IMPACT OF MEDIA REPORTING OF THE SEPTEMBER 11$^{\text{TH}}$ EVENTS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NONPROFIT ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Dedication

It is my pleasure to dedicate this thesis to my mother who always prays that I am successful in my life. Also it is dedicated to my family; my wife and my kids, Ahmad, Rahmah, Sarah, Mohammad, Omar.

They sacrificed their time and rights to let me invest my time for this work. It is also dedicated to my brothers and sisters. Finally, it is dedicated to all people who are interested in organizational communication as an area of study with great wishes and respect.

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Abstract

This research explores the influence of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks on nonprofit Islamic organizations with activities in the United States. The study employs discourse analysis to examine newspaper articles, interviews of leaders of these organizations, as well as data and figures released by these organizations. The articles were mainly taken from US media, namely CNN and *Washington Post* as representatives of the US media. Instruments of data collection about these organizations include, semi- structured interviews, a questionnaire, and an in-depth analysis of media materials, news reports and articles of CNN and *Washington Post*. Content analysis was used to analyze media articles and news stories. Data analysis reveals some important information such as the presumed serious negative impact on their organizations activities which include Da'wa activities, congregational religious services introducing Islam to non-Muslims, establishing mosques and Islamic centers. Political and other activities were also found to be deeply affected by the 9/11 events. In addition, events of 9/11 also negatively impacted the level of participation of Muslim youth and Muslim Scholars in the various activities arranged by these organizations. Also, the US government closely monitors the activities of these organizations. On the American media level, the results indicate that US media often projects negative views of the activities of the Islamic organizations based in America.The research ends up giving some suggestions and recommondations to enhance and re-vitalize the activities of the Islamic charity organizations.

Abstrak

Penyelidikan ini merungkai tentang pengaruh serangan September 11, 2001 (9/11) terhadap organisasi sukarela Islam dengan aktiviti di Amerika Syarikat. Kajian mengambil kira analisis beberapa buah surat khabar, temu bual dengan pemimpin organisasi-organisasi ini, dan juga data serta nombor-nombor yang dikeluarkan oleh organisasi ini. Artikel-artikel ini diambil daripada sumber media Amerika seperti CNN dan *Washington Post* mewakili media negara mereka. Instrumen dalam pengumpulan data mengenai organisasi ini termasuklah dengan mengadakan temu ramah secara semi-struktur, soal selidik dan analisis mendalam terhadap meterial media, laporan berita dan artikel di dalam CNN dan *Washington Post*. Analisis kandungan digunakan untuk menganalisis artikel media dan laporan berita. Data analisis mendedahkan beberapa informasi penting seperti tanggapan serius serta impak nagatif terhadap aktiviti organisasi mereka termasuklah dakwah, menyebarkan agama Islam dan memperkenalkan agama kepada bukan muslim, penubuhan masjid dan pusat agama. Politik dan aktiviti lain juga turut terjejas dek kerana kejadian 9/11. Tambahan pula, kejadian 9/11 ini turut memberi kesan negatif terhadap tahap penglibatan belia dan sarjana Muslim dalam pelbagai aktiviti yang dianjurkan oleh organisasi-organisasi ini. Pada media Amerika, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa media Amerika selalu mengambarkan pandangan negatif terhadap aktiviti oraganisasi Islam yang ada di Amerika. Penyelidikan ini berakhir dengan memberikan beberapa cadangan dan sokongan bagi menaikkan dan mengembangkan aktiviti amal organisasi Islam.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0 Introduction

On Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists from the Islamic militant group al-Qaeda hijacked four passenger jets and flew two of those planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the North and South towers of the World Trade Centre complex in New York City. The other hijacked jet, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and the fourth hijacked jet, United Airlines Flight 93, intended to crash in the United States Capitol Building in Washington D.C. but its passengers tried to overcome the hijackers and the plane crashed into a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people have died in the attacks, including all 227 civilians and 19 hijackers aboard the planes. These incidents, here in after, will be referred to as 9/11.

The 9/11 incidents have influenced the world in many ways and to varied, wide-ranging degrees. There is a change in attitudes toward Muslims whether they live inside or outside the United States (U.S.). Legislative changes made many Muslims and non-profit organizations subject to limitations of their liberties. The Muslim community in the U.S. at large had also been affected. Among the negative impacts of the September 11 incidents was the shutting down of international Muslim organizations, freezing or minimizing their activities on the assumption that they had some relations with terrorist groups that were connected to the events of the two towers of the World Trade Center. Some of these organizations were based in the U.S. while others were working from outside the soil of the U.S.

Johnson (2011) reported that the Pew Research Center administered a survey of 1,003 adults in August 2010 and the findings showed that "more Americans have unfavourable than favourable views of Islam."

The Charity & Security Network (2011) reported that the U.S. government had terminated nine U.S. based charities claiming that these organizations had connections

with terrorists and support terrorism. In addition, the Department of Treasury could also freeze funds belonging to these charities.

The present study explores the influence of the 9/11 incidents on non-profit Islamic organizations, which have activities inside and outside the U.S. Content analysis is used to examine articles, selected from newspapers published in the U.S. as well as interviews with leaders of these organizations and data and figures released by these organizations. The selected articles were mainly taken from U.S. media, namely CNN (www.cnn.com) and The Washington Post (www.washingtonpost.com) as representatives of U.S. media.

1.1 The Statement of the Problem

Immediately after the events of 9/11, the American government launched a campaign against Muslim charitable organizations, probably due to the assumption that they provide financial or other kinds of assistance to groups, which the government has a tendency to describe as "terrorist." Moreover, when the U.S.A. Patriot Act (Uniting and Strengtening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorist Acts) was enacted by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001, it gave the government the authority to treat and label any group as a terrorist organization (U.S.A.Patriot Act). As a result, charitable organizations became vulnerable of being described and treated as terrorist organizations and their members could be detained for questioning and their assets may be frozen. These instances were widely reported in the national and international media (*Charity & Security Network*, 2011). Therefore, the activities of these organizations were highly suspect and deeply affected.

1.2 The Objectives of the Study

This study focuses on the activities and services three pre-selected non-profit Islamic organizations provide to Muslim communities in the US. The selected organizations are; The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), The Muslim World League (MWL) and The Council on American- Islamic Relations (CAIR).

The study seeks to fulfill the following objectives:

1. To assess the impact of 9/11 media reports on selected Islamic non-profit organizations and their activities.

2. To shed light on the most and least affected areas of activities of the three largest Islamic organizations that were selected for the study.

3. To study the U.S. media coverage of 9/11 and assess this type of coverage from a professional point of view.

1.3 Research Questions

The study will attempt to answer the following questions:

1- What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular ?

2- What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations ?

3- What is the content of U.S. media coverage on 9/11 in relation to Islam, Muslims and Islamic nonprofit organizations?

1.4 The Significance of the Study

The present study is significant to many stakeholders, as it provides valuable information on the current situation of non-profit Islamic organizations, which are working in the United States. Moreover, the other aspect of significance is based on the fact that there is very little literature and research on the impact of 9/11 on non-profit Islamic organizations. The study employs different instruments of collecting data on this issue, it is likely to first hand information on this matter which still poses a lot of questions and concerns on a global scale.

There are several benefits of forming a non-profit organization. Innovative non-profit organizations have helped institutions to influence elections and change laws, business practices and cultural focus. They provide a learning platform that is used to organize and educate the public around wealth, poverty and health among other issues. On the other hand, the main benefit of non-profit organizations is that they have less competition than other institutions. For instance, when non-profit organizations have different causes, it means there will be less competition in terms of winning over possible volunteers, contributors, participants, board members and members within the

organizations. This equates to more funding coming to the innovative non-profit organization.

It is worth mentioning here that since funds are normally limited for donors, non-profit organizations rely on grants from other funding sources to operate. For this reason, innovative non-profit organizations gain more donations since they have the ability to bring together more people and solicit funding from contributors. Donors might feel the need to spend their money on innovative organizations that do not rely on funding from other sources.

Kroessin (2007) pointed out that the history of charitable organizations in the Muslim world depended mainly on the principles of belief and compassion, which are involved in Islamic teaching through the Quran and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Kroessin (2007) says:

"In Islamic theology, humankind is seen as a trustee of all the world's God-given resources. Only through following 'divine guidance' can a functioning social and global system be established and maintained. In Islamic teaching, this system is based on the optimal utilization of the resources God has endowed to mankind, and their equitable use and distribution."

Here, the basic mechanism for the redistribution of money in Islam is *Zakah* (obligatory charity), which became a mandatory act of worship at the time when the Islamic state was established by the Prophet Muhammad in 622. Many Quranic verses deal with this topic. Linguistically, the word *Zakah* is derived from the verb '*zaka*', which means to grow and improve. *Zakah* must be given by every Muslim according to the Quran:

"Zakah expenditures are only for the poor and the needy, and for those employed to collect [Zakah] and for bringing hearts together and for freeing captives and for those in debt and in the way of Allah and for the traveler – an obligation imposed by God and God is Knowing and Wise" (Quran, 9, p.60).

The expenditures of charity (Zakah) could perhaps be translated into the following headings according to Kroessin (2007):

- poverty reduction;
- administrative overheads for civil servants dealing with public welfare;
- peace-building and community cohesion;
- promotion of freedom, basic human rights and civil liberties;
- personal insolvency settlements;
- public work, including security and defence; and
- supporting the homeless, refugees and migrants.

Kroessin (2007) also added that "voluntary charity (in Arabic *Sadaqah*, meaning to give away and realising one's faith by action) is also strongly encouraged. It is based on many sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, such as 'Charity is due upon a person on every day that the sun rises'. Charity here goes beyond material support to encompass any voluntary act, even the offering of a smile. It is regarded as an individual devotion given directly to the beneficiary, without the need for state administration or mediation".

There are other regulations and teachings that stress particular seasons for giving charity. Usually these are the seasons in which Muslims are encouraged to do good deeds, such as fasting during the month of Ramadan and performance of the Hajj (pilgrimage) during the Hajj season. During these seasons, Muslims are expected to pay sums of their money either in Zakah El-fitr or to distribute meat during Eid Al-Adha when cows, goats or camels are slaughtered for their meat which is then distributed to feed the needy. In other Muslim countries, the collection of *Zakah* may be organized by the state, such as countries like Pakistan, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, for example. In other cases, it is collected by Islamic charities.

The private organizations have become a substitute for the state welfare system in the Muslim world as a part of social responsibility, where the organization is responsible for collecting and distributing charitable assets. These organizations collect donations in mosques and community centres, and at the offices of Islamic charities and charity shops. Donors are encouraged to remain anonymous in the belief that it is better to give alms discreetly than to publicise one's philanthropy. Thus, one should not underestimate the importance of charitable giving in the Muslim World. For example, the Saudi government is the largest giver of charity through unilateral and bilateral funds. This places the Kingdom among the largest donors in the world, with disbursements of $48 billion between 1975 and 1987 (Kroessin, 2007).

However, due to U.S. pressure the Saudi government has clamped down on public fundraising activities, including banning charity collection boxes in mosques and closing down some leading charities. In July 2003, the Saudi Ministry of Information announced that all NGOs had been barred from sending funds abroad. In Somalia, for instance, the local branch of the Saudi charity the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) was labelled as a terrorist entity by the U.S. Office for Foreign Assets Control in 2004, prompting the Saudi government to close the organisation down (*Charity & Security Network*, 2011). Morever such accusations were allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda. In another case, in the Palestinian Territories, the U.S. government in 2003 cited the British charity Interpal as a 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organization' on the grounds that it supported Hamas activities. In 1996, the Charity Commission had carried out an inquiry into allegations that some of Interpal's funds had been channeled to Hamas, but no evidence of inappropriate activity was found (*Charity & Security Network*, 2011).

The U.S. Muslim Charities and the War on Terror review in December 2011 (*Charity & Security Network,* 2011) also reported that the FBI raided the organization's Oregon branch on February 18, 2004. The charity organization was labelled as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) and was accused as being involved in money laundering and delivering funds to Chechnya.

The Charity Commission froze Interpal's bank accounts while it carried out another investigation. The U.S. authorities failed to provide any evidence to support their allegations, and the inquiry was closed on 24 September 2003. The organization's activities were disrupted and donor confidence may have been undermined. Suspicions around the role of established Islamic charities have also altered the way Muslims give to charity. Since they are obliged by their faith to give, they are forced into informal means of discharging their *Zakah,* often through donations to unrecognized 'charities' and fundraisers at local mosques and community centres.

The Saudi NGO World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY http://www.wamy.co.uk), one of the charitable organizations selected for this study, has seen a 40% drop in its fundraising income since 9/11; its Secretary-General, Saleh Wohaibi, attributes this fall to 'fear of Muslims falling foul of strict US efforts to

monitor terror funding.' But this switch away from established charities may have further weakened the transparency and accountability of charitable donations. Ironically, attempts to close down or control formal charities may have had precisely the opposite effect by forcing charitable giving into less regulated channels.

The significance of the study also arises from its search for the facts of alleged relationship between most Muslim charitable organizations and terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda. The study seeks to state the fact that most non-profitable organizations are not linked to any terrorist deeds and actions and most of these charitable organizations are supported by respectful countries, for example, Saudi Arabia, which is in disagreement with Al-Qaeda and it even deprived its former leader, Osama bin Laden, of his Saudi nationality. Second, the study seeks to ascertain whether these organizations are involved in any terrorist actions of any kind or not.

1.5   Methodology of the Study

This study employs a mixed mode methodology for research; it uses qualitative and quantitative methods to study selected Islamic non-profit organizations based on convenience and purposive sampling. Instruments of data collection about these organizations include: semi-structured interviews and an in-depth analysis of media material such as news reports and articles of *CNN* and *The Washington Post*. Content analysis has been used to analyze media articles and news stories.

Descriptive research aims to describe data and characteristics about the population or phenomenon being studied. Descriptive research answers the questions who, what, where, when and how. Although the data description is factual, accurate and systematic, the research cannot describe what caused a situation. Descriptive research cannot be used to discover a causal relationship, where one variable affects another.

Descriptive research is used to discover frequencies, averages and other statistical calculations. A survey investigation is one of the most common tools in conducting descriptive research. Descriptive studies include any research that involves observation and measurement of the existing conditions without changing any variables. Sometimes descriptive research is used prior to conducting an experiment to assess the existing conditions and decide on how to manipulate the variables. There are a wide

variety of methods that are common in qualitative measurement. Here the researcher shall discuss the methods used in this study.

Unstructured interviewing is an important method of the qualitative approach in research. It involves direct interaction between the researcher and a respondent or group. It differs from quantitative structured interviewing in several important ways. First, although the researcher may have some initial guiding questions or core concepts to ask about, there is no formal structured instrument or protocol. Second, the interviewer is free to move the conversation in any direction of interest that may come up. Consequently, unstructured interviewing is particularly useful for a broad exploration of a subject. However, there are disadvantages to this lack of structure. Since each interview tends to be unique with no predetermined set of questions asked of all respondents, therefore it is usually more difficult to analyze unstructured interview data, especially when synthesizing across respondents. However, this method is highly successful in certain circumstances where the interviewee is very knowledgeable about the subject under inquiry.

When designing quantitative surveys, researchers will need to consider issues related to choosing an appropriate sample, using valid and reliable measures, and conducting a pretest before the survey study is launched. Most surveys are custom-made studies designed to answer a specific set of research questions. Some surveys are omnibus studies, in which researchers add questions about topic under study to an existing survey.

Surveys can be conducted face-to-face, by mail or telephone, or online. They can be self-administered or administered by an interviewer. Tools such as computer-assisted telephone interviewing or touch-screen surveys via a website can be useful. The following are the advantages of using a survey in conducting research:

- When the survey involves a convenience sample (e.g., a mall intercept study), data can be collected and analyzed fairly quickly.
- When the survey involves a statistically valid random sample, the results from the sample can be generalized to the entire population if the response rate is high enough.
- Surveys can provide reliable (i.e., repeatable) direction for planning programs and messages.

- Surveys can be anonymous, which is useful for sensitive topics.
- Like qualitative research methods, surveys can include visual material and can be used to pretest prototypes.
- They can help generalize your findings beyond your participant group.
- People who are willing to respond may share characteristics that do not apply to the audience as a whole, creating a potential bias in the study.
- They can be useful in assessing the proportion of your target audience within a community.
- They can be useful in assessing the proportion of a target audience that practices a behavior.
- They can be useful in assessing the proportion of a target audience that recalls a message.

In this study, the researcher has purposefully selected charitable organizations, therefore it is a purposive sampling, one of the non-probablity sampling methods that has been identified as the sample of the study (Rosenberry and Vickers, 2007). The researcher identified sampling units based on his judgement of what units to select in order to facilitate the investigation, much in the way of a convenience or accidental or availability sampling (Reinard, 2001). As may be easily deduced from the word, convenience sampling allows the researcher to select groups, therefore there is no attempt at random sampling.

There are many charities that are based in the US and some literature noted that there are more than 40 such organizations. Some examples are Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation Inc. (AHIF), Global Relief Foundation (GRF), Goodwill Charitable Organization Inc,. Holy Land Foundation (HLF), Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA-USA), Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development Inc, (Kindhearts), CARE International Inc, (Care Inc) and others.

The current research is a study in which three organizations are selected and will be studied in-depth to find out how nonprofit Islamic organizations have been affected in the aftermath of the 9/11 events in terms of their activities and services rendered to Muslim communities in the United States. The three selected organizations are:
- The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).

-      The Muslim World League (MWL).

-      The Council on American- Islamic Relations (CAIR).

Both WAMY and MWL have American branches working under United Nations umbrella but the CAIR is an American organization based in the United States. These organizations were specifically selected because they are the most active and high profile organizations in the field of Muslim charity. Moreover, they represent the Islamic World appropriately, as WAMY exists in Saudia Arabia, MWL is in Saudi Arabia and has branches in different parts of the world, and CAIR represents Muslims in America. Statisitically, these organizations represent a considerable percentage of organizations all over the world (nearly 30%).

1.5.1 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

The first organization mentioned in this research is World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY). Its importance may arise from the fact that its headquarters are in Saudi Arabia. The researcher selected this organization because it may represent other charity organizations of Arab origin in the U.S. which played a key role in influencing the results and outputs of the post- 9/11 period. This organization is clearly a charitable organization which was impacted directly by the events of September 11 and the reactions of the U.S. and other Western governments after the events of September 11.

WAMY is based in Saudi Arabia, so it is not surprising that it came under scrutiny and became a subject of detailed observation and described as a terrorist organization by the United States. The U.S. government suspected WAMY to be involved in connection with terror funding, and believed that there is a linkage between WAMY and Al-Qaeda, via the umbrella of 'charity'. It is also believed that WAMY's efforts in Somalia are also being aided and abetted by Oxfam and Oxfam Novib (http://www.oxfam.org) based in the UK and Holland, whose leftwing anti-Western agenda (aided by politicians and governmental supporters), and has been extensively documented. Oxfam Novib is the Dutch local front of Oxfam which is well-known

across the globe as a confederation of charities aimed at establishing a fair world without poverty.

Peter Siebelt (2007) claimed that there is a link between Novib and Islamist initiatives and that the charity played a role in organizing demonstrations against the Dutch far right politician Pim Fortuyn, (who warned of the Islamisation of Holland as well as the call to closing the borders). Siebelt (2007) blamed Novib for helping to organize a rally which he characterized as a call to murder and was a prelude to Fortuyn's assassination by animal rights activist Volkert van der Graaf.

The U.S. State Department and UN funded mass migration of Somalians to the United States, where the resettlement has led to a formation of a "mini-Mogadishu" begging the question of how the State Department worked with WAMY in efforts to bring a mass migration of a population of Somalians who have been sending US tax payer money back to support their clans and warlords in Somalia.

According to those suspicious of the charity, WAMY is providing funding under the guise of education touted as a "trust building initiative" aimed at "focusing on mutual exchanges and understanding." Given that WAMY's mission statement is to promote Islam, any educational aid coming from them will be approved by the Islamists who are running the country.

In charities such as WAMY humanitarian work is interpreted in the light of Islam, and aligned to fit the precepts of Islamic law. The view of humanitarianism in Islam is illustrated by the WAMY booklet "Human Rights from an Islamic Perspective" which attempts to reconcile Islamic humane principles with those of modern Western societies such as the US.

WAMY (2010) Critics of WAMY believe that it is involved in disseminating hate literature, including books "that encourage religious hatred and violence against Jews, Christians, and Muslims themselves. The poster on the WAMY website defines their mission, a 'clear-cut Muslim' holding a Quran, and in the background, the symbol of the British parliamentary democracy, the tower of Big Ben, being overshadowed by a mosque dome with a minaret. www.WAMY.co.uk .

It is clear that U.S. government and some Americans have a misunderstanding in analyzing WAMY activities by linking them to terrorism and terrorist actions, which are farfetched and rather impossible. WAMY is a charitable organization and part of Saudi Arabia, which is always in struggle with terrorists inside and outside the country and is always warning their citizens to follow moderate Islam as instructed in the Holy Quran and by Prophet Mohamed (PBUH) more than 14 hundred years ago.

1.5.2 The Muslim World League (MWL)

The second charity organization selected for this study is the Muslim World League (MWL). It is an international organization headquartered in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. Founded in 1962 by the Saudi government, it is also originally an Arabic charity organization and is considered as one of the most famous organizations all over the Muslim World. Therefore, the researcher intended to display the importance and the effects of such organization for the Muslim people especially with regard to some international events such 9/11.

MWL(2008) MWL is a Saudi Arabia-based international organization that provides a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam around the world through a large network of charities and affiliated organizations. Critics of MWL claim it has attempted to portray itself as a broad global Islamist organization, outwardly emphasizing tolerant aspects of Islam and promoting itself as a leader in interfaith dialogue. Its ideological backbone, however, is described as an extremist-based interpretation of Islam and several of its affiliated groups and individuals have been described as linked to terror-related activity. www.theMWL.org.

While the MWL has on several occasions condemned terrorism in general terms, US continued to describe it as an institution of having a long history of providing financial support to terrorist groups or having organizational links to them, including to Hamas, Abu Sayyaf group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Jemaat al Islamiyya, and Al-Qaeda. The MWL has offices throughout the Muslim world as well as in non-Muslim majority countries. The organization's website lists thirty-six offices outside of Mecca, including Washington, New York and London. The degree to which these offices are active is unclear; however, the organization has reportedly used its network to fund Islamic centers and mosques and to distribute materials promoting its fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Through the MWL's Fiqh Council, a body that establishes

jurisprudence according to its own interpretation of Islamic law, the Saudi 'ulama (religious establishment) has attempted to coordinate the efforts of Imams around the world.

David Bukay (2008) The Fiqh Council holds yearly religious conferences in Mecca and disseminates fatawa (religious edicts) upholding a strict fundamentalist interpretation of Islam in the Wahhabi theological tradition. The Wahhabi tradition is embodied in the strict interpretation of fiqh (jurisprudence) by the Saudi 'ulama. Wahhabi theology calls for a return to the sunnah, i.e. the way Muhammad and his companions lived in the early days of Islam. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, a Muslim theologian of the 18th century after whom the movement is named, did not accept the developed body of Islamic law as it was applied in the centuries following the advent of Islam, and thus advocated a return to the literal practices of the sunnah. Therefore, his movement is considered by some Muslim scholars as a sect, and not part of orthodox Islam as defined by the 'ijma, or consensus of Muslims. This fundamental and often radical interpretation of Islam is often expressed in the statements made by the MWL leadership. This is one of the reasons the charity is suspected of having links to terrorist organizations. The Commission on Scientific Signs in the Qur'an and Sunnah is one of eight different bodies that comprise the MWL. The other seven are the Al Haramain and Al-Aqsa Mosque Foundation; The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) Council; Holy Quran Memorization International Organization; International Islamic Organization for Education; International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO); Makkah Al-Mukarramah Charity Foundation for Orphans; and the World Supreme Council for Mosques. The World Assembly for Muslim Youth (WAMY), based in Riyadh and sponsored by the Saudi government with chapters worldwide, is another group closely connected to the MWL.

1.5.3 The Council on American- Islamic Relations (CAIR).

The third selected organization for this research is the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which was founded in June 1994 by three officers of the Islamic Association of Palestine (IAP)—Omar Ahmad (IAP President; became CAIR President), Nihad Awad (IAP PR Director; became CAIR Secretary & Treasurer), and Rafeeq Jaber (IAP Chicago Chapter President; became CAIR Vice President). The importance of this organization in our present research arises from its importance in the world of philanthropy, which provided for the Islamic world in all

parts of the world since its inception, and emerged as its leading role in this area during and after the events of 9/11.

Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is one of America's largest Muslim civil liberties advocacy organizations that deals with civil advocacy and promotes human rights. It is headquartered on Capitol Hill in Washington, D.C., with regional offices nationwide. Through media relations, lobbying, and education, CAIR presents what it views as an Islamic perspective on issues of importance to the American public, and seeks to empower the American Muslim community and encourage its social and political activism. Annual banquets, through which CAIR raises the majority of its funds, are attended by American politicians, statesmen, interfaith leaders, activists and media personalities.

Robert Faturechi (L.A.Times 2011) In 2007 the organization was named by US Federal prosecutors, along with 245 others, as an unindicted co-conspirator in a Hamas funding case involving the Holy Land Foundation, which caused the FBI to cease working with CAIR outside of criminal investigations due to its designation. A federal appeals court removed the label for all parties and sealed the list on October 20, 2010, ruling the designation was the result of "simply an untested allegation of the Government, made in anticipation of a possible evidentiary dispute that never came to pass."

CAIR (2010) CAIR's mission statement is "to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding". CAIR's literature describes the group as promoting understanding of Islam and protecting Muslim civil liberties. It has intervened on behalf of many American Muslims who claim discrimination, profiling, or harassment. Its stated core principles include supporting freedom of religion, protecting all Americans' civil rights, and encouraging inter-faith dialogue. CAIR believes that "the active practice of Islam strengthens the social and religious fabric of our nation." CAIR is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization with affiliates in 20 states (many of which manage multiple offices), and 33 chapters in the US and Canada (CAIR-CAN). www.CAIR.com.

CAIR has conducted investigations, issued reports, held press conferences, filed lawsuits, and organized political action to protest aspects of US counterterrorism policy.

From 2002–2004 CAIR organized the Library Project, an effort to put quality materials about Islam in all 17,000 public libraries in the United States. The initiative sent a set of 18 books and tapes to public libraries written by Muslim and non-Muslim authors on Islamic history and practices, as well as an English translation of the Quran. As of December 2004, CAIR received 7804 sponsorships for the $150 set. The initiative was funded with an initial $500,000 matching contribution from Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, whose donation to the Twin Towers Fund was refused by then-Mayor Rudy Guliani because it came with a letter blaming U.S. support for Israel for the 9/11 attacks. In 2003, CAIR employee Randall "Ismael" Royer, a native from St Louis was arrested for his role in the Northern Virginia jihad terrorist network.

Free Trad (2010)In 2004 CAIR launched a "Not In the Name of Islam" petition in order to "disassociate the faith of Islam from the violent acts of a few Muslims." It encouraged Islamic organizations, mosques, and individuals to sign it. The petition repudiated terrorism and any group that committed such acts, citing a portion of the Quran that told believers to stand for justice even if it was against friends or family. The petition was posted on CAIR's homepage, and garned over 690,000 signatures before being taken down in a sitewide renovation in 2007. In 2005 CAIR coordinated the joint release of a fatwa by 344 American Muslim organizations, mosques, and imams nationwide that stated: "Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is *haram* or forbidden—and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not martyrs." The fatwa cited passages from the Quran and hadith that prohibit violence against innocent people and injustice, and was signed by the Fiqh Council of North America. Authors Kim Ezra Shienbaum and Jamal Hasan in their book *Beyond Jihad: Critical Voices from inside Islam* (2006) felt it did not go far enough in that it did not address attacks on military targets.

Also in 2005, following the Quran desecration controversy of 2005 at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, CAIR initiated an "Explore the Quran" campaign, aimed at providing free copies of the Quran to any person who requested it. Nearly 34,000 Americans requested copies. In 2006, during the protests over cartoons depicting Prophet Muhammad, CAIR responded by launching an educational program "Explore the Life of Muhammad", to bring "people of all faiths together to learn more about the

Islamic Prophet Muhammad and to use mutual understanding as a counterweight to the tensions created by the cartoon controvers" It provided free copies of a DVD or book about the life of Muhammad to any person who requested it. Almost 16,000 Americans requested materials. In June 2006, CAIR announced a $50 million project to create a better understanding of Islam and Muslims in the US ($10 million per year for five years), in a project to be spearheaded by Paul Findley, a former US Congressman. www.cair.com

CAIR (2006) California Senator Barbara Boxer in December 2006 withdrew a "certificate of accomplishment" originally given to former CAIR official Basim Elkarra after Boxer's staff looked into CAIR, and she became concerned about some of CAIR's past statements and actions, and statements by some law enforcement officials that it provides aid to international terrorist groups.

The Jiwish press (2013) In May 2007, the U.S. filed a lawsuit against the Holy Land Foundation, the largest Muslim charity in the United States at the time, for providing funds to Hamas, and federal prosecutors filed pleadings. Along with 300 other organizations, they listed CAIR (and its chairman emeritus, Omar Ahmad), Islamic Society of North America (largest Muslim umbrella organization in the United States), Muslim American Society and North American Islamic Trust as unindicted co-conspirators, a legal designation that can be employed for a variety of reasons including grants of immunity, pragmatic considerations, and evidentiary concerns. While being listed as co-conspirator does not mean that CAIR has been charged with anything, the organization was concerned that the label will forever taint it. In response, National Association of Muslim Lawyers and National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers sent a letter to Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, saying that the move to list the largest Muslim organizations in America as unindicted co-conspirators was an effort to smear the entire Muslim community. They also stated that the list breached the department's own guidelines against releasing the names of unindicted co-conspirators.

The Investigative Project on Terrorism reported that on August 7, 2007, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agent testified at the Holy Land Foundation trial that CAIR was "listed as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine Committee", that it had received money from the Foundation (conflicting with Nihad Awad's Congressional testimony), and that co-founders Awad and Omar Ahmad were "listed as individual members [of] the Brotherhood Palestine Committee in America." On October 22, 2007, the Holy Land Foundation trial ended in a mistrial.

CAIR (2009) stated that the reason for the mistrial, and no convictions on any of the charges, was that the charges were built on fear, not facts. In 2008, the FBI discontinued its long-standing relationship with CAIR. Officials said the decision followed the conviction of the HLF directors for funneling millions of dollars to Hamas, revelations that Nihad Awad had participated in planning meetings with HLF, and CAIR's failure to provide details of its ties to Hamas. During a 2008 retrial of the HLF case, FBI Special Agent Lara Burns labeled CAIR "a front group for Hamas." In January 2009, the FBI's DC office instructed all field offices to cut ties with CAIR, as the ban extended into the Obama administration. U.S. Congressmen Sue Myrick (R-NC), Trent Franks (R-AZ), John Shadegg (R-AZ), and Paul Broun (R-GA) wrote Attorney General Eric Holder on October 21, 2009, that they were very concerned about CAIR's relationships with terrorist groups, and requesting that the Department of Justice (DOJ) provide each Congressman with a summary of DOJ's evidence and findings that led DOJ to name CAIR an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation terrorism trial.

