CHAPTER THREE

THE IGAD AND EXISTING REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

Introduction

The Challenges of International and Regional Security Frames

It has been already ten years since the end Cold War ended. During these ten years, although international security scholars have continued to search for a new international security framework, it still has no concrete international security model, of what this entails and, despite several concepts; there is no agreed strategy or framework for the conduct of global security framework. Indeed, even though the widely acclaimed articles by Samuel Huntington, the Clash of Civilizations, envisages a Post Cold War World Order of competition and conflict among major civilizations, ruling out the possibility for global harmony, there are many who tend to disagree. Huntington suggests that increasing interaction will have the adverse effect of actually sparking off conflicts. However, Huntington views this as the beginning of a breakdown in the existing world order, in contrast as various international frameworks expand, they will provide the means of containing and preventing the escalation of any such conflict. Thus, whereas the frequency with which conflicts arise may increase, their actual scale should decrease, with the overall effect being a more stable New World Order. Therefore, the tendency towards the positive development of regional security frameworks will become increasingly more apparent in all the world’s major regions. For example, already in Europe, changes in the Post Cold War environment have led to the establishment of the
European Union and restructuring of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in response to the new challenges facing current political, economic and security issue. Developments such as these reflects the feeling that now more than ever before, Europe is actively seeking to present a united front to the rest of the world. Recently, this has taken on particular relevance in the case of the war in the former Yugoslavia, where in spite of growing despair throughout Europe over the effectiveness of such co-operation frameworks all agree that operational coordination within bounds of existing frameworks is the only hope for a peace solution. Also NATO, a security framework originally established to contain the former Soviet Union, has expanded its political role since the end of Cold War to include Peacekeeping effort and the promotion of cooperative relation between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia, based on the Partnership for Peace. Indeed, these European and North Atlantic Treaty Organization frameworks are likely to have serious impact on the shaping of any future New World Order. In contrast to developments in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization and maybe somehow Asian Pacific Region, there are still no concrete signs of the formation of a similar regional framework for the whole African Continent. Therefore, the longer the countries in the African Continent delay tackling the issues devising their own regional and sub-regional framework, the greater the risk is that their future survival as part players in the New World Order will be rejected or even diminished. As a part of these efforts to decrease the conflict and promote peace and harmony in the world. In Africa, many sub-regional countries are trying promoting bilateral and multilateral

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71 Ibid., p.219
72 Ibid., p.220
security dialogues in the continent. In the West, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 after signing the Treaty of Lagos by 15 of predominantly English and French speaking West African States. In the South, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADC) came into being 1979 and has been succeeded by the Southern African Development Community, after the dramatic changes in South Africa. Also in the East and Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), was formed in 1986, with the purpose of coordinating member states’ policies on desertification and other environmental issues in the Horn of Africa. However, its mandate was restructured in 1996 to address other regional issues and the organization’s name has been changed to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 73 The ultimate aim of these sub-regional security frameworks (if successful) is to establish a continent framework for the whole of the African Continent. What are the chances that it shall succeed is another question. However, this attempt to locate the sources of insecurity and examine the possibility of a regional security framework in the Horn of Africa it will be considered as an integral part of those efforts. The Horn of Africa, during the Cold War all superpowers had become involved in the conception for position and influence in the Horn of African strategic planning and regional security implementations. In deed, despite the end of the Cold- War and declining influence of the United States and Soviet Union the region still there is no security. In the Horn of Africa a grinding civil war between the largely Amhara central government of Ethiopia and minority peoples of the

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73 According to William T.Tow, a sub-region may be defined as a group of geographically contiguous states united by their mutual susceptibility to a specific threat, a common interest in neutralizing that threat in ways beneficial to their individual national securities, and means of
north-eastern portion of the country led eventually in 1991 to the secession of the Red Sea littoral and its hinterland as the independent state of Eritrea. In the developing world, particular in Africa the "national security and interest" doctrine were implemented through the traditional narrow military and external threat understanding of peace and security against external threat through the use of military forces or threat of it. According to George Wachira in Africa, the doctrine was much more than "national security" where the focus was not so much the security of the nation and its interests as that of the ruling elite perceived to be link that symbolized and held the new and fragile nation-states together. This approach was aided by ruthless state apparatus, which in turn enjoyed the support of super power in the Cold War arithmetic and was based on the assumptions that African countries needed strong centralized rule in order to survive. 

