PART III

A HERMENEUTIC STUDY OF THE HONG KONG POLICE TRAINING SCHOOLS
Chapter 4

UNDERSTANDING THE LOCAL CONTEXT - THE RESEARCHER'S

PERSPECTIVES OF NEEDS

History of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force Prior to 1997

The Royal Hong Kong Police Force has its historical roots in the colonisation of Hong Kong by the British in 1841, when Captain William Caine, a former army officer was appointed Hong Kong's Chief Magistrate, with the task of maintaining law and order over what was then an extremely small population - not more than 6,000 of whom the majority gained their income from fishing and farming. This situation was, however, soon to change with the influx of Chinese merchants, and within a year, the population had doubled, crime and gambling had increased and opium smoking had become the fashion.

As in other colonies, law and order was viewed from the perspective of protecting Britain's military welfare and middle class European interests in trading and administration. As such, the police force that developed was not modelled on Peel's Metropolitan Police system, but rather was based far more on the Irish paramilitary system, in which the police were "..obliged to impose an
alien system of law on an indigenous population who regarded them as no more than agents of the colonial government" (Crisswell and Watson, 1982; p.8).

But the existence of a paramilitary force cannot be equated with military efficiency, as Mawby (1990) suggested:

"The force that was shaped was haphazard, subject to considerable change, the object of criticism and controversy and neither omnipresent nor particularly effective."

(Mawby, 1990; p.92)

Charles May became the first Superintendent of Police in 1845, and he soon realised that one of his major tasks would be that of recruitment. Immediately, he set out to increase the size of his force and improve the calibre of his men, soon building up a team of 168 officers, including for the first time some Chinese. His main policy was to second British officers and to establish and Indian contingency, for which he improved conditions of pay, pensions and quarters, and set up 12 new stations including the headquarters at the Central Police Station. But with the population rising at an alarming rate
(40,000) and the massive influx of Chinese following the Taiping Rebellion, the new force of 168 was still inadequate (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998).

During this period, gambling and prostitution strengthened the triad groups, and piracy added another dimension to local crime. Increasingly, it was becoming clear that the new police force could not cope with the changing situation. Chinese members of the force were divided in their loyalties as too were many of the Europeans, several of whom had been previously discharged from military as unfit for service (Mawby, 1990).

The policy of William Quinn, the next Superintendent, was to bolster the army through the recruitment of Indian officers, firstly through Bombay Sepoys and later through Sikhs from the Punjab region of India. In 1867, Quinn was replaced by Deanne, a civil servant and the first Superintendent who spoke fluent Cantonese, and consequently he appreciated the importance of language and set up a police language school to encourage more officers to become bilingual. He also established a Commission of Enquiry in 1871, following which it was decided that more local officers should be recruited and Cantonese should be
taught to all European and Indian officers as a means of breaking down racial barriers. However this policy proved difficult to implement (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998) and instead the then governor Sir Arthur Kennedy, split the police, transferring the Indian contingent to the management of prison service and recruiting more British to carry out policing duties (Mawby, 1990).

In the period running up to the First World War, the Police Force gained much credit. Firstly, following an outbreak of bubonic plague, the valuable role played by the police in evacuating the living and burying the dead was much recognised by the local people. And secondly, at least from the perspective of the European population, the Force proved effective in handling numerous minor skirmishes and strikes which emerged during the period (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998).

During the war itself, many of the European officers returned home to fight and a Special Police Reserve was set up in case of emergencies, however the need for them at this stage rarely emerged. On the contrary, the major problems of public order arose following the war with the most notable being the Seaman's Strike in 1922, followed
three years later by the General Strike, and it was during this time that the Special Police Reserve was put to greater use. Both these strikes were promoted by elements in China and both resulted in major disruptions to normal trade. For example, the General Strike, affected trade so seriously that 50,000 people left Hong Kong in a period of two weeks (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998). In response to the Seaman’s strike a Criminal Investigation Department was formed and in 1925 a Chinese detective force, the Labour Protection Bureau, was set up to overcome worker intimidation. This was further strengthened by the kai ching, or street committees who provided the police with local information (Mawby, 1990). The strikes plus the growth of communism in China during the 1930s, meant that the police took on an increasingly political role and this became particularly apparent with the formation of the Anti-Communist Squad (Mawby, 1990).

