

APPENDIX A

Request from Senators Nunn and Cohen

REQUEST FROM SENATORS NUNN AND COHEN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6050

April 16, 1993

Mr. Joseph E. Ross
 Director
 Congressional Research Service
 Library of Congress
 Washington, D.C. 20540

Dear Mr. Ross:


We are writing to ask the Congressional Research Service to prepare a study of U.S. special operations forces. In particular, we would greatly appreciate John Collins, your Senior Specialist in National Defense, taking responsibility for this study.

In 1986, Congress passed legislation that established a new unified combatant command, the U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Department of Defense position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Seven years later, it would be helpful for the Congressional Research Service to assess the current and future capabilities of U.S. special operations forces.

We would like Mr. Collins to examine the personnel, equipment, and budgetary requirements of special operations forces. We hope that Mr. Collins' study will help us to understand these requirements in the post-Cold War world.

We authorize Mr. Collins to identify us as his sponsors and to discuss this project with any appropriate officials. Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,


 Sam Nunn


 William S. Cohen

APPENDIX B

General Carl W. Stiner's End of Tour Report

GENERAL CARL W. STINER'S END OF TOUR REPORT



UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33608-6001

WCS: [Signature]
JUN 1 1991
17 May 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: End of Tour Report

1. As you well know, in June of 1990, I became the second Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command. My predecessor, General Jim Lindsay, had done a masterful job of initially pulling together the special operations components from the three Services, staffing and training the joint headquarters, establishing appropriate management and oversight systems, and charting a course for the command's future. My challenge was to build on that start, mature the command, continue to revitalize our nation's special operations forces (SOF), and to employ SOF most fully and beneficially in support of the theater CINCs and our National Military Strategy.

2. My watch has been indeed interesting, challenging, and rewarding. With the support of the Services, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress, we have maintained the momentum while meeting the challenge posed by the recently changed national and international political military environments. At a time when conventional threats and conventional forces are declining, the demands for SOF are increasing.

3. Although the command is, for the most part, healthy and moving in the right direction, there still remain much work to be done and many challenges, but likewise opportunities, for the future. I have highlighted in the attachment the most significant accomplishments, pertinent issues, and key recommendations for the future.

4. I thank you for your support and protection of SOF, and your visionary use of SOF in meeting the challenges of the new world order. I also thank you for your support of me; it could not have been better. It has been both a pleasure and privilege to serve my last assignment as the Commander in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command in the confidence and support of such an outstanding and professionally competent chain of command.

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End of Tour Report

Carl W. Stiner
CARL W. STINER
General, U.S. Army
Commander in Chief

END OF TOUR REPORT

1. Overall Assessment:

a. Overall, I believe that the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in excellent shape. We have the finest special operations forces (SOF) that this nation has ever had. There is no armed forces in the world that can come close to our capability and our means to project and employ them.

b. We have made great strides in the past six years since the formation of the command. We are capable of accomplishing all of the assigned missions given to us by Congress. We have instituted a joint training program which has significantly enhanced our readiness. This program includes a standardized management system and METLs for all subordinate units down to the squadron, company and team level. The command relationships with all of our subordinate elements (except the National Guard, addressed further on) have been solidified in command arrangement agreements, and are working correctly.

c. Our relationships with the theater CINCs are superb. The cooperation between SOF and the theater CINCs is at an all time high, resulting in a significant increase in SOF employment by the theater CINCs. We continue to work closely with the theater CINCs on regional plans for the effective utilization of SOF in furthering regional and national security objectives.

d. The command has stood up or assisted in improving several organizations that have contributed significantly to the smoothly functioning command and control of forward deployed SOF, to include the theater CINCs' Special Operations Commands (SOCs), the Theater Army Special Operations Support Commands (TASOSCs), and the Special Operations Command and Control Elements (SOCCes) with Army Corps.

