouda (2008)

## Breakdown of generic model for government sector reform model

$$(GSR=f (CP+MR+SSR) \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$= f (PBS+PAS+CS+WC+CC+BRC+ITC+IFS) \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

Where:

GSR =Government Sector Reform

f= function

### (1) Reform Framework: (Integrated Components)

CP = Corporatisation (Changing the organisation) and privatisation (changing the ownership);

MR = Management reform (New Public Management(NPM)

SSR =Specific sectors reform (such as Power, health, education, etc)

### (2) Implementation Framework (Collaboration/ Underpinning factors):

PBS= Political and Bureaucratic Support

PSA =Professional and Academic Support

CS = Communication Strategy

WC = Willingness to Change

CC=Consultation and Coordination

BRC= Budgeting of Reform Cost

ITC = Information Technology Capability; and

IFS = International Financial Support (only for developing countries)

Accordingly, the Generic Theory for government sector reform involves the elements below:

(a) Stimuli:

- (i) Economic Crisis
- (ii) Globalisation
- (iii) High Public expenditure profile/ Financial Scandal
- (iv) Change Agent (Citizens Agitation/Demand)
- (v) Financial Problems

(b) Elite's perceptions: (people occupy power positions)

(c) Reform Decision: (for launching the reform process)

(d) Content of the reform framework: (Integration Components): The process entails

(e) (i) Corporatisation and privatisation

(ii) Management Reform (Internal Management Changes, NPM)

(iii) Financial Management Reform- (clarification of notions of performance)

(iv) Specific Sector Reform (power, health, education etc.)

(f) Implementation Framework: (Collaboration /Underpinning factors):

(i) Political support (both legislative and executive bodies support)

(ii) Academic and Professional Support (in related field)

(iii) Communication Strategy

(iv) Willingness to Change

(v) Consultation and Coordination

(vi) Budgeting for Reform Cost (for the whole reform process);

(vii) Information Technology Capability; and

(viii) International Financial Support

(g) The Result: Successful Government Sector Reform; and

- (h) Consequence: Attainment of the cardinal objective of the Reform: Effectiveness, efficiency in the delivery of services; hence the reform process facilitates accountability, transparency, better performance and good governance.

### 2.8.2 The Adapted Model and Justification

Evidently, the generic reform model developed by Ouda (2008) in a study on reform in New Zealand was considered effective. The analysis of the components of the theory suggests that it is a multipurpose theory. Ajmal (2007) rightly observed that there is a likelihood that all constructs, in theory, may not be transferable to societies that have different political, administrative and organisational characteristics. In the Nigerian case, this study employed an adapted model framework. By adapting, it means substantial modifications were done to the original framework. This is because it became apparent that not all components of the framework (Figure 2.1) are fit for the conduct of this study. For instance, the stimuli, the rationale for administrative reform in the power sector, have already been captured in Chapter 1. Likewise, the content of the reform framework in the specific sector has also been clearly established- "privatisation in power industry".

Moreover, on the implementation framework component of the theory, the following variables were retained: political and bureaucratic support (PBS), communication strategy (CS), willingness to change (WC), professional support (PS), consultation and coordination. At the same time, budgeting of reform cost, information technology capacity and international financial support were deleted based on the literature on Nigeria. For instance, the works reviewed failed to establish any link with these variables. This suggests that the variables did not reflect the socio-political environment of Nigeria. Therefore, the revised framework adopted for Nigeria and this study is presented in Figure 2.2.

The Breakdown of the adapted generic reform theory

$$\text{SGR} = f(\text{PBS} + \text{PS} + \text{CS} + \text{WC} + \text{CC (RD)} + \text{CSO}) \dots\dots\dots (3)$$



where:

SGR = Successful Government Reform

f= function

PBS= Political and Bureaucratic Support

PS =Professional Support

CS = Communication Strategy

WC = Willingness to Change

CC = Consultation and Coordination (with the government entities and the will to undertake the reform process)

RD= Reform Decision

CSO= Civil Society organisations (**newly introduced construct**)

- (i) The Result: Successful Government Reform; and
- (j) Consequence: Attainment of the cardinal objective of the Reform: Effectiveness, efficiency in the delivery of services; hence the reform process facilitates accountability, transparency, better performance and good governance.




Figure 2.2: Adapted Theoretical Framework  
Source: Ouda (2008)

It is incontestable that the influence of civil society organisations as critical stakeholder in contemporary service delivery has been underrated. This is because it is conspicuously/virtually missing in all public management theories reviewed which this study recognised as a construct in our modified generic government sector theory.

Therefore, a new variable: civil society organisations (CSO), was added to the adapted theory because literature (as discussed below) affirmed key roles played by CSO in the struggle for citizens' rights and empowerment. It is imperative to note that civil society organisations, as an emerging key actor in the public service delivery chain, were conspicuously missing in Ouda's theory but was included to ensure thorough explanations of the Nigerian situation. Put simply, civil society organisations indicated that non-state, non-profit, voluntary organisations were formed by the people with a common interest in the vanguard for citizen's political and socio-economic rights. As Kankya et al. (2013) asserted that throughout the world, the role of civil societies in service delivery, particularly in the social service sector, has continued to gather momentum and is widely recognised in both developing and industrial societies. Therefore, their impact on the struggle for equity, social and economic rights cannot be downplayed. As a key stakeholder in the business of governance, their support or otherwise is likely to determine reform outcomes (Kankya et al., 2013). Noting that individuals and households are very weak in challenging the government to demand better services from the government, civil societies have emerged to advocate for social justice from the government. By the way, an extract from Okoruwa's (2013, p.1) report summarised this argument when he pointed out that: "civil society groups representing the Nigeria electricity consumers have declared that the Federal government must meet some conditions before supporting the ongoing power reform in the country". Amongst the conditions are ensuring adequate, affordable and regular power supply before their support could be guaranteed.

Adelabu (2018) reported that in the last decades, there had been incessant protests by civil societies against perceived anti people policies and programmes in the power sector. The civil society organisation construct included in the adapted theory was to improve on the limitation of Ouda's generic reform theory.

### **2.8.3 The Relevance and Applicability of Adapted theory to the study**

Zafarullah (1993) and Ahmad & Azizuddin (1995) noted that, whether in the long or short term, the aim of administrative reforms is to ensure crisis management and achieve national development. Most of the theories discussed earlier are Euro-American-centric though not properly fitting, but is important to adopt a suitable theoretical fit for administrative reforms. In most cases, these theories ignore administrative peculiarities and characteristics of transitional and developmental states. To this extent, they often attribute reform failures to be less adjustable to the realities of the countries. Perhaps, divergent historical experiences, exposures to foreign aids, colonialism, and culture also play prominent roles (Jamil, 1998). For these reasons, adopting a generic theory became imperative, particularly for underpinning the reform process in developing countries, because it is a common norm that reform decisions are taken separately from each other (Ouda, 2008).

The theory offers a coherent explanation and gives the reform-makers a broader spectrum and elements of government sector reform and other issues that must be concurrently pursued and coordinated to underpin the reform initiatives. The theory explained why the government must reform its institutions for effective service delivery to fulfil its covenant with the general populace. The underlining principle behind every reform initiative in the public sector lies in the citizens' agitation for improved service delivery (value for money). Accordingly, the theory suggests a basic requirement for the successful execution of government sector reform in a holistic manner, which requires unceasing

efforts by stakeholders in the reform drive. As evidenced in the generic reform theory, the framework of implementation highlighted earlier provided an avenue for a robust deliberation on the reform decisions, thereby promoting inclusiveness in the reform drive. In the same vein, the theory was considered suitable to provide vivid explanations for a strategic framework for a successful public sector reorganisation. In addition, in theory, the component and construct are useful for interrogating the reform process to determine why the reform intervention has failed to produce the desired outcome. Obviously, insights from the model specifications would be useful to answer research questions. MacKinnon (2011) asserted that moderating variables are mostly used in research study as a manipulative check, the generalisability of result, measurement improvement, and the theory test.

Furthermore, Allen (2017) argued that the moderating variable helps the researcher explain the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In the same manner, Smelser and Baltes (2001) asserted that moderating variables modulate the degree of effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable. Therefore, the study used reform decision (RD) as a moderating variable for theory and generalisability of the result. That is, between consultation and coordination (CC), and communication strategy (CS). Conversely, moderating variables would enable the study to test whether or not an intervention is likely to produce the same effect in the proposed theory.

Despite the strength of the generic reform theory to provide a concise explanation about the reform process and its relevance to the core of this study, it is still characterised by some defects and shortcomings that are not completely immune from criticism. The theory has been widely tagged "elitist". An overview of the theory explains the reform process where the reform decision lies, which are usually determined by those in the higher echelon of government, though with minor input from selected key actors in the

body polity. The scepticism about the theory revolved around the non-recognition of external factors, that is, the influence of political, social and economic environments to the attainment of reform outcomes, which obviously was accorded less recognition in the core element of the theory's build-up. As a matter of fact, these external factors are capable of adversely affecting the reform outcome. Therefore, the stability of these external factors remains a vital determinant of the reform outcomes. Notwithstanding the defects noticeable in the theory, the study is poised to explore the basic underlining principles inherent in the theory as a viable instrument for the explanation of the crux of this study.

## **CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides an outline of the research method adopted in the study. Generally, the study adopts a quantitative method, the population of electricity consumers was used as the study unit of analysis. This implies that this research based its generalisation on the outcome of the analysed quantitative results. Specifically, this chapter explains the various methodologies adopted in data collection and analysis relating to this research. In this regard, the methodologies entail research design, study population, sampling techniques, sample size, source of data (primary), and data collection method (questionnaire instrument). Furthermore, this chapter explains the methods and procedures employed in analysing the data derived from the field survey. Subsequently, the study explained the justification for using WarpPLS as a tool for the analysis.

### **3.2 Research Design**

Burn (1994), and Sekaran and Bougie (2016) defined research design as a reorganised and systematic investigation of a problem to provide appropriate solutions. Zikmund (1988), cited in Akhtar (2016, p.68) asserted that research design can be considered a "master plan that specified various methods and procedures for collecting and analysing data". According to Kothari (2004), research design denotes a conceptual structure or framework with which the researcher intends to conduct the investigation, which encompasses data collection and analysis. Furthermore, Cohen *et al.* (2007), Creswell (2009) and Gliner *et al.* (2009) broadly classified research approach into three: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-method research.

Notably, the two prominent techniques (quantitative and qualitative) differ in terms of their goals. While quantitative research is deductive, which is focused on testing a theory, measuring with numbers; according to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), a qualitative study is inductive and always tries to understand a social problem from a multi-dimensional perspective.

This research is empirical, and a cross-sectional design was adopted. Conversely, the study employs quantitative research techniques to collect and analyse data to ascertain why administrative reform initiative in the power sector has failed to facilitate improved service delivery system. In the work of Sekaran (2005, as cited by Aniah 2009), cross-sectional research design involves a study where data for the research is generated over a specified period to fortify the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. The study embraced a cross-sectional research design as it is easier to conduct than other individual-based studies, as follow-up is not required in the types of data collection. It is worth noting that a cross-sectional research survey enables the researcher to study a group of subjects (sample) that are carefully selected from a defined population (source population), which are contacted at a single point in time.

According to Nigel et al. (2009), a cross-sectional survey is a survey that is conducted once at a particular time. The survey reports the phenomenon taking place in the selected group at a particular period. It further gives an in-depth description of the behaviour and attitudes of individuals under investigation. According to Birkegård et al. (2017), a cross-sectional study is relatively easy to conduct compared to other methods, economical in terms of administration, and capable of generating required data within a very short time.

Birkegård et al. further explained that the study must be carefully planned to ensure that the selected sample reflects the true representation of the entire population being studied. Other scholars whose viewpoints corroborated that of Birkegård et al. include Houe et al. (2004), Von Elm et al. (2007), Nigel et al. (2009), Dohoo et al. (2010), and Danmap (2016). The simple logic behind a cross-sectional research survey is that it provides for the collection of many responses on a particular variable or more from selected samples at a specific time without the need for repetition (Muyi, 2016). Though previous studies on electricity supply in Africa conducted by World Bank and the European Commission suggested a time series approach. However, a cross-sectional method or analysis is considered suitable in this study, because this type of research design allows the collection of data on all variables at a single point in time. The design is being considered since the study is aimed at examining the relationship between and amongst factors that hindered the attainment of desired reform outcomes in the period under review.

In this work, the adoption of the quantitative approach became inevitable because of what it encompasses. According to Carrie (2007), quantitative techniques permit the use of inferential statistics to measure the research outcome, which is a common characteristic of quantitative research. It equally allows responses in question format from respondents to be coded in numerical form and analysed to make inferences on a particular phenomenon. In addition, Daniel (2004) contended that quantitative methods permit the use of statistics and numerals to explain a phenomenon by collecting, processing, and analysing data. In addition, another unique benefit inherent in this approach lies in its ability to transform qualitative data (attitude and behaviour) into quantitative data for measurement, generalisation, and predictions.

This research adopted the survey research method in studying administrative reforms in the power industry. Engel and Schutt (2012) described the survey research approach as



the “*collection of information from a sample of individuals*”. This research approach enables the researcher to recruit participants (respondents) and collect data using appropriate instruments such as questionnaires, interviews, and observations. Additionally, survey research can employ quantitative strategies-closed-ended questionnaires or other numerical items and adopt qualitative techniques- open-ended questions. Similarly, Daniel (2004) asserted that survey research has been adjudged to be the most common (quantitative) research method in social science, where the instruments of survey research are quite flexible. It can be applied in various forms according to the circumstances, but at the same time permit gathering of data through standard questionnaire form administered either face-to-face, postal pencil-paper questionnaires, or through electronic platforms such as email form, web-based. Though survey methods have been considered the easiest means of generating research data without wasting much time, the instrument for eliciting information common with the methods is still characterised by various pitfalls that the study has to manage carefully to guarantee reliable, dependable, and credible results. Advocates of survey research amongst others include Opdenaker and Van Damme (2000), Bake et al. (2013), Jack and Jolaiine (2013), Kam and Zechmeister (2013), AAPOR (2015), Ha, et al. (2015), Tesler (2015) and Pasek (2015). In this regard, a survey research instrument (questionnaire) was used to elicit relevant information from the respondents. In addition, the Sample for the study was selected from academia, electricity employees, civil servant, and civil society organisations based on the characteristics of the population. This is important because of its implication on the validity and reliability of the research findings.

### **3.3 Population and Sampling Techniques**

The population is where the data about the subject matter of the study would be derived (Ha, et al., 2015). Therefore, in this research, the unit of analysis is electricity consumers

in Nigeria and other key actors in the power delivery value chain. Pilot and Hungler (1999) conceived the research population as the totality or aggregate of all subjects, objects, or members with predetermined specifications. Additionally, Canvana et al. (2001) also described the research population as the totality of the events, people, or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate. This study is focused on the population presumed to have adequate information and knowledge about the main intent of this research. Hence, the population was streamlined to these categories of stakeholders: civil servants, civil society groups, electricity and academia. The population also covers electricity consumers (in their categories), civil society organisations, and other interest groups. These categories of the population would serve as respondents and have been carefully selected for data triangulation (cross-verification of responses from various informants). The selection procedure for questionnaire administration was done based on the four selected states, as stated in the scope of the study. For instance, the study selected five local government areas each, from Lagos and Niger States.

At the same time, seven were chosen from Osun and four from Kwara, taking cognisance of the percentage of population with electricity and number of population with electricity to represents each category (see Table 3.1). In addition, ten wards were randomly selected in each local government area, as the wards are subdivided into units based on geographical locations. In this way, civil servants, electricity employees, civil society organisations, and the academics who reside in the chosen units were selected using purposive sampling techniques.

This study considered the electricity consumers as key informants because they are the end-users. The burden of epileptic supply is being felt by these categories of the population, the civil servants, as well as artisans who rely heavily on energy sources from

state-owned utilities for their investment, businesses, and entrepreneurial activities. The research adopted a quantitative research instrument to elicit information from these end-users. The artisans selected are educated individuals (education levels were confirmed before questionnaires were administered). The data collected were used to fortify the proposition developed in Chapter 1, thereby making valid generalisation and precision. The study also recognised those in academia as key informants and whose experience and specialties would be most crucial to be ignored. Against this backdrop, the research explores the immense contributions offered by this subset of the research population, especially academia, whose specialties directly relate to the subject matter of this study. The study acknowledges the usefulness of the calibre of the population in fine-tuning the research instruments, serving as a key informant (renders expert opinions), provides more insight on the intent of the study, and remains a key stakeholder from where the study gathered cogent information through the application of closed ended questionnaire. To ensure construct validity, this subset of the population offered the needed theoretical support and technical guidance to actualising this cardinal objective of this investigation.

