CHAPTER TWO

THE CONFLICTS AND CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

Introduction

The Horn of Africa has long been known for civil wars, famines, drought and starvation. The region comprising 7 states has been caught with crisis since independence days in the 1960th except Ethiopia. But before further details it is important to survey the regional member states’ comparative physiographic and demographic data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Pop. (,000)</th>
<th>Pop. Growth rate</th>
<th>Area KM²</th>
<th>GNP/US$</th>
<th>Rural %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>23,200</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>124,300</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>84.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>53,435</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1,116,100</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>27,343</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>582,640</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>9,077</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>637,660</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>27,361</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2,505,813</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>20,621</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>236,680</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total     | 141,842          | 4.4              | 5,226,573| 277     | 70.79   |


The roots and causes of these crises has been studied and traced back, either to external or internal factors. However, in most cases the inter-link of these

12 www.igal-regional-organization.org
factors both internal and external dimensions were ignored. This chapter will analyze both the domestic or internal and external factors and their impact on shaping regional security crisis. The important of this method will be provide more understanding of regional security crisis and will bring into light the possibility of regional security management with regard to most regional conflicts including those behind the dozens of wars going on at present and the disputes about concrete grievances and demands. They are about territorial dispute border, ethnic hatred, revolutions, and so forth. To understand the nature of regional conflict, including their potential for becoming violent, one must study the underlying interests and goals of the actors involved. It might be necessary to say here, these dimensions are not mutually exclusive categories, and they overlap considerably in practice. It is therefore difficult to decide where to start, as they are intricately interlinked. Therefore as matter of convenience and consistency the analysis here will star with the internal issues first because the cohesion security approach toward third world adopted the necessity of understanding and recognizing the relationship between the community and state first. As the approach assumed the community must accept the regime’s legitimacy and the regime also should accept the needs of the community to maintain peace and security through the consensus between them. i.e., if the house is managed well inside it maybe difficult to break it. Internal crises are is first responsible for most of the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in the third world countries. The latter often generate the causes that lead to regional conflict by spillover state boundaries including movements of refugees from one country to another or the dissident move from state-to-state to weaken
their national security. The reality is that unstable states cannot pursue
development policies systematically and end effectively.

Furthermore, an unstable country leaves itself open to manipulation by third
parties and foreign governments\textsuperscript{13}. In this chapter, we will analyse further the
internal issues such as; the regime’s lack of legitimacy, and the adoption of the
traditional security concepts, political dissentions and struggle for power,
encouraging separatist movement against each other and finally, civil war and
state collapse. On the other hand, at the external dimensions we will touch
further on these factors. Boundaries and boundary disputes, intervention
involvement and superpowers assistant. Both internal and external dimensions
led to the spread of civil wars and to the weakening and collapse of central
governments. In the parts of Africa several governments have already collapsed
such as in Liberia, Zaire, Somalia, Sierra Leone and others are on the verge of
collapse such as Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Burundi and so on. The most
important internal factors are the regime’s lack of legitimacy, the adoption of the
single party system, national security militarism, political dissent and struggle for
power, and civil wars.

Internal Dimensions

2.1 The Regime’s Lack of Legitimacy and The Adoption of the Single Party
System

In political terms the contemporary history of the region has been marked by a
steep increase in the rise of authoritarianism, revolutionary leadership style, and
even warlordsism. But not that it is a new phenomenon. These trends have been
in the region since the colonial period; but they have aggravated it instead of working for its elimination. Leaders who have come to power decrying the authoritarian rule of their predecessors have all too easily succumbed themselves. Currently, of the 7 independence regional countries nearly five of them are either under military rule or revolutionary regimes or warlords. For example, Meles Senawi current Ethiopian Prime Minister is a former chairman of Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (E.P.R.D.F). Issayas Afeworki the Eritrean President was also the chairman of Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (E.P.L.F). Uweri Musavene, the Uganda President was also in the bush leading Uganda’s Patriotic Front (U.P.F). Sudan’s current military regime took over power by a military coup in 1989, while Somalia is suffering from civil war and authoritarian warlords for more than one decade. At the time, the Somali central government is so weak and could not run the whole country. The Horn of Africa only two countries are under civilian rule that is Kenya and Djibouti, but nothing is different in their performance compared to their fellows. As we have seen the majority of the regional leaders originally were from the bush, guerilla fighters and military servicemen before they took over power. All are suffering from weak performance in terms of nation building and economic development. Their administrations are corrupt and they maintain power through force. For example, Uganda’s President justified his adoption of the single party system and for remaining in office for so long by saying.34