2. Congressionally Mandated Agreements: USSOCOM has completed all agreements with other Department of Defense (DOD) organizations to help carry out the mandates prescribed by Title 10, United States Code, Section 167. The most significant agreements include Command Arrangements Agreements (CAAs) with the Theater Commanders in Chief and Memoranda of Agreements (MOAs) with the Services. Executive Agreements concerning Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11); Training and Doctrine; Research, Development, & Acquisition; Military Construction; and Professional Development are now in place to establish the responsibilities and relationships between USSOCOM and other DOD organizations in regards to SOF. Today the total number of agreements signed exceeds 122, with additional ones in development.

3. Personnel:

a. The Services have provided SOF with adequate numbers of high-quality volunteers who have demonstrated the maturity, intelligence, skill, and physical toughness to complete the extensive and rigorous selection and training process. The generally higher-than-average selection/promotion rates for SOF personnel attest to their high quality throughout the full range of grades and specialties. Within the past 36 months, we have institutionalized processes to formally monitor promotion, retention, assignments, and professional military education (PME) of SOF personnel to ensure that we maintain the quality standards.

b. We continue to experience shortages in some grades and specialties, particularly in: Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) company grade officers; Army Special Forces medics; and Navy SEAL Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders. We are working with the Services to resolve these shortfalls, but I would caution that we will have serious problems in the future if we cannot fix these shortages. The fast drawdown and the unknowns related to SERBs and RIFs, coupled with incentives to get out, are exacerbating the problem. Special management attention must be given to CA and PSYOP officers or we will end up with not enough for mission accomplishment.

c. We have recently created a joint SOF pre-command course to better prepare prospective SOF unit commanders and senior NCO leaders for their future responsibilities in the joint environment. Another major step forward in professional development is the establishment of a graduate-level curriculum of instruction in Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School to better educate the future leadership of SOF.

4. Intelligence:

a. Intelligence readiness has been greatly advanced during the past three years. We have made major improvements in receipt, analysis and, most importantly, the dissemination of intelligence within the command and strengthened our intelligence relationships with the national intelligence agencies and the other CINCs. We have developed detailed plans called "intelligence architectures" for the five theater CINCs and for our components. In this analysis, we identified shortfalls that have now become new requirements in USSOCOM's intelligence programs. Our most successful program, SOCRATES, was the major intelligence data handling system for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and is in worldwide use today. SOCRATES is another example of how our rapid prototyping and budget authority can be used to enhance conventional as well as unconventional requirements.

b. We have improved intelligence support to the theater special operations commands, published SOF joint intelligence doctrine, and created a Joint Special Operations Intelligence Course at the Defense Intelligence College.

c. Lastly, we are fielding a new family of small, lightweight, and robust intelligence systems that will improve both jointness and interoperability which will be a major step forward in readiness. Work still remaining to be done includes the standing up of a Joint Intelligence Center and the further funding of new equipment such as the SOF intelligence vehicle and multi-mission advanced tactical terminal.

5. Operations:

a. USSOCOM deployed 10,000 special operations personnel in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. SOF conducted all of their primary missions during these two operations, as well as the collateral missions of combat search and rescue and coalition warfare.

b. During the past three years USSOCOM has deployed forces to support all major contingency operations, to include Operations FIERY VIGIL, SEA ANGEL, PROVIDE COMFORT I & II, GTMO, PROVIDE PROMISE, PROVIDE HOPE, EASTERN EXIT, RESTORE HOPE, PROVIDE RELIEF, SHARP EDGE, and many classified activities.

c. Over the past year the command has averaged, on a weekly basis, over 2,600 personnel deployed, in 40+ countries, and 15 states, supporting U.S. national security policies. These numbers represent a 35 percent growth in the demand for SOF over previous years; we expect the growth trend to continue for the foreseeable future as additional emphasis is placed on peacetime engagement and nation assistance operations.

d. Forward basing is critical to SOF's ability to support the theater CINCs' peacetime and wartime mission requirements. SOF are uniquely trained to support forward presence operations through a variety of peacetime missions and provide an important initial contingency response capability. As we draw down conventional forces and close bases, we must maintain SOF's ability to provide this support. In December 1992, I sent personal messages to each of the theater CINCs requesting their support for the continued basing of current or enhanced SOF force structure in the AORs. Feedback from the theater CINCs unanimously indicates strong recognition of SOF's key role in support of theater CINC's peacetime and wartime missions.