Moreover, electricity employees have been recognised as a major stakeholder within the context of this study, as their experience and input would probably serve as insider information. As a player in the electricity delivery value chain, the study gained from the workers' insights on power reform in designing the questionnaire. They also served as respondents; key information provided by this subset of the research population assisted the investigation in ensuring the content validity of the study.


This category of the research population has been identified as a key element of the entire population. As part of the electricity providers, the research elicited classified information on the unbundling and privatisation process in the industry. Paul (2008) explained the vital role of the key informants in survey research, which provides classified insight and

viewpoint about a particular phenomenon: economic programmes, social programmes, and problems. Furthermore, civil servants from related ministries (Ministry of Energy, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Special Duties, and Governors' Office) were chosen as respondents. It is worth stating here that selected states have 23 ministries and a Governor office. Of these, only four parastatals mentioned here are related to the topic under study.

Equally, as a critical participant in the power sector reform process, the research explored relevant materials, both in hard and electronic copies, from this subset of the targeted stakeholders from whom information was generated. Specifically, data were collected on key variables such as political reform decision and bureaucratic support; communication strategy; willingness to change; professional support, consultation, and coordination; and civil society organisation. Moreover, the data collected provided more insights into the aforementioned issues, which are central to the objective of the research.

Over the last decade, civil society organisations (CSOs) have been recognised as key players in the business of governance. Therefore, selected CSOs were chosen as respondents to question-statements. For the other categories of respondents, the questionnaire was self-administered to selected members of the civil society organisations registered in the four states.

**Figure 3.1 The Key Stakeholders in Power Sector**



Source: Adapted from Ramakrishna (2009).

### **3.3.1 Sampling Design and Sample Frame**

Sampling design in an empirical study depends on the research population, sampling, and sample size (Nurul, 2012). Kelley, Clark, Brown, and Sitzia (2003) posited that the collection of data on every element in the research population is undoubtedly impracticable and uneconomical. Therefore, identifying suitable research techniques is fundamental to generating data for the conduct of any academic research. This is because appropriate techniques make possible the conduct of studies by selecting a representation from the population so that the result can be used to draw inferences on the parent population.

Kelley *et al.* suggested that researchers must devise a strategy/technique for selecting a sample from the population that reflects true representation. This thesis further elaborated on the methodological issues that deserves painstaking recognition in the sample selection. Among other things, it includes the ability to minimise sampling error and maximise the response rate. Conversely, they reiterated that the methods employed in sample selection largely determine the internal validity of the survey research. The

sampling frame involves the collection of data from a sample, a technique used in statistics when a population or sample is too large to be studied. The frame within which samples were selected in the investigation on reform in the power sector encompasses all stakeholders' (representing electricity consumers) in their various segments, including operators in the electricity delivery chain, namely generation, transmission, and distribution.

### 3.3.2 Sample Size

The sample size is a vital component of the research design that the researcher must consider because it refers to the number of units selected for data collection from a research population. More importantly, an essential criterion for sample size selection in a study involves determining the population size, determining the level of precision, confidence level or risk, and the level of unpredictability (Miaoulis & Michener, 1976; Adam, 2020). Memon et al. (2020) also argued that determining the appropriate sample size is crucial to a reliable research outcome. The selection of a representative sample remained fundamental to the validity of the result derived because of its generalisation. Tejada and Punzalan (2012) argued that many research studies use Sloven's formula  $n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}$ .  $N$  represents the population size and  $e$  represents the margin of error. However, this formula has been queried and criticised by many scholars in the same field, among whom is Ryan (2013), who argued that the non-parametric formula put forward by Sloven lacks mathematical rigour, yet the formula is still widely adopted and relevant (most especially in a non-experimental study) in determining appropriate sample size from a population under study. Although, the Krejcie and Morgan (1970) sample size determinant might seem old but is still relevant because all other (Yamane and Raosoft sample size calculator) online software is used to produce similar value (for Yamane  $n=385$ ; while Raosoft is  $n=399$ ) for the sample size.

Recently, the following scholars (Adam, 2020; Kariman & Nourabadi, 2021; Keshvari & PourKhalil, 2021; Peighambari, et al., 2021) have used Krejcie and Morgan table for sample size determination. This study adopts Krejcie and Morgan's parameter for sample size determination based on various arguments on sample size determination.

Therefore, in compliance with Krejcie and Morgan's (1970) sample size determinant in his work entitled “determining sample size table for research activity”, the population class in the table ranges from 250,000-300,000,000. The suggested sample size is 384, and the study set the confidence level at 95% and anticipated the margin of error to be 5% (Adam, 2020). This implies that the risk of error anticipated (margin error) in the study stands at 5%, and it means that 95 out of 100 samples to be selected will reflect the true population value within a specified precision level (Gupta & Kapoor, 1970; Singh & Masuku, 2014; Taherdoost, 2017). Given the above specification by Krejcie and Morgan (1970) and the below population of households with electricity is **5,266,482**, which falls within the 250,000-300 million (Table 3.2) range specified, the study sample size has been increased to 463 respondents. This is because, Deziel (2018) argued that small sample sizes reduce the statistical power and also statistically significant results are difficult to detect with small sample sizes. Table 3.1 shows states in Nigeria based on the number of households with electricity and the percentage of households with electricity in four states (Lagos, Osun, Niger, and Kwara) were selected based on NBS (2019) classification.

**Table 3.1: States /Population with Electricity**

	<b>Sampled States</b>	<b>Percentage (%) of Household with Electricity</b>	<b>Number of Household with Electricity</b>
<b>Category A</b>			
Abuja		99.4	204,843
Kaduna		8.8	1,850,037
Kano		86.0	2,353,218
Lagos	Lagos	99.2	3,114,193
Anambra		99.0	1,242,263
Rivers		91.0	1,629,926
Ogun		86.5	841,42
Oyo		98.7	1,115,166
<b>Category B</b>			
Imo		63.4	673,132
Ondo		62.5	511,842
Enugu		70.0	721,096
Osun	Osun	79.2	880,952
Delta		61.6	712,530
Edo		62.1	598,757
Cross Rivers		60.7	576,273
<b>Category C</b>			
Adamawa		54.5	475,140
Ekiti		46.1	554,265
Borno		53.9	565,469
Bauchi		46.5	535,469
Nasarawa		43.0	251,669
Abia		56.6	464,964
Kwara	Kwara	58.8	647,795
Kogi		44.2	506,218
Akwa-Ibom		55.2	554,578
Plateau		50.5	438,495
<b>Category D</b>			
Zamfara		37.0	430,492
Yobe		32.0	191,270
Jigawa		35.2	557,554
Eboyin		46.9	249,413
Benue		30.5	345,146
Sokoto		37.4	497,394
Gombe		38.7	382,367
Niger	Niger	38.9	623,542
Kebbi		37.4	429,794
Bayelsa		29.1	335,469
Katsina		37.7	601,663
Taraba		34.4	283,012

**Source:** Extracted from *National Bureau of Statistic (2019)*.



Table 3.2 shows states selected based on the number of households with electricity and the percentage of households with electricity. The states include: Lagos, Osun, Niger, and Kwara. That is, one from each category: A (80% and above), B (60- 79%), C (40-59%) and D (below 39%).

**Table 3.2: Selected States and Population with Electricity**

Selected States	States				Total
	Lagos	Osun	Niger	Kwara	
Population (Household with Electricity)	3,114,193	880,952	623,542	647,795	<b>5,266,482</b>

**Source:** *Extracted from National Bureau of Statistic (2019).*

### 3.3.3 Sampling Procedure

This research study found that the random sampling method was inappropriate, as key informants in the population might be exempted. That is, the adoption of random sampling in this study might exclude part of the targeted population. Therefore, a purposive sampling method was adopted. In other words, information was obtained from a specific target population instead of from a conveniently available population.

According to Sam (2005), the purposive sampling method entails the selection of samples based on certain features or predetermined characteristics, thereby eliminating the element in the population whose feature did not conform to stated criteria. The purposive sampling technique was adopted based on the declaration from Cavana et al. (2001), which offers a vital lead to eliciting crucial information relating to the population. For instance, purposive techniques designate researchers to people who can offer relevant, dependable, and desirable information.

Additionally, Sam asserted that this method is unique because a sample can be selected not to represent the entire population but to represent a specific segment of the population (in the case of this research, the population of electricity consumers). Notably, the study exempted the population of citizens with no access to electricity. Hash (2011) noted that the underlining principle inherent in purposive methods is that, it enables the researcher to have direct access to the key informants. The study considers purposive sampling techniques most suitable because the techniques enable the researcher to conveniently select a sample of respondents with adequate knowledge and understanding of the issues under investigation. As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, not all households have electricity supply; therefore, the sampled population was restricted to electricity subscribers.

In order to avoid the constraints by the size of the entire population, who are consumers of electricity, the purposive sampling method allows the researcher to collect, manage, and analyse the data within a reasonable time. In furtherance to the premise of this method, the study deliberately sieved out the population of those aged below 20 years from the sampled population to ensure that data are extracted from electricity users, who presumably have adequate knowledge and information on the states of electricity supply overtime, hence improving the validity of the research outcome.

#### **3.3.4 Method of Selection of Respondents**

Table 3.2 shows the procedure for sample selection from the research population. From the geographical coverage, which was restricted to four states (as discussed in Chapter 1, and analysed in Table 3.1), a total of five local government areas were selected in Lagos and Niger, while a total of seven and four other areas were chosen in Osun and Kwara, respectively. Furthermore, the geographical coverage was subsequently demarcated into wards. For Lagos, this is 10 out of 110; Niger, 10 out of 105, Osun, 13 out of 120, and

Kwara 9 out of 95. Altogether, a total of 463 sampled populations were selected in the ratio of the population. Although, the aforementioned sample size determinant of Krejcie and Morgan (1970) specified 384 which is the minimum class boundary. Nevertheless, the researcher increased the sample size from 384 to 463 because, Deziel (2018) argued that small sample sizes reduce the statistical power and also statistically significant results are difficult to detect with small sample sizes, an increase of 13.6 per cent, adequately manage the rate of return (response rate/completion rate). Conversely, the increment was also based on the concern raised by Memon et al. (2020) that an appropriate sample size in research is crucial to a valid conclusion in any research activity. However, Hair (2017), Ringle et al. (2018) and Ryan (2020) agreed that partial least square (PLS-SEM) requires a smaller sample size compared to covariance-based approach to structural equation model like AMOS.

**Table 3.3: Sample Selection Criteria for Four States**

States	No of LGs (sample)	Wards (sample)	Sampled Population
Lagos	20 (5)	110 (10)	156
Niger	25 (5)	105 (10)	104
Osun	30 (7)	120 (13)	104
Kwara	16 (4)	95 (9)	99
Total	91 (21)	430 (42)	<b>463</b>

Source: *Extracted from National Bureau of Statistic, Nigeria, Demographic Distribution of population (2016).*

Note: Figures in parenthesis represent the sample size for each item.

### 3.4 Sources of Data

Data sources occupy a crucial position in every research activity because the researcher must gather relevant data, analyse, and interpret them to provide solutions to problems. Data for the study were obtained or generated mainly from primary sources. The study employed a survey research method whereby data gathered through this platform was

used to fortify the research propositions. To generate more in-depth information and insight on the issues under investigation, the study adopted a self-administered questionnaire. The sources are further enumerated as in 3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3.

#### **3.4.1 Primary Data**

Salkind (2010) described primary data as the first-hand data collected by the researcher to arrive at a dependable solution to a problem. The researcher has control over this data because the data were self-generated. Moreover, data from a primary source in survey research can be obtained from self-administered questionnaires, information gathered through interviews, focus group discussions, and observation mechanisms. In the light of this, the survey research instrument employed in this study is the questionnaire. As highlighted in the introductory section, data gathered through this source were heavily relied upon. Primary data in the form of quantitative data include data collected directly from respondents through self-administered questionnaires and the researcher's personal experience on the subject matter under study. Quantitative data were obtained through the survey questionnaire in the form of close-ended questions.

Primary data relating to the research were obtained from the self-administered questionnaire from academia, electricity employees, civil servant, and civil society groups in a cross-sectional manner. For easy sorting, coding, and analysis, the questionnaire was designed based on the same five point Likert-scale and divided into sections A – I (see Appendix). The selected respondents were assured of secrecy of their personal responses and affirmed that the results of the responses would only be used strictly for academic purposes, pleaded for the sincerity of purpose in their responses to the question-statements. Responses were coded, and keyed-in into the SPSS software for analysis.

### **3.4.2 Secondary Data**

Secondary data is one of the viable means of inquiry that relates to already made information. In this case, the researcher only used data already collected; therefore, the researcher does not have control over the data. All credible secondary sources of materials available for this research were fully explored. They include sources like reputable indexed and non-indexed journals, World Bank reports, quarterly reports, other published documents, government official documents, published newspaper articles, research articles, seminar papers, unpublished theses, and dissertations, working documents and papers, and monographs. The bulk of the data generated through this medium were used to augment the primary data collected from various publications relating to the subject matter under study, i.e. Electricity Power Sector Reform Act 2005, power sector reform document. Others include the Central Bank of Nigeria Economic Report 2005-2015. Equally, e-resource on the Ibadan Electricity Distribution Company (IBDEC, a successor company of the PHCN in the State under research coverage), Ministry of Power, Works & Housing, National Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) Office, Bureau of Public Service Reform, Bureau of Public Enterprise, stakeholders' conference papers, medium-term report, quarterly report of the Association of Electricity Distributions of Nigeria. Moreover, cogent information relating to reform processes in the power sector such as road map for electricity recovery agenda, the legal framework for unbundling, privatisation of generation, and distribution unit of the power delivery chain, update on electricity performance report, drivers of reform in the power industry, rationale for privatisation, picture message of protest and demonstration of aggrieved consumers and hosts of others were greatly significant to the study. Furthermore, the study also sourced relevant materials from electronic databases through the University Libraries and other e-resources platforms. Pollit, and Bouckaert's (2004) public management theory was useful for theoretical arguments.

More Importantly, Ouda's (2008) work provided immense contribution for theoretical underpinning as well as helped to advance strong arguments to support the central point of the study.

### **3.5 Instrument Validation and Reliability**

#### **3.5.1 Questionnaire**

A questionnaire is one of the most commonly used instrument in any survey research (Ballou & Lavrakas, 2008; Ponto, 2015; Younas & Porr, 2021). This instrument primarily involves a set of standardised questions (either open or closed-ended) designed and administered to elicit information from chosen respondents (selected samples). For this study, questionnaire administration occupies a vital part of the data collection method, mostly on power sector reform (Nigel et al., 2009). Allen (2017) described this survey instrument as a cornerstone of quantitative research. The questionnaires were designed in a closed-ended format and administered to 463 respondents (sampled population) selected from Lagos, Osun, Niger, and Kwara States. The questionnaire was administered to academics, civil servants, civil society organisations, and electricity employees who were painstakingly chosen from the population.

For this study, the questionnaire was designed to cater for the nature of information intended to elicit based on the various construct in the model. In this research, in order to guarantee the appropriateness and effectiveness of the research instrument, the questionnaire designed for measuring people's perceptions and viewpoints on the subject matter of this study were subjected to thorough scrutiny/vetting (expert opinions) by experienced academics (Professors), seasoned administrators (permanent Secretaries), experts and other experienced scholars to fine-tune this instrument.

As part of the effort to ensure that the research instrument adequately addresses the central issues, a pilot test was conducted using a smaller group of 30 respondents who shared similar characteristics with the parent population within the research coverage area. The essence of this exercise was to eliminate potential problems (Creswell, 2003; Lancaster et al., 2004; Dannion et al., 2006; Hassan, 2006).

### 3.5.2 Developing the Items for the Instrument

In this study, items used in the questionnaire were sourced from published materials and dissertations. Table 3.4 indicates the sources for each variable and Cronbach alpha values for six constructs, while the values for the other two constructs were not readily available. Additionally, Table 3.5 shows the number of items adapted, including the items added.

