

**ISLAM AND INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY
UNDER THE YUDHOYONO PRESIDENCY**

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**ACADEMY OF ISLAMIC STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
KUALA LUMPUR**

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ABSTRACT

The central question posed by this study is why Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration, compared to the previous ones, came to embrace policy of active engagement with the issues of Muslim concerns? Using state level analysis that rests on the proposition that foreign policy begins at domestic situation and that external posture of state is determined mainly by the internal factor, this qualitative study attempted to search for the possible answer through dynamic relations between state and political Islam in Indonesia as the prime mover.

Drawn mainly from library research and interview, it revealed that both Soekarno and Soeharto have sidelined political Islam from the central discourse of domestic politics. Parallel to that, Indonesian foreign policy has been neutralized from Islamic influence, blocking Islamist groups from advancing their political standing at the international forum. Yudhoyono administration, however, showed significant shift by adopting series of foreign policies that show significant interest in Muslim concerns. It was first time that Islamic glossaries entered foreign policy speeches, and diplomatic machinery often cited jargons such as moderate Muslim, *rahmatan lil ālamīn*, and *ummatan wasaṭan*. The fact that Indonesia is a country with Muslim majority has been transformed to be the source of Indonesia's international identity, which consequently infused Indonesia to be involved in addressing various contemporary *ummatic* challenges, forging closer and strategic relations with the Middle East countries, mainly Saudi, as the cradle of Muslim civilization, and collaborating with Muslim organizations and intellectuals in formulating and implementing some of foreign policies. In doing so, Yudhoyono has made Islam, rather than being a liability, as foreign policy asset.

Further, this study reveals that Yudhoyono's resort to Islam due to two interrelated matters: the increasing importance of Islam in domestic politics in Indonesia, and the increasing level of state's confidence towards Islam, both of which consequently permit the Islamic nuance to be present in Indonesian foreign policy. The gradual proximity between state and Islam created harmonious and constructive relations, enabling Islam to make inroads in informing foreign policy, either dialectically through the Muslim pressure to the government, or peacefully by voluntary state's reception to incorporate Muslim aspirations.

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ABSTRAK

Persoalan utama yang ditimbulkan oleh kajian ini ialah mengapa dasar luar Indonesia semasa pentadbiran Yudhoyono, jika dibandingkan dengan pentadbiran yang terdahulu, merangkul dasar penglibatan secara aktif dengan isu-isu berkaitan Islam? Penggunaan analisis peringkat tinggi yang meletakkan bahawa dasar luar negara bermula di dalam negara dan keadaan luar negara kebanyakannya ditentukan oleh faktor dalaman, kajian kualitatif ini cuba mencari jawapan yang sebaik mungkin melalui hubungan dinamik di antara negeri dan politik Islam di Indonesia sebagai penggerak utama.

Melalui penyelidikan di perpustakaan dan wawancara, ia menunjukkan bahawa kedua-dua Soekarno dan Soeharto telah mengeneipkan politik Islam daripada wacana utama dalam politik domestik. Selari dengan itu, dasar luar Indonesia telah dineutralkan daripada pengaruh Islam dengan menghalang kumpulan Islam dari mengeneipkan kedudukan politik mereka di forum antarabangsa. Walau bagaimanapun pentadbiran Yudhoyono telah menunjukkan perubahan yang sangat ketara dengan mengamalkan beberapa dasar luar negara yang menunjukkan minat secara mendalam berkaitan Islam. Ia adalah merupakan kali pertama glosari Islam dimasukkan ke dalam ucapan dasar luar negara, dan jentera diplomatik selalu menggunakan jargon seperti *moderate Islam*, *rahmatan lil alamin* dan *ummatan wasatan*. Fakta menunjukkan bahawa Indonesia adalah sebuah negara yang majoritinya terdiri dari orang yang beragama Islam telah berubah menjadi sumber identiti antarabangsa Indonesia, yang seterusnya menyebabkan Indonesia terlibat dalam menangani pelbagai cabaran secara ummatik kontemporari. Perkara ini telah mengeratkan hubungan dan strategik dengan negara-negara Asia Barat, terutamanya negara Saudi sebagai permulaan satu asas tamadun Islam, dan bekerjasama dengan organisasi dan intelektual Islam dalam menggubal dan melaksanakan beberapa

dasar luar negara. Dengan berbuat demikian, Yudhoyono telah menjadikan Islam sebagai liabiliti kepada aset dasar luar negara.

Di samping itu, kajian ini telah menunjukkan bahawa Yudhoyono mengambil jalan islam disebabkan oleh dua perkara yang saling berkait: peningkatan kepentingan Islam dalam politik domestik di Indonesia, dan peningkatan tahap keyakinan negara-negara terhadap Islam, kedua-dua perkara ini telah mengakibatkan nuansa Islam terdapat di dalam dasar luar negara Indonesia. Pendekatan secara beransur-ansur di antara negeri dan Islam telah membentuk hubungan yang harmoni dan membina. Ini membolehkan Islam menembusi ke dasar luar negara, sama ada secara dialektik melalui tekanan penduduk islam kepada kerajaan, atau penerimaan secara aman oleh negeri secara sukarela untuk menggabungkan aspirasi penduduk Islam.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABRI	:	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
AICHR	:	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AKP	:	<i>Adelet ve Kalkinma Party</i> Justice and Development Party
APEC	:	Asia Pacific Economic Community
APSC	:	ASEAN Political Security Community
ASEAN	:	Association of Southeast Asia Nations
BAKIN	:	<i>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara</i> State Intelligence Coordinating Body
BPUPKI	:	<i>Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> Investigating Body for the Preparation of Independent Indonesia
BDF	:	Bali Democracy Forum
CIDES	:	Central Information and Development Studies
CSIS	:	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DDII	:	<i>Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia</i> Indonesian Council on Islamic Mission
Dephan	:	<i>Departemen Pertahanan</i> Department of Defense
DNPI	:	<i>Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim</i> National Climate Change Council
DPR	:	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> House of Representative
DPRD	:	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah</i> Regional Legislatives
EAS	:	East Asia Summit
FPA	:	Final Peace Agreement
FPI	:	<i>Front Pembela Islam</i> Islamic Defenders Front
FUI	:	<i>Forum Ummat Islam</i> Islamic Ummah Forum
G-20	:	Group of Twenty
Gerindo	:	<i>Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia</i> Indonesian People's Movement
GUPPI	:	<i>Gabungan Usaha untuk Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam</i>

	: Association for the Improvement of Islamic Education
HMI	: <i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam</i> Muslim Student Association
HMI - MPO	: <i>Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam – Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi</i> Muslim Student Association – Protector Committee of Organization
HRC	: Human Rights Council
IAEO	: Iran Atomic Energy Organization
IAEA	: International Atomic Energy Organization
ICKI	: <i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia</i> Association of Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals
ICMI	: <i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)
ICWA	: Indonesian Council on World Affairs
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
IMT	: International Monitoring Team
IPCC	: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IPD	: Institute for Peace and Democracy
JAT	: Jamaah Anshar Tauhid
JIB	: <i>Jong Islamieten Bond</i> / Islamic Youth Association
JIL	: <i>Jaringan Islam Liberal</i> Liberal Islam Network
KISDI	: <i>Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam</i> Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World
KNRP	: <i>Komite Nasional untuk Rakyat Palestina</i> National Committee for Palestine People
LDK	: <i>Lembaga Dakwah Kampus</i> University Student's Body for Islamic Predication
MER-C	: Medical Emergency Rescue Committee
MIAI	: <i>Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia</i> Higher Assembly of Islam Indonesia
MK	: <i>Mahkamah Konstitusi</i> Constitutional Court
MNLF	: Moro National Liberation Front
MMI	: <i>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</i> Indonesia Mujahedeen Council
MPR	: <i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i>

		People's Consultative Assembly
NLD	:	National League for Democracy
NU	:	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> The Revival of Ulemas
NAASP	:	New Asian Africa Strategic Partnership
NASAKOM	:	<i>Nasionalis Agamis Komunis</i> Nationalist Religious Communist
OIC	:	Organization of Islamic Cooperation
OIC-PCSP	:	OIC Peace Committee for Southern Philippines
OLDEFOS	:	Old Established Forces
PAN	:	<i>Partai Amanat Nasional</i> National Mandate Party
Parindra	:	<i>Partai Indonesia Raya</i> Great Indonesian Party
Parmusi	:	<i>Partai Muslimin Indonesia</i> Indonesian Muslim Party
Partindo	:	<i>Partai Indonesia</i> Indonesian Party
PBB	:	<i>Partai Bulan Bintang</i> Crescent Party
PDI	:	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> Indonesian Democratic Party
PDS	:	<i>Partai Damai Sejahtera</i> Prosperous Peace Party
Persis	:	<i>Persatuan Islam</i> Islamic Union
PII	:	<i>Pelajar Islam Indonesia</i> Indonesian Islam Students
PKB	:	<i>Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa</i> National Awakening Party
PKI	:	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> Indonesian Communist Party
PKS	:	<i>Partai Keadilan Sejahtera</i> Just and Prosperous Party
PLO	:	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNI	:	<i>Partai Nasional Indonesia</i>

	Indonesian National Party
PP	: <i>Peraturan Pemerintah</i> Government Regulation
PPOI	: <i>Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam</i> Preparatory Committee for the Unification of the Islamic Community
PPP	: <i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> United Development Party
PPKI	: <i>Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia</i> Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia
PPPKI	: <i>Permoefakatan Perhimpoean Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia</i> Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Association
PRRI	: <i>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia</i> Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
SDI	: <i>Sarekat Dagang Islam</i> Islamic Trade Association
SI	: <i>Sarekat Islam</i> Islamic Association
SPDC	: State Peace and Development Council
UN	: United Nations
UNGA	: UN General Assembly
UNHCR	: United Nations High Commission for Refugee
UNFCCC	: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC	: United Nations Security Council
USINDO	: United States – Indonesia Society
WTO	: World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background Information

The question of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy has been a unique case of anomaly. As home to more than 207 million Indonesian Muslim population out of 237 million total population,¹ Indonesia constitutes the largest country with Muslim population in the world, followed by Pakistan and India respectively. Along with such vast quantitative number, Islam in Indonesia has also emerged qualitatively as robust political force, accompanied by the increasing number of vibrant civil society organizations. With such fact, one might assume that Indonesian foreign policy would be “Islamic”, more assertive in Islamic issues, or at least reflected in its verbal articulation and declaratory form. Or put it differently, foreign policy of Indonesia would display certain level of activism in dealing with the concerns within the Muslim world.

Most of previous analysis, nevertheless, arrived at the contradicting conclusion that the role of religious affinity has always been a secondary, marginal, never occupied a central position in Indonesian foreign policy and Islam has played a peripheral role in informing state’s external behaviour, therefore not reflected in much of Indonesian foreign policy. (discussed further in the Literature Review section within this chapter).

However, no single state is immune to the changes in the conduct and the orientation of foreign policy as today’s contemporary world is conspicuously marked by constant political change in the international relations. The realignment policy of Islamic Republic of Iran on its western allies after the Islamic revolution in 1979, new posture of Turkish foreign policy during the domination of AKP (*Adelet ve Kalkinma*

¹ “Penduduk Menurut Wilayah dan Agama yang Dianut,” *Badan Pusat Statistik* Website, accessed on July 2nd, 2014, <http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321>

Party/Justice and Development Party) in the Turkish parliament, and the United States unilateral decision to invade Afghanistan following the 9/11 attack, are to mention the few examples of profound changes taking place in state's external reaction. Hermann described it as "pervasive quality of governmental foreign policy."²

In this context, what happened in Indonesia when the wave of *reformasi* swept the country in 1998 called my attention to study further academically the possible linkage between Islam as political and social force and Indonesian foreign policy with special reference to the issues of Muslim concern. The *reformasi*, which heralded democracy and demanded the supremacy of law, has brought about change in Indonesian domestic political landscape. By assuming that foreign policy begins at home, such a change has undoubtedly constructed new possibility in shaping the fresh outlook of Indonesia's external behavior.

The seed of this dissertation commenced with my early observation on twofold: (1) the changing posture of Indonesian political landscape after the *reformasi* 1998, which was marked by, inter alia, the accretive significance of political Islam, and (2) the incremental activism of Indonesian foreign policy, notably in the last ten years under the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (henceforth referred to as Yudhoyono) who assumed the presidency for ten years, from 2004 until 2014.

First, the system of modern Indonesian political institutions has been experiencing considerable changes after the downfall of *Orde Baru* regime (New Order) in 1998. The political system was substantially reshaped to capture the increasing public demands and to absorb the people's aspirations at the political field, and the transformation became more salient after the holding of legislative general election that took place in 1999. One of the most conspicuous features of the nation's trajectory is that the democratic system has captured the momentum ever since: political power,

² Charles F Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (March 1990), 3.

once overtly centralized, has been gradually decentralized; new political institutions have been remade; political parties has emerged with vastly different ideologies and platforms; social organizations with ideological diversity mushroomed in the public life; public media began to expand and clamored the public opinion at unprecedented level; and freedom of speech became the currency of Indonesian contemporary politics.

Against such backdrop, the Islamist movements captured the ongoing democratic momentum, and subsequently reaped its dividend. Islamic organizations and Muslim circles initiated to contribute and take active part in the newly political system by establishing Islamic political parties and social organizations, which either openly acceded to the Islamic platform or modestly adopt nationalist religious agendas. It was, at least, noted that five notable Islamic political parties did participate in the 1999 legislative election, and surprisingly claimed 34 % of total vote, making them eligible to 170 seats in the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* / People Representative Council, henceforth referred to as DPR). The electoral vote of those Islamic parties increased to 41.99 % in subsequent 2004 general election and failed to gain electoral traction in the 2009 legislative election by claiming only 28.81%.³

However, as Tanuwidjaja studied, the decline of electoral clout of Islamic political parties should not be understood as the failure of political Islam. He succinctly argued that the increasing religious aspiration and accommodation in the DPR by both Islamic and non – Islamic Parties, along with the open discussion on controversial religious issues such as Bill on Pornography, was suffice to claim that political Islam played significant role in the system. It showed, moreover, the strength of religious influence in the politics.⁴

³ Komisi Pemilihan Umum, *Pemilu Untuk Pemula* (Jakarta: Komisi Pemilihan Umum, 2010).

⁴ Sunny Tanuwidjaja, "Political Islam and Islamic Parties in Indonesia: Critically Assessing the Evidence of Islam's Political Decline," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, no. 1 (April 2010), 29 – 49.

Second, along with the rise of political Islam in Indonesian domestic political system, Yudhoyono administration in the last ten years has developed Indonesian foreign policy posture and shaped the outlook to become more agile than ever in responding to the contemporary global challenges. Indonesian foreign policy has considerably experienced substantial changes after the political upheaval that ended Suharto's three-decade-long-rule. Corresponding to its geographical vastness, resource endowment, demographic population, economic stability and political achievements, Indonesia seeks to strengthen the leadership in the region and play a more active role in the matters of global concern by promoting the country as "bridge builder" and "problem solver". The strategy has made some to bill Indonesia as an emerging middle-power in the world. Some bold and consistent decisions have been made by Yudhoyono in order to, inter alia, reconstruct Indonesia's international image.⁵

On May 20th, 2005, in front of ICWA (The Indonesian Council on World Affairs), the similar tone of speech was delivered by President Yudhoyono, in which he admitted the statement as his first foreign policy speech. He explained:

In short, constructivism helps us to use our independence and activism to be a peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, bridge-builder. This way, our independent and active policy becomes relevant-- relevant to our national interests, relevant to our people, relevant to the international community.⁶

Five days later, invited at the USINDO (The United States – Indonesia Society) gathering, the newly elected President Yudhoyono reaffirmed his take on Indonesian

⁵ Rizal Sukma, "Domestic Politics and Indonesia's International Posture," *East Asia Forum* Website, updated on October 18th, 2011, accessed on January 9th, 2013, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/18/domestic-politics-and-indonesia-s-international-posture/>; Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia's Cautious Confidence," *Project Syndicate* Website, updated on July 16th, 2013, accessed on January 9th, 2014, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/asean-and-indonesia-s-foreign-policy-priorities-by-dewi-f--anwar>.

⁶ Susilo B Yudhoyono, "Speech Before The Indonesian Council on World Affairs (ICWA)," *Kemlu* Website, updated on May 20th, 2005, accessed on January 20th, 2014, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/presiden/Pages/Speech-by-H.E.-Dr.-Susilo-Bambang-Yudhoyono-President-of-the-Republic-of-Indonesia-before-the-Indone.aspx>.

foreign policy by clearly charting a new course of Indonesian foreign policy in his dinner speech:

Finally, there is the profile of internationalism. It means that Indonesia is preoccupied with domestic affairs, and the cliché about Indonesia being inward-looking no longer applies to us. Indonesia is now an outward-looking country very much eager to shape regional and international order, and intent on having our voice heard.⁷

These two important speeches were considered a political reference of Indonesian profile at the international stage and a blueprint for the future trajectory of Indonesian foreign policy under his leadership.

Indonesian foreign policy outlook that was made during these years has been the reflection of Indonesia's repositioning at multiple fronts: at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level. Being confident of Indonesia's democratic attainment, Indonesia seeks to be engaged in any global issues of common interests. In the 2012 Annual Press Statement, Minister Marty said, "Indonesia always projected its leadership in addressing the myriad issues in the region and in the world at large."⁸

At the bilateral level, Indonesia has planned to establish new diplomatic relations with all the country members of the UN (United Nations), excluding Israel and Taiwan, mediated the negotiation on the Cambodia-Thailand conflict in 2011, and consistently promoted peaceful negotiation among the claimant states on the issue of South China Sea. At the regional level, Indonesia seeks to boost the role of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asia Nations) in the world by strengthening the three pillars of ASEAN Community; politic and security, economic, and socio-cultural. While at the global level, Indonesia joined G-20 (Group of Twenty), and actively engaged in multilateral forums such as UN, OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation), WTO (World Trade Organization), and APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Community). Infused

⁷ Susilo B Yudhoyono, "Keynote Address at Dinner Tendered By USINDO", *PNRI Website*, updated on May 25th, 2005, accessed on January 20th, 2014, <http://sby.kepustakaan-presiden.pnri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2005/05/25/337>.

⁸ Marty Natalegawa, "Annual Press Statement 2012" (Jakarta, Indonesia, January 2012), 2.

with the jargon of “Navigating through Turbulent Oceans”, “Thousands Friends and Zero Enemy”, “All Directions Foreign Policy”, and “Multi-track Diplomacy”, Indonesia has shifted its foreign policy from “backbenchers” to “frontbenchers”.

Within this spirit, Indonesian foreign policy took novel step by envisioning the identity of Indonesia as the world’s largest Muslim. Indonesia has been projected to be a country where Islam, democracy and modernity can develop hand in hand. Adding to that, Yudhoyono also considered Indonesia as Muslim majority country that put concern on the contemporary challenges facing today’s *ummah* (Islamic community) as can be seen from his remark given at Islamic University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, in Riyadh, April 26 2006.⁹ Some Islamic jargons, such as *rahmatan lil ālamīn* (blessing and prosperity for the universe), *tasāmuh* (toleration), and *ummatan wasaṭan* (which commonly translated to Muslim moderate) have been part of Indonesia’s diplomatic daily language.

Not only have these Islamic glossaries been used in the corps of Indonesian diplomacy, but also systematically translated to the actual conduct of Indonesia’s external relations. Indonesia has been actively involved in spreading the true face of Indonesian Muslim abroad through the initiative of interfaith dialogue. To achieve that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been collaborating with several Muslim organizations and regularly conducting consultative meeting with them. In the issue of Muslim minority in non-OIC member countries, such as Rohingya in Myanmar, as the Muslim majority country, Indonesia showed its intense commitment to lend political advice and provide necessary humanitarian assistance to alleviate their sufferings. In the issue of Palestine, while Indonesia has always been the staunch supporter to the establishment of independent Palestine at the various multilateral forums, Indonesia

⁹ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, “Remarks By H.E. Dr. H. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono President of the Republic of Indonesia at Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Bin Sâud Riyadh,” *Kemlu* Website, updated on April 26th, 2006, accessed on November 26th, 2016, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/presiden/Pages/Remarks-By-H.E.-Dr.-H.-Susilo-Bambang-Yudhoyono-President-of-the-Republic-of-Indonesia-at-Islamic-Un.aspx>

initiated a fresh approach by strengthening Palestine human resources through capacity building and vocational program. Indonesia also attempted to forge closer bilateral relations with several Middle East countries, in terms of political, social and economic relations, especially with Saudi Arabia, commonly considered as the cradle of Islam.

The “Islamic” identity of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy and activism in solving the Muslim concern has been unprecedented. Both, the new projected identity of Moderate Islam, the posture and the approach of Indonesian foreign policy towards the Muslim concern, has become somewhat different from two the previous Presidents, who considered Islam as liability rather than an important asset in foreign policy. However, with the coming of *reformasi*, Islam has been considered an important player in the domestic politics, and consequently infused its effect on foreign policy.¹⁰

Considering above explanation, it becomes interesting to go deeper to the seemingly changed posture of Indonesian foreign policy, especially that related to the issues of Muslim concern and Muslim world by linking it to the political events taking place at domestic level including the rise of political Islam. Such curiosity emerges essentially from two main assumptions that (1) political Islam started to gain place and take active in Indonesian domestic politics and (2) democratic government has to display the acceptable level of accountability towards its constituent, which will be manifested, inter alia, through the process of foreign policies and initiatives.

1.2. Research Questions

Henceforth, the main focus of this dissertation is the changing nature of Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues of Muslim concern and the Muslim world during Yudhoyono administration (2004 – 2014) by examining its relation to the domestic

¹⁰ Rizal Sukma, “Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Responsibilities,” in *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant*, ed. Anthony Reid, Indonesia Update Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 77 - 92.

political situation and specifically political Islam. Three particular questions were put forward in this dissertation, namely:

1. How was Indonesian foreign policy posture towards the issues of Muslim concerns before *reformasi* during the administration of both Soekarno and Soeharto?
2. How was Indonesian foreign policy posture towards the issues of Muslim concerns after *reformasi*, with special focus on Yudhoyono's term of presidency?
3. Why Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration came to embrace foreign policy of active engagement with the issues of Muslim concerns?

1.3. Research Objectives

In line with the above questions, this dissertation specifically attempts to pursue the following objectives:

1. Analysis on Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues of Muslim concerns before *reformasi*, during Soeharto and Soekarno.
2. Analysis on Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues of Muslim concerns after *reformasi*, especially during Yudhoyono administration. The first and the second objectives are important to understand the policy changes, especially those relate to the issues of Muslim concerns that have been taking place during different administrations.
3. Analysis on the factors contributing to the changes in Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues of Muslim concern during Yudhoyono administration.

1.4. Scope of Research

This dissertation falls within the dynamic of domestic level analysis that put focus on the importance of state – political Islam relations with regards to the shaping and changing of Indonesian foreign policies, especially those towards the issues of Muslim concerns. To that end, time selection is pivotal in this dissertation for academic and operational purposes. The period of Yudhoyono administration, which lasted for ten years (2004 – 2014), has been purposively chosen for several reasons.

First, during these years, the government of Indonesia appeared to be actively involved in the matters of *ummatic* challenges, coupled with the government's ardent use of Islamic glossaries in the foreign policy agendas. In addition to that, Islam, as political and social force, and state have been observed to be at the positive terms and constructive cooperation than ever. While such rudimentary observation provided an ample indication to the changing government behavior towards the Islamic issues, it presented confirmation the importance of Islam in the process of foreign policy process as well. In line with the proposition of this dissertation, it is argued that many actions and policies of Yudhoyono administration with regard to the Islamic issues contradicted those of previous administrations.

Second, it was during this particular time that the *Kemenlu* (*Kementerian Luar Negeri*/Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the focal point of foreign policy implementation within the executive body, restructured its institution by encouraging civic engagement in the diplomatic activities. To illustrate, a directorate within the ministry has been established to deal with the public issues, called Directorate of Public Diplomacy. In its operation, the newly established unit handled mostly the issue of Interfaith Dialogue and other related Islamic issues. It has been always in constant contact with religious leaders of Muslim organizations.

In addition to that, the period of 2004 – 2014 has demonstrated as the first stable administration after *reformasi*, allowing the ruling government to implement more structured and oriented foreign policy.¹¹ Some analysts called it as the period of democratic consolidation that was marked by, among others, the first direct presidential election Indonesia in 2004.¹² The Habibie administration, while contributed to the guiding and leading the first wave of *reformasi*, has been seen as interregnum and transitional since his presidency lasted only 17 months after his *Pidato Pertanggungjawaban* (accountability speech) was denied by MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*/People's Consultative Assembly) (herein referred to People's Assembly). Abdurrahman Wahid presidency lasted less than two years before the People's Assembly overthrown him and assigned the presidency mandate to his Vice President accordingly.¹³ Megawati, who replaced Abdurrahman Wahid, had been occupied by critical political and economic domestic crisis, and made foreign policy less prioritized. It can be seen from her accountability speech before the People Assembly, in which she made little reference to the foreign policy issues.¹⁴ By doing so, however, it is not necessarily limited to that strict specific timeframe as any foreign policies are not able to operate in vacuum. "Back and forth across the regimes" approach to the specific related data will be necessary when it seems relevant to the research.

¹¹ Avery Poole, "A 'Democratic' Process? Change and Continuity in Foreign Policy Making in Indonesia" (Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) Annual Conference, Murdoch University, 2013), <http://www.auspsa.org.au/page/apsa-conference-2013>, 1.

¹² Louay Abdulbaki, "Democratization in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 2 (2008).

¹³ During his presidency, Abdurrahman Wahid faced some critical issues domestically. His priority was to keep Indonesia intact as one nation. There were three separatist movements that became the thorny issues for Abdurrahman Wahid, namely Aceh, Maluku and Papua. See Anthony L Smith, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or Status Quo State?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 22, no. 3 (December 2000), 507.

¹⁴ Donald E Weatherbee, "Indonesian Foreign Policy: A Wounded Phoenix," *South Asian Affairs*, 2005, 150.

With regard to the level of analysis, by excluding international and personal level, this dissertation focuses on the domestic analysis (will be elaborated in chapter two). Hence, it analyses the relations between state and Islam as political and social force, and connects it to the external posture of Indonesia as manifested throughout some of Indonesian foreign policies and initiatives.

The subject of dissertation is Indonesian foreign policy with regard to the Muslim concerns, including policies towards the Middle East countries. The policy will be selected through commonly used classification in diplomatic terms, namely bilateral, regional, multilateral, and other selected issues. For instance, Indonesian foreign policy towards Palestine cause, Middle East countries (bilateral), Rohingya, Southern Philippines (regional), OIC, Iran Nuclear Program (Multilateral), Indonesia's initiative on interfaith dialogue. Some of those issues were usually controversial, and some even sparked parliament reaction, public criticism, and demonstration from Muslim communities.

This dissertation uses the definition of foreign policy provided by K. J. Holsti, who referred it to the state's action toward outside its boundaries and the conditions framing the policy formulation. As such, the definition denotes that foreign policy is a decision process, covering three, yet interrelated areas: (1) the influences of foreign policy, (2) the process of policy formulation, and (3) the implementation. The Influence is defined as the sources of foreign policy, while the process covers state's formulation of policy, and the implementation is the actual conduct of initiative and policy.¹⁵ Even though the subject of dissertation is foreign policy, the analysis might also elaborate the national policy in general since the two (national and foreign policies) are in dynamic influence theoretically. Foreign policy begins at home, which means that

¹⁵ K. J Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1972), 21.

national policy could be the basis for the making of foreign policy. Therefore, the clear cut separation of two would be avoided.

1.5. Expected Contribution and Limitation of Study

This dissertation is expected to contribute to both academic and practical fields. In terms of academic, it attempts to contribute to the development of interdisciplinary Islamic studies in its extensive field outside the theological construct, by combining the discipline of international relations. As Islam becomes a rapidly spreading religion in the world in terms of number of believers, the question of its substance in the realm of today's practices could provide useful insight what has happened in the Muslim world today. Research on political Islam in Indonesia at the domestic level has been widely conducted, but to connect such domestic politics into the outcomes of actual foreign policy has been wanting and scarce, especially after the increasing popularity of religion in the international studies. By analyzing Indonesian foreign policy and Islam, this dissertation will be an added effort to the enrichment of Interdisciplinary Islamic studies.

At the practical level, this dissertation will be useful for decision makers, especially those working on foreign services, interested in the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy. Unmasking academically the rationale and what drive foreign policy will provide hints of "what is important and seriously considered" in certain state. Such hints are important for the decision makers to anticipate the best practices when dealing with their foreign counterparts.

In terms of limitation, as other qualitative researches of case study, generalization of result is avoided. The result will be uniquely applied to the Indonesian foreign policy cases.

1.6. Literature Review

1.6.1. Islam and Foreign Policy

Amongst the first books discussing the role of Islam in foreign policy is the work of Adeed Dawisha et. al, under title “Islam in Foreign Policy,” written in 1983. Covering ten countries, mostly in the Middle East region, the book attempted to fill the long neglected area of study. Some scholars assumed that the increasing role of Islam in International politics began capturing the attention of scholars following the 1978 Islamic revolution despite the fact that Islamization of politics has long preceded that.

In this book, the writers explored the role of Islam by treating foreign policy in terms of its declaratory as well as operational aspects, thus, providing reasonable explanation on foreign policy in different states. The analysis included not only behavioral level of policy, but also verbal level. The diversity of approaches used by writers allowed the reader to get rich understanding on unique relation of Islam and foreign policy in the framework of Islam and state.

In his analysis on Iranian foreign policy, for example, Ramazani argued that domestic power struggle between right-wing Muslim (Shiite clerics), secular technocratic (Bazargan Government), and Bani-Sadr reflected much in the shape of Iranian foreign policy. He referred to the crisis of American hostage, by which all political segments attempted to win the argument over another. This complex interaction between these factions has also included ideological conflicts of various kinds and degrees of intensity, stemming from different interpretations of Islam. In the crisis of American hostage, Khomeini considered it as struggle between Islam and blasphemy, while Bani-Sadr faction understood it as struggle for Iran’s independence.¹⁶

Dessouki analyzed Egypt’s foreign policy during two different regimes: ‘Abd al-Nasir and Anwar Sadat. The influence of Islam was “ups and downs” during these

¹⁶ R. K Ramazani, “Khomeini’s Islam in Iran’s Foreign Policy,” in *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Published in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15.

two different regimes. The year between 1952 and 1956 was considered as the honeymoon phase between Islam and Egypt's foreign policy since Islamic discourse became the major theme in most of foreign policy. The subsequent period, however, witnessed the "break up" phase despite the Nasir's reliance on Islam for political purposes. In the era of his successor, Anwar Sadat, the pattern of "ups and downs" remained. In his early years of presidency, Sadat resorted much on Islam by citing Islamic symbolism to support his threatened legitimacy at domestic level. However, it did not constrain him in formulating foreign policy which was seen as unfriendly to the Muslim world and Islamic issues. Such ambiguity continued to happen and triggered uncertainty among Muslim organizations, then, propelled to the live-claiming fire attack.¹⁷

The work of Brenda Shaffer et al in "The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy" is another book illuminating the area of study. As clearly shown in the title, the book viewed Islam from cultural perspective. Thus, identity and history are the prevailing discussed themes and main focus of analysis. Employing constructivism approach by contesting material and non-material interests, the writers analyzed the possible influence of Islam in foreign policy in the Caspian and Central Asian states. The book is strict in selecting the study cases by limiting to the states proclaiming as Islamic states, namely Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. From the beginning of the book, one could assume the skeptical nuance of Islam's role in foreign policy. One of the book's findings is that "cultural affinity does not necessarily translate into political alliances or close cooperation."¹⁸

¹⁷ Alie E. Hilal Dessouki, "The Limits of Instrumentalism: Islam in Egypt's Foreign Policy," in *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Published in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Cambridge University Press, 1983), 84 - 95.

¹⁸ Brenda Shaffer, "Introduction: The Limits of Culture," in *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy*, ed. Brenda Shaffer, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass. ; London, England: MIT Press, 2006), 5.

Another illuminating study was presented by Shanti Nair in book “Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy.” The book demonstrated how Malaysia’s politics at domestic level have been full of fluctuating role of Islam and its identity. The resurgence of Islam has found expression in Malaysia’s external behaviour. Foreign policy, Nair argued, has been used by United Malays National Organization UMNO for political mobilization and control for its interest. The Islamic identity acclaimed by UMNO and reflected in Malaysian foreign policy was also utilized as an instrument to fend off external Islamic influence that might endanger the status quo of UMNO in Malaysia’s politics.¹⁹

1.6.2. Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy

The research on Indonesian foreign policy with relation to Islam has not received much attention from scholars, unlike that on Islam and domestic politics. The reasons for this lack of such attention could be varied, from ontological, to methodological (details will be elaborated in chapter 2 on theoretical framework). Such scarcity leads to further technical challenge. As Perwita argued, there is less written about because there is less to write about.²⁰ Another reason could be the pessimistic view that Islam or religions never play an important role in foreign policy of secular Indonesia.

In this section, I will try to review all known studies of Indonesian foreign policy and Islam and provide categories as it were. In this regard, I made two categories based on the conclusion made; First, researches concluding the minor role of Islam; Second, the research concluding the dynamic role of Islam.

In the first category, in a nutshell, the common features of studies on Islam and Indonesian foreign policy, shared the conclusion that Islamic factor has never been playing significant role in Indonesia’s foreign policy with varying explanations. If there

¹⁹ Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1997).

²⁰ Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen; Abingdon: NIAS ; Marston [distributor], 2007), vii.

is influence, it is defined in terms of constraints rather than positive impact. Studies conducted by Michael Leifer, Rizal Sukma, G. Robert Hein, McMichael, Wicaksana, and Suryadinata openly opined that Islamic consideration in Indonesian foreign policy decisions made during the Indonesia's history has been limited.

Leifer began his analysis by providing historical construction of contested identity between Islam and secular faction in the constitution during the formation of Indonesia, which is central to his argument. The reached consensus between Islamic and nationalist factions within the *Konstituante* (Constitutional Assembly of Indonesia) to adopt *Pancasila* (Five Pillars) rather than Djakarta Charter, unfortunately, still inherited some grievances among protagonists of Islam. Thus, the question of identity has been left unsolved. The insertion of controversial statement on *Sharīa* into Indonesian constitution dominated the heated discussion in Constituent Assembly in 1957 and 1959, and once again, the concerted attempt failed.²¹

Islam's role began diminishing since then, being domesticated, and even confronted in many aspects. And it is within this framework the role of Islam is analyzed. Indonesian government had been conscious of its position to not allow foreign policy being hijacked by Muslim groups for Islamic agenda in order to advance their standing in domestic politics. Despite this, where Islamic issues are concerned, the nuance of balancing in foreign policy is maintained to appease Muslim communities, otherwise it would be cultivated as rallying cause to confront the government. If there was affinity to Islamic causes, and only in limited cases however, Leifer claimed it as the strategic move to mobilize Islam community for pragmatic purposes.²²

²¹ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London ; Boston: Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Allen & Unwin, 1983), 136 - 141.

²² Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional Ambiguity," in *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Published in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Cambridge University Press, 1983), 144 – 159.

Sukma's line of arguments is almost identical to Leifer, whom he has acknowledged an intellectual debt. Expanding the framework provided by Leifer, Sukma examined two main arguments, dilemma of dual identity, and domestic weakness, as the prime reasons for the absence of Islam in Indonesia's foreign policy. He viewed that the question of identity is critical in better understanding the relationship between Islam and Indonesian foreign policy. Employing no explicit theoretical approach,²³ Sukma summed up by arguing that Islam has entered Indonesian foreign policy in form rather than substance. In terms of domestic weakness, Sukma opined that the domestic predicament that focused on the attainment of independence and West Papua in the early Indonesia made Islam absent in foreign policy.²⁴

Similar to that, Hein, who focusing on Soeharto administration, attributed the words "ambiguity" to Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues of Islamic concern. And he reasoned that the central focus of Indonesia as a nation and state has been the consolidation and institutionalization of a basically secular state structure over the largest Muslim population in the world.²⁵

In different analysis, McMichael viewed the suspicion that the Indonesian government had towards the domestic Muslim communities became the main constraining factor for the government to take more assertive style of foreign policy to possible cooperation with other Muslim countries and Pan – Islamic organizations. For that reason, despite the fact that Indonesia has been the country with Muslim majority population, it had only been a passive spectator of Middle East politics and took more ambivalent policy towards Islamic issues. Political stability was of paramount important consideration for the then government, and therefore any closer link to the Middle East

²³ Johan Saravanamuttu, *Malaysia's Foreign Policy, the First Fifty Years: Alignment, Neutralism, Islamism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 7.

²⁴ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: Routledge Curzon, 2003).

²⁵ Gordon Robert Hein, "Soeharto's Foreign Policy: Second-Generation Nationalism in Indonesia" (University of California, 1986).

could open the possibility of encroaching influence of orthodox Islam to the country. More than that, the political rivalry between Islam and military faction that control the country made the first unable to inform the shape of Indonesian foreign policy.²⁶

Drawing similar conclusion, Suryadinata critically presented his view on the reasons why Islam has never played a significant role in Indonesian foreign policy. Within the framework of multiethnic and multireligious nature of Indonesian society and the character of Indonesian Islam, especially in Java, Suryadinata opined that Indonesian foreign policy has been secular because of the secular nature of Indonesian leaders. By using idiosyncratic” analysis and categorizing Soekarno and Soeharto as *Abangan / Kejawen*, type of belief that amalgamates values of Islam and Javanese and some refers to syncretic type of Muslim as opposed to *Santri*, devoted Muslim, Islam became hardly important factor for consideration in processing foreign policy.²⁷

In a more recent study, Wicaksana made a different approach by analyzing a single issue of Jakarta – Islamabad relations as the case study. His study concentrated on the actual external behavior of Indonesia by focusing on three propositions; First, the importance of identity of state in examining the role of Islam, Second, analysis on elite interests and domestic politics as those can shed light on the policy preferences; Third, dynamics of external behavior in understanding the limited role of Indonesia. Using this analytical framework, he concludes that Islam has not become the major consideration of Indonesia in shaping her foreign policy, in which he described it as marginal. He argued that secular economic and political agendas dominated Jakarta’s priorities in dealing with Pakistan. Despite consistent pressure from domestic constituencies, mostly

²⁶ Heath McMichael, *Indonesian Foreign Policy: Towards a More Assertive Style*, Research Paper, no. 40 (Nathan, Qld., Australia: Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations, School of Modern Asian Studies, Griffith University, 1987), 4.

²⁷ Leo Suryadinata, “Islam and Suharto’s Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia,” *Asian Survey* 35, no. 3 (March 1995), 291.

from Muslim community, the government differed with those domestic articulation due to Jakarta's prevention from Islam's influence in the policy making process.²⁸

Using comparative case study, Widdowson analyzed three countries with majority of Muslim population: Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. By focusing on statements, speeches, and actual conduct of elites in these countries, Widdowson came to conclude that Islam played no apparent role in the Indonesian foreign Indonesia despite that fact that majority of Indonesia's population professed Islam. The study, however, acknowledged that the formulation of Indonesia's foreign policy was conducted in the context of respect for Islam and an awareness of the strength of Islam.²⁹

Those previous researches clearly drew similar pattern of expected conclusion that the role of Islam has been minor, if not to say absent. Despite rich analysis on the issue of Islam and Indonesian foreign policy, there are three brief comments made on the previous studies. First, there is a need to make a distinction between Islam as merely political ideology and Islam as political and social force. As political ideology, the "taste of Islam" is hardly found in Indonesia's foreign policy because the nature of basic principles of Indonesia has not been Islam. However, Islam as a political and social force has been embedded in Indonesia's history, shaping the dynamic of and contributing in constructing the Indonesia's politic. Despite its ups and downs rapport between Islam and state, the setting in which foreign policy is being made has been always full of state-society dialectic. Second, most of studies, except for Wicaksana's study, provide "macro understanding" of Indonesia's foreign policies, paying minor attention to the specific cases, in which the role of Islam could be fairly specified and understood. Third, the study by Sukma, for instance, stressed the significance of what

²⁸ I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, "Islam and Indonesia's Foreign Policy, with Special Focus on Jakarta - Islamabad Relations" (University of Western Australia, 2012).

²⁹ Harry John Widdowson, "The Influence of Islam on the Formation of the Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia" (University of Hongkong, 1976).

Weinsten called “long-term factors.”³⁰ The dual identity, as proposed by Sukma, could not provide satisfying explanation on the recent Yudhoyono’s appeal to use Islam in Indonesian foreign policy.

Within the second category, by analyzing four decisions in Indonesian foreign policy (OIC, Middle East crisis, resolution of Moro problem and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina), Perwita made a compelling cases on the state-society relationship in Indonesian foreign policy towards the Muslim world. He depicted the tensions between Muslim community’s demand and state’s decision by concluding that the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy has demonstrated the continuity and change in perceptions and attitudes to Islam and its position in Indonesian foreign policy. He concluded that:

The role of the Muslim community in foreign policy issues depended greatly on the domestic political situation. Sometimes, however, Indonesia’s Muslim community was able to play a substantial role in influencing Indonesia’s politics hence also its foreign policies [...] Even though over the years the Indonesian government has strived to deny a significant role for Islam,[...], the major hypothesis in this study is applicable, namely that foreign policies are also influenced by the religious views and beliefs of policymakers and their constituents.³¹

With different angle of analysis, Azra said that when dealing with issues of Islamic concern, Indonesian government faces dilemmatic position. In one hand, the government takes careful consideration. On the other hand, it consistently dismisses the Islamic influence in foreign policy making process. The government then took neutral position by using non-Islamic jargon (*Ukhuwwah or Ummah*) when dealing with issues such as Palestine, Libya, Iraq, or Bosnia. Instead, the Government of Indonesia underlines the necessity of humanitarian aspect on the issue. With the growing apparent Islamic forces domestically, however, the pressure from non state actors, especially from Islamic platform organizations and public opinion has compelled the government

³⁰ Franklin B. Weinsten, “The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries,” *World Politics* 24, no. 3 (1972).

³¹ Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond*, 176.

to wisely consider the issue of Islamic concern. In analyzing some Indonesian foreign policies, Azra also considered the nature of identity of Indonesia as a non-Islamic state. Thus, the identity, regardless being Muslim majority, has constrained the government being dictated by Islamic considerations.³²

Study of Yulyadi, which was his dissertation at the Malaya University, provided fresh insight in which he concluded that the Islamic awakening in Indonesia, beginning from 1993, has to certain extent informed Indonesian foreign policy. In order to prove his thesis, Yulyadi provided different cases such as Indonesian foreign policy in regional context and towards Muslim countries, in which the influence of Islam is salient. In making the case, Yulyadi made the establishment of CIDES (Central Information and Development Studies), spearheaded by *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia/ICMI* (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) as the turning point of the Islamic influence in Indonesia. The conflict of influence between CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and CIDES on the policies of government was the epicentrum of his analysis in Indonesian foreign policy.³³

The study by Delphine Alles on transnational Islamic actors and Indonesia's foreign policy focused on the dynamic role of Islamic organizations in Indonesia, which have set the internationalization at the center of their projects. These organizations, categorized as transnational actors, promote their model beyond Indonesia's political borders and seek to echo their agenda to the updated Indonesia's foreign policy, especially following 1998. Coincided with the reform agenda of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the role of transnational actors have become more intense. In this regards, the role of Islam is analyzed within the constraint imposed by the neutrality of Indonesia's constitution. This book addressed the Islamic transnational actors as major contributors

³² Azyumardi Azra, *Indonesia, Islam, and Democracy: Dynamics in a Global Context* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Solstice Pub, 2006), 89 - 132.

³³ Lily Yulyadi, "The Impact of Islamic Awakening on Indonesian Foreign Policy, 1993-2004" (Malaya University, 2011).

in shaping and framing Indonesia's foreign policy, rather than limiting them into "anecdotal roles".³⁴

1.6.3. Summary of Literature Review

From above literature review, some important notes need to be considered. First, the main analysis falls within the limited role of Islam in influencing Indonesia's foreign policy (Hein, Leifer, Sukma, Suryadinata, Wicaksana, McMichael), and the dynamic role of Islam in positive terms (Perwita, Azra and Yulyadi). Second, the research mentioned above put focus on Indonesian foreign policy through domestic explanation with different angles. Third, some research looked at the foreign policy through macro understanding, which is relevant to depict the overall picture, while some others zoomed in by looking at specific case study, which is also positive in providing "precise" assessment. Fourth, the research covered Indonesian foreign policies before Yudhoyono administration (presidency of both Soekarno and Soeharto, and before Yudhoyono administration).

This research, therefore, will use some of the approaches used by previous studies and at the same time take slightly different path. First, the focus of study will be on the domestic explanation to unbox the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy, instead of idiosyncrasy and international explanation. Domestic explanation, specifically the state – Islam relations, will serve as the "ingredients" of political background, in which state formulate the foreign policy. The approach is almost identical with most of previous studies, except the fact that democratic institutions were more prevailing during Yudhoyono administration, which in turn influenced the dynamic interaction between different policy actors. Second, as has been pointed out earlier, Islam is understood not only in the context of ideology, but as political and social force, capable

³⁴ Delphine Alles, *Transnational Islamic Actors and Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Transcending the State* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

of influencing outcomes of foreign policy. Third, the time of research will be during Yudhoyono administration (2004-2014). This study, therefore, constitutes the continuation of Yulyadi's research, which studied foreign policy between 1993 and 2004. Fourth, the study will be limited on foreign policies with regard to Muslim concerns because it would be used to capture the relations between Islam and Indonesian foreign policies as it will provide better taste of the dynamic interaction within the foreign policy decisions.

The discussion of literature on Islam and Indonesian foreign policy presented in this section led to two propositions that shaped the structure this dissertation. First of all, the insight that level of influence or engagement of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy rises and falls within the fluctuations in the domestic affairs suggests that understanding on the development of domestic political system and political Islam in Indonesia is best suited to capture Indonesian foreign policy decision. The second important proposition is the importance of examining the nature of influence in specific cases (that relates to the issues of Muslim concerns) in order to avoid overgeneralization of conclusion in determining the role of Islam.

Table 1.1. Summary of Previous Studies

Author	Analysis	Conclusion	Case Study
Hein (1986)	National priority	Minor role of Islam	Soeharto
Leifer (1983)	National Identity	Minor role of Islam	Soekarno and Soeharto
Sukma (2003)	Dilemma of dual Identity and domestic weakness	Minor role of Islam	Soekarno and Soeharto
Suryadinata (1995)	Idiosyncrasy of leader (personal)	Minor role of Islam	Soekarno and Soeharto
Wicaksana (2012)	Identity, elite interests, external behavior	Minor role of Islam	Single Case study (Pakistan – Indonesia)
McMichael (1987)	Government Perception towards Islam	Minor role of Islam	
Widdowson (1976)	National priority	Minor role of Islam	Soekarno's Foreign Policy
Perwita (2007)	State – Society Relations	Dynamic role of Islam	Four Cases (OIC, Middle East, Moro, Bosnia)
Yulyadi (2011)	Islamic awakening (CIDES vs CSIS)	Positive role of Islam	Multiple Cases (regional and Middle East Countries) during Soeharto
Alles (2016)	Transnational Islamic Actors	Major role of Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy	Post - 1998

Source: Author, 2015

1.7. Research Methodology

1.7.1. Research Design

In general, this dissertation is a qualitative study that puts emphasize on qualities of entities, process, and meaning, which is suitable to this dissertation that attempts to uncover the foreign policy process. While the design tailored for this qualitative study depends, according to Gschwend and Schimmelfennig, on the research problems posed, unit of analysis, and the cases.³⁵

As has been explained, this dissertation deals with the question on why Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration seemed to be actively engaged in the issues of Muslim concerns and more assertive towards the Middle East countries. From this main question, the unit of analysis, which is usually an abstract entity, is Indonesian domestic politics, and specifically state – political Islam relations, while the cases are Indonesian foreign policy cases towards the issues of Muslim concern. Henceforth, types of research design that used for this dissertation is analytical design,³⁶ and specifically causal, to determine what are the possible factors contributing the changes taking place in Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration by focusing on state – Islam relationship at domestic level as unit analysis and focusing on Indonesian foreign policy towards issues of Muslim concerns.

In order to make the study easier, the research starts with theoretical propositions, though not necessarily grand theory. It is needed to suggest and indicate simple set of relationship. This helps this research to be more concentrated in collecting set of relevant data. In this case, the main proposition is that domestic politics (state-political Islam interaction) within the state informs foreign policy (as opposed to individual and systemic prepositions).

³⁵ Thomas Gschwend and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Introduction: Designing Research in Political Science – A Dialogue between Theory and Data," in *Research Design in Political Science How to Practice What They Preach* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2 - 7.

³⁶ There are three other common research designs for behavioral science, namely, experimental case study and survey.

Causal analytical research design, however, indeed brings some issues. There are three important challenges are that not all relationship are causal, conclusions are commonly uncertain due to confounding variables that exist in social environment. It can only be referred but never proven.³⁷ However, it does not mean it is useless for research on social sciences. For that, the conclusion of research should be limited, any generalization should be avoided.

1.7.2. Data Collection

Since qualitative study favor data in natural settings, as opposed to the quantitative questionnaires, this research combines two important methods of data collection: library and field research, through which the posed questions were addressed adequately.

For that, as the research deals with the dynamic interaction between political Islam and foreign policy in Indonesia and how it occurs in the pertinent time, the bibliographical study is deemed relevant. It was conducted mainly to grasp the nuance of foreign policies across different administrations by analyzing academic dissertations, related books or chapter in books, academic articles, and research reports containing early findings, including statements given by pertinent stakeholders.

The formal documents issued by the government such as speeches, policy paper, press release, were part of the library research. These documents were necessary to indicate the formal position of the government on particular issue. In some cases, the formal documents of government were for eyes only, which the researcher could not get the copy of it. This type of document was only shown to the researcher to verify the substance of the document. Some formal documents have been collected during author's service in Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

³⁷ "Organizing Your Social Sciences Research Paper: Types of Research Designs," *University of Southern California Website*, accessed on November 27, 2016, <http://libguides.usc.edu/writingguide/researchdesigns>

Another source of data was acquired from the field research, through which the collected data could be cross-examined. Field research was conducted by employing mainly the depth interview with relevant stakeholders, though not at the apex of bureaucrat, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Political Parties, and key persons within Muslim Organizations. However, despite the fact the sources were not at the top position structurally, those interviewees have been involved in the issue in depth. Adding to that, the collected data from these interviews was intended to supplement the library research.

Through the interview, the acquired data was to discuss the extent of foreign policy process has been informed by domestic consideration, and the relevance of independent variables to the policy outcome. The interviews were conducted in unstructured questions, tailored to the different actors. The unstructured question, according to researcher, was very relevant to this research as it would possibly open to the other themes on the research. In total, eleven people from government (5 people), political party (1 person) and social organizations (5 people) have been interviewed.

Another important concern relates to the type of data. As this research was conducted, some internet contents were used, especially those relating to the facts and events. Some popular sources (such as detik.com, kompas.com), official sources (such as kemlu.go.id, nu.or.id), or other reliable sources (such as cartercenter.org, csis.org) created no problem in citing the data.

However, some data from unpopular sources such as arrahmah.com could create a problem of reliability in this research. This research used some of data from such websites. In spite of that, it treated the data carefully. The most common problem with those websites is their content that mixed between fact and opinion, which is not acceptable in journalism, except for opinion section. Hence, as long as the data related to the facts and events and statements, this research will rely on those kinds of sources.

Adding to that, those websites could infer and inform the common public opinion in responding towards specific cases. According to some websites on internet traffic analysis, such as alexa.com and similarweb.com, the user visit for non-mainstream websites, reached about 1million to 1.5 million of visitors in each month. Most of the reader is located in Indonesia, and meager portion of it from Malaysia. This statistic indicated the importance of such website among Indonesian readers, which could be understood as “effective tools” in spreading opinion. Adding to that, the collected data from this websites are intended to capture the robust public opinion spreading among Muslim community and other information could not be attained through mainstream media. For instance, in order to get full threatening message of Abu Bakar Baashir, the researcher needed to find it in arrahmah.com, kind of data that could not be found in mainstream media such as Kompas or Detik.

1.7.3. Data Analysis

The common and important technique in analyzing the data is through classification of data into different codes. Such technique helped researcher to put abundant of data into relevant boxes. This classification follows the propositions constructed through theoretical framework, namely foreign policy during different administrations on related issues (to understand whether there was a change or not), political Islam in terms of its reaction towards the democratic system and respond towards specific foreign policy (to understand to what extend political Islam as foreign policy actors interacted with executive), and executive reaction towards the domestic political changes (to understand to what extend the outside actors influence to foreign policy conduct). In doing so, this dissertation used Atlas.ti program to help researcher keeping relevant data and put it into relevant constructed categories.

Hence, the data are classified into five main types; (1) data on domestic policies of different administrations towards political Islam; (2) data on the responses of political Islam towards the state foreign policies; (3) data on dynamic interaction between state and political Islam in shaping Indonesian foreign policy; (4) data on foreign policy posture towards the Muslim aspirations; (5) data on bureaucratic reception towards the domestic democratic political changes in terms of foreign policy changes. These five types are to show the changes in Indonesian foreign policy decisions in different administrations and to understand factors contributing to such change, which mainly drew from state – political Islam dynamic interaction. These classified data passed inferential analysis, in which the meaning of sets data will be interpreted through reflective logical thinking. Adding to that, logical interpretation will lead to the possible causal connection between sets of data before drawing any conclusion.

1.8. Organization of Chapters

The structure of dissertation is broken into seven chapters, which basically falls into four main categories: (1) introduction; (2) theory; (3) foreign policy; and (4) foreign policy drivers or factors. The first category constitutes the background to the dissertation. It included the rationale behind the research, questions posed, objectives pursued, review on the previous studies on the same subject, and methodological research. The second category is to provide dissertation's point of view towards how to answer the questions posed in the introduction. It contains theoretical discussion on what is the best to analyze Indonesian foreign policy towards the Islamic issues during Yudhoyono administration. Some key concepts will be defined for operational purposes. The third category will be divided into two chapters, which deal with presentation of Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues of Muslim concerns across

administrations (Soekarno, Soeharto, and Yudhoyono). These two chapters is intended to answer the first and second question of the research, which attempt to analyze whether there were some changes in the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy. The last category, which mainly attempts to answer the third research question, will be also divided into two chapters. The first deals with the rise of political Islam in domestic politics, while the second addresses the changing format of political Islam that increase level of state confidence to collaborate with Islam.

In brief, the dissertation's structure as follows:

Chapter 1	: Introduction
Chapter 2	: Theoretical Framework
Chapter 3	: Political Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy (Soekarno and Soeharto)
Chapter 4	: Indonesian Foreign Policy towards the Muslim concern (Yudhoyono)
Chapter 5	: The Rise of Political Islam
Chapter 6	: Increasing Confidence towards Peaceful Islam
Chapter 7	: Conclusion

CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION - IN SEARCH OF WORKING FRAMEWORK

*“Those who neglect religion in their analyses of contemporary affairs do so at great
peril”*
(Peter L. Berger)¹

2.1. Introduction of Chapter

In analyzing Indonesian foreign policy towards the Muslim concerns and Muslim world, this dissertation will rest on four important propositions: (1) foreign policy is determined mainly by the internal factor, and that foreign policy begins at home. This proposition does not automatically neglect and abandon the importance of such external influence as the international system (e.g. anarchy, balance of power), as argued by realist theories. The main idea is that the state should be treated as an institution where competing ideas from different actors within the country are put forward. The resultant of this “dialogue” is the policy agreed upon by pertinent actors capable of, and authoritative in policy process; (2) domestic politics is defined in terms of dynamic interaction between political Islam and state as it correlates to the nature of foreign policy on Muslim concern; (3) The influence of Islam is not understood as it serves as the major determinant in terms of values and principles referred by policy elites in the executive government, but rather as the extent of formal political aspirations proposed by Muslim community are considered, exerted and absorbed; and (4) any influence will pass the process phase which either allow or constrain such change to happen. These prepositions are important to help build logical order and consequences during analytical interpretation before drawing any conclusion.

Accordingly, this chapter will be divided into three main sub-chapters, namely unit of analysis, political Islam and policy process. The first preposition will be

¹ Peter L Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics* (Ethics and Public Policy Center and Wm B Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1999), 18.

explained in the first sub-chapter. It is then followed by the explanation on the relationship between Islam and foreign policy. Explanation on Political Islam as the variable of domestic politics that influence foreign policy will follow after. The last sub-chapter will elaborate fourth preposition on the process phase, which commonly called stabilizer unit.

2.2. Discussion on Units of Analysis

Why did certain countries make a decision to provide human assistance, vote for or against in the Security Council meeting, or in extreme decision to declare war with other countries? In a more applicable question to this dissertation, why did Indonesia choose to use soft power and enact Islamic identity in dealing with US global war on terror, decide to have political talk with Myanmar on the Rohingya problem despite constraints in terms of long held principle of ASEAN way, change its position in the United Nations Security Council towards nuclear Iran program, and become active player in OIC? In more general question, why did Indonesia embrace policy of active engagement in the issues of Islamic concern? A long list of possibilities would range from Indonesia's strategic position in the region, its demand for global political power in the anarchic world, economic reason, political Islam influence, domestic pressure, to the President's personal belief and ideology. One might argue that none of this satisfactorily addresses question posed, or those are mutually inclusive.

In this variety of analysis before us, Kenneth Waltz's classical book of "Man, the State, and War" written in 1959, despite originally examining the causes of war and peace, suggested a useful way to decipher the codes of foreign policy puzzle by categorizing them at different levels of analysis. In Waltz's language, he uses the "images" of international relations. The first image is the individual level of analysis, which argues that foreign policy is the product of human nature. The second image is

the state or domestic level of analysis. This level of analysis focuses much on the types and character of states. The last image is international, which understands foreign policy as the result of the international system.² Understanding the levels of analysis posits an important step to analyze foreign policy as it helps the research to directly explore the specific locus of analysis. Failure to do so will blur the entire direction of research.

2.2.1. External Level

In this level of analysis, the root causes of external behavior of state come from the overall and the internal structure of character within the international system. The major theory that falls under the external approach is the realist theory. As argued by Bova, Waltz himself has been regarded as the father of contemporary structural realism.³ One of the basic assumptions in the rationalist approaches (including realism) is that external behaviour of any states is subject to change according to the international distribution of power, and that international environment in which each state interacts is anarchic in nature. The state's behavior is basically considered a logical response to the anarchic world. In this regards, the idea of power in this self-help system of the world is crucial in understanding foreign policy (power relations assumption).⁴

Within this approach, state plays an important rule and acts as the sole actor in the world politics. It is treated as the unitary actor, regardless of differences that occur within the state level (state-centric assumption), and hence, actors within the state are relatively unimportant.⁵ The question of domestic elements is somewhat irrelevant to the realism perspective since the states will behave similarly to the international structure regardless of the variations of domestic politics. If there is a different outcome,

² Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 12.

³ Russell Bova, *How the World Works: A Brief Survey of International Relations* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2012), 71.

⁴ Jack Donnelly, "Realism," in *Theories of International Relations*, 3rd Edition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 35.

⁵ Robert O Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in *Neo-Realism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 165.

it will fall within expected range. Pressures from the international system are assumed to be stronger than the domestic, and the internal threat is rarely introduced within this approach.

The critique towards this approach is directed toward its incapability to answer the soft aspect of foreign policy, since the international relations have been constantly defined in terms of war and competition over power. Adding to that, the idea of state as unitary actor, as sometime referred to as the “billiard model”, poses serious question on the existence of diverse actors playing in the state. Even within the foreign policy elites, if we neglect the influence of outside actors, there are some disagreements that occur.⁶ The problem is therefore conceptual. The question will be is it better to treat Indonesia as a single state or as political field in which the competing groups fight over influence in foreign policy making process?

This approach is useful in understanding Indonesian foreign policies, especially those in times of early independence. It could lend better analysis to explain the early Indonesian foreign policy in general especially with regard to the grouping policy (e.g. Non-aligned Movement, Jakarta-Beijing-Pyongyang-Phnom Penh Axis, and New Emerging Forces). As Korany argue in “How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World”, the global pressure in forms of colonial domination have pushed the states of third world countries to establish common-fate communities in order to strive for their identity.

He said that:

Notwithstanding national variations (although they are very important), this context of vulnerability- that is, previous colonial domination and present weakness, poverty, and insecurity- tends to cement Third World countries together and to make of them an eligible object of study and analysis. It is this global-systemic context

⁶ John A Vasquez, *The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism* (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 165.

that accounts for their various regroupings into the categories of Afro-Asians, Nonaligned, and Group of 77.⁷

The posture of Indonesian foreign policy as the champion of non-aligned movement was a response towards the two competing power politics: Communist bloc and Western bloc. Thus, the principle of *Bebas Aktif* (Independent and Active) as coined by Muhammad Hatta, Vice President of Indonesia, was to challenge the dominant and prevailing concept of bipolarity in the international relations.

However, despite its better analysis, this perspective can not adequately explain the changing Indonesian foreign policy towards Muslim concerns in Soeharto's final years, while the international structure relatively remained the same. In the 1990s, Soeharto made significant changes in his approach towards Muslim constituencies. As a consequence of military faction and the military gradual resistance to support the regime, Soeharto attempted to win the heart of the Muslim community by improving Indonesia's relations with Arab-Islamic states. For example, in 1989, Soeharto decided to allow the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization office in Jakarta. Sukma argued that internal consideration had brought about the change in the tone of Indonesian foreign policy at the time.⁸

Another example is the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 and the tragic event of 9/11 in 2001, obviously representing the significant shift in international structure, that could have significant influence on the direction of foreign policy of any states. A state will presumably build a new pattern of alliance or shift military priorities in order to maximize security, power, influence, or search for absolute gains. Looking at the Indonesian case, however, the overall policy during those systemic changes remained the same, and showed no particular allegiance towards other super powers. After the

⁷ Bahgat Korany, *How Foreign Policy Decisions Are Made in the Third World: A Comparative Analysis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 6.

⁸ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 71.

end of cold war that was marked by the collapse of Soviet, Indonesia still maintained relatively stable diplomatic relations with both Soviet and United States. The “Axis of Evil”, “Global War on Terrorism”, and “Either with Us or Against Us” discourses following 9/11 promoted by the Bush Administration did not push Indonesia to build strategic alliance with the US or broke partnership with the Soviet. Moreover, Indonesia condemned any unilateral actions against Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, those changes are interpreted differently by different groups within Indonesia. The way the structure is influenced more by the interpretation towards the basic tenets of Indonesian active and independent foreign policy that guide the external behaviour of Indonesia throughout history. The meaning of any shifts in international order is the result of intersubjective interpretation exercised over time by state actors, the idea that is deeply rooted in the constructivism approach.

Another constraints of this approach is associated with the nature of issues taken in this dissertation (Indonesian foreign policy on Muslim concerns) that are highly considered salient and to some extent controversial to the general public, media, and political parties. The issue of Rohingya, nuclear Iran program, and terrorism for instance had undoubtedly ignited public demonstration particularly from Muslim communities. In this heated situation, the current governments will receive bottom-up signals about policy preferences, rather than top-down pressure. Therefore, the prospect of using a realist approach is not favourable.⁹

2.2.2. Personal Level

The second level of analysis examines closely the decision makers at a personal level. This approach attempts to “zoom in” on the subject of study by understanding how humans or people make certain decisions. Human decision is subject to cognitive, emotional, psychological, and sometimes even biological influences. Rourke put three

⁹ Kai Oppermann, “The Concept of Issue Saliency in Foreign Policy Analysis: Delineating the Scope Conditions of Theoretical Approaches in the Field” (SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Stockholm, Sweden, September 9, 2010), 14.

categories of analysis within this personal level. First, foreign policy is made by humans as a species, in which they are heavily exposed to a variety of social experiences shaping the thoughts and perceptions of leaders as an individual. It might involve cognitive experiences, emotional factors, and psychological factors. All of which help establish set of perceptions within the individual. A leader of a country could see the opponent as more threatening than they might actually be. Second, in a more complex situation and collective settings, a leader could take foreign policy decisions that are different from when it is taken individually. In this line of thought, the foreign policy is the result of a leader's behavior within organizations (state). The third approach is idiosyncratic analysis, putting focus on how personal traits of certain leaders, personality attributes, and his ideology affect the ultimate decision of a country. All of these approaches lead to the conclusion that foreign policy is neither rational, nor irrational. It is mix of both.¹⁰

The individual analysis stems from the perception of the Great Man Theory of History, which appreciates the beliefs and character of person on the positions of influence as the main determinant of the course of human history.¹¹ Within this framework, one could argue that the world would never been have the same as what we are witnessing today if leaders like Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Gorbachev, and Bush were not born. In specific, the course of Indonesian foreign policy would not follow the current path of posture if there were no such leaders as Soekarno and Soeharto.

The study by Andrew Kennedy suggests an illuminating approach and provides a working application of this type of approach. By comparing two relatively dominant leaders in Asia – Mao of China and Nehru of India – Kennedy attempts to connect the efficacy of beliefs and the type of foreign policies adopted by the states. The selection

¹⁰ John T Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 12th edition (United States: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2008), 65 - 78.

¹¹ Bova, *How the World Works: A Brief Survey of International Relations*, 76.

of Mao and Nehru is due to the types of domestic predicaments (post-liberation of China and post-independence of India), independency situation (under foreign domination), and beliefs (nationalist) shared by the respective leaders. Inspired by aspects of personalities, both leaders took similar course of challenging the established course of international system.¹²

Looking at Kennedy's work, all basic necessary requirements almost fit to the type of Indonesian foreign policies under different regimes: post-independence of Sukarno, post-abortive coup of Soeharto, post-reformasi of Yudhoyono, attempting to fight against foreign colonialism, a nationalistic type of leader, and most importantly followed a course of ambitious Indonesian foreign policy (yet the last is not applied in Soeharto's type of policies). Hence, it is tempting to use such analysis in understanding current posture of Indonesian foreign policy.

However, this level of analysis is better suited to analyze the country that tend to have closed political system, in which the decision or policy is formulated by the powerful elites with the absence of other functioning political institutions. Analyzing foreign policy during Soeharto and Soekarno, not Yudhoyono, at this level could provide better understanding. The study conducted by Hein suggested the strategic position of Soeharto in conducting Indonesian foreign policy made him able to conduct foreign policy with greater freedom from domestic political considerations compared to his predecessor Soekarno. Indonesian foreign policy was seen as Soeharto's policy since he was the major architect of the new trend of Indonesian foreign policy that Hein called "second-generation nationalism".¹³ Wibisono studied the role of elites' perception in democratizing Indonesia, especially during the presidency of Megawati. Driven with the aim to test the general theory of formation on the role of perception of

¹² Andrew Bingham Kennedy, *The International Ambitions of Mao and Nehru, National Efficacy Beliefs and the Making of Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5.

¹³ Gordon Robert Hein, "Soeharto's Foreign Policy: Second-Generation Nationalism in Indonesia" (University of California, 1986).

domestic political actors, Wibisono drew the conclusion that the perception of political elites do matter in the foreign policy making process.¹⁴ However, the political condition in which Megawati and Yudhoyono governed the country was different. The Yudhoyono period was marked as the beginning of consolidated democracy.¹⁵

During the Yudhoyono administration, despite being directly elected as the president, the political institutions were more complex in that the process of check and balances have functioned to the extent that the parliament operated independently and civil society pressure, backed up with media, posed serious challenge to the stability of the country. As the process of decision making is equally complicated as the democratic institutions within the country, any ambitious program or changes in foreign policy is possible on the conditions that all pertinent parties and interested groups submit no complaints towards the decisions.

2.2.3. State Level

As we arrive at the third level of analysis, it is suffice to state that both above analysis are powerful explanations to understand foreign policy, yet not equally capable of explaining policies under the Yudhoyono administration. Hence, as this dissertation attempts to connect foreign policy with the domestic politics, the state-level analysis will be presented in detail along with the reasons. The third level approach is attempting to get out from the idea of treating state as a closed “black box” by analysing internal dynamics of state. State-level analysis is sometimes called domestic approach since the focus of analysis is on the domestic level. In this approach, such as domestic structure of model of Katzenstein, Unified Theory of Snyder, Democratic Peace Theory, Bureaucratic Politics Model, and Organizational Process Model plays a significant role

¹⁴ Aria Teguh Mahendra Wibisono, “Political Elites and Foreign Policy: Democratization in Indonesia” (Leiden University, 2009), 277.

