

CHAPTER ONE

SIAM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

To understand the relations between the central authorities of Siam and northern Siam, a tributary state of the former, it is important to consider first the administration and economy of the Kingdom of Siam in the nineteenth century with particular emphasis on the relations between a tributary state or a *muang prathetsarat* and its sovereign ruler, Siam. What was a *prathetsarat*? What were its obligations towards its suzerain or overlord? Likewise, what were the responsibilities of a suzerain ruler to his *prathetsarat*?

Administration

The Kingdom of Siam in the nineteenth century was composed of three administrative levels. These were the inner provinces, the outer provinces, and the tributary states.¹ The capital city was the centre of administration. It was in the capital city that the palace of the Siamese monarch was located. The capital city was surrounded by the provinces and the Siamese districts. Although these provinces were ruled by chiefs who were either appointed or approved by the ruler, the degree of their submission to the capital depended on the effective power of the ruler as well as the distance between the capital and the districts. The extent of power enjoyed by a monarch was believed to radiate from the centre outwards. In other words, the personal power of the ruler decreased in proportion to the distance of an area from the capital, that is, conversely, the power of the local chieftain increased the further he was from the capital. Communication difficulties arising from the distance between the capital and provincial states led to situations whereby the local chiefs were fairly autonomous

and they sometimes ruled almost independently. A local chief needed only to refrain from an open challenge to the authority of a monarch to avoid intervention or direct interference from the centre. The centre was, in theory, militarily stronger and the King commanded resources which were usually sufficient to enable him to subdue any challenge to his authority from the provinces.

In the old Siamese Buddhist context, a powerful monarch was one who had sufficient *bunya baramii* (merit and the expression of merit) to conquer and rule effectively. He was able to mobilise a large army of men which enabled him to subdue his enemies. King Ram Kamhaeng (1277-1317) of the Sukhotai period, Naresuan (1590-1605) of Ayutthaya, and Taksin (1767-1782) of the Thonburi period are identified in Siamese history as powerful monarchs.

A Buddhist King gained legitimacy for his rule on the basis of his accumulated *bun* or merit. If the people of his Kingdom experienced prosperity, peace and other blessings, then the ruling King was said to have great *bun*. In contrast, the decline of prosperity and glory or the absence of tranquility during his reign was interpreted as a decline and therefore the end of his personal *baramii* (expression of merit) to rule. Phya Taksin, who defeated the Burmese after the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767, was said to have had sufficient *bun* to declare himself King. But the powerful rule of King Taksin ended with his death, only fifteen years after he occupied the throne. In 1782, Taksin was said to be insane and he was executed by his successor, General Chaophraya Chakri. Thus Taksin was said to have had sufficient *bun* to be a King but it was insufficient to last him a lifetime.² In the same year, Chaophraya Chakri (later Rama I) was crowned King. This marked the beginning of the Chakri Dynasty in Siam.

A Siamese (Buddhist) King, by tradition, is also a *dharmaraja* or King of righteousness. He has in him the ten virtues or *dharma* based on the tenets of Buddhism. The ten virtues are: almsgiving, morality, liberality, rectitude, gentleness, self-restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and non-obstruction.³ The glory of his Kingdom and the prosperity of his people are a direct outcome of the possession of these virtues. In other words, a *dharmaraja* ensures that his people enjoy glory and prosperity. Likewise, if he lacks virtue and merit, his state and people will suffer hardship. The institution of kingship which is central in Siam is closely linked to the well-being of the state and its people. A *dharmaraja* must be known for his just and meritorious deeds. In short, he is the embodiment of the virtues and teachings of Buddhism. As such, the King is the source and, at the same time, defender of everything which is virtuous; the state and his people are the beneficiaries.

The Inner and Outer Provinces

Since the fifteenth century, the inner provinces represented the core of the kingdom. These provinces were located within a short distance from the capital. There were four classes of inner provinces, based on their distance from the capital. The fourth class were those closest and the first class were those furthest from the capital. The chief officials of the inner provinces were referred to as acting governors or magistrates(*phu rang*).⁴

The outer provinces were those which "lay between the inner provinces and the Laotian tributary states".⁵ There were two different units within the outer provinces: the major townships and the subordinate townships and territories.⁶ The major townships were classified into first, second and third class townships and these came under the

control of the capital. They reported to either the Chief Minister of the *Mahatthai* (Civil Division) or the *Kalahom* (Military Division) or the *Khlang* (Treasury). The subordinate towns, on the other hand, came under the control of the major townships nearest to them. Chiefs of the subordinate towns, like the chiefs of the major townships, were called the *Chao muang* (governor or master of the town). The duties of a town governor included the maintenance of peace and order. In the case of a town which was situated close to the sea or bordered another state, the governor had the additional duty of defending the town from external attacks.

The town governor was assisted in the administration of his town by a group of officials referred to as the *Krommakan*.⁷ The *Krommakan* comprised the *Palat* or the Deputy Governor, *Phon*, *Mahatthai* and the *Yokkrabat*. The *Phon* was a military commander who was responsible for the defence of the territory. The *Mahatthai* or the Civil Division issued (important) writs and maintained records. The *Yokkrabat* was a legal officer who, at the same time, collected intelligence on local politics for the central government. He kept the central government informed of the conduct of the officers of the *Krommakan*. In the event of a misconduct or abuse of power by the *Krommakan* officials, the *Yokkrabat* reported the matter to the town governor. He was, therefore, a spy for the central government.

In Ayutthayan times (1350-1767), all the officials of the *Krommakan* were appointed from the capital. The rest of the subordinate officials were appointed by the governor. Through a Royal Decree issued by Rama I in 1802, the appointment of all the provincial officials was placed under the jurisdiction of the three central ministries: the *Mahatthai*, *Kalahom* and *Phrakhleng*.

The origins of the *Mahatthai* and *Kalahom* can be traced to the early period of Ayutthaya (1350-1569). During the reign of King Trailok (1448-1488), the people living around Ayutthaya were divided into two categories: the military and the civil. The office of the Head of the Military division was called the *Kalahom* and that of the Civil division, the *Mahatthai*. The Head or Chief of the *Mahatthai* was called the *Samuha Nayok* and the Chief of the *Kalahom*, the *Samuha Phra Kalahom*.⁸ There was, however, no clear distinction between the military and civil departments in terms of their functions. Members of the *Kalahom* and *Mahatthai* both supported the King in local disputes or in wars against foreign powers. Eventually, the *Kalahom* came to have control over the southern provinces and the *Mahatthai*, the northern provinces.⁹

Another Department that also had authority over the regions was the *Phrakhlang*. The Department of *Phrakhlang*, whose Chief was also called the *Phrakhlang*, was entrusted with the duty of looking after a number of coastal provinces. Originally the *Phrakhlang* (the Chief) was in charge of the Royal Treasury. When the Thai King participated in foreign trade, the *Phrakhlang* was given charge of the royal cargoes. It was the responsibility of the *Phrakhlang* to ensure that the King's ships were loaded with trade items of high commercial value such as ivory and sappanwood¹⁰.

Two departments were placed under the *Phrakhlang*. These were the *Krom Tha* which was the Department of Port Authority and the *Krom Phra Khlang Sinkha*, the Department of the Royal Warehouse.¹¹ As a result of his role in Siam's royal trade, the *Phrakhlang* came to be in frequent contact with foreign merchants. Foreigners soon approached the *Phrakhlang* first when dealing with Siam in relation to trade. As such, the Department of the *Phrakhlang* began to assume the role of a Department of Foreign Affairs. Up to the late nineteenth century, the Department of the *Phrakhlang* was in fact

both the Ministry of Treasury and Foreign Affairs.¹² Thus, the control and administration of all the provincial towns in the Kingdom of Siam were divided among the three Ministries. The *Mahatthai*, *Kalahom* and *Phrakhleng* represented the central government.

