CHAPTER 3

GERMANS IN THE LAND OF WHITE ELEPHANTS

The Prussian expedition to Eastern Asia established formal diplomatic and commercial relations with Siam. In many ways the treaty of 1862 gave Germany more privileges than those accorded to Britain and France. Yet, Germany failed to make full use of this advantage.

Germany's official policy towards Siam was largely one of indifference. The German government had no colonial aspirations in this part of the world and accepted the fact that Siam lay within the sphere of French and British interests. Both these powers were vigorously trying to obtain from Siam whatever concessions possible: territorial, commercial, etc.

In spite of Berlin's lack of political ambition in Siam, German subjects gained considerable economic influence there. German engineers played a major part in Siam's railway construction and administration. German shipping companies also managed to secure a leading share in Bangkok's carrying trade, especially in rice which was Siam's main export item. Nevertheless, German commercial interests in Siam were always far smaller than those of Britain.
I. The German-Siamese Treaty of 1862

German diplomatic and commercial relations with Siam began relatively late compared to other Western powers. When the Prussian expedition arrived in the "Land of White Elephants"¹ in 1861, Britain, France, the United States, Denmark, Portugal, and Holland had already established official links with that Asian kingdom.² A start towards formal relations was made by the efforts of the German Consul in Bangkok, Thiesen. An understanding between Siam and three German Hanse towns was signed on 25 October 1858, following which there was a slight increase in the number of German ships touching Siam. But trade was still limited to sporadic enterprise on behalf of some Hanse merchants.³

Late in 1861, the Prussian delegation led by Eulenburg arrived at Bangkok in the frigates "Thetis" and "Arkona".⁴ After a few months of talks, a treaty between Siam and the German Customs Union, including the other


²C.O.273/333, No.29967, Paget's General Report on Siam for the Year 1906, confidential. Siamese treaties with other powers prior to the German-Siamese treaty of 1862: Britain (1855 and 1856), France (1856), United States (1856), Denmark (1858), Portugal (1859), and Holland (1860).

³Schramm, *Deutschland*, p.91; Kellenbenz, "German Trade", pp.140-1.

⁴K. Wenk, "The Relations Between Germany and Thailand", in *Southeast Asia and the Germans*, Tuebingen and Basle, Horst Erdmann, 1977, p.145.
states represented by the expedition, was signed on 7 February 1862. The Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaty of 1862 contained 25 articles of which the following four were the most important:

Article V: All subjects of the Contracting German States are at liberty to travel and trade throughout the entire Kingdom of Siam, and to buy and sell all merchandise not prohibited from and to whomsoever they please. They are not bound to purchase from or to sell to officials or monopolists, nor is anybody permitted to interfere with them or hinder them in their business.

Article VII: Should they wish to go beyond the same limits and travel in the interior of the Kingdom of Siam, they shall procure for themselves a passport, which shall be delivered to them at the request of the Consular officer by the Siamese authorities and such passport shall not be refused in any instance except with the concurrence of the Consular officer of the Contracting German States.

Article VIII: Subjects of the Contracting German States shall be at liberty to search for and open mines in any part of Siam, and the matter being distinctly set forth to the Consul, he shall, in conjunction with the Siamese authorities, arrange such suitable conditions and terms as shall admit of the mines being worked. German subjects shall likewise be permitted to engage in and carry on in Siam any description of manufacture not contrary to law upon like reasonable terms arranged between the Consul and the Siamese authorities.

Article XXIII: The Contracting German States and their subjects shall be allowed free and equal participation in all privileges that may have been or may hereafter be granted by the Siamese Government to the Government, subjects, or citizens of any other nation.

In addition to the most-favoured-nation clause, Siam

=C.0.273/275, No.19594, Extracts from Treaty between Siam and the States of the German Customs, & c., of February 7, 1862, (British and Foreign State Paper 4111, 1892-63, p.741). For the full German text see Beutner, Die deutschen, pp.337-48.
agreed not to raise import tariffs above 3 percent. Consular jurisdiction for German residents in Siam was also granted. In some areas the Germans managed to secure better commercial conditions than those accorded to other Western countries. For example, Germans were allowed to buy land in and around Bangkok, and to trade in salt and rice, hitherto a Siamese government monopoly."

The strained Siamese-French relations and the fear of further British demands explains the reason for Siam's generous terms to the Germans. Siam saw Prussia as a possible ally and mediator in her struggle against British and French encroachments. In 1852, Britain had annexed Lower Burma and coerced Siam into signing the treaties of 1855 and 1856 which gave the British special commercial privileges. France joined Britain against China in the Second Opium War of 1857-60. After occupying Saigon in 1859, France continued the process of extending her control over Cochinchina and Cambodia which were tributary provinces of Siam. The Prussian delegation's sojourn in Siam almost coincided with French military incursions in Cambodia. Late in 1861, France sent a gunboat up the Menam River to Bangkok and demanded the cession of the Cambodian territories. France then seized several Cambodian ports and occupied more territory in Cochinchina in 1862."

The Siamese were encouraged by the fact that Prussia


did not possess any Asian colonies, and were especially assured when Eulenburg told them that Prussia had no intention of doing so either. King Mongkut understood all too well the mechanism of European expansion, which he explained to Eulenburg:

"First, ships are sent out to explore the unknown parts of the world. Then other ships follow for the purpose of trading. Then merchants settle down, who are either fought by natives or who try to subjugate the native population. In short, wars emerge out of guilt and misunderstanding on both sides. The foreigners keep extending their influence until entire empires belong to them. Nowadays there is hardly any country left for new colonies, except Oceana (i.e. the Pacific) and the islands of the South Sea. The Asian countries have been in a disadvantageous position since the norms of Western international law have not been applied to them."

Even with the favourable conditions set forth by the treaty, German investment in Siam remained relatively small until the 1880s, while German export was mostly confined to "the usual cheap and flashy merchandise." From 1858 to 1871, some 100 German ships entered Siamese ports. The overwhelming number came from Hamburg, and only the occasional ship left Siam directly for German ports. About 20 ships arrived at Bremen from Siam during the same

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"Quoted in Martin, "The Prussian", p.39.

