CHAPTER THREE: ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

3.1. Dependence on extra-regional countries

One of the biggest challenges to ECOWAS primary goal, economic integration, is economic dependency. This might be considered the deep root of all present African security problems. Although the causes of Africa’s economic problem have always been debated, a brief illustration of its origin is of great importance to better understand its seriousness.

Africans established kingdoms and indeed vast empires comprising different ethnic groups before colonial period especially beginning from the 15th century to late 19th century. However, there had not been any major innovations in the mode of production comparable to those of Europe after the sixteenth century onward. African societies at the time of the colonial conquest had not harnessed water, wind; production was almost entirely dependent upon human muscle. Neither the plow nor the wheel, crucial technological breakthroughs in Europe, had been adopted in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. 50 Agricultural surplus, due to the problems of transportation and storage was not encouraged. Insignificant exception would be made in areas of permanent settlements where agricultural markets flourished to some degree.

There was also an absence of technological inventions for manufacturing development. Although some African societies had great skills in metalworking, Africans did not develop the furnaces capable of generating high temperatures that were to play a significant role in the European industrial revolution. Mining technology was extremely rudimentary - no pumps, no explosives, little knowledge of

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geology—such that the vast mineral riches of the African continent remained virtually untouched before European colonization.31

Hence after decades of European colonization and massive exploitation, the newly independent African countries entered the world economy to be shocked by markets that have been saturated by more developed countries with protectionist inclinations towards their exports from the side of industrialized countries. Heavily dependent upon international finance institutions and more powerful nations for their capital formation, African states have often been subject to pressure by international agencies to adjust their preferred development schemes.

Until this day, the majority of ECOWAS member countries, particularly the Francophone ones, are economically very much dependent on their former colonial metropolitan powers. Such dependency on the economic field alone, has intruded into all other security related areas among the community. Since independence these states looked to donor nations and international monetary institutions for guidance and advice on development but with negative returns. During the Cold War there was a better room for shifting political allegiance between competing giant world states for economic gains. But West African states were not able to exploit the opportunity for long-term technological and economic benefits that would later sustain future development based on self-reliance. If the situation is compared with some Asian countries like ASEAN that went through the same colonial experiences for example, it can be seen that the latter have benefited more in terms of acquiring better technologies that placed them ahead of ECOWAS in development. As a matter of strategic fact, foreign aid that West African states received for political loyalty to the

31 Ibid., p. 230
West have added to their dependency as it was detrimental to the principle of self reliance for the achievement of future regional integration.

One of the problems that faced ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone was inadequate finance and equipment of its troops due to ECOWAS economic underprivilege. As one Nigerian official admitted, one of the reasons for ECOMOG's failure to protect Freetown was the lack of military equipment like helicopter gunships and M1245. 52 Without the financial and logistic support extended by US and UN to the peace initiatives in the two West African states, ECOMOG would not have been able to carry on for several years. For in January 1991, Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, announced that Bush had authorized the delivery of nearly $2.8 million worth of 'non-lethal' military equipment to ECOWAS peacekeeping force, as well as $6 million of emergency funds to assist humanitarian relief operations in Liberia. 53

3. 2. Foreign aid and major power interest

Foreign aid has been the major channel through which former colonial and other major powers in the world maintain substantial influence on ECOWAS countries as well as the whole African continent. Foreign aid is not a charity accorded to former colonies or poor countries. But it is a strategy to guarantee and preserve the important interests of the world most powerful nations.

The primary link between Africa and US in strategic policy in the Post-Cold War era is the fact that US and its allies are increasingly dependent on important raw materials produced in unstable African states. There is a shift in US security policy from the struggle to contain the former Soviet Union to the need to preserve order and

52 Yusuf Bangura, opcit., p. 576
53 Daniel Volman, opcit., p.10
secure access to strategic assets throughout the world. Among the ECOWAS, Francophone countries were targets of US Official Development Assistance (ODA), as a back up for France’s role during the Cold War. US ODA reached its height during 1980s, when it was doubled from $243 million in 1980 to $542 million in 1989. It is important to note, however, that US aid for Africa was divided among 25 Francophone countries, and was still much lower than that provided to other regions of the world.  

French ODA policies towards Francophone Africa during the Cold War was motivated by cultural, economic, and security interests. After the end of East West cold confrontation, of the top ten African recipients of French foreign aid, four are ECOWAS members. These are Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Guinea.