Smiling Ted (2010) The four Congressmen also wrote House of Representatives Sergeant at Arms Wilson Livingood a letter the same day asking that he work with members of the House Judiciary, Homeland Security, and Intelligence Committees to determine if CAIR was successful in placing interns in the committees' offices, to review FBI and DOJ evidence regarding CAIR's Hamas ties, and to determine whether CAIR is a security threat. Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez (D-CA), "appalled", said "I urge the rest of my colleagues to join me in denouncing this witch hunt." She was echoed by Keith Ellison (D-MN), the first Muslim elected to the U.S. Congress, in a speech that included a statement by the House's Tri-Caucus. The four Republican Congressmen, joined by Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) and Congressman Patrick McHenry (R-NC), then wrote IRS Commissioner Douglas H. Shulman on November 16, 2009, asking that CAIR be investigated for excessive lobbying and failing to register as a lobbying organization.

CAIR condemned the Fort Hood shooting and expressed prayers for the victims and condolences for their families. CAIR pointed to an arrest of five men in Pakistan on December 10, 2009, as a "success story between Muslims and Muslim community organizations (like CAIR) and American law enforcement authorities. When the five men left Washington for Karachi on November 28, the families of the men discovered

an extremist videotape. Worried, they contacted CAIR, which set up a meeting with the FBI on December 1, and the families shared their sons' computers and electronic devices with FBI agents. A US law enforcement official described them as models of cooperation. CAIR hoped the event would ease "strained" relations of American Muslims with the FBI.

CAIR (2011) Hours after it was announced by President Barack Obama that Osama bin Laden had been killed, CAIR released a statement: "We join our fellow citizens in welcoming the announcement that Osama bin Laden has been eliminated as a threat to our nation and the world through the actions of American military personnel. As we have stated repeatedly since the 9/11 terror attacks, bin Laden never represented Muslims or Islam. In fact, in addition to the killing of thousands of Americans, he and Al-Qaeda caused the deaths of countless Muslims worldwide. We also reiterate President Obama's clear statement tonight that the United States is not at war with Islam"

1.5.4 Reasons for Selecting These Organizations

Bradlee Dean (320130 There are many organizations working in philanthropy all over the world, and some of those organizations carry the message of Islam, especially in the field of charitable work, and call for Islam. However, the researcher has chosen three of the largest Muslim charity organizations in the world, which have a strong and distinctive role in the world and in the United States in particular.

Of the leading Islamic organizations chosen by the researcher, the Muslim World League (MWL), is one of the oldest Islamic charity organizations and the most prevalent. It has branches in all countries of the world in addition to its many branches in all countries of the Islamic world. Muslim countries have provided the necessary legal and politcal cover for the organization. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth partners with the Muslim World League in its efforts, but the main advantage of it is that it focuses on youth and their work in the field of philanthropy. For these reasons it has many active branches around the world and especially in the United States of America.

The CAIR is the largest of the Islamic and American organizations, interested in civil rights of Muslim Americans. It has a number of branches in several U.S. states

and has great influence in the social life and political society of the U.S. It has played an effective role in handling the hate campaign against Muslims in the aftermath of September 11 events and continues to play that role.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

This study has some limitations which should be regarded when considering the study and its contributions. The study focuses on a major event in recent history and its impact on Islamic nonprofit organizations i.e. 9/11 and the aftermath.

For this reason, and to narrow the scope of the study, the researcher has chosen to limit the study to three main Islamic organizations out of more than forty. In addition, the impact of 9/11 events touched every country in the world, but the researcher confines the study to the United States, because this event is very extensive and complex. The selection of the case study design normally results in many limitations as far as the generalization of the results of the study is concerned. Another limitation of this study is that instead of trying to understand the wide range of media that cover the event, it confines its scope to two media representatives, namely, the CNN and *Washington Post* as they are considered as among the most popular and influential media in the United States and worldwide.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.0   Introduction

More than a decade after 9/11/2001, the consequences of this event continue to affect the Islamic Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Muslim communities in the United States as well as the rest of the world. The 9/11 events constituted a new era to Muslims in which they began facing new complicated situations. Muslims became careful with every movement or action as might be misinterpreted or fabricated against them. Thus, civil rights were jeopardized and their religion was always under question. To all intents and purposes the Muslims suddenly became demonized and became the new enemy.

The horrible and tragic event of September 11, 2001 has changed the global scenario with dramatic consequences on the seven million American Muslims. American Muslims, who had been struggling and hardly been able to integrate and become an integral part of American social and political life, all of a sudden became subject to suspicion, ridicule and threat. The existing achievements and assets such as thousands of mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic schools and charitable organizations came under direct scrutiny.

Although the facts of the tragedy that took place on September 11, 2001 are indisputable, there exist many diverse points of view to explain why they happened and how to respond. The responses, from the war on terrorism to various reactions to Islam, have created their own series of diverse views and perspectives. To achieve an authentic literate discourse on the myriad of issues surrounding 9/11, the crisis must be framed in the global context in which it exists. Through the educational sphere of media literacy, this lesson offers a process to foster the authentic discourse and an approach to framing a global context.

In today's information age, the media has become the dominant force in shaping our view of reality and our understanding of the way the world works. As educators in this era, we have a professional responsibility to teach our students how best to access and evaluate the vast spectrum of information, in the variety of forms and structures, which they have available to them.

Media sources may intend to be objective in their reporting, but, today more than ever, we have come to understand that all media is constructed. Because of the nature of decisions that go into producing media, from the audience it is intended to serve, to the way the story is told, to the voices that are edited to be presented, all media embodies a point of view. If one voice can be heard as advocacy, many voices can be heard as education. The best of scholarship comes from studying more than one source (whether primary, secondary or reference). This process of learning also applies to becoming media literate. Developing media literacy skills can give students tools to identify and evaluate information about their world, from a local to global context.

To develop a more global context for analyzing and discussing the crisis stemming from 9/11 and its aftermath both the corporate and independent media have typically not approached the events of 9/11 with open inquiry. It would appear that, with very few exceptions, the corporate mainstream media and their independent alternatives have dismissed critical 9/11 questions as conspiratorial or unpatriotic

Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea (2009) Traditional American mythology was used to exalt the official story of 9/11, a story that has become the only story. New York University historian Judt (2006) recently lamented that today's discourse centers almost exclusively on "official accounts as officially rendered and received." Nowhere is this truer than in the case of 9/11. It was clear to any media user that the mainstream corporate media and even the progressive press have initially repeatedly endorsed the government-sponsored official story formalized in the 9/11 Commission Report. This narrative tells us that nineteen Islamist extremists conspired and outwitted the best-defended country in the world. Due to the fact that government agencies ignored the many pre-warnings, these terrorists were able to catch American defenders by surprise, hijack four jets, and ram three of them into targets symbolic of American economic and military might.

However, is the official narrative the full and true story? Are there other narratives that may have more credibility and evidence? Are significant details being ignored? These are not questions that the American news media have asked, or encouraged the public to ask. Resistance from the news media, both corporate and independent, has effectively prevented adequate reportage, fact-based discussions, and in-depth analyses of 9/11. This paradoxical suppression has made the full story of 9/11 a recurring concern in the publications of Project Censored (www.projectcensored.org).

In fact, some pundits have actively questioned and continue to rely upon strong religious overtones in defense of American mythology and government-endorsed interpretations of 9/11.

Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea (2009) An example is the MSNBC journalist Tucker Carlson, who exemplified this tendency during an interview with 9/11 scholar and theologian Dr. David Ray Griffin. On the program, Carlson attacked the professor for challenging the official narrative of 9/11. As soon as Griffin claimed he rejected the government's explanation for the events of 9/11, Carlson interrupted and stated that: " . . . it is wrong, blasphemous, and sinful for you to suggest, imply, or help other people come to the conclusion that the US government killed 3,000 of its own citizens because it didn't." In this case, as in many others, the interviewer questioned even the prospect of discussion concerning alternative ideas about 9/11 before it began, thus framing the rest of the interview and reinforcing the official myths of 9/11." (Tucker, Carlson, MSNBC, August 9, 2006 on air)

Since intellectuals, politicians, journalists, pundits, and radio/TV/Internet personalities have long reinforced these mythic motives, they have become part of America's historical grand narrative.

In the Aftermath of 9/11, a frenzy of media reporting and narratives took place. It has been observed that during times of psychological trauma, societies tend to revert and hold on to their comfort zone and myths. After 9/11, many distraught Americans looked to their traditional mythology for personal meaning and national purpose; no one wanted to appear unpatriotic. Always responsive to popular moods and trends, politicians also framed subsequent events in familiar terms of traditional myths. In turn, the media, echoing powerful political lobbies and forces, resurrected the myths of national purpose and loyalty, moral exceptionalism, and triumph over adversity, to make sense of tragic events.

Leading the way for others in the media, CBS News anchor Dan Rather proclaimed, "I'm going to do my job as a journalist, but at the same time I will give them [the Bush administration] the benefit of the doubt, whenever possible in this kind of crisis, emergency situation. Not because I am concerned about any [public] backlash. I'm not. But because I want to be a patriotic American without apology." (Engel, *The*

Guardian, 17 may, 2007). Rather later regretted such a stance, but at the time, this reinforced the power of nationalism in a time of crisis. Most in the corporate press relinquished their role as watchdogs and became activists to those in power. Another factor that has blocked discussion of the events of 9/11 is the denial that a supposedly democratically elected government could have played a role in the attacks. Other interpretations of 9/11 events have rarely received fair and open treatment in the American press. Both of these alternative hypotheses suggest possible involvement by elements within the American government: letting the attacks happen on purpose to enable a war, or making the attacks happen on purpose to enable a war. A better knowledge of American history might have helped both journalists and the public to consider these additional possibilities in a broader context.

Mickey S. Huff and Paul W. Rea (2009) Mainstream corporate media have largely excluded historical context of the type that might generate critical inquiry surrounding the tragic events of 9/11 and the War on Terror. The facts surrounding certain important historical events have virtually been written out of history. A walk down this can be an antidote to another kind of censorship.

As it analyzes the role of the media in popularizing myths in the public mind, this chapter will further deconstruct the denials and deceptions of the official narrative of 9/11.

On September 11, 2001, government officials and media outlets began to construct an official account with unprecedented dispatch. Even before the attacks were over, the counterterrorism division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was telling National Security Advisor Richard Clarke it was Al-Qaeda operatives who had attacked the World Trade Center. This account was adapted and amplified in the days, weeks, and months following the attacks. On the one hand, top officials were claiming that these were sneak attacks and that they were caught completely off guard. Yet by 11 a. m. on 9/11, the FBI had started releasing the names, nationalities, and photos of the nineteen suspected hijackers. Before the smoke and dust settled, media were ready to supply instant meaning, relying heavily on traditional mythology and popular history.

If the federal establishment knew so little as to be taken completely by surprise how could they so rapidly come up with an exact list of those responsible? Had federal agencies been keeping close watch on these Al-Qaeda operatives? Adding to the

contradictions, the accuracy of this roster proved suspect. In the weeks immediately following the attacks, several news outlets, including the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), reported that individuals on the FBI's list were still alive. Those reports had to raise doubts about the validity of the official story, which may be one reason why they received scant media coverage in the U.S.

Huff, (2004) said that just two hours after the Towers came down, Senator Orin Hatch (R- Utah) of the Senate Intelligence Committee implicated bin Laden in the events of 9/11, even though few facts pointed to his involvement then or later. Through media stories, bin Laden became the ready-made, chief suspect of the 9/11 attacks. The FBI would later drop him from the Most Wanted list, citing lack of evidence. If these were surprise attacks, then how, on the very day of the attacks, could the government and some corporate media outlets have known who was responsible? For example, CNN, at four o'clock in the afternoon on 9/11, blamed bin Laden "based on new and specific information developed since the attacks. Corporate media and the federal government were peering through the smoke of the day with amazing clarity, fashioning a larger-than-life villain, foreshadowing future policy, and perhaps generating a self-fulfilling prophesy in the ensuing War on Terror. President Bush wrote in his diary the night of the attacks, "The Pearl Harbor of the twenty-first century took place today. We think it's Osama bin Laden.

Kwin (2009) Right after the attacks, the City of New York impounded the firefighters' tape and the Fire Department forbade anyone to discuss its contents because, it claimed, the tape might later become evidence in court trials. This suppression of evidence continued under mayors Rudy Giuliani and Michael Bloomberg. Only three years later, after ongoing pressure from the families of victims and a suit by the *New York Times* would the city finally release the taped oral histories.

Because of the way the buildings disintegrated and dropped, other observers also suspected that the Towers had not simply "collapsed." In fact, CBS news anchor Dan Rather reported on 9/11 that the collapse was "reminiscent of . . . when a building was deliberately destroyed by well-placed dynamite to knock it down. He pointed out this resemblance in the broadcast (11, September, 2001). Since 9/11, however, no one in the corporate media has ever made such a comparison again.

Muslims in the United States were for many decades somewhatignored socially, and totally ignored politically. However,events of the past forty years have been witness to an increased interest in the religion of Islam and its adherents. Large numbers of immigrants from Muslim countries increased the size of the American Muslim community. The Gulf War brought Muslims into the media spotlight. Also, the events of September 11th, 2001 and the destruction of the World Trade Center made popular sentiment turn against Muslims, and paved the way toward legislation that has targeted Muslims as potential enemies. These events in American history have helped to stimulate both civil and political action from Muslims in the United States.

The following pages will describe the development of civil and political activity of the Muslim community.The discussion consists of two parts: First, Muslims have undergone a series of changes in the way they engage in civil and political processes, becoming more effective in focusing their civil activities to gain political power. Second, these changes are best viewed as developments in a periodization marked by three major events involving the United States: The Immigration Act of 1965, the Gulf War, and the events of September 11, 2001.

Harverd Uni. (2004) The development of Muslim civil and political involvement can be looked at as a three-phase process. In the period prior to the Gulf War, Muslim political participation in politics was for all intents and purposes non-existent. Muslim community networks were built with the goal of promoting and providing an Islamic way of life for Muslims in the U.S. These groups are correctly seen as functioning within the realm of civil society. Political involvement was lacking. A common theory for why this was the case is that as Muslims in a non-Muslim country, many questioned whether participation in a system of non-Muslim government was even permitted. It is also important to realize that at this time Muslims were relatively new to the United States and thus to its political system. Many immigrant Muslims came from countries where political involvement or opposition to government policies frequently resulted in economic devastation, imprisonment, or death. Consequently, people who fled these regimes were not anxious to become involved in any activity that had, in their experience, led to mistreatment by the ruling party. For these reasons, the nascent

Muslim community learned to participate in an innocuous way that allowed for greater social participation without conflict of interest in the surrounding community.

The second phase began in the 1990s after the Gulf War ended. Muslims in the United States were thrust suddenly into the media spotlight during the Gulf War. The United States was at war with Saddam Hussein's military regime, which happened also to be a Muslim-majority country. Even after the war had ended, those who even looked like a part of the enemy were scrutinized by their American neighbors as, at worst, potential traitors and, at best, as complete foreigners. The influx of Iraqi refugees, those who had risen up in opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime, increased the attention on Muslims in U.S. and elsewhere received, not necessarily for the better. The negativity American Muslims felt as a result of that war helped to change the nature of Muslims' civil and political activity. The 1980s question 'Should Muslims participate in the politics of a non-Muslim nation?' changed to 'How can Muslims effectively participate in the political process of the United States to affect positive change for the country as a whole?'

In the third and present phase, that question remains the same, but the way in which Muslims in the United States are involving themselves in American politics has changed from the activities of 1990s. This dramatic change took place after September 11th. Now, Muslims in U.S. have found ways to engage in political activity not only through their own efforts, but also by joining forces fo example, with other faith-based groups, as well as secular organizations. In so doing, they have increased not only their political reach, but gained a foothold on the political platform already built by these groups.

2.1 September 11th and Charitable organizations

IPT News (2010)The impact of September 11th, 2001 on Muslims' political engagement cannot be overestimated. Public animosity towards Muslims as well as government sanctioned profiling and spying by the FBI became the norm. The Muslim community of the United States was under attack politically as the government took aim at the community through mandatory registration for Muslim males and infiltration of mosques accused of promoting terrorism and anti-American sentiment.

The researcher chose the case of the Portland Muslim community as an example for this research because the Portland Muslim community came under public scrutiny

immediately following the 9/11 attacks. The infamous Portland 7 case grabbed national headlines as a group of Muslim men from Portland's Sunni Masjid as-Sabr were arrested on charges of attempting to assist the Taliban in fighting the U.S. Army (Associated Press, August, 6, 2003). Also, less than a year after those arrests, Mohammad Kariye the Imam of the same mosque was arrested at Portland International Airport by the Portland Joint Terrorism Taskforce on the grounds of a sealed indictment. Rumors that he had siphoned money through the mosque to finance travel for individuals to join the mujaheden and terrorist groups (IPT News, December 1, 2010) further stained the image of Masjid as-Sabr and outraged the community as they began to feel their civil rights erode.

Harverd Uni. (2004) The felt threat to this community, however, did not only spur reaction from Muslims themselves. A wave of interfaith activity begun by various Christian and Jewish communities around Portland created a whole new arena in which the religious identity of Muslims could play out in the civil societal context. What is fascinating about this interfaith dialogue is that it has become a political tool. The Jewish and Christian community of the United States are well represented at the political level, Portland is no exception. Interfaith dialogue existed prior to September 11th and it grew from an initial show of outreach and solidarity from other faith-based communities to a platform from which people of faith, especially those from the Jewish and Christian sectors.

In the United States, a group of Saudi-initiated charity organizations established the Friends of Charities Association (FOCA) in January 2004. FOCA's members pledged their commitment to the principle of transparency and accountability. FOCA's Transparency Project is an attempt to reassure donors, government and the international community that Islamic charities operate with transparency, and not as a front for terrorist activities, while striving to strenghten all weaknesses and loopholes. FOCA focuses on proving its organizations' activities are legitimate. For this reason, every one of the organizations is required to show that:

- its activities and purposes provide a tangible benefit to the public

- those people who are eligible for benefits are either the public as a whole, or a significant section of it, in that they are not a restricted group or one where members share a private connection, such as social clubs or professional associations with specific membership,

- the charity's activities must be legal and must not be contrary to public policy.

To register as a charity, the organization has to be either incorporated or governed by a legal document called a trust or a constitution. This document has to explain the organization's purposes and structure.

A voluntary organization is an organization set up for charitable, social, philanthropic or other purposes. It is required to use any profit or surplus only for the organization's purposes, and it is not a part of any governing department, local authority or other statutory body.

For a voluntary organization to be a charitable organization or charity, its overall goals or the purposes of the organization, must be charitable. A trust is essentially a relationship between three parties, the donor of some assets, the trustees who hold the assets and the beneficiaries (those people who are eligible to benefit from the charity). When the trust has charitable purposes, and is a charity, the trust is known as a charitable trust. The main disadvantage of a trust is that, as with an unincorporated association, it does not have a separate legal entity and the trustees must themselves own property and enter into contracts. The trustees are also liable if the charity is sued or incurs liability.

Ali Mazrui (2004) noted that the African-American Muslim community has been very active in arranging meetings of local politicians or political candidates and the Muslim community. During the Summer of 2004, at least three mayoral candidates attended monthly potlucks at the Muslim Community Center (MCC), the predominantly African American mosque. The Imam of MCC has attended meetings and events with imams and presidents of other mosques to ask questions and to make sure that mayoral candidates take into account the ten to fifteen thousand Muslims in the Portland area. A leader at MCC explains, "We are trying to position ourselves with those in authority. I think Muslims in this country are going to see more and more that everything is political. You have to be involved if you want to change something. I think that we're becoming more and more aware and making more and more of an effort to become involved politically, to be able to influence decisions, so this meeting is just an extension of that".

The most recent endeavor into the realm of politics has come in the form of the Oregon Muslim Citizens Alliance (OMCA), a newly formed group. One of the founders stated that the purpose of OMCA is to empower the political engagement of the Muslims because Muslim immigrants usually do not engage with the political process and they do not vote. Most of the immigrants come from countries where there is authoritarian rule and they go to America to seek a better life. OMCA does not wish to become associated with just one political philosophy or one ethnic group or religious sect. Instead, the purpose is to create a Muslim community that understands its rights and duties as American citizens, and to form a powerful political force.

Harverd Uni. (2004) The Muslim community in Portland is, of course, only a small section of the American Muslim community. The development of civil and political activities of the community has been shaped by its social context. However, a review of similar national groups which have developed over the past forty or so years has revealed a similar pattern of development. The Muslim Students Association of the 1960s, Islamic Circle of North American and Islamic Society of North America of the 1970s and 1980s, Council on American-Islamic Relations of the 1990s, and the American Muslim Voice of the post-9/11 era, all are national Muslim groups are all good examples of the trend to move from isolated civil activities involving only Muslims to more political activity to try to bridge the gap between American Muslims and American society. Further research into these national organizations may show how periods of social change affect the development of identities of various social groups, whether ethnic, racial, or religious groups. Muslims are becoming more visible politically because political engagement may be the only way to change government sanctioned discrimination and legislative targeting.

2.2 War on Terror

Khurshid Khan (2012) The War on Terror is an international military campaign led by the United States and the United Kingdom with the support of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as non-NATO countries. Originally, the phrase "War on Terror" was coined by former US president George W. Bush to denote a global military, political, legal and ideological struggle against organizations designated as terrorist and regimes that were accused of having a connection or supporting these organizations. The campaign was originally waged against Al-Qaeda and other militant organizations with the purpose of eliminating them.

Terrorist attacks and plots that caused the initiation of this campaign include an attempted bombing of Los Angeles International Airport in the year 2000, the October 2000 USS Cole bombing, followed in 2001 by the September 11 attacks.

1.   The US government had a number of objectives for the War on Terror after 9/11, which included: Identify, locate and destroy terrorists such as Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and their organizations;

2.   Deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists.

3.   End the state sponsorship of terrorism

4.   Establish and maintain an international standard of accountability with regard to combating terrorism

5.   Strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight terrorism

6.   Work with willing and able states

7.   Enable weak states

8.   Persuade reluctant states

9.   Compel unwilling states

10.   Interdict and disrupt material support for terrorists

11.   Eliminate terrorist sanctuaries and havens.

The U.S. government and media framed the 9/11 attacks and defined the events very early in the process of understanding and responding to 9/11. Governments use the process of definition to prepare the public for a particular response to the events. The media has repeated similar processes as they encourage support of, and preparation for, war against Iraq. Examples of the media role regarding 9/11 and Iraq are used to illustrate the limitations of mainstream media.

By any measure, the events of September 11, 2001, that required an official response from the US Government. This response could have taken many forms depending on whether 9/11 was considered a crime or act of war. Although hijacking is normally treated as a crime, in this instance, the hijacking ended with the destruction of the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon. Instead of a hijacking the masses saw commercial airlines used as missiles to attack buildings. Similarly, Timothy McVeigh used a van loaded with explosives to attack a building in Oklahoma City; howeverthis was treated as a crime not an act of war.

Kenneth Mentor (2002) International humanitarian law reflects the lessons of the Holocaust and World War II. This law has been codified in the Geneva Conventions and other universally accepted treaties. The events of 9/11 were so far beyond the imagination of those who wrote these laws that it is safe to assume that these laws were not written to address the events of 9/11. In effect, it is very difficult to define 9/11 by referring to international humanitarian law. The ready acceptance of the media and government interpretation of the events and the attacks were not carried out by the state but by an organization that has never claimed responsibility for the acts.

Although inadequate to define these events, international law remains important in our efforts to resolve international disputes without violations of accepted humanitarian principles. It would be very difficult to make a case that since the events of 9/11 were hard to define that the Bush Administration suddenly had the right to ignore humanitarian laws that clearly apply to the behavior of the United States. The administration never needed to worry about making this argument since questions were never raised in a manner that was loud and clear enough that they could not be ignored.

Historically, wars have been waged by nation-states. The objective of war has been to control other nation-states or to seize control and/or protect a geographic area. In this case the United States directed the energies of the military to stop an organization. The initial stated objective was to hunt down and kill members of this organization without regard to international borders. In effect, the US Government rushed into a war with no clear enemy and without knowing the true motivation for this war. Vengeance, oil and political strategy are the top candidates but without an open debate of the issues, moderated by a free and uncensored press, it will be difficult to know the true motivations.

The American Civil Liberties Union has spoken out against the way U.S. law targeting funding for terrorism has suppressed Muslim charity organizations. The Federal Government argues that some charities are a front for terrorism. The efforts of the government to stop the funding of terrorism post 9/11 are too vague and they are unfairly applied to Muslim charity organizations.

These laws are impeding Muslim Americans from practicing their religion through charitable giving, which is an essential requirement of their religion. These policies are counter productive and they are making it very hard for American Muslims to practice their religious beliefs because they target their charities.

Kenneth Mentor (2002) They are killing legitimate aid to places in the world where Muslim hearts and minds could be won over. Many of the regions that would have received aid from those charities are legitimate allies of the U.S. war on terror. The U.S. Treasury Department has shut down nine Muslim Charities, only one of which was actually found guilty of giving money to terrorists. These eight charities have been denied due process and have no way to appeal against their closure

Strong criticism has not changed the FBI's mind about using informants to monitor activity in mosques. Not only were informants monitoring mosques but they have been monitoring local gyms in an effort to get information on local mosques. The FBI claims that they do not investigate places, but instead investigate people who are suspected of ties to terrorism.

An informant stated that he was instructed to get members of a local mosque to come to the gyms. The FBI would then obtain security footage from the gyms and the informant would identify the men in the video. He would also be asked to provide other information on the men and the FBI would carry out background checks on them. The purpose of the background checks was to find any information that the FBI could use to persuade the men into becoming informants (Glover, *The Los Angeles Times*, 28 April, 2009).

2.2.1 The September 11 Attacks in the U.S. media

The 9/11 attacks were a series of coordinated suicide attacks targeted at the United States on September 11, allegedly carried out by Al-Qaeda, headed by Osama Bin Laden. The Al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. They were able to use the airlines and crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The attack was horrendous and resulted in killing about 3000 persons (CBS News)

The twin towers collapsed in two hours, and affected the neighboring areas. Another group of hijackers crashed into the Ministry of Defense base, The Pentagon, and caused some damage, too. All people on board of the hijacked airplanes were reported killed. Most of the dead persons were mainly civilians and included multinationals (CNN.com)

2.3 Aftermath of the September 11 Attacks

The 9/11 attacks had a massive and immediate influence upon various aspects of life in the U.S. and world wide. On the day of the attack the television networks

suspended normal programming and began 24-hour coverage that would last a week, filling out the script of Osama Bin Laden as the mastermind of the attack with a large number of background stories about Islamic terror. The networks' coverage of Ground Zero was framed almost exclusively as a human interest story of the tragedy of lost life and the rescue operation that soldiered on with "hope against hope." Questions about the plausibility of the official explanation of the collapses and about what officials were doing with the evidence of this vast crime went unasked.

Rev Cutie (2009) On September 13, 2001 the White House announced that there was "overwhelming evidence" that bin Laden was behind the attacks. Shutdowns and evacuations of large buildings in major cities around the nation started soon after the towers in New York started crumbling. This clearly helped to bolster the psychological impact of the attack. A shutdown in civil aviation went into effect on the morning of September 11. Takeoffs were forbidden, and all aircraft in the air were ordered to land, in most cases at airports that were not their destinations. Starting September 13 certain charter jets were quietly allowed to fly.

The Bush Administration submitted the 342-page USA PATRIOT ACT to Congress on September 24, 2001, just 13 days after the attack. Other legislation would follow, but most of the policies enacted in the name of the War on Terror would be accomplished through executive orders. Two Senators who attempted to slow the passage of the PATRIOT ACT received letters containing anthrax.

2.4 Immediate response

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, then President of the United States, George W. Bush declared a war on terrorism, with an intention to retaliate and capture members of Al-Qaeda and their mastermind, Osama Bin Laden. Thus the United States started what would be later be known and have deeper impact on the whole world, " War On Terror" and planned invasion of Afghanistan to enforce Taliban to expel Al-Qaeda members, *(Washington Post)* Other countries, especially NATO members showed strong support to the US in the anti-terrorism campaign. Both economic and military methods were used against countries thought to be harboring terrorists. As a result, massive operations took place outside of the United States.

Quizlet (nd) In the aftermath of the attacks, many U.S. citizens held the view that the attacks had "changed the world forever." The Bush administration announced a war on terrorism, with the stated goals of bringing Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to justice and preventing the emergence of other terrorist networks. These goals would be accomplished by means including economic and military sanctions against states perceived as harboring terrorists and increasing global surveillance and intelligence sharing. Immediately after the September 11 attacks U.S. officials speculated on possible involvement by Saddam Hussein; although unfounded, the association contributed to public acceptance for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On October 7, 2001, the War in Afghanistan began when U.S. and British forces initiated aerial bombing campaigns in Afghanistan targeting Taliban and Al-Qaeda camps, then later invaded Afghanistan with ground troops of the Special Forces. This was second-biggest operation of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism outside of the United States, and the largest directly connected war on terrorism, a U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. was not the only nation to increase its military readiness, but there were with other notable supporters, for example the Philippines and Indonesia; countries that have their own internal conflicts with terrorism.

Murray(2006) Because the attacks on the United States were judged to be within the parameters of its charter, NATO declared that Article 5 of the NATO agreement was satisfied that on September 12, 2001, the US war on terrorism has the support of NATO and that NATO would actually participate in a "hot" war.

Following the attacks, 762 mainly Muslim suspects were rounded up the United States. On December 12, 2001, Fox News reported that some 60 Israelis were among them; Federal investigators were reported to have described them as part of a long-running effort to spy on American government officials. A "handful" of these Israelis were described as active Israeli military or intelligence operatives.

Following the attacks, 80,000 Arab and Muslim immigrants were fingerprinted and registered under the Alien Registration Act of 1940. 8,000 Arab and Muslim men were interviewed, and 5,000 foreign nationals were detained under Joint Congressional Resolution 107-40 authorizing the use of military force to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States

Murray (2006) A federal technical building fire safety investigation of the collapses of the Twin Towers was conducted by the United States Department of Commerce's National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The goals of this investigation, completed on April 6, 2005, were to investigate the building construction, the materials used, and the technical conditions that contributed to the outcome of the WTC disaster. The investigation was to serve as the basis for:

- Improvements in the way in which buildings are designed, constructed, maintained, and used;
- Improved tools and guidance for industry and safety officials;
- Revisions to building and fire codes, standards, and practices;
- Improved public safety.

The report oncludes that the fireproofing on the Twin Towers' steel infrastructures was blown off by the initial impact of the planes and that, if this had not occurred, the towers would likely have remained standing.

The fires weakened the trusses supporting the floors, making the floors sag. Olson (2011) The sagging floors pulled on the exterior steel columns to the point where exterior columns bowed inward. With the damage to the core columns, the buckling exterior columns could no longer support the buildings, causing them to collapse. In addition, the report asserts that the towers' stairwells were not adequately reinforced to provide emergency escape for people above the impact zones. NIST stated that the final report on the collapse of 7 WTC will appear in a separate report.

The Inspector General of the CIA conducted an internal review of the CIA's performance prior to 9/11, and was harshly critical of senior CIA officials for not doing everything possible to confront terrorism, including failing to stop two of the 9/11 hijackers, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar, as they entered the United States and failing to share information on the two men with the FBI. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission), chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean, was formed in late 2002 to prepare a full and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the attacks, including preparedness for, and the immediate response to, the attacks. On July 22, 2004, the report was released.