¹⁰F.O.422/30, Inclosure 1 in No.19, Report on the Present State of German Interests and Influence in Siam, Jones to Salisbury, 18 March 1891. The same report can be found in C.O.537/47, No.622.
period, carrying mostly rice for the European market.\textsuperscript{11} The reason for the modest German activity in Siam lay in the political atmosphere at home, i.e. the issue of German unification. Moreover, the German business community was more interested in reinforcing their economic position in Europe.\textsuperscript{12}

After unification, Germany's standing and influence in Siam grew. According to the German Consul's annual report for Siam for the year 1873:

"the German influence [in Siam] had risen steadily, whereas the personal importance of the English and French agents had persistently receded. This development is analogous to that of 1872."\textsuperscript{13}

The potential for exerting German influence in Siam several years later is borne out by a further consular report dated 23 September 1889:

"[German] prestige was enhanced after it became known in Bangkok that Germany was the first of all the European powers to accord full international equality to Japan, whereas England had shown by her attitude that she was ready to follow Germany's example only with reluctance."\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11}Schramm, Deutschland, p.91; Kellenbenz, "German Trade", pp.140-1.

\textsuperscript{12}Martin, "The Prussian", p.41.

\textsuperscript{13}Quoted in Wenk, "The Relations", p.152. The first Siamese legation in Berlin was established in 1879.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., pp.152-3.
II. Germany's Diplomacy of Indifference

Even with Germany's growing prestige in Siam, the German leadership was largely indifferent to the conditions in Siam. One of Bismarck's main diplomatic ambitions in the 1870s was the isolation of France (see Chapter 1). This strategy continued in the 1880s and explains why Bismarck secretly encouraged France's territorial acquisitions abroad. His support greatly facilitated French colonial expansion in Africa. In Asia, Bismarck supported France's aspirations in Indochina during the Franco-Chinese war of 1883-5. There were several reasons why Bismarck chose this line of policy. First, he hoped to widen the rift between France and Britain by provoking friction between them, like over Egypt for example. Secondly, he needed to secure French support for Germany's own colonial ambitions in Africa and the Pacific. A third reason might be added with regards to Asia. Bismarck expected that the French presence in Tonking would further open up China to foreign trade and investment. In addition to the wish of exporting German industrial goods to China, the Chancellor was particularly interested in gaining contracts for railway construction. 1

William Carr summed up Bismarck's foreign policy towards France and Britain on the eve of Germany's colonial expansion this way:

1Stoecker, "Germany", p.34.
"[Bismarck] was watching with some satisfaction the growing rivalry in Africa between Britain and France. As long as it lasted it made the two powers more dependent on Germany and diverted French attention from Alsace-Lorraine. The rivalry might be turned to Germany's advantage in another way. As Bismarck grew increasingly dubious about the viability of the Russian connection, he seriously considered the possibility of a lasting reconciliation with France as the only way of avoiding war on two fronts. Active co-operation with France in the colonial field was the first step; by picking quarrels with Britain over German colonial claims he aligned Germany on the side with France. Together they opposed British financial reform in Egypt and supported each other's colonial claims. Later Bismarck talked of a general "entente" and a maritime league to isolate Britain and force her to abandon her colonial monopoly."

However, German-French relations worsened soon after the Berlin Conference of 1884-5. France only wanted German help for her colonial endeavours, but was unwilling to forge closer ties with Germany for fear of forfeiting future chances to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Finding difficulties achieving an understanding with France, Germany strived for better relations with Britain. This led to a comprehensive Anglo-German agreement in 1890 in which Britain ceded Heligoland to Germany in exchange for Zanzibar. The new political rapport between Britain and Germany, however, drove France in 1891 to seek closer ties with Russia. The following year saw the signing of a Franco-Russian military convention, which was then

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expanded into a formal alliance treaty in 1894.\textsuperscript{17}

British-German relations were put to the test during the Siamese-French crisis of 1893. Border incidents in May between French and Siamese forces had caused such intense reactions in Bangkok that the German Minister, Kempermann, expressed concern for the safety of foreigners living there. When the German Ambassador in London, Hatzfeldt, requested the extension of British protection to German subjects in Siam, Rosebery, the British Foreign Secretary, agreed.\textsuperscript{18}

The crisis reached its high-water mark when France, who had just allied herself with Russia and felt confident to press for further demands, sent two gunboats up the river to Bangkok and demanded on 20 July the yielding of all Siam's territories east of the Mekong river. When the Siamese government refused, France responded by imposing a blockade of Siam's coast. Although Rosebery had denied a Siamese request for British naval support to defend Bangkok against France, two British gunboats were watching developments closely from a nearby position.\textsuperscript{19}


\textsuperscript{18}F.O.422/35, No.86, Rosebery to Hatzfeldt, 16 May 1893.

The French naval commander in charge of the blockade then ordered the British gunboats to leave Bangkok and remain outside the blockade area. When Rosebery received this news via telegraphic message from Bangkok, he immediately responded by instructing the British commander not to withdraw his warships.²⁰ Fearing a possible disintegration of Siam, Rosebery warned Paris that Britain would resist by force if necessary any foreign intrusions near the Malay states. Siam was also warned not to alienate any of her southern territories to France.²¹

On the night of 31 July, the Kaiser, who was at the time of the naval incident at Cowes for yacht races, received a copy of Rosbery's telegram to Queen Victoria. It read:

"French Government demands that we withdraw our gunboats from Bangkok. I have refused this request. Desire to see Count Hatzfeldt [the German ambassador] immediately in London."²²

The Emperor became visibly disturbed. Eulenburg, who was also at Cowes, recounted the Kaiser's reaction:

"The Emperor took me into his cabin and completely broke down. I really have never seen him so overcome, and I had to bring the whole force of my mind to bear upon finding reasonable arguments which would soothe him. ... The Emperor exclaimed that England's fleets were


weaker than the Russian and French fleets in combination. Even with the aid of our little fleet, England would still be weaker. The French (he said) wanted to drive Russia to some action — which, considering the Czar's hostile attitude towards us, they might succeed in doing. Our army was not strong enough to fight simultaneously against France and Russia. The French had chosen their moment very cleverly. It was impossible to sit still and let the tempest break on our heads. All Germany's prestige was gone, if we could not take a prominent part; and not to be a world-power was to cut a deplorable figure. What were we to do?"\textsuperscript{23}