¹⁵ Louay Abdulbaki, “Democratization in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation,” *Asian Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 2 (2008).

in determining what foreign policy would be issued, focusing on state structure, ideology of regime, opposition movements and regime change, and internal stability.¹⁶

These approaches suggest that one can not tell how a state will react simply from the description of international setting in which the foreign policy operates or from the personal belief of leader and political elites. Bova provided five ranges of types that could play a role in influencing the final result of foreign policy:¹⁷ First, the type of government, whether it is democratic or authoritarian for instance. The more democratic a state is, the more likely is the foreign policy will be contested field of influence from different actors. Or as in democratic peace theory argues, it is unlikely that democratic country will go into war against other democratic countries;¹⁸ Second, the economic system and performance. Economic performance could influence a state to align with other states because the former need economic assistance from the latter. In the case of Indonesia, using this approach, the rapprochement between Indonesia and China after diplomatic break could be understood as Indonesia's demand to have economic relations with China; Third, the national style that stems from differences in geographic position and historical experiences. This type could provide better analysis in understanding the recent Indonesian foreign policy to focus on maritime issue. It stems from the fact that Indonesia geographically is an archipelagic state; Fourth, cultural identity, which range from its population, to the belief system believed by the majority of citizen; Fifth, interest groups and public opinion.

In fact, there are other ranges of explanation that fall within the domestic explanation. Rourke, for instance, stated that the foreign policy also depends on the type of situation whether it is a critical situation or a normal one. In the former, the foreign

¹⁶ Muhittin Ataman, "Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change: Explaining Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s" (University of Kentucky, 1999), 20 - 31.

¹⁷ Bova, *How the World Works: A Brief Survey of International Relations*, 73 - 75.

¹⁸ Michael W Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986).

policy process is likely to be dominated by the elite circle due to time constraints.¹⁹ Kaarbo investigated that in the parliamentary system, in the case of German and Israeli foreign Policy, the coalition partners offered plausible explanations on the influences on foreign policies.²⁰ Cook et al. presented media and agenda setting as having capacity to shape the general public policy in leading what is priority and what is less.²¹

To start with, focusing on the type of government might be useful. As Dugis explained, as the number of states around the world that begin embracing the concept of democracy increases, many International Relations scholars shift the focus of study from systemic approach (external) to the domestic.²² In the study of Indonesian foreign policy, this approach will lend better analysis as indicated by some scholars. Poole, for example, studied the changing posture of Indonesian foreign policy towards more “activist” foreign policy as a result of Indonesia’s profound change in political landscape since 1998. Change in political structure has altered the way Indonesia responds to the external environment. Furthermore, he argued that the democratic identity of Indonesia has provided both impetus and constraints to Indonesian foreign policy.²³

The study by Wirajuda is also useful in viewing the importance of reformation in bringing the change in Indonesian foreign policy, with special attention to the regional cooperation, promotion of political values, and conflict management. Wirajuda’s research has proven that domestic political change has influenced much of the substance and style of Indonesian foreign policy, as shown in Jakarta’s policy on

¹⁹ Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage*, 79.

²⁰ Juliet Kaarbo, “Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy,” *International Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (1996), 501.

²¹ Fay Lomax Cook et al., “Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy,” *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 47, no. 1 (Spring 1983): 16 – 35.

²² The reason why realist assumption dominates the International Relations studies is among other the Cold War as it could provide framework of analysis for the changes in global behavior of states. See further in Vinsensio Dugis, “Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on Foreign Policy, A Basic Model,” *Global & Strategis* 3, no. 2 (2009), 169.

²³ Avery Poole, “A ‘Democratic’ Process? Change and Continuity in Foreign Policy Making in Indonesia” (Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) Annual Conference, Murdoch University, 2013), <http://www.auspsa.org.au/page/apsa-conference-2013>, 3.

political cooperation in ASEAN, conflict management on the Ambalat dispute, and Myanmar.²⁴

In addition to that, the domestic factor in Indonesia after the reformation presented richer understanding on the relational context of foreign policy and the sources of influence. As Nabbs-Keller said:

The turbulent nature of of Indonesia's domestic political transitions – “revolutionary anti-colonial struggle”, parliamentary democracy, authoritarianism, and president multi-party democracy after 1998 – have had a marked impact on Indonesia's foreign policy in institutional and ideational terms. Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy is best understood in the context of its post-authoritarian transition, encouraging closer analysis of domestic-level influences on its formation.²⁵

The study by Dosch even goes further by linking the impact of democratization on the foreign policy of state by looking at dynamics of actor participation (armed forces, parliaments, and civil society organizations) in foreign policy process. In his study on three countries of Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Thailand, and Philippines), Dosch identified the basic element of democracy, accountability, as the possible prime mover of foreign policy change. When state becomes democratic, the more non-government players such as legislative members, opposition groups, and public opinion, come to the policy field with varying degree of influence, attempting to exert their influence. Those political and societal elements within the state monitor closely the government policy decision process and its impact on society. When the government accommodates none of their aspirations, the more the situation is subject to turbulence. Therefore, democratic regime's accountability constraints the government's independence in the foreign policy making and restricts the available options.²⁶

²⁴ Muhammad Hadiyanto Wirajuda, “The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values, and Conflict Management” (London School of Economics, 2014), 3.

²⁵ Greta Nabbs-Keller, “Reforming Indonesia's Foreign Ministry: Ideas, Organization and Leadership,” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 35, no. 1 (2013), 73.

²⁶ Jorn Dosch, “The Impact of Democratization on the Making of Foreign Policy in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines,” *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 25, no. 5 (2006), 42 – 70.

As previously suggested, it becomes obvious that the state-level approach (type of government) in analyzing Indonesian foreign policy especially after the reformation will provide rich understanding on the issue. Three main reasons for this; first, the dynamics of domestic politics in the democratic type of government present different political actors within the country, each attempting to exert their influence on the policy, including foreign policy. The relative distribution of power in Indonesia makes it difficult for the actors to dominate the decision making process. Second, political Islam in Indonesia, as part of unit analysis, is considered an active actor in domestic politics. Third, in the regime where internal threat (domestic opposition) are more significant and external threats are less threatening, the priorities determining foreign policy may tend toward coping with domestic politics.

In the democratic regime, for the elites to remain in the apex of executive, they must gain substantial nod from the domestic power before making decisions. Consideration on the dynamics of contesting power becomes a paramount of importance. The concept of check and balances has consequently been entrenched in the mind of political machination of the regime. It is different from authoritarian in the sense that the domestic approval was less considered in the last. Democratic theory rests on the concept that policy, including foreign policy, must be formulated through active participation of people. The ultimate decision and its implementation is the function of political elites within the government, President or Minister, primarily the executive branch.²⁷ Barbara Farnham stressed the importance of considering the acceptability of policies between elites and public. The political system of state, in which political elites operate, will determine the degree of acceptability required. For instance, a democratic

²⁷ Kenneth W Thompson and Roy C Macridis, "The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, 3rd Edition (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 16.

system demands consensus for the policy to succeed. In a feudalistic system acceptability may not be as important at all times.²⁸

This study, however, does not focus on the impact of democratization on foreign policy, but rather to use it as the background of change that leads to another factor which is equally important in understanding foreign policy. Hence, the question is which part of domestic politics is with which this study needs to begin? The interesting study of “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy,” written by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, suggested a fruitful start. The study focused on the US Foreign policy towards the Middle East in light of Israel Lobby within the Government. The conclusion created a wave of controversies as it said that US foreign policies for decades has not been in line with the core interest of US strategic purposes. Such disconnect between interest and policy has been due to the Israel Lobby, a powerful movement operating in the US Congress that put concern more on protection of Israel rather than the US.²⁹

This particular study presented some useful hints in building this study, though not identical. The important lead is the selection of sources of foreign policy/policy actor (Israel Lobby) that is closely related with the type of foreign policy (US Foreign Policy in the Middle East). In understanding domestic politics, which is pictured as the clash of different interests of different actors in established democratic framework, it is needed to point out the preliminary linkage between the sources/actors and the result/policies. The linkage, as far as this dissertation concerns, is Islam. Thus, the sources of policy will be focusing on the sources/actor (political Islam) and the policy outcome (foreign policies of Muslim concerns). The political Islam and foreign policy is closely related, especially after the reformation due to several facts. First, political Islam

²⁸ Barbara Farnham, “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” *Political Psychology* 25, no. 3 (2004).

²⁹ The book was originally an article written in London Review Books on 23rd March, 2006. Interestingly, the authors were amongst the prominent realist scholars, which usually pay little attention to domestic politics. John J Mearsheimer and Stephen M Walt, *The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 5.

started to rise especially after the democratization process. Second, the ruling government relies on the political Islam in the government and parliament. Third, the pressure group of the Muslim community in Indonesia is also actively involved in Indonesian foreign policy issues.

2.3. Political Islam

2.3.1. Islam and Foreign Policy

Unlike the subject of Indonesian foreign policy in general, specific Indonesian foreign policy analysis with regard to the Islamic issues have not been widely discussed, and the subject of Islam and foreign policy in general has also received limited academic attention. Many would question or even doubt the visible and possible connection between Islam *per se* as a religion and international relations as a field of scientific knowledge. Attempts to establish the link will be fraught with difficulties. Such a dilemmatic concern has also been felt by previous researches.³⁰ There are two main reasons why the subject is often overlooked; ontological and methodological.

Fox traced the rejection of many scientists to understand the social phenomenon by religious explanation as the main reason, therefore it was somewhat overlooked. Social sciences, including International relations and foreign policy analysis (FPA), are seen as secular in nature. The emergence of social disciplines was originally a logical response to the “old” theocratic approach. In addition to that, the role of religion is considered to be a declining force in the world, or becoming less important. Combined with the advent of modernization and increasing trend of

³⁰ Shanti Nair, *Islam in Malaysian Foreign Policy*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 1997); Brenda Shaffer, “Introduction: The Limits of Culture,” in *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy*, ed. Brenda Shaffer, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass. ; London, England: MIT Press, 2006); Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen; Abingdon: NIAS; Marston [distributor], 2007).

secularization, many social scientists believe that political importance of primordial phenomena such as ethnicity, race, and religion will be decreasing.³¹

He noted that, the emergence of social science, including international relations, has been caused by systematic search for natural and social phenomenons by rational explanations, replacing theocratic approaches. Thus, social science is secular in nature. Many theorists in the nineteenth century, such as Auguste Comte, Emil Durkheim, Max Weber contended that religion has been declining in the modern era, and is even predicted to disappear. Secularization and modernization have been the main cause of the declining influence of Islam in modern social explanation.³²

However, the secular nature of social sciences does not automatically reject the “existence” of religion. Islam, as any other religion in the world, could have contributed to the social phenomenon. As an ideology, religion clearly makes its way into personal behaviour, either directly or indirectly. What kind of motivation is behind the emerging religious groups such as *Al-Qaidah*? Political explanation may reasonably answer the question, but complete denial on religious element is not a fair academic option. High ranking elites of the group often cited some related Quranic verses to legitimize their collective actions.

Constructivist perspective that places identity, interests, and culture as an important part of foreign policy analysis could be suggested to answer the rejection of previous perspectives. By understanding Islam as a value rather than a ritual practiced everywhere in the world, it will be acceptable to what extent Islam could exert its influence on state behavior. Foreign policy is constructed by elites and influenced by people of organizations, that is based on calculation not only of material gains but it is intersubjective of domestic sensitivities. Adding to that, as Shaffer argued, prominent realists who often dismiss cultural factors, such as Even John Mearsheimer and Stephen

³¹ Jonathan Fox, “Religion as an Overlooked Element of International Relations,” *International Studies Review* 3, no. 3 (2001), 54.

³² *Ibid*, 55.

Walt, cited culturalist argument when criticizing the US invasion in Iraq on the eve of the 2003 war.³³

Another reason for this lack of academic attention is methodological questions on defining the term Islam, as Islam has different colouring.³⁴ As a variable within social studies, it is difficult to clearly define and measure Islam. But the distinction between Islam as political ideology and Islam as a social and political force could provide a reasonable methodological answer to this. Those can be clearly approached by observing, for example, symbols, statements, organizational mission, and strategies.

Indeed, singular definition of Islam is impossible to do. Thus, its variety in thoughts and practices must be taken into consideration when analyzing its role in foreign policy analysis. However, there must be a certain constancy in the pattern of spirit or values embedded in Islam. Acceptance on these observable universal values, while recognizing the varieties becomes necessary. In this regard, the intense interplay between state and religion in the history of Muslim majority countries, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh would ignite political scholars to assume that Islam plays a pivotal role in the political process of policy making and that Islamic values find their expression in the policies of the states.

Such premise is, at least, based on three common doctrines in the Islamic thought that provides working framework for human action. First, “*Al-Islam Huwa Al-hall*” which means literally that Islam is the only solution. The applicability of the Islamic teaching and values is not restricted to religious aspect, but also includes almost an entire aspect of human life, socio-cultural, economic, and political. Second, the concept of “*Al-Din wa Al-Daula*” that announces inseparability of politics and religion. This concept is the continuation of the first one in the field of politics. Being involved in

³³ Shaffer, “Introduction: The Limits of Culture.”

³⁴ A. I. Dawisha, “Islam in Foreign Policy: Some Methodological Issues,” in *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Published in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Cambridge University Press, 1983), 4.

politics is part of Muslim's *ibadah* (worship) towards Allah. Third, brotherhood or One *Ummah* (the solidarity Muslims), a commonly used concept as a principle reason by Muslim organizations and political parties to be involved in foreign issue of Islamic concern.³⁵

When attempting to connect between political Islam and foreign policy, it is interesting to note that domestic politics and foreign policy are always at constant interplay, as there is a common premise that foreign policy begins at home and is largely informed, whether in form of positive or constraints, by domestic politics. The fact that Islam, either in form of political force (Party), societal level (organization), or ideology (idiosyncrasy, leadership) plays a role in Indonesia could be the basis for analyzing the linkage between the two.

There is, however, doubt about the possible influence of political Islam in terms of foreign policy in terms of vested power that lies in the executive branch of the nation. As many argued that, the executive branch (President and Minister for Foreign Affairs) is the sole architect of foreign policy, and that is true in Indonesian case. The constitution provides authority for the executive to exercise their power, albeit in some particular cases that need parliament consultation. However, *realpolitik* is far more complex than the constitution *per se*. Various consideration needs to be taken into account during the policy formulation, including the political and social force of Islam. Failure to do so would ignite unintended consequences such as decreasing public trust, negative opinion, or rallying demonstration. To make the case clear, for example, the cabinet formation is the prerogative power of president. However, in selecting his cabinet, the elected resident could not work independently and turn down the involvement of political parties or organizations that support him.

³⁵ For instance, in two cases of Iranian nuclear and Rohingya conflict, many Muslim organizations and political parties in Indonesia staged rallies to push the government of Indonesia to take stricter stance in the issue. Their views on both issues are significantly different. *Front Pembela Islam* and *Jamaah Islam* delivered strong message, NU and Muhammadiyah conveyed a moderate view, while *Jaringan Islam Liberal* conveyed more liberal perspective. Despite different views, what can be drawn from those protests is that the tone of message and has been almost identical. Their demands to the government is based on the ground of *Ummah* solidarity.

2.3.2. Making Islam observable

If one takes much less charitable view in understanding the role of Islam, in ideal definition, Islam would have more direct influence in foreign policy, acting as the motivator, legitimator, and justifier.³⁶ It would be certainly applicable for a theocratic political entity or Islamic state, such as Islamic Republic of Iran or Saudi Arabia. It may be over facile to suggest that under non-theocratic country such as Indonesia, using that strict definition, the influence would be limited if not absent altogether. Simple categorization in the academic research, thus, does not present the actual dynamics of foreign policy operation, especially in a country like Indonesia, where most of the population, including the elites, are Muslim. The nature of intersection in national and international issues where Islamic dimension is present, has come to shape the foreign policy of the formally non-theocratic state.

It indeed requires another domain of research to see whether the government of Indonesia in Jakarta consulted two major sources of Islam – *al-Qurān and al-Hadīth* – in processing the foreign policy. Therefore, the factor that Islam conditioned the conduct of foreign policy, as assessed in this dissertation, is conceptualized around the many aspects common in the study of foreign policy but related to Islam such as the size of the Muslim population, political influence of Muslim leaders, political parties, reaction of Muslim communities towards particular policies on Muslim affairs, and mobilization of Islamic social organizations.

To make Islam observable, the operational definition of Islam in this research is needed. Therefore, as Warner & Walker argued that the ideas within institutions (e.g interest group and parties) as the manifestation of Islam could provide methodological avenue to trace the role of religion in foreign policy.³⁷

³⁶ Dawisha, "Islam in Foreign Policy: Some Methodological Issues," 5.

³⁷ Carolyn M Warner and Stephen G Walker, "Thinking about the Role of Religion in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7 (2011), 121.

For that, I will use the term Islam to refer to two main organizations: political party and social organizations. In the study conducted by Baswedan, the term of political Islam is defined as follows:

it refers to efforts that promote Muslim's aspirations and carry an Islamic agenda into laws and government policy through the electoral process and representative (legislative) institutions..... defines these as political aspirations and agendas ranging from the state's moral foundation to policies it produces, including efforts to formally incorporate Syariah into the Constitution and to promote government policies that are particularly supportive of progress for and empowerment of "Muslim" society.³⁸

In the Indonesian political system, where the current parliament have a significant role in monitoring public policy, including foreign policy, it becomes clearer to understand its influence. Some may argue that the parliament pays much attention to the traditionally domestic policies. However, living in the globalized world, almost every aspect of international policies connected to the domestic issues, are called intermestic. Especially in the issue of high salience that would be predicted to have strong emotional reactions from the community.

However, the above definition of political Islam is not limited to political parties as it covers a wide range of Islamist mobilization that attempts to fight for political aspirations outside the systems, such as Islamic organizations. The inclusion of non-state actors is important as the government's decision should be held accountable horizontally (coping with elite pressures in legislative) and vertically (coping with societal legitimation).³⁹

Trice defines interest groups as:

Interest groups can be viewed as auxiliary actors that stand between the government and the mass public, tied to the governmental decision-making system by channels of communication. It is within these channels of communications

³⁸ Anies Rasyied Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey* 44, no. 5 (2004), 670.

³⁹ Alexander V Kozhemiakin, "Democratization and Foreign Policy Change: The Case of the Russian Federation," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (January 1997), 53.

that the process of influence takes place. Interest groups have no formal policy-making authority, and must rely on those people within the government who do have such authority to translate their policy preferences into decisional output.⁴⁰

The influence of interest group depends on political milieu, access, and the effectiveness of the chosen strategy. Political milieu provides context within which interest groups operate. In a democratic country, where legitimate political channels are provided, those groups have higher access to the centers of policy making, and then increase the possibility to exert their influence than in an authoritarian country. Two broad strategies under which interest groups mostly operate: direct and indirect strategy. Direct strategy means that the groups themselves are actively involved in the communication with the policy makers such as through public hearings or policy suggestions. Indirect influence is used when those groups encourage the public to be involved in political activities.⁴¹ There are several organizations that have vested interest and actively involved in foreign policy agendas such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Muhammadiyah*, *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI), Voice of Palestine Indonesia, and Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah (DDI). These organizations are considered vocal in the issue of Palestine and Rohingya.

The interest groups are largely connected to the public mass, in which policy executive circles have political interests to remain in power. Interestingly, as pointed by Hensel, public is usually ignorant towards the foreign policy issues and less aroused by international events. He wrote, "Public opinion on foreign policy issues thus usually lies dormant, with foreign affairs left to the management of political leaders." However, once the foreign issue activates the public, it appears to be challenging the political

⁴⁰ Robert H Trice, "Foreign Policy Interest Groups, Mass Public Opinion and the Arab-Israeli Dispute," *The Western Political Quarterly* 31, no. 2 (June 1978), 238.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 239.

power of executive, generating the sense of “us versus them mentality,” and requiring quick political solution.⁴²

2.4. Foreign Policy Making Process

Goldman’s study provided useful insight that any foreign policy change must overcome normal resistance, in which he mentioned administrative, political, cognitive, and international stabilizers.⁴³ In addition to the source of change (disturbances), there are sources of persistence. The confrontation between them would provide fuller understanding on the foreign policy outcome.

These stabilizers fall within the foreign policy process in the decision units. Within this process, the act of either stabilizing or change happens. Such underlying postulate based on the understanding that influences should be channeled via political apparatus (bureaucracy) of executive members of government, acting singly (president) or in group (pertinent Ministries), that hold constitutional authority to identify, decide, and implement foreign policy. Those bodies are considered legitimate, constitutional, and active participants in foreign policy making and its process.⁴⁴ They are, however, traditionally considered as source of stability rather than as source of change. Halperin as quoted by Eidenfalk describe it as “inert; it moves only when pushed hard and persistently.”⁴⁵

In this regards, policy process in the bureaucratic (government/ministry, not in relation to parliament and society) unit will be treated as single unit that are hierarchically subordinated to political leaders at the top of foreign policy executive, such as President or Minister of Foreign Affairs. They are the principal agents of foreign

⁴² Paul R Hensel, “Domestic Politics and Interstate Rivalry” (American Political Science Association Conference, Boston, 1998), 8.

⁴³ Kjell Goldman, “Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Detente as a Problem of Stabilization,” *World Politics* 34, no. 2 (January 1982), 247.

⁴⁴ Margaret G Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework,” *International Studies Review* 3, no. 2 (Summer 2001), 47.

⁴⁵ Joakim Eidenfalk, “Towards a New Model of Foreign Policy Change” (presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle: University of Wollongong, Australia, 2006), 3.

policy. Differences within various units within the Ministry will not be the focus of analysis, since the policy stated by principal agents is the actual policy at the end.

Bureaucracy is usually an established institution with set of cognitive ideas exercised over the years, creating a set of norms, translated into consistency in the policy. For example, the change in the norm of amity and cooperation, or non-interference in Indonesia would be unlikely, not to say impossible, to change.

The sources do not lead directly to the change. Sometimes they produce change and in some other times they do not. Then, how does domestic politics influence foreign policy? Despite having originally intended to explain a political stabilizer, Goldmann proposed three degrees of dimension: degree of institutionalization; degree of support, and degree of salience. If a certain policy has been well institutionalized, supported by national consensus, and considered significant in domestic politics, the pressure of change needs to be substantial in order for the deviation from the existing policy to happen.⁴⁶ For instance, if Indonesia's position against nuclear proliferation has been institutionalized at the mindset and body of work within the nation, supported by political coalition and national consensus, and considered important to secure domestic exposure towards nuclear war, as such, the diverting position towards pro-nuclear proliferation is hardly to be achieved. The same could be applied to other foreign policies such as Indonesia's stance towards Palestine.

In a clearer account, Hagan, as cited by Dugis, explained that the government simultaneously faces external environment and domestic pressure in crafting foreign policy. Within this premise, there are two broads explanation of political motives in the course of foreign policy change. Domestic politics are described as the melting pot of different interests of different groups within the state institution, thus, foreign policy serves to consensus in order for any initiative to be executed (to build political

⁴⁶ Goldmann, "Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: Detente as a Problem of Stabilization," 251 – 252.

coalition). Or, foreign policy is adjusted in order to de-escalate further opposition that might endanger his position (to retain political power). These two objectives are called pull and push factors. Within these factors, there are three dynamics of interaction: (1) accommodation, bargaining and controversy avoidance. The state responds to domestic pressure in positive terms (usually to serve pull factor); (2) mobilization, legitimation of regime and its policies. The state confronts the opposition by way of explaining and convincing the opposition in order to retain in power; (3) insulation of foreign policy from domestic political pressure, which means ignoring the pressure by suppressing or co-opting the opposition.⁴⁷

However, to say that decision units process is source of stabilizer *an sich* is not completely true. The study of Holsti on several countries that change their foreign policy indicated that decision making process is categorized as moderately significant explanation, despite less powerful explanations. This study will also look at this variable from such angle by assuming that bureaucracy would be the agent of change. In the case of Indonesia, the process of organizational restructuring in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (as the focal point of foreign policy), such as merit based recruitment, open bidding of strategic structural positions, performance-based rewards could be seen as an important lead to this postulate.

Included in the decision units is relational context of executive branch and legislative. In this case, the context can be explained through constitutional arrangement of foreign policy process; to what extent the legislative could provide input to executive members as outlined in the constitution. The answer to this could also explain the stability of foreign policy since, for example, the restricted power distribution of legislative in the process.

⁴⁷ Vinsensio Dugis, "Domestic Political Structure and Public Influence on Foreign Policy, A Basic Model," *Global & Strategis* 3, no. 2 (2009), 177 - 178.

Stabilizer reacts to resist very fundamental change in the course of foreign policy. To what extent does certain foreign policy redirect its course? Hermann proposed four types of changes in understanding the change phenomenon, namely (1) adjustment change, in which there is no change in the program and only added effort, (2) program change that indicates that there is certain formulation in approaching the issues, (3) problem/goal change, which means reformulation of initial goals; and (4) international orientation change, which rarely happened since it requires very fundamental source of change.⁴⁸

Table 2.1. Type of changes in foreign policy outcome

Type of Change	Description
Adjustment Change	Level of effort becomes greater or lesser. What is done, and the purpose for which it is done remain unchanged. It is quantitative change.
Program Change	Methods or means by which goal or problem is addressed has changed. It is qualitative change.
Problem/Goal Change	The initial problem or goal that the policy addresses has changed.
International Orientation	Extreme form of foreign policy change. It involves redirection of overall orientation towards world affairs.


Source: Charles Herman, 1990.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Charles F Hermann, "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (March 1990): 3–21, 5.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 6.

2.5. Applied Framework

To sum up, this dissertation is based on above explanation by drawing line of argument as below:



University of Malaya

**CHAPTER THREE: ISLAM IN INDONESIAN POLITICS AND ITS
INFLUENCE ON INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MUSLIM
CONCERNS PRIOR TO 1998
(SOEKARNO AND SOEHARTO)**

3.1. Introduction of Chapter

As elaborated in the previous chapter, the dynamics of domestic politics and most importantly the quest for political participation in the government system, is one of the important aspect in analyzing country's foreign policy. In discussing the domestic politics of Indonesia and its relations to foreign policy, this research draws attention to the Islam – state relations for its distinct feature. For much of Indonesia's post-independence history, the different types of interaction between Islam and state have had an obstructive effect on the ability of Islam to find its expression in Indonesia's early foreign policy, especially before the New Order started to crumble.

Hence, this chapter will provide an analytical narration on the development of Islam in Indonesia's domestic politics and its consequence to Indonesian foreign policy. The character of Indonesia as an independent state has been affected by the long history of Islam – state relations, ups and downs, and consequently found consequential expression, in terms of either absence or presence, in the Indonesia's posture at the international realm. Islam as a political and social force has been undoubtedly playing an active role in the process of Indonesia's politics, even before the proclamation in 1945 as indicated, among others, by the emergence of various vibrant Islamic social organizations and Islamic political parties that contributed to the process of nation building.

However, as the previous ruling regimes, both Soekarno and Soeharto, perceived Islam as the alarming threat and potential power contender capable of

undermining the nationalist base of the state, rather than a potential partner to build the country, Islam had been gradually sidelined in the arena of Indonesian politics. Series of discriminative policies were implemented and gradually made an impact on the development of Islamic movements, especially in terms of politics, in Indonesian history. Such uncomfortable situation, together with the sharp division of visions between Muslim elites contributed, to a certain extent, to the inability of Islam to inform the direction and to influence the substance of government domestic policy, let alone its foreign policy. In this case, the state has successfully maintained secular political institutions amidst a predominantly Muslim society.

New outlook of Islam – State relations have been observed in the last years of Soeharto, which was indicated by Soeharto's resort to Islam as an alternative political power to back up his position at the domestic level. Even though it did not automatically transform Islam as significant player, Soeharto made substantial changes in his foreign policy, especially towards the issues of Muslim concern.

For that, this research will elaborate the process of Islam – state relations by historical order. The chronological order is important to trace the pattern of development, especially when it relates to the long history of process. First of all, this research will present Islam's role during pre-independence of Indonesia to sketch the background of Islam in Indonesian politics. It will be followed by the process of marginalization of Islam during the presidency of Soekarno and Soeharto, including the changing pattern of Islam – state relations in the late term of Soeharto. This chapter will present afterwards the influence of such dynamic relation on the transformation of Indonesian foreign policy towards Muslim. It needs as well to be stressed out that, due to long period of these two presidents, this chapter will elaborate only the major foreign policies as to serve the major purpose of this dissertation.

3.2. Islam in Pre-Independence of Indonesia

There are different theories explaining the coming of Islam to *Nusantara* (Malay Archipelago, including Indonesia). Hasbullah succinctly summarized various arguments and theses on the origin of Islam into five dominant explanations.¹ Despite these differences, however, they shared the belief that Islam entered and came to *Nusantara* by peaceful means, mainly through economic relations such as trade exchanges and social bonds such as marriage. The fact that those traders travelled to Indonesia mostly bringing the *ṣūfī* type of Islam (mysticism) made Islam as a relatively new religion easily accepted and welcomed by local villagers in *Nusantara*. It was so since *ṣūfī* teachings and Hindu-Buddhist traditions, commonly religion embraced by the native people in Nusantara, shared the common aspects of tolerance, inclusiveness, and mysticism. This unique feature of *ṣūfī* was also another explanation for the peaceful process of islamization in Indonesia. Therefore, as explained by Howell, Indonesian Islam before the 20th century was predominantly *ṣūfī* and illustrated by the combination of local traditions and Islamic teachings,² the way *Wali Songo*³ taught indigenous people about Islam.

However, the coming of colonialism powers, marked initially by the falling of the Malacca Sultanate into Portuguese powers in the early 15th century, to *Nusantara* had turned the religion of Islam as an influential force in mobilizing the struggles against the invaders, as the case of Malacca war by Adipati Unus (1513), Padri War

¹ First, theory that argued it came directly from Arabic region in the 7th century. Most Indonesian scholars held this theory after the national seminar conducted by Prof. Mukti Ali in 1963 discussing the coming of Islam to Nusantara concluded that it directly came from Arab. The standard Indonesian history book of *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia* also held this argument. Second, Islam came through the Chinese traders in 7th century during Tai Tsung administration of Tang Dynasty. Third theory, deriving from linguistic evidences, argued that Islam came from Persia. Fourth theory opined that Islam passed through India before it arrived in Nusantara in 13th century. The argument based on the similarity of the *madhhab* – *Shāfi'ī* – used in these two regions. The last theory saw Islam from Turkey that came to Nusantara, basing the argument on the popular traditions of *ṭarīqah* and reciting *barzanji*. See further details in Moeflich Hasbullah, *Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam Di Indonesia* (Bandung, Indonesia: Pustaka Setia, 2012), 4 - 10.

² Julia Day Howell, "Sufism and the Indonesian Islamic Revival," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 3 (2001), 703.

³ *Wali Songo* refers to Islamic preachers who contributed to the spreading of Islam in Indonesia, comprising of nine (*Songo*) people, by convincing the kings and rulers to accept and embrace Islam as their religion.

(1803-1838) in West Sumatera, Pangeran Diponegoro (1825-1830) in Central Java, and Aceh War by Cut Nyak Dien, Cut Meutia, Cik Ditiro, and Teuku Umar (1873-1912).

In terms of Islamic thought, the teachings of Islamic reformism that started in Egypt and Saudi Arabia had reached the minds of Indonesian scholars in the late 18th century, as a consequence of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 that had facilitated the intensive contact between Indonesian scholars and the Middle East thinkers.⁴ Many Indonesian Muslims began challenging the conformity of traditional Islam to “pure” Islamic teachings based on *al-Qurān* and *al-Hadīth*. Their rejection to the type of traditional Islam relates to twofold: the syncretistic practices of Islam and adherence to the classical Islamic books, commonly known as *kitab kuning* (literally means yellow book, referring to Islamic traditional literature). The reformism agenda was brought mainly by Indonesian Muslim of Arab descents, originally coming from Haḍramut, Yemen. They received Islamic education from Islamic schools in the Middle East, mainly in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Those graduates from Arabic schools then established Islamic educational institutions such as *Jāmi’at al-Khayr* in 1905 and *al-Irshād* by Syeh Ahmad al-Syurkati in 1913 (officially in 1915).

Within this background of the increasing idea of reformism, two notable Islamic associations, political and social, were created, namely SDI (*Sarekat Dagang Islam* – Islamic Trade Association) and *Muhammadiyah*. SDI was founded in 1905 by Hadji Samanhudi, who belonged to the Muslim middle class. SDI, the first embodiment of Islamic association, attempted to articulate Islamic identity as a common denominator to bring Indonesian people together against the economic foreign domination, especially from the Chinese businessmen.⁵ Later, SDI transformed itself to

⁴ Mizan Sya’roni, “The Majlisul Islamil A’la Indonesia (MIAD): Its Socio-Religious and Political Activities (1937-1943)” (McGill University, 1998), 14.

⁵ There are five developments that contributed to the establishment of *Sarekat Islam* in Indonesia. First, it was motivated by the prevailing dissatisfaction among Indonesian people to the already unpleasant situation. Second, the emergence of newly youth generation who were equipped with western education helped the unification of various dissatisfactions into one single unified movement. Third, historical events at the global level, such as the Japanese victory against Russia in 1905, encouraged the sense of nationalism and pan-Islamism. Fourth, the already indigenous values within Indonesia such as *Gotong Royong* (mutual help) and *mufakat* (agreement) served the basis for developing any modern institutions and organizations. Last, economic domination of

be a political party called SI (*Sarekat Islam* – Islamic Association) in 1911. Under the leadership of Tjokroaminoto, Abdul Moeis and Agus Salim, SI reached its apex in 1916 – 1921 as approximately two and half million people registered as the members of the organization.⁶

While *Muhammadiyah*, an Islamic social organization, was established in 1912 by KH Ahmad Dahlan. Inspired by the teachings of Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) and Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d.1897), KH Dahlan aimed at purifying Islam from superstition, myths, and heretical doctrines often found in Islamic rituals especially in the Java region and called his movement *gerakan tajdīd* (reformist movement). The idea of *gerakan tajdīd* in religious practices was mostly welcomed in Sumatera Island, and many members of *Muhammadiyah* came notably from urban areas. The term modernist also means that *Muhammadiyah* devoted much of its energy to establish schools combining Islamic teachings and modern sciences.⁷

The increasing spread of the reformist movement was followed by the traditionalists, who hold mixed teachings of local traditions and Islam. Hence, led by KH Hasyim Asy’ari, NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama* / The Revival of Ulemas) was found in 1926 in Surabaya, East Java. The organization comprised mostly of *kyais* (teachers) and *santris* (students), and held the ideology of *Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā’ah*. Externally, the organization was aimed at responding to the threatening developments in the Middle East regarding religious authorities and practices, namely the declaration of Turkey as a republic in 1923, marking the end of the caliphate system, and al-Saud family conquest over Mecca, who proclaimed Wahhabis as the formal school of thought.⁸

Chinese businessmen created social gap between native and foreigners. For details, see in Timur Jaylani, “The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism” (McGill University, 1959), 25.

⁶ Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto* (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 2003), 27.