9-11 researches (2002) For the first time in history, all nonemergency civilian aircraft in the United States and several other countries including Canada were immediately grounded, stranding tens of thousands of passengers across the world. The

order was given at 9:42 by Federal Aviation Administration Command Center national operations manager Ben Sliney. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "This was an unprecedented order. The air traffic control system handled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircraft soon landed without incident."

2.4.1. International Reaction

The first reaction as reported by international media was the immediate response of condemnation by both global media and governments. The United States received tremendous support from most nations of the world. Arab and Islamic presidents, leaders and kings showed unmistakable solidarity with United States, (CNN.com) with an exception of a few countries.

People in Afghanistan felt unsafe and tried to seek ways out of the country to protect themselves from any potential attack of the US. Thousands of Afghan citizens fled to neighboring Pakistan. A few months afterwards, the United States with an international coalition, executed a military operation against Afghanistan aiming to expel the Taliban regime and capture Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden (CNN.com). Many other countries like the United Kingdom, France, China, Pakistan, Jordan, Germany, India, Uganda, and Russia imposed regulations to control bank accounts of organizations, businesses and individuals suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda. Several people were arrested in different parts of the world as they were labeled as terrorist suspects. The global status quo had become unfavorable to Arabs and Muslims worldwide.

Most Muslim political and religious leaders condemned the attacks. The leaders vehemently denouncing the attacks included the presidents of Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Libya, Syria, Iran and Pakistan. The exception was Iraq, when then-president Saddam Hussein, said of the attacks that "the American cowboys are reaping the fruit of their crimes against humanity." Saddam would later offer sympathy for the Americans killed in the attacks. Renowned Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi denounced the attacks and the killings of hundreds of civilians as a "heinous crime" and urged Muslims to donate blood to the victims. He did however criticise the United States' "biased policy towards Israel" and also called on Muslims to "concentrate on facing the occupying enemy directly", inside the Palestinian territories. The alleged

Hezbollah "spiritual mentor" and Lebanese Shia cleric Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah condemned the attacks.

Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, said he was not interested in exporting such attacks to the United States, however he criticized the "unfair American position".Afghanistan's Taliban rulers condemned the attacks and also vehemently rejected suggestions that Osama bin Laden, who had been given asylum in Afghanistan, could be behind them. Huge crowds attended candlelit vigils in Iran, and 60,000 spectators observed a minute's silence at Tehran football stadium.

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) immediately condemned the attacks. Fox News reported that in Ein el-Hilweh, Lebanon's largest Palestinian refugee camp, revelers fired weapons in the air, with similar celebratory gunfire heard at the Rashidiyeh camp near the southern city of Tyre as well.

Reports and images of Palestinians from East Jerusalem, Nablus, and Lebanon taking to the streets in celebration, were broadcast around the world, and many newspapers, magazines, websites and wire services were running photographs. The PNA claimed such celebrations were not representative of the sentiments of the Palestinian people, and the Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo said the PNA would not allow "a few kids" to "smear the real face of the Palestinians". In an attempt to stop further reporting, Ahmed Abdel Rahman, Arafat's Cabinet secretary, said the Palestinian Authority could not "guarantee the life" of an Associated Press (AP) cameraman if footage he filmed of post-9/11 celebrations in Nablus was broadcast. Rahman's statement prompted a formal protest from the AP bureau chief, Dan Perry.

There were also rumours that the footage of some Palestinians celebrating the attacks was stock footage of Palestinian reactions to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990. This rumour was proven false shortly afterwards, and CNN issued a statement to that effect.

2.4.2. Domestic Scene

In the pre-9/11 American Muslims were able to build their own institutions and enjoyed equal civil rights with the original Americans. Everybody was considered equal before the law. They were optimistic and hopeful in their new homeland because many

of them, particularly the new immigrants had been deprived of much freedom in their native countries. Because they represent the minority, American Muslims mainly focus their efforts on creating suitable environment for their children in order to preserve their religion. For this reason the newly arrived Muslims were not active in political life except in the late 1980s.

All privileges the 7 million American Muslims gained over time suddenly changed on September 11, 2001 with several negative consequences of the attacks. American Muslims, who had succeeded in integrating into American political life, suddenly became suspects. The community after 9/11 worried more about protecting the existing achievements rather than achieving new ones such as building 2000 mosques and many Islamic centers in various American cities, as well as Islamic schools and charitable organizations. In the post 9/11 Islamic community faced hostility and prejudice as never before.

Abdus Sattar Ghazali (2012) in his valuable book argued that the USA Patriot Act, was mainly targeting Muslim countries. "The fallout impacted the daily life of Muslims at schools, in the workplace, in general public encounters and mistreatment at the hand of federal officials." Ghazali (2012) reported that many Muslim homes and businesses were reported to have been attacked and their owners interrogated for baseless allegations.

According to Amnesty International reports, racial profiling by US law enforcement agencies has increased since 9/11. Under the guise of fighting terrorism, these agencies used various forms of degrading, discriminatory and dangerous practices. A report released by the California Senate Office of Research in May 2004 concluded that Arab-Americans and the Muslim minority were badly affected by the Patriot Act and other federal legislations adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (231).

Even immigration laws were being used against Muslims as an anti-terrorism device. American authorities treated minor violations by Muslims and Arabs with harsh, and tough methods while treating smoothly hundreds of cases made by other immigrants who violated the same laws. "The approach is basically to target the Muslim and Arab community with a kind of zero-tolerance immigration policy. No other

community in the U.S. is treated to zero-tolerance enforcement," according to David Cole (2011), a Georgetown University law professor.

2.4.3. Impact on Islamic Organizations

Top Muslim organizations in the United States were swift to condemn the attacks on 9/11 and called "upon Muslim Americans to come forward with their skills and resources to help alleviate the sufferings of the affected people and their families". Top organizations include: Islamic Society of North America, American Muslim Alliance, American Muslim Council, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Islamic Circle of North America, and the Shari'a Scholars Association of North America. In addition to massive monetary donations, many Islamic organizations launched blood drives and provided medical assistance, food, and residence for victims.

Abdus Sattar Ghazali (2012) According to the Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, the U.S. government has closed down 25 Muslim charities and frozen $8 million in donations in Illinois alone. Furthermore, dozens of Muslim charitable groups in the US have been investigated since 2001. Several were shut down, without any official finding that they were aiding terrorist organizations. The organizations shut down were not on any government watch list before their assets were frozen. The predictable result is that Muslims have no way of knowing which groups the government suspects of ties to terrorism. Organizations and individuals suspected of supporting terrorism are guilty until proven innocent.

However, in a major setback to government campaign against the Muslim charities in the name of security, on October 22, 2007 a District Judge in Dallas, Texas, ordered a mistrial in a show case trial of the leading Muslim charity Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development. After 19 days of deliberations by the jury, Judge A. Joe Fish declared a mistrial for most former leaders of HLF charged with financing Hamas militants after jurors failed to reach a verdict. One of the defendants, former HLF Chairman Mohammed El-Mezain, was acquitted of most charges.

Ghazali (2012) spoke of all the American laws that have been twisted and the due-process that has been denied in an apparent bid to stifle any future Muslims from ever thinking about equality or competition in what was an accessible American political process before the 9/11. The government initiatives have reshaped public

attitudes about racial profiling and created a harsh backlash against the Muslim community. This negative attitude has increased since the September 11 attacks. The most startling survey revealing this rise in antipathy to date was released in December 2004 by Cornell University, which found that 44 percent of Americans surveyed believed that the U.S. government should restrict the civil liberties of Muslim Americans. In June 2006, some New York state legislators attempted to make the profiling of Muslims legal.

The 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States have had a worldwide impact. The effect on the Islamic world has been especially complex because the terrorists were Muslims. The United States has an estimated six million Muslims; more than half of them are Arabs. Muslims living in this country are more educated and tend to have higher incomes than average Americans. Unlike Muslim minorities in Europe, American Muslims are generally more assimilated into mainstream society. When terrorists struck New York and Washington DC, U.S. Muslims were as shocked and horrified as other Americans. In addition to coping with terror, many Muslims say they had to deal with the pain of being shunned by their fellow Americans. Nidal Ibrahim who is Executive Director of the Arab-American Institute in Washington was reported to have said that Muslims would be vulnerable to physical attacks while doing mundane things like walking down the road.

2.5   The Spread of Islam in the USA

Most historians now agree, it is possible that there has been an Islamic presence in the Americas from the nation's earliest years, some of them point to Muslim preachers (as conquerors, merchants and scholars) fanned out across West Africa several hundred years before any Christians arrived. Siddiqi (2000) mentioned in his brief report about the history of Islam in the U.S. that there have been some discussions among scholars and historians that there may have been some Muslims in America long before the African slaves arrived in the early 17th century.

Based on the fact that Muslims in the region of West Africa were very successful in converting the people of the area between the Senegal and Gambia Rivers into their faith, and since the vast numbers of Africans from this region were enslaved and shipped west, Muwakkil (2002) stated that 10 to 25 percent of all enslaved Africans shipped to the Americas from the 17th to 19th century were

Muslims. Barry Fell (1980) a New Zealand archaeologist, had some interesting findings. According to Fell, the Pima people in the Southwest US possess a vocabulary containing Arabic words. He has found Islamic petrogyphs (rock carvings) in places like California; in fact, in Inyo county, one such petrogyph contains the following statement in Arabic: "Yasus ben *Maria*" This phrase translates into "Jesus, Son of Mary", which is commonly found in the Holy Quran. Fell stated that this petrogyph is old; older than the U.S. In fact, Ivan Van Sertima (1976) has published a work in which he provided details of this. In his work, he identified 12th and 13th century Chinese documents, which spoke of an "Arab" Muslim trade that extended beyond the Atlantic coast of West Africa. There is even evidence put forward by Clyde-Ahmad (1977) that the first African –American Muslim slaves were brought to a then "Latin America" (present day U.S.) by the armies of both Spain and Portugal.(p 23)

Quick (1996) mentioned that Muslims arrived to the new land, the Americas, more than 500 years before Columbus. He related the history of Islam in the Americas to the History of Islam in the Caribbean and divided it into four phases. The first period was a period of exploration and commerce. During the second period they traded in slaveryand sought labour and work in their third period. Finally, the fourth period witnessed re-connection with the Muslim world. Quick (1996) stated that Al-Masudi (a historian, geographer, philosopher, and natural scientist) wrote about a young man of Cordoba named Khashkash Ibn Saeed Ibn Aswad who crossed the Atlantic ocean, made contact with people on the other side across the sea of darkness, and returned in the year 889 CE. Al-Masudi wrote:(p 27)

> Some people feel that this ocean is the source of all oceans and in it there have been many strange happenings. We have reported some of them in our book Akhbar az-Zaman. Adventurers have penetrated it at the risk of their lives, some returning safely, others perishing in the attempt. One such man was an inhabitant of Andalusia named Khashkhash. He was a young man of Cordoba who gathered a group of young men and went on a voyage on this ocean. After a long time, he returned with a fabulous booty. Every Spaniard (Andalusian) knows his story.

Another Muslim scientist Abu Abd Allah al-Idrisi (1099-1180CE), the famous Arab physician and geographer who established himself in the Arabized court of king Roger II of Sicily, made a report in his extensive work "*Kitab al-Mamalik wa-l-Masalik*", in the 12th century, on the journey of a group of seamen who reached the isles of the Americas. He wrote:

> A group of seafarers sailed into the sea of darkness and fog (the Atlantic Ocean) from Lisbon in order to discover what was in it and to what extent were its limits. They were a party of eight and they took a boat which was loaded with supplies to last them for months. They sailed for eleven days until they reached turbulent waters with great waves and little light. They thought that they would perish so they turned their boat southward and traveled for twelve days. They finally reached an island that had people and civilization but they were captured and chained for three days. On the fourth day, a translator came speaking the Arabic language! He translated for the king and asked them about their mission. They informed him about themselves, then they were returned to their confinement. When the westerly wind began to blow, they were put in a canoe, blindfolded, and brought to land after three days sailing. They were left on the shore with their hands tied behind their back. When the next day came, another tribe appeared, feeing them and informing that between them and their lands was a journey of two months (Quick, 1996 p28).

As proof that Muslims had arrived in the Americas not only for trade or looking for a new land to live, but they came as scientists, Quick (1996) illustrated that two maps were drawn by Haji Ahmad, a Turkish Muslim map maker of 1559CE. He explained that this supports the validity of the theory of a Muslim presence in the Americas long before Columbus. In the first one, the Western side, however, was mapped so well that it is hard to believe that anyone could have drawn this map, who did not have access to maps of people well-traveled in the Americas, especially the western coasts. It was drawn on a highly sophisticated spherical projection, which puts the map about two centuries ahead of the cartography of that time.

Another map of Florida, based on a French expedition of 1694, shows three names that demonstrate an earlier Muslim settlement in that area, they were written as; ***Mayarca(Marjorca), Cadica(Cadiz), and Marracou(Marrakesh).*** Dr. Quick questioned how these names could have been used by people if they had not made contact with North African or Andalusian Muslims (Quick, 1996).

In fact, the historian illustrated that some of Columbus's group were Arabs and among them were many translators. More so, when Columbus arrived on the east coast of the Americas he found people speaking Arabic with Arabic names. In his work, Dr. Mroueh Youssef (1996) refers to this reality; by saying that many references on the Muslim arrival to Americas are available, and he summarizes them in the notes in the following section.

2.5.1 Historic documents

(Quick, 1996) There are many historic documents that support the argument in favor of a historic Muslim presence in the Americas possibly preceding the presence of Columbus. Below is a brief description of some of these documents and their significance in relation to this argument.

    1. A Muslim historian and geographer Abu-Hassan Ali Ibn Al-Hussain Al-Masudi (871-957 CE) wrote in his book *Muruj adh-dhahab wa maadin aljawhar (The meadows of gold and quarries of jewel)* that during the rule of the Muslim caliph of Spain, Abdullah Ibn Mohammad (888-912 CE), a Muslim navigator, Khashkhash Ibn Saeed Ibn Aswad, from Cordoba, Spain sailed from Delba (Palos) in 889 CE, crossed the Atlantic, reached an unknown territory (*Ard majhoola*) and returned with fabulous treasures. In Al-Masudi's map of the World there is a large area in the ocean of darkness and fog which he referred to as the unknown territory (Americas).

    2. A Muslim historian Abu Bakar Ibn Umar Al-Gutiyya narrated that during the reign of the Muslim caliph of Spain, Hisham II (976-1009CE), another Muslim navigator, Ibn Farrukh, from Granada, sailed from Kadesh (February 999CE) into the Atlantic, landed in Gando (Great Canary islands) visiting King Guanariga, and continued westward where he saw and named two islands, Capraria and Pluitana. He then returned back to Spain in May 999 CE).

3. A renowned American historian and linguist, Leo Weiner of Harvard University, in his book, *Africa and the Discovery of America* (1920) wrote that Columbus was well aware of the Mandinka presence in the New World and that the West African Muslims had spread throughout the Caribbean, Central, South and North American territories, including Canada, where they were trading and intermarrying with the Iroquois and Algonquin Indians.

2.5.2 Geographic Explorations

(Quick, 1996) In addition to the above-mentioned documents, there are other historic documents and books that recount explorations conducted by Muslims who are believed to have reached the Americas long before the establishment of the United States of America. Below is a brief description of some of these voyages and explorations as mentioned in the historic literature.

1. The famous Muslim geographer and cartographer *AL-Sharif AL-Idrisi* (1099- 1166CE) wrote in his famous book Nuzhat *al-mushtaq fi ikhtiraq al-afaq (Excursion of the longing one in crossing horizons*) that a group of seafarers (from North Africa) sailed into the sea of darkness and fog (The Atlantic ocean) from Lisbon (Portugal), in order to discover what was in it and what extent were its limits. They finally reached an island that had people and cultivation and they met a translator who spoke to them in the Arabic language.

2. The Muslim reference books mentioned a well-documented description of a journey across the sea of fog and darkness by *Shaikh Zayn Eddine Ali Ben Fadhel AL-Mazandarani*. His journey started from *Tarfaya* (South Morocco) during the reign of the King *Abu-Yacoub Sidi Youssef* (1286-1307CE) 6th of the Marinid dynasty, to Green Island in the Caribbean sea in 1291 CE (690 HE). The details of his ocean journey are mentioned in Islamic references, and many Muslim scholars are aware of this recorded historical event.

3. The Muslim historian *Chihab Ad-dine Abu-L-Iabbas Ahmad Ben fadhl Al-umari* (1300-1384CE/700-786HE) described in detail the geographical explorations beyond the sea of fog and darkness by Mali's sultans in his famous book The Pathways of Sights in the Provinces of Kingdoms.

4. Sultan Mansu Kankanmusa (1312-1337 CE) was the world renowned Mandinka monarch of the West African Islamic empire of Mali. While traveling to

Makkah on his famous Hajj in 1324 CE, he informed the scholars of the Mamluk Bahri sultan court (*An-Nasir Nasir Edin Muhammad III-1309-1340 CE*) in Cairo, that his brother, Sultan Abu Bakari I (1285-1312CE) had undertaken two expeditions into the Atlantic Ocean. When the sultan did not return to Timbuktu from the second voyage of 1311 CE, Mansa Musa became sultan of the empire.

5. Columbus and early Spanish and portuguese explorers were able to voyage across the Atlantic (a distance of 2400km) thanks to Muslim geographical and navigational information. In particular maps made by Muslim traders, including *AL-MASUDI* (871-957CE) in his book *Akhbar Az-zaman* (History of the World) which is based on material a gathered in Africa and Asia. As a matter of fact, Columbus had two Muslim captains during his first transatlantic voyage: *Martin Alonso Pinzon* was the captain of the *PINTA*, and his brother Vicente Yanez Pinzon was the captain of the *NINA*. They were wealthy, expert ship outfitters who helped organize the Columbus expedition and prepared the flagship, *SANTA MARIA*. They did this at their own expense for both commercial and political reasons. The *PINZON* family was related to *ABUZAYAN MUHAMMAD III* (1362-66 CE), the Moroccan sultan of the Marinid dynasty (1196-1465CE).

2.5.3 Arabic (Islamic) Inscriptions

1. Anthropologists have proven that the Mandinkos under Mansa Musa's instructions explored many parts of North America via the Mississippi and other river systems. At Four Corners, Arizona, writings show that they even brought elephants from Africa to the area

2. Columbus admitted in his papers that on Monday, October 21, 1492 CE while his ship was sailing near Gibara on the north-east coast of Cuba, he saw a mosque on top of a beautiful mountain. The ruins of mosques and minarets with inscriptions of Quranic verses have been discovered in Cuba, Mexico, Texas and Nevada

3. Barry Fell of Harvard University introduced in his book *Saga America* (1980) evidence supporting the arrival, centuries before Columbus, of Muslims from North and West Africa. Fell discovered the existence of the Muslim schools at Valley of Fire, Allan Springs, Logomarsino, Keyhole, Canyon, Washoe and

Hickison Summit Pass (Nevada), Mesa Verde (Colorado), Mimbres Valley (New Mexico) and Tipper Canoe (Indiana) dating back to 700-800 CE. Engraved on rocks in the arid western U.S, he found texts, diagrams and charts representing the last surviving fragments of what was once a system of schools - at both an elementary and higher level. The language of instruction was North African Arabic written with old Kufic Arabic scripts. The subjects of instruction included writing, reading, arithmetic, religion, history, geography, mathematics, astronomy and sea navigation Fell (1980). (Quick, 1996).

2.5.4 Phases of Muslim Presence in the Americas

Nyang (1999) states that "the fact remains that Muslims or persons believed to be Muslims visited this part of the world in the pre-Colombian past. He, however, does not focus on this point and instead divides the history of Islam in the U.S. into several phases. The first phase started in 1312 when Mansa Abu Bakr of Mali is believed to have traveled from the Sengambian region of African coast to the Gulf of Mexico. This period is ridden with controversy because all parties to the debate do not universally accept the evidence.

The second phase is the period before and after the American Revolution, at this period at least ten percent of the African slaves were Muslims. However, it should be noted that during this phase, African Muslims had different experiences in the Americas. The Africans who were transported to the Portuguese and Spanish-dominated regions had greater latitude in the practice of their African religions. During this period of time some of Muslim slaves returned to Africa and resettled in Dahomey (now called Benin).

Nyang (1999) says that in North America, the harsh treatment of slaves made the survival of Islam problematic. He states that there is no evidence of any African Muslim slave family that survived slavery and maintained Islam as a way of life. Furthermore, Muslims who made history and were written about either returned to Africa or became freed men and converted to Christianity. Additionally, during this period of slavery, the survivability of Islam among the slaves was impossible because the maintenance of one's religion presupposes freedom.

According to Nyang (1999) the third phase began after the American Civil War when a wave of Arab immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, began to settle along the eastern seaboard and into the heartland of Middle America. Muslim immigrants also came from India, Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. Likewise, Muslim immigrants came

from Central Asia and Ukraine. Most of these immigrants arrived in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The fourth phase began with the coming of the Muslim students in the period after World War II. Many of these students remained in the US and became US citizens and founded the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA).

In conclusion, Nyang (1999) summarizes the historical development of Islam in the United States of America in ten points:

1- Islam has gone through many developmental changes and is now here to stay.

2- Islam as a culture and a community is becoming a part of the American religious and cultural landscape.

3- Muslims are becoming more American and more Muslim in their projection of self and group interest.

4- The proliferation of mosques and schools testifies to the symbolic and substantive presence of American Muslims in society.

5- American Muslims have made progress in securing a niche in the United States of America.

6- American immigrant Muslims must learn to deal with sectarianism among Muslims in their new home.

7- Muslim dietary habits and requirements would gradually sensitize non-Muslim Americans to be more sympathetic to their Muslim neighbors.

8- American Muslims will continue to face a dilemma in terms of responding to foreign policy decisions of the United States government.

9- The institution-building efforts of the Muslims cannot not succeed unless Muslims create both national and local structures that reinforce and support each other.

10- American Muslims are vulnerable to both religious and racial prejudice because Muslims are drawn from all human colors and nationalities around the world.

In summation, the previous section illustrates that many scholars divide the historical presence of Muslims in the Americas into two major phases: before Columbus and after Columbus. Most researchers have focused on the latter phase although there is evidence that proves Muslims may have arrived in the Americas before Columbus.

2.5.5 Early Islamic Centers in America

The development of Islamic institutions and centers in the United States came about slowly because the number of Muslims in proportion to the total population has been relatively small (an estimated 30,000 in 1954 and 100,000 in the early 1970s). Immigrants who came to amass wealth and return to their homelands were not interested in establishing institutions; their allegiance remained with their families at home whom they supported financially.

Muslims who decided to settle in the U.S. began to think of developing institutions and organizations to preserve and maintain their faith and to instruct their children. Individuals in different areas took the initiative: Abdullah Ingram in Cedar Rapids, Iowa: Muhammad Omar in Quincy, Massachusetts; and J. Howard in Washington, DC.

The earliest recorded group who organized for communal prayer in private homes was in Ross, North Dakota in 1900; by 1920 they had built a mosque. Later they became so integrated into the community that they assumed Christian names, married Christians and in 1948 the mosque was abandoned.

In 1919, an Islamic association developed in Highland Park, Michigan, to be followed by one in Detroit in 1922, then by the American Muhammedan Society (of Tatar origin) in Brooklyn in 1922, the Young Men's Muslim Association (of Arab origin) in Brooklyn in 1923, and the Arab Banner Society of Quincy in 1930.

2.5.5 American Muslim Organizations

The end of World War II saw the arrival of large numbers of Muslim students from all parts of the Islamic world, on American university campuses. Initially small Muslim student associations were established on some campuses. A real effort to set up a national organization began in 1963 with the establishment of the Muslim Student Association (MSA).

According to Ali M. M., *Muslims in America: The Nation's Fastest Growing Religion* – (Washington Report May/June 1996) it was at this time that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was expelled from Iran, Maulana Maudoodi was sentenced to death in Pakistan, Sayed Qutb of the Muslim Brotherhood was jailed and later executed in Egypt, the Masjumi Party was banned in Indonesia and the Algerian revolution was coming to a head. All of these developments had a very strong reaction among the Muslim students in Europe and America.

Muslim organizations in American society are many and there are multiple branches and various activities had been planned and executed. Some of these established organizations began their operations with the arrival of the first Muslim immigrants to the United States of America.

The MSA launched an "action plan," setting up offices across the country with initial headquarters in Gary, Indiana. In 1975, the MSA acquired property in Plainsfield, Indiana and moved there. This also was the period when the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT) was created to hold title to MSA properties such as Islamic centers, the American Trust Publications, the International Graphics Press and the Islamic Book Service.

(Basnawi ND) The Muslim organizations in America vary in size and have various services according to the surrounding community and its participants. The researcher chose a number of large organizations that provide a large variety of services and are not just Islamic centers or mosques. The following is a list of the largest Islamic organizations in the US:

Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR)

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Main branch)

Muslim World League (Main branch)

American Muslim Community

American Islamic Community Organization

Islamic Society of North America

Islamic Circle of North America

American Islamic Supreme Council

Islamic Council of North America

MSA Islamic Information Center

Association of Muslim youth in America

Council of Islamic Associations

Islamic Chamber of Commerce in the United States

American Institute for Islamic Affairs

Islamic Waqf in North America

Islamic Medical Science Foundation (p 7)

Of these Islamic organizations, the researcher has selected the largest and most active organizations to be studied as a sample for this research.

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In 1981 the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) was established to deal with all aspects of Islamic activity in the country, allowing MSA to concentrate on the university campuses. Professional activities are now coordinated through such organizations as the American Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS), the American Muslim Engineers and Scientists (AMES), and the Islamic Medical Association (IMA).

The United Muslims of America (UMA) was established in 1982 in the aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon; at the time there were no Muslim political organizations in the US Some Bay Area Muslims realized the need for a Muslim public affairs organization to educate and encourage American Muslims to participate in the political system, and to reach out to mainstream Americans and build the bridges of understanding between them and the Muslim community.

While there had been attempts to form political action committees, none took hold until the late 1980s and early 1990s when Muslim Americans stepped up their efforts to gain a foothold in the American political system. By that time, many had realized that they risked being socially and politically sidelined or excluded if they did not become involved. American Muslim political groups lobbied Congress on behalf of Muslim Americans and their issues; educated Muslim American voters; and addressed the political concerns and rights of predominantly immigrant and first-generation American Muslims, whose interests often remained focused on their home countries. Specifically, four major U.S. Muslim organizations emerged during this time: the Muslim Political Affairs Council (MPAC), the American Muslim Council (AMC), the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the American Muslim Alliance (AMA).

2.6 Professional organizations.

The International Institute of Islamic Thought, an American social sciences organization was founded in 1981 is in Herndon, Virginia, near Washington, D.C. It sponsors research and scholarships, organizes seminars and conferences, and publishes classical and contemporary works including the *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences.* The Institute works closely with universities and organizations in North America to help with outreach programs aimed at improving the level of information and education about Islam.

The Islamic Medical Association (IMA) was formed in 1967 to provide a forum for Muslim health professionals to meet and share relevant information and services with others of their community as well as to benefit the Muslim community. IMA publishes biannually, *The Journal of the Islamic Medical Association* and holds a national convention annually.

The Association of Muslim Scientists and Engineers (AMSE) was founded in 1969 to help promote scientific research and application of science based upon Islamic principles. It publishes a newsletter and organizes an annual conference.

The Association of Muslim Social Scientists (AMSS) was formed in 1972 as a professional, academic and educational, and cultural body dedicated to the initiation, revitalization, and promotion of Islamic thought. It holds an annual conference and several discipline seminars. AMSS, in cooperation with the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), publishes a journal American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (AJISS) and a News bulletin. (http://www.discoverthenetworks.org)

2.6.1 The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY)

The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) is an independent international organization and an Islamic forum that supports the work of Muslim organizations and needy communities the world over. WAMY's headquarters are based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. WAMY has regional as well as various branches in and outside Saudi Arabia. Established in 1972, it has presence in 55 countries and an associate membership of over 500 youth organizations around the world. WAMY is a member of the United Nations NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), and is recognized for its vast scope of humanitarian and relief work that encompasses about 60% of the Muslim World. The objectives of the WAMY are not much different from

other Islamic organizations, usually focusing on the identity of Islamic people and how to present it to others. The objectives of WAMY are:

● To preserve the identity of Muslim youth and help them overcome the problems they face in modern society;

● To educate and train them in order to become active and positive citizens in their countries;

● To introduce Islam to non-Muslims in its purest form as a comprehensive system and a way of life;

● To assist Muslim organizations all over the world through training, communication and cooperation;

● To establish a relationship of dialogue, understanding and coordination between Muslim organizations, Western societies and beyond.

● Holding international, regional, and local Muslim youth and student camps;

● Help establish Muslim scout groups where possible and coordinate with the scout associations in various countries of the world to encourage the Muslim youth to benefit from the programs and activities offered;

● Organizing conferences, symposia, and research circles to address youth issues;

● Publishing books in various languages by capable writers or by research teams on different Islamic issues of importance to the Ummah (Nation) and the Muslim youth;

● Publishing brochures and exhibition materials that best introduce Islam to non-Muslims in its holistic vision;

● Publishing magazines and newsletters that expose WAMY's work and achievements around the world;

● Organizing exchange visits and pilgrimage trips to Makkah for Muslims around the world;

● Providing financial and moral support to Muslim youth organizations to raise the standard of their Islamic work;

●. Establish humanitarian and educational projects for the benefit of the needy Muslim communities in various countries (like building hospitals and schools, orphans' sponsorship, development projects, building mosques, digging wells etc.). WAMY website.

2.6.2 The Muslim World League (MWL)

The Muslim World League has its headquarters in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. It is a broad, international, nongovernmental Islamic organization engaged in the propagation of Islam. Its work encompasses: the elucidation of the principles and teachings of Islam, refuting dubious statements and false allegations against the religion, persuading people to obey the commandments of Islam, providing necessary assistance to solve problems facing Muslims and non-Muslims and helping to carry out projects that include the dissemination of the religion, education and culture. It also opposes violence and terrorism and promotes constructive dialogue with other faiths and religions.

The MWL, which was established in 1962 has the following objectives:
- Expounding the merits of the application of the Islamic Law;
- Coordinating the efforts of Islamic preachers the word over;
- Developing methods of propagation compatible with the dictates of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah (Prophet Mohammad sayings);
- Improving the productivity of the mass media, Islamic propagation, education and culture;
- Holding symposia, conferences, seminars, workshops, rehabilitation and refresher courses;
- Bringing intellectuals and opinion leaders together during the pilgrimage season and at many other times; with the aim of fostering closer relations among them, and urging them to develop practical methods of raising the standards of Muslims in the world;
- Overseeing the activities of the Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) council and supporting it with the needs to find Islamic solutions to contemporary problems;
- Subsidizing activities that aim at spreading Arabic and upgrading the standing of teaching the language both to Arabs and non-Arabs;
- Setting up branch offices as well as Islamic centers to serve the cause of Islam;
- Extending urgent relief to Muslims affected by wars and national disasters;
- Augmenting the activities of mosques and providing assistance for their construction. (http://www.themwl.org/Profile/default.aspx?l=Ar)

The MWL is represented in a number of international organizations, among which are:

● United Nations where it enjoys a category (A) observer status as well as consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECO-SOC)

● United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a member.