Clearly the Kaiser viewed the Siamese crisis in terms of its impact on the political situation in Europe. Siam as such was unimportant. What worried him most was the possibility that Britain might seek Germany's military assistance against France and Russia. The problem lay in the fact that Germany's ability to effectively help Britain was limited. And if Britain was defeated because Germany had withheld active support, Germany would then find herself in a precarious situation when dealing with France and Russia.\textsuperscript{24}

The Kaiser needed some time to consider Germany's options. When Hatzfeldt wired to the Foreign Office saying that he could not meet Rosebery because he was ill, the delay was agreeable to the Kaiser.\textsuperscript{25} Wilhelm II was


\textsuperscript{25}Grosse Politik, vol.8, no.1756-7.
finally relieved from his anxiety when he learnt shortly after that the crisis that threatened to start a war in Europe had suddenly subsided. The British and French commanders on the spot had issued a joint declaration stating that the demand for Britain's gunboats to leave Bangkok was due to a "misunderstanding". It is possible, as Hatzfeldt believed, that either no such demand had been made, or it was issued by the French commander without the knowledge of the French government. As in any case, Siam capitulated to France's demands on 1 August. A Franco-Siamese treaty followed on 3 October ceding to France the left bank of the lower Mekong river, as well as other important concessions.

Some historians believe that Germany was disposed to grant London support if the situation had escalated into a military confrontation between Britain and France. Nothing could have been worse for Germany than a Franco-Russian victory over Britain. Not all German diplomats, however, were slanted to the idea of rendering support unconditionally. Hatzfeldt for one considered such a move too risky. He warned that after Germany had pulled out Britain's "chestnuts out of the fire", the British Prime Minister Gladstone might suddenly leave Germany "in the

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lurch" and conclude a separate peace with France. Without a British guarantee, Germany would find herself "in the situation of having to face the consequences without England." According to Hatzfeldt, the British government "would have no scruples about using this as a means of bringing pressure to bear on France to make a separate peace", leaving Germany "to bear the brunt."\(^{29}\)

Yet, for Hatzfeldt, a deterioration in Anglo-French relations to the point of war was desirable. He hoped "the French in their frenzy push matters to that point - be it over Egypt or anything else," and maybe with a little prodding from Germany, Rosebery one day might "really get angry" at France. What made Rosebery "gloomy" made Hatzfeldt "pleased as Punch".\(^{30}\)

"I [Hatzfeldt] would give much if I were quite certain that the French would become downright impertinent as a result of Russia's embraces and tread heavily on the corns of the English everywhere - Egypt, Madagascar, Tuat, etc, etc. ... I for my part would do all I can to help things along, for I think we are agreed that nothing would be better than that the first shot on the peace of Europe should be fired from English or French guns."\(^{31}\)

It is important to stress again that the German government was not in the least concerned with what was happening to Siam. This is further borne out by Germany's unwillingness to consider Siam's request for help.


\(^{30}\)Holstein Papers, vol.3, Hatzfeldt to Holstein, 19 October 1893, pp.443-4.

\(^{31}\)Ibid.
Obviously wanting to preserve her integrity, Siam had asked Germany in April 1893 to persuade the French to settle their territorial disputes in a court of arbitration. Germany refused. Nevertheless, Germany's position in Siam was enhanced after the Siamese crisis had blown over. Germany had sent a gunboat, the "Wolf", to Bangkok in August 1893, which remained there ostensibly for repair work until things had calmed down. The Siamese government interpreted the presence of the German gunboat as an expression of support. France became Siam's "hereditary enemy", and Britain faced difficulties in maintaining her interests in Siam "without at once stirring up France's jealousy and Siam's suspicion".\(^{32}\)

Siam wanted to get Germany actively involved in her internal affairs to guarantee her integrity and independence (see Chapter 9). Yet, Germany failed to take advantage of Siam's situation although it was extraordinarily inviting. Germany did nothing to help Siam against Britain or France. Why? Because, according to Malet, the British Ambassador to Germany:

"[It was] a matter of absolute indifference to Germany whether France wrests territory from Siam up to the 18th or the 23rd degree; ... but the attitude of H.M.G. in regard to France is watched with great attention."\(^{33}\)

Malet also assumed that Germany would welcome "any success" in Britain's diplomatic negotiations with France because any escalating friction between the two powers


\(^{33}\)F.O.422/36, Malet to Rosebery, 29 July 1893.
would "make the peace in Europe less safe than it is at present."\(^a\)

The German government was more concerned with the prospect that France might become increasingly arrogant and self-assertive towards Germany because of Britain's "miserable weakness shown here in regard to Siam".\(^a\) Partly to annoy France, Germany concluded a treaty with Britain on 15 November 1893 defining their respective claims in the Cameroons. Then, in the mid-1894, Germany attempted to forge better relations with France by blocking British expansion in West Africa. Germany also assisted France and Russia in April 1895 to constrain Japan's ambitions in China. Following Japan's victory over China, the Japanese had sought to acquire the Lia-Tong peninsula.\(^a\)

For Germany's stand during the Siamese crisis, the Kaiser had fallaciously expected that Britain would become more agreeable with regard to German colonial wishes. Britain, apparently, was not ready to oblige. On 1 June 1898, Wilhelm II complained bitterly to his mother, Kaiserin Friedrich, about British indifference and arrogance in colonial matters. He wrote that during the first six years of his reign:

\(^{1}\)Ibid. 