At the present day the most challenges facing the Horn of African state leaders and their strategic planner are how to frame a possible regional security framework and how to manage regional security crisis to avoid insecurity and perpetual conflict in the region. Moreover, this study will attempt to locate the sources of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the forces that are sponsoring in perpetuating in security in the region and to suggest the possibility of regional security framework to overcome the sources of insecurity. In chapter two we discussed the most regional security crisis and their sources both internal and external. For the sources of insecurity at the internal dimensions we touched briefly these issues; the regime's lack of legitimacy and the adoption of single

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collaboration to reduce individual and collective vulnerabilities to future threats. See further details William T. Tow, Sub-regional Security Cooperation in the Third World p.4


party system, national security militarism, political dissention, struggle for power and civil war. As well as we discussed also the external sources of insecurity which crucial role to sponsor and perpetuate conflict in the region like the boundaries, territories and boundary disputes and interstate wars through the external military assistance competitions in the region. Furthermore, in this chapter, we will discuss the IGAD and existing regional security structure. However, we will start first the IGAD and its political security in the region.

3.1 The IGAD and Political Security in the Region

Despite the perpetual conflict in the horn of Africa in and after Cold war period, it is becoming increasingly needed the countries in the Horn of Africa will have to intensify their effort in order to reduce their regional conflicts intrastate and interstate. The IGAD was founded in Djibouti in 1986 by six Horn African countries: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and later in 1993. after achieving independence from Ethiopia Eritrea joined to the organization in the same year. The original mandate of the organization was to cooperate in tackling challenges relating to drought and development. As regional response to the conflict raging in IGAD’s area of operation became rather indispensable, the organization embarked on process of revitalization, which was concluded in November 1996.⁷⁶ In 1996, the regional heads of states and governments recommended and authorized the change and restructuring their sub-regional organization called at that time, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) into Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The IGAD council of ministers identified three priority
areas of cooperation: conflict prevention, management and resolution, and humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development; and food security and environment protection. IGAD also seeks to foster regional security and sustain economic development. Although the IGAD has not managed to consolidate any constructive proposal as such, they have already failed to materialize their initial objectives of establishing themselves as a platform for addressing regional political and security issues. Then, this question will arise regarding why IGAD failed to materialize their initial objectives of establishing themselves as platform for addressing regional security and political issues? In the Horn of Africa there are several factors which are destabilizing the IGAD’s political and security agenda in the region.

3.2 The Most Important Factors Destabilizing the Region

The Horn of Africa cannot enjoy peace and prosperity into the near future, as long as all the regional countries make efforts in the right direction. Presently, the region has witnessed the emergence of an increasing number of potential destabilizing elements. We can assume there are more but these five major factors could produce more insecurity situations that would threaten the peace and stability in the region as a whole

1- Regional Geopolitics location diversities of threat perceptions

2- Imbalance of power existed between the individual countries in the region.

3- Potential dangers stems from the rapid build up military capability through the regional individual countries

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*Abdul Omar, ‘The IGAD Peace Process’ Project Ploughshares Monitor, March, 2000*
4- Arms transferring and illegal weapons circulating in the region.

5- Range of flash points relating to various intra-regional conflicts, resulted of disputed between the neighboring countries over sovereignty and ethnicity.