Japan, due to its economic miracle after the W W II, became interested in extending ODA to many African countries for the sake of safeguarding important sources of raw materials. Economic self-interest, rather than ideological or political, shaped its ODA policy. It consciously targeted states that possess raw materials vital to its industries, and those making lively economic markets for its exports like automobiles. Uranium in Niger, fish products in Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire as a good market.

As such, foreign assistance should have been beneficial for West Africa’s development with such economic giants in much need of its raw materials. The economic giant, Japan itself was dependent on foreign aid after its defeat in the Second War. But contrary to what is expected, despite all the huge amounts of such aid, the majority of African states have faced continuing deterioration in their economic development and have become increasingly dependent on foreign aid. This predicament continues to the present whereby ECOWAS countries like Niger, Mali,

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54 Peter J. Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989", *opcit.*, p. 547
and Burkina Faso depend on foreign assistance in order to pay the salaries of their civil servants. Niger was dependent on France in the first decade after independence, not only for public investment, but also for recurrent budgetary support – occasionally to the tune of 40 percent of total bilateral disbursements from France. This has still continued to be the situation till the present and has been coupled with sharp decrease in US ODA due to lack of serious interest in the post-Cold War age. Also due to American popular pressures to trim US budget deficit, and enhance spending for domestic social programmes. French commitment has also diminished as will be explained later. This has shattered the community’s goal of attaining economic development that would guarantee honourable life for its people.

On the other hand, ECOWAS dependence on foreign aid and the contradiction that raises with regard to its principles is in its relationship with the Lomé Convention. It is an aid and trade co-operation agreement between the EU and the Group of 70 African, Caribbean, and the Pacific countries (ACP), first signed in Benin 1975. It has since then been the center-piece of EU development assistance. In quantitative terms, the European Development Fund, the financial instrument of Lomé, has comprised the largest single portion of EU aid, averaging almost 45 per cent of all disbursements in recent years. Qualitatively, Lomé has been regarded as a model of North-South co-operation, mainly due to three special features: it was founded on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and interdependence. However, the conditions that were set rule out the principles of equality and mutual respect for national sovereignty. For example, governments gaining access to macro-economic financial assistance are to adopt Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that include the acceptance of the traditional macro-economic conditions of World Bank and the IMF. This means, at a

55 Timothy M. Shaw, opcit., p. 174
pragmatic level, that a significant portion of the new European Development Fund was taken out of the national and regional programming process, thus giving the EU both control over its use, and, as with all economic conditionality, leverage over the policies of the ACP states.  

In this respect, ECOWAS and the Lomé convention differ fundamentally in their approach to economic cooperation and development. Whereas the Lomé convention endeavours to promote a close and permanent relationship built on cooperation and interdependence, ECOWAS pursues a strategy of political autonomy and economic independence. The Lomé convention is regarded as neo-colonial arrangement aiming at institutionalizing Africa’s dependency, to better control its own development and organize its exploitation. In view of the serious contradiction of the two sets of economic cooperation, ECOWAS member states will have to make a political choice and will have to make a decision of priority. Whether to be more committed towards intra-regional or to extra-regional economic arrangements.

3.3. Vertical and horizontal trade

Vertical trade means trade between the states of a certain region or economic grouping with others outside of such arrangement. Horizontal refers to trade among the members of the same region or grouping.

Given the fact that most ECOWAS member states are poor in technology and manufacturing capability, and that they are dependent upon foreign aid, it is inconceivable that they can be able in the near future to develop protected horizontal trade among them. Since they mainly produce unprocessed raw mineral and agricultural products as principal source of national income, then trade priority is

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 accorded to those countries capable of processing these products. Hence, strong vertical trade ties with extra-ECOWAS nations and organizations is the reality that deals another blow to future economic integration. Since independence, West African economic relations have been tied to their former colonial masters especially Francophone countries, conducting thereby more trade with those economic and political masters than with each other. The idea of economic integration within the ECOWAS is to end this situation by making trade within the community easier by reducing bureaucratic obstacles.