Governors at the provincial level were chosen from among the more prominent members of the local society and they were usually military leaders or men of sound financial standing. The government issued writs of appointment or *sanyabat* to every newly appointed governor. When a governor was issued with a *sanyabat*, he was said to begin "to eat the town" or *kin muang* because "the idea is that the ruler gets his livelihood and wealth"¹³ from the people of the *muang* under his charge. This also meant that the governor and his officers in the provinces enjoyed a great deal of financial autonomy. They imposed taxes on the local population and on their produce as well. One part of the revenue derived from these taxes was shared among the officials, hence providing them with a livelihood. The remaining part was sent to the central government in Bangkok through the respective Ministries: either the *Mahatthai* or the *Kalahom* or the *Phrakhleng*.

Relations between the Central Administration and the Inner and Outer Provinces

Provincial officers swore allegiance to the King in Bangkok twice a year in a ceremony called *phithi thu nam phi phat sataya* or "drinking of the water of allegiance". By partaking in this ceremony the provincial officials demonstrated their loyalty to the monarchy. The *phithi thu nam phi phat sataya* was considered to be one of the most important and ancient state ceremonies in Siam. It was associated closely with Buddhist rituals and served to maintain the established form of government in

Siam. The rite took place in the Royal Chapel in Bangkok and in one of the temples in each provincial capital. The water was blessed by Buddhist monks so as to purify it. On the day of the ceremony, a Brahman priest read out the oath and each official had to drink a small portion of the blessed water. The water which was placed in a small cup had to be consumed by the official to the last drop.¹⁴

The central government sent commissioners or *khaluang* to the provinces when it deemed it necessary. The most common and frequent occasions were when the central government wanted to survey the potential revenue of a province or to levy corvee labour. On other occasions, the commissioners were sent to act against banditry in the provinces and to restore law and order. In times of war with rebelling provinces and with foreign countries, the provinces were obliged to send men to join the main army in Bangkok.

The Tributary States

Distance from the capital distinguished the inner and outer provinces from that of the tributary states. For instance, travel between Bangkok and the northern tributary states using largely river transportation was arduous and took a long time. The inner and outer provinces were in regions which had easier access to Bangkok. The tributary states or otherwise referred to as *prathetsarat* (dependencies) were situated some distance further from Bangkok. The *prathetsarat* were not considered to be within the core of the Siamese Kingdom.

Tributary relations can be defined as that between states of unequal status. The patron state was the superior power while the tributary was usually the weaker. In mainland Southeast Asia, Siam and Burma were two rival regional super-powers. From

about the sixteenth century to the eighteenth, both Siam and Burma had a number of tributary (vassal) states owing allegiance to either one or the other. During this time, Siam and Burma earnestly endeavoured to wrest each other's vassal states. At the same time, Siam attempted to invade the Burmese Kingdom and Burma, in turn, launched numerous attacks on the Siamese territories with the intention of conquering the Kingdom of Ayutthaya (Siam).

Perhaps the best known of the Siamese defeats at the hands of the Burmese was the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767. Soon after the conquest, there emerged a Siamese general, Phya Taksin, who reconquered Ayutthaya from the Burmese. Following the conquest, Phya Taksin declared himself King and transferred his capital to Thonburi. Consequently, the period of King Taksin's reign, 1757-1782, is referred to as the Thonburi period. Taksin asserted Siam's superiority over Burma by re-establishing the Ayutthayan tributary system. It was during this period, from the second half of the eighteenth century, that most of the northern states acknowledged Siamese overlordship.

Chiang Mai, Lampang, and Lamphun were among the first of the northern states which moved away from Burma. In 1774, all three states paid allegiance to Siam. In 1774 too, Luang Prabang became a tributary of Siam, followed by Vientiane and Bassac in 1778. However, Cambodia which was traditionally a tributary state of Siam stopped her tributary payments after the fall of Ayutthaya. The Cambodian King refused to make tributary payments on the ground that the new King, Taksin, was "non-royal, a usurper, and half-Chinese".¹⁵ The recalcitrant Cambodia was attacked three times by Taksin before she resumed tributary payments to Siam. In 1782, Cambodia moved into the Thai orbit of influence. From then on, until 1867, Cambodia

was, for the most part, in a tributary relationship with Bangkok. Meanwhile, the three northern states mentioned earlier were joined by another state in the north. Nan, located to the extreme east of Chiang Mai, shifted allegiance from Burma and became a vassal state of Siam in 1788.

In the south, Siam's tributary states included the Sultanates of Pattani, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. Siam's political expansion into the northern Malay States began from the end of the thirteenth century.¹⁶ It was during the Sukhotai period, under the leadership of King Ramkamhaeng (1277-1317), that Siam first made inroads into the Malay Peninsula.¹⁷ Siam's influence over the Malay states stopped briefly after the fall of Ayutthaya to the Burmese in 1767. During this time, the Malay vassal states broke away from Siamese hold and reaffirmed their independence. During the reign of King Taksin, followed by the reigns of Rama I and II, Bangkok reasserted her influence over the vassal states in the Malay Peninsula. During the reign of Rama III, not only were most of the Siamese vassal states reclaimed, two other new states on the eastern side of the Malay Peninsula became vassal states to Siam. These were Kelantan and Trengganu.

In Burma, the succession of Bagyidaw, grandson of Bodawpaya, to the Burmese throne in 1819, saw the renewal of the traditional Burma-Siam rivalry with even greater vigour. Burma and Siam contested for complete control of the Isthmus of Kra which was essential to both parties as complete control ensured naval access to the Bay of Bengal and the Gulf of Siam. In contrast, partial control of either the western or the eastern side of the seaboard would weaken naval control of the Isthmus of Kra. Thus, Burmese control of Tavoy and Mergui, two principal ports at the Bay of Bengal, served to limit Siam's access to the western seaboard.

For the Burmese, the island of Thalang (an island rich in bird's nest) and Kedah (Siam's southern tributary state), both located at the southern end of the Isthmus of Kra and fronting the Bay of Bengal, were vital for complete control of the Isthmus. Siam intended to retain, at any cost, its control over Thalang and Kedah which were then under Siamese overlordship. This was best indicated by the preparations that were already set in motion by the Siamese, in the 1820's, for the defence of this region against Burmese invasion. And when Siam suspected the ruler of Kedah of allying himself with Burma, she invaded Kedah in 1821 and enforced the latter's complete submission to the Siamese court.¹⁸

The Tributary States: Obligations

As an expression of their unequal relations and their submission to the more powerful centre, the tributary states were obliged to present gifts. These gifts took various forms. In the case of the Malay states, the presentation of the *bunga mas dan perak* or the ornamental gold and silver tree was the most common form of tribute offering.¹⁹

The offering of the ornamental gold and silver tree was not a tradition that was exclusively peculiar to the southern tributary states of Siam. The sending of the gold and silver tree or any other gift of value was a traditional instrument of statecraft used to maintain regional balance of power among nations such as Burma, Siam and Vietnam. Many other smaller states in the region sought Siamese patronage and offered gifts to Siam voluntarily and these were acknowledged as offerings from a vassal state to a suzerain. In some instances, the tributary payment from a vassal state to a suzerain was not voluntary, but was made under coercion.²⁰

Apart from the ornamental gold and silver tree, some of the other tributary states offered forest products of commercial value. These included wood, beeswax, birds nest and gum benjamin. Cambodia's most valued tributary product was cardamom.²¹ From the northern states, Siam obtained wood, lacquer, hides, horns and benzoin. Birds' nest, a prized item in the Sino-Siamese junk trade, was procured mostly from the island of Phuket (Junk Ceylon or Thalang) in the south.

Siam's tributaries to the south tended to be less consistent in their show of allegiance; they were prone to break away from Siamese suzerainty when they did not require Siamese protection. This difference between the northern and southern tributary states was due largely to the differences in language, ethnicity, culture and religion.

Siam's tributaries to the north had closer cultural, language, ethnic and religious affinities with Siam. They belonged to the same race, the Tai, whose original homeland was in southern China. They were followers of Theravada Buddhism which in itself promoted a common religio-political culture.²² Theravada Buddhism had introduced to the Thais the idea that the monarch at the centre was a Buddhist *dharma* *raja* and his righteous rule determined the well-being of the state. As such, the people paid greater reverence to his rule. The northerners and Thais in the central region also spoke a language which was from the same linguistic family. Although these affinities cannot be taken to mean that there was no political tension between the north and centre, they, nevertheless, contributed to a more harmonious political understanding between the two.