Some in Africa think if we have multi-parties we will have prosperity! This is putting the cart before the horse. If we are going to follow

Europe's lead, then let us first eliminate the peasants, industrialize and achieve the same level of skilled manpower before embarking on multi-party politics. This is what Europe had to do, why should we be any different?

Also Kenyan President Daniel Moi justified the continued existence of the one-party state. President Moi made tentative steps towards pluralism in 1989. Although sustained pressure from Western countries initially provided the imputes for the legalisation of political parties, the euphoria that characterized the earlier phases of democratization quickly dissipated with the regime's ability do disorganise the opposition through violence and intimidation. As the outcome of the election in December revealed, the staying power of the (Kenyan ruling party) K.A.N.U. Government was largely underestimated by both the opposition groups and those external forces committed to building Kenya's civil society.  

President Moi has been running the country since 1978. Most governments of the regional community never practice the democratic system to choose what they think is the best for them like their state leaders. The Eritrean government never accepted to hold free elections. In Somalia, the army destroyed and took-over the power by a military coup. The last free election held in Somalia was in 1968. Also even those communities, which held elections by the vague name (most African countries they abused the term of democracy) of democracy they never practiced clean and honest elections. Ruling groups are wining every election and we do not yet have ruling groups losing-out in elections. Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya all hold elections periodically but the ruling groups win every time. Both the regime's lack of legitimacy and adoption of traditional security concepts will create conflict between the state and community. This will

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15 Ibid., 254
lead to the emergence of dissident groups who will challenge state authority leading to endless struggle for power and civil wars.

2.2 National Security Militarism, Political Dissent, Struggle for Power, and Civil Wars

Our key point in this analysis is that if the character of national security militarism is implemented, political dissent, struggle for power and civil wars are prevailing, everything we have so far said about the security and struggle for power in the Horn of Africa would be valid. From Independence Day until today most of the Horn of African countries like Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, and Somalia have their own internal and external security crisis. But their leaders caused the most harm because they were schooled narrowly in intrigue and Machiavellian strictures of divide and rule. They failed to appreciate the very real grass roots, rejecting their national security militarism and supported for dissident movements to reject the authoritarian rulers. The Horn of African communities are ready to pay any price to repossess or recall their freedom. The Horn of Africa states never attempted to engineer consensus, set out terms of relationship acceptable over the time to key actor in system. By doing this, it will enable various participants to avoid zero-sum aspects of classes or ethnic conflict and rewards political losers as well as winners. Such effort to promote mutual-gains formula is no easy undertaking; this especially under soft ‘weak states’ conditions where institutions are ineffective and distribution of the benefits of modernity bring vital interests into sharp confrontation. It is quite understandable, to use the power of the state to establish regularized relation
among the diverse groups and leaders making up this war-devastated country.\textsuperscript{16} For example, at the end of his regime, Somali President General Mohammed, became increasingly authoritarian, and sought to play different Somali clans against each other in order to hold on to power. His efforts o suppress the growing nation-wide revolt that three separate insurgent movements had begun in May 1988 were marked by widespread acts of barbarism against civilians and hence they became suspected sympathizers with the rebels. According to a letter reported by the State department: It is conservatively estimated that at least 5,000 unarmed civilian clans from Isaac tribe were purposely murdered by the Somali Armed Forces between may 1988 and March 1989 in the absence of resistance and context which presented no immediate danger to these forces.\textsuperscript{37} However, the Somali National Movement (SNM) surprised their keepers’ by taking the civil war across the border from Ethiopia into Northern Somalia in May 1989, without Ethiopia’s prior approval. Just as Ethiopia could encourage but not control the Somali demand for an end to dictatorship and repression not just on the part of the largely Isak SNM, but also the largely Hawiye USC, United Somali Congress supporters and the Ogeden, Somali Patriotic movement SPM. General Mohammed could not create permanent enmity between clans, which he felt no longer supported his military junta. He encouraged the clans of the North to fight each other, with promises of bribes, investment and arms\textsuperscript{38}. The consequences of Somali national security militarism created the political dissent and struggle for power, as well as, struggle for power which leaded into civil war.