⁷ P.M Holt, Ann K.S Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 2 A (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 190; Steven Drakeley, *The History of Indonesia* (United States of America: Greenwood Press, 2005), 58.

⁸ Martin Van Bruinessen, “Ghazwul Fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim Responses to Globalisation,” in *Dynamics of Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of Globalization*, ed. Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency Research Institute, 2009).

Besides these three main organizations, there were other political and social associations initiated by Indonesian Muslim scholars that contributed to the process of Indonesia's struggle against the colonialism such as JIB (*Jong Islamieten Bond* / Islamic Youth Association) in 1925, and *Persis* (*Persatuan Islam* / Islamic Union) in 1923. These organizations were the embodiment of Muslim's bold attempts to voice their concerns regarding Indonesia's future independence in the modern history of Islamic movement.

When Muslim leaders felt that there were different interpretations and distinct outlooks amongst them in expressing Islam, a federative organization was established by leaders of different Islamic organizations. Leader of *Sarekat Islam* (Mr. Wondoamiseno), *Muhammadiyah* (KH Mas Mansyur), and *Nahdlatul Ulama* (KH Hasyim Asyari), gathered to establish a forum called MIAI (*Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia* / Higher Assembly of Islam Indonesia) in September 1937. The organization's main objective was to fuse Muslim powers – political, non-political, traditionalist, and modernists – against the power of colonialism. Despite the differences in terms of visions and means of *da'wah* (spreading Islam), they shared common objective to oppose and terminate the continuation of colonialist domination. In specific, MIAI was a critical respond towards the Dutch discriminatory policies on Islamic matters concerning Islamic belief and practices such as marriage and education. During its operation, from 1937 until 1943, MIAI actively sought political reform on behalf of the Muslim community.⁹ Many Islamic organizations joined the organizations, and until 1941, the federative organization hosted about thirteen organizations. MIAI was considered as the early embryo of *Masjumi*.¹⁰

Along with the emergence of Islamic associations and organizations in Indonesia, the seed of nationalism-based organizations also began to appear and take

⁹ Sya'roni, "The Majlisul Islamil A'la Indonesia (MIAI): Its Socio-Religious and Political Activities (1937-1943)", 1 – 8.

¹⁰ Howard M Federspiel, "The Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)" (McGill University, 1966), 57.

lead in the public discourse of Indonesia's pre-independence. The emergence of these organizations was led mostly by the young graduates educated in western countries. In advocating their cause, these organizations used the spirit of nationalism, rather than religious identity, as a common platform to unite people, bring them together, and rally for the independence of Indonesia. On July 4th, 1927, a group of Intellectual Indonesian Muslims, consisting of Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Mr. Sartono, Mr Iskaq Tjokrohadisuryo and Mr Sunaryo, established a nationalist association called PNI (*Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia* / Indonesian National Association), latter transformed to *Partai Nasional Indonesia* (Indonesian National Party). Soekarno was appointed as the leader of the organization. The PNI attracted the attention of various groups especially outside Muslim circles, including Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus. The plural identity of PNI helped the organization to be the first nation wide political movement in Indonesia. The growing popularity of newly born PNI had caused alarm for the Dutch, forcing it to issue the arrest warrants to some notable PNI leaders. The nationalist ideology then dominated the political scene of Indonesia. Despite the dismissal of PNI in 1931 and that the party became prohibited, the same spirit could not be contained. Many nationalist organizations followed PNI, and emerged under the banner of nationalism such as Gerindo (*Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia* / Indonesian People's Movement) in 1937, Partindo (*Partai Indonesia* / Indonesian Party), PNI Baru (The New PNI), and Parindra (*Partai Indonesia Raya* / Great Indonesian Party).¹¹

The birth of PNI and other nationalist organizations marked the beginning of the dynamics of national debate, at the discourse level, on the issue of Islam and nationalism. The nature of the debate centered on the basis for the would-be independent Indonesia, whether Islam or secular ideology of nationalism. The most significant figures among those who preferred the nationalist identity over the Islamic

¹¹ Nicholas Tarling, *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 3, 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 269; MC Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200*, 3rd ed. (California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 236.

one were Soekarno, Hatta, and Supomo.¹² As argued by Federspiel, during 1920s and 1930s, the subject of nationalism became the major theme of discussion between secularist factions and Muslim groups.¹³

Soekarno saw that ideological differences amongst Indonesian people led to the internal fragmentation, weakening the effort of the anti-colonial front. Based on that, Soekarno initiated the establishment of PPPKI (*Permoefakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia* / Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Association) in 1927. The group was the embodiment of his idea of merging three Indonesian political movements (nationalist, religious, and socialist), which he overtly expressed in pamphlet of *Islamisme, Nasionalisme, dan Marxisme* in 1926. The establishment of the group was possible due to a joint effort of Soekarno, Tjokroaminoto, and Agus Salim.¹⁴ Later, the Soekarno's idea developed into his grand program called NASAKOM (*Nasionalis, Agamis, Komunis* / Nationalism, Religious, and Communism).

During the Japanese occupation (1942-1945), political Islam assumed increasing significance compared to that of during the Dutch colonialism. It was due to Japanese policy to engage 'Ulamā to participate in the administration. At the same time, the 'Ulamā wisely seized the opportunity to seek the freedom for the people of Indonesia. The Japanese at the beginning realized the political bargaining of Islamic organizations as significant power. Thus, they embraced them and allied themselves with the Muslim community.¹⁵ In March 1942, for instance, an office called Shūmubu (*Kantor Urusan Agama* or Office of Religious Affairs) was established. Adding to that,

¹² Three paradigms prevailing among Islamic political thinkers in defining the state-Islam relations in early 19th century that, to certain extent, influences the typology of discourse in Indonesia. First, that religion and state are inseparably integrated. This opinion based on the belief that religion (Islam) is *al-Dīn al-Kāmil* (comprehensive guidance). Muslims are obligatory to follow the political system applied by the Prophet Muhammad and *al-Khulafā al-Rāshidīn*. State, therefore, assumes two interrelated functions: political and religious. Second, opposing the first, argued that religion and state are two different entities. The domain of religion is private, and couldn't intrude to the public issues. Last, the nature of state – religion relations are mutually symbiotic, thus, each need another. This paradigm attempted to reconcile the vast differences between the above two paradigms.

¹³ Federspiel, "The Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union), 130."

¹⁴ Chiara Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia* (The Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2012), 42.

¹⁵ Nurouzzaman Shiddiqi, "The Role of 'Ulama during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia (1942-1945)" (McGill University, 1975), iii.

the Japanese also initiated PPOI (*Persiapan Persatoean Oemmat Islam / Preparatory Committee for the Unification of the Islamic Community*) with the role of spokesperson for Indonesian Islam.¹⁶

3.3. The Impasse of Political Islam (1945 – 1997)

3.3.1. Constitutional Debate on National Identity

As a nation emerging from the ruins of a prolonged war spanning about 350 years, Indonesia was in urgent need to restructure both its “hardware” and “software”.¹⁷ The questions of what will be the identity of this post-colonial state, what will be the proper ground on which to build the newly born nation, how to define the relationship with other states, and how the government will be administered, are to mention the few examples of the overriding challenges in the domestic political context during the early years of Indonesia. These crucial questions have been responded to by political elites differently, leading to the emergence of numerous groups and various blocs within Indonesia.

The debate on the state identity constituted the main point of contention in the initial discussion amongst political elites even before the proclamation of independent Indonesia. Settling the issue of state identity has been of paramount importance for several reasons. First, as a nation beset with vast differences in terms of ethnics, languages, religions, and races, Indonesia realized that such shared identity will serve as a bounding adhesive. It was a necessary step for Indonesia to consolidate various elements within the society. Second, the identity will provide the sense of “we are different” from the former colonial master. By doing so, Indonesia would not only

¹⁶ Sya'roni, “The Majelis Islamil A’la Indonesia (MIAI): Its Socio-Religious and Political Activities (1937-1943),” 66.

¹⁷ What I do mean by hardware is the physical infrastructure such as buildings, offices, and roads. The software on the other hand denotes the visible infrastructure of social political element within a country such as the ideology of nation, identity, the form of government and such. Similar situation was face by modern India after independence, in which leaders were different in determining the position of religion in the state, leading to the separation of Pakistan from India.

become physically independent but ideologically liberated. Third, the identity also becomes the underlying basis to construct political infrastructure upon which the rulers of the country will be legitimized.

The inability of Islam to act as a decisive force in Indonesia's domestic politics has been partly due to the fragmentation within the Muslim community. The cleavages in Indonesia's Muslim community had been salient during the construction of formal national identity between two main camps; one favoring the strong role of Islam in the constitution of newly born state of Indonesia, and one championing the concept of nationalism without differentiating the believers of Indonesia's community. Such ideological debate is reflected well in the item of agenda within the meeting sessions of BPUPKI (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* / Investigating Body for the Preparation of Independent Indonesia). It was a preparatory body under the auspices of Japan, established on 29th April 1945. When the Japanese army felt that they were no longer in possible position to continue the war against the Western powers as the allied armies were in their road to victory, they formed BPUPKI as the political promise for Indonesian people to grant the independence. The BPUPKI's primary mandate was to discuss the underlying basis for independent Indonesia such as form of state, government system, territory, political structure, citizenship, including state identity. During the meetings in May to August that year, the body made headway on several issues, except for one question that developed into a crucial issue that polarized the opinions of the members of the BPUPKI: the question of identity.¹⁸

Within this item of agenda, two main camps emerged: *Kebangsaan* (nationalist) and Islamic factions.¹⁹ Soekarno, one of the BPUPKI members supporting

¹⁸ R. E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 104 - 111.

¹⁹ The bipolarization of ideological differences between Islamism and kebangsaan had its root in the early history of Indonesian nationalist movement. Islamic faction viewed that the first nationalist movement was the establishment of *Sarikat Islam* (SI). On the other hands, the kebangsaan faction considered *Budi Utomo* was supposed to be the first movement. Reference was made in similar way to *Jong Java* (Java Youths) in contrast to *Jong Islamiten Bond* (Muslim Youth Association). Soekarno and Hatta had been engaged in public debate on the issue of Islam and the state around 1940s. Soekarno published series of papers supporting his idea of separation between Islam and the state in *Pandji Islam* magazine. At the same time, Muhammad Nasir responded by publishing nine articles on the unity of religion and state. Such polemics between two important figures were considered as the representative

the idea of *kebangsaan*, believed that Islamic identity was not a viable option for Indonesia, a country in which different people of faith lived. He further argued that Islamic state is not an obligation for every Muslim, and the concept of Islamic state has not been supported by a strong foundation and *dalil* (reasons) within the Islamic teachings. His position on Islam was salient as identified in his remarks on the separation between Islam and state. Hefner argued that:

The young Soekarno argued that the union of religion and state in traditional Muslim governance had contributed to the Muslim's world stagnation, Separating Islam from the state, Soekarno argued, would liberate Islam from the tutelage of corrupt rulers and unleash its progressive potentials.²⁰

On the other hand, the Islamic faction within the BPUPKI, led by Muhammad Natsir, who later on became the head of one of the biggest Islamic political parties in Indonesia, Masjumi, opposed the argument by saying that Islam is a comprehensive working framework for human beings. Every aspect of humans are essentially regulated by Islamic values. A state, therefore, is a preliminary condition for the Muslim community to make the framework operational. Adding to that, Quran, in which all aspects and regulations for Muslim are derived from, mentions the concept of leaders (such as *awliyā*, and *ūlil amri*), unity, organizations in various verses.²¹

The voting mechanism on the issue of state identity could not solve the problem since Kahar Muzakkir rejected the voting result, considering the fact that Islamic faction represented only 25% out of sixty members of the BPUPKI. As a result of deadlock in the negotiation, the issue of identity was further discussed in *Panitia Sembilan* (Committee of Nine), a small committee established on the 1st of June 1945, comprising

of the two most important groups of thought in the early independence of Indonesia. For more detailed accounts, see Saifuddin Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia" (McGill University, 1976).

²⁰ Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 39.

²¹ Ibid, 39.

nine people, four of which were from *Kebangsaan*, the other four from Islamic faction, and one from Christian.²²

On June 22nd, 1945, the committee arrived at a *modus vivendi* called *Piagam Djakarta* (Djakarta Charter), in which five pillars of Indonesia were finally formulated. The first principle within the charter is worth noting as it said: “*Ketuhanan dengan Kewajiban Menjalankan Syariat bagi Pemeluk-Pemeluknya*” (Belief in Almighty God with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out the Islamic law/ *sharī’ah*). By and large, it was the recognition of the “Islamic identity” within the state. In the next session of BPUPKI meeting, the agreed charter was then adopted as the *Muqaddimah* (Preamble) for the adopted State Constitution. It was within this meeting that the clause of which the President of Indonesia must be an Indonesian citizen and Muslim was agreed.²³

However, soon after the declaration of Indonesia’s independence and the appointment of Soekarno as President and Hatta as his Vice President, during the meeting of PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia / Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia*) on August 18th, 1945, several wordy adjustments were made due to a political lobby within the committee. Muhammad Hatta informed Wahid Hasyim that if the word *sharī’ah* remained in the *Pancasila*, some parts of Eastern Indonesia, mainly the Christian populated region, would ask for a separation from Indonesia.²⁴ Wahid Hasyim, leader of the Islamic faction, with the approval of other members, agreed to change some words for the sake of national unity. Three main changes were made: First, the word *Muqaddimah* was changed to *preambule* (Dutch

²² Soekarno, as head of the committee, Muhammad Hatta, Ahmad Subarjo, and Muhammad Yamin were the representatives of *Kebangsaan* group. The Islamic group was being represented by Wahid Hasyim, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Abikusno Cokrosuyoso, and Agus Salim, while AA Maramis was the representative from Christian group.

²³ Anshari, “The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman’s Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia,” 23 – 38.

²⁴ It is worth noting that such differing views in the state identity was also present in other newly decolonized countries, India for instance. During the independence process, two main leaders, Jawaharlal Nehru and Ali Jinnah were in dispute over the national identity of India, leading to the partition of two countries, India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

language). Second, seven words (*dengan Kewajiban Menjalankan Syariat bagi Pemeluk-Pemeluknya*) in the chapter were dropped and replaced by *Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* (Believe in One God). Last, the omission of being Muslim as a condition for being President. *Pancasila*, therefore, was established on five principles: (1) Belief in God, (2) Humanity, (3) The Unity of Indonesia, (4) People's Sovereignty, and (5) Social Justice. In order to maintain the unity of Indonesia, the Islamic faction within the body accepted those "last minute" changes. The acceptance of the Muslim faction was due to the promise made by Soekarno to quickly undertake general election and reformulate the constitution afterwards. The independence would create national stability, and as such, a fair election would be quickly held. Through the election, the agenda to put *sharī'ah* into constitution would be ensured.²⁵ Hefner referred to *Pancasila* as a unique synthesis of Nationalist, Muslim, Marxist, Liberal democratic and Populist Indonesian ideas.²⁶

The discussion, however, did not end. It continued twelve years later, during the meeting of *Konstituante* (Constituent Assembly), a temporary parliament, 1957 – 1959, when the Islamic faction in the *Konstituante* asked for the insertion of *Djakarta Charter* within the National Constitution. It was considered a pivotal step to make the Islamic law as the basis for national law. Muslim leaders in this faction, while acknowledging the diversity of Indonesian people, believed that the state should participate in maintaining the identity of Muslims, the majority population in the country. While another group believed that major points in *Djakarta Charter* had been included in the constitution, thus, its insertion as a whole should be disregarded. The debate on the state identity resulted in deadlock on June 2nd, 1959 without any resolution adopted. Constitutional struggle on the national identity ended with the

²⁵ Anshari, "The Jakarta Charter of June 1945: A History of the Gentleman's Agreement between the Islamic and the Secular Nationalists in Modern Indonesia," 39 – 41.

²⁶ Hefner, *Civil Islam*, 41-42.

dismissal of *Konstituante* by President Soekarno, and with his Presidential Decision to return to the 1945 constitution, in which *Pancasila* would serve as the formal ideology of state.²⁷

3.3.2. Depoliticizing Islam Under Soekarno

In addition to the the heavy debate on the national identity, Indonesia was also in continuous search for political structure. It has been noted that during Soekarno's presidency, Indonesia experienced three types of different systems of government. Guided by the 1945 Indonesian constitution, at the onset, Indonesia established a presidential system, in which the President acted as both the head of state and government. By virtue of liberalizing the Indonesian political system, Vice-Presidential Decree No. X/1949 was issued by Muhammad Hatta, with the establishment of constitutional parliamentary, replacing the former system. Unfortunately, the system ended in failure as the most durable cabinet survived only two years.²⁸ (See Table 3.1)

Table 3.1. The Tenure of Indonesian Cabinet during Liberal Democracy

No	Cabinet	Tenure
1	Hatta Cabinet	December 1949 – August 1950
2	Muhammad Natsir Cabinet	September 1950 – March 1951
3	Sukiman Cabinet	April 1951 – February 1952
4	Wilopo Cabinet	April 1952 – June 1953
5	The First Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet	July 1953 – July 1955
6	Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet	August 1955 – March 1956
7	The Second Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet	March 1956 – March 1957

Source: Author, 2015

The continuous unstable political environment had delegitimized the constitutional system of state, forcing the government to hold the general election for the assembly. With the enactment of the 1953 on Election Law, Indonesia held the first general election in 1955 for members of the *Konstituante* and House of Representatives, participated by 30 competing parties. However, the election did not succeed in ironing

²⁷ Grigis Tinular Harso, "Penerimaan Azas Tunggal Pancasila Oleh Nahdlatul Ulama: Latar Belakang Dan Proses 1983 - 1985" (Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia, 2013).

²⁸ Hermawan Sulisty, "Electoral Politics in Indonesia: A Hard Way to Democracy," in *Electoral Politics in Southeast & East Asia* (Singapore: Office for Regional Co-operation in Southeast Asia, 2002), 75 - 76.

out the differences as regards to the ideological perspectives in the political parties as there was no single party that won the majority of total valid vote in the election. (See the table 3.2)

Table 3.2. The Electoral Result of 1955 Election

No	Party	Ideology	Parliament	Konstituante
1	PNI	Nationalism	57	119
2	Masjumi	Islam	57	112
3	PNU	Islam	45	91
4	PKI	Communism	39	80
5	PSII	Islam	8	16
6	Parkindo	Christian	8	16
7	Partai Katolik	Catholic	6	10
8	Partai Sosialis Indonesia	Socialism	5	10

Source: Official Website of KPU (Election Committee), 2013

The PNI (nationalist party) and *Masjumi* (Muslim party), both had equally secured 57 seats, followed by, PNU with 45 seats, and PKI with 39 seats. The other 59 seats were shared by the remaining relatively smaller parties. The result of the election forced the parties to build political coalition and concession. As the political stalemate continued to take place, the second Ali Cabinet returned his mandate to the President in 1957. The domestic political crisis had pushed Soekarno, backed by military, to declare *Staat van Oorlog en Beleg* (martial law) on the 14th of March 1957. It was then followed by the issuance of the Presidential Decree on July 1959, containing three major political decisions: (1) dissolve of *Konstituante* (Parliament), (2) return to 1945 Constitution which uses presidential system of government, and (3) establishment of temporary parliament appointed by Soekarno. By this decree, Soekarno declared *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy).²⁹

Disappointed over Soekarno's decision, the rebellion movement erupted in 1958, with the proclamation of PRRI (*Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia* / Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) in Sumatra. The PRRI

²⁹ According to Elson, President Soekarno had planned to take over the political system of Indonesia earlier before. In 1956, He reminded the parliament that the victim of Indonesian people during colonialism was less that during after the independence because of the sharp ideological differences. Later, following his trip from China, He issued his first stentorian "to bury the parties." As the political crisis developed uncontrolled, He issued the *Konsepsi* that ended the role of political parties, and followed by Presidential Decree. His idea was fully supported by military, making him more confidence in executing the plan. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia*, 14 - 16.

appointed Syafruddin Prawiranegara, an important figure in *Masjumi*, as the Prime Minister, and some other members of *Masjumi* as Ministers.³⁰ Despite the rebellion movement that was terminated finally by the government of Indonesia, and some venerated figures, mostly from *Masjumi* members involved in the movement were granted amnesty by the government, Soekarno began to feel uneasy and uncomfortable with the political Islam and considered it a menace to Indonesian politics. As such, on September 13th 1960, Soekarno made a critical decision to dismiss *Masjumi*, and banned it from participating in the Indonesian political system. For the Muslim community, the decision was a serious blow for their struggle in the modern political system of Indonesia. And it was considered the first step of marginalization of Islam in Indonesian political history.

Soekarno went further by announcing the concept of *NASAKOM* (*Nasionalis Agamis Komunis* / Nationalist Religious Communist). The very idea was to synchronize the three streams of different thoughts popular among Indonesian citizens and political elites into one concise package. Soekarno attempted to “reconcile” different ideologies and submerge them into one single unified identity, called *NASAKOM*. This term was used to forge unity and evoke struggle.³¹ The novel idea of Soekarno was hardly accepted by many Muslim scholars on the basis that the synthesis between these different philosophical understandings was nearly impossible. It was seen as political move of Soekarno to appease Muslim anger over the banning of *Masjumi*. Among Muslim political parties, only NU accepted the *NASAKOM* concept. The acceptance of NU was on the basis that; (1) NU should be the controlling part inside the government;

³⁰ For some, such as Lieutenant General of Syarwan Hamid, PRRI was not a rebellion movement, but rather corrective movement towards central government that failed to deliver basic services to the public and create central domination. Moreover, considering the significant contribution made by Muhammad Natsir and Syafruddin Prawiranegara in the history of Indonesia's independence, the idea of rebellion did not make any sense. In August 1950, it was Natsir who proposed the so-called Integral Motion, calling on all the states in Republic of the United States of Indonesia to unite and together form unitary state. See “Para Tokoh: Muhammad Natsir Bukan Pemberontak,” *Pelita* Website, retrieved June 29th 2015, <http://www.pelita.or.id/baca.php?id=51740>.

³¹ Donald K Emmerson, *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 32.

(2) it was based on the principle of *maṣālih mursalah* (public interest); and (3) it was possible political avenue to impede and contain the development of communism.³²

3.3.3. Depoliticizing Islam under Soeharto

Winning the 1971 Election

When Soeharto firstly assumed office as a president, he had substantially changed the direction of the country, from one that focused much on the grandiose international agendas to one that put priority on the national achievements. The new government gave the appearance of being dedicated to the economic restoration as opposed to international activism. However, Soeharto was faced by a daunting task, which was to create and maintain national stability in terms of security, politics, and economy (*stabilitas politik dan ekonomi*). Leaving office in 1966, Soekarno inherited political distrust amongst the elites and severe economic turbulence. In order to restore the situation and lead to the better, Soeharto was determined to pursue national stability, political and economic, in which his grand project of national development could be systematically implemented. During the first phase of his office, Soeharto saw two political powers at play at the national level: military and Islam. The first power could be easily controlled by Soeharto since he was a part of the group (two-star military general), while failing to understand the nature of the second power, Islam, could pose serious threat to his administration. In dealing with that, Soeharto seemed to follow the path of Soekarno, putting Islam at periphery in political game.

Once the regime succeeded in consolidating its power, Soeharto began neutralizing Islam as a basis for political mobilization by implementing a series of corporatism approaches in dealing with Islam. In its attempt to bring Islam under the government's control, the New Order relied on the policy of carrot as well as stick. The

³² Hendri F. Isnaeni. "Politisi Air yang Tak Lagi Mengalir." 12 July 2010, *Historia* Website, retrieved 31 January 2017, <http://historia.id/obituari/politisi-air-yang-tak-lagi-mengalir>

strategy was to record Muslim interests and put them into state structures that restrict their political movements. Realizing the importance of ideology in the social movement, the regime attempted to harmonize the ideological differences, including Islam, into state defined goals of economic development and political stability. Two main targets of the New Order's policy: Islamic parties (political) and Islamic education (social).

When military and Muslim cooperated in containing the communist threat to the country following the abortive coup, many believed that Soeharto's policy would be flexible towards Muslim aspirations, allowing them to express their ideas in the public space. Islamic groups had presented substantial support for Soeharto to dismantle the Old Order and welcomed the regime with enthusiasm. As the struggle over constitution was on the top list of agenda, throughout 1968 – 1969, Islamic political parties initiated “Djakarta Charter Commemoration Day” program to be held on 22nd June annually, hoping that the new government would listen to the Muslim demands. Discussion on the charter became a national headline. In terms of politics, the Soeharto administration was expected to rehabilitate *Masjumi* after being terminated by Soekarno in 1960. However, rather than relaxing the muscle, the new government did not allow Muslim voices to be heard. The New order prevented *Masjumi* to re-operate, and President Soeharto seemed to further incapacitate Islamic political parties by dismantling its base. In responding to the request by Prawoto Mangkusasmita, *Masjumi* chairman, in 1967 to seek the recognition of *Masjumi*, Soeharto concluded: “legal, political, and psychological factors have led the armed forces to the opinion that the armed forces can not accept the rehabilitation of the former political party, *Masjumi*.”³³

Considering the fact that the leaders of *Masjumi* still maintained considerable influence at the grassroots level, the New Order attempted to curb the political maneuver of ex-*Masjumi* leaders by creating *Parmusi* (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia* /

³³ Yudi Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 340.

Indonesian Muslim Party). President Soeharto allowed the establishment of *Parmusi* that embraced similar political ideology with *Masjumi*, on the condition that ex-*Masjumi* leaders were not permitted to participate. However, *Parmusi* experienced further government's intervention, especially during the appointment of its general chairman, when the elected Chairman, Mohamad Roem, was refused to be acknowledged by the Government of Indonesia. The internal conflict of *Parmusi* led the government to appoint M.S. Mintaredja, Minister of State, as the Chairman of *Parmusi*. The New Order based their objection on the ideological ground that *Masjumi* sought to realize Islamic law in the Indonesia's constitution by inserting the *Djakarta Charter*. In addition, the military was also in state of alert towards the leaders of *Masjumi* who provided clandestine support to the rebellion activities of the PRRI movement in Sumatra.³⁴

In order to further hold the power over the country, the New Order must win the 1971 election. Therefore, some strategies had been pursued. First, formulating the regulation that the seats within the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* / House of Representative) and MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* / People's Consultative Assembly) would be filled mostly by provincial representatives, appointed directly by the government, rather than through direct election. Second, realizing that PNI and Islamic political parties had significant constituents in bureaucracy and grass root society respectively, the government created *Sekber Golkar* (*Sekretariat Bersama Golkar* / Joint Secretariat of Golkar), as a political machine to counter the two major political powers in the 1971 election. The membership of *Sekber Golkar* was dominated by military officers loyal to Soeharto. In order to reduce the influence of PNI in bureaucracy, the government, through Minister of Internal Affairs Mr. Amir Machmud, issued two regulations: (1) *Permen* (*Peraturan Menteri* / Minister Regulation) No.

³⁴ Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto*, 48.

12/1969, obliging all civil servants to join *Kokar-Mendagri* (*Korps Karyawan Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri – Kokar Mendagri / Corps of Civil Servants*), and (2) PP (*Peraturan Pemerintah / Government Regulation*) No. 6/1970, obliging all members of *Kokar-Mendagri* to elect Golkar in the election. The government's strategy to reduce the power of Islamic political parties at the grass root level was to provide financial assistance for *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and reestablish GUPPI (*Gabungan Usaha untuk Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam / Association for the Improvement of Islamic Education*). Adding to that, Soeharto introduced the "floating mass" concept that prevented *Nahdlatul Ulama* and other parties to organize politically at the lowest level of region (district), in which many NU voters lived. In 1971, Golkar, the only mass organization that participated in the election, coined the concept of "politics no, development yes" to undermine the role of political parties in Indonesia.³⁵ The result of the 1971 election was predictable, that Golkar won more than 60% of total vote. The government's domination over DPR and MPR gave room for the New Order to project the future trajectory of the state. It resulted in structuring political alienation of Islam into repressive policies.

Just two years after the election, in 1973, the government seemed to further flex its muscle by issuing regulations that forced all political parties, excluding Golkar, to merge into two main parties. The secular parties such as PNI, were grouped under PDI (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia / Indonesian Democratic Party*). While Islamic parties (Parmusi, PNU, PSII, and Perti) were united under PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan / United Development Party*). The PPP was banned to use Islamic identities and symbols, while the planned slogans should be consulted to the government, and as such, it gradually lost its magnet to attract Muslim constituents. The

³⁵ Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 42.

sign of loss was felt in the subsequent election, especially in the 1987 election, dropping from 28 percent in 1982 to only 16 percent.³⁶

Azas Tunggal (Sole Foundation)

Beginning from 1980, the Government of Indonesia felt the urgency to apply *Pancasila* as “*azas tunggal*” (the sole foundation or principle) for all community organizations, including political parties and social organizations. As argued by Harso, the emergence of the *azas tunggal* concept was due to ideological and political reasons. Ideologically, the Government was very cautious over the spread of ideologies that were hostile to the national unity of Indonesia and *Pancasila*.³⁷ In this regard, the communism and Islam have been identified as “different” to the accepted concept of *Pancasila*. The 1965 abortive communist coup and Islamic rebellions in 1950s were in particular created collective memory on possible “threat” to the national unity emerging from these ideologies. Islam was perceived as “political enemy number two” after communism, and categorized as *ekstrim kanan* (the right extreme) as opposed to *ekstrim kiri* (left extreme) of communism.

In the speech by Soeharto before ABRI (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia / Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces*), he reminded the consensus made by ABRI and political parties in 1966 to make *Pancasila* as the sole principle. However, Soeharto explained that the consensus had not been fully implemented, because there was still a party (by this, Soeharto meant PPP) using principles other than *Pancasila*. Therefore, on the 16th of August 1982, Soeharto spoke of “sole principle” in front of MPR, saying that “all social-political forces, particularly political parties, should accept the state ideology as their *azas tunggal*.” MPR General Session in March 1983 finally issued the Enactment No. II/1983 (Article 3 Chapter IV) deciding *Pancasila* as the sole

³⁶ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 18.

³⁷ Harso, “Penerimaan Azas Tunggal Pancasila Oleh Nahdlatul Ulama: Latar Belakang Dan Proses 1983 - 1985,” 4.

principle. To implement the mandate of MPR, on February 19th, 1985, the Government of Indonesia passed the law No. 5/1985 obliging two political parties (PPP and PDIP) and Golkar to accept *Pancasila* as the sole ideology. Four months after, carrying the same spirit of previous law, the Government passed Law No. 8/1985 that imposed *azas tunggal* to all social organizations.

The controversial decision received strong criticism, especially from Islamic organizations, and became a major matter of debate. Three arguments put forward by the Muslim community to counter the enforcement of *azas tunggal*. First, *Pancasila* is not equal to Islam in its philosophical purposes. The former is seen as the foundation of state, while the latter is understood as the basis of human life, in which statehood and nationhood are part of it. Thus, submission to Islam doesn't automatically imply insubordination to *Pancasila*. This argument was put forward by Malik Ahmad, Deliar Noer, KH Noer Ali, Syafruddin Prawiranegara,³⁸ and Abdul Qadir Djaelani. Second, forced acquiescence to *azas tunggal* contravenes the 1945 Constitution that literally guaranteed the freedom of religion and worship as stipulated in Article 29, paragraph (2). For many Muslims, any associations that are based on the concept of *al-Ukhuwwah al-Islāmiyyah* are in an act of worship. Prominent figures such as KH Noer Ali and Prawiranegara submitted to this argument as well. Third, the concept of *azas tunggal* had been imposed without sufficient study to the political and social implication arose out of it. Many politicians of PPP in the parliament held this argument, though in the end they agreed to pass the law.³⁹

The unintended consequence of the enforcement of *azas tunggal* was obvious amongst Muslim associations as indicated by the split in HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa*

³⁸ On July 7 1983, Prawiranegara, former President and Acting Prime Minister of the Republic Emergency Government of Indonesia, made a thoughtful letter to the President Soeharto, against the implementation of the law. He made the case for opposing the *azas tunggal* by criticizing the Government's interpretation of *Pancasila* and presenting conceptual analysis of *Pancasila* and Islam, concluding that Islam and *Pancasila* had never been in conflict.

³⁹ Syafruddin Prawiranegara, "Pancasila as the Sole Foundation," *Indonesia* 38 (October 1984), 78 - 80; Djayadi Hanan and Mulyadi J Amalik, *Gerakan Pelajar Islam: Di Bawah Bayang-Bayang Negara : Studi Kasus Pelajar Islam Indonesia Tahun 1980-1997* (Yogyakarta: UII Press & PBPII, 2006), 132 - 133.

Islam / Muslim Student Association). The implementation of *azas tunggal* policy led to the emergence of two different camps in HMI: a camp that attempted to defend the right of HMI to use Islam as the organization's philosophical foundation called HMI-MPO (HMI Majelis Penyelamatan Organisasi), and a camp that voluntarily accepted *Pancasila* as its foundation called HMI Dipo (HMI Diponegoro). HMI MPO that opposed the government, headed by Eggy Sudjana, were interestingly not banned by the Government and were still actively involved in many student activities up to now. Meanwhile PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia* / Indonesian Islam Students) was frozen.⁴⁰ The rejection over *azas tunggal* was also voiced by public, and in some cases descended into bloody conflict between public and military forces. The tragedy of Tanjung Priok in 1984 was ignited by public strong opposition to *azas tunggal* in the Tanjung Priok region, and answered by the government by sending artillery battalion to the site. The case, which was then left uninvestigated, was reopened in 2003 when state prosecutors proceeded with the trial of the military personnel accused of the incident.⁴¹

However, it is worth noting that, despite overall Soeharto's strategy to keep political activities of Islam under strict censorship, during his presidency, Islam was allowed to develop intellectually. For instance, while Masjumi was left prohibited, New Order granted young cadres of this party such as Mukti Ali and Harun Nasution to pursue higher degree on Islamic studies at McGill University. Mukti Ali, whose interest was on comparative religion, later on became Minister for Religious Affairs, and rector of IAIN Sunan Kalijaga. Harun Nasution, one of the most venerated intellectuals defending Mu'tazila thought, became a rector at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah in Jakarta. The government facilitated Islamic higher institutions to expand to reach every province in Indonesia, and to cooperate with universities abroad, especially from western

⁴⁰ Zuhri Humaidi, "Islam Dan Pancasila: Pergulatan Islam Dan Negara Periode Kebijakan Asas Tunggal," *Kontekstualita* 25, no. 2 (2010), 297 - 298.