"I tried to the very utmost of my powers by letter, conversation, and persuasion to elicit from Lord Salisbury a word implying the approval of the idea of an Anglo-German cooperation and Convention. But it was utterly without any result, as he invariably always ended in the same refrain: 'An English government cannot and never will form an alliance with any Continental Power for the simple reason, that Parliament would hardly ever ratify such an instrument and because England prefers to keep its liberty of action, therefore I am unable to fulfill your wishes.'... In numerous phases of Foreign Affairs, notably the Siamese Imbroglio (under the liberal government of Lord Rosebery) I staunchly stood by England and volunteered my help... But instead of thanks or of help in our colonising enterprises I got nothing whatever, and for the last 3 years have been abused, ill-treated and a butt to any bad joke any music hall singer or fishmonger or pressman thought fit to fly at me."\[7

Siam always remained outside Germany's colonial aspirations. The German government's aloofness to what was happening to Siam is clearly borne out by the Kaiser's comments on a consular report. On 10 May 1898, Seldeneck, the German Minister in Bangkok reported that according to Rolin-Jaquémyens,\[8 the King of Siam "was convinced that the German Empire was the only great power represented here [in Bangkok] that was in no way interested in acquiring territory and, therefore, in a position to assess the English-French intrigues impartially." A note in the margin - most probably made by the Kaiser himself - simply registered that this was: 'Very flattering, but


\[8] Rolin-Jaquémyens, a former Belgian cabinet minister and a specialist in international law, was appointed Advisor to King Chulalongkorn in 1893. The Western powers considered Rolin-Jaquémyens as the actual head of the Siamese government.
where does all this take us?" Seldeneck's report continued:

"M. Rolin then disclosed to me, by order of His Majesty that His Highness fostered the greatest confidence in me, and His Majesty would like to let me know his wish and intention, pour me consulter pour entendre mon opinion comme ami (to consult me and learn my opinion as a friend), in the event of His Majesty deeming this to be advisable should particular circumstance and difficulties arise during M. Rolin's absence."  

The Kaiser's comment to this was limited to "well! well!" followed by an instruction that the German Minister should carefully make good use of the king's faith in him.  

The reason for Germany's indifference towards Siam was clearly outlined by Germany's Foreign Secretary. Buelow insisted that Germany was not in the least interested in Siam because Britain and France were already locked in a territorial competition there. It was politically too dangerous for Germany to get drawn into an area which lay between British and French spheres of interest. Moreover, Berlin knew far too little about the conditions in Siam to get politically involved. According to Buelow, the German government knew as much about Siam as it did about Peru. It should be added, however, that the German government did not wish to

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"Quoted in Wenk, "The Relations", p.151.

Ibid.


see the interests of German subjects living in Siam disadvantaged by British and French meddling. Berlin was actually quite pleased with the number of Germans working in different Siamese government departments, some of which were quite important administrative posts.¹³ In 1891 for example, 16 Germans were working for the Siamese government together with 46 Englishmen, 13 Danes, 9 Portuguese, 5 Americans, and the rest were French and Italians (see Chapter 9). Germans also acquired considerable influence in Siam's railways and shipping, a discussion of which will follow shortly.¹⁴

At the turn of the century, Germany became too preoccupied with developments in China to seriously consider political possibilities in Siam. Germany became especially concerned when Russia used the Boxer Rebellion of June 1900 to invade Manchuria. Fearing for her commercial interests in China, Germany convinced Britain to conclude the Yangtze Agreement of 16 October 1900. In addition to preserving the freedom of trade, both powers agreed to maintain China's territorial sovereignty.¹⁵

The German government's indifference to what was going on in Siam eventually aroused indignation from the German community living there. Their protests were echoed


¹⁵Carr, A History, p.224.
several times in the German press. For example, when Berlin refused to pressure the Siamese government into granting the concession of Pulau Langkawi to some German speculators in 1900, several complaints appeared in German newspapers (see Chapter 4). A further example occurred in 1902 when Japanese firms obtained a contract for the yearly supply of 10,000 Mauser rifles as part of Siam's drive to modernise her army. German firms in Bangkok were greatly disappointed because they had almost secured the contract for the rifles. An article then appeared in the Berlin newspaper "Post" urging the German government to take a more active role in support of German interests in Siam.**

When the French opposed Siam's efforts to build a railway eastward to Korat, Luis Weiler, the German Director-General of the Siamese Railway Department, expressed in a private letter dated 9 July 1905 what was perhaps the general opinion of the German community in Bangkok:

"Here, the German Kaiser might put his foot down as he did in Morocco [sic], in order to make an end of these unsound conditions - perhaps even more than there, for German trade is much more developed here than in the Land of the Sherif."**

**F.O.422/56, No.144, Tower to Lansdowne, 7 May 1902; The Bangkok Times, 8 November 1902.

**Quoted in C. Weiler, "The Germans and Thailand's First Railways", in Southeast Asia and the Germans, Tuebingen and Basle, Horst Erdmann, 1977, p.207. As it turned out, however, the German handling of the Moroccan crisis became a diplomatic embarrassment for Germany. France had tried to squeeze out more concessions from the Moroccan government in 1905. But Germany objected and candidly encouraged Morocco to oppose the French demands.
Germans living and doing business in Bangkok were becoming particularly unhappy with the way the German Minister handled their affairs, and a complaint to that effect was transmitted to Berlin. The German government, however, simply responded to the complaints by changing their consular representative in Bangkok in October or November 1905.\footnote{C.O. 273/311, No.10500, Anderson to Lyttelton, 16 February 1905, confidential; C.O. 273/312, No.43668, Anderson to Lyttelton, 16 November 1905, secret.}

The German community in Bangkok, backed by the press in Germany, continued to announce, repeatedly and extensively, their dissatisfaction with Berlin's lack of support towards their interests in Siam.\footnote{Wenk, "The Relations", p.152 and p.163.} They urged for more active support arguing that Britain and France had no right "to close the 'open door' to third parties".\footnote{The Bangkok Times, 5 December 1905 and 26 December 1906.} Yet, Berlin still made no serious attempts to help the interests of German nationals in Siam.

The signing of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909 came as a rude shock to German entrepreneurs with interests in Siam and the Malay Peninsula. Their frustration, however, was more directed to their government's incompetence at

This led to the Algeciras Conference of 1906 in which Germany was compelled to give way due to combined French, British and Russian pressure. France then gained control over Morocco's finances and police force. The Moroccan escapade was a major disaster for German foreign policy because it drove France closer to Britain. (Carr, A History, pp.225-7.)
protecting German interests abroad than by the fact that Britain had just acquired from Siam some 15,000 square miles in the Malay Peninsula. Resenting the damage done by the Anglo-Siamese treaty to their interests, Germans living in Bangkok drafted and dispatched a petition to Berlin that expressed their deeply felt disappointment with the German government. The petition also blamed much of the loss of German influence and prestige on the miserable weakness of the German representative in Siam.\textsuperscript{11}

In Germany, the Deutsche Export Revenue had this to say:

"We are probably right in assuming that Great Britain and France came to an understanding regarding Siam and the new agreement before it was concluded, and that the Anglo-Siamese Agreement is closely connected with the German-French Agreement regarding Morocco. We cannot admit that Germany has no commercial interests in those parts. The greater part of the coasting trade is in German hands. We should like to know whether England came to an understanding with the German Government before concluding the new Anglo-Siamese Treaty.