The Muslim World League (MWL) has bodies affiliated with the (MWL) and these organizations are:

         ● The General Islamic Conference

         ● The Constituent Council

         ● The World Supreme Council for Mosques

         ● The Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) council

         ● International Islamic Relief Organization

         ● Commission on Scientific Signs in the Holy Quran and Sunnah

         ● Makkah Charity Foundation

         ● Al-HaramainAl-Aqsa Charity Foundation

2.6.3 The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR).

The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR) is a non-profit, grassroots membership organization. It has its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and chapters across the US. CAIR was established to promote a positive image of Islam and Muslims in America. The organization believes misrepresentations of Islam are most often the result of ignorance on the part of non-Muslims and reluctance on the part of Muslims to articulate their case. CAIR's mission is dedicated to presenting an Islamic perspective on issues of importance to the American public. In offering that perspective, it seeks to empower the Muslim community in America through political and social activities to help shape a positive image of Islam. To achieve this goal, the organization works closely with media professionals around America. CAIR activists also monitor the local, national and international media to challenge negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslims. CAIRfor uses three channels to achieve its goals: conferences, seminars, and publications. CAIR organizes conferences and seminars for media professionals, government officials and the academic community. These events are designed to present otherwise unavailable information about Islam and Muslims. A variety of publications addressing the needs of Muslims in America are offered to opinion leaders and the public. It also publishes a quarterly newsletter Faith In Action. CAIR also produces

practical handbooks, such as "Hajj and Ramadan Publicity Kits," for use by Muslim leaders and activists.

Other activities of the organizations include: seminars, workshops, conferences, charities events, scholarships, sponsorships, fundraising, local set upand community education.

2.7 September 11: Review of Event, Story and Analysis.
2.7.1. History

Since September 11, 2001 , a variety of theories regarding the 9/11 attacks have been put forward in websites, books, and films. Many groups and individuals advocating 9/11 conspiracy theories identify as part of the 9/11 Truth Movement. Unlike conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana, 9/11 conspiracy theories did not emerge immediately after the event. Indeed, most professional conspiracy theorists in the United States appeared to be as shocked as the rest of the population. The early theories that emerged focused primarily on various anomalies in the publicly available evidence, and proponents later developed more specific theories about an alleged plot. One allegation that was widely circulated by email and on the Web, is that not a single Jew had been killed in the attack and that attacks must have been the work of the Mossad, not Islamic terrorists.

By 2004, conspiracy theories about the September 11 attacks began to gain ground in the United States. One explanation for the increase in conspiracy theory popularity was growing criticism of the Iraq War and the presidency of George W. Bush, who had been reelected in 2004. Furthermore, there were revelations of spin doctoring and lying by federal officials, such as the claims about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the belated release of the President's Daily Brief of August 6, 2001 and reports that NORAD had lied to the 9/11 Commission, may have fuelled the conspiracy theories. In the commission's report, contradictions were ignored, and no military or civilian official was reprimanded.

Between 2004 and the fifth anniversary of the September 11 attacks in 2006, mainstream coverage of the conspiracy theories increased. Reacting to the growing publicity, the U.S. government issued responses to the theories, including a formal analysis by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) about the

collapse of the World Trade Center, a revised 2006 State Department webpage to debunk the theories, and a strategy paper referred to by President Bush in an August 2006 speech, which declared that terrorism springs from "subcultures of conspiracy and misinformation," and that "terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories.

An August 2007 Zogby poll, founded by John Zogby (http://jzanalytics.com/johnzogby.html) commissioned by 911Truth.org found that 63.6% of Americans believe that Arab fundamentalists were responsible for 9/11 while 26.4% believed that "certain elements in the U.S. government knew the attacks were coming but consciously let them proceed for various political, military and economic reasons" and 4.8% of them believed that "certain U.S. Government elements actively planned or assisted some aspects of the attacks." In 2008, 9/11 conspiracy theories topped a "greatest conspiracy theory" list compiled by *The Daily Telegraph*. The list was based on following and traction. Mainstream coverage generally presents these theories as a cultural phenomenon and is often critical of their content.

2.7.2 Conspiracy Theories

Most 9/11 conspiracy theories generally originate from dissatisfaction with the mainstream account of 9/11. Less extensive theories allege that official reports have covered up incompetence or negligence from U.S. personnel or the Bush Administration, or involvement of a foreign government or organization other than Al-Qaeda. The most prevalent theories can be broadly divided into two main forms:

Let It Happen On Purpose (LIHOP) suggests that key individuals within the government had at least some foreknowledge of the attacks and deliberately ignored them or actively weakened America's defenses to ensure the hijacked flights were not intercepted.

MIHOP ("made it happen on purpose") - that key individuals within the government planned the attacks and collaborated with or framed, Al-Qaeda in carrying them out. There is a range of opinions about how this might have been achieved.

2.8 Main Conspiracy Theories Related to 9/11

2.8.1 Foreknowledge

One popular conspiracy theory maintains that The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) did not deploy fighter jets to allow the hijacked airplanes to reach their targets without interference. According to this theory, NORAD had the capability of locating and intercepting planes on 9/11, and its failure to do so indicates a government conspiracy to allow the attacks to occur.

2.8.2 World Trade Center Collapse

The controlled demolition conspiracy theories claim that the collapse of the North Tower, South Tower and 7 World Trade Center was not caused by the plane crash damage, nor by resulting fire damage, but by explosives installed in the buildings in advance. It is rejected by the mainstream media and the engineering community.

2.8.3 The Pentagon

According to some theories, the U.S. administration deliberately chose not to shoot down a plane that was heading for the Pentagon, while others contend that no plane hit the Pentagon at all.

2.8.4 Flight 93

The fourth plane hijacked on 9/11, United Airlines Flight 93, crashed in an open field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after the passengers revolted. Out of the four planes hijacked on that day, it was the only one that did not reach its target. One of the popular conspiracy theories surrounding this event is that Flight 93 was actually shot down by a U.S. fighter jet.

2.8.5 Hijackers

During the initial confusion surrounding the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the BBC published the names and identities of some of the hijackers. Although this story was superseded by subsequent reporting, the original story has been cited as evidence that the 9/11 attacks were part of a US government conspiracy. The BBC explained that this confusion may have arisen because the names they reported back in

2001 were common Arabic and Islamic names. In response to a request from the BBC, the FBI stated:

> "The FBI is confident that it has positively identified the nineteen hijackers responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Also, the 9/11 investigation was thoroughly reviewed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States and the House and Senate Joint Inquiry. Neither of these reviews ever raised the issue of doubt about the identity of the nineteen hijackers." (BBC.com)

According to the Managing Editor John Bradley of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the only public information about the hijackers was a list of names issued by the FBI on September 14, 2001. When the FBI released photographs four days after the cited reports on September 27, the mistaken identities were quickly resolved. According to Bradley, "all of this is attributable to the chaos that prevailed during the first few days following the attack. What we're dealing with are coincidentally identical names." In Saudi Arabia, says Bradley, the names of two of the allegedly surviving attackers, Said al-Ghamdi and Walid al-Shari, are "as common as John Smith in the United States or Great Britain."

2.8.6 Phone Calls

After 9/11, cellular experts said that they were surprised calls were able to be placed from the hijacked planes, and that they lasted as long as they did. They said that the only reason that the calls went through in the first place is that the aircraft were flying so close to the ground.

2.8.7 Jewish and Israeli involvement

There are theories that 9/11 was part of an international Jewish conspiracy. Another myth popular with 9/11 conspiracy theorists is that 4,000 Jewish employees skipped work at the World Trade Center on September 11. This was first reported on September 17 by the Lebanese-Hezbollah-owned satellite television channel Al-Manar and is believed to be based on the September 12 edition of the *Jerusalem Post* that stated "The Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem has so far received the names of 4,000 Israelis believed to have been in the areas of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon

at the time of the attacks." Both turned out to be incorrect; the number of Jews who died in the attacks is variously estimated at between 270 to 400.

2.9 Other Theories

2.9.1 Cover-up Allegations

Conspiracy theorists say they detect a pattern of behavior on the part of officials investigating the September 11 attack meant to suppress the emergence of evidence that might contradict the mainstream account.

2.9.2 Cockpit recorders

9/11 Commission Report (2002) Thomas H. Kean (According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the cockpit voice recorders (CVR) or flight data recorders (FDR) (commonly known as "black boxes") from Flights 11 and 175 were not recovered from the remains of the WTC attack; however, two men, Michael Bellone and Nicholas DeMasi, who worked extensively in the wreckage of the World Trade Center, stated in the book *Behind-The-Scenes: Ground Zer* that they helped federal agents find three of the four "black boxes" from the jetliners. (9/11 Commission Report (2002)

> "At one point it was assigned to take Federal Agents around the site to search for the black boxes from the planes. We were getting ready to go out. My ATV was parked at the top of the stairs at the Brooks Brothers entrance area. We loaded up about a million dollars worth of equipment and strapped it into the ATV. There were a total of four black boxes. We found three."

According to the 9/11 Commission Report both black boxes from Flight 77 and both black boxes from Flight 93 were recovered. However, the CVR from Flight 77 was said to be too damaged to yield any data. On April 18, 2002, the FBI allowed the families of victims from Flight 93 to listen to the voice recordings. In April 2006, a transcript of the CVR was released as part of the Zacarias Moussaoui trial. Some conspiracy theorists do not believe that the black boxes were damaged and that instead there has been a cover up of evidence.

2.9.3 Bin Laden Tapes
A series of interviews, audio and videotapes have been released since the 9/11 attacks were reported to be produced by Osama bin Laden. At first the speaker denied

responsibility for the attacks but over the years has taken increasing responsibility for them culminating in a November 2007 audiotape in which the speaker claimed sole responsibility for the attacks and denied the Taliban and the Afghan government or people had any prior knowledge of the attacks. According to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the speaker was most likely Osama bin Laden. Some observers, especially people in the Muslim world, doubt the authenticity of the tape.

2.9.4 Foreign Governments

There are other conspiracy theories that claim that while Al-Qaeda is mostly responsible for the attacks, Pakistan, Israel or Saudi Arabia also played a role in the attacks but this was deliberately overlooked by the official investigation for political reasons.

There is an enormous quantity of literature on the 9/11 conspiracies. The Internet has thousands of such write-ups from various individuals and organizations. One particular site, http://www.keithhunt.com/Conspi14 under the web page entitled *Restitution of All Things* listed some of the opinions. These opinions are common on almost all web pages discussing the theories. Some are rather outlandish, others are rather bizarre. In order to have an overview of the types of theories put forward by all those interested in the conspiracy theories, the researcher has chosen Keith Hunt's web page as the representative compiler of the theories.

2.9.5 Motives: Pax Americana.

David Ray (2013) there is the suggestion that the U.S. government may have carried out the attacks. This was first articulated in the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992, drafted by Paul Wolfowitz on behalf of then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, in a document that has been called "a blueprint for permanent American global hegemony."

Taibbi (2008) argued that this was "taken completely out of context", and that the "transformation" referenced in the paper was explicitly stated to be a decades-long process to turn the Cold War-era military into a "new, modern military" which could deal with more localized conflicts. He further ridiculed this position by pointing out that, for this to be evidence of motive, that either those responsible decided to openly state their objectives, or read the paper in 2000 and quickly laid the groundwork for the 9/11 attacks using it as inspiration. In either case, he argued that this is a form of

"defiant unfamiliarity with the actual character of America's ruling class" and constitutes part of a "completely and utterly retarded" narrative to explain the attacks.

2.9.6 Invasions

Other conspiracy theories claim that the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq were both planned before 9/11.

Conspiracy theorists have questioned whether oil and 9/11 provided the United States and the United Kingdom with a reason to launch a war they had wanted for some time. They suggest that this provided the two countries with a strong motive for either carrying out the attacks, or allowing them to take place.

2.9.7 Suggested Historical Precedents

Charlie Sheen and others (ND) The Hunt website also mentioned how *Time* magazine compared the events of 9/11 and the assassination of John F. Kennedy in terms of how each event inspired conspiracy theories. Whereas the assassination of Kennedy was a small-scale event, millions of people all around the world witnessed the attack on the World Trade Center and the event was widely documented in videos and photos. *Time* magazine explained that "there is no event so plain and clear that a determined human being can't find ambiguity in it."

2.9.8 Criticism

Charlie Sheen and others (ND) at the end of his essay, reminded the readers that critics of these conspiracy theories say they are "a form of conspiracism common throughout history after a traumatic event in which conspiracy theories emerge as a mythic form of explanation." Another criticism is offered by a form of research on which the theories are based such as the one undertaken by Thomas W. Eagar (2001), an engineering professor at MIT. He implied that they "use the 'reverse scientific method'." Proponents of such theories usually begin with trying to ascertain what had happened, eliminate data that do not conform to their findings, and then conclude that their deductions are the only explanations for the phenemenon. Eagar's criticisms (*9-11Research.com*) also exemplify a common stance that the theories are best ignored.

Michael Shermer, the founding Publisher of Skeptic magazine (www.skeptic.com) and columnist for *Scientific American*, said: "The mistaken belief

that a handful of unexplained anomalies can undermine a well-established theory lies at the heart of all conspiratorial thinking. All the evidence for a 9/11 conspiracy falls under the various spins of this fallacy. Such notions are easily refuted by noting that scientific theories are not built on single facts alone but on a convergence of evidence assembled from multiple lines of questions and answers. *Scientific American*, *Popular Mechanics*, and *Skeptic* magazines have published articles questioning various 9/11 conspiracy theories such as the investigative article on the 9/11 "Truth Movement." Believers of these conspiracy theories have attacked the contribution to the *Popular Mechanics* article by senior researcher Ben Chertoff whom they suspected of being related to a high ranking officer with Homeland Security. Popular *Mechanics* has published a book entitled *Debunking 9/11 Myths (http://www.debunking911.com and http://www.jod911.com)* that expands upon the research findings that were presented in the earlier publication. U.S. Senator John McCain provided a foreword to the book in which he wrote that blaming the U.S. government for the events of 9/11 "mars the memories of all those lost on that day" and "exploits the public's anger and sadness. It shakes Americans' faith in their government at a time when that faith is already near an all-time low. It traffics in ugly, unfounded accusations of extraordinary evil against fellow Americans."

Roger Sauer (2010) dismissed 9/11 conspiracy theories as a "panoply of the absurd" stating that "as diverse as these theories and their adherents may be, they share a basic thought pattern: great tragedies must have great reasons." David Ray Griffin has published a book entitled *Debunking 9/11 Debunking: An Answer to Popular Mechanics and Other Defenders of the Official Conspiracy Theory*, and Jim Hoffman has written an article called 'Popular Mechanics Assault on 9/11 Truth" in which he attacks the methods *Popular Mechanics* used in forming their arguments.

Journalist Matt Taibbi (2008) in his book *The Great Derangemen* discusses 9/11 conspiracy theories as symptomatic of what he calls the "derangement" of American society; a disconnection from reality due to widespread "disgust with our political system." He drew a parallel with the Charismatic Movement, and opined that both "chose to battle bugbears that were completely idiotic, fanciful, and imaginary," instead of taking control of their own establishment and their lives. Taibbi however felt that the 9/11 conspiracy theories are different from "Clinton-era black-helicopter paranoia" and

constitute more than "a small, scattered group of nutcases they really were, just as they claim to be, almost everyone you meet."

Hunt also reported that other writers such as historian Kenneth J. Dillon argued that 9/11 conspiracy theories represent an overly easy target "for skeptics and that their criticisms obfuscate the underlying issue of what actually happened if there wasn't a conspiracy." He emphasized the possibility that these theories were so widespread because they were developed with the intention to divert attention to the possible act of criminal negligence on the part of the president and vice president, who were kept informed and repeatedly warned, followed by a cover-up conspiracy after 9/11.

British historian Antony Beevor wrote in January 2009 that "studies of internet sites reveal an unholy alliance between left-wing 9/11 conspiracy theorists, right-wing Holocaust deniers and Islamic fundamentalists." He claimed that 9/11 and other conspiracy theories are a result of a "Wikipedia-age" phenomenon that author Damian Thompson dubbed "counterknowledge."

David Aaronovitch, a columnist for *The Times,* in his book entitled *Voodoo Histories: The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History* that was published as an audio version in 2010, wrote that the theories are impossible to comprehend and are ridiculous.

The report by Keith Hunt(2010) http://www.keithhunt.com/Conspi14.html) which was accessed on 18 March 2010 has certainly provided a wide overview of the conspiracy theories. Other theories that were not mentioned include those related to the drug cartels, motives of the Pax Americana and the oil factor.

Although the researcher is a skeptic with regard to the conspiracy theories, he could not exclude the theories altogether. There are many researchers inside the U.S. and outside who deeply believe that there is something not truly transparent about 9/11. Whether this assumption is right or not, the researcher simply believes that the dramatic events of 9/11 had a negative impact on the presence of Islam in America and contributed to the negative image of Muslims worldwide. Due to this unfortunate turn of events, the Islamic charity organizations have been affected most seriously by the aftermath of these tragic events.

2.9.9 The Importance of Uncovering the Truth About September 11

The events of 9/11 are the pretext being used to justify a war that will not end in our lifetime, being waged in preemptive interventions in over 50 countries. Yet, more than ten years after the event we still do not have a full and formal account of the September 11, 2001 attacks.

Ajamu Baraka (2010) An extensive body of evidence and well-documented analysis has called into question the official story. Furthermore, the extreme responses that followed 9/11 raise questions about the U.S. Administration's ongoing obstruction and delay of a full and impartial investigation that searches for the truth and demands accountability.

Fundamental baseline questions articulated by 9/11 CitizensWatch (washingtonpeacecenter.net/pla_911- US) include:

1.   Why in the months before 9/11 did FBI headquarters consistently obstruct field agent investigations of potential terrorists or terrorist financiers?

2.   Why were many detailed warnings from the intelligence services of Britain, Germany, Israel, Egypt, Russia, Italy, and other foreign governments ignored?

3.   Why were some prominent travelers warned not to fly on 9/11?

4.   Why in the days immediately before 9/11 were there massive spikes in the number of "puts" on the stocks of airline and insurance companies?

5.   Why in the wake of the most cataclysmic intelligence and air defense failures in American history have no government officials or Pentagon brass been held accountable for the September 11 tragedy?

6.   Why, in the wake of the most cataclysmic intelligence and air defense failures in American history, have responsible government officials and Pentagon brass been rewarded with promotions?

7.   Why did the Bush/Cheney Administration for over a year stonewall victims' family members demands for a full independent investigation?

8.   Why, after 9/11, are new government contracts being issued to private government contractors who have never been accountable for $3.3 trillion of "undocumentable adjustments" in the accounting and information systems they manage?

9.   Were all the 19 suspects named and pictured by the FBI in press reports actually on the planes on 9/11? Eight people came forward in Egypt and Saudi Arabia after the incident claiming that the pictures and names listed were their own, but they were still alive and not aboard the planes. Was the source of that support for the mujehaddin and Al-Qaeda primarily American CIA funding, Saudi Arabian funding, and opium funding? (*Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* by John Cooley, 2002)

10.   What is the actual history of the movements and relations of the 19 suspects inside and outside the United States in the years prior to the attack?

11.   Were or are there existing or ongoing connections between Bin Laden, his family and President Bush, his father, and their corporate and administrative allies and friends?

12.   What was the relationship of major oil companies who provided key figures in both Bush administrations, and their suppliers (Unocal, Haliburton, Enron companies) to the Taliban? Did the refusal of the Taliban to accommodate a planned oil pipeline through Afghanistan lead to plans for their removal that predated 9/11?.

2.10 Conclusion

Mohammed R. Kroessin (ND)   The terrorist threat is real, yet Islamic charities are not guilty by default. Nonetheless, both the lack of support for Islamic charities to help them address their shortcomings in transparency and accountability and the rhetoric about their funding for terrorism contribute to their inability to fulfill their social roles. For example, the Humanitarian Forum was initiated in June 2004 to help foster partnerships and facilitate closer cooperation between Western humanitarian organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Muslim-majority countries. Islamic Relief, which has been unaffected by the drop in funding experienced by other British Muslim charities, consulted a wide spectrum of international and Muslim NGOs. This highlighted the need for action and proactive change within the Islamic charity sector, with external help where necessary.

The way forward is to enable a more open and informed debate about the Muslim charity sector. Islamic NGOs must be seen as partners, not enemies, in

combating both terror and the roots of terrorism. To do this job effectively, their vilification must end, and they must be helped to better engage with the mainstream humanitarian community, since their contribution to relief and development is considerable. The ill-directed 'War on Terror' only makes the problem more deep-rooted, whilst the victims of today's greatest evil, poverty, remain unaided.

Chapter 3

Research Methodology

3.0 Introduction

In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the methodology in terms of the selection of cases to study, data collection procedures, methods of data analysis, etc. This chapter aims to determine the most suitable methods to study and analyze the impact of 9/11 events on Islamic non-profit organizations in the U.S. According to the norms of social research, two methodological approaches are generally employed in this kind of research: qualitative and quantitative. For the current study, the researcher will use both quantitative and qualitative research approaches. Methods of data collection used here include: interviews, content analysis, questionnaire, and analyses of documentary evidence.

3.1 Research Approach

According to a number of researchers, there are four main approaches to academic research these are: exploratory, descriptive, explanatory, and predicative approaches (Saunders et al., 2007: Ryan et al., 1992).

Due to the fact that this study attempts to shed light on a complicated and multi-phase phenomenon, a qualitative research approach will be employed using collective or multiple case studies as methodology. Furthermore, this research will try to analyze social phenomena after collecting data through interviews with relevant personnel, questionnaires and the analysis of media content including articles and news stories. Therefore, it can be said that the study will use a combined descriptive and exploratory methodology.

3.2 Collective Case Study

Case studies usually focus on analyzing one case, or a small number of cases, which will be studied in depth and detail. As Punch (1998) argued, the main objective behind using a case study is to develop deep understanding of that case. Thus, it focuses on the study of a "single unit of analysis", such as a company, a group of workers, an event, a process or an individual (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). As a result, detailed information will be obtained from the "unit of analysis' allowing for the acquisition of "in-depth knowledge". Thus, a well-constructed case study can enable researchers either to challenge an existing theory or to provide a source of new research questions (Saunders et al., 2007).

Using of collective case studies can include documentary analysis, interviews, and observation. Yin (1994) noted that one of the main characteristics of case study research is the use of multiple methods for gathering data, which may be qualitative or quantitative. Collective case studies are sometimes called descriptive case studies which are used to describe phenomena in the real life context in which they occur (Yin, 2003).

However, Hussey and Hussey (1997) point out that one the limitation of the case study as an instument is the difficulty to get access to certain organizations to conduct the study. In addition, it is also difficult to define the boundaries of the study due to difficulty in understanding the facts during a particular period (Yin, 1993). To overcome this difficulty, the researcher visited the relevant organizations and used his personal relations to collect data through his friends who live in the United States.

3.2.1 Generalizability

One of the main criticisms of the case study instrument is what is known as generalizability; i.e. how focusing on a single sample or even multiple samples can be representative so that it might produce findings that can be applied more generally to other cases (Bryman. 2008). In answer to this, Yin (2003) argued that "the important point is not whether the case study findings can be widely generalized, but how well the researchers generate theory out of the findings." In this regard, researchers may generalise by using findings from comparable cases investigated by others. Here the resarcher will take advantage of adopting collective case studies to solicit data which will be supported by content analysis in order to obtain reliable findings.

3.2.2 Validity

The establishment of validity is problematic due to subjectivity of the researcher. In order to solve such a problem, Yin (1994) suggested the use of multiple sources of evidence, the construction of a chain of evidence, and the use of a draft case study reviewed by key informants.

According to Ritchie and Lewis (2003), the validity of findings implies both correct and precise analysis. Thus, there are two dimensions to assess validity. The first, internal validity, which is concerned with explanatory cases where the problem is a deduction of case studies, can be managed through the use of diverse data from the case and then linking to some theoretical proposition. This is actually what the researcher did, when he used diverse data from diverse sources such as organizations, media, and individuals. For media the researcher used articles published in representatives of the most popular media in the United States; The Washington Post and CNN. Other media were also used in some relevant context to consolidate the outcomes of the study.

3.2.3 Reliability

According to Saunders et al. (2007), reliability refers to the extent to which the techniques of data collection used will produce consistent findings. It is mainly centered on the consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observer on different occasions (Silverman, 2005, p.220).

Regarding case study, Yin (l994; p.64-65) proposed the use of a case study protocol in order to make sure that the reliability of the case study research is maintained. Thus, he suggested the following protocols:

- The overview of the case study should include the research questions and the purpose of the case study;
- Data collection procedures should contain organizing data collection activities and planning for unexpected events;
- Case study questions should be carefully designed, particularly the key questions that the researcher should consider during the data collection process;
- There should be an outline to conduct the case study report.

Regarding the current study, the researcher has taken into account all these techniques in order to accomplish the research before the data collection phase.

3.3 Data Collection Methods

It is important to determine the techniques that will be used for data collection. This will help the researcher to conclude findings and thus be able to answer the research questions. In qualitative research, the most common methods used for collecting data are: observations, interviews, group discussions, narratives, and the analyses of documentary evidence.

3.3.1 Questionnaire

A questionnaire is an instrument that consists of a number of questions addressed to a number of participants to obtain relevant information which can be statistically arranged and analyzed. Questionnaires are effective tools in collecting data especially when properly constructed and responsibly administered. They can be used to target specific groups of people or entire populations.

Questionnaires are mainly used for various types of social science research such as the current one. The researcher considers it as the most important tool for collecting a wide range of information from a large number of individuals, which include average persons, managers, and ordinary employees. The researcher takes into account the importance of constructing a good questionnaire by ruling out inappropriate questions, incorrect ordering of questions, incorrect scaling, or bad questionnaire format that may negatively affect the survey values.

Questions were carefully constructed taking into account the following:

1- Questions are consistent with the main questions of the research;

2- All questions contribute to the objectives of the research;

3- Respondents were given enough information and time to answer the questions truthfully;

4- The wording was written in simple language- in case of Saudi based organizations the questions were written in Arabic and later translated into English;

5-   Biased questions or those designed to encourage respondents to answer one way rather than another were ruled out;

6-   The questions were designed according to the statistical data analysis techniques available;

7-   Likert Scale was used to generate data from responses.

Likert scale (Wuensch, Karl L. 2005) is a type of scale which is commonly used in questionnaires and is the most widely used scale in survey research. In this type of scale respondents specify their level of agreement to a statement.

In this study five ordered response levels are used in the following format:

1.   Strongly disagree,

2.   Disagree,

3.   Indifferent (i.e. neither agree nor disagree),

4.   Agree,

5.   Strongly agree.

The demographic questions were composed of five questions and preceded the questionnaire in order to form a kind of background of the respondents. The demographic questions include:

1-   Educational background

2-   Age

3-   Occupation,

4-   Position in the organization

5-   Activities within the organization

The questionnaire was designed to cover the key areas which are relevant to the main objectives of the study and in order to answer the first and second research questions which are: Q1: What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular? Q2: What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations ?

The areas covered in the questionnaire were as follows:

1-   The negative and positive impact of September 11 on non- profit Islamic organizations;

2-   Type of activities that have been affected most;

3-   The role of organizations in introducing Islam in a better way and in correcting stereotypes and distorted images of Islam;

4-   The role of Islamic organizations in serving Muslim communities;

5-   Management systems of these organizations;

6-   Organization needs in order to vitalize their role.

3.3.2 Interviews

An interview is an instrument that involves the collection of data through using either face-to-face meetings or using of phone calls, emails, Internet, and so on. When conducting an interview, the interviewer tries to obtain data or opinions from the interviewee strongly related to the research questions and objectives (Ghauri and Gronhaugh, 2005: Saunders et al., 2007). In this study, interviews were used to help answer the first two research questions:

1-   What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular?

2- What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations?

According to Saunders et al. (2007), interviews can be arranged according to level or formality and structure, as described hereunder:

a) **Structured:** Structured interviews are based on a predetermined or standard set of questions, which are designed to obtain fixed responses from specific categories and systematic samples. They are used to collect quantifiable data; they are usually employed in quantitative research interviews.

b) **Semi-structured:** This type of interview allows both the interviewer and interviewee to explore unexpected topics because of the flexible structure (Mason, 2002). Here, the interviewer uses a list of questions and issues to be tackled; but these questions may be changed or increased according to the circumstances of any interview. Data may be recorded by audio recording or by note taking.

c) **Unstructured or in-depth** i**nterviews**: This kind of interview does not follow any prepared framework, and it helps the researcher to explore a particular issue in depth. Meanwhile, it allows respondents the freedom to discuss any topic according to their own thoughts (Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005).

The main difference between semi-structured, non-structured and structured interviews is that semi-structured and non-structured interviews depend mainly on the researcher's skills. However, structured interviews depend on the uniformity of the interviewer behavior that allows him or her to direct the interview in certain situations. In the current study the researcher adopted the semi and in-depth interview style which was intended to gather qualitative data that fits in with cases of study methodology.

The interviewees included managers of the three organizations and details of how the interviews were conducted are as follows:

❖ The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY): The researcher formulated the questions around the main topic which was: How did the events of September 11 affect your organization? He then requested a meeting with the Secretary General of the organization, Dr. Saleh Al Waheebi, who agreed to meet the researcher at the organization's headquarters in Riyadh. The interview lasted 15 minutes during which the researcher probed the interviewee about the impact of 9/11 on the organization. The interviewee was highly cooperative and answered all the questions fully and also provided a great deal of background information in the form of the organization's annual reports and comparisons of its activities for five years before and five years after 9/11. As for the questionnaires, the researcher distributed them himself among the participants and collected the questionnaires after they were answered.

❖ The Muslim World League (MWL): In the case of MWL it was more difficult obtaining an interview with the Secretary General, Abdul Rahman Al Zayd, as he was occupied with a great deal of work and work-related travel. However, the researcher was finally able to obtain an interview for 10-15 minutes at the MWL headquarters in Makkah. There the researcher had the opportunity to conduct a face-to-face interview and also received a great deal of information about the organization as well as its publications, annual reports and periodicals. As for the questionnaires, the researcher distributed them himself among the participants and collected the questionnaires after they were answered.

❖ The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR): Due to the fact that CAIR is located in the U.S., the researcher conducted the interview via telephone. As for the questionnaires, he mailed the questionnaires to a friend in the U.S. who then undertook distributing them among the participants.

3.3.3 Content Analysis

In this study, content analysis is used to analyze all types of information that appear in the American media with special emphasis on *The Washington Post* and CNN. Thus, content analysis was used to answer research question 3: What is the content of U.S. media coverage on 9/11 in relation to Islam, Muslims and Islamic nonprofit organizations?

Stories, articles, editorials were scrutinized and analyzed within the scope of this study. The analysis consists of counting and classifying types of content. When the researcher gathered information about the entire topic of 9/11 events a large number of pages were collected from both electronic and hard copies. The bulk of the analysis focused on each content item in depth. The researcher analyzed each story in terms of characteristics such as topic, sources, integrity of coverage, and geographic focus.

3.3.3.1 Selecting representative U.S. Media

The researcher selected two major media representatives which have significant impact on both global and local arenas. The period of coverage was five years before and five years after 9/11. The sampling was made according to the importance of both *CNN* and *Washington Post* in terms of news coverage.

Cable News Network (CNN), is considered a major U.S. news network that provides 24-hour TV news coverage. Globally, CNN International can be seen by viewers in over 212 countries and territories. In terms of regular viewers (Nielsen Ratings), CNN is rated as the United States' number two news network, after Fox News (Ibarra, Sergio 2009) but it has more unique viewers and topics. CNN was the first network to break the news of the 9/11 attacks.