⁴¹ "Court urged to pursue Priok case," *The Jakarta Post*, 7 October 2003.

countries. It was intended to provide young progressive Muslim intellectuals who can fully function in “nor secular nor theocratic” state.⁴²

3.3.4. Islam – Military Rivalry

The nature of Islam – Military (then called ABRI, but later changed to TNI) relationship has been at heightened suspicion, sharpened by Soeharto’s political game in taking side to the military group. The Muslim’s uneasy relation with the military was a natural response towards military perception on Islam as the threat to national unity. While military perception was rooted to the history of Muslim demand in inserting the word *Sharī’ah* in the constitution, it further escalated when some prominent leaders of Islamic party of Masjumi were allegedly involved in the creation of *Dārul Islām* (Islamic State). Before looking at that, it is important to touch upon the primacy of the military in Indonesia’s politics. The military has been part of the regime's mechanism, in addition to its role of defending the nation, to supervise society, and to control ideological orientation of community, and help the government in managing the mobilization of masses.

The military considers itself as having an indispensable role in the history of Indonesia's independence through their revolutionary struggle against the Dutch. The ascendancy of military role in the history of domestic politics of Indonesia began following the proclamation of martial law in March 1957 by Soekarno, when the President authorized the military campaign against secessionist rebellions and civilian supervision during the widespread of anti-western demonstrations in West Irian. In December of the same year, Soekarno gave an additional task of controlling nationalized enterprises, expanding military role to economic influence.

⁴² Another prominent scholar who received Islamic education during these years was Nurcholis Madjid, who served as chairman of HMI and became one of the progressive moderate Muslim intellectuals. See more in Bruinessen, “Ghazwul Fikri or Arabisation? Indonesian Muslim Responses to Globalisation.”

In order to anticipate the end of martial law and to maintain its position, military sought the rationale for its continued role in the society. Therefore, as argued by Harisanto, military leaders constructed a major doctrinal concept of their role in the society through "*dwi fungsi*" doctrine. Through the concept, military leaders claimed ABRI's function as both the defender in terms of military organization, and the stabilizer in the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural, and religious terms. The concept of *dwi fungsi* was elaborated further, from 1958 to 1962, through the concept of territorial warfare and territorial management. In the first concept, the military played a significant role in ensuring the security of the nation by expanding the military structure at the national, provincial, district, and village levels, paralleling the structure of government bureaucracy. Some even went on describing it as a shadow government. This delicate and detailed structure of ABRI provided it with far-reaching supervision over almost all aspects of domestic life, including political Islam. In the second concept, the military entrenched their influence through active participation in Golkar, the main party of the regime, and appointment of senior military to important positions in ministries (as Director General, Inspector General, Secretary General), provinces (as governor) and state enterprises (Commission member). These positions have been called as *kekaryaan* (functionaries).⁴³

Amin Rais, one of the outspoken Muslim scholars during the presidency of Soeharto, as quoted by Mietzner, clearly described the complexity of the political situation of Indonesia at the time. He said that sidelining military engagement in the national politics of Indonesia was considered one of the difficult challenges. Military domination had been happening at political, societal and economical level.⁴⁴

⁴³ Eddy S Harisanto, "The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (Dwi Fungsi ABRI)" (Naval Postgraduate School, 1993), 27.

⁴⁴ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 1.

The intensive involvement of the military in domestic public life was aimed at maintaining the internal security of Indonesia and to protect the nation from what was perceived as a latent threat by the regime. From a historical reading, the emergence of *Dārul Islām* (Islamic State) in Indonesia during the presidency of Soekarno, to certain extent, justified the political threat posed by Islam in the multi – ethnic country of Indonesia. However, it also needs to be understood as the regime's policy directed at other "threatening" and "fanatic" ideologies such as liberalism, and communism. In addition to the physical surveillance, ABRI imposed the concept of *pembinaan* (guidance), including ideological guidance.

3.4. Changing Pattern of Relations

In the early 1990s, Soeharto began to feel the urgency of embracing Islam in his Islamic polity by shifting his policy of “containment” to that of “allocative,” a new mode of strategy exercised to co-opt Islam. Scholars identified the shifting political behavior of the New Order towards Islam, and named it differently such as “allocative” and “corporatism”.

In light of the government’s attempt to heal the prolonged rupture with political Islam, Soeharto launched series of measures that would bring the nuance of trust of cooperation. In 1990, at the behest of Soeharto, Habibie, the then Minister for Research and Technology, initiated the establishment of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia / Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals*). The organization was actively involved in coloring the country with Islamic dimension, as in the case of expansion of the authority of Islamic courts, the Islamic program in television, the establishment of Bank Muamalat in 1991, the creation of Muslim think – tank of CIDES (Center of Information and Development Studies), and the daily newspaper *Republika*.

With the formal institution of ICMI and acknowledged by the government, Islam in Indonesia began to take lead in the state policies.

The establishment of CIDES in 1993 was particularly aimed at counterbalancing the domination of CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) in Soeharto's policies. The influence of CSIS, especially in areas of foreign affairs and Asian Pacific Economics was very strong in its early period for the close relations between the CSIS founders and the key policy makers in the New Order. The declining influence started in the early 1990s, when Soeharto paid close attention to ICMI.⁴⁵ CIDES, according to Diane Stone, was understood as the embodiment of Muslim intellectuals, while CSIS, established in 1971, was believed to be a think-tank organization of Chinese and Indonesian Catholic intellectuals who focus on liberalizing the Indonesian economic system and foreign policy.⁴⁶

A similar pattern was behind the establishment of *Republika*, a daily newspaper spearheaded by the members of ICMI. It was also understood as the balancing towards the domination of *Kompas*, established in 1965 by a number of Chinese and Javanese Catholic journalists in order to express Catholic political interests. Soon after its establishment in 1993, *Republika* became a semi-government voice. When *Republika*'s share was open to the public in the same year, President Soeharto advised Muslims to buy the shares.⁴⁷

However, the establishment of ICMI was not without critics. Abdurrahman Wahid, for instance, argued that ICMI was only a political tool for maintaining the ruling regime. It was obvious since Soeharto was still in control over the organization.

⁴⁵ "CSIS Requires Reorientation," *The Jakarta Post*, 5th September 2001, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/09/05/csis-requires-reorientation.html>

⁴⁶ Diane Stone, "Dynamics of Think Tank Development in Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea," in *Think Tanks & Civil Societies: Catalysts for Ideas and Action*, ed. James G McGann and R Kent Weaver (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 390.

⁴⁷ Buni Yani, "Reporting the Maluku Sectarian Conflict: The Politics of Editorship in Kompas and Republika Dailies" (Ohio University, 2002), 11 - 13.

The secretary of ICMI (1995 – 2000), for instance, was an active military officer, Nazri Adlani. Interestingly, the military faction was not in favor of ICMI. The secular-nationalist faction in the military institution believed that ICMI would only present Islamic turn to the country, which would lead to instability to the ongoing development. Therefore, General Edy Sudrajat, initiated the establishment of ICKI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Kebangsaan Indonesia / Association of Indonesian Nationalist Intellectuals*).⁴⁸ Apart from that, ICMI marked the growing influence, though restricted, of Islam in Indonesian policies.

The question that needs to be posed is why did Soeharto in his final years come close to Islam? To sum up there are three explanations on the rapprochement of Soeharto – Islam relations; inward process, personal explanation, and political reason.⁴⁹ First, political Islam has been systematically marginalized from the formal political field in Indonesian politics, inspiring some of the Islamic religious leaders to use informal spaces, such as educational institutions, to develop their ideas of Islamic movements. These movements, which had grown amongst Islamic students in many universities, transformed later on to a social force that cannot be undermined by the ruling regime. The wave of Islamic revivalism in the late 1990s had been an inward process and natural consequence of the long process of marginalization by the regime. Schwarz added the changing composition of the Indonesian Muslim community as the reason for Islamic resurgence. This process was, in larger perspective, the unintended result of Soeharto's effort to de-politicize Indonesia for the sake of political and economic stability. Consequently, many people, including professionals and middle class, look at Islam as an alternative political arena.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond* (Copenhagen; Abingdon: NIAS ; Marston [distributor], 2007), 24.

⁴⁹ Besides the domestic reason for the resurgence of Islam, there is an external factor that contributed to the process of re-emergence of Islam, namely Islamic revolution in Iran. But most observers saw it as peripheral to the increasing interest in Islam in Indonesia.

⁵⁰ Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 174 - 175.

Second, it is more personal. When Soeharto grew older, he personally became more religious, changing his political perspective towards Islam. The personal explanation was substantiated by his Hajj performance in 1991 together with his wife and subsequently changed his name to Haji Muhammad Soeharto. He also established friendship relations with DR. Quraish Shihab, one of the prominent Islamic scholars on *Tafsīr al-Qurān* graduated from Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and made him as Soeharto's personal adviser for religious matters. In addition to that, Soeharto began holding regular religious sermons in his home in Cendana by inviting *kiyai* to lead the *dhikir*.⁵¹

The last explanation is political. Soeharto was threatened by the disillusionment amongst military members. In order to secure his vote in the upcoming election of 1992, Soeharto attempted to widen his position, once supported mainly by the military faction, by embracing Islamic power in the community, once sidelined systematically by the regime. The signs of "confrontation" between Soeharto and the military faction in the regime were detected when military senior officials showed strong allegiance to L.B. Moerdani. The fact that Moerdani put ABRI effectively under his command only pushed Soeharto to re-examine his overall relations with the military. In order to reduce the opposition power of military in the government, Soeharto adopted the policy of "divide and rule." First, Soeharto appointed some of his closest personal assistants, and considered green officials, to the top position in the military, such as General Try Sutrisno, who was also known to be close to Habibie, the chairman of ICMI, and General Feisal Tanjung, who was seen as friendly to Islam or at least less harmful to Muslim associations. In fact "green" officers did not submit to the particular ideology, not list Islamic state as their ultimate agenda. The commitment to the country was no less than other officials. However, their Islamic background had made them

⁵¹ Desra Percaya, "Sino - Indonesian Relations: A Study of Indonesian Perceptions of China" (University of Durham, 2000), 177.

discriminated by Murtopo and Moerdani.⁵² Second, Soeharto removed Moerdani from the command of the armed forces in 1987, a political move that was understood by some as the process of “greening” or “Islamization” of the military. Third, Soeharto punished some military officers over their involvement in the Dili incident of November 1991. Fourth, Soeharto appointed a non-military person, Harmoko, an ex journalist, as the chairman of Golkar. By doing so, Soeharto was seen as showing his political might over the military faction.⁵³

3.5. Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy

As has been presented above, political Islam experienced dynamic – ups and downs – relations with the state. At first, it was sidelined throughout Indonesian history beginning from early on in Indonesia’s independence. The exclusion of seven words of *Djakarta Charter* in the Indonesian Constitution despite the fact that it had been adopted earlier by the Committee of Nine marked the beginning of Islamic marginalization in the Indonesian formal politics. In the decade of Parliamentary Democracy, when Sukarno eventually brought the end of parliamentary democracy in 1957 following the continuing political stalemate, Soekarno was consequently at the apex of policy decision making process, including foreign policy. In other words, he was the “sole” architect in the foreign policy. The fact that Soekarno depended much on military and PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* / Indonesian Communist Party) further made Islam unable to be made a significant influence on state policies. With the banning of *Masjumi* in 1960, and the arrest of ex-leaders of *Masjumi* involved in PRRI – Semesta, political Islam was formally ended.

As a consequence, parallel to the marginalization of Islam in domestic politics, the influence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy, especially towards the issues of

⁵² Donald K Emmerson, *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 64.

⁵³ Percaya, “Sino - Indonesian Relations: A Study of Indonesian Perceptions of China,” 173 – 174.

Muslim concern, was also restrained. The adoption of *Pancasila* as the state ideology of Indonesia indicated that since the very beginning of Indonesia, Islam has been absent in the formal constitution of the country. As Sukma argued, the final product of this long process of debate between the *kebangsaan* faction and Islamic faction has created the identity of Indonesia as neither Islamic nor theocratic. This identity reflected much later on the nature of the initial foreign policy at the international community. Therefore, such principle, not Islam, developed into the actual conduct of Indonesia's foreign policy decisions. Sukma said:

Such a compromise, however, did not solve the problem of state identity. On the contrary, it reinforced the dilemma of dual identity... The delicate management of dual identity dilemma is also extended to the field of foreign policy...Indeed, despite its status as the religion of the majority, Islam has never been adopted as the official defining framework for Indonesia's foreign policy.⁵⁴

Adding to that, developing sense of Islam or identity at the global level within the posture of foreign policy could be "hijacked" by domestic political power, especially Muslim circles, to serve their interests and consequently provided avenue for them to secure significant support in helping their cases domestically from international community. While at the domestic level, the regime attempted to put them at the peripheral circles. Moreover, if we take into account the supremacy of Soekarno, especially after the Guided Democracy, the process of check and balances had been conspicuously absent in the formal constitution of Indonesia, enabling Soekarno to lead the orientation of foreign policy.

3.5.1. Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy Under Soekarno

The first disagreement between the Islamic faction and Soekarno's leadership arose following the Linggadjati Agreement in November 1946. The treaty, signed by Hubertus Van Mook from the Dutch representative and Indonesian Prime Minister

⁵⁴ Rizal Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Politics in Asia Series (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), ix.

Soetan Sjahrir, articulated two points: (1) ceasefire between Indonesian army and the Dutch; (2) the formation of the Federative United States of Indonesia as part of the Netherlands – Indonesian Union, with the Dutch Queen as Head of the Union. The agreement had upset the Islamic faction within the country. At the end of 1946, *Masjumi* overtly called for the opposition against the government that pursued the policy of accommodation. Some prominent Islamic figures, Wahid Hasjim, Soekiman, and Zainal Arifin announced their intention to act against the government. The plan to oppose the government was made public, transmitted to all branches of *Masjumi*, and published in bulletin *al-Djihad*.⁵⁵

The fissure between the two factions continued in the domain of foreign policy as seen in the case of Renville Agreement. Two years after the Linggadjati Agreement, a new agreement was concluded on the American ship called Renville Agreement. The points of agreement were on the ceasefire between Indonesia and the Dutch along the artificial line (Van Mook Line). The acceptance towards the agreement, which means the acceptance towards the line, was considered a serious diplomatic failure. This point was the source of conflict within the state. *Masjumi* rejected the agreement and withdrew four of its members from the cabinet on the 15th of January, leading to the collapse of Sjarifuddin's cabinet on the 23rd of January 1948.⁵⁶

In the early 1950s, Mohammad Natsir sensed that Soekarno, politically close to the Indonesian Communist Party, attempted to forge closer relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Since the concept of communism was considered controversial with the essence of Islamic teachings, Natsir envisioned that being closer with the Western power was less harmful than the communist states. It was evident in his speech at the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs in 1952, when called on

⁵⁵ Formichi, *Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia*, 96.

⁵⁶ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C. 1200*, 263; Luthfi Assyauckanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009), 84; Ann Swift, *The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) Pte Ltd, 2010), 40.

Islamic World to adopt a conciliatory approach by embracing Western countries and institutions rather than deriding them. By embracing the value of peace and liberty, it was hoped that the tension between Islam and Western countries would be defused gradually. Natsir saw with optimism that the Cold War would serve as a momentum for both the Islamic society and Western community to find shared commonalities, as well as differences, and build upon them in an international framework of respect and cooperation. According to Natsir, the Muslim's uneasy relations with the Western community were due to their encounter during colonialism. Therefore, the tension was not inherent, but rather was a product of historical encounters.⁵⁷

This positive signal from Natsir was greeted by the United States. In 1955, the US Department of State described *Masjumi* as a party that encouraged foreign investment, trade relations, and could transform Indonesia into an important Asiatic power. The idea of Natsir was not welcomed by Soekarno who declared himself as a champion of anti-colonialism, in which Western countries were its symbols. *Masjumi's* increasing seats in the 1955 election caused alarm for Soekarno. In the light of contending perceptions on the relations with Western countries between the two figures, added with the alleged involvement of *Masjumi* in PRRI, Natsir and his party were banned from political activities in 1960 following the enactment of *Demokrasi Terpimpin*.⁵⁸

The close relation between Indonesia and the Soviet Union during Soekarno's presidency was also understood as a political manoeuvre in an attempt to claim the West Papua from the Dutch. Indonesia was perplexed with the ambiguous position of Western countries on the issue of West Papua. Therefore, despite the consistent

⁵⁷ Muhammad Natsir, *Some Observations Concerning the Role of Islam in National and International Affairs: An Address Originally Made before the Pakistan Institute of World Affairs with Subsequent Elucidatory Additions* (Ithaca, N.Y. : Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1954).

⁵⁸ Mark S Williams, "Yudhoyono's Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National Stability, End Economic Development in Indonesia," in *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order*, ed. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

statements that the Indonesian foreign policy maintained the principle of *Bebas Aktif* (Independent and Active), Soekarno came close to the Soviet Union by concluding the bilateral agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Union in December 1953.⁵⁹

During the years of *Demokrasi Terpimpin*, Indonesian foreign policy was further radicalized by Soekarno, and leaned toward communism, a foreign policy posture that was criticized by Islamic faction in the country. Some revolutionary policies were introduced, including his policy of *Ganyang Malaysia*, and “axis of Communism.” The absence of control towards Soekarno’s policy was also due to the nature of *Demokrasi Terpimpin* that undermined the role of political parties in the system.

In early 1963, with the full authority rested in the President’s power, Soekarno launched a controversial policy following Malaysia’s plan to establish the Federation of Malaysia as a new country. The policy, so called *Ganyang Malaysia* (Confront Malaysia) was aimed at denying the birth of Federation of Malaysia consisting of Malaysia, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. The controversial policy was motivated by several factors, mainly the domestic impulse to secure the President’s position at the domestic politics. Donald Hindley summed up the motives into three: (1) the expansionist posture of Indonesian foreign policy;⁶⁰ (2) threat perception that Malaysia posed a threat to the existence of Indonesia. This fear rooted to the conviction that the independent Malaysia was not totally free from the domination of the United Kingdom, the representative of colonial powers. For Soekarno, Malaysia would be a base for the Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS); (3) the internal political situation that some of Indonesian elites were in need of embracing new foreign crisis after the end of West Papua crisis. The federation of Malaysia provided them with the new case. For the

⁵⁹ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 31.

⁶⁰ Donald Hindley, “Indonesia’s Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives,” *Asuan Survey* 4, no. 6 (1964), 905.

government, the blame for the economic failings that plagued the country at the time and the delay of upcoming election would be on the crisis, not on the government. For military, the crisis presented privileges of administering the country in time of war and siege. For PKI, the confrontation would be a catalyst for forging closer relations with the communist countries.⁶¹

Prior to the confrontation, IMF (International Monetary Fund) and Western countries had pledged to pour financial assistance amounting \$500 millions for Indonesian economic recovery. International posture of Indonesia was positively hailed, and predicted to play significant role as a non-align country. However, due to confrontation, the assistance was re-evaluated. The ongoing trade relations with Malaysia were halted, bringing about the wane of agricultural and industrial products that were usually exported through Penang and Singapore. Thus, inflation was unavoidable. The image of being non-align was tarnished. Guy Pauker described it as “The Year of Wasted Opportunities.”⁶²

The policy of *konfrontasi* was not supported by many countries, and led to the deterioration of relations between Indonesia and Arabic Muslim countries. Morocco for instance rejected the explanation of *konfrontasi* provided by Soekarno in Security Council meeting. Many Arabic countries, while not supporting Soekarno’s policy towards Malaysia, granted Malaysia the observer status in Non-Aligned Movement Conference in Cairo, a step that further cornered Indonesia’s position.⁶³

The policy of *Ganyang Malaysia* demonstrated that limited consideration on the concept of *serumpun* Malay race and shared religion of Islam among the population was taken by Soekarno.⁶⁴ It brought concomitant opposition from society at large and

⁶¹ Ibid, 909 - 910.

⁶² Guy J Pauker, “Indonesia in 1963: A Year of Wasted Opportunities,” *Asian Survey* 4, no. 2 (1964).

⁶³ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 34.

⁶⁴ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (University of Western Australia, 2009), 191.

the Muslim community. The Muslim rejection came notably on the ground that the policy was masterminded by PKI, adversary to the Muslim community. The sense of growing PKI's role in *Ganyang Malaysia* policy was felt by political elites. In the early of 1961, before the official confrontation launched, PKI had already sent a signal of attack to the concept of the Malaysian Federation, describing it as a neo-colonial concept.⁶⁵ Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said that as long as there were communists in Indonesia, Malaysia could not be in friendly relations to Indonesia. Minister of Home Affairs Dato Ismail noted in December 1963 that the confrontation policy was taken over by PKI.⁶⁶

The position of Islamic political elites towards Malaysia – cordial relations with the Malay brothers – became more evident in time of Soeharto when Muhammad Natsir supported the decision to reestablish friendly relations with Malaysia. With Soekarno's fall, Soeharto attempted to normalize the relations with its immediate neighbor, Malaysia. In time of need to resume domestic economic restoration, Indonesia required large-scale economic aid, which was reasonably dependent upon the formal end of the *Ganyang Malaysia* policy. The then Malaysia's Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, however, retained his political position to regard Indonesia as an enemy and refused to meet with General Ali Moertopo and LB Moerdani, the diplomatic delegation of Indonesia.⁶⁷ As Soeharto was intent on bringing the normalcy in diplomatic relations between the two countries, military aide to Soeharto, Sofjar, turned to Natsir. The former chairman of *Masjumi* wrote to the Prime Minister, whom he knew well, and wisely urged him to consider the political will of Soeharto to normalize the

⁶⁵ Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism's Expansionist Role in Southeast Asia," *International Journal* 20, no. 2 (1965), 189.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 194.

⁶⁷ In a meeting of Indonesian Presidium Cabinet in Bogor on 9 April 1966, Indonesia announced to take necessary preparations for a possible recognition of Singapore, a decision that brought intense rift between the two countries. Adding to that, Soeharto stated that "confrontation will go on as usual but Indonesia has opened the door for a peaceful solution." This signaled no different stance between the two regimes. However, the Soeharto's statement would be best understood in the context of saving face of Soeharto. As explained by Michael Leifer, the Cabinet at the time in Indonesia was sincere in their intent on bringing speedy halt to the confrontation. See more detailed account in Michael Leifer, "Indonesia and Malaysia: The Changing Face of Confrontation," *The World Today* 22, no. 9 (1966), 396 - 398.

diplomatic relations. Due to, among others, the Prime Minister's respect to Natsir, the request was responded positively. Shortly after, following the coming of the Soeharto's envoy to Malaysia, the two countries entered into a series of negotiations, resulting in diplomatic normalization in August of 1966.⁶⁸

In advancing anti – imperialism vision of Soekarno, he established the new axis of Power consisting of Jakarta – Phnom Penh - Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang. Such revolutionary foreign policy was not supported both at domestic and international level. At the domestic level, amidst the increasing anti-communism discourse among the Indonesian public especially Muslim, such an axis was considered another name of “axis of communism” by including Pyong Yang and China. At the international level, Soekarno's decision to announce the axis consequently removed Indonesia from the spirit of non-aligned movement.⁶⁹

However, despite the general pattern of sidelining Islamic dimension, the taste of Islamic influence was present in some cases, especially when related to the diplomatic attempt to secure international recognition after the independence. Indonesia resorted to the common identity of Islam to garner political support from Arabic countries in the Middle East region. In 1947, the Indonesian diplomatic entourage led by Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Syahrir Cabinet, Agus Salim, commonly known as the Grand Old Man, after attending Inter-Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, flew to Arabic countries to negotiate the possible recognition. His command on many languages including Arabic facilitated him to win the hearts of Arabic people.⁷⁰ This diplomatic mission tour was considered a success, leading to the first *de jure* recognition from Egypt after independence on 10th June 1947 by the conclusion of

⁶⁸ Audrey R Kahin, *Islam, Nationalism and Democracy: A Political Biography of Mohammad Natsir* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 155; “Natsir: Surat untuk Tengku Abdul Rahman,” *Tempo*, 14-20 July 2008.

⁶⁹ John Mc Ewen Reinhardt, “Nationalism and Confrontation in the Southeast Asian Islands: The Sources of Indonesian Foreign Policy” (Tulane University, 1967), 227.

⁷⁰ Erni Haryanti Kahfi, “Haji Agus Salim: His Role in Nationalist Movements in Indonesia During the Early Twentieth Century” (McGill University, 1996), 2.

Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. The recognition from Egypt was soon followed by many Arabic countries in the Middle East. (See Table 3.3)

Table 3.3. Middle East countries that extended political recognition to Indonesia in early independence.

No	State	Date of Recognition
1	Lebanon	29 th June 1947
2	Syria	2 nd July 1947
3	Iraq	16 th July 1947
4	Saudi Arabia	24 th November 1947
5	Yemen	3 rd May 1948

Source: Tempo, 2013.⁷¹

It was the spirit of Muslim brotherhood that motivated Egypt to extend the formal recognition to Indonesia. When criticized by the Dutch delegation for recognizing the sovereignty of Indonesia, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Nokrashi Pasha said that “We are sorry. We cannot entertain your complaint. As an independent Islamic state, it is a must for Egypt to help the struggles of the Muslim Indonesian people.” It was clear that the factor of Islam contributed to the persuasion of Egypt to support Indonesia.⁷²

The extension of such recognition helped Indonesia during the Security Council meeting in 1947 on the question of Indonesia. The Dutch representatives attempted to cancel the proposal of the UN intervention to Indonesia following the military intervention of the Dutch. The Dutch’s rejection towards the proposal was based on the fact that Indonesia was not a sovereign state, and not acknowledged by any independent states. However, the argument was rejected since some Arabic countries had already acknowledged Indonesia.⁷³

Such diplomatic measures towards Arabic countries was considered part of grand strategy of Indonesia to garner political support of recognition around the world. Warm bilateral relations with all states would render help for the newly independent

⁷¹ Arif Zulkifli and Purwanto Setiadi, eds., *Agus Salim: Diplomat Jenaka Penopang Republik* (Jakarta: TEMPO, 2013), 13.

⁷² *Ibid*, 13.

⁷³ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 28.

state of Indonesia to be fully recognized as a sovereign state by the international community. Within this framework, establishing diplomatic relations with all nations was of a paramount priority for Indonesian foreign policy. Mohammad Hatta further argued that “In short, Indonesia will pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all nations on a basis of mutual respect and non-interference with each other’s structure of government.”⁷⁴

Another case of Islamic importance in Indonesian foreign policy was Indonesia’s relations with other Islamic countries, Pakistan for instance. It was aimed to show Indonesia’s consistent position towards any kind of imperialism. When expressing the Indonesia’s solidarity toward the Kashmir case, Soekarno based the support on the spirit of Muslim majority country, and it was even stated in the *Joint Communiqué* that Islam is the primary basis of relation between the two countries.⁷⁵

However, it needs to be stressed that the use of Islamic identity during this period does not mean Islam’s central and substantial position on foreign policy. But rather, it was used for practical purposes by Soekarno in advancing his anti – imperialism rhetoric of New Emerging Forces concept. Hence, any reference to a particular segmented identity, such as pro-western, pro Islam, would put constraint on the Soekarno’s overall strategy. The identity of Islam was used only when Indonesia “talked” to other Muslim majority countries.

3.5.2. Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy Under Soeharto

During the early presidency of Soeharto, Indonesian foreign policy was also sterilized from the Islamic dimension and influence, consonant with his policy towards political Islam at the domestic level. According to Leifer, domestic political context contained international dimension and vice versa. Therefore, the New Order, as part of its grand

⁷⁴ Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,” *Council on Foreign Relations* 31, no. 3 (April 1953), 441 - 442.

⁷⁵ I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana, “Islam and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy, with Special Focus on Jakarta - Islamabad Relations” (University of Western Australia, 2012).

strategy to keep political Islam in Indonesia under the radar, prevented international issues with Islamic dimension from being hijacked or exploited to voice the demands of Muslim groups, or to advance political standing in relations to the state.⁷⁶ He further said that:

With the exception during the period of national revolution, successive Indonesian governments have taken care not to allow foreign policy to be dictated by Islamic considerations. They have sought to avoid incautious engagement in international issues which might be exploited either to advance Islamic claims presented by Muslim groups or to enhance political standing of Islam in the Republic.⁷⁷

The process of depoliticization of Islam in Indonesia's domestic politics made the impact on the absence of Islamic influence in Indonesia's foreign policy. The fear of the ruling regimes to provide space for Islamic movement to speak at the international scene was one of the reasons. Another factor was the closed political system that disabled Islam to have influence in the foreign policy making process. Hence, it led to the underground activities carried out by Islamic organizations to show religious solidarity at the global scene. Indonesian foreign policy towards Palestine was perceived inconsistent and insufficient since there was no more than political statement. After the Israel – Palestine War in 1967 and 1973, the Government of Indonesia only supported the UN statement without any significant actions taken as requested by Arab countries.⁷⁸ It led Muslim leaders to act on their own initiatives. After the 1967 war, for instance, Mohammad Natsir made a visit to see firsthand the situation at the refugee camp of Palestinian people. Upon his return to Indonesia, he said how ashamed he was after seeing that representatives from different countries came and provided relief assistances for Palestinian people, but, unfortunately not from Indonesia, a country with

⁷⁶ Michael Leifer, "The Islamic Factor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy: A Case of Functional Ambiguity," in *Islam in Foreign Policy* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Published in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs [by] Cambridge University Press, 1983), 148.

⁷⁷ Michael Leifer, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy* (London; Boston: Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Allen & Unwin, 1983), xvi.

⁷⁸ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 73.

majority Muslim population. It was also the reason for the establishment of DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia / Indonesian Council on Islamic Mission*) in the same year. DDII then, amongst others, were committed to keep the Indonesian Muslims informed about the situation of the wider Muslim world. Following the 1973 war, the Muslim solidarity committee (ad-hoc basis) was established and they asked Indonesian Muslims to voluntarily donate blood for Palestine. It was a political shock to the government since only 45 liters of blood was sent to Lebanon as the expression of the Indonesian Muslims solidarity. The first *Intifāḍah* (1987-1993) in Palestine motivated DDII to establish KISDI (*Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam / Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Islamic World*) in 1987. The organization was established originally to show sympathy to Palestinian people, but its activities expanded to include a solidarity campaign in the Bosnian war, and Indian Kashmir.⁷⁹

The case of Indonesia - China normalization policy could provide another light of how powerful the President is in the Indonesian foreign policy decision making process. In August 1990, for instance, Soeharto made a diplomatic decision to reopen the long-frozen relations between China and Indonesia. It was taken as part of Indonesia's effort to increase the international prestige by playing a bigger role in the world stage. Normalization with China was considered an important part of Indonesia's grand strategy to participate in the regional problem of Cambodia. Without significant support from China, any measures of engagement pursued by Indonesia would be in vain. Adding to that, China was on the rise economically, so that bilateral relations with the country would provide economical advantage for Indonesia. The initiative came from Soeharto, however, without sufficient consent and consultation from pertinent elements within the government. Therefore, the institutions within the government received the proposal with mixed feelings. Dephan (*Departemen Pertahanan /*

⁷⁹ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Modernism and Anti-Modernism in Indonesian Muslim Responses to Globalisation" (Conference on Islam and Development in Southeast Asia: Southeast Asian Muslim Responses to Globalization, Singapore, November 21, 2009).

Department of Defense) and BAKIN (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara* / State Intelligence Coordinating Body) were amongst the opponents to the idea put forward by Soeharto. The argument was centered on the possible revivalism of communism. But later, their stance was changed due to Soeharto's primacy in the government. Adam Malik, former Vice President, was in favor of normalization.⁸⁰

Responding to the policy, the Muslim group in parliament voiced their concern and directed criticism over Soeharto's policy. Jailani Naro, a leading figure in the PPP, expressed his concern over the possible communist resurgence following the enactment of policy. He believed in the executive assessment on the political reason and possible economic advantage by establishing normal relations with one of the emerging economic countries in Asia. However, as Naro explained, the collective memory of the abortive coup attempted by Chinese-backed communist party should be in the top list of the government's consideration. The spokesperson of the PPP provided another argument in criticizing the diplomatic resumption from the economic perspective. He said that protection to the indigenous businessmen was important since the reopening of diplomatic relations will give leeway to the Chinese businessmen to monopolize Indonesia's economy, and in turn, hold control over the government.

Stiff opposition was also shown by several leaders of Islamic youth organization. Just one day before Prime Minister Li Peng made a visit to Indonesia in August 1990, the organizations made their campaign publicly and warned the government on the possibility of communism "coming back" as a result of diplomatic normalization. They put forward five demands before any further diplomatic steps were taken. First, Prime Minister, on behalf of the Chinese Government should make a statement of apology for their involvement in the abortive coup on September 30th, 1965. Second, in order to show the serious political will, the Chinese Government

⁸⁰ Percaya, "Sino - Indonesian Relations: A Study of Indonesian Perceptions of China."

should repatriate some prominent PKI figures who flew to China, so they can be brought to trial. Third, the Chinese Government needed to ensure Indonesia that they wouldn't interfere in Indonesia's domestic affairs. Fourth, the containment of the communism ideology should be guaranteed by the Government of Indonesia. And finally, the Chinese Government must not grant ethnic Chinese who have become Indonesian nationals.⁸¹

However, despite a strong reaction from Muslim group in the parliament, the Soeharto administration stuck to the plan, and only took note on the Muslim resentment on his decision. Interestingly, however, when Soeharto decided to suspend the Indonesia - China diplomatic relationship in 1967 following the abortive coup, the perception on China as a threat was legitimized by Islamic reasoning, that communism is antithetical to Islam. Soeharto sought nationwide support of the Muslim community to the policy. But when he decided to normalize the diplomatic relations 23 years later, the voice of the Muslim group was less considered, a proof that the foreign policy decision making process was dominated by small elites in the executives.

The changing political stance of Soeharto in the late 1980s towards Islam had made its impact on the way Indonesia projects its foreign policy at the international relations. When Soeharto began embracing Islam in domestic politics, some of the Indonesian foreign policies showed significant changes in issues of Islamic concern. Responding to the long quest of Muslim community towards the formalization of Palestine – Indonesia diplomatic relations, Indonesia in 1989 eventually made a political announcement that the country of biggest Muslim population would allow PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) to open an embassy in Jakarta. The Foreign Minister of Ali Alatas commented that the logical consequence of having diplomatic relations with the State of Palestine was the establishment of the Embassy in Jakarta.

⁸¹ Ibid, 168.

With regards to the earlier decline of Palestine's request by the government, the Minister argued that the delaying formalization of diplomatic links was due to a technical problem.⁸² The decision was different from its earlier position when Indonesia consistently rejected the plan of PLO to upgrade its representative office into the establishment of the Embassy in Jakarta as requested by the Palestinian side.