In 1938 Thomas King became the first Commissioner of Police, and he was to oversee the difficult years leading up to the Second World War. That same year, an emergency regulation was passed which gave police the power: “to require anyone not in employment to leave; forbid meetings, processions and organisations suspected of propagating sedition; to impose censorship over Chinese
newspapers, placards and pamphlets; and to enrol a Special Constabulary" (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998, p. 29). Moreover, it gave them control over the internment camps set up to house the latest major influx of refugees from China, following Sino-Japanese tensions in 1937.

But despite their major new powers, the Japanese advancement came quickly and in 1941, Hong Kong was occupied by the Japanese. Nevertheless their occupation was short-lived, but most of the European officers who had been kept in Japanese camps, were too weak or sick and returned home, leaving the new commissioner Duncan MacIntosh with a major problem of rebuilding the force - a task he did relatively effectively by doubling its size, improving conditions of service, and raising police morale (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998). As an experienced police commission, MacIntosh foresaw the possibility of clashes between Communists and Nationalists among the growing population and in 1949 initiated a massive deportation of Communists (Benton, 1983), but it was ironically the Nationalists that were to cause the worst riots in Hong Kong's history (Mawby, 1990).
Starting in 1949 and continuing throughout the early 1950s, Hong Kong was hit by endless waves of refugees fleeing the political revolution in China, many of whom lived in wooden huts in squatter settlements around the territory. In 1953 a major fire in one of these areas, Shek Kip Mei, left 58,000 people homeless and forced the government to build three resettlement areas in Shek Kip Mei, Tai Hang Tung, and Li Cheng Uk, for the homeless many of whom were sympathetic to Taiwan’s cause and opposed to the China’s communist government (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998). Thus when some Nationalist flags and emblems were removed from display in Li Cheng Uk a dispute arose, which escalated into a series of major riots known as the Double Tenth Riots, occurring on the tenth of October 1956. During the riots, the Police used firearms and tear gas; the outcome was that 59 people died, there were 107 police casualties, and 6,000 arrests were made (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998). Clearly the riots had severely tested the Police’s ability to handle questions of internal security and a critical examination was made following the riots of the system.

In effect, the riots had highlighted two basic inefficiencies of the previous system. One was the
existence of two separate part-time police units, the Police Reserve and the Special Constabulary, and hence these were amalgamated to form what was to become the Hong Kong Auxiliary Police Force. The second was the need for all officers to be fully trained in handling emergency situations and in 1958 the Police Training Contingent was set up (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998).

Nineteen sixty-two saw the beginning of one of the most difficult periods in the history of illegal immigration in Hong Kong. With 5,500 people entering per day, the Police were forced to arrest and repatriate large numbers, making 64,000 arrests in a period of 6 weeks (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998). To deal with the situation the Marine police were strengthened and when a decision was made in 1966 to increase the price of fares on the Star Ferries, protesters marched in opposition and an ugly confrontation broke out between police and protesters. This confrontation, known as the Star Ferry Riots, split over into 1967, leading to work stoppages, food strikes, seaman’s strikes, and numerous periods of aggressive rioting.
The relative success of the police in handling the dispute led to the police to be bestowed the "honour", at least from the colonial powers perspective, of being renamed the 'Royal' Hong Kong Police Force (Sinclair, 1983). Moreover, a subsequent Commission of Inquiry into the disturbances came to the conclusion that there was a need for greater public education into the responsibilities of the police in order to improve relations between the police and the public. For this a Police Public Information Bureau was set up.

The extent of the disturbances, however, had taken Hong Kong by surprise, with the Government and Police perceiving them to be initiated by left wing agitators from China who "...thought the time was ripe to bring the cultural revolution to Hong Kong" (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998; p. 37). Although, the degree to which the riots were Communist evoked or merely the result of the growing rift between wealth and poverty is still somewhat questionable. Public dissatisfaction with the corruption, bribery and extortion that was becoming a way of life in Hong Kong had been growing throughout the 1960s, and the massive economic development had resulted in a custom of paying bribes to government officials (Wong, 1998). This sparked a period to expose
corruption among senior officers leading to the arrest of Peter Godber, the Chief Superintendent of Police on suspicion of earning over HK$4 million—a case which severely damaged the Police’s image and morale (Mawby, 1990). The outcome was the setting up of an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).