Nigeria has been trying since independence to break loose from the yoke of vertical trade. In the initial stage of tightening vertical ties, threat of nationalization became a foreign policy weapon. It was used against Britain (via the nationalization of BP assets). It extended to blackmail tactics and confrontation with the Ford Administration since the United States as early as 1978 took nearly 70 percent of Nigeria’s petroleum exports, although this constituted less than 20 percent of American petroleum imports and the ‘indigenized’ companies still managed by Americans – Gulf, Mobil, Texaco and Ashland – produced nearly 30 of Nigeria’s daily output.  

Cote d’Ivoire is also known to have very strong trade attachment to its former colonial master. Before independence, it had signed privileged agreements with France that were lucrative to the country due to the Ivorian good economic management. Light import-substitution industries like floor milling, oil refining, canning, textiles, and plastic products that used to come from Senegal were established. The most important trade partner after France was the United States and

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57 Ibid., p. 505
58 Timothy M. Shaw, opcit., p. 211
the former EEC. Since the era of Houphouet-Boigny, Côte d'Ivoire has always given more priority to vertical trade agreements, as do other ECOWAS countries.

On the other side, since independence Niger believes that capital resources on a sustained basis had to be sought outside Africa. Though many other countries like Germany, US, Japan, and Canada trade with Niger, France still takes the lion's share of such trade, whereby Niger's uranium goes primarily to France.

During 1974 to 1986, 38 percent of Francophone countries' total imports came from France, while 25 percent of their exports went there. 59 Most of the remaining percentages were with other non-ECOWAS states. Libya showed keen interest in Niger's animal wealth beside its purchase of substantial amount of uranium. There is also appreciable commerce between Niger and Nigeria, as an ECOWAS member. Most of exports to Nigeria have been agricultural commodities and livestock, and Nigeria has become a significant regional supplier of energy and manufactured goods to Niger as well. Trade with both Nigeria and Libya, however, has been interrupted periodically for political reasons, which has contributed to the weakness and dependency of the Nigerien economy. 60

Horizontal trade means trade diversion from extra-regional to regional countries. With the backwardness of industrialization in the West African region, such an economic policy will be detrimental to the very cause of economic integration. Because members of ECOWAS trade and custom unions will have to shift from low-cost producers in industrial countries to high-cost producers among themselves. It is an economic irrationality to import goods at higher prices for the sake of economic integration, a risk that no member will likely be willing to take.

59 Peter J. Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989", opcit., p. 544
The issue of being tied to multiple economic organizations like the Lomé convention and other bilateral state to state trade agreements limits the political clout of ECOWAS to unanimously decide to seek another alternative that would enhance its future goals. Indeed, it does not seem that the creation of ECOWAS has resulted in any significant increase in intra-regional trade so far. Intra-ECOWAS trade represented only 2.1% of total ECOWAS exports in 1970, 3.1% in 1976, 3.8% in 1979 and 4.6% of such exports in 1981. At the same time, trade between ECOWAS and the EEC has remained significant, averaging around 50% of total ECOWAS trade (Exports and imports) during the period 1976 to 1980.\(^{61}\)

On this basis, it is clear that economic integration, not talking about political integration among the community will remain a very difficult target to reach in the near future. There is a new conception among economic experts that Africa will be a great economic potential in the future for investments and business opportunity. This means major powers will have more interest in Africa, the matter that would urge to more trade ties and arrangements with ECOWAS countries. In other words, vertical trade relations are going to be strengthened more and more, dealing another blow to West African economic dream.

### 3.4. Francophone sub-regional economic arrangement

All former French African colonies are economically tied to France’s monetary system. They agree to hold their reserves in the form of French Francs and to affect their exchange on the Paris market. Their currency, Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), or African Finance Community, is freely convertible into French Francs, 50 CFA Francs to one French Franc. Among the ECOWAS Francophone

\[^{61}\] Emanuel Hansen, *opcit.*, p. 176

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members, only Mauritania is not part of this agreement, which is also known as the Franc Zone. Guinea-Bissau, a former Portuguese colony, joined in 1997. By wedding its fiscal policy to that of the franc zone, France preserved monetary stability throughout the region. Concurrently, it co-ordinated regional financial flows, regulated fiscal policies, provided emergency credit, subsidized private investments to member-states, and offered tax breaks to French companies doing business in the region. The guarantee of this stability is based upon the lost of significant degree of autonomy over national economic policy by Francophone countries. For instance, one of the most effective strategies for promoting exports is devaluation of national currency. This is deferred to French government, and as such unavailable to member states. While the Lomé convention is considered a neo-colonial arrangement to keep ACP countries permanently dependent on the European Union, the Francophone one is considered a continuation of France's colonization of its former colonies.