There were further differences between the north and the south. One of the most significant was the participation in Siamese state ceremonies. Chiefs of the Malay states generally sent representatives to attend state ceremonies while the northern rulers, more

often than not, appeared in person. These state ceremonies included royal weddings, funerals and investitures or ordination.

The north and the central government also had links through marriages. It was a common practice in the past for northern royal families to offer their daughters to the Siamese King in marriage. In addition, it was more common for the sons of the northern chiefs to be sent to Bangkok for their formal education.²³ All these factors created a closer bond between the northern vassal states and the central government.

The ethnic and cultural differences between Siam and the Malay states were, of course, accentuated by the conversion of the Malay states to Islam in the fifteenth century after which the Malay states viewed most of Siam's beliefs and rituals as un-Islamic. The *prathetsarat* were given autonomy in their internal affairs. Succession to the rulership was hereditary, and they were allowed to continue observing their own customs, religion and way of life. As long as the *prathetsarat* acknowledged Siamese suzerainty or overlordship, there was no interference in their internal affairs. The *prathetsarat* were expected to submit their tribute offerings, the ornamental gold and silver trees for instance, at scheduled times. These were made at regular intervals which could vary from one to three years. When Cambodia paid dual allegiance to both Siam and Vietnam in the 1800's, she made tribute payment annually to Bangkok and once every three years to Hue.²⁴

The payment of tribute was compulsory. A delay in payment had to be explained immediately to the suzerain. The Treaty between Siam and Cambodia in 1863 made this point explicit. Article (X) of the Treaty stated that:

Regarding the articles of tribute which it has been customary to present to His Majesty the King of Siam by the Cambodian Government, and to send in charge of one of their nobles every year, if there be any

impediments, such as wars or other events, to their sending their tribute when due, and which would prevent its being presented for a year or two, and the Cambodian Government should request to defer it till a convenient opportunity, the Siamese Government give their consent, but if there be no such cause for delay, the Cambodian Government at the time appointed every year, will present the tribute by one of their nobles.²⁵

The *prathetsarat* also accepted other responsibilities. This included providing men to the capital when the need arose or when requested by the suzerain. They also provided military supplies, labour for public works and, occasionally, food for the army. For instance, in the early nineteenth century, men from Cambodia were mobilized to dig canals in both Bangkok and Vietnam.²⁶ In 1853, King Mongkut instructed the Chief of Nan to send a force of men to Sipsong Panna and Chiang Rung. They were expected to join a large army, consisting of forces from Phrae, Lampang, Lamphun and Chiang Mai, to attack and occupy Kengtung.²⁷ A similar demand was made by Rama III in order to quell the Chao Anu Rebellion in Vientiane in 1826/27.²⁸

The chiefs of the vassal states always acted with great care so as not to offend the patron. In 1821, Chao Sumon Thewarat, Chief of Nan, received a delegation from the rulers of Sipsong Panna and Chiang Rung. The chiefs of Sipsong Panna and Chiang Rung wanted to purchase six male elephants which they hoped to present as gifts to the new King of Ava. Chao Sumon Thewarat did not comply with the request immediately. Instead, he wrote to and consulted the King of Siam over the matter. Only after the King had granted permission, because Ava was then on friendly terms with Siam, was it considered proper for Chao Sumon Thewarat to proceed with the request.²⁹

It was obligatory for a *prathetsarat* to send white elephants, if found in their territories, to the suzerain ruler in the capital.³⁰ An article in the Treaty between Siam and Cambodia which referred to the white elephants clearly indicated this point. It said:

... should [the Cambodian authorities] meet with any white ones, either males or females, or with any curiously coloured ones, with the complete and requisite number of toes or nails, the Cambodian authorities will not conceal the facts, but send a communication with such elephants to be presented to His Majesty after the custom of the other tributary States of Siam.³¹

The tributary-state relations served two purposes for the suzerain. One, it was a practical and inexpensive way of obtaining goods of economic value from the *prathetsarat*. Two, it was an effective way to maintain security along Siam's extensive frontiers.³² The tributary states were used to help in the defence of the Kingdom, particularly its frontier states. The advantages to the *prathetsarat* culminating from its relations with the suzerain ruler, on the other hand, can be understood by first looking at the functions of the latter.

The Suzerain

A suzerain ruler was obliged to extend protection to the *prathetsarat* against all internal and external threats. It was customary for the suzerain to provide military assistance to the tributary states when the need arose or if requests were made.

Article (I) of the Treaty between Cambodia and Siam related to the provision of Siamese assistance should "the Cambodian nobles or the inhabitants rebel and collect forces to oppose the ruler of the country". In such a situation, "an army in the charge of a Royal Commissioner will be sent to quell the disturbances and restore the country to tranquility".³³

It was also Bangkok, as the suzerain, that formalized the appointment of a Chief to the throne of a tributary state. When the appointment was recognised, the regalia to rule was formally sent from the King of Siam in Bangkok. This was the case at least in Cambodia³⁴ and in the northern states of Siam. The appointment of Sumon Thewarat as Chief of Nan in 1811 illustrates this point. After the formal notification of his appointment, Sumon Thewarat called on the King in Bangkok, where the King presented him with the regalia of a ruling prince.³⁵ The regalia consisted of a golden betel nut chewing set, a golden goblet and cups, a golden spittoon, umbrella and guns.³⁶

The northern Malay States, however, stopped receiving from Siam the insignia to rule after the rulers of these states embraced Islam. It is relevant to note that the Malay states, prior to their conversion, received traditional Malay insignia from the Siamese monarch. The Malay insignia, according to Walter F. Vella, was different from that given to the Siamese states and officials. The Malay insignia comprised robes and various kinds of utensils.³⁷ The insignia apart, there was no distinction in the titles conferred on the Malay and Thai vassal states. Both Malay and Thai vassal states received Siamese titles. Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin Halim Shah of Kedah and the Governor of Nakhon Sithammarat (before the Siamese attack on Kedah in 1821), both held the title of *Chao Phraya*.³⁸

The sovereign ruler also bestowed titles and honours or presented gifts to the rulers of the *prathetsarat* when the latter presented the sovereign with gifts and in particular white elephants. In 1816, the Chief of Nan, Sumon Thewarat, offered a white elephant which was captured at Muang Ngam to the King in Bangkok. The King presented cash to the Chief, amounting to two *chang* (about 160 baht), and other fine gifts.³⁹

Unlike the suzerain ruler who benefited both politically and economically from the state-tributary relations, the tributary states stood mostly to gain from a political-military point of view.

Economic demands made by the suzerain ruler on the tributary states became increasingly burdensome especially when appointed tax collectors and, in later years, the *Chao pasi cjin* (Chinese tax farmers) who were responsible for tax collection, were oppressive. These people exacted from the local populace more than was stipulated and, in some cases, siphoned off a substantial amount of the taxes collected to their private funds while the state treasury remained poor. The nature of the state-tributary relations, from an economic point of view, can be better understood by referring to the economy of the Kingdom of Siam in the nineteenth century as well as the traditional system of revenue collection and the importance of trade.

The Economy

Agriculture and trade were the predominant economic activities in Siam during the first half of the nineteenth century. Agriculture for the most part consisted of the cultivation of rice and the gathering of forest products by the *phrai* or the commoners. The *phrai* cultivated crops and gathered forest products mainly for their own consumption and for the payment of tax and purchase of essentials. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, agriculture remained the most important sector in the economy of Siam. Production grew to meet the increasing demand from foreign traders.

Overseas trade, on the other hand, was a court or royal monopoly. Only the King and his noblemen engaged in Siam's trade with foreign countries. Three factors

appear to favour the King and the nobility. One, the King and the nobility received the right to purchase first (royal pre-emptive rights).⁴⁰ And, what they did not want was afterwards sold to the public or other private traders. Two, the King and the noblemen could purchase goods from producers at rates lower than market prices or at rates fixed by the court. Three, the King and the nobility traded goods which they received as gifts and taxes from the *phrai*.⁴¹ In this way, the court had control over the supply of goods and the revenue therefrom.