First, from the regions' geopolitics strategic location, diversities of threat perceptions Uganda and Ethiopia are land-Locked countries with no access to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea while others are have access to large coasts with Indian Ocean and Red Sea or both like Somalia. Diversity also exists in political, economic, religious, language, social system, and military structure. Therefore, in view of the diversity of the geographical location, the strategic priorities of individual countries may differ considerably. For example, the Land- Locked countries like Ethiopia and Uganda their lifeline to the outside world to access the Sea is vital to them for ensuring their survival. So, the latest war between Ethiopian –Eritrean, was erupted in 1998, the disagreement between them was regarding how much Ethiopia should have to pay to access the Eritrean Port at Assab. In addition, half of the regional population is living in Ethiopia and Ethiopia also has the largest personal army in the region. We consider the geopolitics location and diversities of threat perception created as one of the most factors destabilizing in the Horn of Africa however without Ethiopian having accessed to the Sea it could be difficult to get solution to the regional security crisis. Second, there is existing imbalance of power between individual countries in the region. The collapse of Somalia central authority with destruction of Somali army forces and breakdown of civil order in the 1991 has created the imbalance of power in the region. In this respect, there has been

http://www.ploughshares.ca/CONTENT/MONITOR/monm00b.html
increasing concern voiced over what is perceived as Ethiopian bid to become dominant power in the region. This is not a problem in itself but it would not be conducive to the region's stability to have this imbalance of power filled by Ethiopia's power, which not deemed stabilizing policy but instead keen to destabilizing the region. Ethiopia tried to discharge the region only their national security interests regardless of others security and stability. For example we have seen how the Ethiopian government-backed group of rebels from Somalia and Eritrea to destabilize their security. In addition, Ethiopia has been occupying Somali towns in the Gede region such as Bulo Hawo, Dolo and Lugh since 1996. Furthermore, Ethiopia is giving arms, ammunition, and supplies to groups opposed to Transnational Government (TNG), including a group based in Mogadishu; Ethiopia is aggressively recruiting and arming militias in Gede, Middle Juba. Bay, Bakool, and Hiran. As well as Ethiopia carried out a diplomatic and media campaign against Transnational Government. Thirdly, potential danger stems from the rapid build-up military capability through the regional individual countries. All Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda have significantly increased their military service men and modernized their military capacity and they are continuing to acquire the more advanced weapons. However, there are growing fears that if these high advanced are used to settle intra-regional disputes, events could soon escalate to full-scale alerts. Thus, the very existence of such large number of service men and high advanced weapons, even though not deployed, does constitute a very real threat to region's stability.

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77 Dr. Ali Khalif, Somali Premier Minister's Speech at the United Nations Security Council 17 January 2001. Also Ethiopia's chief political adviser to the foreign ministry, Kinfe Abraham interviews with BBC, said that Ethiopia had emerged as a defining power in the Horn of Africa region. Kinfe said Ethiopia had a responsibility to help maintain peace in the sub region, and had a "track record of not being aggressive, but responding decisively". He compared Ethiopia's
Fourthly, Moreover, the region is facing not only the formal military build-up and modernizing the weapons but also there are arms transferring and illegal weapons circulating in the region. Also through the region, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea faced high scale widespread proliferation of arms transfer especially the light weapons in the most of the Horn of Africa and great lakes regions has now led to acceptance of weapons as a normal part of life. One of the most widely available weapons is the AK47, which has sold on estimated US$ 50-60 since its introduction can be striped and assembled by a child of ten years in countries like Sudan, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo where children have been combatants. The gravest fear and direct consequence of unimpeded proliferation of light weapon in the region is the erosion of state authority as a response to demand for personal security where normative social regions are the brink of collapse. The gravest direct consequence particular where state farces are waging counter insurgency campaign has been breakdown of governance and erosion of respect of Human right. In the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region over two million people have died and most of them are children and women. Fifthly, there exists a whole range of flash points relating to various intra-regional conflicts. those are the result of dispute between the neighboring countries over sovereignty and ethnicity. These include disputes between the Somalia and Ethiopian, Somalia and Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sudan and Eritrea as well Kenya and Uganda. However due to the inherent nature of these problem, there would seem no simple solution and real challenge will be how to deal effectively with these conflicts. The regional problems not

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Superiority" in the region to that of Egypt in the North Africa and Nigeria in the west. BBC, Focus on Africa, 8/19/2000

78 Foreign Affairs Bulletin, January, 2000 (Nairobi, Kenya)
only coming from destabilizing factors at the present regional situation but there are also other factors and challenges in the future such as about these questions. How the regional security will look like in the future? What issues will focus on at the regional security framing in the future? And the question of what measures can actually be enforced in the face of an outbreak of regional conflict? And also ones a country has joined IGAD, how will this affect its relations with countries which belong to another regional security framework?