The eighties saw a major restructuring and reorganisation of the police with increasing emphasis being placed on day to day community policing, however, with a total of 22,425 illegal immigrants and 11,000 Vietnamese refugees entering Hong Kong in 1987, border policing has remained a key component of police work (Mawby, 1990). While numerous efforts have been developed, including the Junior Police Call, neighbourhood watch programmes and police reserve, in an effort to encourage community involvement in policing, but as Mawby (1990) states:

"Hong Kong’s system of laissez-faire capitalism, with its marked inequalities, co-exists alongside a political system which allows the public little say in the operation of government. ......In this context, moves towards greater community involvement may be interpreted, as in Singapore (Austin 1987), as mechanisms for extending control of the community, rather than opening up the police, or indeed the government, to public accountability. While there is no inevitable link between democratic government and democratic police, in Hong Kong it seems unlikely that the police system can be changed significantly without fundamental changes in the political system, changes ruled unlikely in the run-up to 1997."

(Mawby, 1990; p.101)
The Hong Kong Police Force Post 1997

In 1984, when the United Kingdom signed a joint declaration with the People’s Republic of China agreeing to return sovereignty over Hong Kong to China in 1997 - but as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) that would follow a policy of one nation two systems - massive changes started to occur in all aspects of government policy and society in general. There were few areas where these challenges were felt more strongly than in the field of policing. In preparation for this, a series of succession plans were put in place, including the identification and appointment of the first local commissioner, and the reversion of the ratio of British to local commissioned officers through the termination of further recruitment and early retirement of British nationals (Poon, 1999).

As 1997 approached, serious concern emerged both on the part of the public and the police regarding the changing role of force following the transfer of sovereignty. The public were concerned that, as a colony, Hong Kong had always been a semi-closed society with limited democracy, the police being an extended arm of the colonial government, and as such were not answerable to the general public, but rather were an instrument for the protection
and control of the ruling regime to which they were accountable. This being so, the public were apprehensive that with the transfer of sovereignty to China, the police would become an extension of the communist government. Since China is a totalitarian state that dictates people’s needs, lifestyles and activities, the Hong Kong people feared the setting up of a police state, where the Force serves to control rather than protect public interests (Cheuk, 1996). Moreover, aware both of the degree of misconduct and corruption within the police force, and of their rights as a newly democratic region, the public advocated that there should be institutionalised opportunities for checking the police. That is, the police should be seen as a public service that like other services should be answerable to government (Jones, Newburn & Smith, 1994).

It was this latter point that formed the basis of much concern on the part of the police themselves, leading to an intense power struggle regarding how and to what extent they should be answerable to, and co-operate with, politicians. The politicians as representatives of the general public, were weary of China’s non-interference and were concerned about the repressiveness of police activities, hence they continually attempted to control
police actions by requesting that they publicly report on activities, and by threatening to reduce their budget or introduce legislation against them. An example of this was when the Security Panel of the Legislative Council, requested the police to publicly report on the role of the Security Wing of the Police Headquarters, suspicious that they were committing political espionage. When the Police refused, the Legislative Council threaten to cut their budget, forcing the Security Wing to give a televised briefing (Cheuk, 1996). Other incidences have included the request for an explanation regarding the number of officers heavily indebted to loan sharks, and the termination of stop searches on the basis that they constitute a violation of citizen rights (Cheuk, 1996).

These actions initially led to resentment on the part of the police, and to a certain extent, resulted in lack of cooperation with politicians. On the one hand, the police felt that their activities were being controlled, but primarily they argued that operations to ensure internal security require a high degree of secrecy, and that through their requests politicians were preventing them from effectively carrying out their duties (Jones, Newburn, & Smith, 1994).
This power struggle between the police and the politicians created fundamental problems of trust between the two parties and led to a questioning of the entire role of the police in contemporary Hong Kong (Cheuk, 1996). Within the Force, different concepts of policing emerged and factions grew up, resulting in many of the younger officers feeling confused and puzzled, a situation which added to the declining morale (Cheuk, 1996).