Foreign Minister Adam Malik indeed supported PLO and recognized it as the sole representative of Palestinian people, and it was consonant with the international mood. Following the war of 1967, PLO gained popularity, and was acknowledged as the legitimate representative of Palestinian people. The position of PLO was further strengthened through the political recognition extended by the Arab League during the Rabat Summit in October 1974, and the UN's support to the leadership of Yasser Arafat.⁸³

In the UNGA (UN General Assembly) of 1979, Foreign Minister Kusumaatmadja hinted that the Government of Indonesia was in a position to support the legitimacy of PLO when he said that:

Indonesia has consistently supported the recognition of the PLO as the one legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Then one can ignore the fact that the PLO, as the sole representative of the people of Palestine and their aspirations, is now more universally recognized. We look forward to that inevitable day when the PLO participates in the negotiations for a just and comprehensive settlement leading to the establishment by the Palestinian people of their own national State.⁸⁴

Two years later, on the same occasion, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated his position on the legitimacy of PLO, quoting the PLO's successful

⁸² "Indonesia says PLO can open embassy," UPI Website, retrieved January 29th, 2015, <http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/01/09/Indonesia-says-PLO-can-open-embassy/4816600325200/>

⁸³ M Muttaqien, "Domestic Politics and Indonesia's Foreign Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Global & Strategies* 7, no. 1 (2013), 64.

⁸⁴ Kementerian Luar Negeri, *Indonesia at the United Nations General Assembly: Compilation of Statements in the Plenary Debate (1951 - 2010)* (Jakarta, Indonesia, 2011), 213 - 218.

brokering ceasefire in Lebanon. He said that PLO could be a reliable partner in the search of peace based on justice.⁸⁵

However, Indonesia's support to PLO was not translated into actual diplomatic ties. Minister Malik was indeed in support of PLO to open office in Jakarta, but the policy came fifteen years later, consonant with the changing attitude of government towards Islam. There are two main arguments put forward in rejecting the plan to allow diplomatic mission of PLO in Jakarta: fear of terrorism and communism. The strong rejection came from military faction within the government out of fear of PLO's influence on the Muslim community in terms of spread of radical Islam. The emergence of many radical organizations in the region was motivated by the Arab – Israel Conflict, the establishment of *Hamas* under *Ikhwanul Muslimin* for instance. The increasing popularity of PLO commenced after launching the guerrilla strategy with random attacks during the war between 1967 and 1982. The nature of these organizations that pursued the independence of Palestine through armed struggle created fear of attracting ideas of radicalism to Indonesia. Adding to that, the concern of the military was also linked to the communist's ties with the PLO. The organization was comprised of different political ideologies, one of which was *baathism* or Arabic socialism.⁸⁶

Among the political elites, the establishment of the Embassy of Palestine would represent Indonesia's leaning position towards PLO, a position that would endanger Indonesia's relations with the Western countries. The refusal of Indonesia to accommodate the PLO's demand to open office in Indonesia received criticism from two Islamic organizations of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*. Some scholars

⁸⁵ Ibid, 227 - 234.

⁸⁶ Muttaqien, "Domestic Politics and Indonesia's Foreign Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict," 64.

even argued that Indonesia's position on the issue of Palestine had been dictated by the US.⁸⁷

As Soeharto shifted his policy at domestic level towards Muslim community and leaned towards Islam, in October 19th, 1989, Indonesia and Palestine concluded the agreement and signed the document of *Joint Communiqué* on the Opening of Diplomatic Relations between Indonesia and Palestine. It was signed by Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas and Palestinian Foreign Minister, Farouq Kaddoumi. On the same day, Palestinian Foreign Minister officially opened the Palestinian Embassy in Jakarta. The first Palestinian Ambassador to Indonesia handed over credentials to President Soeharto on April 23rd, 1990. Indonesia reciprocated the decision by appointing Indonesian Ambassador in Tunis to be accredited for the State of Palestine. Since June 1st, 2004, the Indonesian Embassy in Jordan was accredited for Palestine.⁸⁸ The decision was hailed by many Muslim communities. Lukman Harun in his capacity as the chairman of *Muhammadiyah* welcomed the recognition as the commitment of Indonesia's effort to bring peace in the Middle East.⁸⁹

Another new posture of foreign policy was shown by Soeharto by submitting the application of Indonesia to be a full member of OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) in 1991. When several countries came to the Rabat Conference in September 1969 following the act of arson at the holy al-Aqşa mosque, which would be the seed of the establishment of OIC, Indonesia didn't participate in the conference. Indonesia's absence in the conference was mainly due to internal political consolidation after the transfer of power from Soekarno to Soeharto. Indonesia's participation in the group would only send signal of the importance of Islamic element within Indonesian foreign policy. In addition to that, the newly formed government still maintained

⁸⁷ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 74.

⁸⁸ "Hubungan Bilateral RI – Palestina," *Kementerian Luar Negeri RI* website, retrieved in July 19th, 2015, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/IFPDisplay.aspx?Name=BilateralCooperation&IDP=44&P=Bilateral&l=id>

⁸⁹ Sukma, *Islam in Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 76.

negative judgement that Islam could threaten the national unity of Indonesia. The New Order attempted to exclude the Islamic sentiment of Islam in foreign policy as the upcoming election of 1971 drew near. The focus of the New Order was to gain control over the country through the election.

When OIC held the third International Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) in Jeddah, 1972, Indonesia was represented by Foreign Minister Adam Malik. The delegation carried Soeharto's message to the forum, Indonesia's participation or membership in OIC would be on a loose and non-binding way and without involving Islamic sentiments, and consonant with the UN Charter. For the New Order, OIC was considered less important in the agenda of the Indonesian foreign policy. As Kusumaatmadja noted, the Indonesian foreign policy towards OIC during these years was a reflection of the policy of ambiguity. It is worth noting that, despite Indonesia's involvement in OIC, Indonesia was not a signatory of OIC Charter.⁹⁰ Amidst the Indonesia's attempt to revive economic turbulence, Indonesia was in need of assistance, especially from Western Countries. Indonesia's close position to OIC would be perceived as a political barrier to such rapprochement with the Western Countries. However, Indonesia still maintained its involvement in the group since foreign policy could not ignore the fact that Muslim population made up 88 percent of its population.

The policy of ambiguity towards OIC received mixed responses. Secular and nationalist elites supported the policy while leaders of *Muhammadiyah* and *Nadhlatul Ulama* always called on the government to quickly sign the charter. Imron Rosyadi, member of PPP for instance, stated that Indonesia's policy on OIC was half-hearted, and for the sake of formality. Indonesia's ambiguous position continued more than two decades after the establishment of OIC. Indonesia's participation was based on *Bebas Aktif* principle of foreign policy.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Perwita, *Indonesia and the Muslim World Between Islam and Secularism in the Foreign Policy of Soeharto and Beyond*, 44.

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 47.

Parallel to changing domestic policy on political Islam, Soeharto ended his foreign policy of ambiguity towards OIC by formally submitting to the full membership of the OIC in 1991. Indonesia's intention to participate in the group was further shown by Soeharto's first visit to the OIC Summit in Dakar Senegal in 1991. Soeharto's first visit was important in two ways: as a signal on Indonesia's growing concern on the issues of Muslim world, and as a political gesture of Soeharto's shift towards Islam. The growing concern of Indonesia on OIC was more salient when Indonesia hosted the OIC Foreign Ministerial Meeting in 1996.

3.6. Summary of Chapter

The above presentation provided an argument that the nature of relations between (political) Islam and state at the domestic level could explain the absence and presence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. From early Indonesian independence, the marginal position of Islam in domestic politics contributed to its inability to exert the influence on Indonesian foreign policy. The political alienation of Islam created supremacy and unchecked authority of ruling regimes – supported by the military and communist party during the Soekarno presidency and by the military and Golkar during Suharto presidency – to shape the posture of foreign policy without being informed by Islam. As the New Order regime's policy experienced changes towards Islam at the domestic level in the late 1989, with different reasons and explanations, the government began considering the voices of the Muslim community and accommodated some of the long-abandoned aspirations in the foreign policy conduct.

Therefore, Indonesian foreign policy with regard to Muslim concerns during these years was the reflection of domestic political struggle between Islam and State. The absence of Islam during Soekarno was understood in the framework of political contestation between, on one hand, Islam and nationalist, and between Islam and

communism on the other hand. During Soeharto, the inability of Islam to exert its influence was in the context of conflictual perception between military and Islam, and the focus of regime to unite different ideologies under *Pancasila*, in which Islam was considered an obstacle towards the full attainment of such national program. Such conflict, in the concept of Hagan, is considered as part of insulation strategy by the government in order to suppress the influences of the societal factor in the domain of foreign policy.

The significance of this chapter lies in its task to strengthen the argument/hypotheses built up in this dissertation that the influence of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy (on Islamic issues/with Islamic dimension) parallel to the place of political Islam in domestic politics and its relation to the state. It was done by contrasting the image of Indonesian foreign policy between the marginalization of political Islam and the accommodation as will be presented in the remaining chapters. The coming of *Reformasi* provided new path and fresh trajectory for Islam in Indonesia's domestic politics, enabling it to serve as influencer to the government policy process.

CHAPTER FOUR: INDONESIA FOREIGN POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE MUSLIM CONCERNS DURING YUDHOYONO ADMINISTRATION (2004 – 2014)

4.1. Introduction of Chapter

After having glanced the posture of Indonesian foreign policy towards Muslim concerns during the administration of both Soekarno and Soeharto, it is safe to conclude that both leaders have undoubtedly placed Muslim concerns in unfavorable position in terms of Indonesia's external relations. The articulation of Islam in the foreign policies was seen as unsupportive to their domestic policy on Islam and Muslim community. By virtue of that, it is logical preference for leader to avert their attention from Islam in shaping Indonesian foreign policy.

This chapter attempts to present Yudhoyono's foreign policy during his ten years of tenure. It is argued that, compared to the previous administrations, Yudhoyono made significant endeavors in bringing the values, spirit, and glossaries of Islam within the concept of foreign policy. Adding to that, Yudhoyono administration has made it clear, through his statements and executed policies, that the aspiration and concerns of Indonesian Muslim have been increasingly voiced. Albeit not completely different with previous administrations especially in terms of *Bebas Aktif* principle, Yudhoyono's term has been more accommodative and active towards the concerns of Muslim community.

This posture, as this dissertation argues, needs to be understood, among others, in the context of increasing Indonesian presence at the global issues and discussion. Yudhoyono has been determined to take foreign policy to a higher level of activism. Thus, during his administration, foreign policy was one of his best achievements. In doing so, Yudhoyono resorted to all possible avenues and available assets to be involved in the global community activities. Two important assets were used to elevate

the leverage of Indonesia: (1) achievement in terms of democratic transition and safeguarding human rights; and (2) Islam and Indonesian Muslim community.

This chapter will touch the issue in sequence by elaborating three main themes namely: (1) the general posture of Yudhoyono's foreign policy, which will be closely looked at the Indonesia's increasing activism, and reformulation of foreign policy agendas; (2) the new currency of Indonesian foreign policy: democracy and human rights; and (3) Indonesian foreign policy towards the Muslim concerns. This chapter will touch the issue in sequence. It is important to note that, the first two issues provided the background before understanding the Islamic place in Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration.

4.2. Indonesian Foreign Policy during Yudhoyono Administration

In the years after *reformasi*, and following the fall of Soeharto from the presidency, the image of Indonesia in the eyes of the world was in paradoxical picture. On one hand, the international community paid tribute for the Indonesia's relative success in guiding the peaceful political transformation from authoritarian rule to the democratic system. Some analysts have predicted that Indonesia would follow similar fate of Yugoslavia, path of separation and disintegration.¹ However, Indonesia succeeded to prove that it was too big to fail.

On the other hand, unfortunately, with the opening of political valve, various communal conflicts, violence, terrorism, and the imminent threat of religious fundamentalism emerged. The Ambon conflict, the Acehese's demand for the independence, and the Bali bombing were some of the examples that had tarnished the already fragile reputation of Indonesia amongst the international community.

¹ Dibb and Peter commented on shaky foundation of Indonesia's regional base, referring to economic jealousies and ethnic differences, and considered it as the one of possible causes for regional integration. Adding to that, Menon described Indonesia as a heavyweight boxer who absorbed multiple punches in many spots. Deteriorating economic situation, feeble central government, social fragility, communal conflict are the imminent threat to the national unity of Indonesia. For more detail, see Paul Dibb and Peter Prince, "Indonesia's Grim Outlook," *Orbis* 45, no. 4 (Fall 2001); Raja Menon, "Another Year of Living Dangerously," *The National Interest*, no. 65 (Fall 2001).

In terms of foreign affairs, 1999 was considered one of the unpleasant years for Indonesian diplomatic machinery that was put on the enormous test. Two unpredicted events took place: (1) the separation of East Timor from Indonesia after the referendum overseen by the United Nations following the pressure from its neighboring country Australia; and (2) the US government's decision to impose arms embargo for Indonesian military amidst the Indonesia's bold attempt to bring spirit of reformation to the military. The two events further exacerbated Indonesia's image abroad, which in turn diminished diplomatic confidence of Indonesia in conducting foreign policy.

The democratization process has remarkably brought about change to the Indonesian politics. In a fundamental way, government's policies need to be a true reflection of what people want and what Indonesia as a big country is. Along with that, the global situation and environment have been in constant changes and unpredictable. Within such background, Indonesia was demanded to respond to both the domestic and international situations in an elegant manner. It is within this context that Yudhoyono administration charted a fresh course of Indonesian foreign policy.

Most of Yudhoyono's speeches and statements, albeit preserved the elements of *bebas aktif*, heralded change in foreign policy, in terms of its worldview, orientation, emphasis, strategy, issues, and the process. Yudhoyono clearly set the vision for Indonesia to be a global player in the global community, which would champion peaceful diplomatic measures through soft power.

As has been mentioned earlier in the introduction, before the USINDO Forum, Yudhoyono said that Indonesia would be following the path of internationalism, very much eager to take constructive role in global order. Before the ICWA forum, he also clearly attached new jargon to Indonesian foreign policy such as peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, and bridge-builder. He further said that our Indonesian foreign policy was based on constructivism. It is interesting to note that the

world view, constructivism, used by Yudhoyono was somewhat different from previous administrations.

The regime of Sukarno, to certain extent Suharto, drew the picture of international relations within the perspective of realism, whose main feature has been the perception that the world is anarchic in nature, unfriendly, potentially threatening the sovereignty and national interests, and to the point of endangering the existence of the country. Such perception consequently led to suspicion, lack of trust, self-defense behavior, inward looking. Such worldview has been the prevailing norms in the 1940s, when realism became the mainstream of perspective of international relations, and the world was full of colonialism, conflict, and war.

During the Indonesia's struggle to attain the power and protect its early independence, the domination of realism was conspicuously felt in the atmosphere of Indonesian foreign policy. The relational pattern of Indonesia with other countries in an international community was built on the foundation of strong nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, territorial protection either in the political, economic, and ideological.² Such fundament was considered an important element for Indonesia to counterbalance the imminent threats from the outside. Thus, the slogans such as "*Hidup atau Mati*" (live or die), "*NKRI Harga Mati*" (The unity of Indonesia is the fixed price and non-negotiable), "*Amerika Kita Sterika, Inggris Kita Linggis*" (literally means, we iron the American, and we crowbar the British), "*Persetan dengan PBB*" (Go to Hell the United Nations), and Go to Hell with your Aid, needs to be put in such context and understood within political environment of self-defense. Such expressive slogans, provocative words are an embodiment of the worldview of Indonesia towards the global environment in which foreign policy operate.

² Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Soeharto*, Politics and International Relations of Southeast Asia (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1976), 161.

With the use of internationalism and constructivism perspective, Yudhoyono administration consequently should be able to embrace the international values and norms, and to handle the burning issues that were considered a taboo in previous administrations, such as democracy, human rights, and environment. Senior researcher at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), Shafiah F. Muhibat at the discussion on the theme “The Indonesian Quarterly: SBY’s 10-Year: A Review of Indonesian Foreign Policy (2004-2014)” commended three achievements made during Yudhoyono administration with regard to Indonesian foreign policy. First, the internal restructuring of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This reform focuses on increasing diplomat’s capability in handling issues of Indonesia’s concern. Second, the increasing actors influencing the foreign policy process by involving educational institutions, think-tank, media, and social organizations. Last, the widening scope of theme handled by the Government of Indonesia, including issues such as environment, human rights, and democracy, which were hardly discussed during previous regime.³

4.2.1. Global Aspiration of Foreign Policy: Activism

During his administration, President Yudhoyono almost always made impression to be involved in the global problems. Indonesia has been pictured as the active player, and problem solver who navigate in the turbulent oceans.⁴ This has been in line with Yudhoyono’s interpretation and definition to the long held foreign policy principle of “*Bebas Aktif*”.

³ “Catatan Penting Kebijakan Luar Negeri SBY Selama 10 Tahun Versi CSIS,” *Berita Satu* Website, retrieved on February 5th, 2015, from <http://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/242055-catatan-penting-kebijakan-luar-negeri-sby-selama-10-tahun-versi-csis.html>

⁴ The jargon has been rooted to the Hatta’s term of “*Mendajung Antara Dua Karang*” (Rowing between two Reefs), describing Indonesia’s neutral and non-aligned position during the cold war between two super powers: the United States and Soviet Union. See Mohammad Hatta, *Mendajung Antara Dua Karang*, Pepora 2 (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan RI, 1951); In 1956, the jargon has been reformulated by Minister for Foreign Affairs, DR. Roeslan Abdul Ghani, to “*Mendajung Dalam Taufan*”, which literally means rowing in the hurricane. It was conceptually to describe the active position of Indonesia amidst the constant global challenge. See Roeslan Abdulgani, *Mendajung Dalam Taufan: Ichtisar Dan Ichtiar Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia 1956* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Penerbit Endang, 1956).

Yudhoyono defined the principle of *bebas aktif* as “independence of judgment” and “freedom of action”, which denotes five interrelated meanings: (1) peace maker, confidence builder, problem solver, and bridge builder; (2) Indonesia’s neutral position by not engaging in any military pact; (3) connectivity with other countries, which could be summarized to the jargon of “millions of friends and zero enemy”; (4) Indonesia’s international identity that stems from national identity; and (5) prioritizing on national interests.⁵ The Indonesia’s international activism is a consequential reflection the Yudhoyono’s *bebas aktif* definition.

According to Mietzner, Yudhoyono considered foreign policy as his biggest achievement during the tenure. He was also described as a foreign policy president, who brought new spirit of global engagement in the posture of Indonesian foreign policy since taking office in 2004. Indonesia, in the eye of Yudhoyono, should avoid being a passive and reactive player. The country needs to be actively involved in the global discussion. Such confidence was supported by the belief that Indonesia is considered as a strategic country in terms of its geographic location, economic potentials, growth of population, and socio-culture asset.⁶

There are some indications that prove Indonesia’s increasing activism in terms of foreign policy. For instance, Indonesia took significant part in the issue of climate change, which was considered as one of the most global pressing issues in the last decades, besides food security, population, and migration. There have been many documents and reports warned about the imminent threat and potential danger posed by the climate change, amongst other was the report submitted by the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) that was overseen by the British government in 2007. The finding of the report, by providing scientific proof and

⁵ Susilo B Yudhoyono, *Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Office of Special Staff of the President for International Affairs, 2005), 386 - 390.

⁶ Marcus Mietzner, “Indonesia in 2014: Jokowi and the Repolarization of Post-Soeharto Politics,” in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2015*, ed. Daljit Singh (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2015), 132.

verified theses, was to urge all countries around the world to build the case of global warming in more serious effort. The finding became popular after former US Vice President Al Gore produced a documentary movie under title “An Inconvenient Truth”.⁷

The critical proportion of the issue has been the failure of the global community under the banner of the United Nations to establish an effective global partnership in order to deal with the challenge of climate change that could eventually affect the world and humankind as a whole.⁸ Accordingly, in 2009, Indonesia attempted to lead by example through its ambitious commitment to adopt unilateral cutting emission target to 26 percent by 2020. And with international assistance and support, the target to cut greenhouse gas emissions will be higher to reach up to 41 percent.⁹ In 2007, Indonesia hosted the 13th UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Bali that resulted in the issuance of Bali Action Plan. Amongst the important points are the enhanced national action to mitigate the climate change, technology development and transfer, and the provision of financial resources.¹⁰ Within this spirit, together with Indonesia’s attempt to increase its credibility, in 2008 under the President Regulation 46/2008, Yudhoyono established DNPI (*Dewan Nasional Perubahan Iklim* / National Climate Change Council), which was considered pivotal institution to further implement the announced commitments.

Another indicator to show the increasing Indonesia’s activism was the number of international forums either hosted or initiated by the government between 2004 and 2014. At the beginning of his presidency, Yudhoyono attempted to reinvigorate the spirit of Bandung that took place in the past 50 years when Indonesia hosted most of

⁷ Later, in 2016, a documentary film was made under title “Before the Flood” starred by very famous actor Leonardo Di Caprio. For more detailed, see Frank Jotzo, “Can Indonesia Lead on Climate Change?,” in *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2012), 93.

⁸ Hassan Wirajuda, *Himpunan Pidato Menteri Luar Negeri Republik Indonesia 2009* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2010), 31.

⁹ Syamsidar Thamrin, “Indonesia’s National Mitigation Actions: Paving the Way towards NAMAs” (CCXG/Global Forum on Environment Seminar on MRV and Carbon Markets, Paris, 2011), 3.

¹⁰ “Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Thirteenth Session, Held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007” (United Nations, 2007).

newly independent countries spanning from Asia to Africa. It was in 2005, Yudhyono invited leaders from Asia – African countries to commemorate the golden jubilee of Bandung spirit. The conference was a success. Nearly 90 leaders from different countries participated in the conference and represented by the heads of state / government. At the substance level, Indonesia attempted to transform the movement from a political organization that was primarily motivated by anti-Western and anti-colonialism into a more dynamic organization that promote tangible cooperation and contribution to address the complicated challenges of today's world. Such spirit could be detected from the Declaration of NAASP (New Asian – Africa Strategic Partnership) that set prioritized and workable agendas and achievable timeline as formulated in the plan of action. In this case, the cause of Palestine has remained one of the substantial agendas.

In December 2007, Indonesia hosted United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the third meeting of the 176 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. A year later, Yudhyono embarked on the idea of establishing BDF (Bali Democracy Forum), an inclusive international gathering for the world leaders to share lessons learned and experiences, and to discuss the ideas and best practices on democracy. Ever since, the forum has become annually held. The last meeting, the ninth BDF, took place in 2016.

In 2011, Indonesia proposed swap for the ASEAN chairmanship, which was supposed to be assumed by Brunei Darussalam. The formal reason submitted by Indonesia was practical. In 2013, the year that Indonesia would host ASEAN, coincided with APEC meetings in Bali. However, it could be understood as well as political. Year 2011 had significance for ASEAN since the United States and Russia participated in the EAS (East Asia Summit). Indonesia's chairmanship was timely and strategic. As the "big brother" in ASEAN, Indonesia would like to ensure the centrality of this regional

organization amidst the participation of these two superpowers, the US and Russia. ASEAN was projected to be in the driving seat in terms of regional architecture. It does mean that Indonesia paid prime concern on the stability and the balance of power within this organization.

In 2013, Indonesia hosted APEC Meetings, which concluded with the adoption of APEC Leader's Declaration 2013. Within the said document, 20 deliverables have been agreed under three broad themes; (1) attaining the Bogor Goals; (2) achieving sustainable growth with equity; and (3) promoting connectivity.¹¹

Another example of this increasing activism was Indonesia's success to be non-permanent member of the United Security Council for the term 2007 – 2008. This mandate was considered one of the biggest achievements for the Indonesian diplomatic corps. Indonesia's membership was considered as the diplomatic channel to implement the vision embraced by Yudhoyono, who wanted to bring Indonesia on the center of global discussion.

With such high profile of Indonesian foreign policy posture, Yudhoyono government has set a clear tone to put Indonesia on the global radar. It is true that Yudhoyono's activism in Indonesian foreign policy has been more like that of Soekarno's. The first president Soekarno was known for his grand vision of challenging the established global forces, and brought Indonesia to the epicentrum of global politics and its dynamics. Yudhoyono's foreign policy manouvre, however, attempted to present the soft image of Indonesia, picture it as a friendly nation, in order to gain considerable trust, which could be utilized for Indonesia's meaningful leverage to play substantial role in the global arena.

Therefore, Indonesia's activism and self-acclaimed as regional power was not meant to be a threat to the regional stability, let alone global community. But the

¹¹ *Diplomasi Indonesia 2013: Fakta Dan Angka* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Direktorat Jenderal Informasi dan Diplomasi Publik, 2014), 19 - 20.

opposite is true. It can be seen from several indicators, namely the military expenditure, selection of strategic countries that Indonesia established with, and commitment to build diplomatic relations with all countries in the world.

First, the military expenditure of Indonesia was less than 1 percent of total GDP. Compared to other countries in South East Asia region, Indonesia's expenditure in terms of military has been historically low. In average, the countries in the regions such as Malaysia and Thailand spent for 2 percent of total GDP for military purchases.¹² In terms of number, Indonesia's expenditure has been the lowest among five major ASEAN countries. (See Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. Military Spending as % of GDP and Total Government Spending in 2014

Year 2014	Malaysia	Thailand	Singapore	Philippine	Indonesia
% of GDP	1.5	1.5	3.3	1.1	0.8
% of Govt Spending	5.4	6.6	18.3	6	4.1

Source: Cogit Asia Website, 2015¹³

Second, consistent with the dictum of *Bebas Aktif*, together with Yudhoyono's interpretation to it, amidst the increasing activism, Indonesia consistently signaled the neutral position. In promoting bilateral relations with important countries in terms of politics, and economy, Indonesia has established "strategic partnership" with 14 countries and one regional organization, namely the United States, Russia, Republic of China, South Korea, Viet Nam, India, Australia, France, United Kingdom, Netherland, Brazil, Turkey, South Africa, Japan, and the European Union. It could be concluded that, deriving from both the inclusion of the USA, China and Russia at the same level of importance, and from the geographical representation to include countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, Australia and America, Yudhoyono administration wanted to avoid being pointed as leaning towards one particular global power. (see table 4.2)

¹² Fuadi Pitsuwan, "Smart Power Strategy: Recalibrating Indonesian Foreign Policy," *Asian Politics and Policy* 6, no. 2 (2014), 247; Mietzner, "Indonesia in 2014: Jokowi and the Repolarization of Post-Soeharto Politics," 133.

¹³ , CSIS Asia Program, "Analyzing Southeast Asia's Military Expenditures, 2015," Cogitasia Website, retrieved 31 January 2015, <https://www.cogitasia.com/analyzing-southeast-asias-military-expenditures/>

Table 4.2. List of Countries that signed Strategic Partnership with Indonesia

No	Country	Document	Date of Agreement
1	Russia	Declaration on the Framework of Friendly Relations and Cooperation of Indonesia and Russia in the 21st Century	21 April, 2003
2	Australia	Indonesia – Australia Comprehensive Partnership	2005
3	People's Republic of China	Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership between People's Republic of China and Indonesia	25 April, 2005
4	India	New Strategic Partnership between India and Indonesia	November, 2005
5	Japan	Strategic Partnership for Peaceful and Prosperous Future	28 December, 2006
6	South Korea	Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership to Promote Friendship and Cooperation in the 21st Century	4 December, 2006
7	South Africa	Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership for a peaceful and Prosperous Future Between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Republic of South Africa	17 March, 2008
8	Brazil	Strategic Partnership between Brazil and Indonesia	18 November, 2008
9	The USA	Comprehensive Partnership between USA and Indonesia	10 November, 2010
10	Turkey	Joint Declaration on Indonesia-Turkey: an Enhanced Partnership toward a New World Setting	5 April, 2011
11	France	Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership between France and Indonesia	1 July, 2011
12	Viet Nam	Declaration on the Framework of Friendly and Comprehensive Partnership Entering the 21st Century	Originally signed in 2003, but put in effective after the sign of Plan of Action in September 2011
13	United Kingdom	Joint Statement on Closer Cooperation Between The Republic of Indonesia and The United Kingdom on The Re-launch of Indonesia – UK Partnership Forum	2012
14	Netherland	Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Partnership	November, 2013
15	European Union	Framework Agreement on RI-EU Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation	9 November, 2009

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016¹⁴

Lastly, within the spirit of activism, Indonesia also set the goal to have bilateral relations with all countries of UN member, except for Israel and Taiwan. Minister Natalegawa explained such commitment in annual press conference in 2012. He said:

In line with our commitment to establish diplomatic relations with all member States of the United Nations, throughout 2011, Indonesia

¹⁴ *Diplomasi Indonesia 2014* (Jakarta: Biro Administrasi Menteri, 2015), 25 - 46.

officially opened diplomatic relations with nine countries, namely Mauritania, El Salvador, San Marino, Montenegro, the Dominican Republic, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Antigua and Barbuda, and Bhutan. These nine countries were among the remaining 21 friendly countries with which Indonesia had not had official diplomatic relations. With the eventual official establishment of diplomatic relations with the rest of these countries, Indonesia will be enjoying diplomatic relations with practically all 193 member States of the United Nations.¹⁵

4.2.2. New Currency of Foreign Policy: Agendas of Democracy and Human Rights

Indonesia's democratic credentials have provided Indonesia the confidence over playing active role in the global world. Such credentials stem from the fact that Indonesia defied the intellectual and political environment, which suggested that: (1) economic growth could not be in tandem with democracy at the same time, and (2) political Islam headed in the opposite direction of democracy. With the success of holding two direct presidential and legislative elections on schedule, Indonesia could simultaneously registered as member of economic elites of G-20. Adding to that, the involvement of Islamic political parties in the current democratic political system was a living example of Indonesia's achievement in bringing all once seemingly irreconcilable values into one practicable experience.¹⁶

Indonesia's success in implementing democracy has significantly contributed to the global recognition that Indonesia is the third largest democracy in the world. Such recognition has significance for Indonesia in several respects. Firstly, Indonesia has more confidence to contribute solutions to the challenging problems of the world. This is due to that democracy has been informally considered as the "accepted currency" in the "political transaction" of the international relations. Secondly, Indonesia has the "legitimacy" to talk about democracy in the world stage, in which Acharya described it

¹⁵ Marty Natalegawa, "Annual Press Statement 2012" (Jakarta, Indonesia, January 2012).

¹⁶ Susilo B Yudhoyono, "The Democratic Instinct in the 21st Century," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (2010), 6 - 8.

as democratic pride.¹⁷ Based on that, many new discourses related to democracy that previously were considered taboo in Indonesian foreign policy has gradually become inherent element within the discussion of Indonesian foreign policy. More than that, those concepts have been institutionalized and adopted in the formal activities of the government, including Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ever since, the Government of Indonesia has therefore actively promoted the norms and values of democracy through dialogue. The Bali Democracy Forum was established to channel the Indonesia's ideas on democracy. Established in 2008 as the annual consultative forum, it has been held seven times since its inception.¹⁸ As the intergovernmental forum, it attempts to promote the principles of equality, mutual respect and understanding in building the cooperation in the field of democracy and peace. The promotion of democracy and human rights in foreign policy context was limited to a mechanism of sharing best practices and experiences, with no ultimate goal of creating code of conduct or binding legal documents. In this regards, Fitriani explains that:

Through the Bali Democracy Forum, Indonesia was able to promote its belief that democracy had to be home-grown, that there was no single standard of democracy and that it could not be injected into a country from abroad, but rather had to be nurtured based on the socio-cultural traditions and norms embraced by each nation.¹⁹

As the second track diplomacy, the Government of Indonesia also established a semi-governmental agency called IPD (Institute for Peace and Democracy). As the entity that is based on academic milieu, the institution has more leverage in dealing with public and civil society groups from different countries. For instance, during the

¹⁷ Acharya explained the term as "the pride in having achieved an open polity; being able to say we are a 'democratic nation', win respect from the international community, avoid the derogatory labels of authoritarian regime or 'dictator.'" See further in Amitav Acharya, "Democracy or Death? Will Democratisation Bring Greater Regional Instability to East Asia?," *The Pacific Review* 23, no. 3 (July 2010), 341.

¹⁸ The BDF participants are not limited to those countries that adopt democracy as the political system, but also to include those that "are willing to learn about democracy". For further detail, see the official website of BDF: <http://bdf.kemlu.go.id/>

¹⁹ Evi Fitriani, "Yudhoyono's Foreign Policy: Is Indonesia a Rising Power?," in *The Yudhoyono Presidency* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2015), 81.

political turmoil in Egypt, Indonesia, through IPD, actively held consultation with the representatives of Egypt to discuss the experiences of Indonesia's democratic transition, which was aimed to reduce the unintended allegation that the Government of Indonesia intervened in the domestic affairs of Egypt.²⁰

The promotion of democratic values in the bilateral foreign policy was also observable in Indonesia's relation with Myanmar for instance. Within the internal discussion of ASEAN members, the case of military suppression and internal conflicts in Myanmar has been a stark case, especially following the bloody encounter at Depayin in May 2003 between NLD (National League for Democracy) and SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) of Military Regime.

Indonesian foreign policy towards Myanmar has been involving Myanmar to the table of dialogue. In 2003, in responding to the halted effort of Thailand in promoting democracy through "flexible engagement" proposed by Minister Surin Pitsuwan,²¹ Indonesia came up with the idea of enhanced interaction, as reflected in the initial proposal of APSC (ASEAN Political Security Community) in 2003. As Acharya argued, the APSC was the truncated version of more ambitious proposal of Indonesia that urged ASEAN to establish variety of institutions to promote security and defense cooperation.²² In October 2003, ASEAN members adopted Bali Concord II that acknowledged APSC as one of the three pillar of ASEAN Community 2020. It is worth noting that the Bali Concord II mentions unprecedented reference to democracy as it said:

²⁰ Muhammad Hadiyanto Wirajuda, "The Impact of Democratisation on Indonesia's Foreign Policy: Regional Cooperation, Promotion of Political Values, and Conflict Management" (London School of Economics, 2014), 138-139.

²¹ Flexible engagement was a new term coined by Thai Minister Pitsuwan to encourage ASEAN members to talk collectively in more open forum about challenging problems faced by certain ASEAN country within its territories but may have indirect consequences on regional and international stability and prosperity. ASEAN members had expressed their reservations on the idea, since it might threaten the non-intervention principle. Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos and Burma believed that member countries should not tamper with the principle of non-interference, while the Philippines endorse the idea of Minister Surin. See more Kavi Chongkittavorn, "ASEAN Needs 'Flexible Engagement,'" *The Nation*, July 21, 1998, A4; Jurgen Haacke, "'Enhanced Interaction' with Myanmar and the Project of a Security Community: Is ASEAN Refining or Breaking with Its Diplomatic and Security Culture?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27, no. 2 (August 2005), 188-189.