**Table 3.4: Adapted Questionnaire**

Latent Variables	Original Sources	Number of Items	Cronbach alpha value
Reform Decision	Dwivedi, Shareef, Pandey, & Kumar (2013)	18	$\alpha=0.85$
Political & Bureaucratic Support	Suzuki & Hur (2018)	10	$\alpha=0.753$
Communication Strategy	Pandey & Garnett (2006)	13	$\alpha=0.72$
Willingness to Change	Metselaar (1997)	4	$\alpha=0.84$
Consultation & Coordination	Ramesh, Araral, & Wu (2010)	5	$\alpha=0.764$
Professional Support	Jorge (2008)	15	$\alpha=0.8073$
Civil Society Organisation (CSOs)	SEARP (2017); Kankya (2013)	12	Not available
Successful government reform	FGN (2010); Ouda (2008)	16	Not available

Source: Research Survey, 2019.

The rules for interpreting reliability test are as follows:  $\alpha \geq .9$  = excellent;  $.9 > \alpha \geq .8$  = good;  $.8 > \alpha \geq .7$  is acceptable while  $.7 > \alpha \geq .6$  indicates questionable;  $.6 > \alpha \geq .5$  poor and lastly  $.5 > \alpha$  is considered unacceptable (Tavakol, & Dennick, 2011; Singh, 2017).

Table 3.5 indicates the number of adapted questions for each latent variable used in the study. Notably, statements adapted in these three constructs, i.e (i) Consultation and Coordination, (ii) Professional Support, and (ii) Civil society organization were few, therefore, it was imperative to add more indicators.

Altogether, the study used the following constructs: political and bureaucratic support (PBS), consultation and coordination (CC), professional support (PS), willingness to change (WC), communication strategy (CS), civil society organisations (CSO), reform decision (RD) and successful government reforms (SGR). As suggested by Whitley (1996), the questionnaire was developed on a 5-point Likert scale of *1-strongly disagree, 2-disagree, 3-neutral, 4-agree, 5-strongly agree*. There are six independent variables; one dependent (DV) and one moderating variable on the design of this study and the influence of political and bureaucratic support (PBS), communication strategy (CS), consultation and coordination (CC), professional support (PS), willingness to change (WC) and civil society organisations on a dependent variable (level of successful government reform).

**Table 3.5: Summary of Adapted Questionnaires**

Latent Variables	Original Sources	Number of Items	No of Item(s) Adapted	Own Item Added	Total Items
Reform Decision	Dwivedi, Shareef, Pandey, & Kumar (2013)	18	6	1	7
Political & Bureaucratic Support	Suzuki & Hur (2018)	10	7	1	8
Communication Strategy	Pandey & Garnett (2006)	13	7	0	7
Willingness to Change	Metselaar (1997)	4	4	2	6
Consultation & Coordination	Ramesh, Araral, & Wu (2010)	5	2	4	6
Professional Support	Jorge (2008)	15	1	6	7
Civil Society Organisation (CSOs)	SEARP (2017); Kankya (2013)	12	2	5	7
Successful government reform	FGN (2010); Ouda (2008)	16	4	2	6

Source: Research Survey, 2019.



### **3.5.3 Goodness of Measure**

The goodness of measurement in every research activity is twofold: validity and reliability (Mohajan, 2017). These two fundamental and critical measurements procedure is subjected to competent and effective study. For instance, a good and effective measurement must measure what it purports to evaluate. Kimberlin and Wintersein (2008) asserted that the goodness of measurement (validity and reliability) is a requisite condition to ensure the integrity and quality of the measurement instrument. In the long run, good measurement relates to the credibility and acceptability of the research outcome. Additionally, these measurements enable researchers to minimise errors and increase confidence in the research outcome.

### **3.5.4 Validity of Research Instrument**

According to Daniel (2004), the essence of validity in quantitative research is for measurement. Therefore, when one measures the views and perceptions of the sampled population on a particular phenomenon, the issue of validity and reliability becomes a central point. Amongst scholars who have extensively discussed the concept of validity in research are DeVellis (1991), Gregory (1992), and Messick (1995). The study subjected the designed questionnaire to expert vetting (expert opinions) for content and construct validity to ascertain whether the variables contained in the designed questionnaires were capable of addressing and measuring the latent central issues. Likewise, the structural sequence of variables stated in the questionnaire was also subjected to expert vetting. Furthermore, on the instruments employed in the study, the researcher received input from serving and retired public servants, officials from relevant ministries, bureaucrats, seasoned administrators, and the academia.

Also, varying suggestions, comments, observations, and recommendations given by these stakeholders assisted the research in improving the questionnaire design for the final survey.

### **3.5.5 Reliability of Research Instrument**

As the research is to arrive at a reliable solution to perceived societal problems, the study conducted methodological triangulation to guarantee the accuracy of data collected from stakeholders. Daniel (2004) stressed that the reliability factor remains an essential element that determines the quality of research outcome through the adoption of appropriate techniques and instruments of measurement in survey research. Reliability, in this case, relates to the relationship between the result and the measurement error. Reliability measures the consistency of the instrument used in survey research. Reliability implies that a test consistently measures whatever it has measured (Gay, 1987; Hair et al., 2016). In this sense, a survey instrument must be subjected to a test to ascertain the level of its consistency. Every academic investigative exercise, therefore, strives to minimise or frees the exercise from measurement error to increase the level of reliability of the result. Similarly, studies by Mehren and Lehman (1991), Thompson (1999), and Zikmund (2001) critically discussed methods of reliability estimation and various factors affecting the reliability of research results. Based on this argument, the questionnaire instrument employed in this study was subjected to criticism through pilot study. Electricity employees who had vast experience offered technical advice on the research instrument adopted by the researcher. Specifically, it became essential to add more indicators to variables whose question statements were few. For instance, the number of questions added in these constructs Consultation and Coordination, Professional Support and Civil Society Organisation (CSOs) were more the adapted questions.

### 3.5.6 Pilot Study

The central objective of the pilot study was to ascertain the level of respondents' understanding of the questions, guidelines, and issues raised in the questionnaire. A pilot test is necessary to ascertain the veracity of the survey design and research instrument (questionnaire). The process also affords the selected respondents to objectively comment on and critique the research instruments in terms of clarity, conciseness, relevance to the topic, language usage, coherency, grammar, and typographical errors (if any). The feedback obtained from this exercise enables the researcher to redirect, restructure the questionnaires designed for this research purpose (Goodman & Bailey, 1998; Schoenfeld, 2006; Khairu, 2008). This research entailed a pilot study in Kwara State, Nigeria, to ascertain the validity and reliability of the measurement instruments. The participants were public servants, lecturers, retired electricity employees, and public officers who had adequate knowledge about the privatisation programme. The number of respondents for the pilot study was 30, chosen from the target study population. The pilot study employed a survey research method where closed-ended questionnaires on administrative reform in the power industry were administered to respondents. A pilot test was conducted between 26th and 30th January 2019. The study administered 30 sets of questionnaire developed on a 5-point Likert scale. A summary of the reliability tests on the pilot study is presented in Table 3.6.

**Table 3.6: Reliability Statistics**

<b>Latent variable</b>	<b>Number of items</b>	<b>Cronbach's Alpha</b>
PBS	8	0.812
CS	7	0.810
WC	6	0.776
CC	6	0.793
PS	7	0.798
CSO	7	0.780
RD	7	0.748
SGR	6	0.824

**Source:** Author's Computation, 2019.

From the foregoing, the alpha value of all the latent variables exceeded the threshold, which is greater than  $\geq 0.7$ . Notably, it is important to state that the values obtained from all the variables used for the pilot test stage are good and acceptable (Singh, 2017). In this sense, the internal consistency for the latent variable met an acceptable level, implying that the reliability value is satisfactory.

### **3.6 Methods of Data Collection**

Data collection is a crucial component in any research activity because the researcher's ability to provide a reliable solution to problems depends largely on the quantum of data collected. This process involves gathering and measuring variables of interest to fortify hypotheses, answer research questions, and determine the research outcome (Kabir, 2016). Notably, inaccurate data can significantly affect the study result and hence invalidate the research result. Central to this investigation is the fieldwork for collecting data and gathering relevant information for the study, which was conducted in Nigeria from January to April in 2019. The study adopted triangulation techniques for data collection and fieldwork. This definitely ensures the validation of data through cross-verification of information gathered from the respondents. The essence of this technique is to ascertain the sincerity of selected respondents to responses from the survey research instrument adopted, for example, the questionnaire. Furthermore, the study suggests a "bi-angular" approach supported by Jick's work (1979, cited in Ajmal, 2008). The argument for this approach was premised on the defects in each method, which would be compensated by counter-balancing the strengths of another technique. He emphasised that bi-angularities may enhance the validity of research results (Silveman, 2000, as cited in Ajmal, 2008) at the same time, reduces the propensity for the bias of a single method model. The assertion was supported by Hussey and Hussey (1997). For this study, data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The researcher fully explored

the questionnaire: an instrument of survey research, for the ultimate purpose of generating adequate data to fortify the hypothetical statements stated in Chapter 2 of this study.

### **3.6.1 Data Collection Procedure**

To test the hypothetical statements stated in Chapter 1 of this study, a pilot study was firstly conducted where 30 closed-ended questionnaires were distributed to respondents for self-administration. The respondents (civil servants, academia, CSOs, and electricity employees) were given four days, 26<sup>th</sup> to 30<sup>th</sup> January 2019, to fill up the questionnaire. Retrieved sets of questionnaires were subsequently analysed to ascertain whether the respondent understood the questions (see Table 3.3). In the subsequent phase, a total of 463 questionnaires were administered to respondents (civil servants, electricity employees, members of civil society organisations, and academics). The questionnaire for civil servants was administered through the Permanent Secretaries, while the questionnaire for electricity employees was administered through the Business Managers. Similarly, the questionnaire for CSOs was administered through State Administrators of the selected CSOs. However, questionnaires were distributed to academics for self-administration in selected tertiary institutions (LASU, Niger Poly, KWASU, and OAU). Respondents were given five days to fill up the questionnaire. Finally, completed questionnaires were retrieved, collated, coded, and data were keyed into SPSS software.

### **3.7 Methods Employed**

This segment accommodates critical issues directly related to methods employed for marshalling and analysis of the survey data. The study employed relevant software packages to organise and manage the survey data. The data were systematically coded according to the parameter developed during research and questionnaire design. In order to improve the response rate, respondents were given five days to respond to the questionnaire before they were collected from them. For the purpose of accuracy, returned

questionnaires were coded and key-ed into SPSS software and carefully checked before editing was performed (data cleaning). This study complied with the suggestion of Hair et al. (2014) for data editing/cleaning and the removal of observed and systematic errors from the dataset and using the SPSS package to fortify the dataset.

### **3.7.1 Criteria of Respondents**

The relevance of gender, occupation, length of service, qualification, duration of electricity usage, and location of respondents' residence for a research of this nature cannot be underrated. Ajmal (2007) stressed that these variables largely determine the reliability of the data in any research activity. The profiles of the respondents were examined using frequency distribution and percentages mainly to ascertain the adequacy in terms of population representation of the various segments/ groups in the research. Respondents' profiles presented in the study provide clear insights on whether the different groups in the population are fairly represented based on their varying categories, namely gender, occupation, length of service, qualification, years of electricity usage, and respondents' residential location. The bottom line was to ascertain whether the respondents had any in-depth knowledge of the issues under investigation and had the resources to provide credible information that would assist the researcher in making valid inferences. Similarly, the respondents, that the researcher presumed understood the issues raised in the questionnaire, were selected for the survey administration.

### **3.8 Methods of Data Presentation and Analysis**

In this study, quantitative data analysis WarpLS was employed. Conversely, raw data collected from the field were sorted and coded for easy analysis. Also, data collected were cross-tabulated and analysed using (SPSS) software for normality test. Subsequently, WarpPLS - a variance-based partial least square structural equation model (PLS-SEM),

was considered as a suitable test to analyse the data to ascertain the level of relationship between the dependent and independent variables.

### **3.8.1 Justification for Partial Least-Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM)**

Structural equation model (SEM) approaches are basically twofold: confirmatory factor analysis and Partial least squares (Hair et al., 2014). The Partial Least Square method of analysis was adopted based on the result obtained from the Kolmogorov-Shapiro-Wilk normality test in Section 3.9.1. Analysis of the normality test result indicated that the data were not normally distributed. Therefore, a non-parametric approach to the structural equation model was considered most suitable. Additionally, the main thrust of the study was to make predictions and explanations other than the confirmation of existing theories.

### **3.8.2 Justification of Using WarpPLS**

According to Joseph et al. (2014), WarpPLS – a variance-based Partial Least Square approach is an alternative to the covariance-based structural equation model (CB-SEM). This type of PLS-SEM is considered the best approach for this study because of its unique attributes. Further justifications are as follows:

- i. Size of the Data. For instance, apart from the usefulness to appropriately manage a small sample size, it is equally built to manage data when it is not normally distributed (nonlinear data) or when a complex model with many indicators seeks to estimate multiple relationships.
- ii. Nature of the data/missing values: The approach is not only less stringent as compared to the covariance-based structural equation model (CB-SEM) but rather

a complementary approach to the structural equation model of data analysis (Hair et al., 2011, 2017). More importantly, it is non-parametric and is capable of treating missing values at a reasonable level, suspicious response, and outliers (extreme response to a particular response). For instance, Joseph et al. (2014) explained that the observation is typically removed from the data file when the amount of missing data on a questionnaire exceeds 15 per cent.

- iii. Measurement Scale: The system allows for a nominal level of data.
- iv. Purpose of the Study: The thrust of this study is prediction rather than confirmation.
- v. Additionally, part of the rationale for adopting WarpPLS SEM is that it is suitable for evaluating complex cause and effect relationships (Lowry & Gaskin, 2014; Henseler et al., 2015). Moreover, Vinzie et al. (2010) described PLS-SEM as a non-parametric approach that poses limited restrictions on the sample size and data distribution.

### **3.8.3 Study Assumptions**

In a nutshell, assumptions provide the basis for the conduct of a research study. Therefore, the following assumptions were drawn from theories, empirical literature evaluated, and study environment.

- i. Citizens' confidence in government, support, or otherwise has a significant influence on government reform outcomes.
- ii. The politico-socio environment is not just a factor but an important determinant of positive reform outcomes.



- iii. Contributions of reform implementers (bureaucrats), political actors, and civil society groups are required, but their full commitments are necessary for successful reform.
- iv. The existence of synergy amongst government components and consensus on reform strategy is significant to reform outcomes.

#### **3.8.4 Estimation Techniques**

As mentioned earlier, the relationship between variables can be established in many ways. What determines the method to be adopted depends on the nature of the variables and data of the study. Using SEM methodology, there are basically two common approaches: Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and partial least square (PLS). Hair et al. (2020), argued that confirmatory factor analysis is mostly adopted to confirm (or reject) theories. The basic assumption of the CFA approach is that the data must be normally distributed and derived from a random sample. When the data is normally distributed, it implies that the parametric method of SEM analysis should be adopted. In that respect, Kelloway (1998) and Olya (2017) suggested the following confirmatory analysis applications, such as Amos SPSS, R, STATA, Listrel Mplus, EQS, SAS, SEPATH, CALIS, VISCOM, Lavaan, and COSAN for estimation.

On the other hand, PLS-SEM is a variance-based approach to SEM, which deals with the prediction and explanation of target construct (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 2003; Tenenhaus, 2008; Olya, 2017). Conversely, Hair et al. (2014) and Wong (2013) stressed that PLS-SEM arrives at its predictions based on a non-parametric approach. This variance-based approach is useful to estimate a model with a large number of latent variables (Chin, Peters, & Brown, 2008). In addition, PLS-SEM has the capacity to manage huge, hierarchical, and complex systems as compared to confirmatory factor analysis (Chin, Peters on, & Brown 2008). In order to accomplish this, the manifest

variable must be used repeatedly (Noonan & Wold, 1982; Guinot, Latreille & Tanenhaus, 2001; Tenenhaus, Vinzi, Chatelin, & Lauro, 2005; Akter et al., 2011). The availability of dedicated software such as SmartPLS and WarpPLS has significantly reduced the problem encountered when estimating complex relationships. This is so because it is accessible and easy to manipulate with an inbuilt feature to provide non-spurious results that are obtained from a conceptualised system (Kock, 2014). For instance, WarpPLS has the capacity to manage a complex system with multiple relationships and, at the same time, take care of nonlinear relationships (Kock, 2010; Olya, 2017). Since this study seeks to make a prediction, currently WarpPLS (version 6.0) is deemed appropriate to determine the relationship.