However, finding methods to address the growing problem will be crucial for a number of reasons. Apart from the internal operational problems it can cause, if Hong Kong is to remain attractive to international capital markets, then its police must be accountable to the government and the two institutions must, at least outwardly, be seen to be working together. A great deal of interest will be on this relationship, and the Chinese government, as much as other international countries and financial markets, will be following closely the balance of power. Moreover, associated with this is the international concern regarding triads, since some argue that China's intolerance of triads will push their activities abroad (Chin, 1995), while others argue on the contrary that corruption within China will provide the triad with an opportunity to increase their criminal activities (Law,
1995). Regardless of which of these were true, the impact on international crime would be substantial, hence once again the delicate balance between crackdown and tolerance is crucial.

Intertwined with this power struggle, are a whole series of other issues which have influenced the effectiveness and morale of policing in recent years. One particularly serious issue has been that of the mass exodus of senior staff members. With the reversion in the ratio of British to local staff, in 1997 and 1998, many Chief Inspector positions were left open and were consequently filled by promoting Senior Inspectors to this level. As such, in 1997 and 1998, there were 110 and 103 promotions, respectively (Poon, 1999). Since many of these Senior Inspectors who took up these positions were relatively young, departure rate has dropped to an all time low, and hence promotions dropped in 1999 to only 19, and are likely to stay this way for some time, resulting in what Poon (1999) refers to as an ‘unprecedented problem of plateauing among Senior Inspectors’. That is, the Force’s structure no longer offers much opportunity for promotion, and as such officers perform the same duties for long periods of time, becoming bored or demotivated, feeling trapped, loosing their self esteem and lacking confidence.
(Yip, 1998; Bardwick, 1986). However, plateauing need not have this impact, if redistribution of tasks occurs, or if officers are encouraged to seek new ways of gaining intrinsic rewards. In Hong Kong, however, it is very much a part of the culture to equate personal success with promotion and it will require a determined effort on the part of the Chief Inspectors to guide officers to seek personal satisfaction through other means, such as personal learning and the acquisition of expertise (Poon, 1999).

As a means of dealing with the power struggle and of overcoming complacency and the low public perspective of the police, in 1997, the Force openly embarked upon a vigorous campaign of reducing internal corruption and working in partnership with the community to prevent crime (Hong Kong Police Review, 1997). In particular, they set up a Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO) and carried out numerous public opinion surveys. The studies indicated that assault and misconduct had increased significantly since 1995, and some argued that this was due to the Force attempting to develop a more community policing model without providing the officers with the necessary training required, resulting in excessive
stress, high rates absenteeism and low officer morale (Yip, 1998).

Thus while much more time, consultation and skillful negotiation is required to secure a compromise between the police and politicians, a great deal of training and education will be necessary to help the Hong Kong Police Force deal with the internal and external problems facing it in these crucial years following sovereignty. This education will require a clear understanding of Hong Kong’s specific socio-cultural and political needs.

The Socio-Cultural and Political Structure of Hong Kong

Hong Kong is a heavily populated and heavily policed society. The territory has a total of approximately 6 million inhabitants in an area covering 1,060 square kilometres (Igbinovia, 1987), and almost 40% of this population live on Hong Kong Island where there are over 5,000 people and 25 officers per square kilometre (Mawby, 1990). Mass emigration from communist China has been the major factor behind this high population density, and also has been the reason why 98% of the population is Chinese although only 57% were born in Hong Kong. Moreover, it
has created an unusual demographic structure where adults account for 77% of the total population (Benton, 1983).