Despite the assurance of Francophone countries' "currency" stability, yet they failed to build any solid foundation for sustainable economic growth. Besides, there are several other constraints and latent causes that are likely to create conditions for security instability in these states. Of these, is the French commitment itself, which will form a dilemma in the future particularly after the unification of EU currency. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, African Franc Zone states' economies were negatively affected because of increasing foreign debts, and low prices offered for their main export products. The IMF recommended devaluation of the Franc CFA, but the French government refused. But on 12 January 1994, devaluation had to come to pass, whereby Francophone countries were immediately affected as the value of their currency decreased by 50 percent. One French franc became worth 100 instead of 50

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62 Schraeder, "From Berlin 1884 to 1989", opcit., p. 543
CFA- in reality a 100 percent increase in the cost of goods purchased on the international market with the CFA franc. The public reaction in all 14 Franc Zone countries was immediate. African newspapers screamed of betrayal by their own regimes, and by the French. 61 Equally important, French support for Francophone countries seems to be waning. French policy-makers are preoccupied with the implications of European integration. Meanwhile, the French public also is beginning to question French financial commitments to African states at a time of economic stagnation in France. It is still not clear what kind of policy adjustment French foreign policy under Jacques Chirac is going to make in its relation with an increasingly unstable Francophone Africa.

ECOWAS Francophone members have also concluded several political and economic arrangements that divide their loyalty between these arrangements and ECOWAS. There has always been competition between Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire on regional prestige and influence among West African Francophone that could be gained through the forging of integrative policies. For instance, in 1959, long before the birth of ECOWAS, a prominent federation was established by the name of Conseil de l'Entente, which is a loosely integrative federation headquartered in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, linking Togo, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Benin, and intended to harmonize relations between member states on the basis of friendship, brotherhood, and solidarity. 64 In 1971, the Communaute Economique Afrique Occidentale (CEAO), or West African Economic Community was established in Mali as another regional organization. Both Cote d'Ivoire and France saw the organization as a counter to Nigeria's growing influence on the regional politics of West Africa during the 1970s.

The most significant of such Francophone regional groupings is the *Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine* (UEMOA), or *West African Economic and Monetary Union*, which replaced CEAO in 1973 with a central bank in Senegal. Its members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. In the same year, the union set up the *Banque Ouest-Africaine de Development* (BOAD), or *West African Development Bank*, in Togo. It promotes regional monetary and economic integration, and intends to improve regional trade by easing the movement of labour and capital between member states. In 1996, UEMOA heads of state met in Burkina Faso where they agreed to establish a customs union. A preferential tariff scheme, eliminating duties on most local products and reducing by 30% import duties on most local products and industrial goods. In addition, July 1996, a community solidarity tax of 0.5% was imposed on all goods from third countries sold within the community, in order to strengthen UEMOA’s capacity to promote economic integration. At the meeting, UEMOA heads of state adopted a declaration on peace and security in the region.\(^6\)

In the light of such elaboration, it is clear that economic integration under ECOWAS will still require many political and economic regional changes and rearrangements if it is to succeed. Because there is no any rational economic basis for the existence of CEAO as it has similar objectives with ECOWAS. But its members declared their willingness to preserve their identity within the bigger and much looser ECOWAS economic framework. They asserted their resolve not to be swallowed by the Nigerian economic giant. Trade relations between CEAO and EU and bilaterally with France is much higher than within West Africa. Since the early years after the birth of ECOWAS, there has always been suspicion that Nigeria which contributes

more than 30% of total budget of ECOWAS, is wielding its power within ECOWAS for the promotion of its own national, economic, and political interests, to the detriment of community interests. Undoubtedly, the West, particularly France, uses CEAO as a tool to eternalize its colonial interests in Francophone Africa, and also as a "divide and rule" strategy to weaken ECOWAS.