The Washington Post is the newspaper with the largest circulation in the U.S. and is the city's oldest and most respected paper. It is also regarded among the leading American daily newspapers.

Analysis of content focused on the following topics:

- The situation of Muslims and organizations before 9/11;

- The impact of 9/11 attacks on Americans;

- Reactions of the government and legislations against terror;

- Response of Muslims against the 9/11 attacks;

- Response of Muslims to resist the negative consequences in the aftermath of 9/11.

Statistical data and Annual Reports of Organizations

Statistical data and annual reports were also collected from non- profit Islamic organizations and subjected to content analysis in order to show how 9/11 impacted the activities of these organizations statistically. The analysis focused on the period five years before and five years after 9/11. The analysis of data is based on 15 types of activities which represent the most important activities carried out by these organizations inside the U.S. They are as follows:

1- Provide financial support to Dawah teachers,

2- Dawah (Islamic Call) Trips to introduce Islam,

3- Financial support to Islamic Centers and societies,

4- Hosting delegates,

5- Student subsidiaries,

6- Educational and youth camps,

7- Training courses,

8- Brochures, cassettes and exhibition material that best introduce Islam,

9- Regional and international conferences,

10- Propagation for Islamic dress for women,

11- Quran memorization classes,

12- New converts to Islam,

13- Scholarships for gifted students,

14- Feasts of breaking the fast in Ramadan,

15- Distribution of free cassettes and books that introduce Islam to non- Muslims.

In order to ensure that the research procedures are systematic and properly structured, the researcher has devised the following steps in the pursuance of the research planning and the seven stages of research. It was based on the module for research compiled by Open University of Malaysia, (2011).

Figure 1. The seven steps of research

Chapter 4

Analysis and Discussion

4.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the modes of analysis used in this study; qualitative, quantitative, and generative. It presents the data collected from different sources and a discussion of the findings as related to the objectives of the study. In so doing, three methods of data collection were used: questionnaires, interviews, and content analysis. Questionnaires and interviews were used to solicit data from members of Islamic organizations, while content of statistical data and annual reports were used for the evaluation of 9/11 event impact on activities of these organizations.

4.1 General Background of the Respondents

The questionnaire was distributed to 45 selected respondents who represent three non- profit Islamic organizations, that is, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the Muslim World League (MWL) and the Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR). Only 15 leaders and members of each of these organizations were selected. The general demographic and socio-economic backgrounds of the selected respondents are presented in the following sub-sections.

4.1.1. Educational background

According to Table 1 below, 86.6% of respondents had at least a bachelor's degree from a university, , and only 2.2% had elementary education. It can be assumed that the majority of respondents had a relatively high level of education and were able to understand and to articulate the implications or the impact 9/11 on Muslim community and Islamic organizations.

Table 4.1: Educational Background of Respondents

Level of education	Number	Percentage
Elementary	1	2.2
Intermediate	0	0
High School	2	4.4
Bachelor	23	51.1
Master	10	22.2
Ph.D	6	13.3
Others	3	6.7
Total	45	100.0

4.1.2. Age of Respondents

Table 4.2 below shows that the respondents' age ranged from 20 years to 50 years and above. Most of them 88.8% (51.1% + 24.4%+13.3%) were below the age of 50. The majority of respondents are considered relatively young.

Table 4.2 : Age of Respondents

Age Groups	Number	Percentage
20-29	6	13.3
30-39	23	51.1
40-49	11	24.4
50 and above	5	11.1
Total	45	100

4.1.3. Occupation of Respondents

Table 4.3 shows that most of the respondents occupy high positions in their organizations (62.2%). They represent decision makers and key persons (leaders) who get in contact and have formal access to government and influential bodies in the U.S. That is why their opinion has a special significance for these reasons.

Table 4.3 : Occupation of Respondents

Type of Occupation/Duty	Number	Percentage
Normal member	17	37.8
Leader of the Organization	28	62.2
Total	45	100.0

4.1.4. Positions of Respondents

According to Table 4.4 below, the majority of respondents (93%) were employees with these organizations and only three persons were just volunteers. However, the opinions of volunteers can reflect and represent a neutral view on the impact of 9/11 on the work of organizations.

Table 4.4 : Type of Work of Respondents

Types of work	Number	Percentage
Employees	42	93.3
Volunteers	3	6.7
Total	45	100.0

4.1.5. Activities of Respondents

Table 4.5 indicates that the two important activities of respondents were political and media activities (24.4% + 26.7%). Social activities were also among the major tasks of respondents. Daawah activity, which was the least practiced activity, includes introducing Islam to non Muslims by different means. This result is consistent with the statistical and annual reports of these organizations.

Table 4.5 : Type of Activities of Respondents

Types of Activities	Number	Percentage
Daawah	6	13.3
Social Works	11	24.4
Political	16	35.6
Media	12	26.7
Total	45	100.0

4.2. Questionnaire results

4.2.1. Type of activities that have been most affected by 9/11 (Research Question 2)

In this section, the researcher will discuss the questions that were included in the questionnaire with the aim of answering the second research question: What were the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations? The following question was asked in the questionnaire: Do you think that this organization has been affected by the events of September 1 2001? Respondents were asked to reflect their own opinion to general question of the impact of 9/11 events on the organization in

which they work. According to Table 4.6, it is clear that the majority of respondents (66.7%) believe that 9/11 had an impact on their organization.

Table 4.6 : General Opinions of Respondents of the Effect of 9/11

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly Agree	30	66.7
Agree	13	28.9
Indifferent	2	4.4
Disagree	0	0.0
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100.0

The table shows that 95.6% of respondents strongly agree and agree that 9/11 event had an impact and they support the general trend that they generally have been affected by these events. However, in what aspects 9/11 events have impacted these organizations, the following sub-questions will clarify in details:

Which types of activities have been most affected?

Table 4.7 : Effects on Dawah Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Very much Affected	23	51.1
Much Affected	12	26.7
Somewhat affected	8	17.8
Least affected	1	2.2

Total	45	100.0

Dawah activities which are carried out by members of these organizations, include but are not limited to the following:

1. Conduct congregational religious services and prayers,

2. Introduce Islam to non-Muslims as the righteous way,

3. Teach, and to disseminate the faith among Muslims and non-Muslims,

4. Establish mosques, Islamic centers, Islamic schools, and meeting places,

5. Strengthen fraternal bonds and brotherly relationships among Muslims,

6. Revitalize cooperative endeavors with other Muslim organizations,

7. Promote friendly relations and understanding between Muslims and followers of other religions,

8. Printing books and distributing Dawah materials.

However, there is an interrelationship between Dawah activites and other activities. This is because the concept of Dawah in Islam includes a wide scope of activities.

Table 4.8 : Impacts of 9/11 on Social Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Very much affected	16	35.6

Categories	Number	Percentage
Much affected	14	31.1
Somewhat affected	12	26.7
Least affected	2	4.4
Not affected at all	1	2.2
Total	45	100

Social activities were thought to have been affected by 35%. Very few Respondents think that social activities were the least affected (only 2.2%). This may be due to the fact that after 9/11 attacks most of the group work of Muslims such as gatherings, fund raising and charitable initiatives were suspected of being connected with terrorist groups. That is why they have been affected and retracted.

Table (9) indicates the extent of the effect of 9/11 on political activities of these organizations. Some respondents think that political activities were to some extent affected. This finding may be understood in the context that politics was used as a way to find out a solution to several problems faced by Muslims after 9/11. Politics was necessary to change and reverse the momentum.

Table 4.9 : Effects of 9/11 on Political Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Very much affected	19	42.2
Much affected	8	17.8
Somewhat affected	16	35.6

Least affected	0	0.0
Not affected at all	2	4.4
Total	45	100

Table 4.10 : Effects of 9/11 on Media Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Very much affected	18	40.0
Much affected	12	26.7
Somewhat affected	13	28.9
Disagree	00	0.0
Strongly Disagree	2	4.4
Total	45	100

According to Table and Figure (10) the effect of 9/11 on media activities of these organizations reached a high degree (40% + 28.9%) also confirms previous findings because media represent a mirror that reflects the activities of organizations.

In addition, in the aftermath of 9/11 media endeavors of Islamic organizations faced a media backlash that diminished their role and minimized their effect in preserving the true image of Islam and Muslims in the U.S. The media backlash was fierce, strong and supported by lobbies that took advantage of the prevalent anti-Muslim sentiment.

Islam recognizes other revealed religions and considers believing in all prophets is one of the articles of faith. Islam has encouraged Muslims to treat Christians and Jews with due justice, giving them rights and duties, securing their safety in Muslim territories and imposing a Muslim payment of blood-money in the event that one of them is killed accidentally. Islam has prohibited the killing of any Christians or Jews living in Muslim countries or territories. Prophet Muhammad said that whoever kills a Jewish or Christian person, whose people are in alliance with Muslims, will not enjoy the taste of the Paradise smell. Islam encourages Muslims to treat non-Muslims who have neither fought nor expelled Muslims from their homes, well.

4.2.2 The Negative and Positive Impact of 9/11 attacks (Research Question 1)

This part discusses the results of the questionnaire that relate to the first research question: What is the impact of 9/11 on the Islamic community and Islamic nonprofit organizations? The first question in this section was: Do you agree that this organization can benefit from September 11th events?

Table 4.11 indicates that 24.4% strongly agree that their organization can benefit from 9/11 event, while 42.2% believe 9/11 was beneficial in some way to their organization.

Table 4.11 : Benefits of 9/11 to the Organization

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	11	24.4
Agree	19	42.2
Indifferent	13	28.9
Disagree	2	4.4

Strongly Disagree	00	0.0
Total	45	100

The events of September 11 had a negative impact on the participation of Muslims especially the youth in organizational activities. Regarding the negative impact of 9/11 on the participation of Muslim youth in the organization activities, table (12) shows that less than half of the respondents are in favor of this view. There are also some views which think that participation of youth was not affected.

Table 4.12 : Effect of 9/11 on Organization of Muslim Youths

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	8	17.8
Agree	12	26.7
Indifferent	13	28.9
Disagree	12	26.7
Strongly Disagree	00	0.0
Total	45	100

One of the consequences of September 11 is that it encouraged non-Muslims to ask about Islam and its view of Jihad, violence, and September 11 events. Regarding the negative impact of 9/11 on participation of Muslim youth in the organization activities, Table and Figure (13) show that less than half of the respondents are in favor of this view. Some respondents think that the participation of youth was not affected.

Table 4.13 : Effects of 9/11 on Activities of Muslim Youths.

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	18	40.0
Agree	21	46.7
Partially agree	6	13.3
Disagree	0	0.0
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

After September 11, all activities of the organization became more closely watched by governments. Table and Figure (14) show one of the most significant results of this study, which is effect on activities of Islamic organizations. The vast majority of respondents believe that activities of these organizations have been affected as a result of the close watching of government agents who sometimes did harmful and illegal actions against these organizations. The literature review provided in this study also provides support for this argument.

Table 4.14 : Effects of 9/11 on the activities of the Organization

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	8	17.8
Agree	19	42.2
Partially agree	17	37.8
Disagree	1	2.2
Strongly Disagree	o	0.0
Total	45	100

With regard to whether September 11 events have limited the presence of the activities of the organizations with respect to using the media, the results are stated as follows:

Again Table 15 shows more evidence of how many Islamic organizations have been influenced by 9/11 in terms of humanitarian, cultural, and social activities However, a good deal of respondents (13.3% + 37.8%+8.9%) have different view on this issue.

Table 4.15 : Effects of 9/11 on the Activities of Organization

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	0	0.0
Agree	18	40.0
Partially agree	6	13.3
Disagree	17	37.8
Strongly Disagree	4	8.9
Total	45	100

As for whether American media projected a negative view of the activities of these organizations, from table and Figure 16, it is evident that approximately 60% senior staff members working in Islamic non-profit organizations agree or even strongly agree that American media project negative views about the activities of their organizations. This relates to research question 3.

Table 4.16 : Opinions Towards American Media Project Negative View of the Activities of the Organization

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	17	37.8
Agree	10	22.2
Partially agree	15	33.3
Disagree	3	6.7
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

The next question tried to discover if September 11 events have consolidated the campaign against Muslims in American society.

Table 4.17 : Opinions About how American Media Have Consolidated the Campaign Against Muslims.

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	11	24.4
Agree	10	22.2
Partially agree	20	44.4
Disagree	3	6.7
Strongly Disagree	1	2.2
Total	45	100

Table and Figure (17) reflect that a vast majority of the respondents; 90.8% fully or partially agree that September 11 events have consolidated the campaign against Muslims in the American society.

Table 4.18 : Opinions about the Participation of Muslim Scholars in Activities of the Organization.

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	4	8.9
Agree	6	13.3
Partially agree	13	28.9
Disagree	22	48.9
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

When asked about the level of participation of Muslim Scholars almost half of the participants (48.9%) believe that scholar participations have not decreased as a result of 9/11.

Table 4.19 : Hatred Against Muslims After 9/11.

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	14	31.1
Agree	14	31.1
Partially agree	17	37.8
Disagree	0	0.0
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

When asked about the participation in government activities, more than 60% of the participants see that the number of participants who work with the government has decreased after September 11.

Table 4.20 : Participation in Government Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	1	2.2
Agree	4	8.9
Partially agree	13	28.9
Disagree	23	51.1
Strongly Disagree	4	8.9
Total	45	100

As for how the organizations can minimize the negative impact of 9/11, the results are as follows:

21- Participation in political life

Table 4.21 : Political Participation to Minimize the Impact of 9/11

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	23	51.1
Agree	10	22.2
Partially agree	10	22.2
Disagree	2	4.4

Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

Table 4.21 suggests that Islamic organizations can minimize the negative impact of 9/11 by participating in political life. A majority of 51.1% strongly agree that political participation can be a solution and 22.2% agree on the same statement. That means that most respondents think this is the right way for organizations to overcome the bad consequences of September 11. Only 4.4% disagree with this approach.

Table 4.22 : Opening New Branches to Minimize the Impact of 9/11

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	12	26.7
Agree	13	28.9
Partially agree	17	37.8
Disagree	3	6.7
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

Table and Figure (22) show that some respondents suggest opening new branches can be helpful in reducing the negative impact of 9/11. 37.8% partially agree on this point and 6.7% disagree with this solution.

Table 4.23 : Using Media to Present the Organization

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	29	64.4
Agree	10	22.2
Partially agree	6	13.3
Disagree	0	0.0
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

Using media as a means to minimize the negative impact of 9/11 scores the highest by respondents; 46.4% strongly agree and 22.2% agree on this alternative. None of the respondents disagree with this practical and effective alternative. This result is consistent with other findings.

Table 4.24 : Involving Very Important Persons (VIP) in Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	27	60.0
Agree	11	24.4
Partially agree	7	15.6
Disagree	0	0.0
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

According to Table and Figure (25) the suggestion of calling VIPs to participate in activities has also gained a high degree of support from respondents. Along with the use of media, this suggestion was viewed as the most effective method of minimizing the negative effects of 9/11.

As for what organizations need in order to vitalize their role, the following results show what the respondents think in this regard.

Table 4.25 : Financial Support for Activities

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	34	75.6
Agree	9	20.0
Partially agree	2	4.4
Disagree	0	0.0
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

25- The organization needs financial support, so it can continue its social philanthropic and Dawah activities.

Table and Figure (25) show that 75.5% of participants strongly agree that financial support is important in order that organizations continue their philanthropic and Dawah activities. None of the respondents disagreed with this point. This finding is significant because it shows as will be elaborated in the discussion how these

organizations suffered after 9/11 when most of their accounts and financial assets were either seized or frozen by American government agencies.

Table 4.26: To Provide Cultural, Educational, Administrative and Trained Specialists

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	15	33.3
Agree	17	37.8
Partially agree	7	15.6
Disagree	6	13.3
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

26- The organization needs to be provided with cultural, educational, administrative and trained specialists.

Table and Figure (26) indicate that providing cultural, educational, administrative and trained specialists can be necessary to some extent but they are less important compared to financial support.

27- The organization needs to use the public and the private media very well to explain the Islamic position on violence and terrorism.

Table 4.27: To Use the Private and Public Media to Explain the Position on Violence and Terrorism

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	15	33.3
Agree	17	37.8
Partially agree	7	15.6
Disagree	6	13.3
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

According to Table and Figure (27) very few respondents believe that the effective use of media is needed in order to explain the Islamic position. Although this result might seem to contradict previous results are not harmonious with them, it signifies the fact that media is not in the hands of these organizations and they have no influence on the media. Furthermore, the media in the West, especially in the United States, often present a stereotyped image of Islam; thus they are unlikely to provide access for Islamic organizations to reflect the true image of Islam.

4.2.3 What is the Role of Organizations in Introducing Islam in a Better way and in Correcting Stereotypes and Distorted images of Islam? (Research Question 3)

The organizations under study have a great presence in Muslim society in America and have demonstrated great comprehension of the events of September 11, 2001. As will be seen in later sections, there is a negative portrayal of Islam in the U.S. media which has led to a distorted image of the religion and of Muslims. Thus, it is

important to discover if Islamic nonprofit organizations can play a role in changing this image and how individuals working in such organizations see their role in this regard.

Table 4.28 : Roles of Organizations in correcting Stereotypes and Distorted Images of Islam

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	2	4.4
Agree	24	53.3
Partially agree	11	24.4
Disagree	6	13.3
Strongly Disagree	2	4.4
Total	45	100

From Table and Figure 28, show that Islamic charity organizations have a significant presence in Muslim society in America. Almost (57.7%) agree or even strongly agree with this statement.

The offices and centers of the organizations must cover the whole Muslim community in the US.

Table 4.29 : Coverage of the Whole Muslim Community in the US

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	14	31.1
Agree	18	40.0
Partially agree	11	24.4
Disagree	2	4.4

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

Table and Figure (29) show that the overwhelming majority think that the organizations' centers and serving offices do not cover the Muslim community. This indicates one of the shortcomings of the organizations in serving Muslims. Physical presence is important for both Muslims and non-Muslims.

30-The activities must cater to the members needs with respect to their different life philosophies and ages.

Table 4.30 : Activities Do Not Cater to the Members Needs

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	6	13.3
Agree	8	17.8
Partially agree	12	26.7
Disagree	17	37.8
Strongly Disagree	2	4.4
Total	45	100

Again Table and Figure (30) show a similar result to the previous table which may be categorized under shortcomings of these organizations. The two previous results indicate a serious problem with regard to the role of these organizations in serving Islam and Muslims. The following result also supports this trend and suggests that Islamic

organizations need to vitalize their role in order to deliver better services to Muslim communities and eliminate any negative images about Islam.

As for whether the organizations need to be more useful to both the Muslims and non-Muslims in society, the results are as follows.

Table 4.31: Organization Needs to be More Beneficial to Non-Muslims

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	13	28.9
Agree	16	35.6
Partially agree	10	22.2
Disagree	6	13.3
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

Table and Figure (31) reveal that Islamic organizations need to be more beneficial to both Muslim and non-Muslim groups in American society. Indeed, more than (57 %) of the participants agree or strongly agree with this suggestion.

Table 4.32 : Newspaper and TV Channel

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	16	35.6
Agree	13	28.9
Partially agree	9	20.0
Disagree	7	15.6
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0

Total	45	100

Table and Figure (32) show that most of the respondents think it is important for these organizations to have their own media, such as television channels and newspapers. The result implies that Islamic organizations lack media coverage within Muslim and non- Muslim communities.

As for the results to the question that attempted to find out whether respondents think the organizations need to build bridges with influential members of local government through a variety of activities; table 4.33 shows what respondents think.

Table 4.33 : Needs to Build Bridges with Members of Local Government

Categories	Number	Percentage
Strongly agree	22	48.9
Agree	19	42.2
Partially agree	3	6.7
Disagree	1	2.2
Strongly Disagree	0	0.0
Total	45	100

According to Table and Figure (33) an overwhelming majority, i.e., (48.9% + 42.2%) of respondents believe that building relations with influential government officials is important.

4.3 The Role of the American Media in Nourishing Islamophobia (Research Question 3)

Before analyzing the content of the American media with regard to this study's subject, it is important to introduce the mechanisms and the system by which the American media function. The following section investigates the American media system and focuces on the role of the major news providers such as CNN that have shaped the American public's perception regarding non-profit Islamic organizations in America.

4.11.1 The Role of CNN

From his analysis, the researcher has concluded that in the period after 9/11, CNN coverage has been relatively exaggerated and biased, helping promote Islamophobia. . The impact of CNN's coverage on Islamic nonprofit organizations in America has always been incredibly harmful. Below are some examples of reports presented by CNN.

Title of first report: "FBI slammed for fighting 9/11 reforms Bureau disputes panel's findings, citing improvement" From Pam Benson and Kevin Bohn CNN Thursday, October 20, 2005 Posted: 2300 GMT (0700 HKT)

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The former members of the 9/11 commission slammed the FBI on Thursday for the pace of its reforms, saying the agency has fought the changes more than expected and warning that "terrorists will not wait."

The criticism came in a report by the former commission, now called the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, released Thursday in Washington.

"Reforms are at risk from inertia and complacency," said former commission Vice Chairman Lee Hamilton. If the pace of reform is" not accelerated," he said, Congress will have to consider "other alternatives," a veiled reference to removing the

FBI's intelligence function. The report faulted the FBI for continued deficiencies in its analytical capabilities and information sharing with other agencies, as well as its failure to improve information technology. The bureau was also cited for too much turnover in its workforce.

Former commission Chairman Thomas Kean complimented FBI Director Robert Mueller for setting the right priorities, but said there was "much more resistance than anticipated" from the rest of the bureau.

The FBI has been criticized for having a culture entrenched in law enforcement, one not geared to carry out intelligence missions.

The bipartisan 9/11 panel -- formally known as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States -- was created by Congress in 2002 to investigate aspects of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It released its final report in a nearly 570-page book in July 2004. The panel disbanded as a government entity the following month, but the 10 members formed the Public Discourse Project with the aim of fulfilling their original mandate of protecting against future terrorist attacks. Thursday's report card listed 14 of the panel's recommendations for the FBI and other parts of the federal government, grading progress on eight of them as minimal, insufficient or unsatisfactory.

President Bush signed legislation in December that overhauled the U.S. intelligence community based on the 9/11 commission's recommendations, including the creation of a director of national intelligence post that was filled by John D. Negroponte.

Last week, Negroponte announced the creation of a National Clandestine Service headed by an undercover CIA official, based on the recommendations of the

White House's so-called WMD commission, a separate panel that investigated intelligence failures regarding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq before the war.

Bush endorsed 70 of the 74 recommendations made by the WMD commission, including the creation in June of a National Security Service within the FBI.

Title of second report:

WASHINGTON (CNN) (December 5, 2005 *) **The former chairman and vice-chairman of the 9/11 commission warned Sunday that the nation is ill-prepared for another terrorist attack.** The bipartisan panel plans to issue a report Monday assessing the federal government's response to the recommendations it made last year.*

The group was created by Congress in 2002 to investigate aspects of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It released its final report with a slew of recommendations in a nearly 570-page book in July 2004.

Thomas Kean, the Republican chairman of the committee, told NBC's "Meet the Press" that enacting the changes is "not a priority for the government right now. "A lot of the things we need to do really to prevent another 9/11 just simply aren't being done by the president or by the Congress.

What we're concerned about now is that these recommendations -- four years, more than four years after 9/11, are still not being done. People are not paying attention to them.

Lee Hamilton, the committee's Democratic vice-chairman, predicted another attack will occur -- "It's not a question of if" -- and said the nation is not "as well-prepared as we should be."

Added Kean, "God help us if we have another attack and we haven't done some of these things."

The Bush administration did carry out one of the panel's central recommendations for overhauling the nation's intelligence system: creating the post of director of national intelligence, charged with beefing up intelligence efforts and information-sharing among disparate agencies.

In his first one-on-one interview in that post, John Negroponte told CNN last week, "America is safer than it was at 9/11" because of better integrated intelligence efforts.

But Kean and Hamilton said many of the commission's most important recommendations for strengthening U.S. security have been given short shrift.

Among their top concerns: first responders still cannot communicate with each other in an emergency because no part of the radio spectrum has been allocated for their use, the two men said.

"It really approaches scandal to think that, four years after 9/11, the police and the fire cannot talk to one another at the scene of the disaster," said Hamilton

"They could not do it on 9/11, and as a result of that, lives were lost. They could not do it at Katrina. They still cannot do it."

Congress is considering a bill to establish such a radio frequency, but even if it passes, "the best hope we have is a bill that fixes it by 2009," said Kean, former governor of New Jersey.

The two men, and the other members of the former commission, also want funding for first responders to be distributed based on risk -- with more likely targets

receiving a bigger chunk of the funding -- rather than on a per capita or geographical basis.

"We've had some of this money spent to air condition garbage trucks. We've had some of the money spent for armor for dogs. This money is being distributed as if it's general revenue sharing," said Kean.

Title of third report: "U.S., Saudis suspect terror group in Riyadh bombings"

Wednesday, May 14, 2003 Posted: 0232 GMT (10:32 AM HKT)
RIYADH, Saudi Arabia *(CNN) CNN correspondents Rula Amin, David Ensor, John King, Andrea Koppel and Brent Sadler, and producer Elise Labott, contributed to this report.*

--President Bush said Tuesday that he wouldn't be surprised if al Qaeda were behind the suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, and other U.S. officials said they were worried that the terrorist group might be planning new attacks.

The triple car bombings Monday night killed at least 21 people, including eight Americans and seven Saudis, authorities said.

Nearly 200 others were wounded in the blasts, including 17 Americans. One State Department official said some of the wounded Americans are "in pretty bad shape."

U.S. and Saudi officials said it appears that the simultaneous attacks in the Saudi capital were the work of al Qaeda, the terrorist organization headed by Saudi exile Osama bin Laden.

Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah said Tuesday that there is "no place for terror" in his country and vowed to "destroy" the group responsible for the attacks. Another Saudi official called the bombings "a declaration of war against Saudi Arabia."

The three residential compounds targeted included one used by an American defense contractor and one owned by a pro-Western Saudi billionaire.

Attacks follow U.S. warning

Rula Amin and others (2003) The blasts came less than two weeks after the U.S. State Department warned Americans of possible terror attacks in Saudi Arabia. Last week, the Saudi government issued an all-points bulletin for 19 men -- 17 of them Saudis -- on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks.

In Washington, a senior U.S. official involved in national security affairs said the statement by the Saudi crown prince was "the strongest thing we have ever seen from them."

The State Department said Tuesday that Saudi cooperation in the wake of Monday's bombings was "outstanding."

"We've had excellent cooperation with Saudi Arabia with this attack," Deputy Spokesman Philip Reeker said.

One official said Saudi approval for the FBI team to travel to Riyadh to aid with the investigation came "within hours" of the blast.

"That is the quickest approval by the Saudi government I have ever seen," he said. "It is very significant."

Some U.S. authorities and lawmakers have criticized Saudi Arabia for its cooperation -- or lack thereof -- in cracking down against terrorism. FBI officials were especially critical of what they called a Saudi lack of cooperation in the 1996 investigation of the Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 U.S. service members.

Title of fourth report: "Terror suspect 'had Navy plans'"

(CNN.com) Friday, August 6, 2004 Posted: 1637 GMT (0037 HKT) CNN's Diana Muriel in London contributed to this report

LONDON, England (CNN) -- A British man facing extradition to the United States on terrorism-related charges was found in possession of a U.S. Navy battle group plan, U.S. officials have alleged.

The charges against Babar Ahmad also link him to a Chechen group that seized a Moscow movie theater and hundreds of hostages in October 2002.

Ahmad is accused of using U.S.-based Web sites in connection with "acts of terrorism in Chechnya and Afghanistan."

Ahmad was denied bail when he appeared before a London judge on Friday. He told Bow Street Magistrates' Court he did not want to voluntarily go to the United States, and he was remanded to jail until his next hearing on August 13.

Later Friday, the U.S. Attorney's office in New Haven, Connecticut, unsealed the 31-page indictment against Ahmad detailing the charges against him.

U.S. Attorney Kevin O'Connor said investigators found a floppy disk at Ahmad's home that contained plans for a U.S. Navy battle group from April 2001.

The plans included drawings of the battle group's formation, details of specific assignments of individual ships and details of each ship's vulnerability.

The battle group was patrolling the Straits of Hormuz and tasked with operations against al Qaeda and enforcing sanctions against Iraq.

The document concludes that the battle group had nothing except Navy SEALs armed with Stinger missiles to stop an attack by a small vessel armed with rocket-propelled grenades.

Ahmad is charged in Connecticut with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists; conspiracy to provide money to support the Taliban, to kill people abroad

and to support terrorists; conspiracy to support designated terrorist groups; and solicitation to commit crimes of physical violence. The charges carry maximum penalties from 10 years in prison for conspiring to support designated terrorist groups to life in prison for conspiring to provide material support for terrorists.

"Between 1997 and 2003, Mr. Ahmad -- through various entities -- created, maintained and operated Web sites in Connecticut, Nevada and outside the United States," O'Connor told a news conference in New Haven.

"The main purpose of all of these sites was to solicit financing for certain terrorist organizations including the Taliban and Chechen mujahedeen and to recruit individuals to travel to Afghanistan and Chechnya for the purpose of waging jihad against the perceived enemies of Islam, including the United States." Ahmad, 30, was arrested in Britain on Thursday by the Extradition and International Assistance Unit of the Metropolitan Police Service. Officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch were searching three residential properties and one office in southwest London on behalf of U.S. authorities.

Friday's hearing included a formal reading of charges. After the charges were read, the judge asked Ahmad if he understood them.

"Not really," he responded. "It's a bit confusing."

The charges against Ahmad link him to a Chechen group that seized a Moscow movie theater -- and hundreds of hostages -- in October 2002. More than 125 of the hostages died in the rescue.

U.S. authorities argued that freeing Ahmad before his trial would result in his continued cooperation with terrorists and the destruction of evidence.

Ahmad's attorney said he was in need of psychiatric care, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder following what he called an assault by police last year. The attorney said that police raided his home on December 2, 2003, assaulting him in his

home and later in a police van, leaving him with kidney and soft-tissue damage. At the

August 13 hearing, the judge will consider whether to allow the extradition to move

forward. Ahmad will remain in Woodhill prison near London until then.

In New Haven, O'Connor said he expected Ahmad to fight extradition.

"I don't expect it to happen very quickly, even with the cooperation of our

counterparts, because there are certain rights that this individual is afforded," he said.

"It could take more than one year. Five years? I hope not."

O'Connor also said it was "impossible to tell" whether any of the money Ahmad

allegedly raised on his Web sites was used for the September 11, 2001 attacks on the

United States

"There was a lot of activity pre 9/11, and there was a lot of activity post 9/11,"

he said. "But after it gets into Afghanistan, it's impossible to tell what it was used for.

We don't know if any of it was used for 9/11 and we'll probably never know."

O'Connor said the investigation had uncovered at least two U.S. citizens who

had made contributions via Ahmad's Web sites.

The investigation also identified a U.S. sailor serving aboard the guided missile

destroyer USS Benfold who sent a sympathetic e-mail to Ahmad in July 2001, O'Connor

said.

Authorities have not decided whether to charge them, he said.

O'Connor said Ahmad's arrest was the result of more than two years of

investigation sparked by a U.S. Customs officer who "for a long time was a bit of a lone

ranger."