6. Logistics:

a. Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM demonstrated that while the Services could provide common types of support to Army and Air Force SOF, and to SEALs when they were afloat, SOF-peculiar support was deficient. USSOCOM, with support from the Services, developed a number of fixes to include providing better management and funding of SOF war reserve materiel, creation of operational contingency stocks, upgrading and fleshing out the capabilities of the special operations support battalion, and creation of a SOF "mini-depot" to provide responsive, cost-effective repair or modification for critical equipment and stockage of a small amount of highly specialized equipment for contingency operations.

b. SOF must continue to receive adequate "service-common" logistical support while developing innovative and cost-effective ways to obtain SOF-peculiar support.

7. Doctrine:

a. We have made great strides in this critical area. A few years ago joint SOF doctrine was practically nonexistent. Today joint SOF doctrine has been published in keystone manuals, which range from topical coverage of SOF roles, missions, and functions to specific joint SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures.

b. Equally as important, SOF doctrine has been integrated into appropriate Service doctrinal publications and has been fully integrated into most Service school instruction, although there is still much more to be accomplished in Service schools.

8. Force Structure:

a. Over the past three years we have been able to program some badly needed Active component structure growth. We have added a Special Forces Group and will soon increase the number of SEAL teams and Air Force Special Operations Squadrons while boosting the strengths of the heavily committed CA and PSYOP units. We also plan to add an austere, multi-service aviation Foreign Internal Defense organization to respond to the needs of several of the theater CINCs for assisting developing countries to more effectively utilize and employ aviation assets in support of ground operations.

b. I must point out that we are still in critical need of additional Active component CA and PSYOP units; there are simply not enough of these units to meet today's commitments. We must also strike a better balance between Active and Reserve component SOF units. Reserve units, particularly CA, which are no longer needed must be inactivated.

c. The designation of CA and PSYOP units as SOF was a major milestone and will enable USSOCOM to clear up some of the legal ambiguities and institutional misunderstandings that have existed in the past and will allow us to better utilize their unique capabilities at home and abroad.

d. We have stood up the theater Special Operations Commands (SOCs) and clearly codified their roles and missions as a sub-unified command of the theater CINCs. In FY 93, USSOCOM assumed responsibility for planning and programming SOC requirements. Four of the five SOCs are now authorized brigadier generals as commanders, and as the Atlantic Command expands its joint service training role for joint CONUS forces, I foresee the need to upgrade SOCLANT to a brigadier general position to handle the increased responsibility, as SOCLANT takes over many SOF staff areas of responsibility now handled by the CINCLANT staff. We stood up the SOCs with bare minimum staffing. As their utility has been recognized, and as the overall utility of SOF deployments in theaters has risen, we must ensure that the SOCs are manned at a level commensurate with their increasing responsibilities.

e. Similarly, the Theater Army Special Operations Support Commands (TASOSCs) were stood up with very small staffs. A study on the TASOSCs was completed in May 1992. It was forwarded to Congress in response to congressional language in the FY 92 Joint Appropriations Conference Report directing the elimination of the TASOSCs from the SOF force structure. The TASOSC study findings were briefed to congressional staffers and resulted in congressional language in the FY 93 Joint Appropriations Conference Report that retained the TASOSCs. As we clarify the roles and missions of the TASOSCs, as the utility of this organization in supporting the increasing number of SOF peacetime deployments is demonstrated, and as the essential role of the TASOSC supporting Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM is recognized, these commands, too, will need to be resourced in accordance with their increasing roles.

9. **Communications:** We have improved the overall SOF communications readiness since August 1990 when SOF first deployed in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. The command's focus has been on team level communications ranging from small inter-team radios to lightweight UHF SATCOM terminals. Communications readiness has been improved by various means: through the expenditure of MFP-11 funds for NDI systems, through coordination with the Services for priority fielding of "common items" to SOF units, and through accelerated development efforts for SOF-peculiar systems. In short, C4 readiness is at an acceptable level across the force and team level modernization will be complete by the end of FY 94.