3.3 The IGAD and the Major Challenges in the Future

The major challenges faced by the IGAD countries in the future, is that, most of the members are keen to participate, there is no broad consensus on what it should really focus on in the future, and hence it will be very difficult to proceed further. Simply because the basis for a future regional framework is problematic and it is far too early to predict at first stage how well this kind of regional security framework will be practiced? There is also the second problem of dealing with the members ones they become members of another organizations. That is to say, ones a country has joined IGAD, how will this affect its relations with countries, which belong to other framework such as the Arab League? In the IGAD some of its members like Somalia, Djibouti, and Sudan were already members of Arab League as well as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya have their tied relation with Israel. That kind of problem exists in the region for longtime. The other actors like Israel, Arab countries and party of Western powers all are interesting to make sure the Red Sea security as strategic root in and out of Suez Canal and Persian Gulf. For example, the problem surfaced immediately after Somalia Conference and Reconciliation held
in Djibouti, 2000. The conference elected the head of the Transnational Government leading by H.E. Dr. Abdulqasim Hassan. Immediately, all regional leaders except Sudan and Djibouti rejected his capacity as a president legitimate of Somalia government and started backing his opponents to weak his running up the devastated country. They proclaimed and perceived threat because Dr. Hassan was pro-Arab, Islamist and more loyal to them rather than to a black African leader. At the time of regional leaders rejected Mr. Hassan’s post. During their rejection, all international forums including United Nations, Organization of Islamic Conference, Organization of African Unity, and Arab league as a legitimate president of Somali Republic welcomed Mr. Hassan. Also maybe the faith dimension can be considering another problem. As well as Somali, Djibouti, and Sudan presidents are Muslim while the rest of the regional leaders Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia are Christian.79 There is another question of what measures can actually be enforced in the face of an outbreak of regional conflict.

A serious conflict arises between two countries within the region, unless action is taken to immediately resolve that conflict, it would diminish the very purpose for which such a regional framework was originally established. For this reason, the question of whether IGAD is able to act in a capacity to deter and prevent the outbreak of regional conflict is of critical importance. According to Satoshi in his article A Security Framework for the Asian Pacific Region: An evidently intractable issues is ability of any regional structure to deal with important security disputes or prevent conflicts where the vital interests of one or

79 In recent years, Sudanese leadership, have been viewed as potential threats in one form or another by Uganda, Ethiopian and Eritrea Christian secularist leadership style. On the other hand, Somalia and Djibouti were viewed the Sudanese leadership style as a moderate and acceptable regime.
other of the regional powers are involved.\textsuperscript{80} Also according to William T. Tow, there are three key factors, which determine how effective sub-regional security organizations can be as legitimate instruments to promote the security of member-states. The key factors are how successful the sub-regional security organizations are enabling their members to overcome their sense of strategic and economic vulnerability to the outside world? The extent to which they allow members to overcome their suspicions of each other’s intra-regional ambitions and policies? And the levels of military, economic, and diplomatic competitiveness sub-regional security organization members achieve, individuals and collectively.\textsuperscript{81} However, if we examine these points closely and the IGAD’s capacity to fulfill these conditions the result will be zero. Yet not achieve any particular key factor to determine how effective sub-regional security organization can be as legitimate instruments to promote the security of member-states. The IGAD faced challenges as any party of the third world countries to cooperate fully and implemented the regional security issues. Third world countries cannot co-operate the security issues as well as they have different threat perception and national security implementations. For example, General Hashim analyzing the challenges heading ASEAN states to cooperate the security cooperation issues and he said; It is a fact it is just difficult to forge collective security arrangement among members which differing threat perceptions or among members without common threats perceptions.\textsuperscript{82} This is not to say that the IGAD will not playing an important role enabling future regional stability and security but it is still a little premature to envisage it