3.5. Economic mismanagement and corruption

Security is comprehensive of many aspects of social life. Another factor that destabilizes it is economic mismanagement and corruption by leaders, bureaucrats and other government officials. Corruption in particular is found in every society. But its magnitude is different. Among some states its impact upon the rest of the population is neither serious nor visible. However among others, and this includes some ECOWAS countries like Nigeria and Sierra Leone, great degrees of corruption have been exposed by many top ranking government leaders. While among most Francophone states like Niger, Senegal, and Cote d'Ivoire, there appears to be more discipline and accountability.

Apart from corruption, the management of economy itself has so far been inefficient among almost all West African countries. Economic institutions have stagnated, leading to more frustration and miserable conditions among the common masses. After independence, most African states had higher GNP than many Asian countries like Thailand and Malaysia. But today, these countries are far more developed than all Black African countries, excluding South Africa.

The reason was because most post-colonial West African leaders considered the economies of their countries as their own private properties, without consideration to consultation or public opinion. They initiated development policies that were of no
real benefits for their nations. Instead of developing the educational system, agriculture for greater food surplus, or investment in industrial technologies and science, meager resources were used for military expansion and prestige projects. The worst was, and still continues to be the case on many occasions, the swindling away of public wealth and depositing billions of dollars into personal foreign bank accounts, while the bulk of the nation is left desperately. Many development projects were initiated but remained without any implementation. Those implemented were in many instances short-lived without materializing their anticipated outcome. It is undeniable that there were number of projects that have succeeded in various ECOWAS countries like Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. But they never have sustainable positive impact on the development of their country or the lives of the common people. That is the reason why many infrastructures have rusted and had to be shut down.

Many Leaders believed that assuring peace and stability can only be realized through single-party system that would bring together the heterogeneous societal ethnic components. They argued that the one-party political systems represented a firm and solid foundation for democracy, much more so than political competition. The state as such, controlled all centers of economic activities. Nevertheless, one-party rule had been a manifestation of West African "Gilded Age", as it was in most cases used to eliminate opposition. It became a tool of rewarding party loyalists with jobs, contracts, and other spoils of power. The legacy of one-party rule during the postcolonial era and its contribution to underdevelopment cannot be emphasized enough. Bureaucratic and political corruption basically involved the misuse of authority for personal enrichment. It has enabled the governing elite to amass huge

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wealth for themselves and their close relatives, while it led to the impoverishment of the vast majority of the population. Clientalism and patronage have sometimes put the most top government positions in the hands of very close relatives.

Basically, at independence, most African countries adopted laws and institutions that were weak, inefficient and not designed to maximize the participation of the African people in national development. These rules allowed dominant political groups to "highjack" governmental structures and use them to plunder the economy for their own benefit, while imposing significant costs on the masses. In addition, the new laws and institutions discouraged entrepreneurship and significantly reduced the ability of the economy to generate the new wealth that could have been used to eliminate poverty and material deprivation.68

State intervention in the market has tremendous effects on the development of the economy. It politicized resource allocation and compelled business firms to rely on rent seeking instead of managerial expertise and profits competition. Consequently, many owners of business had to devote too much time and effort to lobby and influence the state in order to improve the profitability of their enterprises. The use of scarce resources for rent seeking negatively affected wealth creation. Therefore, African business has to bribe bureaucrats for import, production, or investment licenses, or otherwise, close down. The mass exit of many business enterprises from the formal sectors of the economics of several African countries had a significant impact on national revenues and the ability of the governments of these countries to provide public goods. In its report on the state of the African economies in the 1980s, the World Bank specifically mentioned state control of economic activities as one of the most important constraints to development. The Organization of African Unity

67 David N. Abdullah, opcit., p. 85
(OAU) came to the same conclusion when it issued its Lagos Plan of Action in 1981 and acknowledged that the over-reaching state was fast becoming an important obstacle to development. 69.

On the individual levels, corruption stands high in a detrimental manner to the objective of ensuring good economic life for the peoples of ECOWAS member states. Before its replacement, the CEAO’s top-level administrative staff was under investigation for alleged mismanagement and fraudulent budgetary and financial practices.