In some ways Hong Kong’s economic values resemble those of the U.S.A. being based on:

"...materialism, entrepreneurial initiative, wealth as a goal, competitiveness, the profit motive, success at all costs, significant wealth differentials or gaps among various social groups and categories, pragmatism, urbanisation, and corruption."
(McKenna, 1996; p. 316)

Hong Kong’s economic success has been based on its commerce in international finance and banking, and on its strong textile and clothing industry. This success has meant that unemployment has been low, less than 1.5%, although job security is low and employee benefits and worker compensation are minimal (Mawby, 1990). "Hong Kong is the classic example of unregulated capitalism. Policy is in the hands of the elite, and legislation restricting the market is minimal" (Mawby, 1990; p. 89). The outcome is extreme inequality, with vast wealth living alongside shanty towns and squatter areas. While there is a Social Welfare Department and subsidised, high rise public housing does exist, there are still half a million people without running water or legal electricity (1990). On the
contrary, education is available free, and is of a high standard.

Hong Kong has a three tier, quasi-Westminster system of government constituting the Legislative Council (LegCo), regional and district levels. The LegCo is made up of 60 elected members whose function it is to enact laws, control public spending and question policy - including issues of policing. At the regional level there are two municipal councils concerned with public health, environmental sanitation, recreation, sports, cultural activities and services. While at the district level, 18 districts advise the administration on local matters (Cheuk, 1996).

The government is organised into branches and departments with the Hong Kong Police coming under the Secretary of Security. Since the Secretary of Security is a career civil servant and does not hold a political position, he is not removable by the LegCo. This implies that the police are not accountable to government, a situation that further adds to the power struggle between the politicians and the police.

**Crime and the Criminal Justice System**

Hong Kong has a long history of piracy, gambling, prostitution, opium and heroin dealing. Yet, today there
are conflicting views about the extent and nature of that crime. Many argue that organised crime, and triads, infiltrate every sector of society, including the police (Lau; 1990; Hodson, 1995; Dombink & Song, 1996; McKenna, 1996), while the Hong Kong Royal Police Force have reported continually that less than 5% of all criminal cases are linked with organised crime (Ng, 1994). On the contrary, the Hong Kong Police argue that in 1997 overall crime reached its lowest in 24 years, dropping to 1,036 per 100,000 persons as opposed to 4,100 per 100,000 in 1988 (The Hong Kong Police, 1997).

Table 3

CHANGE IN CRIME RATES BETWEEN 1996 AND 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serious Crime</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>1,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicides</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounding and Serious Assault</td>
<td>6,962</td>
<td>6,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juvenile Crime Offences</td>
<td>6,855</td>
<td>5,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Hong Kong Police Review (1997)
Official reports indicate, therefore, that crime has fallen in just about every area with the exception of homicides. Moreover, while figures for drug abuse and juvenile crime would indicate that they are both on the decline, increasingly there has been a change from cannabis to less common drugs such as amphetamines and ecstasy (Hong Kong Police, 1997).

Despite these figures, popular opinion tends to be far more sceptical about the level of crime within the Hong Kongese society regarding it as 'highly criminogenic', with 1 in every 20 residents being a member of a triad, or alternatively, an organised crime group (Mckenna, 1996). Hong Kong is widely known for its triads, or "illegal Chinese secret society which uses triad ritual and nomenclature" (Mckenna, 1996). Triads were formed historically for political reasons (Dombrink & Song, 1996) and thrived in Hong Kong under the liberal British penal system with its general acceptance of crime, until the crackdown in the late 1950s and 1960s, when the Force was concerned with ensuring stability, law and order (Mawby, 1990). Nevertheless, the economic success since the late 1960s provided the triads with ample opportunities to strengthen their gains in areas such as gambling, loansharking and narcotics (Roger, 1989).
The definition of a triad is still somewhat unclear. For some, triads are synonymous with organised crime (McKenna, 1996), while others argue that triads are not necessarily organised crime (Dombrink & Song, 1996). In practice, the triads in Hong Kong take one of a number of forms; they may be:

- **youth gangs**, comprised of adolescents who view delinquent behaviour as part of having fun, and who generally leave the gang as they mature;

- **street gangs**, made up often of previous members of youth gangs who, as they mature come to claim territories by dress, language or behaviour, and become involved in increasingly violent and abusive activities;

- **criminal gangs**, consisting of groups specialised in pick pocketing, shop lifting and burglary, or alternatively who are involved in the forging of counterfeit passports and driver’s licences;

- **multi-crime syndicates**, comprised primarily of groups involved in drug trafficking, credit card fraud, arms smuggling, and money laundering; and,

- **criminal enterprises**, whose members generally are thought to be legitimate law abiding people, but who,
through their enterprises corrupt politicians and manipulate the law (McKenna, 1996).