Apart from the royal class merchants, there were also a few merchants of non-nobility background. These groups of merchants engaged in trade as a privilege from the royal household. Non-nobility merchants comprised mostly foreigners like Chinese and Europeans. Some of these traders represented the Siamese King on trade trips abroad. The non-nobility traders were persons who were favoured in the Siamese court circle for various reasons. One such person was Robert Hunter, an Englishman and a trader in Siam during the reign of Rama III. Hunter held the title of *Luang Viset Bani*⁴² principally for his gift of muskets, an important item of military value sought by the Siamese court.⁴³

Beginning from the second half of the nineteenth century, Siam's external trade which was hitherto a court monopoly and one which was largely conducted with China expanded to include Western nations in a new unrestricted trade policy.

Traditional Revenue Collection

In the early part of the nineteenth century, the Thai state derived its revenue mostly from *suai* (payment in kind), land tax, Chinese poll tax, and profit from trade. *Suai* was an indirect system of taxation on the *phrai* (commoner) population. There

were different obligations and functions required of the *phrai* towards the King and the state. The most important of the obligations was corvee labour. As a rule, all *phrai* could be called up by the government for labour without any payment. Corvee was practised in Siam since the Ayutthayan period. During the reign of King Taksin (1767-1782), the mobilization of labour was further regulated. The Royal Decree of 1774 required that every *phrai* be tattooed with the name of their *munnai* (master/patron) and the name of the town in which the *phrai* resided.⁴⁴ The servant class for example were tattooed on their wrists.⁴⁵

There were two categories of labour in Siam in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These were the *phrai luang* and the *phrai som*. The *phrai luang* were men assigned to work for the King for three months in a year. The second category called the *phrai som* served the King for a month and the noblemen for the remaining two months.⁴⁶

The *phrai luang* served the King in the *ratchakan* (King's affairs). The *phrai luang* were men who were conscripted to carry out the bulk of the state's construction work. Construction work conducted by the *phrai luang* met the needs of both the royal household and the general public. These included the building of royal palaces, *wads* (temples), *stupas* (shrines), cities, forts and irrigation works.⁴⁷ The King placed the *phrai luang* under the control of nobles. These nobles became masters or *nai* to the *phrai luang*.

The *phrai som* were men working in the prince's service. A *phrai som*'s duties ranged from guarding the palace of the prince to serving as a messenger for the prince as well as accompanying the prince in his travels.⁴⁸ If the prince was involved in a war

or a local conflict, the *phrai som* was called upon for military services under the command of the prince.

The *phrai suai*, however, were *phrai* who were exempted from corvee. They were required to pay *suai* (payment in kind) in lieu of corvee. The *suai* payments were made to the *Chaos* (ruling class) and the King. Rice, sandalwood, sappanwood, beeswax, hides, horns, ivory, betel nut and other native products were among the items offered as *suai*. Alternatively, when the *phrai suai* could not fulfil their quota of the *suai* obligations in goods, *suai* could be paid in cash. *Suai* in currency was paid in *ngoen* (silver money) and *thong* (gold). *Nai kong* who were the masters or patrons to the *phrai* at the provincial (*kong*) level, collected the *suai* and handed it to local officials who were either the *Chao muang* (provincial ruler), *Palat* (deputy governor) or the *Yokrabat* (Legal Officer or Judge).

In Siam, the corvee system was not merely a system of exacting labour services from the people. It was also part of "an elaborate scheme of taxation".⁴⁹ Through this scheme the government received services and goods from the people in a regular manner. People who performed corvee provided services for the benefit of the government. Those who wanted to be exempted from corvee paid taxes in cash and goods. Both ways the government earned its revenue through a regular supply of goods and services.⁵⁰

There were other forms of revenue that the state collected. These were the land tax, poll tax, taxes on exports and imports and revenue from tax farms.⁵¹ The land tax was collected on rice land. Land tax was collected by local officials from the *Krom Na* (Ministry of Agriculture) and, as such, it was a direct form of taxation unlike the collection of *suai*. This was because the *krom* was a central administrative unit while

the *kong* was a provincial unit. Officials from the *Krom Na*, however, often failed to distinguish between private and state funds. Monies from the land tax were often regarded as their personal property and, therefore, did not reach the central Treasury.⁵²

When the demand for rice increased in the 1850's, King Mongkut was reported to have reduced the land tax on rice land. This measure was intended as an incentive to rice farmers to clear and cultivate new lands. Land tax on newly cultivated land was waived for the first few years.⁵³ Between 1857 and 1905, taxes on rice land were kept relatively low. They ranged from 0.125 to 0.375 baht per *rai*.⁵⁴ Furthermore, land tax was collected only in the central and northern region of Siam. The northeast or *Isan* was exempted from land tax.⁵⁵

The poll tax was a head tax imposed on the Chinese residing in Siam. As the Chinese were exempted from *suai* payments and corvee obligations, the poll tax served as the only form of taxation that the Chinese were subjected to. The poll tax was collected by *krom* (central) officials. The collection of the tax was made once every three years. Some accounts state that the tax was collected annually. The amount of poll tax imposed on the Chinese varied between 1.5 baht and 4.5 baht. Quaritch Wales, in his book, stated that the poll tax on the Chinese during the reign of Rama II was 1.5 ticals, payable once every three years.⁵⁶ Crawford gave the figure of 2 ticals payable to the government and 1.5 fuang to the collector of the poll tax.⁵⁷ Burney, in his account, stated that 4.5 baht was collected from every Chinese resident tri-annually.⁵⁸

Taxes on imports and exports were another source of revenue to the state. But the amount collected from import duties dwindled in the years following the Bowring Treaty of 1855. This was to a great extent due to the 3 % tax fixed on imports. In other words, prior to 1855, the Siamese King levied charges arbitrarily on the Western

merchants, whereas, in the years following the Bowring Treaty, this charge was fixed at 3 per cent. Hence, the effect of the Treaty was to reduce the revenue obtained by the King from this quarter.⁵⁹ Bowring suggested that the Treaty was one which "destroys many of the present and most fruitful sources of revenue".⁶⁰ Bowring also believed that the Treaty would destroy the lucrative tax farms, which were, in his words "undermining all the foundations of the national prosperity".⁶¹

But some scholars do not share Bowring's view that the Treaty of 1855 led to a "complete revolution to the financial system of the country".⁶² Indeed, the revenue from the tax farms increased steadily in the years after the Treaty was concluded⁶³ and it continued to be a form of revenue collection throughout the fourth (1851-1868) and well into the fifth (1868-1910) reigns of the Bangkok period. It was during the reign of Rama II (1809-1824) that some of the tax farms inherited from the Ayutthayan period resumed operation in Bangkok. These were the Chinese farms on gambling, liquor, market and fishing.⁶⁴ During the third reign (1824-1851), King Rama III extended the system of tax farming to include a wider range of products and services.⁶⁵

The *suai* in goods from the *phrai* constituted a major proportion of the merchandise with which the Siamese court traded with China.⁶⁶ In fact, it was said that the Thai King and nobility engaged in the state trade of Siam for "the purpose of selling the goods they collected in taxes or from services owed".⁶⁷ Thus, the collection of *suai* was an important source of revenue to the Siamese Kingdom. Essentially, *suai* provided the court with the supply of goods which were traded with China in the Sino-Siamese junk trade. *Suai* collected from the people of the northern tributary states was subsequently offered by the *Chao prathetsarat* (ruler of a dependency) along with other

gifts and tribute to the monarch in Bangkok. These items also constituted part of the merchandise in the junk trade.

The Growing Importance of Trade

Throughout the late eighteenth century and the first four decades of the nineteenth century, there was an important and regular trade between Siam and China.⁶⁸ Siam's trade with China was part of the *Nanhai* trade. The Chinese referred to the Southeast Asian region as the Southern Seas or *Nanhai*.⁶⁹ Siam's trade with China was important at this time mainly because of the strategic location of her port and the availability of teak which was essential to the shipbuilding industry.