"One tenacious agent, to his credit, began this investigation," he said. "It didn't

come easy. It took two years of document review, subpoenas and the like."

Title of fifth report: "Cheney: Bush has right to authorize secret surveillance"

Tuesday, December 20, 2005 Posted: 2055 GMT (0455 HKT)

MUZAFFARABAD, Pakistan (CNN) -- Vice President Dick Cheney said Tuesday that President Bush has the authority to order international eavesdropping on suspected terrorists in the United States without informing a court.

"If we had been able to do that before 9/11, we might have been able to pick up on two of the hijackers who were in San Diego in touch overseas with al Qaeda," Cheney said during a tour of earthquake damage in Pakistan.

"It's good, solid, sound policy," the vice president added. "It's the right thing to do."

Cheney's comments follow Bush's defense of the practice Monday during a year-end news conference at the White House. Bush said he "absolutely" has the legal authority to order the wiretaps, which are necessary to be "quick to detect and prevent" possible near-term terrorist attacks. Bush said authorization is derived from the Constitution, and Congress following the September 11, 2001, attacks. Cheney said such measures were necessary because the United States needed to "aggressively go after terrorists."

Critics say Bush had no legal standing to authorize such wiretaps without obtaining a warrant from a court in accordance with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).

Cheney said the program had "saved thousands of lives." "It is, I'm convinced, one of the reasons we haven't been attacked in the past four years," Cheney said.

The New York Times first reported last week that Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others in the United States while they communicate with people outside the country.

Although the NSA is usually barred from domestic spying, it can get warrants issued with the permission of a judicial body called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court. Bush's action eliminated the need to get a warrant from the court.

Bush said that the program had been discussed at least 12 times with Congress since 2001 and that it was constantly being reviewed to make sure it was being run correctly. The program is reauthorized every 45 days, meaning he has given his approval more than 30 times since its inception, Bush said.

Calls for investigation

Both Democrats and Republicans have questioned the legality of the program, and some lawmakers have called for an independent investigation or congressional hearings. Bush and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said technological advances used by terrorists made it necessary to conduct the surveillance without a court order.

"We know that a two-minute phone conversation between somebody linked to al Qaeda here and an operative overseas could lead directly to the loss of thousands of lives," Bush said. "To save American lives, we must be able to act fast and to detect these conversations so we can prevent new attacks."

"It has been effective in disrupting the enemy while safeguarding our civil liberties," the president added.

But lawmakers, several of whom said Congress hadn't been informed about the wiretap program, also are concerned about the legality of the president's authorization.

Democratic Sen. Russ Feingold of Wisconsin told CNN on Sunday that he believes Bush's action violated the law.

"FISA says it's the exclusive law to authorize wiretaps," he said. "This administration is playing fast and loose with the law in national security. The issue here

is whether the president of the United States is putting himself above the law, and I believe he has done so."

'I'm just stunned'

Sen. Jack Reed said the president could have gone back to a FISA court after the wiretaps if he was concerned about speed.

"I'm just stunned by the president's rationales with respect to the illegal wiretapping," the Rhode Island Democrat said. "There are two points that have to be emphasized with respect to the FISA procedure: They're secret and they're retroactive.

"There is no situation where time is of such an essence they can't use the FISA proceedings. And so the president's justification, I think, is without merit."

Gonzales said Monday that a congressional act passed after September 11 not only authorized President Bush to use force in the war on terror, it gave the president the power to allow such wiretaps.

"There were many people, many lawyers within the administration who advised the president that he had an inherent authority as commander in chief under the Constitution to engage in these kind of signal intelligence of our enemy," he said. (CNN Access)

"We also believe that the authorization to use force, which was passed by the Congress in the days following the attacks of September 11, constituted additional authorization for the president to engage in this kind of signal intelligence." (Watch Gonzales' explanation of the administration's position -- 5:36)

Signal intelligence refers to intercepted electronic communications, such as phone calls.

The measure meant the president doesn't need to get a court order to request such wiretaps, as called for in FISA, Gonzales said.

Title of Sixth Report: Court delays Padilla transfer from brig

From CNN Justice Producer Terry Frieden

Wednesday, November 30, 2005 Posted: 2002 GMT (0402 HKT)

Jose Padilla has been held since May 2002 when he returned to the United States from Pakistan.

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A federal appeals court on Wednesday delayed the transfer of accused terrorist Jose Padilla from a military brig to face trial in Miami.

Padilla, a 35-year-old U.S. citizen, was indicted last week by a federal grand jury in Florida. He will remain in the Navy brig in South Carolina for at least two weeks under a two-page order issued by the 4th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in Richmond, Virginia.

The development surprised top Justice Department officials. But the three-judge panel said it needs to know whether it should set aside a September opinion that upheld Padilla's military detention before returning him to civilian authorities.

The court said it wants to hear arguments on whether the opinion was to be vacated "as a consequence of the transfer." The judges pointed out that the facts alleged by the government "warranting" Padilla's military detention differed from the charges in the indictment.

The government was ordered to reply by December 9, and Padilla's lawyers have a deadline of December 16 to respond -- the same date the government is also due to respond to Padilla's latest appeal to the Supreme Court.

"We're disappointed that Mr. Padilla's transfer to the civilian justice system has been delayed," said Padilla defense attorney Jonathan Freiman, who argued Padilla's case before a South Carolina judge earlier this year.

"The case is pending in the Supreme Court, and we think the Supreme Court should decide whether to address the question of the president's power to detain

American citizens seized in a civilian setting in the United States indefinitely and without charges."

The 4th Circuit must rule on the transfer to clear the way for U.S. marshals to take Padilla from the brig to Miami.

"We intend to comply with the 4th Circuit Court's order," the Justice Department said in a brief statement. Officials declined further comment.

The indictment charges Padilla with conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and providing material support to terrorists.

Padilla was added as a defendant to an existing case against four other men, accusing them of forming a "North American support cell" of a global "violent jihad" movement. Padilla specifically was accused of little more than attending al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan in 1999 and 2000.

Prior to the criminal charges, Padilla had been designated an enemy combatant and held in military custody without charges for nearly three and half years.

Padilla, who has served two criminal sentences in the United States and lived abroad, was arrested in Chicago in May 2002 by the FBI and jailed as a material witness in the investigation into the September 11, 2001, terrorists attack.

One month later, President Bush designated him an "enemy combatant" for posing "a continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United States."

The attorney general at the time alleged that Padilla had plotted to blow up a radioactive "dirty bomb" in the United States.

The indictment does not include allegations related to a dirty bomb plot or any reference to allegations publicly stated last year that Padilla also plotted to blow up apartment buildings with natural gas lines.

The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over Padilla's case because the government had appealed the ruling of a South Carolina federal judge who ruled his continued detention unconstitutional and said he must be charged or released.

The appeals court overruled U.S. District Judge Henry Floyd, a Bush appointee who ruled that the president does have the legal authority to declare enemy combatants and hold them indefinitely in military custody.

CNN's Phil Hirschkorn contributed to this report.

4.3.2 The role of the American Press

From his observations, the author has concluded that the American press has a tendency to magnify issues and exaggerate events in relation to Muslims and terrorism. Furthermore, with regard to 9/11 this tendency is even clearer than with other issues. The events were clearly exaggerated and closely linked with Islam and Islamic activities with the ultimate objective of distorting the image of Islam.

Some articles from the *Washington Post* and other American newspapers and magazines will be cited below to support the researcher's point of view.

1. *Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead. Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert*

By Michael Grunwald

Washington Post Staff Writer

Wednesday, September 12, 2001

Terrorists unleashed an astonishing air assault on America's military and financial power centers yesterday morning, hijacking four commercial jets and then

crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania countryside.

There were no reliable estimates last night of how many people were killed in the most devastating terrorist operation in American history. The number was certainly in the hundreds and could be in the thousands.

It was the most dramatic attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor, and it created indelible scenes of carnage and chaos. The commandeered jets obliterated the World Trade Center's twin 110-story towers from their familiar perch above Manhattan's skyline and ripped a blazing swath through the Defense Department's imposing five-sided fortress, grounding the domestic air traffic system for the first time and plunging the entire nation into an unparalleled state of anxiety.

U.S. military forces at home and abroad were placed on their highest state of alert, and a loose network of Navy warships was deployed along both coasts for air defense.

The terrorists hijacked four California-bound planes from three airports on the Eastern Seaboard; the airliners were loaded with the maximum amount of fuel, suggesting a well-financed, well-coordinated plot. First, two planes slammed into the World Trade Center. Then an American Airlines plane out of Dulles International Airport ripped through the newly renovated walls of the Pentagon, perhaps the world's most secure office building. A fourth jet crashed 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, shortly after it was hijacked and turned in the direction of Washington.

None of the 266 people aboard the four planes survived. There were even more horrific but still untallied casualties in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,

which together provided office space for more than 70,000 people. At just one of the firms with offices in the World Trade Center, the Marsh and McLennan insurance brokerage, 1,200 of its 1,700 employees were unaccounted for last night.

The spectacular collapse of the Trade Center's historic twin towers and another less recognizable skyscraper during the rescue operations caused even more bloodshed. At least 300 New York firefighters and 85 police officers are presumed dead. The preliminary list of victims included the conservative commentator Barbara K. Olson, "Frasier" executive producer David Angell and two hockey scouts from the Los Angeles Kings.

No one claimed responsibility for the attacks, but federal officials said they suspect the involvement of Islamic extremists with links to fugitive terrorist Osama bin Laden, who has been implicated in the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa and several other attacks. Law enforcement sources said there is already evidence implicating bin Laden's militant network in the attack, and politicians from both parties predicted a major and immediate escalation in America's worldwide war against terrorism.

In a grim address to the nation last night, President Bush denounced the attacks as a failed attempt to frighten the United States, and promised to hunt down those responsible. "We will make no distinction," he said, "between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."

Bush vowed that America would continue to function "without interruption," and federal offices and Congress are scheduled to be open today. But the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq Stock Market will remain closed, along with most businesses in

lower Manhattan. And yesterday was a day of extraordinary interruptions -- for the president, for federal Washington and for the country.

Bush was in a classroom in Florida yesterday morning when the attacks began and spent the day on the move for security reasons, flying to military bases in Louisiana and then Nebraska before returning to Washington in the evening. At one point at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, the president rode in a camouflaged, armored Humvee, guarded by machine gun-toting soldiers in fatigues.

Vice President Cheney and first lady Laura Bush were whisked away to undisclosed locations in the morning, and congressional leaders were temporarily moved to a secure facility 75 miles west of Washington. The White House, the Capitol, the Supreme Court, the State Department and the Treasury Department were evacuated, along with federal buildings nationwide and the United Nations in New York.

Private buildings also were shut down, from the Space Needle in Seattle to the Sears Tower in Chicago to Walt Disney World in Orlando. America's borders with Canada and Mexico were sealed. New York's mayoral primary was abruptly postponed. So was Major League Baseball's schedule for the night.

Wireless networks buckled under the barrage of cell phone calls. The besieged Internet search engine Google told Web surfers to try radio or TV instead. Amtrak train and Greyhound bus operations were also halted in the Northeast.

Last night, fires were still burning amid the rubble of the World Trade Center, and pools of highly flammable jet fuel continued to hinder rescue teams searching through waist-deep rubble.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency dispatched eight search-and-rescue teams to New York and four teams to the Pentagon. The Department of Health and Human Services sent medical teams and mortuary teams, and activated a national medical emergency cadre of 7,000 volunteers for the first time.

The Empire State Building went dark as a symbol of national mourning. In Washington, Republicans and Democrats presented a united front in condemning the attacks; members of Congress delivered a spontaneous rendition of "God Bless America" after a news conference on the Capitol steps.

"We are outraged at this cowardly attack on the people of the United States," the leaders of Congress said in a bipartisan statement. "Our heartfelt prayers are with the victims and their families, and we stand strongly united behind the President as our commander-in-chief."

The impact of the attacks reverberated not just in the United States but in every major capital. European and Asian airlines canceled all flights to the United States and recalled or diverted those already in the air. Flights over London, Paris and other capitals were re-routed over less populous areas. London's financial district was largely evacuated; security was bolstered around U.S. schools and embassies in many countries.

Panic buying caused oil and gold prices to soar while stock investors in all major foreign markets dumped shares in the most frenzied wave of selling since the 1987 crash. In the Middle East, China and the Yugoslav republic of Serbia, some people

welcomed the attacks, but an array of international leaders pledged support for the victims.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon condemned the attack in blistering terms, and described it as a "turning point" in the global war against terrorism. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat condemned the attack as well, although some Palestinians in Israeli-occupied territories and Lebanon celebrated with glee.

But amid all the sadness and all the outrage, there were questions about lax security and inadequate intelligence, as Americans tried to fathom how such a catastrophe could happen with no apparent warning. On at least two of the airliners, according to federal officials, the hijackers were armed with nothing but knives. How did they get away with it?

In fact, counterterrorism experts have talked in recent years about cyber-attacks and biological attacks. Security officials issued warnings just last month about bin Laden's threats to American installations abroad.

But yesterday's attacks caught a vast security apparatus off guard. The military command center in Colorado's Cheyenne Mountain, responsible for U.S. air defenses, received word just 10 minutes before the first aircraft struck the World Trade Center that a American plane had been hijacked. The notification came too late for fighter jets to take action, a senior Air Force officer said.

The disaster began to unfold at 8:48 a.m., when American Airlines Flight 11, carrying 92 people from Boston to Los Angeles, crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center, the landmark glass-and-steel complex at the southern tip of Manhattan that provided office space for 50,000 workers. Islamic militants had

detonated a bomb there in 1993, killing six people. Yesterday's terrorism turned out to be far worse.

Eighteen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people on the same Boston-to-Los Angeles route, tore through the South Tower with an even larger explosion. The collisions shrouded New York's helter-skelter financial district in pallid ash, and created mass pandemonium inside and outside the towers. Workers were screaming, running for stairways, gasping for air. Several of them began leaping to their death from the upper floors.

But the scene soon shifted from America's financial mecca to its military fortress. At about 9:40 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77, carrying 64 people from Dulles to Los Angeles, barreled into the west wing of the Pentagon in yet another fiery collision, destroying at least four of the five rings that encircle the world's largest office building. A Pentagon spokesman called the casualties "extensive," although they were clearly not as extensive as New York's.

The Federal Aviation Administration promptly banned takeoffs nationwide, ordered domestic flights to land at the nearest airport and diverted international flights to Canada. But officials soon confirmed that a fourth plane, United Airlines Flight 93, carrying 45 people from Newark to San Francisco, had crashed in Shanksville, Pa. It had been hijacked as well -- one passenger called 911 from a cell phone -- and had been heading toward Washington when it went down.

Then it was back to the World Trade Center. Shortly before 10 a.m., the South Tower collapsed with an earthshaking roar. Smoke replaced steel as if the building had

suddenly imploded. A half-hour later, the North Tower collapsed. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani publicly urged New Yorkers to stay calm and stay put -- unless they were below Canal Street in lower Manhattan.

"If you're south of Canal Street, get out," he warned. "Just walk north."

America's battle against terrorism, it seemed clear last night, will never be the same. The nation's airports are expected to reopen at noon today, but with beefed-up security measures: no more curbside check-in, and a possible return of armed "air marshals" to prevent future hijackings.

Many members of both parties declared that for all practical purposes, the nation is at war. At a briefing last night in the battered Pentagon, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld warned that America's enemies should not rest easy.

For now, those enemies have not been publicly identified. But government officials said they have strong evidence from multiple sources linking the attacks to bin Laden and his terrorist web, known as al Qaeda.

Journalists with access to bin Laden said his followers have been boasting about preparations for major attacks against the United States in retaliation for American support of Israel. Bin Laden has already been linked to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and last year's attack on the USS Cole in Yemen. Yesterday, government officials said they intercepted messages from bin Laden associates gloating about hitting their targets.

Before the mayhem, though, U.S. intelligence all pointed to an attack overseas. The State Department had warned travelers in an advisory Friday, and U.S. military and diplomatic posts abroad have been on alert as well.

Terrorism experts have repeatedly warned that U.S. airport security is extremely lax, warnings that have been backed up by a stack of studies. When Department of Transportation investigators tried to breach security at eight airports three years ago, they succeeded 68 percent of the time.

"The security of airports is pathetic," said Harvey W. Kushner, a Long Island University professor and terrorism consultant to several federal agencies. "It's very easy to have someone get on a plane and wreak havoc."

Today, at least, the debates over education, health care, Social Security and the budget surplus that have consumed Washington in recent months have been put on hold; perhaps for the first time since the Gulf War, national security is at the top of the agenda. Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) was preparing to call for more military spending at a news conference at the time of the attacks.

"This is a failure of the U.S. intelligence system, caused by a lack of resources and by complacency," he said. "Today, our government failed the American public."

But that was a discordant note yesterday in Washington, where solidarity was the watchword of the day. In his speech last night, Bush emphasized the nation's harmony, noting that "a great people have been moved to defend a great nation." After reading from the 23rd Psalm, he proclaimed that even amid suffering and death, Americans will remain committed to their freedom-loving way of life.

"This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace," he said. "America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time .

The American press continued their fierce attacks and allegations against some Saudi personnel and staff involved in nonprofit Islamic organizations in America. The press goes further to accuse the Saudi Government and several members of the Saudi Royal Family of being involved directly or indirectly in providing finance for the 9/11 events. All this has had a severe negative effect on Islamic nonprofit organizations working in America to secure relief for the needy and to promote Islam.

In this regard, *Newsweek*, the famous American magazine published the following article under the heading "The Saudi Money Trail.'

The Saudi Money Trail

by Michael Isikoff

Published in Newsweek, December 1, 2002 (retrieved from: http://www.newsweek.com/saudi-money-trail-140813)

When the two Al Qaeda operatives arrived at Los Angeles International Airport around New Year's 2000, they were warmly welcomed. Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar would help hijack American Airlines Flight 77 and crash it into the Pentagon a year and a half later, but that January in Los Angeles, they were just a couple of young Saudi men who barely spoke English and needed a place to stay. At the airport, they were swept up by a gregarious fellow Saudi, Omar al-Bayoumi, who had been living in the United States for several years. Al-Bayoumi drove the two men to San Diego, threw a welcoming party and arranged for the visitors to get an apartment next

to his. He guaranteed the lease, and plunked down $1,550 in cash to cover the first two months' rent. His hospitality did not end there.

Al-Bayoumi also aided Alhazmi and Almihdhar as they opened a bank account, and recruited a friend to help them obtain Social Security cards and call flight schools in Florida to arrange flying lessons, according to law-enforcement officials. Two months before 9-11, al-Bayoumi moved to England; several months later, he disappeared.

Who is al-Bayoumi? At various times, the affable father of four told people that he was getting his doctorate at San Diego State, though the school has no record he ever attended. He told others that he was a pilot for the Saudi national airline. He apparently did work for Dallah Avco, an aviation-services company with extensive contracts with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Prince Sultan, the father of the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar. According to informed sources, some federal investigators suspect that al-Bayoumi could have been an advance man for the 9-11 hijackers, sent by Al Qaeda to assist the plot that ultimately claimed 3,000 lives.

The Feds' interest in al-Bayoumi has been heightened by a money trail that could be perfectly innocent, but is nonetheless intriguing--and could ultimately expose the Saudi government to some of the blame for 9-11 and seriously strain U.S.-Saudi ties. It is too soon to say where the trail will wind up, but it begins with a very surprising name on a Washington bank account.

About two months after al-Bayoumi began aiding Alhazmi and Almihdhar, NEWSWEEK has learned, al-Bayoumi's wife began receiving regular stipends, often monthly and usually around $2,000, totaling tens of thousands of dollars. The money came in the form of cashier's checks, purchased from Washington's Riggs Bank by Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the daughter of the late King Faisal and wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi envoy who is a prominent Washington figure and personal friend of the Bush family. The checks were sent to a woman named Majeda Ibrahin Dweikat, who in turn signed over many of them to al-Bayoumi's wife (and her friend), Manal Ahmed Bagader. The Feds want to know: Was this well-meaning charity gone awry? Or some elaborate money-laundering scheme? A scam? Or just a coincidence?

A spokesperson for Princess Haifa told NEWSWEEK that she had no idea the money was going to the al-Bayoumi family or that it might in any way be used for some nefarious purpose. Saudi officials and members of the royal family routinely give money to supplicants who need medical or financial help and write the embassy. Dwei-kat's husband, Osama Basnan, had first pleaded to the Saudi Embassy for help in 1998, saying that he needed money to treat his wife's thyroid condition. At the time, Prince Bandar wrote Basnan a $15,000 check. The monthly payments to his wife, Majeda, began in January 1999 and ended only last summer. Until she was contacted late last week by NEWSWEEK, Princess Haifa was unaware that the payments are being investigated by U.S. authorities, according to the spokesperson.

Questions over the money trail have enflamed a fierce, behind-the-scenes struggle between two congressional committees looking into 9-11 and the Bush administration. Senate Intelligence Committee co-chairman Robert Graham of Florida, a Democrat, and Richard Shelby of Alabama, a Republican, believe that the FBI failed to fully investigate 9-11.

The FBI is still trying to figure out if al-Bayoumi played a role in the 9-11 plot. Within a few days of the attacks last fall, New Scotland Yard, working with the FBI, had found him enrolled in a business graduate program at Birmingham, England's Aston University. The British investigators arrested al-Bayoumi, and tore up the floorboards in his house. They discovered records of phone calls to two diplomats in the Saudi Embassy in Washington. The officials, who worked in the Islamic section of the embassy, which supports mosques and Islamic charities, apparently offered innocent explanations to FBI investigators. Al-Bayoumi, who adamantly denied any connection to the attacks or knowledge of the hijackers' links to Al Qaeda, was released after a week without charge.

Before he vanished, al-Bayoumi offered a benign explanation of how he met with Almihdhar and Alhazmi. He told investigators that he just happened to be in a restaurant at the Los Angeles airport and overheard the two men talking in Arabic. He introduced himself and offered to help the two newcomers get settled and adjust to life in southern California. It was a chance meeting, he insisted to the skeptical agents. His offer of help was nothing more than the usual charity extended by one Muslim "brother" to another.

Al-Bayoumi was a familiar figure in San Diego's burgeoning Islamic community. He was often seen at the mosque or at social functions, chatting amiably, almost always holding a video camera. Al-Bayoumi seemed to pay so much attention to the comings and goings of young Saudi college students that some were convinced that he was a Saudi government spy. "He was always watching them, always checking up on them, literally following them around and then apparently reporting their activities

back to Saudi Arabia," said Henry Bagadan, a Pakistani businessman who worships at the San Diego Islamic Center.

After al-Bayoumi left San Diego in July 2001, the cashier's checks purchased by Princess Haifa continued to flow to Majeda Dweikat, who in turn signed many of them over to her husband, Osama. Basnan also befriended the two hijackers, Almihdhar and Alhazmi. After the terrorist attacks, Basnan, who was known as a vocal Qaeda sympathizer, "celebrated the heroes of September 11" and talked about "what a wonderful, glorious day it had been," according to a law-enforcement official. Wife Dweikat appears to have been at least a minor scamster. She was convicted of marriage fraud to obtain immigration papers and pleaded guilty--along with al-Bayoumi's wife, Manal--to shoplifting in April 2001. The checks from Princess Haifa stopped when Basnan was arrested for visa fraud last August. (He told a judge, "I love this country," but was ordered deported to Saudi Arabia.) Interestingly, Osama Basnan showed up in Houston last April when Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah came to town with a vast entourage en route to President George W. Bush's ranch. According to informed sources, Basnan met with a high Saudi prince who has responsibilities for intelligence matters and is known to bring suitcases full of cash into the United States to be distributed to Saudi students when they come to welcome the crown prince. A Houston police report obtained by NEWSWEEK shows that Basnan complained he had been robbed of his Saudi passport and $400. It is dated April 25, the same week the crown prince was in town.

The congressional investigators looking into 9-11 argue that the Feds aren't doing enough to stop another attack. The FBI's failure to thoroughly investigate the Saudi connection reveals the bureau's inherent weakness as a counterterror

organization, these investigators tell NEWSWEEK. Senator Graham has been pushing for a new domestic-intelligence service, modeled on Britain's M.I.5, to track terror cells in this country. Graham says he fears that a concealed terrorist "infrastructure" set up to support the 19 hijackers is still in place--waiting for a new call to action.

The Bush administration has been reluctant to give the congressional committee investigating 9-11 everything it asks for. Cheney and others believe that Congress is intruding on the executive branch's intelligence-gathering and foreign-policy-making powers and that a "witch hunt" will distract and hobble the CIA and FBI. But the administration may also worry that if investigators keep digging, the U.S.-Saudi relationship will wind up in a deep hole.

4.20 A Royal Connection to September 11th?

According to the above article from *Newsweek*, a Saudi man named Omar al-Bayoumi arrived in the United States and settled in the San Diego area. Over the next few years he got a job and immersed himself in the Islamic community. After meeting two of the would-be 9-11 hijackers at L.A. International Airport, al-Bayoumi set them up in an apartment and paid the first two months of their rent in early 2000. Al-Bayoumi allegedly started receiving stipends in the form of cashier's checks, originally purchased by Princess Haifa bint Faisal, the wife of Saudi envoy Prince Bandar. He facilitated getting IDs for the two hijackers. In July 2001Al-Bayoumi left the United States for England; his close friend Osama Basnan continued to receive the money. In September 2001 he was detained by authorities in England, while asserting he had no connection to the 9-11 attacks.

The *Washington Post* also published allegations against Muslim charity organizations and their staff. They presented the following article about one of the leaders of these charity organizations, Holy Land Foundation. The article was as follows:

US-based Muslim charity convicted of funding terrorism

(AFP) – Nov 24, 2008

Dallas, Texas (AFP) — The leaders of what was once the largest Muslim charity in the United States were found guilty of acting as a front for Palestinian militants in the largest terrorism financing prosecution in American history.

It was a major victory in the White House's legal "war on terror" and comes after a mistrial was declared last year in the case involving the now defunct Texas-based Holy Land Foundation, charged with funneling 12 million dollars to Hamas.

"Today's verdicts are important milestones in America's efforts against financiers of terrorism," Patrick Rowan, assistant attorney general for national security, said in a statement.

"This prosecution demonstrates our resolve to ensure that humanitarian relief efforts are not used as a mechanism to disguise and enable support for terrorist groups."

Family members could be heard sobbing in the Dallas courtroom as guilty verdicts were read on all 108 charges of providing material support to terrorists, money laundering and tax fraud.

One woman cried out: "My dad is not a criminal! He's a human!"

Holy Land was one of several Muslim organizations the Bush administration closed in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks for allegedly raising money for overseas Islamic extremists.

Muslim charities that remain open have reported significant drops in contributions because of fears of prosecution even as juries deadlocked or rendered acquittals or convictions of lesser charges in two other high-profile terror financing cases in Florida and Chicago.

The United States Justice Department vowed in October 2007 to retry the five former charity organizers in the Holy Land case after jurors could not agree on verdicts on nearly 200 charges and a new jury was seated in mid-September.

Over the past two months, the government has presented largely the same evidence hoping to prove that Holy Land was created in the late 1980s to gather donations from deep-pocketed American Muslims to support the then-newly formed Hamas movement resisting the Israeli occupation.

Hamas -- a multi-faceted Islamist political, social and armed movement which now controls the Gaza Strip -- was designated a terrorist organization by the United States in 1995 and the trial centered over whether Holy Land continued to support the group after this point.

Prosecutors did not accuse the charity of directly financing or being involved in terrorist activity. Instead, they said humanitarian aid was used to promote Hamas and allow it to divert existing funds to militant activities.

Defense attorneys said the charity was a non-political organization which operated legally to get much-needed aid to Palestinians living in squalor under the Israeli occupation and argued that the chief reasons their clients were on trial are family ties.

After reading the verdicts, U.S. District Judge Jorge Solis ordered the men detained because of fears they would flee the country before sentencing given their international ties.

Khaled Meshaal, Hamas' political leader in Syria, is the brother of defendant Mufid Abdulqader, a top Holy Land fundraiser whose Palestinian band played at the charity's events and now faces up to 55 years in jail.

Meshaal's deputy, Mousa Abu Marzook, is a cousin of defendant Mohammad el-Mezain, a foundation co-founder, and is married to the cousin of defendant Ghassan Elashi, former Holy Land board chairman.

Mezain faces up to 15 years in prison while Elashi, who is already serving six and a half years for export law violations, faces up to life in prison.

The brother of defendant Shukri Abu Baker, Holy Land's former chief executive officer, is Jamal Issa, former Hamas leader in Sudan and its current head in Yemen. Baker, the former chief executive officer of Holy Land, faces up to life in prison.

A fifth defendant is Abdulrahman Odeh, Holy Land's New Jersey representative, who faces up to 55 years in jail.

Jurors also found that the defendants owed the government 12.4 million dollars.

The American press continued its aggressive attack on Muslim charity organizations even in Canada and reported allegations against their staff and leaders. The *National Post* presented this article a few months after 9/11.

Ottawa pulls Saudi group's charity status. Muslim World League being sued by 9/11 families

National Post *12/1/2003 | Stewart Bell*

Ottawa pulls Saudi group's charity status Tax violation: Muslim World League being sued by 9/11 families

Stewart Bell National Post

Monday, December 01, 2003

TORONTO - Federal regulators have revoked the charity status of the Canadian branch of a Saudi organization that has faced longstanding allegations of ties to terrorism.

A notice in the government publication Canada Gazette said the Muslim World League (MWL) is one of several charities that "have not met the filing requirements of the Income Tax Act."

The revocation came into effect on Nov. 15, but the organization, dedicated to promoting Islam, was still calling itself an officially registered charity on its Internet site yesterday.

The action by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency was unrelated to terrorism allegations that have dogged the League, founded in Mecca in 1962 and later established in Etobicoke, Ont.

The MWL is among dozens of charities being sued by the families of those killed in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11. "The Muslim World League has numerous connections to al-Qaeda," the suit claims.

The group has publicly condemned terrorism.

The Canadian branch has never itself been accused of supporting terrorists, although one of its directors was also a director of Benevolence International Foundation-Canada, which has been blacklisted under United Nations terror-financing regulations.

But the international offices of the Muslim World League, and those of its sister organization the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), have surfaced repeatedly in intelligence reports and affidavits.

"I know that terrorists who have attacked or tried to attack the United States around the world have been associated with the MWL/IIRO," Special Agent David Kane of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security said in a recent court affidavit.

A U.S. law enforcement task force has been investigating allegations that a series of related companies and charities based in Virginia, including the IIRO and MWL, are involved in the financing of terror.

The class action lawsuit filed by the families of the victims of 9/11 lists several ties between the Osama bin Laden network and the MWL, including claims the charity's office in Peshawar was headed by al-Qaeda co-founder Wa'el Jalaidan."

"Wa'el Jalaidan spread Muslim World League offices around the world. These offices served in the early days of al-Qaeda to attract and train holy warriors for the war in Afghanistan," the suit alleges.

Canadian intelligence claims that Mohamed Harkat, an Ottawa pizza delivery man and suspected member of the bin Laden network, worked for the Muslim World

League in Pakistan before coming to Canada. Mahmoud Jaballah, a member of the Egyptian Al Jihad who was caught in Toronto, worked for the IIRO in Pakistan.

During the 1979-89 war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, Saudi aid organizations were often used to move money and get fighters into battle zones. Since the war, some of these same groups have been accused of serving as conduits for supporting a broader international campaign of anti-Western Islamic terror.