#### **3.8.5 Estimation Procedure**

The PLS-SEM estimation using WarpPLS works on the basis of some underlined assumptions. These assumptions are clearly highlighted in the work of Hair et al. (2014) and Olya (2017) as follows:

- i. The study must be aimed at predictions and explanation of the target construct;
- ii. The model is complex with large numbers of latent variables;
- iii. The distribution of data is not normal, which suggests a non-parametric approach;
- iv. Outlier should be completely avoided; and
- v. There must not be missing values. If there is any missing value, it must not be above an acceptable level ( $\leq 15\%$ ).

#### **3.8.6 Data Screening and Missing Values**

In compliance with the PLS-SEM assumption, the procedure for estimation begins with screening/cleaning of raw data collected from the field surveys. This process is a standard for detecting and correcting data errors, for instance, cases of irregularities and unrealistic

values that might lead to spurious results. This can occur in many ways: firstly, the issue of inclusion criteria (chosen respondents). This study has adequately selected key stakeholders who are presumed to have relevant knowledge about the issue under study. Therefore, the problem of inclusion does not arise. Also, the issue of missing cases/values on the administered questionnaires were adequately treated. For example, the WarpPLS software version 6.00 automatically replaces the missing values as long as they are at a reasonable level  $\leq$  of 15% (Hair et al., 2014; Kock, 2014). However, when the missing values have exceeded the benchmark, they should be removed from the dataset. Interestingly, WarpPLS software was developed in a manner that automatically removes all cases from the analysis, including missing values under the case-wise deletion process.

### **3.8.7 Data Coding and Outliers**

In this study, all the questionnaires administered were coded on a five-point Likert scale with the categories (1) *strongly disagree*, (2) *disagree*, (3) *neutral*, (4) *agree*, (5) *strongly agree*. This is to ensure that the class interval between 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5 have the same distance. As mentioned earlier, one of the underlying assumptions of PLS-SEM is the absence of outliers.

Outliers in a dataset imply extreme response to all questions or a particular question by the respondent(s) (Hair et al., 2014; Wada, 2020; Sullivan et al., 2021). In a statistical screening process, detection and dealing with outliers, and resolving the problem is a challenging activity (Gupta, Gao & Aggarwal et al., 2014; Wada, 2020). However, this problem was resolved using a statistical software package - IBM SPSS, as recommended by Mooi and Sarstedt (2011). Notably, the general approach to deal with outliers, if only a few are identified, is to remove them from the dataset. However, when larger numbers are identified, the researcher must identify whether the outliers represent a distinct group or subgroup and decide whether to remove them.

### 3.9 Normality of the Distribution

The nonlinear nature of the distribution is aptly part of the justification for adopting PLS-SEM. This implies that when the data distribution changes, then the approach to SEM changes. Conventionally, the non-normality of the distributions infers the adoption of non-parametric methods, while a normal distribution implies a parametric approach to SEM. Therefore, to determine the appropriate statistical tool to estimate the relationship, the study perceives the need to execute a Kolmogorov normality test because the sample size is huge and met the specified benchmark of 200. To compute this, the confidence level at 95% and 5% margin of error were set. The null and alternate hypothesis to be tested is stated as follows:

$H_0$ : The observed distribution fits a normal distribution

$H_1$ : The observed distribution does not fit a normal distribution

Decision rule: reject  $H_0$  if the  $p$ -value  $\leq 0.05$ . When the result is otherwise, accept  $H_0$ .

#### 3.9.1 Kolmogorov-Shapiro-Wilk Normality Test

Ghasemi and Zahediasl (2012) emphasised that the main test for ascertaining the normality of data distribution is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test. The decision rule further states that the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) proclaimed that the sample distribution is normal. However, if the test is statistically significant, that is,  $p$ -value  $\geq 0.05$  reject *the*  $H_0$  hypothesis, then it suggests that the alternate hypothesis ( $H_1$ ) is true. This amply implies that the distribution is non-normal. The SPSS normality test conducted on all the latent variable shows  $p$ -value = .000 that is, the  $P < .05$  (see Appendix B). In this case, based on the argument of Ghasemi and Zahediasl, we rejected the null hypothesis ( $H_0$ ) and accepted the alternate hypothesis ( $H_1$ ). The implication is that this distribution is not (normally distributed) nonlinear and allows for the use of WarpPLS 6.0 statistical

software developed by Kock (2018), as being a non-parametric type of structural equation model fit for this analysis.

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## CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATIONS

### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the data obtained using the instruments discussed in Chapter 3; with a focus on answering four specific objectives, the data are presented, interpreted and analysed. A total of 463 questionnaires were distributed to the respondents for self-administration with 401 valid responses received, thus implying a response rate of 86.8 per cent. In the preliminary analysis, this thesis analyses the demographic background of respondents, conducts a reliability test for each of the latent variables and data screening to cross-check the accuracy of the values assigned to each manifest variable in the data set. The SPSS software was used to detect outliers in the four variables (CC, PBS, CS, and CSO). The outliers discovered from the four variables are as follows: CC (4), PBS (3), CS (1) and CSO (5); these errors were subsequently removed from the dataset.

### 4.2 Descriptive Statistics (Variables)

Table 4.1 shows the breakdown of the demography of the sample from the population. The descriptive statistics captured the following: gender, occupation, experience, level of educational accomplishments, duration of electricity usage, type of electricity consumers and residency. As mentioned in section 4.1, analysis shows that the response rate was relatively high (86.8 per cent) against (13.2 per cent) non-response rate. Perhaps, writing materials and other documents such as pens, pencils and envelopes provided to respondents could be the reason for the high response rate.

**Table 4.1: Gender**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
Male	241	61.5
Female	151	38.5
Total	392	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Table 4.1 shows the distribution based on gender, which indicates 61.5 per cent are male, 38.5 per cent are female. Notably, the higher number of male respondents might reflect on the demographic distribution of the general population in terms of the male-female ratio, likewise socio-cultural issues.

**Table 4.2: Nature of Work**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
Academia	109	27.7
Electricity Employees	45	11.4
CSO	44	11.2
Civil Servant	196	49.7
Total	394	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

The demographic analysis of respondents' nature of work reveals that 27.7 per cent are from academia, 11.4 per cent electricity employees, 11.2 per cent members of civil society organisations (CSO), while 49.7 per cent are civil servants. Consistently, evidence from the table shows that civil servants accounted for majority of the respondents, followed by academia, electricity employees and CSO.

**Table 4.3: Work Experience (years)**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
0-5	97	24.4
6-15	115	28.9
16-20	64	16.1
21-25	30	7.5
26 & above	92	23.1
Total	398	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Moreover, the analysis of respondents work experience indicates that 24.4 per cent had spent between 0-5 years, 28.9 per cent had work experience which spans between 6 and 15 years, also 16.1 per cent spent between 16 and 20 years, 7.5 per cent had worked for 21-25 years while 23.1 per cent of the respondents had over 26 years work experience. Table 4.1 indicates that the majority of the respondents had work experience between 5 and 16 years.

**Table 4.4: Educational Attainment**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
OND/NCE	51	13.1
HND/Bachelor	249	64.2
PG Diploma	29	7.5
Masters	35	9.0
PhD	6	1.5
Others	18	4.6
Total	388	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Furthermore, the educational status of respondents would influence their views and responses to question statements. For example, Table 4.4 shows that 13.1 per cent of respondents had an Ordinary National Diploma (OND)/ National Certificate in Education (NCE) degree certificate; 64.2 per cent possessed a Higher National Diploma/ Bachelor degree certificate. Furthermore, 7.5 per cent of the respondents held Postgraduate Diploma certificate, 9.0 per cent are Masters of Science certificate holders, 1.5 per cent of the respondents possessed PhD degrees, while 4.6 per cent indicated others (non-classified). Evidently, the majority of the respondents are graduates.

**Table 4.5: Duration of Electricity Usage (by Consumer, years)**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
0-5	80	20.3
6-15	154	39.2
16-20	47	12.0
21-25	26	6.6
26 & above	86	21.9
Total	393	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Moreover, respondents were requested to indicate their corresponding responses to the question-statement on the duration of usage of electricity (as Consumers). The breakdown of responses as evident in Table 4.5 suggests that 20.3 per cent of respondents' are electricity consumers between 0- 5years, 39.2 per cent between 6 and 15 years, 12.0 per cent between 16-20 years, 6.6 per cent 21-25 years' while 21.9 per cent of the respondents have been electricity consumers for over 26 years. It is evident that most of the respondents have subscribed to electricity services for more than six



decades. This question enables the study to collect data from consumers who have had access to electricity in the pre and post-reform era.

**Table 4.6: Electricity Consumer**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
Household	323	84.1
Small-scale	61	15.9
Total	384	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Table 4.6 shows the analysis of responses according to the type of electricity consumers. The breakdown indicates that 84.1 per cent of respondents are household electricity consumers, while 15.9 per cent are small-scale consumers. It is evidently clear that majority of respondents are household consumers.

**Table 4.7: Location of Residence**

Attribute	Frequency	Per cent
Household	323	84.1
Small-scale	61	15.9
Total	384	100.0

*Note: Total numbers differ due to missing values.*

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Further analysis of the respondents based on residency indicates that 57.9 per cent resided in the urban areas, 27.9 per cent lived in semi-urban, while 14.2 per cent were from rural areas. Obviously, this analysis shows that majority of the respondents are from urban areas, followed by semi-urban while a few of the respondents were selected from rural areas.

The study conducted a descriptive analysis of both independent and dependent variables used in the model to understand the pattern of responses to each question statement. Accordingly, the results of each measurement item were analysed. This estimate is essential to guide the researcher in answering the research question stated in Chapter 1. Similarly, the result obtained from this analysis is used to augment the structural model result.

For instance, when the estimation of a variable is found to be insignificant, this descriptive analysis seeks to provide an in-depth dimension of respondents' viewpoints and assertions. All tables presented in this sub-section show the numbers of questionnaires analysed, and responses (%) to each question for all variables. The result is presented and analysed in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.8: Reform Decision (n=399)**

Reform Decision	Per cent				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>RD1</b> -There is an understanding among government officials on the benefits of privatisation.	8.3	26.8	22.6	35.1	7.3
<b>RD2</b> - There is an existence of trust among the people and the government on why the government privatised the electricity supply.	14.8	40.9	18.3	21.3	4.8
<b>RD3</b> - There is an agreement between levels of government (the Executive & Legislative arm) on the modalities for the privatisation of electricity supply.	6.8	34.3	24.3	23.8	10.8
<b>RD4</b> -There is an understanding between the Executive & Legislative bodies on how to privatise the nation's electricity company.	11.8	35.3	18.0	27.8	7.0
<b>RD5</b> - The decision to privatise was inclusive and reflected general opinion.	15.0	43.6	21.8	14.5	5.0
<b>RD6</b> -Electricity stakeholders (consumers, interest groups, NGOs) have input in the electricity privatisation strategy.	13.0	37.1	22.8	21.8	5.3
<b>RD7</b> -Privatisation of Electricity supply enjoys the support of the legislators and politicians.	8.0	28.1	25.8	29.1	9.0

*Source: Field Survey, 2019.*

**Reform Decision:** Table 4.8 shows the responses to each measurement item on the first model variable, "reform decision" (RD). The analysis for statement **RD1**, which relates to understanding among government officials on the benefit of privatisation, unveils a marginal difference. This is because the breakdown reveals that 35.1 per cent consented while 42.4 per cent held a dissenting view. In the same way, the statement in **RD2**, **indicates** whether people trust the government on the privatisation of electricity supply. Though the government has vehemently explained the rationale for privatisation as evident in the reform policy, the analysis of responses depicted serious scepticism about the sincerity of government reform programme in the power sector because 55.7 per cent disagreed as opposed to 26.1 who agreed.

Furthermore, responses to statement on agreement among tiers of government on modalities for reform (**RD3**) shows that there seems to be conflicting interest right from the reform conception. This is because 41.1 per cent held that dissenting standpoint outnumbered respondents while 34.6 per cent affirmed the existence of consensus within the government circle. Likewise, the result on understanding between government agencies on reform methods as in **RD4** indicates that there is no consensus. For instance, 34.8 per cent of responses were affirmative, while 47.1 per cent of respondents differed. Evidently, it appears that government functionaries were working at cross-purposes.

Furthermore, **RD5**, which borders on the inclusiveness of reform initiative in the power industry, indicates that 58.6 per cent of respondents expressed dissented views whilst 19.5 per cent affirms cooperation. This suggests that key stakeholders were not actively involved in the reform process. Subsequently, analysis of shareholders' input to the reform strategy **RD6** suggests the non-involvement of key stakeholders in the reform process. Finally, the result of **RD7** in Table 4.8 indicates a relatively fuzzy view on the level of

support from the legislators and politicians. This is because the number of respondents who consented was 38.1 per cent, and dissenting views 36.1 per cent had a marginal difference. In brief, it is imperative to state that the views expressed from statements (RD1–RD7) sharply contradicted part of what Ouda (2008) considered as a basic requirement for successful reform.

**Table 4.9 Political and Bureaucratic support (n=398)**

<b>Political and Bureaucratic support (PSB)</b>	Per cent				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>PBS1-</b> Political actors consider privatisation as the best policy option.	13.3	19.1	13.8	40.5	13.3
<b>PBS2-</b> The elites are not convinced of what constitutes the main reason for electricity Privatisation.	7.8	34.9	27.9	22.1	7.3
<b>PBS3-</b> Administrators pledge commitment to the Blueprint on Power Industry Reform implementation.	10.6	25.7	34.3	24.2	5.3
<b>PBS4-</b> Executors of the Electricity Privatisation programme were desirous of its full implementation.	9.5	31.7	24.1	28.4	6.3
<b>PBS5-</b> Administrators of the electricity privatisation programme enlightened the citizens on its benefits	16.6	42.2	15.8	19.8	5.5
<b>PBS6-</b> Bureaucrats understand the need to privatise power utilities	12.3	28.9	31.2	22.6	5.0
<b>PBS7-</b> Civil servants are convinced their interests have been adequately protected in the electricity privatisation programme	21.1	41.0	17.8	16.1	4.0
<b>PBS8-</b> The political elites encouraged the citizens to support the power reform programme.	13.6	33.2	21.9	24.9	6.5

**Source:** Field Survey, 2019.

**Political and Bureaucratic Support:** Table 4.9 shows a descriptive analysis of responses based on political and bureaucratic support for the reform initiative. For **PBS1**, analysis of statement on privatisation as a policy option revealed that political actors consented to privatisation, that is 53.8 per cent, as against 32.4 per cent dissenting views. This aptly indicates that the elite considered privatisation appropriate, which is part of the ingredient for positive reform outcome. Also, the breakdown of responses on **PBS2**, why the elite are not convinced of the rationale for the privatisation of electricity. Although respondents held diverse views, relatively, 42.7 per cent disagreed while 29.4 per cent consented. This invariably implies that the rationale for privatisation was justified, as evident in Table 4.9, where the majority held a dissenting viewpoint. More so, statement **PSB3** in Table 4.9, which seeks to measure the executor's commitment to reform implementation, revealed a lack of commitment on the part of the executors. For instance, 36.3 per cent of the respondents doubted (disagreed) the commitment of reform executors, while only 29.5 per cent were confident. As suggested in the literature, proper implementation is key to successful reform outcomes. Alongside this assertion, analysis of the statement in **PBS4** indicates that respondents doubted the ability of administrators to implement the reform framework, as 41.2 per cent held dissenting views, while 34.7 per cent agreed. In the same vein, the question in **PBS5** seeks to measure the administrators' support for reform. It appeared that they were indifferent because 58.8 per cent did not agree, while only 25.3 per cent suggested that administrators had mobilised support for the reform. Likewise, in **PBS6**, which sought to ascertain whether bureaucrats understood the need to privatise power utilities, 42.1 per cent seemed not convinced while 27 per cent were affirmative.

In **PBS7**, analysed responses to a question posed to ascertain whether citizens' interests had been adequately protected contradicted the government's claim, as 62.1 per cent of the respondents believed that citizens' interest had not been adequately addressed, while only 20.1 per cent expressed satisfaction. The role of the political elite as an agent of

mobilisation was measured in PBS8, and the result indicated that 46.8 per cent of the respondents were dissatisfied, while 31.4 per cent agreed. This evidence suggests that the reform programme was unlikely to have received the necessary supports. This is because the political elites who are supposed to mobilise citizens support for power reform programme are unwilling to play this role.

