THE GENESIS OF FEYERABEND'S 'INCOMMENSURABILITY THESIS' AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO HIS PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIETY

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Abstract

This thesis explores the genesis of Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis and its relationship to his philosophy of science and society. The exposition commences with an introduction to the origin of incommensurability thesis in chapter one. A brief outlook of the concept is introduced. In the second chapter, intellectual influences of Popper and Wittgenstein on Feyerabend is examined. With these intellectual linkages in sight, Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis is elaborated in the light of philosophy of science, in chapter three. In the consequent chapter, the focus shifts towards Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis in the perspective of his philosophy of society. In the last chapter, a comparison between Feyerabend and his contemporaries has been sketched, with the intention to examine the significance of Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis in the field.
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