The Financial Intelligence Branch of the RCMP said in a report last year that "the main source of funding of al-Qaeda are charities, NGO [non-governmental organizations] and commercial enterprises.

"The money is given by supporters and is funneled to al-Qaeda through the hawala, the international underground banking system." .

Other US publications have tried to find links between 9/11 and many well known Muslim figures that lead or support charity activities. The ultimate objective has always been to defame Muslims and to cripple Islamic nonprofit organizations working in America and worldwide. In this regard *Footnote* wrote on 28 April 2000 the following article:

Participants in the conspiracy reportedly have offered different explanations why so many Saudis were used in the attacks.

According to the 9/11 Commission, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, considered the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly told interrogators that so many Saudis were chosen simply because Saudis make up the largest portion of recruits in al-Qaeda training camps (roughly 70 percent).

Many Saudis do have strong feelings against the United States. For example, a Gallup poll taken of about 750 Saudis in December 2001 and January 2002 found that

49% of Saudis polled had a "very unfavorable" view of the United States, and 64% had a "mostly" or "very" unfavorable view. According to the Gallup organization, Saudis saw the United States as pursuing biased policies (65%), had high crime (64%), was aggressive (62%), and was conceited (61%). Only 3% of Saudis saw the United States as friendly or trustworthy. Moreover, only 29% of Saudis thought that better understanding would occur fairly or very quickly and 28% of Saudis thought that better understanding would never come about.

At least one other conspirator, however, reportedly has said that Saudis were chosen specifically to hurt the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Ramzi Binalshibh, who helped plan the attacks but did not participate in the attacks, reportedly told interrogators that al-Qaeda chose so many Saudis to send a message to the United States.

Binalshibh's comments are in line with the Saudi government's own explanation of the Saudi representation in the attacks. Prince Bandar, for example, said in an April 25, 2004 interview with Tim Russert of NBC News (on-line) that the attack was "an evil work done by evil people who were targeting your country, but also targeting the relationship between our two countries. Otherwise is it accidental that they would choose 15 misguided young people to be out of 19 that when they had the pool of so many people from so many different countries?

4.2 Fund Raising

The Saudi government did freeze Bin Laden out from his family fortune in 1994. Bin Laden was long thought to have financed al-Qaeda's efforts through a personal inheritance of about $300 million which he received when his father died. According to the 9/11 Commission, Bin Laden actually received less than a tenth of that

amount spread over nearly a quarter of a century (about $1 million a year from 1970 through 1994) and received no more after 1994.

Kevin Ryan (2011) However, the 9/11 Commission reported that it found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization.

Since September 11, 2001, the Saudi Arabian government reportedly has taken more steps to cut off al-Qaeda's funding, especially after Saudi Arabia itself experienced attacks in May 2003.

U.S. State Department official E. Anthony Wayne testified in a September 25, 2003 Senate hearing that Saudi Arabia had made "fundamental and necessary changes to its banking and charity systems to help strangle the funds that keep al Qaida in business." Wayne noted that Saudi charities cannot deposit or withdraw cash from their bank accounts and cannot make wire transfers abroad, and that the Saudi government has banned the collection of donations at mosques and discouraged the use of collection boxes at retail establishments.

"The Saudis are not where they need to be, and they have much work to do," Wayne testified. "However, we believe they are headed in the right direction, are committed to countering the threat of terrorist financing, and are giving us very strong cooperation in the war on terrorism."

4.3 Cooperation

Long before the September 11 attacks, some questioned Saudi Arabia's cooperation with the United States' counterterrorism efforts and its efforts against Osama bin Laden. This cooperation has improved immediately after the September 11 attacks in keeping with Saudi Arabia's promises of cooperation and support. .

4.4 Extremism as Viewed by American Muslims.

According to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project Survey Muslims in the United States largely deny Islamic extremism more than do Muslim minorities in Western European countries. Few native-born African American Muslims apparently condemn al Qaeda. Younger Muslims in the U.S. have a different Muslim identity to older Muslim Americans, and a small number of them believe that suicide bombing is to some extent excusable and sometimes justified when used in defense. However, the overall level of support for Islamic extremism among American Muslims is found to be very low, particularly when compared with Muslims around the world.

In general, the Muslim Americans surveyed were not hesitant in expressing dissatisfaction with the American war on terrorism and the impact it has had on their lives. A majority of Muslim Americans (53%) believe that Muslims have suffered a lot in the U.S. since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Most also believe that the government targets Muslims for special searches and inspections. A small number of Muslim Americans thought that the U.S is justified in leading a war against terror and perceived it as a legalized effort to reduce terrorism. The survey shows that although many Muslims are relative newcomers to the U.S., they are highly assimilated into American society. With the exception of very recent immigrants, most report that a large proportion of their closest friends are non-Muslims. Muslim Americans do not see any contradiction between being true Muslim and living in a modern society.

Kevin Ryan (2011) The Pew Study Project explored approximately 1.5 million adult Muslim Americans, 18 years of age and older. The total Muslim American population is estimated at 2.35 million, based on data from this survey and available

U.S. Census Bureau data on immigrants' nationality. It is important to note that both of these figures are estimates.

4.5 The life situations and attitudes of Muslim Americans Compared to Europe

Muslim Americans are so different in their attitude towards their American identity because they hold positive attitude. Pew Global Attitudes Survey conducted in 2006 showed that Muslim minorities from the Western European countries Britain, France, Germany and Spain to be greatly concerned about unemployment. Unlike Muslims in the U.S., the average annual incomes of Muslims in these countries were lower than the incomes of non-Muslims. About half of Muslims in the U.S. (47%) identify themselves first as Muslims, then as Americans. However, a larger percentage of Muslims in three of the four Western European nations surveyed said they considered themselves first as Muslims, rather than citizens of their countries.

These are the main results of a nationwide survey of 1.5 million Muslim adults who live in the United States. Interviews were carried out in English, Arabic, Urdu and Farsi. The poll was conducted by telephone using a random sample based on three sampling sources. About a third of the interviewees (354,000) were obtained from a geographically random sample of the general public, which involved 57,549 households.

4.6 The Lasting Impact of September 11

While Muslim Americans generally express positive views of American society, most believe life for Muslims has become more difficult since 9/11. Many Muslims believe that U.S. Government anti-terrorism campaigns are singling out Muslims – and

most of those who express this view are worried about the excessive scrutiny. Native-born Muslims, both African-Americans and others, do believe that they have been singled out.

A quarter of Muslim Americans think they have been victims of discrimination in the United States, while 73% believe that they have never felt discrimination throughout their lives in America. More native-born Muslims than Muslim immigrants think that they have been victims of discrimination (41% vs. 18%).

4.7 Complex Views about Terrorism

Kevin Ryan (2011) There is a widespread concern among American Muslims about the rise of Islamic extremism, both around the world and in the United States. Roughly, half of Muslim Americans (51%) say they are very concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism around the world. This is much greater than the concern expressed by Muslims in most of Western Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere over the rise of Islamic extremism globally. A smaller but sizable percentage of Muslim Americans (36%) are very concerned about the potential rise of Islamic extremism in the United States. While most Muslims in America express concern about the rise of Islamic extremism around the world, they express relatively little support for the global war on terrorism. Only 26% said that they thought the U.S.-led war on terror is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism. In contrast, a Pew Survey of the general public in 2004 found 67% thought that the U.S.-led war on terror is a sincere effort to reduce terrorism. In this regard, Muslim American views come closer to the strong disapproval Muslims in the Middle East have voiced regarding the war on terrorism.

The overwhelming majority of Muslim Americans were opposed the war in Iraq, and most of them disagree with the decision to go to war in Afghanistan as well.

Roughly six-to-one (75%-12%), Muslim Americans say the U.S. did the wrong thing in going to war in Iraq; the general public is divided over the Iraq war. Only about a third of Muslim Americans (35%) have a positive view of the decision to go to war in Afghanistan, compared with 61% of the general public. Very few Muslim Americans – just 1% – say that suicide bombings against civilian targets are often justified to defend Islam. In Western Europe, higher percentages of Muslims in Great Britain, France and Spain said that suicide bombings in the defense of Islam are often or sometimes justified.

All segments of the Muslim American population share negative views about terrorism, but the polling did find a small percentage in support of extremism. Overall, just 5% of Muslim Americans express even slightly favorable opinions of al Qaeda. Yet strong hostility toward al Qaeda varies widely – 63% of foreign-born U.S. Muslims say they have a very unfavorable opinion about al Qaeda, compared with 51% of all native-born Muslims, and just 36% of African American Muslims

More generally, native-born African American Muslims are the most disillusioned segment of the U.S. Muslim population. When compared with other Muslims in the U.S., they are more skeptical of the view that hard work pays off, and more of them believe that Muslim immigrants in the U.S. should try to remain distinct from mainstream society. They also are far less satisfied with the way things are going in the United States. Just 13% of African American Muslims expressed satisfaction with national conditions, compared with 29% of other native-born Muslims, and 45% of Muslim immigrants.

In addition, the survey finds that younger Muslim Americans – those under age 30 – are both much more religiously observant and more accepting of Islamic extremism than are older Muslim Americans. Younger Muslim Americans reported that they attend services at a mosque more frequently than older Muslims. In addition, a greater percentage of younger Muslims in the U.S. think of themselves first as Muslims, rather than primarily as Americans (60% vs. 41% among Muslim Americans ages 30 and older). Moreover, more than twice as many Muslim Americans under age 30 as older Muslims believe that suicide bombings can be often or sometimes justified in the defense of Islam (15% vs. 6%).

Most religious Muslim Americans are less likely to believe that groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks than are less religious Muslims. In addition, the survey finds that those who say that suicide bombings in defense of Islam can be often or sometimes justified are more disbelieving than others that Arabs carried out the September 11 attacks. Kevin Ryan (2011).

4.8 Muslims in the United States views

Pew (2007) Pew Global Attitude Project Survey, 2007 a comprehensive survey on American Muslims, shows them to be largely assimilated, lead happy lives, and adopt moderate attitudes with regard to several topics that have divided Muslims and Westerners around the world. According to the survey, American Muslims are a largely diverse group that consists mainly of immigrants. However, they are able to maintain their American identity and they believe hard work is the right way to make a better living. Their main concern is to raise their income and education levels. The survey (Pew Global Attitude Project Survey, 2007) found that roughly two-thirds (65%) of adult Muslims living in the United States were born outside, and 39% have come to the U.S. since 1990. The majority of Muslim immigrants to the U.S. come from Arab

countries, but a good number of them also come from Pakistan and other South Asian countries. The survey discloses that among native-born Muslims, little more than half are African American (20% of U.S. Muslims overall), and a great deal of them are converts to Islam.

However, the exact size of Muslim American population is a matter of great debate. Incomplete data and instruments make it difficult to give reliable estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. The result of this uncertainty gives quite different estimates based on different methodologies that use very different data.

The Pew Research Center conducted a survey-based study designed to collect data about a nationwide representative sample of Muslim Americans from each of the three categories of the U.S. Muslim population: Muslim immigrants, U.S.-born Muslims, and converts to Islam. In spite of the challenges of reaching this diversified population, the Pew study provides reliable data that may be used by any researcher.

Regarding their general stance, Muslim Americans have a generally positive view of the way of life and society they live in. Most of them express their satisfaction by saying that their communities are excellent or good places to live. They also express their contentment with the state of the nation. In addition, 71% of Muslim Americans believe that most people who want to advance in the American society can make it if they have the will to work hard.

4.29 Diverse Population

Rew (2007) There were many attempts carried out with the aim of determining the size of the U.S. Muslim population that date back to at least 1960, when the Federation of Islamic Associations in America put the number at 1.2 million. Depending on the methods used, subsequent estimates differed considerably from this. The American Religious Identification Survey stimated in 2001 that there were approximately 1.1 million adult Muslims in the U.S. The 2005 Britannica Book of the Year (ref.) reported the total number of Muslims in the U.S. to be 4.7 million. Several leading national Muslim groups estimated Muslims there at 6-7 million, or more. Some of the difficulties in counting U.S. Muslims are attributed to the diverse nature of the population itself. Muslim immigrants to the United States come from at least 68 countries, and have different traditions, practices, doctrines, languages and beliefs. In addition, large numbers are native-born Americans who have converted to Islam; estimates of the proportion of native-born Muslims who are African American range from 20% to 42%.

Finally, there are the children born to either immigrants or converts. While each of these sources accounts for a significant share of the total U.S. Muslim population, the actual proportions who are immigrants, converts and native-born Americans remain unknown.

4.30 Previous Survey Estimates

Most of the researchers who work on similar topics mainly use public opinion surveys for estimates of religious affiliation. So it is logical that researchers would turn to surveys to provide estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. These polls, conducted with varying degrees of methodological rigor, have produced relatively consistent estimates of the U.S. Muslim population.

The General Social Survey (GSS), regarded as one of the most reliable barometers of social trends in the United States, has been administered every other year since 1972 to more than 2,000 randomly sampled adults nationally. The GSS asks people their religion, and their verbatim response is recorded and later coded. In combined data from the five GSS surveys conducted between 1998 and 2006 Muslims made up 0.5% of the U.S. adults interviewed, which projects to about 1.2 million adults nationwide.

The 2001 American Religious Identification survey, which surveyed a random sample of 50,281 adults, also found the proportion of the adult population who identify themselves as Muslim to be 0.5%. Other surveys, including national surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center, Gallup and *Washington Post*-ABC News, estimate that Muslims make up less than 1% of the U.S. adult population.

In 2002, Tom W. Smith, director of the GSS, published a review of every major national survey conducted over the previous five years that produced an estimate of the Muslim American population. These polls, on average, estimated that Muslims constitute 0.5% of the total population. That average, combined with an estimate of the number of Muslim children, produced an estimate of the Muslim population of about 2 million.

Researchers also have used data from surveys of special populations to estimate the U.S. Muslim population. Every year since 1966, UCLA researchers have surveyed incoming college freshmen. In 2006, a total of 271,441 first-time, full-time students at 393 colleges and universities were interviewed. This study estimated the proportion of Muslims in this group at 0.8%, virtually identical to the proportion recorded in previous waves of the freshmen survey. A similar estimate was obtained by another research

team that examined the stated religious preference of high school students who took the SAT college admissions exam.

There are reasons to question all of these estimates, as Smith and other researchers have noted The UCLA study is limited only to incoming college students and is not an accurate reflection of the percentage of Muslims – or any other group – in the general population. For example, less affluent young people and those with limited English language abilities are underrepresented among the students who take these college entrance exams.

Language difficulties also pose obstacles to the major national polls. Researchers who study immigrant populations estimate as many as a quarter of all recent arrivals have limited or no English-language ability, meaning they could not be interviewed by the GSS, Gallup, the Washington Post-ABC News survey, the American Religious Identification Survey, or other polls done primarily or exclusively in English.

1 Smith, Tom W. 2002. "The Polls – Review: The Muslim population of the United States: The Methodology of Estimates." *Public Opinion Quarterly* Volume 66:404-417.

4.10.1 Other Estimates

Other studies have produced higher estimates of the U.S. Muslim population. An ambitious 2001 survey led by researchers from Hartford Institute for Religious Research provided a basis for the frequently cited estimate of 6-7 million Muslim adults and children. The study, sponsored by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, attempted to identify every mosque in the U.S. Leaders from a representative sample of mosques were then questioned about a host of issues, including the number of

worshippers associated with each one. This study concluded that 2 million Muslims in the U.S. are involved with mosque, at least tangentially. By taking this number into account, the author surmises that estimates of a total Muslim population of 6-7 million in America seem reasonable. Some critics speculated that mosque representatives may have inflated or otherwise misreported the number of people associated with the mosque, a tendency researchers have found among religious leaders in other faiths.

Other estimates of this population bypass surveys and use data from the U.S. Census and immigration records that identify an individual's country of origin and preferred language. The 2000 Census found that about 0.7% of the population, or about 2 million people, reported a majority-Muslim country as their country-of-origin. To this number must be added an estimate of Muslims born in the U.S. as well as converts. However, as Smith has noted, using an individual's country-of-origin or preferred language assumes that every immigrant from these majority-Muslim countries is a Muslim and that no Muslim emigrated from a minority-Muslim country.

There is considerable evidence that immigrant waves from the same country can be very different in terms of religious composition. For example, only about 1% of immigrants who arrived in the U.S. from predominantly Muslim Iran in the 1980s were believed to be Muslims, with larger proportions assumed to be Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Baha'is. Similarly, the 1975 civil war in Lebanon resulted in disproportionately larger numbers of Christians than Muslims immigrating to the United States during the 1980s. Other factors further complicate projections of the U.S. Muslim population based on immigration and Census data. These estimates must be adjusted to reflect the presence of Muslims who arrived earlier, with each new wave added to those who are already in the United States. These numbers also must be adjusted to account

for births and deaths of Muslims already in the United States. These adjustments require researchers to use estimates of the birth and death rates, and then apply them to each generation of immigrants.

4.11 American Muslims

A careful study in San Diego, California, found that the Muslim population there was capable of doubling every six years. However, a more rigorous study in Illinois found the Muslim population in that state doubled every 17 years, or only about a third of the increase estimated in San Diego.

American-born converts to Islam also increase the U.S. Muslim population, and researchers say getting accurate estimates of this group may be the most difficult challenge of all. Data on conversion from another religion to Islam is virtually non-existent, and what estimates exist are based on conversion rates to other faiths that may not apply to the Muslim experience.

4.11.1 Nativity, Immigration, and Citizenship

Most U.S. Muslims (65%) are first-generation immigrants, but more than a third (35%) were born in the United States. One-fifth (21%) of the native-born (or 7% of all Muslims in the U.S.) are second generation, with one or both parents having been born outside of the U.S. The nearly two-thirds who were born outside of the United States come from at least 68 different nations, with no single nation accounting for more than 12% of the immigrants. More than a third (37%) of all foreign-born Muslim Americans arrived from the Arab region. An additional 27% emigrated from the South Asian region, including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.

Another 8% come from European countries and 6% from other parts of Africa. In terms of specific countries, 12% of foreign-born Muslims arrived from Pakistan, and

the same proportion from Iran. No more than 7% of first-generation immigrants were born in any other single country. A majority of the foreign-born Muslims arrived in the U.S. in the 1990s (33%) or between 2000 and 2010 (28%). An additional 23% came during the 1980s, while just 16% came earlier than that.

The reasons for immigrating are highly varied. Roughly equal numbers cite educational opportunities (26%), economic opportunities (24%), and family reasons (24%) for moving to the U.S. An additional 20% say they came to the U.S. because of conflict or persecution in their home country. Conflict or persecution is cited as a reason for immigrating by roughly equal shares of those emigrating from Iran (26%), Arab nations (19%) and South Asian countries (19%).

Despite the heavy presence of immigrants among the Muslim population, more than three-quarters (77%) of all U.S. Muslims are American citizens. In addition to the 35% who are citizens by birth, a 65% majority of those who were born outside of the U.S. report that they are now naturalized citizens. The vast majority of immigrant Muslims who arrived prior to 1990 have been naturalized (92%), as have most of those who arrived during the 1990s (70%). Among more recent arrivals (2000 and later), 22% so far have become citizens.

4.11.2 Gender and Age

Estimating the proportion of male and female Muslims in America is more complicated than it may seem. Previous surveys of Muslim Americans – including the self identified Muslims who participated in the Pew Research Center's nationwide surveys over the past decade – tended to complete more interviews with male Muslims than female Muslims. However, potential cultural factors – in particular, the possibility

that some Muslims consider it inappropriate for Muslim women to be interviewed by a stranger, especially if the interviewer is male – make these unreliable as measures of the overall gender balance among U.S. Muslims.

For this reason, the survey asked Muslim respondents for information about the number of people living in their household, and the gender and religious affiliation of each person. When compiled, these figures indicate that 54% of all adult Muslims in the U.S. are male, while 46% are female.

The survey's finding that most adult Muslims in the U.S. are male is consistent with U.S. Census data on immigrants from majority-Muslim nations. Males constitute a majority of immigrants from several Muslim nations that are the source of significant numbers of people coming to the U.S.

The balance of men and women is similar across most immigrant groups, including South Asians and Arabs. In addition, more than six-in ten native-born African American Muslims are male (64%); there is a closer division between males and females (52% male vs. 48% female) among other native-born Muslims.

Muslim Americans are significantly younger than the non-Muslim population.

More than half of adult Muslims (56%) are between the ages of 18 and 39; in the general public, just 40% of adults are in this category. The survey finds that 13% of Muslim adults are 55 and older; in the broader population, 30% of adults fall into this age group. Muslim adults who were born in the United States are younger than those who were born elsewhere, and it is the non-black native born who are the youngest. Nearly half (46%) of native-born Muslim adults who are not African American are between 18 and 29 years of age. The group under age 30 is lower among both native-

born African American Muslims (28%) and foreign-born Muslims (26%), though these groups are significantly younger than the public at large.

Marriage rates are similar for Muslims and non-Muslims. Sixty percent of the survey's respondents say they are married, compared with 57% among the general public. The percentage of Muslim Americans who report being divorced or separated (9%) is slightly lower than among the general public (13%).

4.11.3 Race and Ethnicity

No single racial group constitutes a majority among the Muslim American population: 38% describe themselves as white, 26% black, 20% Asian, and 16% other or mixed race. Foreign-born Muslims are 44% white, 28% Asian, and 18% mixed or other. Just 10% say they are black. By comparison, a 56% majority of native-born Muslims are black, 31% are white and just 2% describe themselves as Asian.

Within specific ethnic heritages, 64% of Muslims from the Arab region say they are white, while 20% say they are some other or mixed race. By contrast, 85% of Pakistanis and 77% of those from other South Asian nations describe their race as Asian. Overall, just 4% of Muslim Americans say they are of Hispanic origin or descent, though this number is 10% among native-born Muslims. This includes 8% among African American Muslims and 11% among others who were born in the U.S.

4.11.4 Income and Education

American Muslims generally mirror the U.S. public in education and income. Compared with the general public, somewhat fewer Muslims have finished high school and considerably fewer own their home, but just as many have earned college degrees and attended graduate school. More than one-fifth of U.S. Muslims (22%) are enrolled

in college classes, with similar rates of college enrollment among foreign-born Muslims (22%) and native-born Muslims (20%). About a quarter (24%) of American Muslims have a college degree, including 10% who have gone on to graduate study.

These numbers are similar to the U.S. general public. A somewhat larger proportion of Muslims have not finished high school (21%) than is true for the public at large (16%). Economically, family income among American Muslims is roughly comparable with that of the population as a whole. Among adults nationwide, 44% report household incomes of $50,000 or more annually, as do 41% of American Muslim adults. At the highest end of the income scale, American Muslims are about as likely to report household incomes of $100,000 or more as are members of the general public (16% for Muslims compared with 17% among the public). Roughly a third of both Muslim Americans (35%) and adults nationwide (33%) report household incomes of less than $30,000 annually.

The extent to which Muslims are integrated into the economic mainstream in America is in stark contrast to the position of Muslims living in four major Western European nations. Surveys of Muslim populations in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain conducted in 2006 as part of the Pew Global Attitudes Project found Muslims to be much less affluent relative to the general populations of those nations. For example, a majority of Muslims in Germany (53%) reported family incomes of less than 18,000 Euros annually compared with 35% of Germans overall. A similar gap exists in France. In Great Britain, 61% of Muslims reported incomes of less than 20,000 pounds, compared with 39% of the general public. In addition, 73% of Spanish Muslims report incomes of less than 14,500 Euros compared with half of the population nationwide.

4.11.5 Economic Satisfaction and Employment

Muslim Americans are slightly less likely than members of the general public to express overall satisfaction with their personal financial situation (42% "excellent" or "good" vs. 49% in a recent national survey). Immigrant Muslims are happier with their finances than are native-born Muslims (47% excellent/good among immigrants vs. 37% among native-born). Differences between individual subgroups are especially large: 68% of Muslims of Pakistani heritage rate their situation excellent or good, compared with 42% among those of Arab descent and just 30% among African American Muslims. Although Muslim Americans as a group are doing reasonably well financially, a lower percentage reports being employed fulltime than among the general public.

Overall 41% say they work full-time, compared with 49% of the general population. There is little difference in the overall rate of employment between foreign-born (40%) and native-born Muslims (42%). But there are significant differences by subgroups. Immigrants who came to the U.S. prior to 1990 have a full-time employment rate comparable to the general public's (55%), while more recent immigrants lag behind (33% work full-time). Among Arab Americans, only 29% are employed full-time. African American Muslims (at 45%) match the full-time employment rate for all Muslims (41%).

Part-time employment is fairly common among American Muslims, with rates exceeding the U.S. public's (16% vs. 11% in the public). In addition, a significant number of Muslims say that they are self-employed or own a small business (24%), including 32% among African American native-born Muslims and 29% among Muslims of Pakistani heritage.

4.11.6 Household Composition

Most U.S. Muslims (61%) live in multiple-person households in which everyone is a Muslim. But nearly one-in four (23%) live in a household with at least one non-Muslim. Among native born Muslims, the number living in mixed households is considerably higher (43%); 57% of native-born African American Muslims share a home with one or more non-Muslims.

One-third of adult Muslims (33%) live in households with no children; half (48%) live in households where all of the children are Muslim, and smaller numbers live in households with one or more non-Muslim child. Native-born Muslims are especially likely to live in households with at least one non- Muslim child (24%).

4.11.7 Religious Belief and Practice

Just like the larger American public of which they are a part, most U.S. Muslims say that religion is very important to them and that they accept the basic tenets of their faith. Most pray every day and four-in-10 attend a mosque at least once a week. Yet there is considerable religious diversity in American Islam, resembling the diversity of American Christian. A large majority of Muslims accept the Koran as the word of God, but only half say that it should be taken literally, word for word. Most Muslims also say there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam.

One distinctive feature of the Muslim American population is the relatively large number of converts from outside of the tradition. Nearly one-quarter have converted to Islam, most of them from Christianity. Nearly all of the conversions to Islam are among the native-born population, and the majority of all converts to Islam are African Americans.

4.11.8 Islamic Affiliation

Muslims in the United States belong to diverse religious traditions within Islam. Half identify with Sunni Islam, the largest Muslim tradition worldwide. The second largest segment of the Muslim American population – about one-fifth of the total (22%) – volunteers they are just Muslim, without any particular affiliation. An additional 16% identify with Shia Islam, which is the second largest Muslim tradition worldwide. Only 5% of U.S. Muslims identify with another Muslim tradition, and 7% did not offer a response. Sunni Muslims make up about half of both the native-born (50%) and foreign-born (53%) segments of the U.S. Muslim population, but there are bigger differences when it comes to other traditions. Among Muslim Americans who were born in the United States, just 7% identify with Shia Islam, while 30% say they are Muslim without specifying a tradition. Among Muslims who immigrated to the United States, 21% identify themselves as Shia. Those who say they do not have a particular affiliation (18%). Not surprisingly, religious affiliation is strongly linked to a person's country of origin.

American Muslims who are first- or second-generation immigrants from Arab countries are mostly Sunni (56%), with about one-fifth each either Shia (19%) or just Muslim (23%). Large majorities of Pakistanis (72%) and other South Asians (82%) are Sunni, while Iranians are overwhelmingly Shia (91%).

Overall, 20% of U.S. Muslims are native-born African Americans, nearly half of whom (48%) identify as Sunni. Another third (34%) of native-born African Americans say they are just a Muslim, and 15% have another affiliation, including Shia and the Nation of Islam.

4.11.9 Converts to Islam

More than three-quarters (77%) of Muslim Americans say they have always been a Muslim, while 23% say they converted to Islam. Nine-in-10 (91%) converts to Islam were born in the United States, and almost three-fifths (59%) of converts to Islam are African American. A 55% majority of converts identify with Sunni Islam and another quarter (24%) identify with no specific tradition. Only 6% of Muslim converts in America identify themselves as Shia. Almost half (49%) of Muslim converts in America report that their conversion occurred when they were under 21 years of age, another third (34%) converted when they were between ages 21 and 35, and 17% when they were older than 35.

The early age of most conversions to Islam resembles the typical pattern of conversion in the general public, where religious change is concentrated in adolescence and early adulthood. Two-thirds (67%) of all converts to Islam in the U.S. came from Protestant churches, 10% came from Catholicism, and just 5% from other religions. Nearly one-in-seven converts to Islam (15%) had no religion before their conversion.

Most converts to Islam (58%) cite aspects of the religion as the reason for their conversion. These include references to the truth or appeal of Islam's teachings, the belief that Islam is superior to Christianity, or that the religion just "made sense" to them. Just 18% of converts mentioned family reasons, such as marrying a Muslim, as the reason for their conversion.

4.11.10 Religious Beliefs

Overall, Muslim Americans are fairly traditional in their religious beliefs. For example, 86% say that the Quran is "the word of God" and half (50%) say that the Quran is to be read literally, word for word. Fewer than one-in-10 U.S. Muslims (8%) say the Quran is a book written by men. In this regard, Muslims in this country are more

likely to adopt a strict literal view of the Quran than American Christians are to adopt a strict literal view of the Bible (50% to 40%).

Large majorities of Muslim Americans accept the basic teachings of Islam. For example, nearly all (96%) believe in "One God, Allah," and the Prophet Muhammad (94%). Belief in a future Day of Judgment (91%) and the existence of angels (87%) is nearly as common. While U.S. Muslims hold many traditional Islamic beliefs, a 60% majority also say that "there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam." A third says that "there is only one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam." Views on diverse interpretations of Islam are associated with views of the Koran. Two-thirds (66%) of those who believe there is only one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam accept a literal view of the Koran. In contrast, less than half (45%) of those who believe there is more than one true way to interpret the teachings of Islam hold a literal view of the Koran.

4.11.11 Religious Practices

Muslims in the United States take their faith seriously. For example, 72% say religion plays a "very important" role in their life. Another 18% say it is "somewhat important," and just 9% say that religion is "not too important" or "not at all important" to them.

While religion is very important to the vast majority, not all Muslim Americans practice their faith in the same way. For instance, when asked about attending a mosque or Islamic center for salah and Jum'ah prayer, 40% say they attend either more than once a week (17%) or once a week (23%). An additional 8% say they attend once or twice a month, and 18% report attending a mosque a few times a year, especially for the

Eid services. Roughly a third of Muslim Americans say they either "seldom" (16%) or "never" (18%) attend worship services.

Mosque attendance among U.S. Muslims varies by nativity and nationality. Native-born Muslims (45%), especially African Americans (54%), are more likely to attend mosque weekly than are the foreign-born (37%). Muslims of Pakistani descent (57%) are more likely to be frequent attendees compared with other South Asians (38%). Muslims of first- or second generation Iranian descent stand out for their very low levels (7%) of weekly mosque attendance. Overall, nearly three-quarters (74%) of Muslim Americans say they are satisfied with the quality of mosques in their area, while 15% say they are dissatisfied. Among those who attend services weekly or more often, 83% are satisfied, while 16% are not. Satisfaction is lower among the 18% of Muslim Americans who never attend a mosque, but mostly because they don't have an opinion one way or the other. Nationwide, 3% of Muslims note that there is no mosque nearby, a response that is most common among those who seldom (6%) or never (10%) attend.