"When we start a new line of steamships to the Persian Gulf, or when we obtain a bank concession in Persia - in short, whenever we make some modest attempt to extend our commercial relations - there is always a loud outcry in England regarding a violation of British interests; and we regularly allow ourselves to be intimidated thereby. Why do not the German Government act with the same energy when German interests are at stake? We are persuaded that England would only respect us all the more on this account."\textsuperscript{12}

Echoing the grievances felt by the Germans in Bangkok, the "Vossische Zeitung" published an article on

\textsuperscript{11}C.O.273/353, No.21069, Beckett to Grey, 26 April 1909.

\textsuperscript{12}The Straits Times, 26 March 1909.
30 June 1909 saying that:

"After the English colony, the German is the most numerous, though the influence of the latter, owing to Germany's inadequate representation, is almost a negligible quantity. We need here a strong man determined to make himself acquainted with the conditions of the country and courageous enough, if necessary, energetically to represent German interests. ... The sudden abandonment in April last of the work on the Bangkok-Kiangmai Railway is yet another proof of the weakness of Germany's influence in Siam. ... Now the money is said to be exhausted, and no less than 14 German engineers and officials are forced with dismissal."

Not all Germans residing in Siam blamed the German Minister in Bangkok for the loss of German influence and prestige. Luis Weiler was perhaps the most qualified to comment on the German position in Siam. He was in the midst of it all while working as Director-General of the Siamese Railway Department. He expressed his views on 13 July 1909 this way:

"Some irritation at the British-Siamese agreement is now being felt in German circles. There is no doubt that its conclusion has resulted in a lowering of German prestige. The mere fact that the head of the railway administration is a German has caused the British to demand that the railways in the Malay peninsula should be built under British control and complete elimination of the existing railway administration. It is a purely political matter which does not annoy me personally, less so since the King has recently expressed his full confidence in me. For the German government, however, it means a British act of transgression.

"Here among the German circles our Envoy Herr von Prollius is being held responsible for this German defeat. As far as I can judge, however, he cannot be blamed. Without the necessary backing on the part of the Foreign Office in Berlin even the smartest diplomat
cannot succeed here. One must not overlook the fact that in the Far East only Britain and France are recognized as great European powers while Germany is regarded as a secondary one. In addition I can state that even Austria, certainly acknowledged as a great power in Europe, ranks in the Far East no higher than, say, Holland or Belgium. It is, therefore, due only to the prevailing circumstances that in this part of the world Germany is being eclipsed by her opponents, Britain and France. It's a fact of life and will remain that way so long as Germany does not possess the necessary resources to enforce her will also overseas."

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III. The "German Railway Department"

King Chulalongkorn ruled Siam for forty-two years (1868-1910). In addition to his endeavours to bring economic development to Siam, he did his utmost to preserve his kingdom's independence and integrity from the claws of European powers (see Chapter 9). As part of his desire to advance Siam's economy, the king eagerly sought to connect the more remote parts of Siam with railway lines. British engineers conducted a preliminary survey for a railway line from Bangkok to the northern provinces as early as 1875. Yet no further steps were taken towards actual railway construction.***

The Siamese hesitated for a long time when it came to granting concessions for railway construction. A British company, which was patiently waiting for a concession after having concluded a railway survey in 1886, was shocked to hear from a London newspaper that the Siamese government was considering granting a German company the contract to construct a network of railway lines across the country.*** It was Siam's Consul in Paris who

***British officials often used this term when referring to the Royal Siamese Railway Department. (See for example C.O.273/323, No.46119, Beckett to Grey, 12 December 1906, confidential).

***W.A. Graham, "Siam and her Relations with other Powers", Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 1928, p.307.

proposed the introduction of German capital for railway construction. When the Siamese government enquired whether Britain had any objections to this proposal, Rosebery promptly replied that German investment in railway construction in Siam was in fact very "objectionable". Several large German financial houses had expressed interest in investing in Siam, especially in railway construction. A preliminary survey for that purpose was conducted by German engineers in 1887, but the idea was soon abandoned.

The British representative, Satow, tried in vain to persuade the Siamese government to assign the responsibility of constructing railways to British firms. British firms would more likely do a much better job because of "greater commercial advantages" than firms of other nationalities. He also cautioned the Siamese government that Britain "would feel hurt if any special preference were shown to the capitalists and manufacturers of other countries". The King of Siam, however, mistrusted all foreign companies that applied for railway concessions, believing them to be "mere speculators". The king refused to sanction railway concessions to foreigners because "they would have great difficulty in satisfying themselves that particular individuals applying for

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"F.O.422/13, No.3, Satow to Rosebery, 29 March 1886, telegraphic; No.4, Rosebery to Satow, 29 March 1886, telegraphic.

"The Straits Times, 29 January 1890."
concessions would treat them honestly".\textsuperscript{60}

A few years later, on 6 March 1888, the firm of Andrew Clarke - the ex-Governor of the Straits Settlements - obtained a contract for the complex job of charting and planning a railway line from Bangkok to Chiangmai in the north, and from Bangkok to Korat in the east, a total length of more than 1,080 km. The contract clearly stated the Siamese government was not obliged to give the surveyors the concession for constructing the line. The British company's plans and estimates were presented to the Siamese government three years later, in the spring of 1891.\textsuperscript{61}

While the British company was busy surveying, Siam's Foreign Minister engaged in December 1888 a German railway engineer to make a separate survey of the Korat line. Karl Bethge, who happened to be in Siam at the time on his homeward journey from China, was formerly employed by the Royal Prussian Railways. He was a specialist in railway construction in mountainous regions and had conducted railway studies for Krupp in China. Apparently, the Siamese authorities were impressed by Bethge's vast knowledge and experience, especially after showing them ways of cutting costs for constructing the 265 km line to

\textsuperscript{60}C.O.273/142, No.9836, Satow to Rosebery, 8 April 1886.