Indeed, Siam was among the more important ports of call along the *Nanhai*-China trade route. In the nineteenth century, it became an entrepot for China's trade with the *Nanhai* countries. Various factors contributed to the rise of Siam as an entrepot.

First, Siam's location determined its importance in the China-*Nanhai* trade. It is well-known that the seaborne trade between China and the *Nanhai* countries depended primarily on the monsoon. Ships sailing from China to the *Nanhai* region relied on the northeast monsoon and waited for the southeast monsoon to sail back to China.⁷⁰ The trade route between Bangkok and China lay in the path of the two monsoons. Hence, Siam's location was well suited as an entrepot and drew traders from China as well as other Southeast Asian countries.

Second, Siam provided China with goods she needed. Trade staples, both rice and wood, found a ready market in China.⁷¹ Siam was also a collection point for goods from neighbouring countries, such as the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra and the Philippines.

Goods, indigenous to either Siam or the neighbouring countries, formed the bulk of merchandise in Siam's trade with China. Exports from Siam, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, included rice, wood, salt, coconut oil, hides, brown sugar, tin, iron, copper, lead, indigo, cotton, sticklac, benjamin, wax, horns and ivory. In the nineteenth century, pepper, white sugar and tobacco were introduced.⁷²

Third, closely linked to Siam's ability to provide China with a variety of trade items was the fact that there were a number of safe ports on both the eastern and western seaboard of the Gulf of Siam. Ports on the west coast included Chumpon, Chaiya, Bandon, Ligor and Singora. Chantabun (Chantaburi), Tungyai and Rayong were among the ports on the east coast.⁷³ Bangkok, the centre of Siam's trade activities, engaged in trade with these ports to obtain goods for the Chinese market.⁷⁴ In the early nineteenth century, pepper was the most sought after item of trade. Junks belonging to the King carried royal tributes in pepper from Chantaburi and Tungyai.

Fourth, no less important was the presence of a large community of Chinese residing in Bangkok. These Chinese provided useful services to facilitate Siam's trade with China.⁷⁵ They formed, very often, the majority of the crew on board the ocean-going vessels to China. Furthermore, as Lysa Hong has pointed out, Chinese immigration was encouraged by the King from the early period of the Bangkok Dynasty for two important reasons. The first reason was to increase the size of Siam's population. Repopulation was important because the war with Ava (Burma) had led to a depletion of population in parts of the country. The second reason was that the Chinese would provide the "manpower and expertise for trading, shipping, and navigation functions, as well as for the development of commercial agriculture".⁷⁶ The Burney

Report of 1826 indicated that the Chinese were the "manufacturers of sugar and other articles, the junk builders and navigators, and most of the shopkeepers at Bangkok".⁷⁷

Fifth, perhaps the most important factor for the rise of Siam as a trade entrepot was the availability in Siam of a large supply of shipbuilding materials. Teak, particularly, was in abundance. The large teak forests in northern Siam provided the Siamese monarch, through the annual *suai* payment or the triennial tribute, an abundant supply of teak. In fact many of the Chinese ocean-going vessels engaged in the overseas trade were built in Siam.⁷⁸ The availability of teak and other types of wood in Siam made the construction of junks in Siam relatively cheaper. In 1821, for instance, there was an average of 82 Siamese-constructed vessels, approximately 300 tons each, plying between China and Siam.⁷⁹

The shipbuilding industry also received support and patronage from the Siamese King. From the time of King Taksin (1767-1781), ships were constructed in Siam under royal patronage. In fact, Taksin was said to have authorised his Chinese merchants to sell both merchandise and the junks carrying the merchandise to the Chinese in Canton.⁸⁰ Some of the Chinese in Bangkok had the skills required in shipbuilding and, subsequently, were employed by the royal court as shipbuilders. As a result, most of the vessels built in Siam were modelled upon the Chinese *chuan* (junk).

The Siamese King and his noblemen were the principal merchants in the Sino-Siamese trade. King Rama I (1782-1809) and Rama II (1809-1824) sent trade junks to China regularly. Siamese royal fleets were sent to China 22 times during the 27 years that King Rama I ruled in Siam. During the reign of Rama II, junks belonging to the royal court were despatched 13 times to China and, during the reign of Rama III, junks were sent to China once every two years.⁸¹ The frequency of trade trips to China

suggests that the trade must have been very profitable to the Siamese kings and merchant classes.⁸²

Most of the crew members of the King's junks were Chinese.⁸³ Unlike crew members of a Western merchant ship, crew members of a Chinese junk were "merchants first and sailors second".⁸⁴ This was because most of the crewmen were not paid wages in cash. Instead, they were allotted cabin space which was usually hired out to carry passengers. They were also given space which was used to store goods and, subsequently, the goods were sold, on arrival, at the ports. In this way, the crewmen earned their remuneration. The Chinese on a Siamese junk held various positions. They were either agents for both Siamese and Chinese goods or trade brokers or leaders in a trade mission. Some of the Chinese settlers in Siam represented the Siamese King or other nobility in the junk trade to China.⁸⁵ There were also some private Chinese junk owners in Siam who traded with China. Most of their junks were constructed in Siam as well, and these merchants very often received patronage from the Siamese nobility.⁸⁶ The Siamese junk trade to China thus had significant Chinese elements.

Because the Siamese ocean-going junks were modelled upon the Chinese junks and were often constructed by Chinese artisans and its crew were largely Chinese, they were generally regarded in China as Chinese vessels. Siamese junks were regulated by similar customs rules as imposed on the indigenous vessels. They were also occasionally allowed to trade from one coastal port to another, a practice which was not permitted in the case of foreign vessels.⁸⁷

The Sino-Siamese trade which took place within a system of royal monopolies brought large profits to the state throughout the reigns of Rama I and Rama II. But the

importance of the Sino-Siamese trade declined from the 1840's, during the last decade of the reign of King Rama III. The declining trade had important repercussions because it was then that Siam needed more revenue to cope with the demands made on her by the Western countries. The court had to look for new sources of revenue and make more efficient its existing revenue collection mechanism.

Decline of the Sino-Siamese Trade

One of the reasons which led to the decline of the Sino-Siamese trade was the termination of royal monopolies by King Rama III. Lysa Hong points out that the royal trade monopolies were unable to compete with the trade of the Chinese traders.⁸⁸ The Chinese traders played a dual role. Firstly, they were royal trading factors, meaning that they were in charge of the royal cargo and traded for the King. Secondly, they also owned and sent junks to China. The latter were strictly private ventures. Thus Hong argues that the state-sponsored trade dwindled owing to the "priority that the Chinese merchants would have placed on their own business before that of the King's".⁸⁹ Private Chinese merchants reaped greater profits and increased their ownership of junks. In the 1820's, while the Siamese King, nobility and officials owned some twenty-odd junks, the Chinese residing in Siam owned 136 junks.⁹⁰

The overwhelming presence of the Western maritime powers in the Eastern Seas and their demand for the expansion of free trade, increasingly felt from the 1840's, eclipsed the Sino-Siamese trade. In the 1850's, tax farming replaced the junk trade as the most important source of cash revenue for the Siamese Kingdom.