**Table 4.10 Communication Strategy (n=396)**

<b>Communication Strategy (CS)</b>	<b>Per cent</b>				
	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
<b>CS1</b> -Citizens are properly informed on the rationale behind the power industry reform.	24.9	46.7	10.1	13.3	5.0
<b>CS2</b> -Citizens are properly educated and sensitised on the government reform decision	23.9	46.0	12.3	13.1	4.8
<b>CS3</b> -People are fully informed on the privatisation process	31.4	42.5	10.6	11.11	4.5
<b>CS4</b> -The government has successfully mobilised public opinion in support of the government privatisation programme.	22.9	41.2	19.1	12.1	4.8
<b>The CS5</b> -The government developed a close partnership with stakeholders to actualise the objective of power sector reform.	15.1	30.7	26.6	24.4	3.3
<b>CS6</b> -The citizens were fully engaged in the power sector reform process.	26.6	46.7	14.6	9.0	3.0
<b>CS7</b> -Limited knowledge of the power sector reform process will hinder desirable reform outcome.	6.3	13.6	18.8	37.4	23.9

Source: *Field Survey, 2019.*

**Communication Strategy:** Table 4.10 shows the analysis of responses for each measurement item. Although the rationale for privatisation became public even before a deliberate action towards privatisation, evidence in **CS1** suggests that respondents were dissatisfied that citizens were not adequately communicated, Consequently, 71.6 per cent contradicted the government's claim, while 18.3 per cent concurred. In the same manner,

the analysis of responses to statement **CS2**, which measures the level of citizens' education and sensitisation on proposed reform, reveals great dissatisfaction. Evidence from the following questions contained in **CS3**, **CS4**, **CS5**, and **CS6**, which measure the level of information, mobilisation, partnership, and citizens' engagement, revealed that people were disappointed in the communication strategy adopted by the government. This was because the value for dissenting views was higher. **CS3** obtained disagreement that total 73.9 per cent; Also, analysis of **CS4** indicated that 64.1 per cent disagreed. Similar response was obtained in **CS5**, where 45.8 per cent expressed disappointment, and in **CS6**, majority disagreed that is 73.3 per cent. Undoubtedly, this analysis unveils that people were not adequately mobilised, which invariably suggests there is a communication gap between the government and the citizens. On the other hand, the majority of respondents, 61.3 per cent, in the **CS7** question, consented that limited knowledge about reform was likely to affect the desirable outcomes.

Table 4.5 shows summary of result obtained from descriptive analysis of responses to question-statements to measure this construct (Willingness to Change). The breakdown indicated that a total of 394 responses were analysed.

**Willingness to change (WC):** The analysis of the question in **WC1** related to good maintenance culture in the usage of public goods indicates a positive response and willingness because 43.1 per cent consented as against 37.9 per cent who dissented. Also, the responses to the statement in **WC2**, which concerns citizens' readiness to perform their obligation, show great desire, as 60.4 per cent acceded. Evidence from Table 4.5, as analysed, shows that the majority of responses were in the affirmative. For instance, pieces of evidence from questions **WC3**, **WC4**, **WC5** and **WC6** suggest that most of the respondents, 52.8 per cent, show a willingness to embrace a positive attitude towards electricity service, infrastructure 49.5 per cent, and 75 per cent agreed to change their negative perception about reform activities.

**Table 4.11 Willingness to Change (n=394)**

<b>Willingness to Change (WC)</b>	Per cent				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>WC1</b> -After the privatisation of electricity, people have shown a desire to imbibe new maintenance culture over the usage of public goods	14.6	28.5	18.9	31.1	6.8
<b>WC2</b> -After electricity privatisation, people are more willing to pay their bills when the electricity supply is stable.	7.8	21.0	10.9	42.2	18.2
<b>WC3</b> -People adopt a positive attitude towards the usage of electricity services	10.4	21.10	15.9	42.2	10.6
<b>WC4</b> -People show the desire to protect electricity infrastructure	8.3	21.5	20.7	40.4	9.1
<b>WC5</b> -People tends to change their negative perception about government reform programmes when their worries about electricity are adequately catered for.	3.8	10.9	10.4	46.0	29.0
<b>WC6</b> -Electricity providers' readiness to address customer's complaints will build customers' loyalty and trust	7.3	10.9	11.4	38.9	31.6

Source: *Field Survey, 2019.*

The analysis of the statement in **CC1** of Table 4.6, which relates to the involvement of citizens in the reform process, indicates great displeasure as 81.4 per cent disagreed, while only 9.6 per cent consented. Similarly, evidence from the statement in **CC2** also indicates that the majority of the respondents, 62 per cent, affirmed that citizens' representatives were not involved. Furthermore, the responses to the statement in **CC3** suggest that most of the respondents, 64.4 per cent, disagreed that people's voices or those of their representatives were heard, while 17.4 per cent aligned with the statement.



**Table 4.12 Consultation and Coordination (n=386)**

<b>Consultation and Coordination (CC)</b>	Per cent				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>CC1</b> -The citizens were fully involved in the privatisation process.	36.8	44.6	9.1	5.8	3.8
<b>CC2</b> -People's representatives actively participated in the reform implementation process	19.4	42.6	22.9	12.6	2.5
<b>CC3</b> -People's voices were heard through the representatives who were involved in the privatisation process.	20.5	43.9	18.2	14.9	2.5
<b>CC4</b> -The stakeholders in the electricity industry were consulted through dialogue and deliberation in the privatisation programme.	12.8	29.5	31.2	23.2	3.3
<b>CC5</b> -The Government keenly recognised public opinions on the power reform initiatives	20.2	41.1	16.9	18.1	3.8
<b>CC6</b> -The Government adopted an inclusive, interactive approach to power industry reform conception and implementation	15.6	39.5	26.2	13.4	5.3

Source: *Field Survey, 2019.*

Additionally, the analysis of the statement in **CC4** indicates that 42.3 per cent differed on the level of stakeholders' consultation, while 26.6 concurred. Moreover, a breakdown of the statement in **CC5**, which concerns the government's recognition of public opinions, indicates a disappointing outcome, as 61.3 per cent expressed their frustrations. In the same vein, the analysis of statement **CC6** on inclusiveness in reform implementation shows that 55.1 per cent affirmed that an interactive approach that ought to be embraced was ignored. On the other hand, only 18 per cent applauded the reform approach. Evidently, the analysis suggests there was inadequate consultation and coordination in the reform process because dissenting views were overwhelming.

**Table 4.13: Professional Support (n=397)**

<b>Professional Support (PS)</b>	Per cent				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>PS1</b> -Opinions of experts were considered before the privatisation of electricity.	16.7	39.7	16.7	20.8	6.1
<b>PS2</b> - Experienced professionals were co-opted into power reform technical and steering committees	10.4	37.5	24.3	23.8	4.1
<b>PS3</b> -There is a collaboration between professional interest groups, pressure groups and the government throughout the privatisation process.	16.2	42.3	22.8	16.5	2.3
<b>PS4</b> -Interest groups provided necessary input to support the privatisation exercise	14.2	35.7	23.3	23.5	3.3
<b>PS5</b> -Professionals from informal sector support reform implementation	12.4	42.6	23.9	17.8	3.3
<b>PS6</b> -Government officials in the power sector ensure implementation guidelines	12.4	40.8	24.6	18.2	4.1
<b>PS7</b> -The Civil servant ensures that the reform process was designed in a manner that would allow easy implementation.	11.4	38.0	22.5	23.8	4.3

Source: *Field Survey, 2019.*

**Professional Support:** Table 4.13 shows a breakdown of the responses to question statements on professional support. For instance, the statement in **PS1** sought to understand whether experts' opinions were sought in the reform process. The breakdown indicates that 26.9 per cent agreed, while 56.4 per cent disagreed.

Conversely, the statement in **PS2** relates to the level of expert participation in the reform process, which indicates that 27.9 per cent were convinced that professionals actively

participated, while 47.9 per cent disown this claim. This invariably suggests that the majority of the respondents agreed that professionals who were key stakeholders were not co-opted into the initiation of the reform. More so, a breakdown of the statement in **PS3** on the collaboration between professional interest groups and government shows the existence of a consultation gap because only 18.8 per cent of the respondents agreed as opposed to 58.5 per cent who vehemently denounced the passive role of key stakeholders.

Further analysis on whether interest group provided input into reform decision in **PS4** indicated that 26.8 affirmed this, while 49.9 per cent expressed disagreeing views. Therefore, it is evidently clear that the majority of respondents opined that key professional interest groups were excluded from the reform process. The **PS5** statement in Table 4.13 shows a breakdown of the analysis on the informal sector's support for reform implementation. However, the outcome suggests that critical stakeholders were left out throughout the reform process because 21.1 per cent of the respondents affirmed involvement as opposed to 55.0 per cent who held a contrary view. Also, a further breakdown of the result obtained from **PS6** unveiled that government officials could not pledge commitment to the full implementation of the reform as 53.2 per cent of responses contradicted reform expectations, while 22.3 per cent showed commitment.

In the same manner, the result obtained from statement **PS7** indicates that the reform was unlikely to attain the desired goals because 49.4 per cent suggested that reforms were not streamlined for proper implementation.

**Table 4.14 Civil Society Organisation (n=395)**

<b>Civil Society Organisation (CSO)</b>	<b>Per cent</b>				
	<b>Strongly Disagree</b>	<b>Disagree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Strongly Agree</b>
<b>CSO1</b> -Civil Society Organisations were convinced that restructuring is the best policy option.	14.4	39.0	13.2	24.8	8.6
<b>CSO2</b> -Civil Society Organisations provided significant input for the reform plan.	11.4	44.6	18.0	21.0	5.1
<b>CSO3</b> -There exists a close interface between the government and Civil Society Organisations.	12.9	44.8	23.0	16.7	2.5
<b>CSO4</b> -The Civil Society Organisations were not provided with the opportunity to vet the privatisation agenda for a possible alternative approach.	13.2	35.9	19.0	21.8	10.1
<b>CSO5</b> -Civil Societies built formidable coalitions to support the reform agenda.	13.7	44.3	21.8	16.2	4.1
<b>CSO6</b> -Civil Society Organisation's criticisms of the electricity reform process reflect the wishes of the people.	4.8	18.5	15.7	32.7	28.4
<b>The CSO7</b> -The current state of electricity utilities justified Civil Society Organisations' agitations for the reversal of privatised companies.	6.1	13.9	16.7	29.9	33.4

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

The analysis of the statement in **CSO1** of Table 4.14 borders on the influence of Civil Society Organisations on reform outcome. Although the government made spirited efforts to convince the citizens to accept privatisation as the best policy option, it appeared that interest groups had a different view because 53.4 per cent held divergent views as opposed to only 33.4 per cent who consented.

Similarly, the analysis of the statement in **CSO2** also indicates that 26.1 per cent affirmed the contribution of interest groups, while 56 per cent indicated that the groups were

conspicuously exempted from the reform plan. The result aptly suggests that CSOs, that have been recognised as viable partners in promoting good governance were ignored in the reform process. A further breakdown of the result in **CSO3**, as in Table 4.14, indicates that 57.7 per cent disagreed as opposed to 19.2 per cent that affirmed a close relationship. Therefore, the result invariably suggests the non-existence of the expected synergy between government and interest groups. Similarly, the analysis of the result of **CSO4** also affirmed that interest groups were side-lined and denied the opportunity to scrutinise the reform programme as 49.1 per cent expressed displeasure as against 31.9 per cent who were satisfied. The analysis of statement **CSO5**, which sought to measure the extent of CSO coalitions supporting the reform exercise, indicated that 58 per cent were dissatisfied while only 20.3 per cent expressed satisfaction. The analysis of the statement in **CSO6** showed that 61.1 per cent consented that criticisms that had trailed the reform exercise reflected the citizens' opinions, though 23.3 per cent shared dissenting views. The result of the analysis in **CSO7** also aligned with the aforementioned. However, 20 per cent of the respondents disagreed. As evident in Table 4.14, majority of the respondents that is, 63.3 per cent affirmed that the current state of privatisation was responsible for the agitation for a complete reversal of the entire process.

Table 4.15 shows the responses to the statement on the model's "*dependent variable*" (SGR). The breakdown indicated that a total of 392 responses were analysed. The descriptive analysis of the measurement items indicates clearly that the reform has failed to achieve the desired objectives. For instance, evaluation of the response to the question on **SGR1** shows that 64.1 per cent admitted failure of the reform to attract more capital injection, while 18.4 per cent acceded to reform success. The result ably implies that the outcomes have deviated from the reform objectives.

In addition, an estimate of the statement in **SGR2** also shows that 70.4 per cent of respondents affirmed the failure of the reform to facilitate anticipated improved service delivery, while 15.9 per cent opined otherwise.

**Table 4.15 Successful Government Reform (n=392)**

<b>Successful Government reform (SGR)</b>	Per cent				
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
<b>SGR1</b> -There is more investment and capital injection into the power industry by private companies.	22.2	41.9	17.4	14.4	4.0
<b>SGR2</b> -Improved service delivery systems have facilitated economic growth.	21.7	48.7	13.6	13.1	2.8
<b>SGR3</b> -There is improved revenue generation from power industry reform to the successor companies and government.	15.4	38.9	19.4	18.2	8.1
<b>SGR4</b> -There is no improvement in the living conditions of the entire populace.	36.9	36.6	10.9	10.4	5.3
<b>SGR5</b> -Electricity sector reform has created expected fair competition amongst electricity producers.	10.4	51.8	19.7	15.4	2.8
<b>SGR6</b> -There is a relative reduction in the source of electricity through generator sets.	29.5	38.6	12.4	15.4	4.0

Source: Field Survey, 2019.

Furthermore, the result of **SGR3** on whether there is improvement in revenue generation after the power industry reform indicates that 54.3 per cent expressed deep disappointment about the failure of the reform in this direction, while 26.3 per cent of the respondents acknowledged improvements. In the same vein, the result of the statement in **SGR4**, which sought to ascertain the living conditions of citizens, shows that 73.5 per cent of the respondents asserted that no substantial improvement was recorded, whilst

only 15.7 per cent acknowledged the positive impact of the reform. The result also suggests a dissenting standpoint, which was similar to an earlier outcome.

Furthermore, the estimation of part of the reform objective in **SGR5** indicates that the reform has failed to create the expected fair competition amongst electricity producers. This is because 62.2 per cent of the respondents disagreed, while 18.2 per cent agreed. This result suggests that the majority were not satisfied with the outcome of the reform. Lastly, the result of **SGR6** in Table 4.15 indicates that 68.1 per cent of the respondents consented as opposed to 19.4 per cent who disagreed.

#### **4.3 Assessment of Measurement Model (Outer Model)**

Assessment of the PLS model basically involves two phases (Rasoolimanesh *et al.*, 2015; Hair *et al.*, 2016). Firstly, it estimates the relationship between the construct and the observed indicators. Secondly, it also assesses the structural model, which examines how constructs are related to each other in the model (Hair *et al.*, 2017).

Notably, the essence of the measurement model is to indicate which measurement elements (items) are directly related to each latent variable (Muhamadali & Azizah, 2013). All constructs under consideration are political and bureaucratic support (PBS), communication strategy (CS), consultation and coordination (CC), professional support (PS) and civil society organisation support (CSO). They were evaluated using factor loading. More importantly, the study also used reform decision (RD) as the moderating variable, which was estimated alongside other latent variables. Furthermore, Muhamadali and Azizah (2013) suggested that the assessment of validity uses two pathways: (1) convergent validity and (2) discriminant validity. Therefore, in compliance with the foregoing and to ascertain the construct validity, the study subjected the latent variable to convergent and discriminant validity test.

#### 4.3.1 Model Fit and Quality of Indices

To determine the model fit and quality of indices in a partial least square structural equation model (PLS-SEM), Kock (2017) suggested that the interpretation depends largely on the goal of the structural equation model. For example, a model fit and quality of indices are useful to test whether a model is a better fit than the other, using original data or for testing a hypothesis. Table 4.16 shows the output derived from the model estimation.

**Table 4.16 Model Fit and Quality of indices**

Description	Threshold	Estimated Value	p-Value	Remark
APC	$\leq 0.05$	0.065	0.048	Significant
ARS	$\leq 0.05$	0.113	0.006	Significant
AARS	$\leq 0.05$	0.095	0.014	Significant
AVIF	$\leq 5$	1.408	-	Satisfactory
AFVIF	$\leq 5$	1.464	-	Satisfactory
GOLF	$\geq 0.1$	0.2	-	Medium
SPR	$\geq 0.7$	1	-	Satisfactory
(RSCR) $R^2$	$\geq 0.9$	1	-	Satisfactory
SSR	$\geq 0.7$	1	-	Satisfactory

Source: Primary Data Processed with WarpPLS 6.0 software, 2019.