Obasanjo, already famous for being Nigeria’s only military dictator to ever hand over power to an elected civilian, has the chance to guide his country from the depth of underdevelopment to sound economic ground. But first he would have to tame the endemic corruption that extends from the statehouse at Aso Rock to every corner of Nigerian society. 70. It is known that one of the major preoccupations of the new president is exposing and curbing corruption in the country. He has so far been successful on some grounds. The death of Sani Abacha in 1998 has exposed how much he looted the coffers of the country. So far, the Obasanjo government has recovered $2.2 billion, 52 luxury cars and 34 houses. A search is still on internally to recover embezzled funds. The Swiss authorities have also frozen $550 million belonging to the late and his associates, monies deposited in various Swiss banks. 71

Prior to that, bribery scandals followed one another in different government departments. Newspapers published exposes of fantastic corruption, something much more than business as usual. In 1983 alone, these included the alleged mysterious

exhaustion by June of the $2.5-billion annual allocation for import licenses, a press report from London of fraudulent import-export transactions exceeding $6 billion, and the arrest of several top officials of the Federal Capital Development Authority in Abuja over an alleged $20-million fraud in its account. 72

When the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) was established between 1994 to 1995 under the leadership of Professors Amos Sawyer and Kpomakpor, unexpected rapid corruption occurred. Several civilian leaders turned out to be far more dishonest than most Liberians ever imagined. Rumours that Sawyer purchased a house in the United States worth almost $5 million and that Kpomakpor's LNTG spent about $3.3 million on international telephone calls – allegedly in a desperate search for resources to help disarm fighters. By way of contrast, despite having embezzled government funds as head of General Services Administration in the early 1980s, Taylor remains a rather inscrutable and legendary character in Liberia. 73

3.6. Administrative and technical weakness

A major problem among number of ECOWAS countries is technological weakness. There is real difficulty in transportation and communication links, among the members themselves and among some of them with the outside world. Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso are land-locked without any seaports for facilitating export and import activities. Even tarred roads remain to be a problem till the present time in most ECOWAS member states. This makes transportation of goods and movement of people from one area to another in the same country very difficult. While inter-state

lines of transportation are worse and neglected, despite earlier plans to develop that sector. Airlines are still underdeveloped, as most members do not have enough planes connecting their capital cities and major towns.

In the agricultural level, several ECOWAS countries still face so much hardship in assuring sustainable agricultural growth. The three land-locked members of the community are well pitied in this field. Scarcity of fertile land due to desertification and lack of enough rain form a formidable obstacles to their well being, the matter that limits their contributions in regional development. Food production in Africa in general declined by over 20 per cent since 1970 whereas the population has been increasing at around 3.2 per cent per annum, the highest in the world. This has led to a lack of food security in the continent. Added to this, Africa’s agriculture largely depended on primitive technology and is virtually dependent on rainfall. African industry remained highly underdeveloped and overtly dependent on imports of capital, skilled labours, technology and spare parts. 74 Storage of crops is one main problem facing farmers today in West Africa. Silos remain primitive with small capacity of storing crop quantity in terms of time and space. They rely heavily on human labour and energy due to the lack of modern machinery like tractors and irrigation tools. The absence of fertilizers as well is to be added to factors of instability. From the administrative side, governments’ policies in West Africa are also responsible for the problem of agricultural growth. For example in Mali, the government pricing policy for small farmers in a large irrigated rice production scheme can be labeled as “extortion”. A meticulous two-year study in 1980-81 has shown that it costs farmers 83 Malian francs to produce a kilo of rice but that the

75 K. Mathews, opcit., p. 89
government paid farmers only 60 Malian francs per kilo. Consequently, farmers found it rational to smuggle rice across the border into Senegal, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where they could secure 108 to 128 Malian francs per kilo. It was because of such factors and more others that there had been starvation and famine in the 1970s, and the ghost of that natural calamity continues to haunt number of these countries. Especially, Niger and Mali

On the administrative arena, most of the institutions fare very poor. For instance, medical services, and sanitation further expose the inefficiency of administrative systems of most ECOWAS countries.

The existence of large number of bureaucrats was and is still a heavy pressure on the government to sustain. The very sophistication of the inherited administrative machinery, largely modeled on the institutions of the metropolitan countries in the post-1945 period, meant that that machinery was costly to run and difficult to staff without some help from expatriate officers. The bureaucracy constituted a high proportion of the people within a given state who were in wage and salaried occupations, and therefore imposed a substantial drain on the national budget was allocated to civil service salaries.

There was good positive progress in some ECOWAS countries with regard to the administrative and technical sectors, for example in Nigeria, Ghana, and Cote d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, deterioration has visited them since during Cold War years, and continues through the present epoch.

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