Another factor that led to the decline of the junk trade was the development in ocean transportation. The superior European square-rigged vessels with their greater

capacity and speed as well as steamships, introduced a little later, soon replaced the Chinese junks.⁹¹ Towards the turn of the twentieth century, the number of junks, and with it the Chinese control of the trade of Siam, gradually diminished. During the same period, more square-rigged vessels were used in the foreign trade. In fact, from about the late 1830's, the King and nobility had become involved in the development of square-rigged vessels. Prominent among them was Chuang Bunnag, Minister of the *Kalahom*, during the reign of King Rama the IV.⁹²

Events in China arising from the Anglo-Chinese or the Opium War played a no less significant part in the shift from junk transport to square-rigged vessels. Following China's defeat in the war, the Treaty of Nanking was signed in 1842, first between China and Britain, and then between China and other European powers. Article II of the Treaty opened the ports of Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai to Western trade. The opening of these treaty ports removed the need for Siamese traders to rely on junks to gain entry into these ports. As mentioned earlier, junks, in the past, were granted access into Chinese ports other than Canton and observed the same customs regulations as native vessels. European square-rigged vessels, however, paid higher taxes and tariff and were restricted to trade at the port of Canton. After the Treaty, both European and Nanhai traders who entered the treaty ports were subjected to the same customs regulations, irrespective of the type of vessels used: junk or square-rigged. The need for Siam to engage Chinese sailors in order to receive favourable treatment from the Chinese officials was therefore removed. Without such advantages, the Siamese traders preferred the more spacious and speedier square-rigged vessels over the junks.

The decline in the Sino-Siamese trade also arose in part from the unreliable supply of previous forms of revenue. The collection of *suai* is a case in point. The

crown had minimal supervision over the *nai kongs* who were responsible for the collection of *suai*. The weak control that the central government had over the provincial areas allowed the *nai kongs* to get away with the embezzlement of *suai* belonging to the state. Also, the irregular supply of forest products and the dependence of the state on goods obtained through *suai* for trade purposes soon adversely affected the needs of an expanding economy, beginning from the 1850's.

There was an urgent need for more revenue; for this a regular and efficient method of obtaining it was sought during the reigns of King Rama IV and later his son, King Rama V. The need was especially felt when King Rama V embarked on a broad reorganization of the Siamese bureaucracy in a move to modernize the administration of the state. The implementation of administrative reforms required additional revenue. This could be achieved with a better regulated mechanism to improve tax collection. The expansion of the tax farming system in the 1850's was, therefore, an effort to have a reliable mechanism to collect revenue that was so vital to the reorganization of the Thai bureaucracy.⁹³

In northern Siam, the extension of the tax farming system began with the start of the centralization policy of King Rama V. Chatthip Nartsupha points out that the tax-farming system was introduced in Chiang Mai from the year 1873.⁹⁴ Taxes on lacquer (*krang*), beeswax (*ki pheng*), betel nut and siri leaf (*makplu*), Chinese delicacies (*khanom cjan ab*), opium (*fin*) and gambling (*bon bia*) were farmed out to *Chao pasi* (tax farmers).⁹⁵

Expansion of International Trade

In 1851, King Mongkut (Rama IV) ascended the throne upon the death of his half brother King Rama III. By then, Mongkut had spent twenty seven years in the Buddhist monkhood. During this time Mongkut studied English from Jesse Caswell, an American missionary in Bangkok.⁹⁶ Mongkut's education, mostly self-taught, encompassed various fields. He excelled in Pali which was the language of the Buddhist *Tripitaka* (scriptures) and studied astronomy, geography, as well as science. Mongkut's knowledge of the English language better prepared him to deal with foreigners. He was fully aware of the need to foster commercial and diplomatic relations with foreign nations as a means to prevent Western expansion into Siam. British annexation of the Burmese territories, Arakan and Tenasserim in 1826, alerted him to the need for a radical change in Siamese foreign policy.⁹⁷

As is now quite well-known, four years after the ascension of Mongkut, Siam opened her door to free trade. In 1855, John Bowring, a British government representative, succeeded in negotiating a treaty of friendship and commerce with Siam. The signing of the treaty between King Mongkut and Bowring - aimed at encouraging, facilitating, and regulating the trade and industry between Britain and Siam - helped to promote the expansion of international trade in Siam.⁹⁸ It is significant that articles similar to those in the Nanking Treaty of 1842, enunciating parity between Western-owned ships and those owned by the Siamese and Chinese, were found in the Bowring Treaty of 1855. Article VIII [Para 5], for example, stated that:

... it is agreed that British shipping shall enjoy all the privileges now exercised by, or which hereafter may be granted to, Siamese or Chinese vessel or junks.⁹⁹

As a result of the Bowring Treaty, almost all restrictions on imports and exports, previously imposed by the Siamese state, were removed. Import duties were fixed at 3 per cent while export duties (various rates) were specified on all export items. British, and subsequently other European, traders had access to all the seaports in the Kingdom.

There were also other factors which contributed to the expansion of international trade. The most important was the introduction of steamships as a more effective form of ocean transport. Whereas, in 1880, a total of 349 sailing ships and 182 steamships entered the port of Bangkok, in 1898, the number of sailing and steamships which called at the port of Bangkok were 7 and 511 respectively.¹⁰⁰

Ocean transportation in Siam in the nineteenth century went through a steady period of transition: first from junks to square-rigged vessels and, subsequently, to steamships. Similarly, the economy of Siam changed from one which produced a wide range of products in the early part of the nineteenth century to an economy which concentrated on the output of a few export commodities namely rice, tin, teak and, at the beginning of the twentieth century, rubber. This was especially so after the Free Trade Treaty of 1855.

Trade Commodities

As mentioned above, prior to the Free Trade Agreement of 1855, Siam's economy was more varied. Exports included sugar, pepper, salted fish and a variety of jungle produce. The volume and extent of trade was relatively small but its export composition was not determined by the specific commodities that were highly in demand in the international market.

Throughout the period 1900 to 1945, rice, tin, teak and rubber, accounted for almost 80 to 90 per cent in value of Siam's total exports.¹⁰¹ In short, the economy of Siam during this period became highly dependent on these commodities.

Rice was Siam's most important export item in the 1850's. For the rest of the nineteenth century, it remained Siam's top export earner. Large quantities of rice were shipped to the ports of Hong Kong and Singapore for further transshipment to Britain's other colonies in Asia. These colonies included Penang and the Malay States. The demand for rice from the British colonial governments stemmed largely from the need to feed the growing immigrant labourers employed there.

Until the 1900's, rice indeed formed two-thirds of Siam's total exports. During the same period, there was a sharp increase in the acreage of paddy land, indicating the importance of rice as a commercial crop. In 1850, 6 million *rai* (1 *rai*= 0.4 acres) were planted with rice. Between 1905 and 1906, the figure rose to 9 million *rai*. Although tin, teak and rubber emerged to take over as the major export items in the 1900's, rice continued to be Siam's staple export during this period. The dominance of rice as Siam's top export earner arose in part from the fact that 90 % of crop land was allocated to the cultivation of rice. This was the case for almost a century after the 1850's.¹⁰² A majority of the local people cultivated rice and provided the land and labour for rice farming. Rice traders and middlemen were mostly Chinese.

Tin was mined extensively in the late nineteenth century in the southern part of Siam. The island of Phuket and the provinces of Pangnga, Takuapa and Renong on the west coast of the Peninsula, produced more than half of Siam's total tin output¹⁰³ while Nakhon Sithammarat and Pattani on the east coast contributed a smaller amount annually.

Large scale tin extraction, beginning from the late nineteenth century, had a few distinct characteristics which remained unchanged for a long time. Firstly, it was labour intensive. Secondly, the mining industry employed a huge number of Chinese coolies of the Hokkien speech group. Thirdly, the industry was concentrated around Phuket and adjacent tin-rich areas on the west coast. Fourthly, the mining industry in Siam relied on capital investments from wealthy Chinese and Siamese nobles.

Tin was an important export item in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Between 1871 and 1900, it accounted for 7 to 15 percent in value of Siam's total exports.¹⁰⁴ Between 1901 and 1905, it accounted for 8 % of total exports and between 1906 and 1910, it rose to 9 % of the total exports.¹⁰⁵

The output of teak, during the same period (1901 and 1910), accounted for 10 % of the total exports in value.¹⁰⁶ Large scale teak extraction began in the 1880's and, at the start of the twentieth century, its contribution to the export economy of Siam outweighed tin. It did not remain, however, in this position for long. Between 1911 and 1920, tin contributed approximately 12 to 13 percent of Siam's exports while teak dropped to about 6 to 8 percent.¹⁰⁷ After the 1920's, the output of both tin and teak dropped significantly.