One clear example of the strength of the triad culture in Hong Kong is the movie industry where it is claimed that triads control 80-90% of the market, selling tickets for supposedly sold out films, coercing actors to carry out roles, and assaulting and raping young female stars (Lo, 1993). In recent years their power in this sector has declined and in the period between 1992-1995, major competition with the Big Circle, the largest Chinese organised crime group, led to the murder of four of the triad’s principal movie producers.

Triad influence over the legal system has been widely documented and the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) described it as including bribery, kickbacks and general corruption, with the Canadian Consulate in Hong Kong going as far as to say that 95% of all law clerks were linked with triads (McKenna, 1996). An indication that it exists includes the example where a 1,000 men from the Kum Tong triad wearing white gloves on their right hands turned up to the sale of some flats with the aim of reselling them at inflated costs. Instead they were chased and beaten by 100 police, who supposedly were
defending the interests of the 14K, the Sun Yee On and the Lo Dan triads, ensuring that they got disproportionately more places (Lau, 1991).

The seriousness of the triad issue has been highlighted with the change of sovereignty and with Hong Kong's growing role in world finance and communications. Many have been concerned that the change in sovereignty could have a vast impact on the territories triad world, some arguing that it could cause them to flee to countries such as the United States to avoid fierce competition from the Big Circle, and stringent Chinese police. However, to date evidence does not seem to be backing up these fears (Bode, 1995) and moreover others argue that international drug trafficking was common practice well before the change of sovereignty (Law, 1995). Thus while it is crucial that the Hong Kong police keep a careful eye on the changing trends in triad activity, and while it may be so that triad members are taking a "wait-and-see attitude while seeking a niche in other countries" (Dombrink & Song, 1996), the impact of sovereignty may in fact be overstated. More important, perhaps is the changing nature of multinational crime in the 21st century, and its ability to move money, people and goods across borders.
The Police Training School

The Hong Police Training School, based at Queens Park, was initially established in 1920 following the First World War. During the war many experienced Europeans had returned to Britain to fight and several local officers had been conscripted to fill their roles but these new officers required training in areas, such as: the use of firearms, physical fitness, and language. During the Second World War when the Japanese took over Hong Kong, the Police Training School was closed down, however, it was soon reactivated in 1946, and was run at this time by the senior police officers who returned to the territory (Hong Kong Police Force Museum Advisory Committee, 1998).

The actual importance of the Police Training School did not emerge until the riots of the late 50s and early 60s, when the police started to examine their internal security system and their ability to deal with national crises. This spurred the Force to set up a specialist unit to train all officers in matters relating to internal security, and in 1958 the Police Training Contingent, later to become the Police Tactical Unit, was established. The unit provides the officers with instruction on how to deal with issues of internal security and crowd control.
Education, however, did not become a major concern until 1980, when the minimum qualification for entry into the Force was raised to Grade 11. While this did lead to an initial decline in the number of applicants, the total number who were ultimately deemed fit for selection did not fall (Igbinovia, 1987). At this stage, training programmes offered by the Police Training School lasted 20 weeks and included topics such as first aid, life saving, weapons training and community policing. A variety of specialist courses were also offered in detective, marine, cadet, language, and adventure training, and these were run out of the Police Training School.

Today, the Police Training School is responsible for all the basic training of the officers and the Probationary Inspectors (PIs) newly entering the Force, as well as for the majority of their on-going, in-service training. Initially, all PIs undergo 36 weeks of basic training, while the constables (PCs) undergo 27 weeks of basic training. The training aims to teach them about legal, police and court procedures, social studies, social values, and care for victims (Hong Kong Police, 1999). It is also supplemented with physical training, including: self-defence, first aid, swimming, life saving, firearm
tactics, and public order. More recently, officers have been required to attend in a Basic Putonghua course as a means of developing language proficiency and to participate in a Community Interface Programme working with some of the economically poorer groups. The Continuation and Promotion Division of the Police Training School provides in-service training for all staff. This training takes the form of practical exercises, seminars, visits, project research and presentations.