\textsuperscript{80} Satoshi, p.230
\textsuperscript{81} William T. Tow, Sub-regional Security cooperation in the third World, London: Lynne Reinner Publisher. 1990, p.18
provide the basis for a comprehensive regional security framework. Then, Developing the IGAD as a possible security framework structure could be called impractical assumption. However, accordingly, in view of this point, as the Horn of Africa, unlike the Europe, Asian Pacific or other major regions, has no such formal structure, it should at least begin examining possible structures and the necessary steps to create some form of regional framework. The study found out that to maintain peace and security in the Horn of Africa through the regional security framework it would take generation after generation and far away to dream at the present. Our major assumption based on the reality that the factors destabilizing of the region and overcrowded challenges waiting to overcome are too very huge and it is not easy to get solution at least at the present time. It is probably best to think of framework being created gradually in step-by-step approach, with the initial phase consisting of devising and developing a series of regional dialogue at the formal and informal debates among decision-makers and scholars.

According to K.S. Nathan any security framework must address the structural causes of conflict and tensions in the global and regional environments, and prescribe modalities and procedures by which protagonists might be engaged in the direction of conflict resolution. Moreover, any regional security framework aimed at resolving regional conflict in the Horn of Africa must necessarily be based upon a strategic scenario connecting national, regional, international interest. Therefore, throughout our preliminary examination of the

reasons for the region’s insecurity, it will be possible to establish a clear location of potential destabilizing factors and what, if any, preventative measures can be taken to secure the region’s future. Therefore, although it is essential that the countries of the region first acknowledge the need for some kind of regional framework, if this proves impossible, they at least need to examine alternatives for dealing with the problems that will undoubtedly affect regional peace and stability in the future. IGAD’s present structure was not established with the intention of becoming a regional security framework therefore, there must be some form of consensus or loose agreement concerning the ways of developing a legitimate framework. However, according to Satoshi, the best way to engender the gradual development of framework for dealing with security and political issues would be to begin by having joint exchange on economic and social issues.\(^4\) To reduce the conflict and Facilitate confidence building measures through the Social-to State, State-to State, and at regional level are the best approach to enhancing the security and the policies through the economic cooperation and social issues first. Then, reducing security and political conflict through the providing a mechanism for resolving problem, facilitating confidence-building measures will be second steps. At the end, one of the first issues to be addressed in the coming future is whether the Horn of African region needs a regional framework and if so, what kind of framework is appropriate. If there is agreement on the need for such a framework, then it will become necessary to obtain some kind of basic consensus on its contents and structure. It will take considerable time, energy and patience before all the countries of the

Association IPSA XVIIIth World Congress: Conflict &order . Hotel Lotte, Seoul, Republic of Korea, August 17-21,1997)
region will reach any kind of agreement. However, as well as that there still has not been sufficient debate on the importance of security framework for the Horn of Africa. Therefore, it is important to define a basis for the framework and its role and function of its primary objective and guidelines. How it will develop and what kinds of measures are appropriate in the long-term, and under what circumstances such measures can be evoked are also very appropriate works. However, after the study discussed and evaluated what the regional community and their leaders have done so far. At the present question is what the regional leaders have to do in the future to come out of the regional security crisis, to avoid insecurity issues and to promote peace and security in the region? The study, hence suggests the new possible regional security framework, which is named as “Cohesion Security Approach”, as an alternative approach to study third world security issues. Cohesion security approach is formulated through the selection and combination of several theories such as system, integration and independence theories. The idea is to combine the basic elements of all theories to integrate all levels of analysis such as community, state, regional organization and international community. The aim of the cohesion security approach towards the Horn of Africa, as an alternative approach, is to reduce the cycle conflict and to promote the co-existence and living together with tolerance despite differences of political system and economic development. The study will analysis further for this new approach in the next chapter.