Rubber emerged as a more important commodity in the 1930's.¹⁰⁸ The crop was introduced in Siam in 1901 following the success of rubber cultivation in the Malay Peninsula.¹⁰⁹ But, it was only in the 1920's that the rubber sector began to expand in Siam.¹¹⁰ The rubber-growing areas were concentrated mostly in the southern region of Siam. The province of Trang on the southern part of the west cost of the Peninsula became the most important rubber growing area in the country.¹¹¹

Overview

The picture that emerges from this discussion of Siam in the nineteenth century is one of a kingdom which covered a large area and had a traditionally "loose" administrative and financial machinery, most of which can be traced back to the "glorious" days of Ayutthaya. But, developments on the international front, by the mid-nineteenth century, such as the expansion of Western maritime powers to this region and with it, the threat of colonization by Western powers, soon forced Siam to review her "Ayutthayan-style" administrative structure, in order to meet the demands of a new age, that of Western imperialism. Thus, by 1910, Siam became very different from what it was in 1867. From about the mid-1870's, Bangkok introduced major administrative reforms throughout the country, which included the core region, the provinces and the northern tributary states.

Perhaps, the most observable administrative change, and admittedly the one that required Bangkok to employ its utmost tact was, first, the extension of its political control to the "autonomous-five" (the five northern tributary states) and second, the incorporation of these states into Siam proper. By the second half of the nineteenth century these "autonomous-five" states received unprecedented attention from both the Western powers and Bangkok itself. Northern Siam's large teak forests drew the attention of the Western powers, while the problems and threat to Siam's northern frontier, as a result of this attention, forced Bangkok to assume political control of these states.

The extension of Bangkok's total control over the northern tributary states was gradual, covering a period of more than half a century. It is not clear to many that

Bangkok was aided considerably by two regional groups present in northern Siam, namely the missionaries and the teak traders, in its attempt to assume control of the northern states. Indeed, the present study argues that the missionaries and the teak traders not only created situations favourable for Bangkok to extend its control to the northern states but they were also largely instrumental in effecting important socio-economic changes in the northern region of Siam.

¹ Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration Of Siam, 1892-1915: The Ministry of the Interior under Prince Damrong Rajanubhab, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977, p.17.

The Bangkok Calendar, however, reports that the states were denominated: interior or inner, central and outer. According to the article, the interior belong to "Siam proper", while the outer were "simply tributary states". See Bangkok Calendar, 1868, p. 74.

² Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 37.

³ Dhani Nivat, "The Old Siamese Conception Of The Monarchy", in JSS, Vol. 36, Pt. 2, 1946/47, p. 95.

⁴ Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society in the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873, Data Paper No. 74, Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1969, p. 69.

⁵ Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, p. 17.

⁶ Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society, p. 69.

⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

⁸ Ibid., p. 66.

⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁰ Ian Brown, The Creation of the Modern Ministry of Finance in Siam, 1885-1910, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 6.

¹¹ Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society, p. 67.

¹² In October 1890, the Ministry of Finance was formally established to monitor all of Siam's financial affairs.

¹³ Bangkok Calendar, 1868, p. 76.

See also, Tej Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, p. 22.

¹⁴ For details see, H.G. Quaritch Wales, Siamese State Ceremonies, Their History and Function, London: Bernard Quaritch, 1931, pp. 193-198.

¹⁵ David P. Chandler, "Cambodia's Relations with Siam in the Early Bangkok Period: The Politics of a Tributary State", in JSS, Vol. 60, Pt. 1, 1972, p. 156.

¹⁶ Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III, 1824-1851, New York: J.J. Augustin

Incorporated, 1957, p. 59.

¹⁷ Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations, p. 3.

¹⁸ For a detail account of Siam's invasion of Kedah see, R. Bonney, Kedah, 1771-1821: The Search For Security and Independence, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971.

¹⁹ There is some disagreement as to the correct understanding of the gold and silver tree presentation in the context of the Siamese-Malay relations. While it was to the Malay rulers a token of friendship and alliance (tanda sepakat dan persahabatan), to the Siamese it was a gift from a vassal state to a suzerain ruler. For details on this subject, see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, Thai- Malay Relations: Traditional Intra-regional Relations from the Seventeenth to the Early Twentieth Centuries, pp. 56-57. On the Kedah viewpoint of the gold and silver tree as a free-will and complimentary offering to Siam, see R. Bonney, Kedah, 1771-1821: The Search for Security and Independence, p. 12.

²⁰ Cambodia is an example of a Siamese vassal state which was attacked and forced to submit her tributary payment to Siam.

²¹ David P. Chandler, "Cambodia's Relations with Siam", p.154.

²² Kobkua Suwanathat-Pian, Thai-Malay Relations, p. 41.

²³ Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III, pp. 78-79.

²⁴ David P. Chandler, "Cambodia's relations with Siam", p. 154.

²⁵ NA, R.5. T. 6.1/3, Treaty between Siam and Cambodia, relative to Commerce, Extradition, Succession, and Tribute. 1 Dec, 1863 (sgnd), in State Papers: Kingdom of Siam 1664-1886, London: William Ridgway, 1886, p. 26.

²⁶ David P. Chandler, "Cambodia's relations with Siam", p. 154.

²⁷ Prasert Churatana (trans.), D.K. Wyatt (ed.), The Nan Chronicle, Data Paper 59, Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1966, p. 74.

²⁸ A French source stated that each one of the Chiefs (*les souverains*) of Lamphun, Chiang Mai and Lampang sent the princes of their families to put themselves at the disposition of royal service against the army of Vientiane (Vieng Chan). See, Camille Notton, Annales Du Siam: Chronique de Xieng Mai, Vol. 3, Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1932, p.254.

²⁹ Prasert Churatana (trans.), The Nan Chronicle, p. 67.

- ³⁰ Siam's ruler was not the only sovereign who requested elephants from his vassal states. When King Alaungpaya of Burma occupied Siam, he wrote to the King of Siam and requested to be presented with a daughter and some elephants. See G.E. Harvey, History of Burma: From the Earliest Times to March 1824, The Beginning of the English Conquest, London: Frank Cass & Co, 1967, p. 241.
- ³¹ NA, R.5. T. 6.1/3, Treaty between Siam and Cambodia, p. 27.
- ³² David P. Chandler, "Cambodia's Relations with Siam", p. 154.
- ³³ NA, R.5. T.6.1/3, Treaty between Siam and Cambodia, p. 24.
- ³⁴ Ibid., p. 25. See Article (VII) of the Treaty.
- ³⁵ Prasert Churatana (trans.), The Nan Chronicle, p. 61.
- ³⁶ Ibid.
- ³⁷ Walter F. Vella, Siam Under Rama III, p. 60. See also, Footnote (6) on the same page.
- ³⁸ R. Bonney, Kedah, 1771-1821, p. 163.
- ³⁹ Prasert Churatana (trans.), The Nan Chronicle, p. 62.
- ⁴⁰ Ammar Siamwalla, "Kan karawang prathet kab rabob sethakit pay nai prathet (B.E. 2363-2398) [Foreign Trade and Domestic Economy in Siam (1820-1855)]", in Chatthip Nartsupha and Sompop Manarungsan (ed.), Prawatsat Sethakit Thai jon teng B.E.2484 [The History of Thai Economy until A.D. 1941], Bangkok: Samnakpiem Mahawityalai Thammasat, 1984, p. 149.
- ⁴¹ John Crawford, Journal of an Embassy To The Courts of Siam and Cochin China, Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 380.
- ⁴² Damrong Rajanubhab, "The Introduction of Western Culture in Siam", in JSS, Vol. 20, Pt. 2, 1926, p. 95.
Hunter was also responsible for introducing the first steamship to Siam in 1843. See W. Nunn, "Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam", in JSS, Vol. 15, Pt. 2, 1922, p. 100.
- ⁴³ Adey Moore, "An Early British Merchant In Bangkok", in Selected Articles from the Journal of Siam Society, Vol. 8, Bangkok, 1959, p. 245.
- ⁴⁴ Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society, p. 57.
This does not mean that the tradition of tattooing was introduced during the reign of

Taksin. In his account, Simon de la Loubere indicated that tattooing was practised during the reign of King Narai (1656-1688) of Ayutthaya. See Simon de la Loubere, Kingdom of Siam, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1968 (reprint), p. 78.