\textsuperscript{16} ibid., p-113
and state collapsed in 1991, after 21 years of national security militarism implemented in Somalia.

**External Dimensions**

2.3 **Boundaries, Territories and Boundary Disputes**

The origins of contemporary in the Horn of Africa are to be traced to the problem confronting ruling classes in the region. According to Michael Chege, the creation of national states within the international boundaries were established in the interests of European colonialism at a time when the post-colonial states have little economic surplus and weak economic base. Nationalism and preservation of territorial integrity of the state have become dominant regime objectives. Conflicts arise because nowhere are territorial boundaries co-extensive with the natural boundaries of the nationalities which inhabit the area.\(^39\) Therefore, since most of the boundaries are not demarcated or are poorly demarcated, and since most of the maps used differ, it is not surprising that the boundary lines drawn during colonial times have not been everywhere accepted by post-colonial states.\(^40\) The successor states accept their boundaries if it is in their favour; if not, they complain that they were drawn arbitrarily by the colonial powers. This propensity has resulted in disputes over the location of boundaries to full-scale military confrontation in the Horn of Africa states. For example, Somalia verses Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia verses Eritrea, and Somalia. Eritrea verses Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan. Kenya verses Somalia and Uganda, and as well as Uganda has some trouble with Sudan. At this study we

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\(^{40}\) Lee Yong Leng, *Southeast Asia Essays in Political Geography*, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1982,p. 5
will focus more on the particular conflicts between Somalia-Ethiopian, and Ethiopia- Eritrea conflicts because we have seen between these states the heaviest military confrontation in the region for the last forty years. Somalia and Ethiopia as interstate war and Eritrea and Ethiopia as an intrastate war first and after Eritrean independence from Ethiopia as an interstate war. While in the case of other states in the region we have seen only the arrangement with the other side’s political dissents to weaken the other side and of course the counter arrangement not face-to-face. For example, Uganda and Sudan are both trying to weaken each other by attempting to foment internal conflict in each other’s country. The Ugandan government has encouraged and supported the Sudan People’s liberation Movement Army (SPLM/A). In retaliation, the Sudanese government is encouraging Uganda dissident called the Lord Resistant Army to operate from Sudan against the Uganda government. In the Horn of Africa, the demise of European colonialism, the concept of self-determination as applied to Africa became an integral component of the rhetoric of nationalism and cornerstone of anti-colonial movements of the late 1940s-1950s. According to Ruth Lyob its primary utility was in the mobilization of internal and external forces to precipitate the demise of the old order. An enduring problem was how to define “people” and means by which a decision on “pooplehoold” could be reached. What is significant in the African case is that the right of people of self-determination was limited to those under European ruler.41 In the process, the right of self-determination was narrowly interpreted to refer solely to those African people waging liberation struggles against European colonialism or

white rulers. In this context, violations of the right of local minorities or forcible inclusion of inhabitants of contested territories were justified in the name of protecting the territorial integrity of sovereign states.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, the Horn of Africa was one of the most affected by that policy. For example, Somalia and Ethiopia conflict, which started in the last decade of the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century. That time, Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II achieved one of the greatest achievements in the Ethiopian modern history; he was recognized as a major power in the region by European powers. He had doubled the geographical size of Ethiopia and occupied large part of the Somali territory. He also could subjugate his African neighbors, including the Oromo, Eritrean, and Somalis, and even, to defend himself against Egyptian and Italian expansion\textsuperscript{43}. Therefore, a resurgent Somali nationalism after 1960 would be founded on the reunification of the Somali people left resident in five territories: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopia and Kenya. According to Ruth’s assumption the demise of colonialism did not end the domination of weaker by stronger. In the Horn of Africa, in institutions where the decolonization process has been contested, such as in Eritrea and Somalia, the principle of self-determination of peoples directly confronts that of the territorial integrity of established states.\textsuperscript{44} Also after WW2, Ethiopia exploited its recognition as a sovereign state, enhanced by its role as a victim (opponent) of Italian fascism, to ensure international support for its territorial expansion via membership in the newly established United Nations. Haile Selassie Ethiopian Emperor used his prestige and astute diplomatic corps to justify Ethiopia’s need for access to the Red Sea, and use of Eritrea as a springboard for the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1933 was successfully