²² Amitav Acharya, *The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of Region* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012), 256.

The APSC will ensure that the peoples and Member States of ASEAN live in peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. The APSC shall promote political development in adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and promotion and protection of human rights and...²³

Another development of issue following the *reformasi* is the increasing use of human rights issue in the foreign policy discourse. The issue was an “avoided issue” before the 1998. In line with the changing local political pendulum, the issue of human rights becomes one of the central issues in state policy. Moreover, the Government of Indonesia formally established the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. In foreign policy, the Foreign Ministry set up a Directorate of Human Rights under the Directorate General of Multilateral Issues.

Within ASEAN, in the context of APSC, Indonesia encouraged the establishment of AICHR (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights) as mandated by the ASEAN Charter article 14. The word “promotion and protection” of human rights in the Charter was the most contentious issue in the process of Charter building. The establishment of AICHR, which took two years after the adoption of Charter, was largely through the persistence of Indonesian Minister Wirajuda who described his situation at the time as “being alone”. However, as the critics went, the institution was considered “lack of teeth” as having no binding mechanism for the ASEAN members in protecting human rights in the region.²⁴

Indonesia’s strengthened standing in the human right discussion further found momentum when Indonesia was elected for two times (2007 – 2010, and 2011 – 2014) as a member of HRC (Human Rights Council) in Geneva, a subsidiary body of the UN that replaced Human Rights Commission after being criticized for its double standard.

²³ “ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint” (ASEAN, 2009),” ASEAN Website, retrieved 20 January 2015, <http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-18.pdf>.

²⁴ Donald E Weatherbee, *Indonesian in ASEAN: Vision and Reality* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 35.

In order for Indonesia to integrate within the international system, it needs to bind itself to the accepted international norms and values. Human Rights issue was in the first list. In 2006, a year after Yudhoyono was sworn as President, Indonesia took a boldest attempt by ratifying two important standard human rights: (1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and (2) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). By the end of 2011, Indonesia has been party to nine important instruments of human rights. Adding to the above two instruments are (1) Convention against Torture (CAT); (2) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); (3) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; (4) Convention on the Rights of the Child; (5) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; and (6) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant.

Table 4.3. List of Conventions related to Human Rights, ratified and signed by Indonesia during the Yudhoyono administration.

Convention	Date of Ratification
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights	2006
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	2006
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women :1981	1984
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment :1987	1998
Convention on the Rights of the Child :1990	1990
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict :2002	2012
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography :2002	2012
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance :2010	2010 (signed only)
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities :2008	2011

Source: United Nations Human Rights Commission, 2016.²⁵

4.3. Indonesian Foreign Policy towards Muslim concerns

The fresh outlook of Indonesian foreign policy was also sensed in its relations with Islam and Muslim communities. In this regards, Yudhoyono administration came to

²⁵ "Status of Ratification," *OHCHR Website*, retrieved on 23rd September 2016, <http://indicators.ohchr.org/>.

embrace policy of active engagement with the issues of Muslim concerns, and used Islam as a significant asset in shaping Indonesian foreign policy. As pointed by Sukma, Yudhoyono's approach has been somewhat different from previous administrations that tended to consider Islam and Muslim as liability rather than as an asset.²⁶

There are some indicators referring to that change. First, the government of Indonesia acclaimed as Muslim majority country in Indonesian foreign policy discourse and consistently used it as new Indonesia's international identity in guiding some of its initiatives. Second, infused with the spirit of that identity, there are some bold initiatives of Indonesia to take part in solving the ummatic problems such as in the case of Palestine, reconciling the conflicting parties between Sunni and Shiite, and broader involvement in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation). Third, Indonesia attempted to forge closer bilateral relations with the Middle East countries especially Saudi Arabia, which was seen as the birthplace of Islam. Fourth, Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated with several Muslim organizations in launching some of Indonesian foreign policies.

4.3.1. Indonesia's International Identity of "Islam"

It was indeed true that both previous presidents, Soekarno and Soeharto, have incorporated the label of Islam in their foreign policy. During Soekarno, for instance, Islam was used to garner diplomatic support and secure the international recognition from Arabic countries after declaring the independence. Islam was used as well when referring to Indonesia's support to Pakistan during the Kashmir conflict in 1960s.

However, the use of Islam in this time was limited only when dealing with Muslim majority countries, and not to other. This limitation was due to the overall strategy and projected vision of President Soekarno who attempted to promote the

²⁶ Rizal Sukma, "Domestic Politics and International Posture: Constraints and Responsibilities," in *Indonesia Rising: The Repositioning of Asia's Third Giant*, ed. Anthony Reid, Indonesia Update Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2012).

concept of New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) to the world, and his worldview of anti-imperialism and colonialism. Reference to any segmented identity such as pro-Islam could block Indonesia's ambitious plan in bringing all countries to rally behind. The limitation could be seen also in Soekarno's concept of *Nasionalis Agamis Komunis*, the seemingly impossible amalgamation between Islam and Communism. The concept was Soekarno's attempt to incorporate Islam and put it under the meaning of his nationalist interpretation.

During President Soeharto, albeit in his late term, the identity of Islam was used as well when dealing with Islamic organization, namely OIC. Just as the case of President Soekarno, this identity appeared in a strict condition and for limited function. Soeharto challenged the ambitious foreign policy of Soekarno, and presented "calmer" pro-western and pro-development foreign policy, especially in order to attract foreign investment amidst the Indonesia's economic collapse. Such Soeharto's agenda made Indonesian foreign policy should be carefully crafted, and not to be perceived by other countries as too Islamic. Albeit different direction and outlook, both leaders shared the feature that foreign policy's inclination to Islam could hamper their agendas.²⁷

It was also true that the first attempt to insert Islam as one of the main components in Indonesian foreign policy was made during Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency. In his term, President Wahid appointed a prominent Muslim scholar Alwi Shihab as his Minister for Foreign Affairs. It could be understood as Wahid's first attempt to insert the values of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy. Historically, the path of Indonesian foreign policy was dominated by the bureaucrats who were inclined to stand on non religious positions in responding the global situation. It can be seen from Soeharto's preference to appoint academic and career diplomats to be his ministers such

²⁷ Other reasons for the lack of Islamic identity were twofold. First, the rational bureaucrats of diplomatic machine of Indonesia under the leadership of both leaders disabled Islam to act as one of the significant determinants in crafting Indonesian foreign policy. Second, internationally, the use of Islam in global interaction was not timely and insignificant, especially during the cold war between the US and USSR. The importance of Islam at the global arena was limited in the challenging the creation of Pan Arabism in the Middle East countries. See detailed in Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah, "A Genealogy of Moderate Islam: Governmentality and Discourses of Islam in Indonesia's Foreign Policy," *Studia Islamika* 23, no. 3 (2016), 413 - 414.

as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Ali Alatas. Equipped with Wahid's progressive Islamic intellectual capacity, the president envisioned to have bilateral relations, only in terms of economic cooperation, with Israel. This policy was originally meant to present Indonesia as a country with biggest Muslim population who were moderate and able to interact with any countries in the world, including Israel. However, Wahid's foreign policy was not supported at the domestic level, especially from Muslim constituencies.²⁸ If we look at the Wahid's foreign policy, in which he governed the country in less than two years, there was no direct reference, indicating Islamic identity in his foreign policy.

The seed of Islamic identity in Indonesian foreign policy emerged in the year of Megawati, albeit in its early stage. Indonesia facilitated the first international Conference of Islamic Scholars, organized by *Nahdlatul Ulama* in early 2004. It was, among others, motivated by the terrorist attack in Bali in 2001. There was a felt urgency to counter the image of Islam, which was strongly associated with the terrorism. However, the tenure of Megawati ended in 2004. The idea of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy was in its early infancy.

The Islamic identity in Indonesian foreign policy, therefore, as this dissertation argues, was firstly developed into "full-fledged" during Yudhoyono administration. Beginning in his early presidency, Yudhoyono embarked on new identity of Indonesian foreign policy by attaching the identity of Indonesia as the country with the biggest Muslim population in the world, with inherent feature of moderation and toleration that are compatible with the values of democracy. The difference between Yudhoyono and his previous administrations lays in two matters. First, it was first time that Islam, in terms of population and unique feature, was mentioned clearly as Indonesia's international identity and constitute as one of its main components. Second, the identity

²⁸ Ibid, 415.

of Muslim country was meant to be Indonesia's international identity upon which the country will establish relations with all countries, either countries with majority Muslim population or not. By this, such identity was not intended for instrumental purposes and pragmatism. More than that, it was an integral part of Indonesia. Consequently, this international identity has been developed and translated into many initiatives integrated with Indonesian foreign policy.

Firstly, in his speech under the title of "An Independent and Active Foreign Policy in the 21st Century," President Yudhoyono proposed his projection of Indonesia's international identity. In doing so, as he further explained, such identity needs to originate from the domestic ingredients and made up from native character. In this case, Indonesia is, among others, the world's largest Muslim population that can put Islam and democracy at the same table. He said:

Fourth, "Independent and active should project Indonesia's international identity. [...] How we project ourselves to the outside world, and how we perceived by the international community. International identity defines country's role, place and standing in the world community. [...] Our international identity must be rooted in strong sense of who we are. [...] We are home to the world's largest Muslim population. We are also a country where democracy, Islam and modernity go hand – in – hand."²⁹

Ever since, such international identity has been a common terminology, restated in several multilateral forums by Indonesia's diplomatic machinery. This identity has been translated to Indonesia's Muslim moderate, denoting that Islam in Indonesia has special character of moderation, toleration, and progressiveness.

The projection of such new identity has been based on the fact that majority of Muslim population in Indonesia do not subscribe to the idea of violence, while at the same time the violent minority has almost always becomes the headline and gradually known to the world. Taylor accurately described the situation by coining the terms

²⁹ Yudhoyono, *Transforming Indonesia: Selected International Speeches*, 389 - 390.

“Silent Majority” to the most of Muslim population who originally embrace the idea of leniency towards the others but attract scarce notice, and “Emperor has no Clothes” to the minority groups that hold no theological validity in their belief but secure considerable attention.³⁰

It was also basically an effort to engage Indonesian Muslims to the foreign policy agenda in order to set the connecting bridge between Muslim world and Western world, between East and West and to ensure the triumph of pluralistic and tolerant understanding of Islam. The project was largely in line with the Yudhoyono’s working framework of “*Intermestic*” which is essentially the entanglement between international and domestic factors. Perceived as a domestic asset, Moderate Indonesian Muslims were taken to international arena to bring a more balanced perception about Islam in Indonesia.

Yudhoyono administration, amidst the worsening image of Islam in the world following the tragic event of 9/11, has been determined to share the true face of Islam by proposing the Indonesia’s moderate Islam, as reflected in the Indonesia’s initiative on the interfaith dialogue forum at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels. Within the forum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constantly used Islamic terminologies such as *rahmatan lil ālamīn*, and *ummatan wasaṭan* in the formal speeches to denote the international identity of Indonesia.

Indonesia’s Muslim asset as international identity has been used to bargain Indonesia’s position in the Security Council. When the agenda of reforming Security Council within the UN became the global highlight especially that relates to the exclusive membership of the council, Indonesia was overtly confident to propose the concept of Muslim civilization’s representation. During the United Nations General

³⁰ C Holland Taylor, “Mobilizing Islam’s Silent Majority,” *Jerusalem Post* Website, updated on February 12, 2007, accessed on January 16, 2015, <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1170359843587&pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull>.

Assembly in 2008, Indonesia made a remark signaling her position on the Security Council reform agenda. In his speech, Minister Wirajuda said that it was timely for UN to answer the contemporary world challenges through the calibration of the decision making process. In this regards, Indonesia was in opinion that the Council needed to capture the aspiration of Muslim community that made up 1.1 billion of world population. He said that “true democratization of the Council also means an equitable distribution of its membership – not only in terms of geographical representation, where we already have imbalances – but also in terms of constituencies. Hence, the world’s major civilizations of Muslim countries should be proportionately represented. The world’s community of 1.1 billion Muslims must be represented on the Council if it is to be truly democratic.”³¹

By this statement, Minister Wirajuda wanted to propose that Muslim civilization needed to be represented in such august council, whose decision could have enormous impact on the world’s population, which more than half it are Muslim. In this case, Indonesia as the biggest Muslim country in the world that embraces the moderate value of Islam, has been eligible to be considered as part of such representation.

Second, Indonesia has been consistently used such “Islamic” international identity to deal with other countries, especially with Western countries, which can be observed obviously in the initiative of interfaith dialogue forum. Such initiative, along with other similar forums, are mainly intended to be a venue of confidence building measure, in which open discussion are held to reduce tensions, bridge the gap of misunderstanding, resolve uncertainties, and build sense of togetherness amongst different people of different background around the globe. In this regard, the Government of Indonesia has conducted several forums at different levels, by inviting

³¹ “Indonesia calls for Muslim representation on Security Council,” United Nations *Website*, September 27, 2008, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=28334#.VxhTnP197IU>

key religious leaders and interested parties to share ideas and thoughts on building culture of peace and harmony through constructive dialogue.

The emergence of such initiative could be understood in terms of Indonesia's response towards the GWOT (Global War on Terrorism) launched by the US after the 9/11 attack. Indonesia wanted to propose alternative solution in addressing the burning issue of terrorism by bridging the gap of understanding between Western hemisphere and Islamic one, to promote the noble values of Islam such as *rahmatan lil'alamīn*, as opposed to the coercion value of military power. The act of terrorism is understood as not only as a physical attack but also as an ideological one, a war of contrasting minds in which competing ideas attempt to gain victory over other. By virtue of this logic, success in curbing its alarming threat necessitates physical prevention paralleled with the ideological containment. Based on that, the government of Indonesia attempted to pursue foreign policy that is inclusive to the soft power paradigm.

Therefore, Yudhoyono administration targeted Western countries as the "operational field" of interfaith dialogue initiative.³² Indonesia has conducted intensive communication with different partnering countries to establish a similar dialogue forum. During Yudhoyono's leadership, the government of Indonesia has agreed to hold interfaith dialogue forum on a regular basis with 22 countries. Out of this, 77 percent of total partner in the initiative locates in the European continent. One of which is regional organization, namely European Union.³³

The Selection of the European countries is in accordance with the main purpose of holding of Interfaith Dialogue forum, which is to reduce the gap and further build mutual understanding between Islam and the West. (See table 4.4 and table 4.5).

³² Fadhly Ahmad Bachmid (Political Staff at Directorate of Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), interview with the author, Jakarta, November 2014.

³³ Countries that have bilateral forum on interfaith dialogue with the Government of Indonesia are the United States, Austria, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Canada, Lebanon, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Spain, European Union, Vatican, Greece, Chile (30 May 2012), Argentine, and Pakistan.

Particularly with the United Kingdom, the establishment of interfaith dialogue forum was motivated by the visit of Prime Minister Tony Blair to Indonesia in 30th March 2006, the first by a British Prime Minister for over 20 years. During the meeting with President SBY, the two leaders discussed various issues of common concern on political and security issues including the terrorism and the comprehensive measure to address it. The visit resulted in issuing the Joint Statement between the two leaders, affirming the commitment of both countries to work together in curbing the alarming threat of misunderstanding between Islam and the West.


Table 4.4. List of Indonesia's bilateral partner in Interfaith Dialogue as of 2013

No	Country	Document of Agreement to Initiate bilateral Interfaith Dialogue	Name of Dialogue
1	The United States	Indonesia US Comprehensive Partnership (Sept 2010)	Indonesia - US Interfaith Cooperation (2010)
2	Austria	Joint Statement on Cooperation in the Areas of Dialogue of Cultures and Religions (Nov 2009)	Indonesia - Austria Interfaith Dialogue
3	Netherlands	Letter of Intent on Comprehensive Partnership Mechanism for Dialogue and Cooperation (Dec 2006)	Indonesian - Dutch Interfaith Dialogue
4	Bulgaria	-	Bilateral Interfaith Dialogue RI – Bulgaria
5	Czechoslovakia	-	Interfaith Dialogue Indonesia-Czech Republic (2010)
6	Ethiopia	-	Indonesia-Ethiopia Interfaith Dialogue (2011)
7	Hungary	Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Bilateral Consultations (Oct 2005)	Indonesia – Hungarian Interfaith Dialogue
8	United Kingdom	Joint Statement on UK - Indonesia Partnership Forum (March 2006)	Indonesia-UK Islamic Advisory Group
9	Italy	Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Consultation (March 2009)	Indonesia – Italy Interfaith Dialogue
10	Germany	-	Indonesia – Germany Interfaith Dialogue And Promoting Academic Cooperation
11	Canada	Joint Declaration on Enhancing Bilateral Consultations (Aug 2012)	Indonesia – Canada Interfaith Dialogue
12	Poland	Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Consultation (Nov 2013)	Indonesia – Poland Interfaith Dialogue
13	Russia	Declaration on the Framework of Friendly Relations and Cooperation of Indonesia and Russia in the 21st Century (2003)	Indonesian-Russian Interfaith Dialogue (2009)
14	Spain	-	Indonesia – Spain Interfaith Dialogue (2010)
15	Vatican	-	Indonesia – Vatican Interfaith Dialogue (2008)
16	Greece	-	Indonesia – Greece Interfaith Dialogue (2011)

17	Chile	Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Bilateral Consultations (2002)	2002 (but the interfaith dialogue forum was conducted first in 2012)
18	Argentina	Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Bilateral Consultation (August 2005)	Indonesia – Argentine Interfaith Dialogue (2012)
19	Pakistan	Joint Statement (Nov 2005)	Indonesia – Pakistan Interfaith Dialogue: Empowering Moderates (2012)
20	Lebanon	-	Indonesia-Lebanon Bilateral Interfaith Dialogue (2008)
21	Serbia	Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of Bilateral Consultations (March 2008)	Indonesia Serbia Interfaith Dialogue
22	European Union	Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between Indonesia and the European Community and its Members States (Nov 2009)	

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Treaty Room, 2016

Figure 4.5. Percentage of Countries that have regular bilateral interfaith dialogue with Indonesia according to geographical representation



Source: Author, 2014

On 5th October 2006, both leaders agreed to write to fourteen prominent religious leaders from the two countries to invite them to establish “Indonesia – UK Islamic Advisory Group”, to provide necessary advise on countering radicalism and religious extremism. The group consisted of Azyumardi Azra (Muslim scholar), Hasyim Muzadi, Yenny Wahid (*Nahdatul Ulama*), Din Syamsuddin, Abdul Muti (*Muhammadiyah*), Marwah Daud (ICMI), Nasaruddin Umar (Ministry of Religious Affairs), Asim Siddiqui (City Circle), Mishal Husain (BBC), Shaykh Muhammad Bilal Abdallah (Ebrahem Community College), Musharraf Hussain (Karimia Institute), Yusuf Islam, Moulana Shahid Raza, and Sabira Lakha. The first meeting of the group, which was held on February 2007, issued policy recommendations submitted to both countries

on June 2007.³⁴ Some recommended programs have been carried out such as the Imam and Muslim Scholars exchange and Sister Schools Program.

The establishment of interfaith dialogue between Indonesia and the US was motivated by the speech of President Barack Obama to the Muslim world at the University of al-Azhar in Cairo on 4th June 2009. The speech, among others, expressed the need to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam. President Obama stated that the US government has committed "to fight against negative stereotypes of Islam". In response, President Yudhoyono expressed the Indonesia's shared commitment to bridge the Islamic world and the West in a speech at Harvard University on September 29th, 2009. Subsequently, the two countries agreed to bring together interested stakeholders and key religious leaders in a forum called Indonesia-US Interfaith Cooperation on 25 to 27 January 2010. The meeting produced several items of cooperation stated in the "Shared Concerns and Commitments Indonesia - US Interfaith Cooperation."³⁵

In order to follow up the Shared Concern and Commitments especially those related to education, the Government of Indonesia has facilitated academicians, religious leaders, and civil society activists to give a public lecture on the state of democracy and moderate Islam in Indonesia at several universities in the United States (Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles and San Francisco) on 8 to 12 November 2010.

In the same year, the US government, through the World Conference of Religious for Peace (WCRP), a think-tank partner to the US Embassy in Jakarta, organized visit of Indonesian delegation led by Prof. Din Syamsuddin to Washington, D.C. The Indonesian delegation held a meeting with the officials of the State Department, the White House and National Security Council (NSC). During these meeting, it has been confirmed by both that the interfaith cooperation between

³⁴ "SBY endorses RI-UK group's proposals on Islam's issues," *The Jakarta Post*, 16th June 2007.

³⁵ "Status Hubungan Bilateral RI - US" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2009).

Indonesia and the US considered a valuable investment that needs to be continuously driven and intensively developed in the future to obtain tangible results.

The result of such continuous projection of soft power by Yudhoyono was positively hailed by the US, especially under the Obama administration. The focus of the agreement between the two countries has been expanded to include other areas addressing the gap of understanding between Western and Islam. On 11th December 2009, for instance, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Peace Corps was signed by the two countries, marking an important step of cooperation. The MoU upholds the commitment of US to send the volunteers to give training to English teachers in public schools and *Madrasah* (Islamic school) in East Java. As the program yielded satisfactory result, the United States increased the total number of volunteers to 33 people in 2011 and 50 people in 2012 as well as decided to expand the program outside of East Java province.

Another important stride taken by Indonesia with regard to peace dialogue was one conducted by Indonesia's Ambassador to Washington, Dino Pati Djalal, when he initiated the US - Indonesia Interfaith Mission for Peace and Understanding to the Middle East in February 2012. The mission, in terms of Track II people to people Diplomacy, was envisioned to trigger the resumption of a peace stalled process between Israel and Palestine. 20 leaders across religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism) from the US and Indonesia were invited to conduct interfaith pilgrimage to Jakarta, Amman, Ramallah, The visit ended in Washington, where which the delegates were expected to deliver joint statement in US Congress and State Department. Initially, the trip to Bethlehem and Jerusalem would be included as part of the joint journey. However, it was cancelled since some of Delegates member were denied of entrance by Israel authority.³⁶

³⁶ James B. Hoesterey, "Soft Islam: Indonesia's Interfaith Mission for Peace in the Middle East," retrieved on 23rd May 2015, <http://www.mei.edu/content/map/soft-islam-indonesia%E2%80%99s-interfaith-mission-peace-middle-east>.

The agreement to have joint cooperation on interfaith dialogue between Indonesia and the US came at the right timing for three reasons. First, it coincided with the planning of Pastor Terry Jones, the leader of Dove World Outreach Center (DWOC), to conduct International Burn Quran Day in Gainesville, Florida on 11th September 2010. In this regards, President Yudhoyono wrote a letter to President Obama, while recognizing US citizen's right to speak, urging to reconsider its implication to the US interest abroad.

Second, the idea of interfaith dialogue forum coincided with the high expectation amongst the two governments to restore confidence after years of GWOT and unilateral action under Bush Administration. The election of President Obama was highly welcomed not only by the Government of Indonesia, but also by Indonesian society. Adding to that, the forum was also part of the larger commitment between Indonesia and the US to forge closer relationship as enshrined in the US – Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership.

Third, there is growing awareness amongst foreign policy scholars in the US on the importance of religion in addressing some of the recent global challenges. Madeline Albright, for instance, in her conversation with CNN, explained that during her time serving in the State Secretary, she has been taught not to complicate an issue by bringing God and religion to the discourse of international relations. However, through her diplomatic journey and exploration on the subject, she came to realize that the opposite is true. She concluded that the effectiveness of foreign policy today relies partly on the understanding on the role of God and religion, especially after 9/11.³⁷ In the same spirit, in the early 2010, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, led by R. Scott Appleby of the University of Notre Dame and Richard Cizik of the New Evangelical Partnership for the Common Good, released academic report, titled

³⁷ "Albright: Ignore religion 'at our own peril,'" CNN Website, 21st August 2007, retrieved on 22nd May 2015, <http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/08/17/albright.qa/>.

“Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy”, that encourage US foreign policy makers to take more into consideration religious matters and to involve religious community in crafting its foreign policies.³⁸

4.3.2. Part of the Solution to the *Ummatic* Challenges

Indonesia’s international identity, as the country with the biggest Muslim population, consequently ignited the feeling of urgency to solve the global challenges that haunted the Muslim community and countries with majority Muslim population. There are some daunting tasks, as identified by Yudhoyono in some of his remarks, need to be solved by *Ummah* (Muslim communities) around the globe. First, many Muslim societies have been continuously facing *Islamophobia*, stemming from a lack of adequate understanding of the nature of Islam as a religion of peace. Such misunderstanding often ended in physical attack, and escalated into conflict. Second, the *Ummah* are also beset with internal conflict, as a result of trust deficit between different factions and groups of Muslim. This internal problem leads to inability of *Ummah* to survive in the middle of the swift currents of globalization, let alone make progress, or even contribute in it. In the worst scenario, the *Ummah* are trapped in this internal conflict. The rivalry between Sunni and Shiite, and political disunity between Fatah and Hamas are some of the examples. Third, Muslim minority problem is another crucial issue. One of the most salient issues is the Rohingya people in Myanmar. It is a complex problem that requires intensive cooperation between countries concerned, not only between Muslim population countries. Last, Palestine is still one of the contending and prolonged issues at the top of the list that *Ummah* need to tackle.³⁹

³⁸ “Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy,” *The Chicago Council on Global Affairs* Website, retrieved on 22nd May 2015, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/engaging-religious-communities-abroad-new-imperative-us-foreign-policy>

³⁹ These identified problems can be traced in Yudhoyono’s speeches in different occasions and forums. For instance, (1) his speech at OIC Summit in Egypt, 2013; (2) his remark during state visit to Saudi Arabia in 2006 before the students of Islamic University of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, Riyadh; (3) his remark at the 2nd International Conference of Islamic Scholars, Jakarta, June 2006; (4) and his remark at the opening of the Wahid Institute, 2004.

Islamophobia

First, the issue of *Islamophobia* has been one of the utmost concerns voiced by the leaders of Muslim countries, and thus placed an important agenda in most of the OIC meetings, indicating that the issue has been spotted as rising phenomenon in today's *ummah* world. Therefore, in the 3rd extraordinary meeting of OIC in Mecca, 2005, member states of OIC adopted Program of Action, which inter alia, decided to formally establish special body in the OIC secretariat that deals with this serious issue.⁴⁰

According to the OIC report, the false image of Islamic teachings and the incorrect depiction of Muslim characters have been widely distributed by media irresponsibly, especially in western countries. Adding to that, those media have been protected by the "pretext" of freedom of expression without taking into consideration the possible political and social impact of such act. In a more harsh statement, the concept has been seen as an alarming indicator towards the institutionalization of *Islamophobia*.⁴¹

For instance, the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist carrying bomb by the Danish magazine of Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005 has sparked global outrage among Muslim communities around the world. Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical weekly magazine, published the same cartoon, put it as in headline page, and wrote, "It's hard to be loved by Imbeciles."⁴² Some European media in Norway, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain reprinted the cartoon without considering the negative consequence to the harmony between Muslim community and Western society. In 2008, a Dutch parliamentarian, Geert Wilders, released a controversial movie titled "Fitna".

⁴⁰ "1st Observatory Report on Islamophobia" (35th Council of Foreign Ministers, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 2008), 1 -2.

⁴¹ "6th OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia" (40th Council of Foreign Ministers, Conakry, Republic of Guinea, 2013), 1.

⁴² "Prophet Mohammed cartoons controversy: timeline," May 4th 2015, retrieved on May 21st 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341599/Prophet-Muhammad-cartoons-controversy-timeline.html>

The movie, approximately 16 minutes in length, attempted to depict that verses of Holy Quran encourage Muslims to commit act of terrorism, and to describe Islam as religion of hatred and backwardness.

In this case, Indonesia was in a view that repercussion of this grave issue could worsen the already fragile relations between Islam and the West provided that managed inappropriately. Yudhoyono administration felt the urgency to actively involve public media as the pillar of democracy in the process of building better understanding and reducing unnecessary hatred and baseless tension between Muslim countries and the West. As explained by Yudhoyono in 2006, that the dialogue and inter change activities remain important aspect of Indonesia's foreign policy in the future. However, such an effort will be much more meaningful with the active participation of the media.⁴³

Responding to that crisis, Minister Hassan Wirajuda said that the cartoon and the movie have been published in "an extremely irrelevant way," and that those acts have put social harmony in a danger. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia, together with the Kingdom of Norway, took the initiative to co-sponsor the first Global Inter Media Dialogue (GIMD) in Bali, on September 2nd, 2006. The forum was attended by 73 leading media representatives from 50 countries. It was intended to be a venue for professional journalists from all over the world to gather and discuss the concept of freedom of expression in multicultural world in its proportional context. The media has both rights to exercise its freedom, and responsibility to maintain harmony in religious and cultural sensitivity. It is important, as such, to safeguard the freedom of expression while preventing its abuse. Minister Wirajuda opined that the freedom of expression is (1) fundamental human rights, and (2) political, social and economic imperative. Hence, it is the first civic right restored when Indonesia decided to launch democratic transition. However, it is not an absolute freedom as it is limited by responsibility to

⁴³ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "Statement at the opening of the Global Inter-Media Dialogue" (Speech delivered in Bali, September 2nd, 2006).

public order.⁴⁴ The next meeting, Second GIMD, was held in Oslo, Norway on 4 – 5 June 2007.

The third GIMD took place in Bali, on 7 – 8 May, 2008, bringing the theme of “Ethical Journalism in Extreme Condition: The Challenge in Diversity”. More than 130 representatives from different countries participated in the forum. Within these venues, one of the controversial issues being debated was the ethical foundation for journalists. Bambang Harymurti, senior journalist of TEMPO, the leading investigating magazine in Indonesia, admitted that such agreement in the conception of ethical journalism is a mission impossible, yet it is worth trying.⁴⁵

The necessity to involve youth generation in the process of spreading even information has motivated Indonesia to create activities participated by young people. In 2008, for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held Asia Pacific Interfaith Youth Forum, in which many young people from several countries live together in a camp and house of local villagers to experience first-hand the taste of multiculturalism. In 2012, Indonesia also hosted Peace Journalism Media Workshop that invite 15 young journalist from 15 countries of the Regional Interfaith Dialogue to Indonesia.

Internal Conflict

Second, *Ummah* has been preoccupied with the low level of trust between different factions, sects, and groups, leading to unnecessary internal conflict. The long standing “conflict” between Sunni and Shiite could at any time explode, and be exploited, resulting in the absence of peace in the Middle East region. However, such trust deficit can be addressed if there is mutual understanding between the conflicting parties. Henceforth, as part of Indonesia’s mission to broker the peace and take part in bringing

⁴⁴ Hassan Wirajuda, “Beyond the CNN Effect” (Speech delivered at Third Global Inter-Media Dialogue, Nusa Dua, Bali, May 7th 2008).

⁴⁵ “Transkripsi Joint Press Conference,” May 7th 2008, retrieved on May 21st 2015, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Transkripsi&Name2=Menteri&IDP=224&l=id>

stability to the region of conflict, Minister Wirajuda facilitated the Bogor Conference, in April 2007, inviting leaders of Shiite and Sunni from Iran and Iraq to sit for a meaningful dialogue. It was opened by President Yudhoyono, and closed by Vice President Jusuf Kalla, indicating the importance of this effort for Indonesia's side. The conference was considered as part of Yudhoyono's proposal to contribute in mediating the deep seated conflict between two different strands of Islam.

Unfortunately, Indonesia's serious effort failed to evoke positive response from the pertinent parties. Some of influential leaders from both parties were not in attendance. Minister Wirajuda argued that the national security in Iraq had prevented the leaders from coming to Jakarta. On the other hand, Hasyim Muzadai and Din Syamsuddin viewed that their absence due to the earlier position taken by Indonesia in the UN Security Council on Iranian nuclear. Indonesia voted for putting sanctions on Iran, that took place a week before conference started. Therefore, Indonesia's neutral position and its image as nonpartisan were being questioned.⁴⁶

In the case of Fatah and Hamas, for instance, Indonesia was committed to unite these two factions in order to create strong governance of Palestine following the result of legislative election in 2006. Minister Wirajuda, in early February 2007, held a meeting with the chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, Khaled Meshal, at the headquarter of Hamas in Damascus. During the meeting, Minister Wirajuda expressed hope and call for the speedy implementation of the formation of Palestinian government made of relevant factions in the country. In other words, reconciliation between Hamas, Fatah and other smaller factions in Palestine is a pivotal step before further talking on ruling the country. Otherwise, internal disunity will consequently impede the resumption of peace talk in the region. In this connection, Minister Wirajuda offered help for both parties to have political discussion and stood ready to facilitate such

⁴⁶ "RI's lead role in Iraq resolution is put to the test," *The Jakarta Post*, 9th April 2007.

dialogue.⁴⁷ Despite the failure of this attempt, Indonesia has been showing its commitment to be part of solution for the *ummah*'s problem.

Muslim Minority

Third, the issue of Muslim minority has been occupying central debate within the Muslim world. The concept of *Ukhuwwah Islamiyah* (Islamic solidarity) has been an integral part of Muslim belief, in which Muslims are described as one body in their love, compassion, and mercy towards each other. The problem of Muslim minority, such as Rohingya people in Myanmar and conflict in the Southern Philippine, posed serious challenge for Muslim community.

Related to the issue of the Southern Philippines, during 2013, as Chairman of the OIC-PCSP (OIC Peace Committee for Southern Philippines), Indonesia has facilitated a series of consultations with the Philippine government and the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) in the framework of tripartite to conduct a review of the implementation of the FPA (Final Peace Agreement) in 1996 between the Philippine government and the MNLF.⁴⁸

Indonesia's contribution in promoting peace in the southern Philippines is also realized through Indonesia's participation in the IMT (International Monitoring Team). This team consisted of six countries, namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, the European Union and Norway. Indonesia has sent five teams of Indonesian observers, comprised of elements from the military personnel and civilians (mostly from Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The first team was dispatched in 2011. This team of observers was established through Presidential Decree 47/2012.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ "Menlu RI Bertemu dengan Pemerintah Suriah dan Kelompok Hamas di Damaskus," *Kemlu* Website, dated 10 February 2007, retrieved on 6 February 2016, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/siaran-pers/Pages/Menlu-RI-Bertemu-dengan-Pemerintah-Suriah-dan-Kelompok-Hamas-di-Damaskus.aspx>

⁴⁸ "Status Kontribusi Indonesia Pada Isu Isu Multilateral" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2015).

⁴⁹ Muhammad Yusuf (Political Staff at Directorate General of Multilateral Issues), interview with the author, Jakarta, August 20th, 2015.