⁴⁵ B.J. Terwiel, "Tattooing In Thailand's History", paper presented at the Seventh Conference of the International Association of the Historians of Asia, Bangkok, 1977.

⁴⁶ Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset (eds.), The Political Economy of Siam, 1851-1910, Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand, 1981, p. 27.

⁴⁷ Akin Rabibhadana, The Organization of Thai Society, p. 33.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ B. Terwiel, "Bondage and Slavery in Early Nineteenth Century Siam" in Anthony Reid (ed.), Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia, St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1983, p. 126.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 127.

⁵¹ Constance M. Wilson, "Revenue Farming, Economic Development and Government Policy during the Early Bangkok Period, 1830-92", in John Butcher and Howard Dick (eds.), The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 147.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ James Ingram, "Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources", in C.D. Cowan (ed.), The Economic Development of South East Asia, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964, p. 110.

⁵⁴ Constance Wilson, "Revenue Farming, Economic Development and Government Policy", p. 147.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ H.G. Quaritch Wales, Ancient Siamese Government and Administration, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1965, p. 201.

⁵⁷ John Crawford, Journal of an Embassy To The Courts of Siam and Cochin China, p. 386.

⁵⁸ The Burney Papers, Vol. 2, Part 4, Vajirayana Library, Bangkok, 1910-1914 (reprint), p. 80.

Burney refers to the poll tax as capitation tax charged on every adult Chinese resident.

- ⁵⁹ Lysa Hong, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century: Evolution of the Economy and Society, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984, p. 82.
- ⁶⁰ John Bowring, The Kingdom and People of Siam, Oxford in Asia Historical Reprints, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969, p. 262.
- ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 263.
- ⁶² Ibid., p. 262.
- ⁶³ B.J. Terwiel, "The Bowring Treaty: Imperialism and the Indigenous Perspective", in JSS, Vol. 79, Pt. 2, 1991, p. 44.
- ⁶⁴ Lysa Hong, Thailand in the Nineteenth Century, p. 76.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ B. Terwiel, "Bondage and Slavery in Early Nineteenth Century Siam", p. 127.
- ⁶⁷ Jennifer W. Cushman, Fields From The Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam During The Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, Ithaca, New York: South East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993, p. 3.
- ⁶⁸ See, The Burney Papers, Vol 2, Part 4, p. 79.
Burney referred to the Siamese trade with China as the "most extensive as well as the most ancient part of the foreign commerce of Bangkok".
- ⁶⁹ The Chinese divided the Nanhai countries into two regions, namely the Tung-yang: the Eastern Ocean and the Hsi-yang: the Western Ocean. Siam, Indochina and the Malay Archipelago to the west of Brunei were included in the Hsi-yang circle while the region to the east of Brunei, Moluccas, Philippines and Celebes formed the Tung-yang. See Ng Chin Keong, "Chinese Trade with Southeast Asia in the 17th and 18th Centuries", in Kapal dan Harta Karam: Ships and Sunken Treasure, Kuala Lumpur: Persatuan Muzium Malaysia, 1986, p. 91.
See also, Wang Gangwu, The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early History of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea, JMBRAS, Vol. 31, Pt. 2, 1958.
- ⁷⁰ Ng Chin Keong, "Chinese Trade With Southeast Asia in the 17th and 18th Centuries", p. 91.
- ⁷¹ Jennifer W. Cushman, Fields From The Sea: Chinese Junk Trade With Siam, p. 5.
- ⁷² Ibid., p. 74.
- ⁷³ John Crawford, Journal of an Embassy to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, p. 413.

- ⁷⁴ European accounts refer to this branch of trade as the coastal trade of Siam.
- ⁷⁵ The Chinese played an important role in Siam's external trade from the time when Ayutthaya was the capital port of Siam. As the majority of Siam's population were not skilled in seafaring activities, Ayutthaya used the services of the overseas Chinese in her maritime activities, which included shipbuilding and trade.
See Charnvit Kasetsiri, "Ayudhya: Capital-Port Of Siam And Its "Chinese Connection" In The Fourteenth And Fifteenth Centuries", in *JSS*, Vol. 80, Pt. 1, 1992.
- ⁷⁶ Lysa Hong, *Thailand in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 48.
- ⁷⁷ *The Burney Papers*, Vol 2, Pt. 4, p. 79.
- ⁷⁸ Ng Chin Keong, "Chinese Trade With South East Asia in the 17th and 18th Centuries" p. 94.
- ⁷⁹ Ibid.
- ⁸⁰ Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit: Sino-Siamese Trade, 1652-1853*, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 163.
- ⁸¹ Akira Suehiro, *Capital Accumulation in Thailand, 1885-1985*, Honolulu: Centre for Asian Studies, 1989, p. 345. See Endnote (4).
- ⁸² Captain Burney for example, remarked that Siam earned up to 300 percent in profits from the junk trade. See, *The Burney Papers*, Vol. 2, Pt. 4, p. 80.
- ⁸³ Ibid., p. 47.
- ⁸⁴ Jennifer W. Cushman, *Fields From The Sea: Chinese Junk Trade With Siam*, p. 99.
- ⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 106.
- ⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 110.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 43.
- ⁸⁸ Lysa Hong, *Thailand in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 47.
- ⁸⁹ Ibid.
- ⁹⁰ Sarasin Viraphol, *Tribute and Profit*, p. 186.
- ⁹¹ Jennifer Cushman, *Fields From The Sea: Chinese Junk Trade With Siam*, p. 44.
See also, W. Nunn, "Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam", p. 100.

- ⁹² Jennifer Cushman, Fields From The Sea: Chinese Junk Trade with Siam, p. 112.
- ⁹³ Constance Wilson, "Revenue Farming, Economic Development and Government Policy", p. 148.
- ⁹⁴ Chatthip Nartsupha, Sethakit Muban Thai Nai Aditr [The Economy of Siam in the Past], Bangkok: Borisat Samnakpiem Sangoen Jamkad, 1990 (reprint), p. 54.
- ⁹⁵ Ibid.
- ⁹⁶ William L. Bradley, "Prince Mongkut and Jesse Caswell" in JSS, Vol. 54, Pt. 1, 1966, pp. 29-41.
- ⁹⁷ NA, Public Office Record, P.O./ 59, (copied from) F.O. 97/368, "British Assessment of King Mongkut's overtures to friendship with government of Britain and potential for British influence in the region".
A passage from the correspondence refers to the annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim and how it had "left the Burmese a sea coast almost exclusively confined to the mouths of the Irrawaddy". In the following paragraph, the writer (obviously a British), reminded Siam on the impending threat of a Burmese attack on Siam. The passage reads:
"Should circumstances render it desirable or compulsory to deprive the Burman empire of their remaining coast line, their attention will be naturally turned to the acquisition of an outlet in the Gulph [sic] of Siam, either across the Siamese territories, or through the Tenasserim provinces".
- ⁹⁸ Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development of Thailand, 1850-1950: Response to the Challenge of the World Economy, Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1989, p. 13.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 240.
- ¹⁰⁰ BCR (Siam), 1880 (p. 4) and 1898 (p. 14).
- ¹⁰¹ Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development of Thailand, p. 160.
- ¹⁰² James Ingram, "Thailand's Rice Trade and the Allocation of Resources", p. 109.
- ¹⁰³ John H. Heal, "Mines and Mining Administration", in Chatthip Nartsupha and Suthy Prasartset (eds.), The Political Economy of Siam, 1851-1910, p. 206.
Heal served as the Inspector General of the Siamese Royal Department of Mines for a period of time. The Department was established in 1891 under the Ministry of Agriculture.
- ¹⁰⁴ Sompop Manarungsan, Economic Development of Thailand, p. 160.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 161. (Figures derived from Table 6.1: Exports of Thailand, 1860-1950).

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. (Figures derived from Table 6.1).

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. (Figures derived from Table 6.1).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 107.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 110.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 107.