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 257
invoked to garner sympathy for his demands. Haile selassie exploited the symbolic legitimacy of Menelik's legacy, was as well as the anti-fascist sentiments of post-war era, to extend Ethiopia's boundaries with the consent or tacit approval of both regional and international communities. By 1964, the Organization of African Unity had accorded Haile Selassie's regime so much influence that it appeared to be functioning as little more than a rubber stamp for the hegemony's claims. Ethiopia's role in the drafting of the O.A.U. charter, the emphasis placed on non-intervention, and safeguarding of existing boundaries vindicated the Emperor's strategy and delegitimised any demands that ran counter to the consensus on the status quo. Nonetheless, at O.A.U. summit conference of 1973, Libyan president accused Ethiopia of being an ally of Zionism and imperialist state faithless to Africa traditions for opposing the aspirations of the Somalis for a Greater Somaliland and the Eritreans for independence. He called for the removal of O.A.U headquarters from Addis Ababa. The Ethiopian government denies having any territorial ambition in Somalia, conveniently ignoring claims, which have been made on several occasions over the last fifteen decades. Ethiopian government called the disputed territory as Ethiopian Southeastern province, and even Somalia called Somalia Western Province. Somalia regarded and considered that part as a part of their motherland and called; the Western Somali territory and went to fight back to recapture from Ethiopia. Somali government and the Western Somali

43 Greenfield Richard, p.105
44 Ibid., 263
45 Ibid., 266
46 Ibid., 269
47 John H. Spencer, Ethiopia, the Horn of Africa, and United States policy. Cambridge and Massachusetts: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, INC. 1977, p.50
48 A resurgent Somali nationalism after 1960 would be founded on the reunification of the Somali people left resident in five territories: British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, and Kenya and Ethiopia. This task was to fall to the independent Somali Republic born out of the
liberation front (WSLF) decided and went to fight Ethiopia because they believed the expansion of Ethiopia and creation of modern Ethiopia Empire during the scramble for Africa and since as “black colonialism”. However, the Somali government’s point of view was the assumption that of Somalis populations living under Ethiopian authority, they too, have a right to choose their allegiance and system of government as had the citizens of former British and Italian Somali-lands (now Somali republic), and French Somali-land (now the republic of Djibouti) who were in fact colonized somewhat earlier, but who are now independent states. The Somali government thus, doesn’t recognize the Ethiopian sovereignty and territorial integrity but instead of that she recognized the Somali ethnic group living under Ethiopian authority. In 1977, Somalia and Ethiopia were at war. Somali armed forces were defeated badly at that war and Ethiopia and its alliances started attacking Somalia and encouraging political dissentions and Somali separatist movement to counter and to weak General Mohammed’s military campaign against Ethiopia. The era of Cold war, Ethiopia and Somalia, each sought to enlist the assistant and support of one or other super powers. Ethiopia arguably achieved greater success first with United States and then with Soviet Union. And again at end of the Cold- War the United States appeared ones more to like to incline towards Ethiopia.49 On the other side, another example, Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict background. Italy colonized Eritrea in nineteenth century but at end of the World War II Italy was defeated by the

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Union of British and Italian Somaliland in 1960. Ethiopia racked in pre-colonial times by the jockeying for power among and Amharic and Tigrayan rivals. For, in the last decade of the 19th Century, Menelik had doubled the geographical size of the state and occupied large part of the Somali territory. Also at independence in 1963 Kenya inherited a restive Somali population in its northeastern quadrant, previously known as the Northern Frontier District. Further details see Michael Chege, Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p.87-100