Table 4.16 shows the model fit and quality of indices obtained from WarpPLS 6.0 software. For average path coefficient (APC), average R-squared (ARS), and an average adjusted R-squared (AARS), Kock (2011) recommended *p-value* less than or equal to ( $\leq$ ) 0.05, that is at 0.05 significant level. From the estimation, the *p-value* for APC is 0.048, which is within the acceptable value. This is statistically significant. Likewise, the average R-square (ARS) and average adjusted R-square (AARS) stood at 0.006; 0.014, respectively, which is below the threshold of 0.05, which means both indices are significant. The study further conducted AVIF and AFVIF to ascertain the extent of the relationship between two or more variables. The reason is to show that the variables in the model explain different underlying constructs and not the same construct. The estimation also shows that the average block VIF(AVIF) and average full collinearity



(AFVIF) values are 1.408; 1.464, respectively. Kock and Lynn (2012) stated that the acceptance criterion for indices is less or equal to ( $\leq$ ) 5. In this study, the estimated value for both indices is  $< 5$ , which implies the absence of a multi-collinearity problem between the variables; hence both are satisfactory. This invariably indicates that there was no overlap of latent variables. Kock (2010) described average path coefficient (APC), average R-squared (ARS) and average variance inflation factors (AVIF) as the main model fit indices in WarpPLS.

Similarly, the study also estimated the Goodness of Fit, commonly referred to as "Tenenhaus GoF", which shows 0.2. Wetzels *et al.* (2009) categorised the thresholds for GoF thus: greater than or equal to 0.1 ( $\geq 0.1$ ) as small;  $\geq 0.25$  as a medium; and  $\geq 0.36$  as large. Kock (2017) affirmed that a GOF value below 0.01 implies that the model's explanatory power is moderate and acceptable. Based on this clarification, the GoF in this study is 0.2, which satisfied the acceptable threshold as it is greater than 0.01.

Moreover, the research conducted the Simpson's Paradox Ratio (SPR) to ascertain whether the model is free from Simpson's paradox problem. Kock (2015) and Kock and Gaskins (2016) emphasised that SPR occurs when the path coefficient and correlation which relate to a pair of variables, produced different signs. The SPR threshold is  $\geq 0.7$ , while the estimated value is 1.000. Therefore, the study concludes that the SPR is satisfied. This implies that there is no incidence of Simpson's paradox in the model. More importantly, the R-squared contribution ratio (RSCR) test was conducted to determine whether the R-squared was free from negative R-squared contribution. This mostly occurs when a predictor variable contributes negatively to the latent variable's R-squared (Wagner, 1992; Pearl, 2009; Kock, 2015; Kock & Gaskins, 2016). Therefore, to treat the RSCR, the threshold must be equal to or greater than 0.9 ( $\geq 0.9$ ), while the estimated value is 1.000. This estimated value aptly satisfied the acceptable benchmark, which signifies satisfaction, and therefore, suggests no negative R-squared contribution in the model.

Furthermore, the study ascertained the extent to which the model is free from incidences of statistical suppression (SSR). This is crucial because MacKinnon *et al.* (2000) and Kock and Gaskins (2016) considered statistical suppression to mean a greater path coefficient than the corresponding correlation related to a pair of linked variables. Spirtes *et al.* (1993), Kock (2015), Kock and Gaskins (2016) indicated that the incidence of SSR suggests possibilities of a causality problem. Kock (2017) recommended the acceptable SSR value of  $\geq 0.7$ , while the study's SSR estimated value is 1.000. From the foregoing, it shows that the SSR index is satisfied. This invariably implies that more than 70 per cent of path model are free from statistical suppression.

#### 4.3.2 Test of Multi-Collinearity

In a study, multi-collinearity implies a close correlation between two or more independent variables. The basis for this test is to ascertain whether or not two or more variables contain similar constructs. Determining this will guard against misleading results. Kock and Lynn (2012) stated that the VIFs are estimated based on a full collinearity test. No doubt, this ensures the detection of not only vertical but also lateral collinearity. Moreover, for PLS-SEM, a full collinearity test is usually conducted instead of the common bias method or common variance method in other analysis (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Kock & Lynn, 2012; Kock, 2015). Table 4.17 shows the multi-collinearity result for all the latent variables in the proposed model.

**Table 4.17 Multi-collinearity Test (VIFs)**

Variable	VIFs
SGR	1.113
PBS	1.541
WC	1.143
PS	1.769
CSO	1.465
CS	1.663
CC	1.677
RD	1.243
RD*CC	1.488
RD*CS	1.536

Source: WarpPLS Software Output, 2019.

To Lindell and Whitney (2001), Hair *et al.* (2011), Kock and Lynn (2012), Hair *et al.* (2014), Kock (2015), VIFs of  $\leq 3.3$  or less indicate no incidence of multi-collinearity and the absence of a common method bias in the model. But conservatively, the VIFs  $< 5$  is recommended and acceptable (Hair *et al.*, 1987; Kline, 1998; Hair *et al.*, 2009; Kock, 2014).

Based on the two thresholds, all the latent variables in the above table satisfied the acceptable benchmark. For instance, the VIF for SGR is 1.13; PBS 1.541; WC 1.143; PAS 1.769; CSO 1.465; CS 1.627; CC 1.677; and moderating variable RD (RD\* CC 1.488; RD\* CS 1.536). As shown above, the VIFs for all variables, including moderating variables (RD), are less than 3.3, or 5 thresholds. This aptly implies the absence of multi-collinearity or common method bias in the model. The result suggests no similarity amongst the constructs in the proposed model.

#### **4.3.3 Internal Consistency**

Unquestionably, inconsistency in measurement is one of the main challenges of internal validity (Sideridis, Saddaawi & Al-Harbi, 2018). Notably, there are diverse opinions on the best method to determine internal consistency in a study (Hattie, 1985). To measure reliability in a study, composite reliability and Cronbach alpha are the major tests (Kline, 2010; Kock, 2015b), and the most popular and widely used amongst the indices of internal consistency is Cronbach alpha (Hogan, Benjamin & Brezinski 2000). However, the accuracy of Cronbach alpha as an incidence of internal consistency has been challenged because of noticeable shortcomings and issues pertaining to computation and interpretation (Shevlin *et al.*, 2000; Raykov, 2001; Henson, 2001; Streiner, 2003; Hayashi & Kamata, 2005; Liu & Zumbo, 2007). This concern has undoubtedly attracted the attention of researchers. Specifically, Peters and Kim (2013) criticised Cronbach alpha for being lower bound and underestimating true reliability; hence the alternative and a generally accepted measure of reliability is composite reliability. Generally, the

recommended criteria for Cronbach alpha and composite reliability should be  $\geq 0.7$  (Nunnally, 1994; Kock & Lynn, 2012; Kock, 2014; Dijkstra & Henseler, (2015).

Conversely, Kock and Lynn (2012) supported this threshold and affirmed that the coefficient must be  $\geq 0.7$ . Additionally, a more relaxed version of the threshold was set at 0.6 (Nunnally, 1994; Kock & Lynn, 2012). In setting the thresholds, Perry et al. (2004), like Ramayah (2011), considered Cronbach alpha (CA) at 0.7 as good and argued that CA at 0.5 is moderate in reliability. Based on Peters and Kim's criticism, the study conducted both the composite reliability test and Cronbach alpha test but relied heavily on composite reliability. The Cronbach alpha for the latent variables as shown in Table 4.18.

**Table 4.18 Cronbach Alpha (CA)**

Latent Variable	Coefficients
SGR	0.722
PBS	0.546
WC	0.709
PS	0.817
CSO	0.324
CS	0.736
CC	0.737
RD	0.623
RD*CC	0.865
RD*CS	0.868

Source: WarpPLS Software Output, 2019.

The values obtained from each latent variables are as follows: SGR 0.722; WC 0.709; PAS 0.817; CS 0.736; CC 0.737; RD 0.623, RD\*CC 0.865; RD\*CS 0.868.

Based on Nunnally (1994) and Kock and Lynn's (2012) recommended acceptable value, it clearly shows that the following latent variables SGR; WC; PS; CS; CC; and RD, satisfied the general criteria for internal consistency, but PSB scores are 0.546 and CSO scores 0.32. However, it is imperative to note that the coefficient of these latent variables, PSB and CSO, was relatively low reliability, but Ramayah (2011) argued that Cronbach alpha at 0.5 could be considered as moderate reliability.

The study opted for composite reliability as a substitute and a more appropriate measure of internal consistency. Notably, Composite reliability is an alternative to Cronbach alpha in measuring reliability. This study considers that composite reliability is more appropriate to measure internal consistency based on previous arguments coupled with the findings of Hair et al. (2012) and Wong (2013). They strongly recommended composite reliability as the most appropriate measure of internal consistency. The results obtained from the estimation of all latent variables are presented in Table 4.19.

**Table 4.19 Composite Reliability Test (C.R)**

Latent Variables	Coefficients
SGR	0.812
PBS	0.704
WC	0.805
PS	0.865
CSO	0.515
CS	0.822
CC	0.821
RD	0.751
RD*CC	0.878
RD*CS	0.880

Source: WarpPLS Software Output, 2019.

Evidence from the table indicates that the coefficient values for latent variables are: SGR 0.812; PBS 0.704; WC 0.805; PAS 0.865; CSO 0.588; CS 0.822; CC 0.821 including the moderating variable RD (RD\*CC 0.878; RD\*CS 0.880). The result clearly shows that the values for latent variables are higher than the threshold values of 0.6 for composite reliability (CR), except for latent variable CSO, which is 0.515. This aptly implies that the internal consistency for the structural model is satisfactory for all the reflective latent variables when CSO is discarded.

#### **4.3.4 Assessment for Validity - *Convergent Validity***

In PLS-SEM, the average variance extracted (AVE) is commonly used to determine the convergent validity of the structural model. To ascertain the convergent validity of this

proposed model, all the latent variables were estimated. Generally, the threshold for convergent validity should be  $\geq 0.5$ . However, when the value of AVE is less than 5, and when the composite reliability is more than 0.6, then the convergent validity for the variable(s) is deemed satisfactory and acceptable (Fornell & Larcker, 1981 as cited in Safiih and Azreen, 2016). Table 4.14 shows the measurement items, loadings for each construct, as well as composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) for the latent variables.

To determine the convergent validity, factor loading, composite reliability (CR) and average variance extracted (AVE) were estimated. Accordingly, the values for each variable were presented in Table 4.14. The average variance extracted (AVE) for the latent variables are as follows: SGR 0.424; PBS 0.33; CS 0.459; WC 0.412; PAS 0.478; CC 0.435; CSO 0.316. Although the AVE for PBS, which stood at 0.33, is low, the corresponding composite reliability (CR, [0.704]) is higher than the 0.06 threshold.

Therefore, the result was considered satisfactory based on Fornell and David's (1981) argument and supported by Safiih and Azreen (2016), which was discussed in subsection 4.3.4. Conversely, the composite reliability for the other variables are: SGR 0.812; PBS 0.704; CS 0.822; WC 0.805; CC 0.821; PAS 0.865, which were found to be higher than the 0.06 threshold. This indicates that convergent validity is achieved for these variables, except CSO, whose CR stood at 0.588 and the AVE at 0.316. Although the AVE for CSO is weak, the path analysis was statistically significant.

**Table 4.20: Convergent Validity**

Measurement Item	Loading	Composite Reliability (CR)	Average Variance Extracted (AVE)
SGR1	0.706	0.812	0.424 (0.500)
SGR2	0.712	-	-
SGR3	0.703	-	-
SGR4_2	0.452	-	-
SGR5	0.664	-	-
SGR6	0.631	-	-
PBS1	-0.096	0.704	0.33
PBS2_2	0.072	-	-
PBS3	0.087	-	-
PBS4	0.074	-	-
PBS5	0.001	-	-
PBS6	0.009	-	-
PBS7	-0.007	-	-
PBS8	-0.039	-	-
WC1	0.007	0.805	0.412
WC2	0.008	-	-
WC3	0.015	-	-
WC4	-0.023	-	-
WC5	-0.003	-	-
WC6	-0.004	-	-
PS1	-0.066	0.865	0.478
PS2	-0.03	-	-
PS3	-0.073	-	-
PS4	0.027	-	-
PS5	-0.004	-	-
PS6	0.033	-	-
PS7	0.123	-	-
CSO1	-0.026	0.515	0.316
CSO2	-0.001	-	-
CSO3	0.078	-	-
CSO4_2	-0.017	-	-
CSO5	-0.066	-	-
CSO6	0.026	-	-
CSO7	-0.035	-	-
CS1	-0.08	0.822	0.459
CS2	-0.058	-	-
CS3	0.056	-	-
CS4	0.074	-	-
CS5	-0.034	-	-
CS6	0.039	-	-
CS7	0.012	-	-
CC1	0.052	0.821	0.435
CC2	0.062	-	-
CC3	-0.085	-	-
CC4	-0.015	-	-
CC5	-0.115	-	-
CC6	0.116	-	-

Source: Primary Data Analysed using WarpPLS Software, 2019.

#### 4.3.5 Assessment for Validity - *Discriminant Validity*

The discriminant validity was estimated by comparing the correlations between the constructs and the square root of Average Variance Extracted (AVE). This test assesses the extent to which construct are empirically different from one another. For this study, Table 4.21 shows the correlation matrix between the latent variables.

**Table 4. 21: Discriminant Validity**

	SGR	PBS	WC	PAS	CSO	CS	CC	RD	RD*CC	RD*CS
SGR	<b>0.651</b>									
PBS	0.171	<b>0.575</b>								
WC	0.048	0.274	<b>0.642</b>							
PAS	0.289	0.395	0.264	<b>0.692</b>						
CSO	0.232	0.342	0.163	0.509	<b>0.562</b>					
CS	0.169	0.455	0.159	0.440	0.364	<b>0.677</b>				
CC	0.197	0.340	0.251	0.492	0.400	0.525	<b>0.660</b>			
RD	0.116	0.399	0.176	0.282	0.182	0.288	0.197	<b>0.583</b>		
RD*CC	-0.059	-0.113	-0.006	-0.044	-0.064	-0.048	-0.064	-0.070	<b>0.424</b>	
RD*CS	0.036	-0.012	0.038	0.111	0.075	0.082	-0.052	0.074	0.548	<b>0.420</b>

Source: Primary Data Analysed using WarpPLS Software, 2019.

The values in bold shown in table 4.21 show the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE). Then, to determine discriminant validity, the values in bold must be higher than the values in the rows and columns (Mohamadali, 2013; Henseler et al., 2015). As shown in the table above, the value in each construct is higher than those in the diagonal and off-diagonal in the rows and columns. For instance, the values for the variables are as follows: SGR 0.651; PBS 0.575; WC 0.642; CSO 0.562; CS 0.677. Similarly, the values in bold are higher than those in the horizontal and vertical rows and columns for the following variables: CC 0.660; RD 0.583; RD\*CC 0.424; RD\*CS 0.420.



For this reason, the analysis has satisfactorily proved discriminant validity. The result presented in Table 4.21, as analysed, clearly indicates that there was no correlation between the latent variables. Conversely, evidence from the result has demonstrated that the latent variables in the hypothesised model are distinct and uncorrelated.

#### **4.4 Assessment of the Structural Model (Inner Model)**

The results presented and analysed in section 4.3 indicate that the first stage has been satisfied, where the study established that the model fit (robustness) criterion had been fulfilled. This is so because evidence from the results obtained from the model fit and quality of indices estimation in subsections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 clearly established that the absence of a multi-collinearity problem affirms the goodness of the proposed model. Equally, the measurement model assessment outcome also demonstrates sufficient robustness required to test the relationship between the variables in the proposed model. For this reason, the study proceeds to estimate the structural model, which involves the estimation proposed hypothesis, structural model outcome and R-squared coefficients. The various components of the hypothesised structural model are further analysed and discussed in subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2.

##### **4.4.1 Evaluation of proposed Hypotheses Model (inner model)**

In PLS-SEM, the inner model or structural model is usually conducted to predict the relationship between the latent variables (Nurcahyono *et al.*, 2019). Having confirmed the validity of the structural model, the next stage is to assess the path coefficients of the proposed model. For this purpose, Figure 4.1 unveils the structural model and corresponding paths results (Mohamadali, 2013). The path analysis clearly indicates the pattern of interactions between the latent variables. The most important activity here is basically to test the proposed hypothesis earlier developed in Chapter 2 to answer the research questions. Scholars have suggested that size, sign, and the significance of path

coefficient must be checked and reported to assess the structural model (Ali *et al.*, 2018; Hair *et al.*, 2017).