Three-in-10 Muslim Americans report taking part in other social and religious activities at a mosque or Islamic center outside of regular salah and Jum'ah prayers, and more than three quarters (78%) of those who are active in this regard also say they are satisfied with the quality of mosques available to them. A solid majority of Muslim Americans (61%) say they pray every day. Roughly four-in- 10 (41%) Muslims report praying all five prayers daily, one of the Five Pillars of Islam. Another 20% say they make some of the five salah every day; 20% make salah occasionally, while just (6%) only make Eid prayers. About one-in-10 Muslim Americans (12%) say that they never pray. Muslim Americans also assign considerable importance to other Islamic religious practices included among the Five Pillars of Islam. For example, about three-quarters of

Muslim Americans say that giving charity or zakat (76%) to the poor and fasting during Ramadan (77%) are "very important" to them.

A pilgrimage to Mecca is "very important" to 63% of U.S. Muslims. Small minorities of Muslim Americans say that these practices are "not too" or "not at all important," ranging from 8% for zakat to 15% for the Hajj pilgrimage. Most Muslim Americans (58%) also say that it is "very important" to read or listen to the Koran daily. Another 23% say this is somewhat important, while 17% say it is not too or not at all important to read or hear the Koran every day.

4.11.12 Levels of Religious Commitment

Nearly one-quarter (23%) of Muslim Americans have a high level of religious commitment, which is defined as attending mosque at least once a week, praying all five salah every day, and reporting that religion is "very important" in their lives. About as many as (26%) have a relatively low level of religious commitment, rarely engaging in these practices and generally regarding religion as less important in their lives. A majority of Muslim Americans (51%) fall somewhere in between. Religious commitment varies by religious affiliation. Among Sunni Muslims, 28% are highly religious, compared with just 13% of Shia Muslims. Those who say that they are just Muslim, without specifying an Islamic tradition, closely resemble U.S. Muslims as a whole (21% high commitment).

Muslim immigrants who arrived before 1990 are more likely than native-born Muslims to report low levels of religious commitment. Muslim men and women practice their faith in different ways. Men tend to attend services at mosques or Islamic centers more often than women (48% attend weekly or more vs. 30% of Muslim

women). However, nearly half of Muslim women (48%) say that they pray all five salah every day, compared with barely a third (34%) of men. Regular mosque attendance is particularly high among younger Muslim Americans. Full half (51%) of Muslims under age 30 say they attend at least weekly, compared with 36% of those ages 30 to 54 and just 26% of those ages 55 and older. But daily prayer is observed somewhat more frequently by older Muslims. Nearly two thirds (64%) of those ages 55 and older say that they pray every day, compared with 54% of Muslims under age 30.

4.12 The Muslim Experience: Identity, Assimilation and Community

While Muslim Americans are somewhat less upbeat about their life and circumstances than are other Americans, the differences are modest, and Muslims in the United States are mostly satisfied with their communities and their lives. As with the general public, however, Muslims are less satisfied with the overall direction of the country. On the question of assimilation, a plurality of U.S. Muslims (43%) say that Muslim immigrants arriving in the U.S. should mostly adopt American customs and ways of life, though a significant minority (26%) thinks that new immigrants should try to remain distinct. Nearly half of Muslims say they think of themselves as a Muslim "first," while 28% say they think of themselves as an American "first." However, Muslims in Western Europe and in predominantly Muslims countries are generally much more likely to think of themselves primarily as Muslims, rather than as citizens of their countries.

4.13 Happiness and Community

Nearly eight-in-10 U.S. Muslims say they are either "very happy" (24%) or "pretty happy (54%) with their lives. This is modestly lower than the proportion of the general public expressing this view (36% very happy and 51% pretty happy). Few

notable demographic differences emerge in overall levels of personal satisfaction. Muslim immigrants are somewhat less content (74% very or pretty happy) than Muslims who were born in the United States (84%). Bigger differences emerge among younger and older Muslims: Just one-in-10 Muslims younger than 30 say they are not very happy with their lives, while 89% are very or pretty happy. Among Muslims ages 30 and older, 21% are unhappy with how things are in their lives, while 74% say they are very or pretty happy. A similar age-related difference is evident in the general public.

Like other Americans, Muslims are generally pleased with the communities in which they live. More than seven-in-10 rate their community as an "excellent" (28%) or "good" (44%) place to live. In the general population, 41% rate their communities as excellent, and 41% as good. Three-in-four Muslim immigrants (76%), compared with 65% of all native-born Muslims, rate their home communities as either "excellent" or "good" places to live. Contentment with their lives and communities does not extend to their views about the country. Most Muslim Americans (54%) say they are dissatisfied with the overall direction of the county – a critical view shared by an even larger proportion of the general public (61%).

4.14 U.S. Muslims: Americans First?

Asked whether they think of themselves first as Americans or first as Muslims, a 47% plurality of U.S. Muslims say they consider themselves Muslims first; 28% say they think of themselves first as Americans. In May 2006, when U.S. Christians were asked a parallel question, 42% said they think of themselves as Christians first, while 48% said they are Americans first. The survey findings suggest the question is as much

a measure of personal religious commitment as an expression of patriotism to the United States.

Among Muslim Americans who have a high level of religious commitment, 70% say they consider themselves to be Muslims first. But among those with low religious commitment, just 28% see themselves this way, while a 47% plurality identify first as American, and 12% say they consider themselves equally Muslim and American. The link between religiosity and selfidentity is similar among Christians in America. By roughly two-to-one (59% vs. 30%), U.S. Christians who say religion is very important identify as Christians first, while those who say religion is less important identify as Americans first, by a margin of 76% to 18%. Similarly, most white evangelical Protestants (62%) say they primarily identify themselves as Christians rather than Americans, while most white mainline Protestants (65%) identify as Americans first. The relationship between religious attendance and religious identity may partially explain why younger Muslims are more likely to consider themselves as Muslim first. By a margin of more than two-to-one (60% vs. 25%), most Muslim Americans under age 30 say they think of themselves as Muslims first. About half of all Muslims under age 30 say they attend mosque at least once a week compared with slightly more than a third of Muslims age 30 and older. Among young people who attend weekly, nearly seven-in-10 (68%) say they identify first as Muslim compared with 36% of all Muslims who seldom or never attend services.

4.15 Muslim Identity and Extremism

The poll finds that one's identification as Muslim or American also relates to opinions about Muslim extremism. For example, 13% of those who think of themselves primarily as Muslims believe that suicide bombing to defend Islam from its enemies can

be often or sometimes justified, compared with 4% of those who say they are American first. Still, overwhelming majorities of both groups reject suicide bombing as a strategy, including 85% of those who identify primarily as Americans and 79% who consider themselves Muslims first.

Somewhat larger differences emerge when it comes to views about who carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Those who identify themselves first as Muslim are twice as likely (40% vs. 20%) to say these attacks were not carried out by groups of Arabs. Slightly fewer than three-in-10 U.S. Muslims (28%) who think of themselves primarily as Muslim say they believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by groups of Arabs while six-in-10 Muslims (61%) who think of themselves first as American say Arabs were responsible.

4.16 Assimilation vs. Maintaining Identity

Like other U.S. religious groups, Muslims believe that their religious convictions can fit comfortably in a world of rapid change and shifting values. More than six in- 10 U.S. Muslims (63%) say they see no conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society, a belief they share with many Muslims around the world. Still, Muslim Americans struggle to find a balance between two worlds and two very different cultures. They divide over the best strategy for Muslim immigrants to pursue when they arrive in the United States. The largest share (43%) say new arrivals should "mostly adopt American customs and ways of life." But 26% believe Muslims should "mostly try to remain distinct from the larger American society." Another 16% volunteer that new immigrants should try to do both. Muslims who were born in the United States – particularly African American Muslims – are more likely than Muslim immigrants to argue against new arrivals assimilating fully into American life. Nearly

half of African American Muslims (47%) say that Muslim newcomers to the U.S. should strive to keep their religious and cultural identities; just 31% believe they should try to assimilate. By contrast, pluralities of other native-born Muslims and foreign-born Muslims say that Muslims arriving in the U.S. should try to adopt American customs. Gender and religiosity also are linked to views about whether new Muslim immigrants should assimilate. Men are more likely than women to say Muslims should adapt (48% vs. 38%).

Devout Muslims are less inclined to favor new arrivals integrating into American life. Among those Muslims with the strongest religious commitment, fewer than four-in-10 (37%) say immigrants should adopt American customs, a view held by more than half (58%) of less religious Muslims. In general, Muslim Americans reject the idea that their fellow Muslims in the U.S. are becoming less religious. Roughly four-in-10 (43%) say that Muslims in the United States are not changing very much in terms of their religiosity. If anything, a greater percentage says that U.S. Muslims are becoming more religious (31%) rather than less religious (17%). Two-thirds of those who say that Muslims in the United States are becoming more religious say that is a good thing, while about half of those who say Muslims are becoming less religious view this as a bad thing. Other questions portray U.S. Muslims as a community in the process of assimilating with the larger society. Nearly half (47%) report that all or most of their close friends are Muslims, while 51% report having relatively few Muslims in their inner friendship circle. Muslim American women are particularly likely to have mostly Muslim friends. A majority of Muslim women (56%) say that all or most of their close friends are Muslims, compared with 39% of Muslim men. For the most part, Muslim Americans say it is acceptable for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim, even though Islamic law prohibits a Muslim woman – but not a man – from marrying outside the faith. Overall, 62% believe it is "okay" for a Muslim to marry a non-Muslim, while

24% say it is unacceptable; 11% volunteered that it depends. More than eight-in-10 (84%) American Muslims with a relatively low level of religious commitment say there is nothing significantly wrong with interfaith marriages, compared with just 45% of highly religious U.S. Muslims. In addition, many more men (70%) than women (54%) think it is okay to marry a non-Muslim.

4.17 Full Transcript of the Interview with Secretary General of Muslim World League

Q. How Did the Events of 9/11 affect the Muslim World League?

A. Muslim World League, as part of the world was affected positively or negatively by the events of 9/11. However, the degree of impact was uneven and varied according to type of activities undertaken by the Organization.

Regarding the Dawah activity (Calling non- Muslims to embrace Islam), there was an increase eagerness to know about Islam and its teachings. People here also become more curious to know about all aspects of the event. On the financial side, our organization was subjected to more scrutiny and follow-up, but because our organizations is one of the affiliates of the United Nations which provided us with the necessary legitimacy and helped the Muslim World League to be looked at with respect and appreciation in the world especially the humanitarian activities.

On the other hand, the Muslim World League has been receiving great support of the Muslim world as a whole assisted us to get financial support to run the various activities of the Organization.

The Muslim World League has managed to avoid many of the negative aspects of the events of September Eleven by declaring its official position and the viewpoint of Islam in terrorism as counter to humanity. The World Muslim League has also led an

effective media campaign against anti Muslims attacks following the 9/111 events.   I also dealt with financial matter with transparently and legality.

4.18 Interview with CAIR

Q. How Did the Events of 9/11 affect CAIR?

A. September Eleven was a horrible disaster to the whole world and all human kind. Humanitarian and NGOs has greatly been affected. CAIR was not an exception as it represents one of the biggest Islamic organizations in the United States. It is a legal origination working under the American law with all transparency and commitment to it objectives. After 9/11 events CAIR has more challenges and greater role to play in removing the negative impact of the events and introducing true Islam and in protecting Muslims in the United States against all types of prejudices and aggressions.

Regarding the positive impact of 9/11, of course there are some positive aspects, for instance many people start to come to the center asking about Islam and the Holly Book of Quran. They are so eager to know about the Islamic view on terrorism and the meaning of Jihad in Islam.

Since CAIR is an American organization and abide by American law, we have succeeded to good extent in doing our job here and serving Muslim community because of our wide range of networking and good relations we have built with government and officials, particularly governmental bodies of humanitarian activities.

4.19 The Muslim Experience: Challenges, Worries and Problems

The terrorist attacks on September 11 continue to cast a long shadow over Muslim Americans. Most say life has become more difficult for Muslims in this country in the post-9/11 era. Many worry about government surveillance, job discrimination, and being harassed in public. When asked to name the biggest problem facing U.S. Muslims, concerns about discrimination and prejudice top the list. Fewer Muslim

Americans than African Americans report that they have encountered bigoted acts in the past year. Still, a third of U.S. Muslims report that, in the past year, they have been verbally harassed, physically threatened, or treated with suspicion because of their faith.

A majority (53%) of all Muslim Americans say that, since the 9/11 attacks, it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the United States. This view is particularly prevalent among highly educated and wealthier Muslims: Nearly two-thirds of U.S. Muslims (65%) who have attended graduate school, and 68% of those with household incomes of $100,000 a year or more, say 9/11 has made it harder to be a Muslim. In addition, highly religious Muslims also are more likely to say things have become more difficult for Muslims in the post-9/11 era compared with those who are less religious (by 57%-46%).

Prejudice, being viewed as terrorists, ignorance about Islam, and negative stereotyping lead the list of the biggest problems that U.S. Muslims say they face. At the same time, other problems that typically rank among the public's top worries barely make the list of Muslim concerns. For example, just 2% mention economic and job worries. The rankings display a consistent pattern: Problems rooted in prejudice, ignorance or misunderstandings dominate the list. Beyond discrimination (19%), American Muslims say that their most important problems are being viewed as terrorists (15%), ignorance about Islam (14%), and stereotyping (12%). Significantly, an overwhelming majority of Muslims named at least one of these problems as a top concern for U.S. Muslims.

More than half of Muslim Americans (54%) believe the government's anti-terrorism efforts single out Muslims for increased surveillance and monitoring. And

most of those who believe the government gives extra scrutiny to Muslims say this attention bothers them either a lot (40%) or some (34%). The belief that government anti-terrorist policies target Muslims is much more widespread among immigrants who came to the U.S. before 1990 (61%) than among more recent Muslim immigrants (40%). However, a relatively large proportion of recent immigrants declined to respond to this question (22%). A large majority of native-born Muslim Americans say that U.S. anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims for extra surveillance.

This view is shared as widely among African American Muslims (72%) as among native-born Muslims who are not black (74%). Notably, many non-Muslims also believe that government anti-terrorism policies single out Muslims. Nearly half of the public (45%) believes these policies do target Muslims, while 43% say they do not. However, only about half of the Americans who think Muslims are singled out (52%) say they are bothered a lot or some by this, compared with 74% of Muslim Americans.

About one-in-five Muslim Americans (22%) say they are very worried that women who wear the hijab – the traditional Muslim headscarf – will be treated poorly because it identifies them as Muslim; 29% say they are somewhat worried about this. Muslim American men and women are equally likely to worry that Muslim women wearing a hijab will be treated poorly.

Notably, Muslim women who always wear a hijab are slightly less concerned about this than are women who never wear it. Overall, 43% of Muslim American women say they wear the hijab all the time (38%) or most of the time (5%), while another 8% wear one only some of the time. Nearly half of Muslim women (48%) report they never wear the traditional head covering. In terms of their personal concerns, 37% of Muslim Americans say they are very or somewhat worried about not being

hired for a job or promoted because of their religion. Slightly fewer (32%) are very or somewhat concerned about their telephone calls and emails being monitored by the government because of their religion.

A quarter of American Muslims say that, in the past year, "people have acted as if they were suspicious" of them. Somewhat fewer (15%) say they have been called offensive names. Smaller proportions report they have been singled out by law enforcement (9%) or physically threatened or assaulted (4%) because they are Muslim. Overall, a third of Muslim Americans interviewed report that they experienced at least one of these hostile acts in the past 12 months. To place these findings in context, Pew conducted a separate survey of African Americans and measured personal experiences with racial discrimination. A third of all African Americans report that people have acted as if they are suspicious of them in the past year, compared with 26% of Muslim Americans. Roughly the same share of blacks and U.S Muslims report they had been called offensive names (20% vs. 15%).

While the overall percentages are small, African Americans also are more than twice as likely as U.S. Muslims to say they have been singled out by police, or physically threatened or attacked, in the past 12 months. Taken together, nearly half (46%) of all blacks report that they have had at least one of these four experiences in the past year, or 13 percentage points greater than the proportion of Muslims who have personally encountered similar acts of intolerance. In the past year, younger Muslim Americans are more likely to say they have been victims of discrimination or intolerance based on their religion. Roughly four-in-10 (42%) Muslims under the age of 30 say in the past year they have experienced verbal taunts, been treated with suspicion, been physically threatened or attacked, or been targeted by police because they are

Muslims, compared with 29% of Muslims who are 30 years old or older. African Americans who are Muslim appear to bear a double burden, as they say they face racial as well as religious intolerance.

Overall, half of all Muslims who are African American say they have been the target of bigotry based on their religion in the past 12 months, compared with 28% of white Muslims and 23% of Asian Muslims. However, expressions of support are just as common as incidents of bigotry and intolerance, the survey suggests. Overall, about a third of U.S. Muslims (32%) say someone had offered them support because they were Muslim, which is virtually identical to the proportion that reported experiencing an act of prejudice or hostility. Native-born Muslims are significantly more likely than immigrants (54% vs. 22%) to report having been the recipients of supportive words. While younger Muslims appear to encounter more intolerant acts, they are also more likely to have had positive encounters: 40% say someone has expressed support for them because they are Muslim, compared with 29% of those 30 or older. In addition to overt expressions of prejudice, 18% of Muslim Americans report they have been singled out by airport security for inspection or questioning in the past year. When the analysis is limited to Muslims who report having taken a trip by airplane in the past year, 30% report having been singled out by security because they are Muslim, while 68% say this experience did not happen to them.

Asked whether they believe groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, 40% of Muslim Americans say yes, while 28% say they do not believe this, and about a third (32%) say they do not know or decline to answer the question. When those who say Arabs were not involved in the 9/11 attacks are asked who they believe was responsible, most say they do not know or declined to

answer. Seven percent of Muslims overall say that the attacks were the result of a conspiracy involving the United States government or the Bush administration. Very small proportions hold others responsible, including individuals other than Muslims (1%), Israel or Jewish interests (1%), and crazy or misguided people (1%). Despite widespread doubts about the official accounts of 9/11, Muslims in the U.S. are more likely than Muslims living in a number of European and majority-Muslim countries to believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks. For instance, Muslims in the U.S. are more than twice as likely as Muslims in Great Britain (17%), Turkey (16%), Indonesia (16%) and Pakistan (15%) to say that groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. In all of these countries, clear majorities or pluralities reject the official account of the attacks. In the U.S., younger Muslims are more likely than older Muslims to say they do not believe that groups of Arabs carried out the 9/11 attacks. Indeed, among Muslims under the age of 30, 38% reject the fact that groups of Arabs were responsible for 9/11. By comparison, among Muslims 55 and older, just 16% say that Arabs were not responsible for the attacks.

Chapter 5

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

5.1 Summary

The events of 9/11 have impacted the world in many ways and to varied degrees. There is a change in attitudes towards Muslims whether they live in the United States or abroad. Legislative changes made many Muslims and nonprofit organizations subject to limitations of their liberties. The Muslim community in the U.S. at large had also been affected. In the aftermath of 9/11 tens of international Muslim organizations were either shut down, frozen or reduced their activities on the assumption that they had some relation with terrorist groups that attacked the two towers of the World Trade Center. Some of these organizations were based in the US while others were working from outside the soil of the United States.

This research explores the influence of the September 11, 2001 attacks on nonprofit Islamic organizations which have activities in the United States. Content analysis is used to examine articles from newspaper published in the United States and interviews of leaders of these organizations as well as data and figures released by these organizations. The articles were mainly taken from US media, namely CNN and *Washington Post* as representatives of the US media.

The current research is both qualitative and quatitative in which three organizations were studied to find out how nonprofit Islamic organizations have been affected in the aftermath of 9/11 in terms of their activities and services rendered to Muslim communities in the United States. The three organizations are:

   a- The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY).
   b- The Muslim World League (MWL).
   c- The Council of American Islamic Relations (CAIR).

The study is intended to realize the following objectives:

   1. To assess the impact of 9/11 media reports on selected Islamic non-profit organizations and their activities.
   2. To shed light on the most and least affected areas of activities of the three Islamic organizations that were selected for the study.

3. To study the U.S. media coverage of 9/11 and assess this type of coverage from a professional point of view.

This study includes a qualitative case study of Islamic nonprofit organizations. Instruments of data collection about these organizations included, semi-structured interviews, a questionnaire, and an in-depth analysis of media material, news reports and articles published by CNN and the *Washington Post*. Content analysis was used to analyze the media articles and news stories.

The study attempted to answer the following questions:

1. What is the impact of events of 9/11 on the Islamic community in general and on the Islamic nonprofit organizations in particular ?

2. What are the most and least affected areas in the activities of Islamic organizations ?

3. What is the content of U.S. media coverage on 9/11 in relation to Islam, Muslims and Islamic nonprofit organizations?

The results of the questionnaire also indicate that the 9/11 events have also negatively impacted the level of participation of Muslim youth and Muslim Scholars in the various activities arranged by the organizations under study.

It is also revealed that the organizations' activities are now more closely watched by the government and the security forces.

On the American media level, the results of the study indicate that the media always project negative views of the activities of the Islamic organizations based in America.

The respondents have also claimed that the events of September 11 have led to a campaign against Islam and Muslims, they also claimed that hatred for Muslims has significantly increased after the 9/11 events.

Generally speaking one can arrange the activities that mostly affected by 9/11 attacks in the following order from top to down:

1- Dawaa activities (77.8%)

2- Media activities (66%)

3- Social activities (66.1%)

4- Political activities (60%)

Thus the most affected activity was Dawaa and the least affected was political activity. The reason behind this may be due to the fact that Dawaa activity is closely

related to religion and connected with Islamic teachings such as Jihad. Unfortunately Jihad was tremendously misunderstood by many Western governments and people particularly after 9/11. The reason for this is due to Muslim radical practices and thoughts which had a negative impact on the image of pure Islam and tolerant Muslims. There are some radical Muslims including Al Qaeda group that misinterpret Islamic teachings in a way that leads to the killing of innocent people. Their attitude was widely refuted and rejected by most well known Muslim scholars, organizations and even countries.

5.2 Conclusion

The events of 9/11 have impacted the world in many ways and to varied degrees. There is a change in attitudes towards Muslims whether they live in the United States or in other countries. Legislative changes made many Muslims and nonprofit organizations subject to limitations of their liberties. The Muslim community in the U.S. at large had also been affected. After many nonprofit Muslim organizations were either shut down, frozen or reduced their activities on the assumption that they had some relation with terrorist groups that attacked the Two Towers of the World Trade Center. Some of these organizations were based in the US while others were working from outside the soil of the United States.

The media has played a negative role in shaping the public opinion showing that a large number of Americans have a negative attitude towards Islam and hate crimes against Muslims continue unabated. This is the logical consequence of stereotyping of Muslims by the media.

The researcher has come to the conclusion that the U.S. press has a tendency to exaggerate in its coverage of events related to Muslims, thus promoting Islamophobia. The impact of these reports on Islamic nonprofit organizations based in America has been incredibly harmful.

Nevertheless, the researcher has a strong sense of optimism that the current wave of Islamophobia will recede in due time and American Muslims will regain their civic vitality and rejoin the mosaic of other minorities and ethnic groups. The American Muslims will join their predecessors: Japanese Americans, American Jews, Irish

Americans and African Americans who also, in times past, endured national intolerance, social prejudice, and legal injustice.

Many people many not agree with these observations but the biased government legislation and policies which infringe on the civil rights of the Muslims and Arabs and the growing use of anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric by media and some local and national opinion leaders give credence to the arguments of this research.

5.3 Recommendations

In order to change the negative attitudes which have developed towards Islam and Muslims in general and the Islamic charity organizations based in America or outside America, a number of rigorous measures have to be followed to safeguard the continuity of the vital services provided by these organizations Those may include :

1- According to respondents. It is suggested that Islamic organizations can minimize the negative impact of 9/11 events by participating in political life.

2- Opening new branches : Their strategy should involve opening new branches.

3- Using media to present organizations properly and correct false views of Islam and Islamic organizations.

4- They should also call on VIPs to participate in their activities.

5- The organizations need financial support, so they can continue their social philanthropic and Dawah activities.

6- The organizations need to be provided with cultural, educational, administrative and trained specialists.

7- The organizations need to use the public and the private media very well to explain the Islamic position on violence and terrorism.

8- These organizations must have a great presence in the Muslim society in America and must demonstrate great comprehension of September 11th events.

9- The offices and centers of the organizations must cover the whole Muslim community in the U.S.

10- The activities must cater to the members' needs with respect to their life philosophy and ages.

11-   The organizations need to be more useful to both the Muslims and non-Muslims in the society.

12-   The organizations need to build bridges with influential members of local government through a variety of activities.

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Appendix A: Organization Activities Before and After 9/11

1. Activities of WAMY 5 years before 9/11 events

The following Tables show how much aid Islamic organizations provided to teachers for five years before 9/ 11 and five years after 9/ 11.

Table (34) shows how many times WAMY was able to provide financial aid to teachers of "Dawah" or "Islamic call" in the United States.

Table 4.34 : Financial Aid From WAMY Before 9/11

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Provide financial support to Dawah teachers	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	--				-	2

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Dawah (Islamic Call) Trips to introduce Islam.	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	-	-	-			2

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Financial support to Islamic Centers and societies	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	--				-	2

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Hosting Delegates	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--				-	

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Student subsidiaries	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--				-	

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Educational and Youth camps	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--				-	

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Training courses	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--				-	

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Brochures, cassettes and exhibition material that best introduce Islam	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--				-	

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Regional and international conferences	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--			-		

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Propagation for Hijab " Veil"	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--			-		

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Quran memorization classes	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--			-		

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
New converts to Islam	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--			-		

Type of activities	Years before and after September Eleven					
Scholarships for gifted students	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
						2
	--			-		

Type of activities	5 Years before September Eleven					
Feasts of breaking fasting in Ramadan.	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	--			-		2

Type of activities	5 Years before September Eleven					
Distribution of free cassettes and books that introduce Islam to non- Muslims	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
	--			-		2

4.9 Statistical report about WAMY activities before and after 9/11

Sr.	Type of activities	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
1	Provide financial support to Dawah teachers	---	1	2	3	--	2
2	Dawah (Islamic Call) Trips to introduce Islam	--	--	--	1	3	2
3	Financial support to Islamic Centers and societies	6	18	25	19	12	11
4	Hosting delegates	--	--	15	2	--	
5	Students subsidiaries	--	2	36	8	6	41
6	Educational and Youth camps	--	2	--	2	5	5
7	Training courses	--	10	6	1	3	9
8	Brochures, cassettes and exhibition	--	7830	2824	6695	1579	11010

material that best introduce Islam

9	Regional and international conferences	--	--	5	3	--	2
10	Propagation for Hijab " Veil"	--	--	--	--	--	--
11	Quarn memorization classes	--	--	--	--	--	20
12	New converts to Islam	--	--	35	100	96	--
13	Scholarships for gifted students	--	--	--	5	73	10
14	Feasts of breaking fasting in Ramadan	--	5740	--	--	10000	4200
15	Distribution of free cassettes and books that introduce Islam to non-Muslims	--	--	--	--	--	--

Table (35) shows WAMY activities 5 years before 9/11.

4.10 Statistical Report about WAMY Activities After 9/11

Sr.	Type of activities	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
1	Provide financial support to Dawah teachers	2	3	--	--	--	1
2	Dawah (Islamic Call) Trips to introduce Islam	2	6	--	--	--	--
3	Financial support to Islamic Centers and societies	11	12	--	--	--	--
4	Hosting delegates	--	37	--	--	--	--
5	Students subsidiaries	41	107	--	--	--	4
6	Educational and Youth camps	5	11	--	--	--	--
7	Training courses	9	10	--	--	--	--

8	Brochures, cassettes and exhibition material that best introduce Islam	11010	1312	--	--	--	--
9	Regional and international conferences	2	4	--	--	--	1
10	Propagation for Hijab " Veil"	--	75	--	--	--	--
11	Quarn memorization classes	20	10	--	--	--	--
12	New converts to Islam	--	22				
13	Scholarships for gifted students	10	--	--	--	--	--
14	Feasts of breaking fasting in Ramadan	4200	7600	--	--	--	4
15	Distribution of free cassettes and books that introduce Islam to non- Muslims	--	808	--	--	--	19250

Table (36) shows WAMY activities 5 years after 9/11

Appendix B: Interview Transcripts in Arabic

1.MWL

<u>مقابلة أجريت مع رابطة العالم الإسلامي</u>

<u>عن تأثير أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر على الرابطة</u>

كيف كان تأثير أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر على رابطة العالم الإسلامي ؟

رابطة العالم الإسلامي جزء من العالم تتأثر بأحداثه سلبا أو إيجابا ومن هذا المنطلق فقد كان التأثير متفاوتا في جوانب النشـــاطات التي تقـــوم بها الرابطة ففي الجانب الدعوي فقد كان، الإقبال على التعرف على الإسلام وهذا من الجوانب الايجابية لهذه الأزمة العالمية.ومن الناحية المالية فقد كان الأمر أكثر متابعة ولكن باعتبار أن الرابطة إحدى المنظمـات المنضوية تحت مضلة الأمم المتحدة وهي مضلة شـــرعية أكسبت رابطة العالم الإسلامي حضورا متميزا علـــ مستوى العالم كما أن الأنشطةالإنسانية التي تقوم بها الرابطة وسمو هذه الأنشطة أكسب الرابطة احترام وتقدير العالم بأسره.

من ناحية أخرى فإن رابطة العالم الإسلامي تتمتع بدعـــم دول العالم الإسلامي بأسره وهي الممول الرئيسي لأنشــطة الرابطــة المتنوعـة.

ولقد استطاعت رابطة العالم الإسلامي تجنب الكثير من الجوانب السلبية لأحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر وذلك بإعلان موقفها الرسمي المنبثق من رأي الإسلام في الإرهاب وكذلك كانت مساهمتها فعالة في التصدي للهجمة التي نضمت للإساءة للإسلام والمسلمين .كمـــا تعاملت الرابطة بالشفافية المعهودة في جميع تعاملاتها وأنشطتها وبخاصة النواحي المالية.

كيف تأثر مجلس العلاقات الأمريكية الإسلامية (كير) بأحــداث الحادي عشر من ؟ .سبتمبر 2001كانت هذه الأحداث المؤلمة مروعة ومفزعــة لكل الجنس البشري وهي بهذا عامل تأثير على كل المنظمات العاملــة في الشأن الإنساني وكير واحدة من أكبر المنظمات الإسلامية في أمريكا وهي منظمة شرعية خاضعة للقانون الأمريكي تتعامل بمنتهى الشفافية مع الأفراد والمؤسسات الحكومية.

وقد تعاظم الدور المــناط بهذ المنظمة بعد أحداث الحادي عشر من سبتمبر من ناحية الدفاع عن الحقوق المدنية للمسلمين في أمريكا ومناهضة الكراهية ضد المسلمين في أمريكا.

الأمر كذلك لايخلو مــن الجانب الايجابي والمتمثل قي الإقبــال على المراكز الإسلامية في أمريكا للسؤال عن هذا الدين ومعرفة شي عــن كتابه المقدس "القران الكريم" ومعرفة رأي الإسلام في الإرهاب وكذلك السؤال عن الجهاد وماذا يعني للمسلمين .

وباعتبار أن هذه المنظمة منظمة تقع في الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية وخاضعة للقوانين الأمريكية وتهتم بشأن المسلمين في أمريكا فقد كانت المسؤولية عظيمة وقد استطعنا بحمد الله القيام بهذا الدور خير قيام ساعدنا في ذلك حسن علاقتنا بالحكومة الأمريكية والمؤسسات الأمريكية المهتمة بالشأن الإنساني.