49 Ibid., p-111
alliances and she also **lost the territory**. And then, United Nations decided Eritrea to be a part of Ethiopia as a federal territory. In 1962, Ethiopian government took-over and annexed its land and proclaimed Eritrea was part of Ethiopia in the long history. However, the civil war started between the Ethiopian forces and Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) ended in 1991, when the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized the power in Addis Ababa after ousted the Marxist military regime Mengistu Haile Miriam. Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front were both collaborators during struggle against Ethiopian Marxist regime. Two years after their victory Eritrea enjoyed more autonomy from Addis Ababa. The republic became fully independent from Ethiopia after a local referendum on Eritrean future in 1993. But the problem never ended, the war re-started again, only four years later they had become again the enemies in the region because of border dispute. Following Eritrea’s independence in 1993, a boundary commission had been established to cover the Yirga Trinangle and other disputed areas, including Badda at the Northern end of the Danakil Depression, where there was an incident in 1996, and Biru, North-West of Assab, where there was a clash in early 1998. The problem started in 1997, when the Ethiopian authority issued a Map of the Tigrayan Administrative Region (MTAR), which appeared to confirm Eritrean suspicions about Tigrayan expansionism. On the basis of this map, Eritrean believed Tigrayans appears eager to press the claims of their region for special status. The dispute triangle is remote and rugged area occupied by Tigrinya speakers, who have never given much attention to borders. No attempt

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was made to alter the boundaries during British military or mandate rule, or when Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia between 1952 and 1962. When Eritrea became an Ethiopian province in 1962, the fact that the boundary was ill defined ceased to matter much. In addition, as Richard Cornwell emphasized in his article Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal Conflict in the Horn, (he) said, another point being raised by some Ethiopians is that the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 nullified all treaties between Eritrea and Ethiopia prior to that time. The impact of that conflict was military build-up both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopian armed forces have increased from fifty thousand to at least three hundred and fifty thousand, while Eritrea is having about two hundred and thirty thousand troops. At time, the two governments were busy in military build-up and continue their conflict. International media broadcasted and published; after three successive years of drought and crop failure the Horn of Africa is once again facing the prospect of hunger and starvation, the country worst affected is Ethiopia where an estimated eight million people are said to be at risk. The news comes at a time when Ethiopia is involved in border conflict with her northern neighbor Eritrea. The conflicts reflect the fact that political boundaries dispute left behind by the colonial powers concealed unresolved dispute and cut across ethnic lines. The conflict arising now among the Horn African states associated with the integration of ethnic or religious groups. The regional states are forced into military dependence on their colonial role and ready for external interventions role.

2.4 Interstates Wars and External Powers, Interventions

For the Horn of Africa, an external intervention escalates conflicts and leads
to arms transfer, conflict, and military campaign, forming alliances, separatist movement to counter each other by bilateral agreement between the regional countries and metropolitan countries. For example, Somalia after a bloodless military coup in October 21, 1969 led by Commander in Chief Major-General Mohamed. Immediately, General Mohamed and his company rapidly formed (SRC) Somali Revolutionary Council that abrogated the constitution, banned political parties. Having the already received military aid from the Soviet Union. One the Italian Trusteeship Administration had withdrawn in 1960, the Soviet Union swiftly took advantage of the tension between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Greater Somali-land issue by concluding a serious military aid agreement in 1961, 1966 and 1974, and economic and cultural agreements in 1961. On the basis of these agreements, the Soviet Union had, by 1975, build up a military force in Somalia more powerful and more modernized than that created in Ethiopia by United States over a much longer period under the 1953 defense agreement. Soviet Union was happy to help Looking for facilities to support their naval aspirations in the Indian Ocean. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had signed agreement with Somalia government on July 11, 1974, under which the USSR had not only supplied that country with defense equipment but also established a naval base, communications and missile base at the Berbera on the North Somalia coast opposite Aden and to the east of Djibouti, defended by SAM batteries. Facilities also exist at Mogadishu in Somalia: at Socotra. the island off the tip of the Horn of Africa; at Aden and the airport nearby: at