In a report dated 23 September 1889, the German Minister in Bangkok explained that Siam's attitude in the matter of railway construction clearly shows her desire to limit as far as possible British influence in that area. The Siamese government's interest in Bethge may be further attributed to the wish of getting Germany more involved as a set-off to French and British interferences (see Chapter 9). The Royal Railway Department was established in October 1890 as a branch of the Siamese Ministry of Public Works, with authority to supervise the work of foreign contractors. Late in 1889, the Siamese government had offered Gordon, an English engineer employed in the Public Works Department in Burma, the job of directing the new department. After several months went by without receiving an answer from Gordon, the Siamese government hired Bethge instead. The German Minister in Bangkok, Kempermann had recommended Bethge. Shortly after, a letter arrived from Gordon accepting the offer. The Siamese then engaged him to co-direct the department with Bethge. The two men held equal rank, duties, and received the same salary. Within less than a year, however, Gordon resigned from his post because of "private motive" and went to England leaving to Bethge the entire control of the Railway Department. During his tenure as Director-


**Wenk, "The Relations", p.153.**
General of the Siamese Railway Department, Bethge gained considerable influence in all matters relating to railway construction in Siam.\textsuperscript{a}\textsuperscript{a}

In order to be able to better deal with France's encroachments on her eastern borders, Siam decided that her first railways should be constructed towards Korat, using the more expensive standard gauge that allowed the carrying of heavier loads. Late in 1890, Bethge invited public tenders for the construction of the Bangkok-Korat line (160 miles). But he reserved for his department the right to purchase directly all machinery, rails, rolling stock, and other materials. Although Bethge had warned the Siamese government not to grant the railway concession to the lowest tender, A. Clarke managed in December 1891 to obtain for his company the contract for constructing the Korat line to be completed within five years. A. Clarke deeply resented Bethge's interferences, especially the move to regulate the supply of all railway material (see Chapter 8). He had been almost certain that his company would acquire the construction contract including the tender for supplying all machinery, rails, rolling stock, etc.\textsuperscript{a}\textsuperscript{a}


\textsuperscript{a}\textsuperscript{a}F.O.422/30, Inclosure 1 in No.19, Report on the Present State of German Interests and Influence in Siam, in Jones to Salisbury, 18 March 1891; F.O.422/47, Inclosure in No.91, Extract from the Siam "Observer" of 28
Actual construction of the line began with the official turning of the first sods by the Siamese King and Crown Prince on 9 March 1892. "Three years later on 11 April 1893, Siam's first ever railway line, between Bangkok and Paknam, was officially opened by the king." The Siamese crisis of 1893, however, temporarily delayed construction work. The French in Cambodia viewed with great displeasure the prospect of a railway track connecting Siam's eastern provinces with Bangkok. "Commenting on Siam's situation in 1893, Luis Weiler, a German engineer with the department, wrote:

"There is unrest on the Mekong. The Siamese and the French are at each others' throats. The British are pushing from the west. And European pioneer work is going on in the interior. Just as the Prince awakens his Sleeping Beauty with a kiss, Europe will one day rouse Siam from her sleep and transform the whole country."

As Bethge had expected, the British firm failed to complete the line within the stipulated period, apparently because of financial difficulties and shortages of material. Disappointed with the delay and quality of work, the Siamese government cancelled the British contractor's contract on 8 August 1896, and ordered the Royal Railway

March 1897; Weiler, "The Germans", p.201.


"Quoted in Weiler, "The Germans", p.203.
Department to undertake all future railway construction.\textsuperscript{70} The dismissed firm appealed to an international arbitration court to reverse Siam's cancelation of the contract. It seems, however, that the work done on the Korat line was well below acceptable engineering standards. The appeal was turned down. Commenting on the quality of the work, an Indian technical journal sarcastically wrote: "The contractor knows as much about railway affairs as a cow does about Mr. Gladstone's change of politics."\textsuperscript{71}

The Railway Department under German management was now fully in charge of Siam's railway construction, and progress was fast. A 50 mile section of the Korat line stretching between Bangkok and Ayuthia was opened by the King and Queen on 26 March 1897. A second section, that to Genghol, was opened on 1 November. This was followed five months later, on 1 April 1898, by the opening of a third section to Hinlap. Work was progressing so well that the line to Korat was expected to be completed by early 1900, and other plans were made to start a line in June 1898 from Ayuthia heading northwards to Chiangmai.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{70}F.O.422/47, Inclosure in No.91, Extract from the Siam "Observer" of 28 March 1897; C.O.273/333, No.29967, Paget's General Report on Siam for the Year 1906, confidential; Weiler, "The Germans", p.201 and p.204. According to Weiler the contract was cancelled on 1 September 1896.

\textsuperscript{71}Quoted in Weiler, "The Germans", p.205.

\textsuperscript{72}Low, European Settlements, pp.242-3.
Although the Siamese were evidently quite pleased with Bethge's handling of their railways,²³ the British were not so thrilled. Because of Bethge, most of the contracts for supplying rails, locomotives, rolling-stock, bridges, and other railway materials went to German companies.²⁴ Moreover, through Bethge's influence, more and more German engineers were being employed by the Railway Department. In 1892, Bethge recruited Herman Gehrts as chief assistant, and Luis Weiler as section engineer. These two men later became themselves directors-generals of the Siamese Railways Department. When Gehrts and Weiler showed up for the first time at the department attired in dress-coats with tails and white gloves, the "Siam Free Press" of 20 February 1893 remarked that: "Fine feathers make fine birds, but not at all a good railway engineer". The position of the German engineers became even more difficult with the escalating Siamese-French crisis. The crisis halted railway construction and Bethge threatened to resign.²⁵

Not at all pleased with the rise of German involvement in Siam's railways, British diplomats in Bangkok persistently tried to pressure the Siamese government to dismiss Bethge and the rest of the German staff from the department. In a letter sent home, Luis

²³Weiler, "The Germans", pp.204-5.


Weller wrote: "I myself read a letter by the British resident minister to the Siamese government, which would make any fair-thinking person blush."

The Financial Advisor and Comptroller-General to the Siamese government, the Englishman Rivett-Carnac, also made problems for the Germans. He was in constant friction with the Railway Department in matters regarding the department's annual budget and the audit of accounts. Another point of contention was the department's refusal to invite open tenders for the supply of railway materials. The prodding of Rivett-Carnac and several Western consuls finally influenced the Siamese government to adopt the "open tender" system instead of the closed order policy hitherto being the custom."