Similarly, Kock (2015) proposed a one-tailed test when the path coefficient shows a sign (positive or negative); otherwise, a two-tailed test is strongly recommended. Figure 4.1 shows the result of path coefficients  $p$ -values and R-squared ( $R^2$ ) using WarpPLS 6.0 software. The arrows in Figure 4.1 show the direct and indirect relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables.




Figure 4.1 Hypothesised model (path coefficient)

Source: Research Survey processed with WarpPLS 2019 Software, 2019.

#### 4.4.2 Analysis of Structural Model Outcome

After estimating the path analysis, the next stage is to interpret the proposed structural model's paths and test the hypothetical statements developed in Chapter 2. Notably, the estimated  $p$ -value of path coefficients was used as the yardstick for testing the hypothesis.

Equally, the study also estimated the path coefficient and R-squared ( $R^2$ ) in assessing the structural model outcome. Additionally, the Path coefficient and R-squared ( $R^2$ ) were the main yardsticks for testing the hypothesis. On hypothesis testing using PLS, Kock (2010) observed that it might be difficult to establish a linear relationship strong enough to be statistically significant at  $\leq .05$ . Therefore, jack-knife resampling technique should be adopted when the sample size is less than 100. When the sample size is large, the bootstrapping resampling method is recommended. In this sense, Nevitt and Hancock (2001), supported by Kock (2010), described bootstrapping and jackknifing as a resampling method for generating estimates, and employed them in the testing of hypothesis.

Hair et al. (2013) compared bootstrapping to a resampling approach, which draws random samples on a replacement from a dataset basis to assess path analysis multiple times with minimal changes in the data. This study adopts the bootstrapping method of testing the hypothesis. Vinzi *et al.* (2010) argued that the essence of bootstrapping is to estimate the standard error of coefficients and calculate the statistical significance of the coefficients. According to Mohamadali (2013), the statistical significance of the path coefficient between the latent variables and the dependent variable is achievable by looking at the sign and size that appear on the path analysis (estimation). For instance, a stronger effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable depends on a higher path coefficient. Koh (2011) equally adopted this method by suggesting significance at  $p < .001$ ;  $p < .05$ ;  $p < .10$ . The output of the estimations is presented in Table 4.16, and the result is interpreted on all paths used to measure each hypothesis.

**Table 4.22 Result of Structural Model**

<u>Measurement Items</u>	<u>Hypotheses</u>	<u>Beta, <math>\beta</math></u>	<u>Results</u>
Political and Bureaucratic Support	$H_{1a}$ : PBS to SGR	.035	Not Supported
<b>Consultation and Coordination</b>	$H_{1b}$ : CC to SGR	<b>.066*</b>	<b>Supported</b>
Communication Strategy	$H_{2a}$ : CS to SGR	.008	Not Supported
Willingness to Change	$H_{2b}$ : WC to SGR	.021	Not Supported
<b>Professional Support</b>	$H_{3a}$ : PAS to SGR	<b>.194***</b>	<b>Supported</b>
<b>Civil Society Org. Support</b>	$H_{3b}$ : CSO to SGR	<b>.088**</b>	<b>Supported</b>
<i>(Moderation: Indirect)</i>			
Reform Decision	$H_{4a}$ : RD*CC to SGR	-0.031	Not Supported
<b>Reform Decision</b>	$H_{4b}$ : RD*CS to SGR	<b>.074*</b>	<b>Supported</b>

\* indicate significant at  $p < .10$ ; \*\*indicate significant  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* indicate significant  $p < .001$ .

Source: Survey Data Processed with WarpPLS 6.0 Software, 2019.

To interpret the outcome of the result, it is important to first restate the main purpose of the proposed model, which is to establish the direct relationship, (if any), between the independent variables: PSB; CC; CS; WC; PAS; CSO; and SGR (dependent variable). Also, the indirect relationship between reform decision (RD) and SGR. Table 4.22 offers an overview of the relationships in the proposed model. As shown in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.22, the result of bootstrapping methods revealed that path model  $H_{1a}$ : PBS to SGR shows  $\beta = .035$ ;  $p > .10$ , indicated a positive but insignificant relationship. However, evidence from Hesse (2005); Beh (2007); Schedler and Schmucki (2009); Ahmed (2009); and Seidman (2016), as referred to in Chapter 2, suggests that political and bureaucratic support is key to attaining successful reform activities. Although the result established a positive relationship, nevertheless, it failed to provide statistical significance to validate this assertion. It could be interpreted to mean that the relationship is practically significant, but the study could not validate the relationship.

The result of path analysis between consultation and coordination (CC) and successful government reform (SGR) estimated  $H_{1b}$ : CC to SGR indicates ( $\beta = .066^*$ ;  $p < .10$ ).

Path result suggests a positive relationship and statistical significance. The result of path  $H_{1b}$ : CC to SGR established a strong relationship which validates Igboke's (2017) arguments that lack of proper consultation is one of the banes of administrative failures in Africa. After evaluating the two relationships to test hypothesis 1 ( $H_{1a}$ : PBS to SGR and  $H_{1b}$ : CC to SGR) therefore, the study failed to reject the alternate hypothesis. Evidence from this empirical result (estimation) also validates Sangita's (2002, p.340) argument in Chapter 2 that "the success of administrative reform depends upon the government's ability to present strategic reform based on the vision in consultation with the people".

For hypothesis two ( $H_{2a}$  &  $H_{2b}$ ), the latent variables (independent) *Communication Strategy (CS)*, *Willingness to Change (WC)* and the dependent variable *Successful Government Reform (SGR)* were estimated. The paths ( $H_{2a}$ : CS to SGR) as shown in Table 4.22 indicate ( $\beta=.008$ ;  $p>.10$ ). Although the result revealed a positive relationship between CS and SGR, the result is not statistically significant. This implies that there is no common relationship between these latent variables and is not supported, causing a failure to reject the alternate hypothesis.

Furthermore, the hypothesis on *Willingness to Change (WC)*, path ( $H_{2b}$ : WC to SGR) is also not supported because ( $\beta=.021$ ;  $p>.10$ ). Thompson (1999, p.283) was sceptical about behaviour and change, thus "administrative reform that rarely "works" as intended by its sponsors. Where he posed questions about change and change processes-whether and to what extent large organisations and the behaviours of those therein can be shaped according to the intentions of one or more actors".

The result suggests there is positive but insignificant relationship between the variables. As discussed in Chapter 2, Ouda (2008) predicted the interactions between CS and SGR, WC and SGR, but the result of path analysis in this study has failed to validate this argument. This aptly implies that the hypothetical relationship is not empirically

supported; nonetheless, the study failed to reject the alternate hypothesis because of the evidence from the descriptive analysis of the model variable, as shown in Table 4.11.

Furthermore, hypothesis three, which states that *there is a relationship between inclusive stakeholders' engagement during the reform plan and result-driven reform outcome*," is tested. The result confirms there is a positive relationship and was found statistically significant because estimation of the path ( $H_{3a}$ : PAS to SGR), that is, the lateral relationship between professional support and successful government reform, indicates ( $\beta=.194^{***}; p<.05$ ). The implication of the result is that empirical evidence based on the data analysed enviably supports this hypothetical relationship and validates a similar argument by Ouda (2008). Based on this outcome, the alternate hypothesis ( $H_{3a}$ ) is hereby accepted.

Similarly, the study also tests other hypothesis stated in Chapter 2, which states that:  $H_{3b}$ : *there is a relationship between inclusive shareholders' engagement during the reform plan and result-driven reform outcome*". Path estimation of the relationship between civil society organisations (CSO) and successful government reforms (SGR) indicates a positive relationship and statistical significance. That is, the path analysis  $H_{3b}$ : CSO to SGR revealed ( $\beta=.088^{**}; p<.05$ ).

The empirical result presented in Table 4.14 and analysed in this subsection corroborates Hesse's (2005, p.5) declaration captured in this statement:

"it is necessary to recognise that government reform is like a marathon, not a sprint. The government should recognise the inevitable roles of the civil society organisation in the mainstream of democratic governance. This has to be demonstrated by providing a concrete opportunity for civil society organisation to participate meaningfully and positively in the national decision-making process."

Additionally, Kankya *et al.* (2013) agreed that the role of civil societies in service delivery, particularly in the social service sector, has continued to gather momentum and

is widely recognised in both developing and industrial societies. Furthermore, Kankya rightly mentioned that the contributions of CSO are crucial to sustainable change and improved governance. Therefore, based on the empirical result presented and relevant literature, which affirmed the significant impact of CSO on SGR, the hypothesis is hereby accepted.

Subsequently, the result of the indirect interaction between reform decision (RD) - a moderating variable (SGR), shows negative relationship  $H_{4a}$ : RD\*CC to SGR because of ( $\beta=-0.031$ ;  $p> .10$ ). As shown above, the result was not aligned to move in the proposed direction, and the relationship  $H_{4a}$ : RD\*CC to SGR is not supported in this thesis. However, the indirect relationship between  $H_{4b}$ :RD\*CS to SGR estimated indicates a positive relationship and suggests statistical significance ( $\beta=.074^*$ ;  $p< .10$ ). Evidence, as presented in Table 4.14, suggests that the result is supported in this study.

This result implies that reform *decision (RD)* influences *communication strategy (CS)*, and *successful government reforms (SGR)*, which corroborates Ouda's (2008) arguments.

#### 4.4.3 Assessment of $R^2$ Coefficients

According to Muhamadali (2012),  $R^2$  is usually estimated to determine the predictive power of the hypothesised model. As affirmed by Muhamadali (2012), the  $R^2$  coefficients of the structural model were estimated to assess the strength of the prediction of the association between endogenous (dependent) and exogenous (independent) variables in the model. Cohen (2013) categorised  $R^2$  and adjusted  $R^2$  coefficient into the following:

0.02 (weak); 0.13 (moderate), and 0.25 (substantial). Similarly, Kock (2014) considered  $R^2$  coefficients below 0.02 to be too weak and unacceptable. Similarly, Falk and Miller (1992) argued that the  $R^2$  value must be greater than or equal to 0.10 for the variable to be deemed acceptable. Conversely, Kock (2014) emphasised that this implicitly suggests that the predictor latent variables are not relevant to practical views. The implication is

that the  $R^2$  be reconsidered for reversion because it falls below expectation in terms of explanatory power between the endogenous and exogenous variables in the model. Georgi (2020) argued that a low  $R^2$  does not suggest that the statistical model is inadequate because the adjusted  $R^2$  in the model is more important, most especially in a cross-sectional study. Furthermore, Georgi argued that  $R^2$  could not measure the statistical adequacy of the model. This study employed WarpPLS 0.6 for the analysis. The value of  $R^2$  obtained is .113 (see Figure 4.1). As this result is higher than the threshold, it is therefore found acceptable and satisfactory. The value suggests that the hypothesised model possessed the explanatory power of predicting the relationship between the endogenous and exogenous variables.

#### **4.5 Discussion of Findings**

Analysis of previous studies indicates that most administrative reforms often fail to produce the expected outcomes, that is, the reforms are unsatisfactory in terms of expectation and reality (Bennell, 1997; Ji, 1998; Thompson, 1999; Alex, 2006 in Liou, 2017; Ellinas & Suleiman, 2007; Cini, 2008; Kim & Han, 2015).

This chapter analysed the extent of how key issues (expected support) influence the outcomes of reform activities. Evidence from the quantitative analysis in this chapter confirms the arguments in the literature review that adequate support by political/bureaucratic actors and a well-designed consultation mechanism denotes the likelihood of satisfactory reform outcomes.

The result demonstrates the centrality of the consultation as a key to purposeful and result-driven reforms. In the first instance, the study proposed a relationship between political, bureaucratic actors and successful reform. Also, empirical data collected were used to test the relationship between consultation, coordination, and relevance to successful reform. Alongside this proposition, both empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that substantial reform outcome depends on consultation/ coordination



strategies. This finding affirmed the submissions of Bowornwathana (1997, 1998, 1999, 2013), Sangita (2002, p1), Hesse (2005), Ouda (2008) that “the success of administrative reform depends upon the government's ability to present strategic reform based on the vision in consultation with the wider sections of the society as well as effective communication to the stakeholders and people about the need for reform and likely benefits from it”. The implication of this result is that administrative reform without an effective consultation framework is vulnerable to an undesirable outcome.

Additionally, the relevance of behavioural change (WC); and communication strategy to successful government reform estimated indicates a positive relationship but could not be statistically proven because the result of paths analysis for (*H<sub>2a</sub>: CS to SGR*, *H<sub>2b</sub>: WC to SGR*) was found to be insignificant. Nevertheless, practical evidence and theoretical exposition from previous literature (Ouda, 2008) and particularly Thompson (1999, p.1) suggested that “administrative reform works when organisations and the behaviours of those therein can be shaped according to the intentions of one or more actors”. Perhaps, the reasons for the non-significance of the paths analysis for *H<sub>2a</sub>: CS to SGR*, *H<sub>2b</sub>: WC to SGR* might not be linked to the choice of respondents' demography. For instance, the analysis of respondents' educational attainment in Table 4.1 indicates that the majority being 62.1 per cent are HND/Bachelor holders.

The result might possibly improve/ be better if the respondent with a higher degree has a substantial percentage in the distribution. Notwithstanding, other evidence presented seems to validate the proposed paths, which suggest the significant impact on reform outcomes (satisfactory/unsatisfactory). The result presented and analysed replicated Ouda's submission in his model, which acknowledged the relationship between professional support as a pre-condition for successful reform outcome. This study model outcome has validated Ouda's theoretical postulation. More importantly, the study added (CSO) independent variable hitherto missing in the original theory developed by Ouda

(2008) as a cogent contribution to expanding the horizon of knowledge. Interestingly, the evidence as presented in Table 4.14 affirmed the relationship between ***H<sub>3b</sub>: CSO to SGR***. Beyond the direct relationship estimated above, analysis of moderating effect reform decision from ***RD\*CC to SGR*** showed negative relation.

The result clearly shows that the variables are uncorrelated, as the study could not statistically establish any influence of *reform decision on successful government reform* through consultation/ coordination. However, the resulting outcome validates the influence of ***RD\* CS on SGR***. The result of the path analysis depicted the significant *reform decision on communication strategy and successful government reform*. Although Ouda's (2008) study affirmed the reform decision as a pre-requisite for successful reform, this study used reform decision as a moderator between *communication strategy* and *successful government reform*.

Conversely, the result of the estimation has validly established the moderating effect of ***RD\* CS on SGR***. Finally, the value of R-square ( $R^2$ ) estimation as a statistical measure to determine the explanatory power of the proposed model also indicates small. Nevertheless, the model possessed the requisite for reliable prediction. This is because the value obtained is satisfactory enough to measure the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable and the model. R-square ( $R^2$ ) result suggests that the proposed model possesses substantial strength and explanatory power. This is evident in Georgi (2020) findings, who affirmed that low  $R^2$  does not imply inadequacy of the statistical model.

## **CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This thesis analysed the critical factors that contributed to the contrast between anticipated reform results and the actual outcomes. This study was adapted from Ouda's (2008) generic government sector reform model, which identifies essential requisites for a desirable reform outcome. Most importantly, key variables (components) recognised as a basic requirement for a successful reform were adapted to interrogate reform in the Nigerian power sector.

The main thrust of the reform exercise is to improve the overall efficiency of electricity supply to the end-users. However, as the complaints and public administrative reform instituted to restructure the problematic Nigerian power sector appeared to have failed to achieve the desired outcome. This is because of the displayed epileptic supply of electricity that has characterised the sector before reform persists. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the NERC (2016) indicated that in the last quarter of 2015, electricity consumers had lodged over 47,127 complaints against electricity distribution companies. In addition, reports showed that over 109,048 complaints were lodged by electricity consumers over interrupted and poor supply against power distribution companies in the third quarter of 2017 (NERC, 2018). Similarly, a total of 120,028 complaints were lodged against all distribution companies (11) in the first quarter, 145,959 in the second quarter (NERC, 2019). Evidently, increasing numbers of complaints were lodged by customers quarterly and yearly suggesting great dissatisfaction. Apparently, the outcome of the power sector restructuring exercise was again a futile adventure, as indicated in the NERC (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) quarterly reports.