53 Richard Cornwell, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Fratricidal Conflict in the Horn, African Watch, official web-side http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASIR/7.5/Africa%20Watch.html.
54 The World Today, (May 2000)
55 John, p.55
Hodeida on the Northern Yemen coast; at Umm Qasir in Iraq, and at Mauritius. In this manner, the entire northwest quarter of Indian Ocean from the Gulf of Aden to Sri-Lanka is surrounded by the Soviet bases and facilities. However, the treaty was abrogated by the latter on November 13, 1977, after the Somali President had, on October 21 of that year, condemned the Soviet Union for its "all-out armed support to Ethiopian regime" with which Somalia was then at war. Simultaneously, Somali neighboring Ethiopia abolished its traditional monarchy and new ruling military council severed longstanding ties with the United States and proclaimed a Marxist state. The Permanent Committee of Seventeen, presided over by Head of State Lt. Colonel Mingistu called for the expulsion of all United States agencies except the Embassy, ordered the staff of the latter reduced by half, and called all students undergoing military training in the United States. At the time, the Commander in Chief and Head of State Lt. Colonel Mingistu also adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology and issued the "Declaration on Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia." For his calling for nationalization and collectivization of farm lands and announced the campaign for one year service, under which all student would be sent into the country side to educate the people in the new socialist philosophy. Thus, by the early 1977, Ethiopia had made a clear break with the past and was moving into new orbit. Ethiopian leader changed his ally partner from America to Soviet Union and Somalia on the other hand allied with America leaving Soviet Union. Moscow

57 John., p.5
and Washington both were eager to get advantage on their military basis regardless with which regime they should support him. The soviet shifted, in 1977, to support Ethiopia against Somalia. That time, Ethiopia not only received military equipment, more than 250 heavy military transport aircraft, mainly Antonov 22s but including a fleet of Tupolev 76s, and some civil aircraft took part in airlifts of men and material on a hither to unprecedented scale. The Ethiopian and large forces from several communist countries such as Cuba, Northern Yemen, Libya, East German directed by senior Russian officers was recaptured the Somali Western lands were liberated from Ethiopian forces.  

58 Here, according to David Rawson; it may well have seemed unlikely that the Soviet would intervene to upset Mohammed’s plan. But they did. In retrospect, several reasons may be advanced: Ethiopia was bigger, it was more geopolitical significant, and its Marxist seemed more pristine, untainted by Islam as Mohammed’s was.  

59 On the other hand, to counter Soviet presence in the Horn of Africa, Somalia became an important strategic ally of the United States as a result of the political realignment (re-correction) in the region in the 1970s that brought the Derg in Ethiopia into alliance with the Soviet Union. After General Mohammed had broken with Moscow, which had previously backed his regime, he allowed U.S. troops to use military facilities constructed by the Soviets in exchange for American aid.  

60 The U.S. Military assistance for Somalia was justified, according to the Administration’s statement in support of its request for $ 900,000 in I.M.E.T (International Military Education Training), funds to train

58 Greenfield Richard, p.108
the régime’s soldiers in FY 1990. “to maintain access to Somali facilities” that are “vital to regional contingency planning”. Under an agreement authorized by President Jimmy Carter in August 1980, the U.S. Central Command had gained the right to use the military airbases and ports facilities at Berbera and Mogadishu during any “intervention” in the Middle East and Africa, and to prepare American troops for such a eventuality a regular biennial exercise was held in the area.\textsuperscript{61} For example, there was a Bright Star Exercise in August 1988, several small-scale exercises later in the year, and another Bright Star planned for August 1989. But the exercise was aborted when there were street disturbances in Mogadishu in June 1989, followed by the massacre of opposition leaders on Gezira Beach in June, forced U.S. participants to withdraw as well as the regime collapsed totally in 1990, and Somali civil war started. However, according to David Rawson, the United States sought three different security objectives from the Somali partnership. One was to counter growing Soviet influence in the Horn by demonstrating willingness to engage on the African continent without building up threatening forces. Another was to guard the Strait of Bab el Mandab, thus expanding the projection of U.S. power in the Persian Gulf area into the Gulf of Aden and lower Red Sea. The third security objective was to provide rear-echelon support for the operation of the U.S Rapid Deployment Force to put out local fires in the Middle East\textsuperscript{62} For more example, the presence and external powers military competition we can also refer as an only example, the bilateral agreement between the France and Djibouti was signed June 27, 1977. France maintained some 5,000 troops in Djibouti and