The German Minister in Bangkok protested, warning that the adoption of the "open tender" policy might flood Siam with cheap and inferior materials. According to Rivett-Carnac, however, the Germans themselves caused this change of policy "by their rough and autocratic methods and by the scant courtesy that German diplomacy exercises in its dealings with the Siamese Foreign Office." The "open tender" made it very difficult for German companies


**C.O.273/323, No.44803, Beckett to Grey, 12 October 906, confidential.

**F.O.422/56, No.28, Tower to Lansdowne, 15 January 902, confidential.
to acquire contracts.\textsuperscript{80} German manufacturers obtained orders only when the department began inserting special references to German rules and types in the specifications when tendering for railway materials.\textsuperscript{81}

In 1905, the Royal Railway Department was busy extending railway lines to Korat, Petchaburi, and Chiengmai, when the French began causing problems again. As before, they disliked the idea of lengthening the line further eastward.\textsuperscript{82} Facing growing obstacles in constructing the Korat track, Siam looked south and prepared a project to construct a railway line from Bangkok to her Malay provinces. Another line was to connect the western port of Trang with Pathalung on the other side of the peninsula. But Siam's plans to construct the southern railway became marred with great political obstacles from the British side. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 9.

\textsuperscript{80} C.O. 273/333, No.29967, Paget's General Report on Siam for the Year 1906, confidential.

\textsuperscript{81} C.O. 273/353, No.1738, Beckett to Grey, 28 October 1908, confidential.

\textsuperscript{82} C.O. 273/323, No.36188, Beckett to Grey, 13 August 1906, very confidential; Weiler, "The Germans", p.207.
IV. Bangkok's Rice Transporters

British shipping in the port of Bangkok steadily declined between 1898 and 1906, while German shipping showed remarkable growth. The shift towards German predominance in controlling Bangkok's shipping took place around the turn of the century when the North German Lloyd purchased from the Ocean Steam Navigation Co. their line of steamers running the Bangkok-Singapore route, and from the Scottish Oriental Steamship Co. the steamers servicing the Bangkok-Hong Kong line (see Chapter 2).\textsuperscript{53}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lrr}
\hline

British and German Ships Clearing Bangkok in 1898 and 1901: \textsuperscript{54} & \\
British & German & \\
\hline
1898 & 396 & 78 & \\
1901 & 151 & 272 & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{}
\end{table}

The amount of cargo carried on German ships from Bangkok increased by 10 percent between 1897 and 1899.

In 1900, German ships carried 54 percent of Siam's total exports, while

\textsuperscript{53} F.O. 422/54, No. 26, Archer to Lansdowne, 19 March 1901, confidential; \textit{The Straits Times}, 8 July 1901.

\textsuperscript{54} Hoffman, \textit{Great Britain}, p. 189; Meyer, "Das Eindringen", p. 89.
only 34 percent went on British vessels.\textsuperscript{6}

Norwegian shipping achieved a considerable gain in 1902, but dropped again in 1903 during a general decline in Siam's foreign trade. The Germans took up most of what was lost by the Norwegians.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Germany %</th>
<th>Britain %</th>
<th>Norway %</th>
<th>Total Number of Steamers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>11\textsuperscript{7}</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>49.33</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the North German Lloyd's near total control of cargo transport between Bangkok and Singapore, and between Bangkok and Hong Kong, German rice millers and traders in Siam gained considerable advantage over their British counterparts in Siam's export of rice, especially to

\textsuperscript{6}``The Bangkok Times, 25 May 1900; The Straits Times, 8 July 1901; Chiang Hai Ding, \textit{A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade, 1870-1915}, Singapore, National Museum, 1978, p.100.

\textsuperscript{7}``Data compiled from F.O.422/54, No.26, Archer to Lansdowne, 19 March 1901, confidential; C.O.273/333, No.29967, Paget's General Report on Siam for the Year 1906, confidential; \textit{The Straits Times}, 8 July 1901; \textit{The Bangkok Times}, 7 April 1904; Vagts, "William II", p.835. (Note: there are some slight variations between sources, but the general trend remains the same.)

\textsuperscript{7}``Including Swedish shipping.
Europe. Only a few Norwegian and Chinese steamers afforded the Germans some competition in the transportation of Siamese rice.\textsuperscript{**} The French and the Swedes desperately tried to acquire a piece of Bangkok's shipping. French authorities in Indochina offered the Saigon shipping firm of M. Petal a subsidy of 300,000 francs to start a line between Singapore and Bangkok. The Swede Johnson wanted to run several steamers between Bangkok and Singapore under the Siamese flag.\textsuperscript{**}

In an effort to counter the German monopoly in Siam's rice trade, the British representative in Bangkok, Archer, suggested in September 1902 that arrangements should be made to start up a competing shipping company under the management of an Englishman named Alfred Jones. The steamers were to begin operation early in 1903 with the help of an annual subsidy of 6,000 pounds from the Siamese treasury. Although totally British, the new line of 4 steamers was supposed to fly the Siamese flag to avoid any offence to Germany. But Archer's proposal was shelved. The Siamese government, had earlier turned down another offer made by the North German Lloyd to supply a regular and improved mail and passenger service to Bangkok in return for a smaller subsidy. The Siamese rejected the offer

\textsuperscript{**}The Bangkok Times, 27 October 1901; C.O.273/296, Paget to Lansdowne, 24 February 1903.

\textsuperscript{**}The Bangkok Times, 10 and 12 June 1901.
fearing a further increase in German shipping.\(^{30}\)

Paget, the British Minister in Bangkok, made a similar suggestion in February 1903, that the Siamese government should consider granting a subsidy to a British line, Stewart and Harkinson. In support of Paget's proposal, Rivett-Carnac maintained that Siam needed a line capable of challenging the alliance between German shipping and the rice millers' combination. To back his case, Rivett-Carnac wrote to the King of Siam on 4 April 1903 explaining that the North German Lloyd held virtual control over Bangkok's shipping and freight rates. The Lloyd and several rice millers' in Siam had formed a ring with the aim of controlling the price of rice. Accordingly, the Lloyd refused to carry rice milled by firms outside the combination, especially when the rice market in Singapore was favourable. But also this time the Siamese government hesitated to grant a subsidy to the British firm of Stewart and Harkinson. The French had protested such a line.\(^{31}\)

In mid-1904, Paget asked the Siamese government whether it was now willing to consider granting a subsidy to the British firm Stewart and Harkinson. He argued that the time was right to establish a competing line of

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\(^{30}\) C.O. 273/287, No. 43693, Archer to Lansdowne, 13 September 1902, confidential; C.O. 273/296, Paget to Lansdowne, 24 February 1903; Cheong, "German Interest", p. 66.