Although women played a notable role in the Hong Kong Police Force since the mass immigration of the late 1940s and early 1950s, where they helped to control the women and children refugees (Calderwood, 1974), it was not until the change in focus towards more community policing in 1970s, when they became particularly significant. By 1998, of the 902 PCs who completed basic training at the Police Training School 303, or 33.5%, were women (Hong Kong Police, 1999).

While the nature of education at the Police Training School has invariably changed over the years, the extent to which this has altered police/community relationships is disputed and some would argue that their methods are still largely 'intrusive' (Mawby, 1990). Moreover, it is
argued that any move towards improved community policing will require achieving greater confidence on the part of the general public through investigation of complaints against police and greater accountability – process which will require careful training of staff at all levels.

The Training Development Bureau, is an off-shoot of the Police Training School, and is responsible for designing, reviewing and up-dating all the mainstream courses taught at the School. Aware of the various problems which exist between the police and the public, in 1998, the Bureau for the first time elected specialists and academics from outside the force for the role of Force Training Officer and Assistant Training Officer (Hong Kong Police, 1999).

The Royal Hong Kong Police Force training methodology and content of all training programmes was identical to the London Met's programmes till 1996. This similarity changed significantly in 1997 and the emphasis on language training/education and community police relationship plays an important role since 1997. As many training staff left the organisation prior to 1997, there is also a need to recruit specialist training staff. The importance of University based education is still considered to be a priority but the lack of interest in providing police
related educational programmes by local Universities and the high cost of enrolling students in overseas programmes prevents this avenue as a viable option. The police force in Hong Kong actively encourages graduates from any discipline to join the force and provides incentives by way of promotion and higher pay for these recruits (through lateral entry).

Growing Educational Concerns

On reviewing the socio-political and cultural history of Hong Kong and their Police Force, a number of specific training/educational needs start to emerge:

- Community policing in the past has been limited by colonisation and the lack of democracy, with police being seen as a representative of an outside body rather than a service for the public.

- Police were not answerable to the government and hence there was no public accountability, problem which has led to corruption. Recently police set up Complaints Against Police Office (CAPO) and ICAC, but this has created much stress for the average police officer who requires training in how to handle the relationships with CAPO and ICAC.
Lack of public accountability has created a serious power struggle between the police and the LegCo - a situation which is still not solved and which has led to dispute about whether police's objective is to control or to protect. Dealing with this problem will require skills in negotiation/consultation.

Fear of police aligning with China has created specific concerns

Internationally much concern due to interest to protect financial/economic markets

International organised crime and what will happen to the triads is another major concern

Immigration-illegal immigration are other areas of special interest in Hong Kong

The extent of career plateauing is particularly unique to Hong Kong because of the large number of young chief superintendents who replaced the British staff, this has limited the availability of promotion for others creating decreased motivation

There is a need to change the attitude from that of success = promotion towards encouraging officers to seek personal gains through education and self-satisfaction.

Police structuring and changes due to the change of government in 1997. There seems to be a genuine lack of
interest in policing and perceived dropping in standards in training and education of the Police in Hong Kong.

- Need for more qualified staff trainers at the Police Training School and reinvigorating of the intensive on the job training programmes
- Need for specific programmes on the police relationship with mainland China

It should be noted that the above list is the perceived understanding of the needs of the Hong Kong Police Force through the researcher's eyes. Using the outlined methodology, the perceived understanding of the needs through the participants eyes was conducted and these were matched up to gain a holistic picture of the needs in relation to training and education for the Hong Kong Police Force. The next chapter outlines the participants (Officers) perspective of the needs using the questions outlined in the previous chapter. A list of factors (that were consistent for all participants in all jurisdictions for this study) were also presented to the participants (Officers) as a guide to the focus group discussions and some of these factors were derived from the researchers perceived understanding of the needs as outlined above.