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p.6
\textsuperscript{62} David., p.162
assisted in the formation of a Djibouti national army.\textsuperscript{63} The U.S signed mutual defense agreement with Ethiopia in 1975 and Somalia in 1982.\textsuperscript{64} The Union Soviet also has had treaties of friendship and cooperation with Somalia in 1974, Ethiopia in 1978. in addition, Sudan and Uganda, also have received Soviet Military assistance under additional military cooperation agreements.\textsuperscript{65} The assistance received by Amin included the military hardware that was needed not only to reinforce his domestic power, but also to deal with the overtly hostile Nyeree.\textsuperscript{66} The consequence of this is the possibility of drawing Horn of Africa into external conflicts. These bilateral agreements provide access to naval and air facilities for the external powers. This not only endangers security in the region but also produce an atmosphere in which peaceful settlement of disputes became more difficult. For example, the conflict in Southern Sudan has been going on since 1957 (more than four decades) and that in Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict has lasted (more than three decades, 1962-1993). And Somali almost after one decade of civil war and chaos, still a part of the country is under warlord authority. Even today Somali warlords are backed and they received aid directly from foreign forces including neighboring countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and also indirectly like United States, Italy. All these countries wanted warlords not to accept the Somali central government. However, at the present moment the Horn of Africa is the most serious area of conflict in the African continent. The chances of the conflict escalating into a major war with metropolitans' countries

\textsuperscript{63} The European world yearbook, London: Europe publication limited, 2000, P- 123

\textsuperscript{64} The agreement between Ethiopia and US was abrogated in 1978 during the time of Ethiopia’s conflict with Somalia.\textsuperscript{4}


involvement in the region are present even after the end of the Cold War. For example, the latest war between Ethiopia-Eritrea, 1998-199, both bought from Russia the latest Mig-29 fighters to boost their forces, the planes are worth an estimated U$ 25 million each one. During the war between them the Interfax News agency reported from Moscow (December, 1998), that the Russia would supply Ethiopia with used warplanes helicopters, and other military equipment in a deal worth U$ 150 million. On the other hand, the diplomat said; in Eritrean capital Asmara more than a dozen of officials from Russian ministry of aviation production have been in Asmara and Russian pilots and technicians have also been seen. The same can be said of the conflict in the Sudan. The Sudanese dissident S.P.L.A was supported and backed by the United States and western countries. Wars in the Horn of Africa have brought unprecedented social dislocation and human suffering in its train. According to Michael Chage, of the estimated five million refugees in Africa, about one half are to be found in the Horn of Africa; and nearly all have been rendered refugees by reasons directly or indirectly associated with war. Thus, the boundaries, territories, and boundary disputes as a colonial legacy and interstate wars through the external power’s involvement and their military assistance competition in the Horn of Africa considered the most external factors behind the regional security crisis. At the era of Cold War the two major superpowers, the United States and Union Soviet and their alliances involved a seriously the regional conflict because of their competition for the natural resources and strategic advantage. The superpowers were not only willing to oblige but they were ready to provoke and fan the flames of political conflict in the Horn of Africa and thus render themselves

indispensable. According to Michael Chage, in this fashion the stage is set for a murderous see-saw of military escalation; local invokes external intervention which in turn expands the scope of local confrontation making it necessary to import more sophisticated armaments for the next round of military engagement, and so on." Indeed, despite the end of the Cold War and declining influence of the United States and Soviet Union still there is no internal or regional security. The boundaries, territories and boundary disputes were considering the most sources for regional security crisis both during the Cold war and after as well as conflict unresolved. As already the study mentioned the regional states in the Horn of Africa formed in Djibouti, 1986, sub-regional organization called at that time, the Intergovernmental Authority on Droughty and Desertification (IGADD). After ten years, in 1996, at the recommendation of the head of states governments, the organization was restructured and changed its name to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD seeks to foster regional security and sustain economic development. Then, in the next chapter the study will examine it the IGAD and the existing regional security structure and the challenges of international and regional security frames. Also the IGAD and the political security in the region and the important factors destabilize the Horn of Africa, and the IGAD and the major challenges in the future.

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64 Michael Chage., p.87