\(^{31}\) C.O. 273/296, No. 13087, Rivett-Carnac to the King of Siam, 4 April 1903; C.O. 273/3, No. 18818, F.O. to C.O. 27 May 1904; Cheong, "German Interest", pp. 67-8.
steamers between Bangkok, Hong Kong and Singapore. According to Paget, German steamers were operating at a loss and if it was not for the continued large subsidies received from the German government, these steamers would cease operation.**2 It seems, however, that for the third time the Siamese government was not responsive.

The growing German influence in the railways and shipping of Siam did not escape public attention and was a topic of frequent discussion. On 4 November 1905, the "Bangkok Times" reported:

"The Straits Settlements belong to Britain, but their trade is dominated by Germans and Chinese. Germans predominate in the commerce and the shipping trade in Siam. Siamese railways are largely controlled by Germans. Even in Hongkong, there are now three times as many Germans as British firms."**3

Shortly after this article had appeared, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Anderson, raised the issue of Germany's growing shipping interests in a report to the Colonial Secretary, Lyttelton. Obviously magnifying the German threat to British interests in Siam, Anderson wrote:

"already German shipping has ousted British shipping almost completely from the Singapore-Bangkok trade, and its only serious rival is Norwegian shipping. If Norway, as is not impossible, accepts a dynastic connection with Germany leading to close political relations, the position of Germany in Siam will be very strong. ... Siam will ... replace the English


**3The Bangkok Times, 4 November 1905."
officials in its service by Germans."

The following excerpt from an article that appeared in the "Bangkok Times" of 29 October 1906 is another good example of how the extent of German influence and interest in Siam was exaggerated:

"The commerce of Siam is at present about equally divided between English and German merchants. Steamship lines of both nations call at Bangkok, and many officials of both nationalities are employed by the short railway and telegraph lines. The recent increase in the number of vessels in the service between Germany and the Far East would indicate that German merchants are determined to hold their own against the ever increasing pressure of not only English but especially Japanese competition. Siam offers a field for railway supplies, road-making machines, and farm implements as well as textile manufactured goods and the Germans are prepared to make the most of it."

German shipping gained a further advantage in 1907 when the Siamese government allowed German steamers heading for Bangkok to coal at Kohsichang, some 40 km off the mouth of the Menam river. Coal was brought in longhags and stored in two coal bulks erected for the purpose on the island. Previously, a considerable amount of cargo space was lost because steamers had to carry sufficient coal in their holds to Bangkok for the onward journey to the next coaling facility.

It must be noted, however, that Germany's shipping advantage in Siam lay primarily in transporting rice and

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"C.O.273/312, No.43668, Anderson to Lyttelton, 16 November 1905, secret.

"The Bangkok Times, 29 October 1906.

"The Bangkok Times, 11 May and 20 July 1907."
other goods. British export-import agencies in Bangkok still controlled most of Siam's foreign trade, including direct trade with Europe. In 1906, between 60 and 70 percent of Siam's total exports and imports went through British trading firms. There were only 5 German import agencies in Siam supplying various manufactured products from Europe, especially jewellery. Germany's entire share in Siam's foreign trade amounted to only 3 percent. There were about 60 steam rice-mills in Bangkok, British firms owned 2 of the largest, 14 were owned by British-Chinese, only 3 by Germans, and the rest by Siamese-Chinese subjects.

Also in direct investment Germany lagged far behind. In 1901, Germans held merely 1 concession for prospecting minerals in Siam. Only with extreme difficulty did the Germans manage to increase the number of prospecting mining licenses to 7 in 1907, and none were for actual mining. British speculators held most concessions granted by Siam (see Chapter 7). In 1906, foreign capital investment in Siam was estimated at 70 percent British, 10 percent German, 10 percent Danish, and 10 percent other nationalities.

C.0.273/327, No.18519, Report on Shipping Freight Conferences Operating in the Straits Settlements, in Anderson to C.O., 30 April 1907.

C.0.273/333, No.29967, Paget's General Report on Siam for the Year 1906, confidential.

Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Barmer Export Co.</td>
<td>Import-Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Behn, Meyer &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Import-Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A. Berli &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Import-Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>German-Slamese Trading Co.</td>
<td>Import-Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Falck &amp; Beideck</td>
<td>Import-Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Windsor &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Import-Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>F. Graehlert &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Jewellery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Leonhardt &amp; Tiegel</td>
<td>Jewellery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>J.R. Andre Nachf.</td>
<td>Jewellery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Pape Bros.</td>
<td>Medical Hall, Apothecary, Optics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bangkok Dispensary</td>
<td>Apothecary, Optics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>B. Grimm &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Apothecary, Steel Wares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Ta Tien Dispensary</td>
<td>Apothecary, Photography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>R. Lenz &amp; Co.</td>
<td>Postcards, Photography</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>F.H. Schule Ltd.</td>
<td>Rice Mills, Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Siemens Broth. Dynamo Works Ltd.</td>
<td>Dynamo Machines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were 16 German companies operating in Bangkok in 1912. They specialized mainly in trade, jewellery, medical care, photography, rice mills and machinery. As in Singapore, the Germans had their own social club in Bangkok. Thus, in the first decade of the 20th century Germany was indisputably the principal shipping power iniam—her shipping alone being bigger than that of all the other nations combined. This striking accomplishment seen from the point of view of British interests was nothing but pleasant. In terms of direct trade and investment, however, Germany's share remained small when compared with that of Britain.

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100 Vosberg-Rekow, *Asiatisches Jahrbuch*, p.263.
101 With Schmidt & Kuestermann in Hamburg.
102 With O. Beideck, Muelheim in Baden.
103 With Pickenpack & Co. in Hamburg.