10. Program and Budget:

a. The need for SOF is increasing in an emerging non-traditional, multi-polar world. Despite increasing demand by theater CINCs, and SOF's expanding missions, proportionate reimbursement in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding has not materialized. In FY 91, USSOCOM received compensation for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and other unbudgeted operations. During FY 92, unprogrammed, unbudgeted operations increased 35 percent, and FY 93 rates already exceed those. Lack of reimbursement is forcing USSOCOM to mortgage the future for current operational requirements. For FY 93, a predicted \$25 million O&M shortfall required restructuring and delay of several acquisition programs. Continued restructuring will put these programs at risk and SOF will be inadequately equipped for the capabilities needed for the future. PBD 191's \$36 million RDT&E decrement and proposed funding for the former Soviet Union threat reduction (Nunn-Lugar) exacerbates the problem.

b. As the Head of a Defense Agency, USCINCSOC deals financially with OSD as a Service equivalent. To ensure issues such as the "additive end strength" nature of SOF and common equipment support continue, close coordination with the Services and OSD is necessary. Inclusion of the USSOCOM Director of Resources in the monthly MIL-5 meetings could strengthen the cooperation among USSOCOM, the Services, and OSD.

11. Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition:

a. During FY 92, I appointed Mr. Gary L. Smith as the Special Operations Acquisition Executive and Senior Procurement Executive and delegated Head of Agency authority to him. We concurrently updated all internal acquisition policies and renegotiated new umbrella RDT&E memorandums of agreement (MOA) and several program specific MOAs with the Services. As a result, we have improved our acquisition management and have more clearly defined lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility of SOF-peculiar weapons systems and equipment.

b. On 2 March 1993, I signed an Acquisition Decision Memorandum authorizing an Acquisition Category III (ACAT III) program for a combatant craft, the MARK V Special Operations Craft, to enter Concept Exploration and Definition (Acquisition Phase 0). We have decided to retain program management control and milestone decision authority for this program. The MARK V program represents the first significant program to be executed completely by USSOCOM's Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (SORDAC) and was a major step forward for the command.

c. During Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, USSOCOM, using our unique authority for SOF-peculiar acquisition, responded to urgent needs and validated 23 of 24 USCENTCOM requested items, procured 19 of the items, and had them in the hands of SOF troops in theater, with appropriate new equipment training conducted, within 30 days. These actions demonstrated the utility of such needed acquisition authorities.

d. SORDAC was reorganized in FY 93 to provide abbreviated lines of responsibilities and authority, and to improve accountability for acquisition management functions within Headquarters, USSOCOM. This objective was accomplished by aligning similar acquisition programs under the control of a Program Executive Officer (PEO), with the PEO reporting directly to the Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE). This reorganization was the final step toward establishing a system for USSOCOM to better manage all investment programs.

12. **Modernization:** The following are ongoing major modernization actions that are essential to the capability of SOF for meeting the needs of the future.

a. **Aerial Mobility.**

(1) Army special operations aviation is currently fielding the most advanced penetrator helicopters in the world, the MH-60K (23 each) and the MH-47E (26 each). They will provide increased medium-range capability for low-level flight in adverse weather and precision navigation through unfamiliar, mountainous terrain. These helicopters are equipped with extended range fuel systems, aerial refueling capability, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) systems, and upgraded engines. Coupled with the upgraded MH-53Js, these helicopters will provide a superb capability for short- and medium-range penetration. However, helicopter technology has reached its limits for inserting SOF over extended distances into denied areas and exfiltrating them in one night. We need a greater capability, which means another platform.

(2) The 24 MC-130H Combat Talon II aircraft will dramatically improve our long-range capability to employ SOF. The aircraft is capable of low-level, night, adverse weather penetration of hostile air space to infiltrate or resupply SOF. Twelve have already been fielded, and fielding of the remaining twelve should be complete by the end of FY 94.

b. Maritime Mobility.

(1) SDV platoon readiness will be enhanced by modernizing the SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV) and swimmer life support systems to increase short-range missions capacity. Fielding the Advanced Swimmer Delivery System (ASDS) (6 each) in the later part of the decade will provide significant improvements over current capabilities. The ASDS will provide increased range and speed, and will protect SEALs from extreme cold water conditions, resulting in improved performance at the target. It will also enhance the survivability of the delivery system's host ship. The ASDS will give SOF covert capabilities never before available. These two programs will enhance maritime infiltration and exfiltration.