Papaefstratiou (2019) cited the deficit of mutual trust amongst stakeholders, most especially politicians, bureaucrats and interest groups, as vital problems, that are likely to negatively affect reform outcomes. Additionally, Ibrahim (2012) asserted that the non-participation of the stakeholders in the reform process is a critical obstacle to a desirable result. Undoubtedly, issues raised here aptly relates to the components of Ouda's (2008) generic framework for successful reform, which highlighted the basic requirement for a purposeful reform. Therefore, this thesis examined the influence of political, bureaucrat support, consultation and communication approaches on the level of successful reform. Additionally, it analysed the relationship between willingness to change and communication strategy as a determinant of successful government reform. Also, it investigated whether the professional and civil society organisation support facilitates a successful government reform. This study adopted a quantitative method and a cross-sectional approach where data were collected from field surveys through a self-administered questionnaire instrument. In conclusion, recommendations relating to findings in the study are elaborated to broaden issues related to the expansion of the theory.

## **5.2 Summary of Findings**

Evidence from previous studies discussed in Chapters One and Two have attributed a low level of development and living conditions in developing economies to lack of good governance. In fact, Chapter 2 specifically discussed various impediments to impactful administrative reforms. Consequently, this study examined factors that contribute to unsuccessful reforms. To investigate this issue, Ouda's model was found suitable because of its comprehensiveness and problem-solving effectiveness. However, little modification was carried out to suit the peculiarity of the study area. Findings from an empirical analysis indicates that not all hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 are statistically significant, confirmed and supported.

The findings in this research unveil that there is a correlation between reform frameworks and outcomes. Therefore, a positive outcome will ensure improvement in the public service delivery system. The theory, after empirical examination suggests a lead way to attain purposeful reform activity. It is noteworthy that the spectrum/broad attribute of the model permits further examination in other field. Specifically, the following topics were designed to address the research objectives as stipulated in Chapter 1.

### **5.2.1 Influence of Political, Bureaucratic Support and Consultation on Successful Government Reform**

The analysis on the empirical and qualitative findings divulged that political and bureaucratic supports, consultation, willingness to change, communication strategy, and professional and civil society organisations are prerequisites for successful reforms. In a nutshell, it was discovered that the hypothesised model was fully supported by the data. More so, the result obtained from the data collected and analysed affirmed that there is a positive relationship between political, bureaucratic support, consultation, coordination and level of successful government reform. This evidently supports the findings of many earlier studies on the crucial roles of political, bureaucratic support as well as consultation and coordination in facilitating successful reform outcomes. Moreover, the result obtained supported the theoretical explanations and argument advanced by these scholars: These were discussed in the works of Hesse (2005), Beh (2007), Schedler and Schmucki (2009), Ahmed (2009), and Seidman (2016), in the literature review section of this thesis.

Additionally, the findings also reinforced Ouda's (2008) postulation, which presupposes that political, bureaucratic support, consultation and coordination are crucial towards the implementation of purposeful reforms. Likewise, Ouda (2008) and Guma (2012) stressed the importance of an all-inclusive stakeholder's engagement as the key to successful reform, otherwise, reform is tantamount to failure. In this case, the empirical result

supported the theoretical arguments which affirmed political and bureaucratic support and consultation as the key determinants of positive reform outcome. Evidently, they found that political, bureaucratic support and consultation are not only essential but a prerequisite for successful reform.

### **5.2.2 Willingness to Change and Communication Strategies as a critical factor for Successful Government Reforms**

It was found that the data obtained did not support the hypothesised model. Though the relationship was positive but it cannot be statistically confirmed. This result suggests that the analysis failed to statistically confirm the proposed relationship. For instance, the result obtained might be influenced by the pattern of respondent's demography or the method of data collection. The findings unveiled that the willingness to change and communication strategy does not have a positive impact on successful government reforms. However, from a conceptual viewpoint, previous studies affirmed the positive impact of willingness to change and communication strategy on successful government reforms. The submission by Thompson (1999) was reinforced by Ouda's (2008) theoretical postulation, which asserted that the success of administrative reforms depends on the willingness to change the processes. To put it simply, whether and to what extent actors in the organisations are ready to embrace reform initiatives (change). In this case, the result obtained in this study contradicted the theoretical exposition developed by Ouda. The reason might be due to the variations in the political and socio-cultural systems between Nigeria (where the theory is being tested) and New Zealand (where the theory was originally developed). Apparently, the government-to-citizens' relationship in New Zealand has been cooperative, which entrenched confidence against Nigeria, where a deficit of mutual trust between government and the citizens have remained a key obstacle to developmental drives. Perhaps, these realities in both countries were largely responsible for the variation in the result analysed.

### **5.2.3 Professional Support (PS) and Civil Society Organisations (CSO) as a viable ingredient for Successful Government Reforms (SGR)**

The findings in this study affirmed the benefit of professional support (PS) as a pre-condition and critical factor that largely facilitates satisfactory reform exercise. In the like manner, the Civil Society Organisations (CSO) a newly introduced construct was found to have a positive impact on the level of successful government reforms. Therefore, the findings validate the result of previous studies by Hesse (2005), Kankya et al.,(2013) and part of Ouda's model specification. Undoubtedly, this study has implications for public managers, the research community and the entire public management research. It is also important to state that the study has become a key reference point because it introduced variables hitherto ignored by previous scholars.

### **5.2.4 Influence of Reform decision (RD) on the level of successful reform (SGR)**

This thesis analysis how reform decisions shape reform outcomes through two mediators' consultation, coordination (CC) and communication strategy (CS). In addition, the study established that there is a positive mediation of CC between reform decision (RD) and successful government reform (SGR). The result obtained statistically supported the proposed indirect relationship between reform decisions, communication strategy and successful government reforms. This implies that the relationship is confirmed. Evidence from the literature of Ouda (2008) affirmed there is a positive indirect relationship between the variables (reform decision, communication and successful government reforms). However, the result failed to confirm the relationship because it could not be statistically supported.

### **5.3 Research Contribution**

This study captured issues that are of utmost concern to academics, practitioners and the general public. A summary of the main contribution of this study is as follows:

#### **5.3.1 Theoretical Implication**

No doubt, the research of this nature is mostly assessed based on its contributions to expand the theoretical base and enrich the body of literature. Theoretically, the issue of administrative reform is crucial to improving public service delivery systems and promote good governance. This is because many unsuccessful administrative reforms have largely contributed to unsatisfactory living conditions of the populace, as illustrated in Chapter 1 of this study. In order to underscore this issue, published studies have proposed frameworks as an essential prerequisite for a successful government sector reform (Ouda, 2008). While scholars have failed to conduct an empirical analysis of this proposed framework, this study has attempted to provide a theory/ framework that can possibly predict the outcomes of reform exercises.

More specifically, variables used in the proposed model were adapted from a theory originally developed for reform of accounting accruals in New Zealand by Ouda (2008). The variables: RD, PBS, CC, WC, CS, PS and SBR “*adapted*” were subjected to empirical studies to ascertain their capability for interrogating administrative reform process in the power industry. Not only that, "CSO", an independent variable hitherto ignored by Ouda, was introduced into the theory; its relevance to successful reform was also statistically proven.

- (i) The finding of this study hopes to contribute to the intellectual search for the appropriate theory/framework for result-oriented reform activity in the public sector. It has enriched the body of literature and expanded the horizon of knowledge in the area of public administration and public management in particular.



- (ii) It attempts to contribute to the academic debate on promoting good governance and efficient public service delivery.
- (iii) Notably, a distinctive contribution of this study is by adopting the structural equation model (SEM); the study has successfully developed a robust framework/model/paths for successful administrative reforms. For instance, the model presumed that result-driven reforms must take cognisance of this framework because the result analysis and literature have established the relevance of this framework to successful reforms.

### **5.3.2 Empirical Implication**

Based on the issues discussed in Section 1.7, which suggested that no concrete/ empirical investigation on why successive administrative reforms often failed in Nigeria, this thesis represents a pioneering effort in the context of Nigeria and enters new empirical terrain. Moreover, this study advocates an alignment between theory and empirical evaluation. While Ouda merely conceptualises the generic reform framework (variables), this study expands and empirically tests conceptualised variables (adapted variables). Apart from that, the study employed WarpPLS 6.0 - a variance-based approach to the structural equation model as a tool of analysis, a relatively new software developed in 2017, and novel in terms of application, especially in the public management field. The software was used to analyse the complex relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

### **5.3.3 Practical Implications**

In a nutshell, within the purview of public management, this research hopes to serve as a lead way or respite for the debate on purposeful reforms and the promotion of good governance not only in Nigeria but also in other emerging economies and beyond. The implications of this study are:

- i. This research is policy-relevant. Therefore, the findings of this study will prevent known problems/hindrances from being replicated in the future initiation, design and implementation of proposed reform initiatives in Nigeria.
- ii. This study is multi-dimensional. On the one hand, it unveils what is likely to hinder purposeful reform agendas, and on the other hand, it suggests a suitable framework for impactful reform exercises to enable governments to achieve national objectives.
- iii. On the part of the public, it is hoped that the chronicles of previous reform activities, trajectories and global perspectives on reforms discussed in this thesis will broaden knowledge, and hence, offer more support for reform initiatives.
- iv. More importantly, the practical implication of this study entails the development of an adequate understanding of dynamics, complexities and pre-conditions for a successful reform activity.

#### **5.4 Limitation of the Study**

A research of this nature cannot be absolutely devoid of constraints that often characterise a social research study. Nigeria is spread over 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory. However, out of these, only four states were covered in this study because of time, human and financial constraints. The categories of respondents were also limited/restricted to consumers, whom the research presumed had adequate knowledge of reforms in the power sector and electricity privatisation in the period under review. Perhaps, some key informants with cogent information might have been unavoidably excluded from the survey exercise.

In addition, the cross-sectional research approach adopted in the study may have a limitation on the accuracy of the data, like electricity generation, transmission and distribution metrics. Thus, a longitudinal study over a specified period would pave the way for an in-depth investigation and analysis. More so, accessing vital materials,

“classified document” was strongly restricted. At the same time, adherence to the "oath of secrecy" by electricity workers and other bureaucrats also prevented the researcher from accessing necessary documents that would have probably provided better insights and unveiled detailed process, deeds, terms and conditions for privatising the electricity sector. Regrettably, only reform decision (RD)-was used as a moderating variable, while only two independent variables: consultation and coordination (CC); and communication strategy (CS), were used in the proposed theory.

## **5.5 Recommendations**

To improve reform outcomes and attain set national objectives in terms of improving the public service delivery system, salient recommendations are suggested as follows. These recommendations comprise those that are directly related to improving the manner of reform initiation and implementation.

### **5.5.1 Relevance of Political, Bureaucratic support and Consultation to successful government reform**

The political class and bureaucrats remain key players in the business of governance. Undoubtedly, Ouda's (2008) generic government sector reform theory affirmed that support of these key actors determines successful reform or otherwise. Evidence from the descriptive analysis of the result (Table 4.9: PSB1-2) suggests that only 53.8 per cent of political elites consented to the privatisation of power utilities as the best policy option. There seems to be scepticism and lack of conviction amongst the political class and the bureaucrats in terms of reform implementation. Also, suspicion on the likelihood of sabotage of government reform programmes by reformers cannot be totally dismissed, as evident in Table 4.9 (PBS3-6), which are unhealthy for result-driven reform outcome. The result suggests that bureaucrats did not show commitment to the full implementation of the reform. It is evidently clear from the result that the consultation, which is critical

to sustainable government policy, was poorly conducted amongst all the strata of society. The predictive effect of the analysis, as confirmed by the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), is that reform programmes, without commitment and strong support from the political class, bureaucrats and wider consultation strategy, are unlikely to be successful. Therefore, this thesis suggests that:

- (i) There must be understanding, mutual trust between government and political elites to build strong political support, and mobilisation for the intended reform programmes. Mutual trust within the government circle would ensure confidence building for effective reform exercise. Likewise, political support has been recognised as an essential prerequisite for a desirable reform outcome. This is important because the mind-set of politicians account for their attitude towards administrative reforms cross-nationally.
- (ii) Implementation framework and strategy must be all-inclusive and accommodate input from experienced bureaucrats. This will invariably ensure that previous shortcomings are prevented, and create a sense of ownership, hence facilitates a result-oriented reform programme.

#### **5.5.2 Willingness to change and Communication Strategies as a critical factor for successful government reform**

Similarly, the existing reform model by Ouda (2008) recognised a willingness to change and a pattern of communication strategy as a pre-condition for successful reforms. In fact, Thompson (1999) affirmed that reformers' attitude determines whether reforms "work or not". This argument cannot be dismissed because the key issue in reform is "change", and this relates to the attitude and behaviour of individuals and reformers.

Evidence from the field study (Table 4.11, WC1-4) unveils that people were not properly informed on the rationale behind the power industry reform, including the various

transition processes. The predictive effect of this, as affirmed by literature, is that the willingness of people to change their lackadaisical behaviour towards power infrastructure would facilitate the attainment of power reform objectives. Furtherance to the above discussion, this thesis recommends that:

- i. The public must imbibe a new attitude and maintenance culture towards public infrastructures. This became imperative to ensure sustainable use of public infrastructures.
- ii. Reformers must clearly understand the substance of the reform exercise. This is because a poor understanding of reforms might be responsible for unexpected outcomes.
- iii. The government must develop effective communication strategy to provide adequate information on the intended reform programme to the public. This is crucial because the management of reforms is often tricky and thorny. However, driving reform initiative required obvious and candid action to gain public support.

### **5.5.3 Professional and Civil Society Organisations' support as a viable ingredient for successful government reforms**

Hesse's (2005) and Kankya et al. (2013) submitted that interest groups, most especially civil society, have roles to play in educating local communities on the provision and implementation in engaging with political actors on their accountability to the citizens. Surprisingly, this key player in the reform process was conspicuously ignored in the existing model developed by Ouda (2008). Therefore, in order to fulfil part of the significance of the study stated in subsection 5 of Chapter 1, professional support (PAS) and civil society organisation (CSO) as independent variables were added to the adapted theory. Interestingly, the variables were tested and found to be significant.

The predictive effects of this are confirmed by literature, and the structural model is that interest and pressure groups influence government policy and determine the success of government reform or otherwise. In simple terms, stakeholders support is crucial to achieving successful reform initiatives. Unfortunately, evidence from this study suggests that these key stakeholders were completely exempted from the reform process. This might be responsible for the persistent failure of various government reform initiatives. Therefore, this thesis recommends that:

- (i) Professionals in various fields should be co-opted into reform initiatives and the development of a workable reform implementation framework. Certainly, contributions from professionals would ensure the robustness of the reform strategy and improve its effectiveness.
- (ii) Various interest groups comprising professionals whose support have recently been recognised should be represented in the reform technical and implementation committees. Interest groups, civil society's representation is key because they would ensure that the reform agenda is tailored towards improving the living conditions of the people.

## **5.6 Further Areas for research and possible extension**

Future research drives may, amongst other things, capture areas described below:

- i. Re-validate the proposed model by a re-evaluation of the relationship between paths found insignificant. This is important because the environment, culture and value system relatively affect respondents' responses to the statements. Thus, the outcome might likely unveil a different result.
- ii. Analysis of the structural model should be conducted using different moderating variables. Hopefully, the outcome of the estimation might

enhance the robustness of the proposed model and improve the predictive and explanatory power of the model ( $R^2$ ).

- iii. In order to estimate the interrelationship between the various variables in the proposed theory, it is also important to investigate the moderation effect of common demographic variables: occupation, sex, age, length of service and type of electricity consumers on the dependent variable.
- iv. On coverage, future research should focus on the population outside the scope of this study. This will enable the theory to be all-inclusive.

This thesis suggests that the strength of this proposed model should be tested in other relevant disciplines. As applicable to this study, which adapted the variables from the reform of accounting accruals, the variables tested here should also be adapted in other fields to ascertain its general applicability.

## **5.7 Conclusion**

Without doubt, an evaluation study on the drive towards purposeful administrative reforms is crucial to improve public service delivery and the promotion of good governance. Administrative reform initiative in the public sector had a long history and is still a regular exercise. This rightly suggests that reform is unavoidable as the government strives to provide better services for improved livelihood. This equally suggests that nation-states have invested huge resources, especially in developing countries, without commensurate positive results. For this reason, the framework has been proposed to better understand a successful/ result-driven reform exercise. However, this research does not claim that the model/ framework offers respite for the failure of administrative reforms when the same method is adopted and obtain a different outcome when replicated in a different setting. Empirical data collected were processed, analysed to validate the proposed model, which introduced new variables hitherto ignored. Furthermore, the existing study by Ouda (2008) on reform in the public sector only

conceptualised the framework but did not critically evaluate the statistical data to validate the hypothesised relationships. This study, therefore, serves as a stride towards a practical framework for successful reform initiatives.

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