(2) The USS CYCLONE Class Patrol, Coastal (PC) (13 each) and the air transportable MK V patrol boat (16 each) will modernize Navy special operations direct action, special reconnaissance and coastal patrol and interdiction capabilities. The mission of the PC is coastal patrol and interdiction, with a secondary mission of SEAL support. The MK V patrol boat's mission is medium-range insertion and extraction of SOF in a low- to medium-threat environment. The system combines a high performance, highly versatile, reliable, and rugged combatant craft with a transporter. The entire system will be air transportable, allowing rapid response to developing situations around the world.

c. The development of the Joint Advanced Special Operations Radio System (JASORS) is USSOCOM's most important C3I modernization program. When fielded this radio will replace several older, heavier, and less reliable radios with a single system that will greatly increase SOF's ability to communicate within SOF and also with conventional forces. It offers a secure, low probability of interception and detection capability to improve the survivability of SOF teams operating in denied areas. JASORS will be interoperable with communications systems used by conventional forces as well as theater CINC C3I systems.

d. The AC-130U gunship (13 each) will greatly enhance AFSOC's capability to support SOF and conventional forces in contingency operations. The AC-130U will be the best gunship in the world in terms of navigation, target acquisition, adverse weather capabilities, and accuracy and lethality of fires. An additional benefit of the gunship is its greater stand-off capability and its ability to minimize collateral damage with pinpoint firing accuracy.

e. The Special Operations Medical Training Center, a new facility to be built at Fort Bragg, will significantly improve the training and sustainment of a key element of SOF utility. The benefits of this facility will be twofold. First, it will enhance SOF medical training significantly by tailoring courses for specific needs with a regional orientation, and by training all SOF medics to the same standard. Second, it will save significant amounts of money in reduced TDY costs. We expect the facility to pay for itself in only five years based on TDY savings.

13. Issues:

a. 25K Reserve Call Up: The increasing demand for civil affairs units to support theater CINCs has severely strained the ability of the Army's only active duty CA battalion to meet all the requirements and still maintain a reasonable OPTEMPO for its personnel. The activation of the second active CA battalion will partially relieve this shortfall. But the long term solution, one that will guarantee adequate CA units, and other SOF units, to meet future increasing demands, is for passage of legislation that will authorize the National Command Authorities to activate up to 25,000 Reserve component personnel without Congressional approval. The call up of units is necessary; individual volunteers are of little value.

b. Command and Control of National Guard Units: The only remaining gap between USSOCOM's legislated mission of providing trained and ready SOF to theater CINCs, and the ability of this command to monitor and ensure that readiness, lies with National Guard units. USSOCOM has not been assigned all of the National Guard forces that are SOF, specifically Air National Guard units. Assignment of these units to USSOCOM is essential if we are to meet our mandated missions and legislated responsibilities for readiness. The Air National Guard units are critical SOF units that, in the case of the COMMANDO SOLO aircraft, contain capabilities found only in that unit and not in the active force.

c. Shortfalls in Major Procurement Accounts: When USSOCOM took over several major equipment procurement programs from the Services, the programs had significant shortfalls in money due to cost overruns. Each program represents a critical component of SOF modernization and future capabilities that will be essential if SOF are to continue to contribute to national security without undue risk to operators and mission accomplishment. If we are not allocated the money to fix these programs they will be in jeopardy.

d. AC/RC Mix: Much of the Reserve component force structure for SOP was created in response to the Cold War. While the active force structure was always regional in character, and designed to support both wartime and peacetime low intensity conflicts, much of the RC force structure was designed to support a global war with the Soviet Union or a major theater wide war in Europe. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the severe reduction in the immediate threat of a global or theater wide war, the United States no longer needs many of the RC units that were put into the force structure specifically for this mission. This is particularly true of RC civil affairs units. If we do not remove these units from the force structure we will be paying badly needed defense dollars for unneeded force structure, at the expense of other, vital programs.