Regarding the Rohingya conflict, especially that took place in 2012, with the intensive domestic pressure, mainly from Muslim communities, towards the ruling government, Yudhoyono eventually took bold step to lend help for the Rohingya people. As the only regional organization in Southeast Asia, ASEAN was deemed irresolute in addressing Rohingya issue. It was obvious when the conflict occurred in June 2012, ASEAN had not issued any statement clarifying its position on the issue at the first place. It was only after two months, on 17th August 2012, that ASEAN publicly issued its formal statement. The issuance of this statement, interestingly, was pushed by Minister Natalegawa. The draft of statement was initiated by Indonesia, and took more than a month to be approved by all other ministers.⁵⁰

Furthermore, as argued by Wakhidah, The ASEAN way, in which principle of non-intervention serves as its main ingredient, has created dilemmatic position for members of ASEAN to provide sustainable political solution for Myanmar. The government of Myanmar always claimed Rohingya conflict as internal matter, and that any other countries or political entities, including ASEAN, were not entitled to intervene.⁵¹

For instance, amidst the increasing international pressure towards Myanmar, ASEAN Secretary General, Mr Surin Pitsuwan, attempted to promote a breakthrough in the pattern of problem-solving within ASEAN. He coined the idea of “tripartite talk”, in which three core relevant parties (ASEAN, UN, and Myanmar) would meet on the same table to come up with the constructive ideas to address the problem. Mr Pitsuwan’s offer was based on the fear that the internal matter of Myanmar, if not handled carefully, would be regional matter and develop into wider the security concern.

⁵⁰ Gilang Gumilar Eka (Political Staff at Bureau of Minister), Interview with the Author, September 20th 2014.

⁵¹ Nurul Wakhidah, “Prinsip Non-Intervensi ASEAN Dalam Upaya Penyelesaian Konflik Rohingya Di Myanmar” (University of Gadjah Mada, 2014), 51.

However, this proposal was turned down by the Myanmar government, insisting that it was their internal problem.⁵²

Minister Marty also met with Cambodian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Chair of ASEAN) and Mr Surin Pitsuwan in Phnom Penh in 2012, and proposed a special meeting to discuss the Rohingya issue under the agenda of humanitarian issues. The meeting was intended to make ASEAN focusing on providing humanitarian aids and reducing the unintended consequences of the conflict. The meeting was facilitated by the AICHR (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights). However, the offer was once again turned down by Myanmar.⁵³

At the time the conflict occurred, Indonesia did not assume the chairmanship of ASEAN. It could become one of the reasons for Indonesia's initial calm position towards the issue. In this case, Indonesia was not in position to do quick and swift diplomatic action as in the case of Cambodia – Thailand border conflict in 2011. In the case, since Indonesia assumed chairmanship of ASEAN, Minister Marty initiated several meetings with his counterparts to deescalate the border conflict within the framework of ASEAN (Informal Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers). The Indonesia's swift diplomatic action was considered timely and relevant.

Looking at the nature of conflict that had been consistently considered "internal" by Myanmar, there was two logical policy choices for Indonesia to be taken to be involved in the issue. First, to wait for Cambodia, as chair of ASEAN, to lead the organization to address the issue. Second, to act in the framework of ASEAN corridor. These options were the "safer" policy that Indonesia could take in order to respect the norms of ASEAN way and sovereignty of Myanmar.

⁵² "Myanmar 'rejects talks' on ethnic violence," Aljazeera *Website*, 31 October 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2012/10/2012103161130375846.html>

⁵³ Novie Lucky Andriyani, "Pelanggaran HAM Di ASEAN (Studi Kasus Etnis Rohingya)" (University of Gadjah Mada, 2015), 73.

However, with the mounted domestic pressure, it was then reasonable that Indonesia preferred to seek bilateral avenue in addressing the conflict rather than ASEAN level. It was quite unusual approach taken by Yudhoyono administration that, as reflected in most of his speeches, preferred for consensus-driven multilateral approaches to any foreign policy issues with cross-cutting dimension including Rohingya.

At bilateral level, President Yudhoyono used his good offices by promoting constructive engagement to encourage Myanmar to peacefully settle the ongoing conflict. The measures reflected in series of intensive bilateral talks at highest and ministerial level. On August 4, 2012, President SBY sent a formal letter to President U Thein Sein. Three points were stressed in the letter; encouraging Myanmar to take concrete steps to ensure harmony among groups of different background; suggesting Nay Pyi Taw to invite delegation from OIC to visit Myanmar, including Rakhine State; and expressing Indonesia's readiness to lend necessary assistance upon the request of Myanmar.

Interestingly, despite President Yudhoyono explained to the public that it was communal conflict rather than religious conflict, he encouraged Myanmar to open its border for OIC working group and to invite OIC Secretary General to the site. In this regards, President Yudhoyono also met with OIC Secretary General on December 4, 2012, stressing the importance of OIC to have humanitarian mission deployed to the site of conflict. In the meeting, President Yudhoyono also asked for OIC to appoint Jusuf Kalla formally as OIC Special Envoy for Myanmar. It was approved after President Yudhoyono formally sent letter of request on December 9, 2012.

In order to intensify the talk, President Yudhoyono held *tete a tete* meeting with his Myanmar Counterpart President U Thein Sein at the sidelines of the 21st ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2012. The talks centered on the possible

cooperation to address the conflict, including financial support for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and immediate humanitarian assistance. The meeting resulted in Indonesia's commitment to support Myanmar in terms of capacity building, which will be guided by "Blue Book" agreed upon by two sides. The issue of Rohingya also featured the bilateral talk between President Yudhoyono and Presiden Thein Sein During state visit trip to Myanmar on 24 April, 2013. SBY said that serious steps need to be taken by Myanmar government to handle the issue by politically settling the issue of citizenship, as Indonesia considered it as the core source of the conflict.⁵⁴

Upon the request of Myanmar, and to follow up the commitment made by President Yudhoyono, Minister Marty visited firsthand the site of conflict on January 9, 2013, and held bilateral meeting with Minister of Border Affairs and Chief Minister of Rakhine State.⁵⁵ The visit was also could be understood as political gesture of Indonesian government to show its real action. The visit was also considered important since one of its agendas was political settlement, in which Minister Marty encourages Myanmar to continue taking concrete steps in addressing contentious political dimensions, ranging from resettlement of displaced populations to granting of citizenship, as well as to look at issues of birth registration, work permits and permits for movement across the country for all, in line with a uniform national practice across the country ensuring that they are in keeping with accepted international norms.

Another agenda was to inform Myanmar that Indonesia would organize four capacity building partnership programs in 2013 in the fields of socio-economic development, democracy, SME development and land transportation management. In the spirit of friendship and solidarity, Indonesia also pledged to extend a US\$ 1 million humanitarian aid to Myanmar to build community center, schools, youth and sport

⁵⁴ "Presiden SBY Desak Penyelesaian Isu Rohingya," State Secretariat Website, 24th April 2013, http://www.setneg.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6973

⁵⁵ "Catatan Untuk Menteri Luar Negeri: Bahan Utama" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2013).

center that promote reconciliation between the conflicting ethnics. The visit was also intended to explore the possibility of Indonesia's participation in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process.⁵⁶

The financial commitment has been realized in late 2014, when Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.M. Fachir, visited Myanmar and met Chief Minister of Rakhine State, U Maung Maung Ohn 8 December 2014. Vice Minister Fachir officially opened public schools in four different areas of Mawrawaddy, Maungdaw Township, Buthidaung village, and Thapyaygone Township. In his opening speech, Vice Minister stated that his was part of Indonesia's serious concern on settling the conflict in the regions by promoting constructive engagement and sharing best practices from Indonesia's experiences through humanitarian assistance. Indonesia targeted the humanitarian assistance for the children, one of the most vulnerable groups within the ongoing conflict.⁵⁷ The vocational education for the children is also provided by the government for the refugees within Indonesia territory while waiting their status provided by UNHCR.⁵⁸

Responding to the enthusiasm of Indonesian community to help Rohingya people, government of Indonesia, through its Embassy in Yangon also coordinated all humanitarian assistances provided for Rohingya (See Table 4.6). These humanitarian assistances were supplied by different social organizations, mostly Muslim organizations, and channeled by the government as part of its commitment to implement multi-track diplomacy.⁵⁹

Another issue raised by Muslim organizations, besides Indonesia's active involvement, was the lives of Rohingya refugees who fled to Indonesia. It was noted

⁵⁶ "Bahan Masukan Kunjungan Menlu January 2013" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2013).

⁵⁷ "RI Dorong Rekonsiliasi Konflik Di Wilayah Rakhine Melalui Pendekatan Kemanusiaan." *Tabloid Diplomasi Website*, 27th February 2015, <http://www.tabloiddiplomasi.org/current-issue/207-diplomasi-januari-2015/1824-ri-dorong-rekonsiliasi-konflik-di-wilayah-rakhine-melalui-pendekatan-kemanusiaan.html>

⁵⁸ Bagus Subekti Nuswanto, "Sikap Negara ASEAN Terhadap Pengungsi Rohingya Studi Komparatif Kebijakan Indonesia Dan Thailand 2015" (University of Gadjah Mada, 2015), 61.

⁵⁹ Gilang Gumilar Eka (Political Staff at Bureau of Minister), Interview with the Author, September 20th 2014.

that until July 2012, approximately 400 Rohingya people were in Indonesia.⁶⁰ In most cases, the Rohingya migrants were found floating in boats on seas within Indonesian water territory. They were housed in several regions in Indonesia such as Aceh, Medan, Tanjung Pinang, Batam (Riau Islands), Kupang East Nusa Tenggara.

Table 4.6. List of Humanitarian Aids coordinated through Government of Indonesia as of 1st January 2013

No	Organizations	Assistance	
		Cash	Non-Cash
1	Indonesian Embassy	US\$ 5000	
2	Palang Merah Indonesia		7.210 kg Emergency Aids (3000 blankets, 10000 sarongs, and 500 hygiene kits)
			50000 sarongs, 2000 mosquito nets, 2000 water bottle (20 liter) and 100 kg standard medicines
			40 hand water pumps, 20 public toilets, 12 water tanks, and a water carrier vehicle
			100 ton of rices
		US\$ 44000	
		US\$ 25000	Ambulance Car
3	PKPU (Lembaga Kemanusiaan Nasional, Dompot Duafa, dan Rumah Zakat)	US\$ 200000	21 shelters, 33 public toilets, 23 units of water pump, and 90000 of burning woods
		US\$ 100000	Foods
4	Aksi Cepat Tanggap (ACT)	US\$ 35000	Food
		US\$ 50000	10 units of shelters
5	Badan Amil Zakat	US\$ 20000	
6	MER-C	US\$ 3500	Medical supplies

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013

In light of that, Indonesia until now is not among the countries that ratified the 1951 Vienna Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Protocol in 1967. Therefore, Indonesia has not had a clear national regulation with regard to the status of refugees, and does not have legal obligation and authority to deal with Rohingya migrants entering Indonesia. However, as said by Minister Marty, as country with majority Muslim population, Indonesia would not send back the refugees the country of origin.

⁶⁰ This estimate was according to Ministry of Foreign Affairs after coordination with several stakeholders in June 2012

But rather, Indonesia would provide safe place for them and coordinated with UNHCR for further process until they are granted the refugee status.⁶¹

Palestine

Fourth, the Palestine cause remains at the apex of *Ummah* problem. In this regard, Indonesia consistently views that the Palestine issue is a clear manifestation of colonialism in the modern world. Palestinian people have an integral right to be independent, and consequently rule the government freely without interference from any other countries. Indonesia's struggle to help Palestine was based on Indonesia's 1945 Constitution that said that independence is right for all nations, and that colonialism should be abolished in this world.

Indonesia has been fought for Palestine's independence at various multilateral forums, mainly at the UN, Non-Align Movement, and OIC. At the UN, Indonesia has always been co-sponsor in various UN resolutions on Palestine issue in various UN Committees (e.g. Plenary, Committee 2, Committee 3, and Committee 4). More than 15 resolutions were discussed at the UN.

At the forums on Human Rights in Geneva, Indonesia consistently sponsored and supported resolutions related to Palestine and also initiated the creation of a committee investigating alleged human rights violations by Israel. In early January 2009, for instance, Indonesia sponsored Special Session of Human Right Council to address the military attack of Israel in Gaza, resulting in death of many civilians. The session decided to adopt resolution titled "The Grave Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly due to the recent Israeli military attacks against the Occupied Gaza Strip"

⁶¹ "Warga Rohingya Hadapi Ketidakpastian di Indonesia," VOA Indonesia Website, June 5, 2013, <http://www.voaindonesia.com/content/warga-rohingya-hadapi-ketidakpastian-di-indonesia/1695594.html>

On 31 October 2011, Indonesia also became one of the co-sponsors of the resolution when Palestine sought the full membership at UNESCO. In the vote, 107 countries supported the resolution, 14 countries voted against, 52 voted abstentions, 21 were absent from the voting. UNESCO's decision was criticized by the US, resulting in the US's termination of fund for the UNESCO. As part of Indonesia's commitment to support the cause, Indonesia provided USD 10 million as compensation for such termination.

Moreover, during Palestine's effort to improve its UN membership status in 2012, from "observer" state to "non-member observer state", not only has Indonesia supported the resolution by giving its vote, but also has Indonesia been the co-sponsor of the said resolution.⁶² Indonesia viewed that the improvement of Palestine's status was considered as the indicator of global community towards further settlement of prolonged problem of Palestine. A total of 138 UN Member States supported the draft resolution, 9 Member States rejected and 41 countries voted to be abstain. During the vote, only three countries were represented by high ranking officials (Minister): Indonesia, Turkey, and Canada.

Indonesia also continues to support UNRWA (The United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) in order to alleviate the burden of the Palestinian refugee in the occupied land.⁶³ Indonesia's support was implemented through, besides its support at various UNRWA resolutions, financial commitment. In 2008, Indonesia contributed USD\$ 10,000 and in 2009 to 2011, the amount of these contributions rose to USD \$ 20,000. In the next year, the number contribution increased considerably to USD \$ 100,000 which was paid in February 2012.

⁶² Improving the membership status to be 'non-member observer state' does not require a recommendation from the UN Security Council. The status of 'non-member state' of the UN reinforces the position of Palestine as a state entity and give the Palestinians the rights of the wider, such as the right to become a full member of the UN agencies.

⁶³ UNRWA is one of the UN Agencies, formed in the aftermath of 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict due to the increasing of numbers of Palestine refugees.

At NAM, Indonesia continues to fight for the interests of the Palestine by holding the 50th Anniversary of the movement, in Bali, May 2011. The issue of Palestine dominated the major proportion of the agenda. During the event, Indonesia initiated two special meetings: (1) Ministerial Meeting NAM Committee on Palestine, and (2) Special Segment on Palestine Political Prisoners. The main point of the agreed decision was the Action Plan as proposed by host country, Indonesia, which stressed the commitment from member countries to increase the number of international recognition to the Palestine.

In the next NAM meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, Indonesia again proposed several initiatives, among others: (1) collectively collect data on illegal Israeli actions in Palestine by utilizing various channels, (2) take concrete steps to put an end to Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem (3) increase the number of countries recognizing Palestine as an independent state, and (4) support UNESCO financially after the US's termination of funding to the organization.

Indonesia's commitment was also shown by the plan to establish representative in Palestine. Indonesia recognized Palestine as a state on November 16, 1988 one day (8 hours) after the announcement of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on 15 November 1988 in Alger, Algeria. In October 1989, the two countries signed a joint communiqué establishment of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Palestine by sending their ambassadors respectively. Palestinian Ambassador delivered credentials the first time on 23 April 1990. Indonesia has a resident Ambassador to Palestine in Amman, Jordan. However, Indonesia wanted to elevate this political endeavour.

During the meeting with Minister Riyadh Maliki in December 10, 2010, Minister Natalegawa expressed Indonesia's desire to improve bilateral relations with Palestine through the establishment of "foothold" in Palestine in form of diplomatic or

consular missions in Ramallah, the capital city of Palestine that has been, *de facto*, under Israeli occupation. Indonesia's plan received a very positive response from the Palestine side by exploring the possibility of opening diplomatic missions in Ramallah.⁶⁴

On September 27, 2011, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting, Palestine Ambassador suggested Jerusalem to be the place for the Honorary Consul of the Republic of Indonesia, since the city is under UN administration. However, the stumbling block towards the realization of this initiative has been the absence of Indonesia's diplomatic relations with Israel.

However, the Yudhoyono's novelty in addressing the Palestine issue lies in its change of policy focus from supporting the formal government of Palestine to helping people of Palestine. As the political struggle in the global forums continued to become the focal point of Indonesia's overall policy, the government of Indonesia made a breakthrough strategy by seeking the possibilities of "bottom-up" empowerment called "capacity program for 1000 Palestinians". The idea was to significantly contribute to the welfare of Palestine population regardless the Palestine political status in the world. To this end, the government of Indonesia offered 1.000 scholarships for the Palestinian people, mostly for those employed by the Palestine authority. The achievement was more than what have been pledged. In total, 1257 people have been trained in among others two famous universities in Indonesia, *Gadjah Mada Yogyakarta* and *Bandung Institute of Technology*. The training included 128 programs such technical **skills**,

⁶⁴ Currently the foreign representative to Palestine can be divided into three groups, depending on the level of recognition of the sending state for the Palestinians, as follows: (1) State and Representatives who have Representative Office based in Palestine: that as many as 35 countries and one European Union Representative: South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Austria, The Netherlands, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, India, Ireland, Japan, Germany, Canada, South Korea, Malta, Morocco, Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Cyprus, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Russia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela, Jordan. Of these countries, two (2) countries including Morocco and Tunisia, has no diplomatic relations with Israel. (2) Countries that have Embassies in the countries surrounding the Palestinians an additional accreditation. There are 13 countries namely: Bangladesh (Amman), Dominica (Cairo), the Philippines (Amman), Indonesia (Amman), North Korea (Cairo), Cuba (Cairo), Malawi (Cairo), Mali (Cairo), Pakistan (Amman), New Zealand (Ankara), United Arab Emirates (Amman), Vietnam (Cairo), Zambia (Cairo). (3) The third group are the countries that opened the Consulate General or Consulate in Jerusalem under their embassy in Tel Aviv as many as 10 countries, namely the US, Belgium, England, Italy, France, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the Vatican, and Greece.

economic micro and macro-finance, infrastructure, fire rescue, gender mainstreaming, and archive management.⁶⁵

The two countries, Indonesia and Palestine, have also signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Cooperation for Human Resource Development in Jakarta on October 22, 2007 during the state visit of President Mahmoud Abbas to Indonesia.

With relatively stagnant achievement in the political process of Palestine cause, the government of Indonesia remained proactive in creating new political initiatives to support the Palestine Authority. In 2005, Indonesia, together with South Africa, co-chaired the meeting of Asia Africa Summit that established NAASP (New Asian Africa Strategic Partnership), in which solidarity to Palestine cause is one of the top lists of the agenda. Within this partnership, Technical Coordinating Committee (CTC) on capacity building for Palestinians was established, consisting of Indonesia, Japan and Palestine.

With the full support of House of Representatives, the Indonesian Government has provided a grant worth 20 billion rupiahs or the equivalent of USD 2.6 million in 2012 to establish the "Indonesia Cardiac Center" (ICC) at Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza. The grants are distributed and managed by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

4.3.3. Closer Bilateral Relations with the Middle East

Another significant factor on the increasing sense of Muslim accommodation in Indonesian foreign policy has been the government's decision to strengthen diplomatic rapport between Indonesia and Middle East countries, especially Saudi Arabia, which has been considered as the cradle of Muslim civilization. Indonesia's ties with Saudi Arabia has been formally commenced in 1948 with the establishment of Indonesia's

⁶⁵ *Diplomasi Indonesia 2011* (Jakarta, Indonesia: Direktorat Diplomasi Publik, Kementerian Luar Negeri, 2015), 162.

diplomatic mission in Jeddah, reciprocated with the formal appointment of Saudi Ambassador to Jakarta in 1955. Two countries enjoyed harmonious political relationship, referring to the fact that the Kingdom of Saudi was amongst the first political entity recognized Indonesia as a sovereign state.⁶⁶

However, despite the fact that the each of the two countries are in a reciprocal need, as in the case of migrant workers and religious pilgrimage, Indonesia's relations with the Kingdom has been conducted as business as usual, with general target of increasing political, economic, and cultural relations. It has been rarely found any strategic agreement between the two countries to elevate the status of relations. And if there is a challenge, it will be solved at an ad-hoc basis. The case of Indonesian migrant workers, for instance, has been considered a "routine" problem for the two countries. It was not until 2014 that Saudi and Indonesia have finally signed an agreement to protect the rights of Indonesian domestic workers.

There are some reasons that could explain the absence of further closer bilateral relations. First, Saudi is not a superpower country that has military clout, political bargaining, which have great impact on the world order and dictate the direction of global discourses. Second, close proximity with Saudi, as the icon of Islam, would provide the possible promotion of Wahhabism ideology, which has been considered as fundamental and strict in applying Islamic teachings. There have been some scholars indicating the increasing Saudi religious influence Indonesia, posing the security threat to the wider Southeast Asia region.⁶⁷

However, during Yudhoyono, Minister of Foreign Affairs has put the Middle East region as one of the priorities for Indonesia's strategic importance. In terms of politics, the volatile environment has led to many unintended consequences such as

⁶⁶ "Status Hubungan Bilateral RI - Saudi" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2016).

⁶⁷ See for instance Christina Lin, "ISIS and the Saudi Wahhabi Threat to Asian Security," ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security (Germany, July 2015); Dennis Ignatius, "The Wahhabi Threat to Southeast Asia," *The Malaysian Insider*, March 30, 2015.

increasing terrorism, and rise of numbers of refugee. These circumstances, when left unmanaged, could spill over to other regions beyond the geographical borders. Bilaterally, Indonesia was in need to put its relation with Middle East regions, specifically Saudi, in more order and structured pattern. In this regards, Minister Natalegawa constructed four pillars of Indonesia's bilateral relations with the countries of Middle East: Peaceful Middle East Region, Prosperous Middle East Reagion, Middle-East Region with Home-Grown Democratic Values, and Middle-East Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Free-Zone.⁶⁸

The increasing number of bilateral agreement signed by the two countries during Yudhoyono could explain the increasing importance of Saudi to Indonesia, and Indonesia's attempt to more institutionalize the diplomatic relations. During ten years of Yudhoyono presidency, 6 bilateral agreements have been concluded to include bilateral defense and security cooperation, compared to 11 agreements in 32 years of Soeharto, mainly on social and economic matters.⁶⁹ (See table 4.7.)

Table 4.7. List of Bilateral Agreement concluded between Kingdom of Saudi and Indonesia (2004 – 2014)

No	Agreement	Date of Signing
1	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Domestic Workers	Riyadh, 19-Feb-2014
2	Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Jakarta, 23-Jan-2014
3	Recognition Program on Certificates of Conformity between National Accreditation Body of Indonesia – KAN and Saudi Standards, Metrology and Quality Organization - SASO	Bali, 26-Apr-2012
4	Technical Cooperation Program between the National Standardization Agency of Indonesia (BSN) and the Saudi Standards, Metrology and Quality Organization (SASO)	Bali, 26-Apr-2012
5	Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Makkah al Mulkarramah Charity Trust Establishment-Kingdom	Jakarta, 07-Jan-2009
6	Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Religious affairs of the Republic of Indonesia and the Muslim World League of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Jeddah, 15-Sep-200

⁶⁸ "Status Hubungan Bilateral RI - Saudi."

⁶⁹ Ainur Rifqie Madanie (Political Staff at Directorate of Middle East Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), interview with the author, Yogyakarta, February 12th, 2015.

With the entrance of political Islam into the playing mainstream of domestic politic of Indonesia, there was an increasing demand for the government to redirect its foreign policy towards the Middle East countries by paying considerable attention to establish strategic relations with the Islamic world, particularly Middle East countries. The old critics directed to the previous government is that Indonesia was reluctant to forge closer bilateral relations with Middle East countries, and economic, in certain extent political, advantages. In comparison to its immediate neighbor Malaysia, Indonesia has been lagging behind. In responding to these critics, President Yudhoyono initiated a regional tour to the Middle East by visiting five major countries, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Emirate Arabs, and Jordan in 2006.⁷⁰

The visit was strategic in three interrelated main reasons. First, Indonesia was in need to inflows of capital by expanding the list of investors to include new countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region while maintaining the traditional investor such as Japan and the USA. Second, the countries in the region were in need to invest their capital to the alternative place, especially after the 2001 attack. It is safe to conclude, based on these two reasons, that main impetus was economic rather than Islamic. However, as the third reasons argue that the move was in line with Indonesia's projected international identity of million friend and zero enemy, it is safe as well to opine that the relative positive perception of state towards Islam in Indonesia has made it possible for Yudhoyono administration to seek an alternative places that are strongly related to the Islamic stronghold. Forging closer relations with the MENA countries, politically or economically or both, could mitigate the long perception that Indonesia

⁷⁰ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Foreign Policy, Islam, and Democracy in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 3 (2010), 50 - 51.

created space with those countries, cautious of importing “unwanted political ideologies” to the country.

4.3.4. Partnership with Religious Institutions

Another sign of growing taste of “Islam” in Indonesian foreign policy is the increasing engagement of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a focal point of foreign policy implementation, with religious institutions, especially Islam. The most salient case is the interfaith dialogue. The strategy employed by Yudhoyono was to involve more related institutions, groups, key persons in decision making process and implementation. In this context, interfaith dialogue initiative has been engaging Ministry of Religious Affairs, parliament, Muslim organizations, and Muslim scholars.

As soon as assumed presidency, Yudhoyono issued a Presidential Regulation No. 7/2005 which lay three main national interests and priorities, namely (1) to create peaceful and stable Indonesia, (2) to realize a just and democratic Indonesia, and (3) to achieve national prosperity.⁷¹ Under the first agenda, SBY highlighted the counter terrorism as a prioritized agenda at the national level. The implementation of the national agenda involves different actors within the Government of Indonesia such as BNPT (*Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme* / National Counter Terrorism Body), BIN (*Badan Intelijen Negara* / Indonesian State Intelligence Agency), BAIS (*Badan Intelijen Strategis* / Intelligence Strategic Agency), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Religious Affairs. The first three institutions are dedicated to counter terrorism through building legal framework and intelligence information. While the last two deals more with the soft side of counter terrorism through diplomatic and ideological instruments and to ensure the conformity of national laws with international obligations. In this context, interfaith dialogue program is one of the activities promoted

⁷¹ Bappenas, *Pencapaian Sebuah Perubahan: Evaluasi 4 Tahun Pelaksanaan RPJMN 2004 - 2009* (Jakarta: Bappenas, 2009), vii.

by the two institutions to implement the national agenda as prioritized by Presidential Regulation.

Historically, interfaith dialogue program is relatively an old established practice in Indonesia with Ministry of Religious Affairs serves as the focal point. The concept of dialogue between religions first emerged as a religious discourse in the mid-1950s. Not surprisingly, though, given the demographic nature of Indonesia that consists of various races and religions. Indonesia, according to 1945 Basic Constitution, recognizes five religions, which later revised to six religions. The Discourse of dialogue between different religions began to crystallize in early 1960s, marked by the opening of the Department of Comparative Religion under the Faculty of Islamic Theology (*Ushuluddin*) at the Islamic Institute of Sunan Kalijaga in Jogjakarta. This is an academic embryo to the later development of the religious dialogue in Indonesia. The concept of comparative religions was developed later on by, among others, Mukti Ali, a lecturer graduating from McGill professor who later became Minister of Religious Affairs in 1971. He is well known as a pioneer of interfaith dialogue in Indonesia. He proposed the concept of “Agreement in Disagreement”, a concept that is still used in every discussion between religions in Indonesia. The concept of interfaith becomes increasingly institutionalized with the establishment of the Center for Interreligious Harmony (*Pusat Kerukunan Ummat Beragama*) in Jakarta and Forum for Religious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Ummat Beragama) in various regions in Indonesia under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2000.⁷²

In the New Order era, in the early 1970s, interfaith harmony became an important part of national agenda with motto "*Tri Kerukunan Ummat Beragama*" (three concepts of religious harmony), which contains (1) internal harmony of religious

⁷² Faisal Ismail, "Paving the Way for Interreligious Dialogue, Tolerance, and Harmony: Following Mukti Ali's Path," *Al Jamiah* 50, no. 1 (2012), 164-170.

community, (2) religious harmony among different religious communities, and (3) harmony between religious communities and government. At the societal level, interfaith dialogue activities have been part of agenda of many civil society organizations. For instance, DIAN Interfidei, an institute established in 1991, regarded as an organization that has long voiced the harmony between different believers.

Although the idea of interfaith dialogue has long been part of history of Indonesia, but it is something of novelty in Indonesia's diplomacy. Development in the international politics has put new urgency for Indonesia to entrench interfaith dialogue on the strategic tools of foreign policy. Minister Wirajuda explained that, "international circumstances have encouraged Indonesian diplomacy to involve religious community in their activities and embrace interfaith dialogue as an important agenda in Indonesian diplomacy".⁷³ In line with that, Mr. Andri Hadi, Director General for Information and Public Diplomacy, explained that interfaith dialogue initiative as part of Indonesia's diplomacy begins from 2004. In this case, Indonesia attempts to be the force of dialogue not only for Muslim countries, but also for the global community.⁷⁴

Given the history of interfaith dialogue, and the Indonesian government's plan to make it as an instrument of diplomacy, President Yudhoyono decided to appoint Dr. Maftuh Basyunie as the Minister of Religious Affairs in 2004. He was a career diplomat, served as Ambassador of Indonesia to Saudi Arabia, and a doctoral graduate of the University of Medina. In order to strengthen the program of "Indonesian Islam" projection at the global level, Yudhoyono administration, beginning from 2012, appointed DR. Nasaruddin Umar, a lecturer at Jakarta Islamic University, as the Vice Minister for Religious Affairs, a newly created position during the history of Indonesian administration.

⁷³ Rakhmawati, "Interfaith Dialogue in Indonesian Public Diplomacy: The Role of Department of Foreign Affairs in Interfaith Dialogue," 8.

⁷⁴ Andri Hadi, "Interfaith Dialogue: Dalam Konteks Hubungan Internasional," *Tabloid Diplomasi*, June 2010. (<http://www.tabloiddiplomasi.org/previous-issuue/93-juni-2010/845-interfaith-dialogue-dalam-konteks-hubungan-internasional.html>)

The designation of ex diplomat in the top ranking of Ministry of Religious Affairs, together with the creation of Vice Minister position needs to be understood as part of Yudhoyono's strategy to create synergy between these two institutions. It was intended to make interfaith dialogue, once held at national level, to become international in scale.

The interfaith dialogue program was also supported by the parliament. Through BKSAP (*Badan Kerjasama Antar Parlemen / Committee for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation*), one of the Parliament's permanent bodies, the parliament took active role in promoting Indonesia's agenda on interfaith dialogue in many international forum.

For instance, during the 7th Parliamentary Union of Islamic Countries (PIUC) in Palembang, January 2012, Head of BKSAP, Hidayat Nurwahid, former President of Justice Party, said that BKSAP has actively initiated several resolutions on Islamic concern in various meetings, in which 14 out of 35 total adopted resolutions, were drafted and formulated by Indonesian delegation. On the political matters, besides on the issue of democratization in the region, Indonesian delegation proposed to increase public involvement in combating terrorism through intensification of interfaith dialogue program amongst the member countries.

Civil Society: Religious Organizations

Two biggest Islamic organizations, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*, have been considered as the main partners, with which Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborates. Almost in every international conferences on interfaith dialogue initiated by the Government of Indonesia, these two Islamic organizations are listed as the participants. The moderate Islamic views of held by these organizations have been the main reason for the government to seek close partnership. It has been indicated by Minister Wirajuda when he said: "Secondly, the vast majority of Muslims in Indonesia

are moderate. The fact that we have been living in the existing arrangements—where Islam is not a state religion—is proof in itself. The two biggest Muslim organizations, the *Nahdatul Ulama* and the *Muhammadiyah*, reflect the face of true Islamic traditions of peace, tolerance and harmony.”⁷⁵

The form of collaboration was further strengthened by institutionalizing the partnership. The Chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama* and Minister Wirajuda, on 24th February 2004, agreed to establish the International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), intended to respond global events with Islamic dimension. The conference was inspired by the formation of *Hijaz Committee* in 1926, a small group of Indonesian Islamic scholars with similar purpose: responding to the current global politics. The Committee was considered as an embryo of NU formation.⁷⁶ With Muhammadiyah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported and facilitated the establishment of World Peace Forum in 2006. These two forum share similar purposes and objectives, yet follow different methods.

Since its inception, ICIS has held three international conferences in 2004, 2006, and 2008. The focus of this conference has been to uphold Islam as *rahmatan lilalamin* by conducting scholarly studies, especially on the challenges facing contemporary *ummah*, which will be presented in the conference. According to Hasyim Muzadi, the formation of ICIS was based on the belief that Islam is *rahmatan lil ālamīn*. This basic conception of Islam needs to be channeled through, so that it could help contribute in the process of conflict resolution, at least at discursive level, and contain the widespread stigma of Islam, not only at national level, but at global scale.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Hassan Wirajuda, “The Democratic Response,” *The BrownJournal of World Affairs* IX, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 20.

⁷⁶ Ali Maschan Moesa, *Nasionalisme Kiai: Konstruksi Sosial Berbasis Agama* (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007), 131.

⁷⁷ Hafid Fuad, “Pemikiran Hasyim Muzadi Dalam ICIS (International Conference of Islamic Scholars)” (Universitas Indonesia, 2010), 44-46.

Besides the international conference, ICIS conducted regular meeting with various Islamic organizations around the world on smaller scale. For instance, in 2011, ICIS held meeting with 15 US journalists of International Reporting Project (IRP) to explain the true teaching of Islam from Indonesian perspective. Much of ICIS's effort is allocated to unearth the principles of Islam from theological perspectives. In all events, ICIS consistently used *rahmatan lil ālamīn* as its slogan. Chaired by Hasyim Muzadi, ICIS also appointed Eminent Persons consist of five respected Muslim leaders from Malaysia, Indonesia, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon. During its development, there is a need to develop the organizational structure of ICIS from conference to an established institution.

As part of ICIS agenda, in 2006, with the collaboration and support from the government of Indonesia, KH Hasyim Muzadi, on 25 September 2006, participated in Tripartite Forum on High-Level Conference on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, a UN sponsored forum, in which KH Muzadi delivered his speech under title "A Moderation as the Pillar of a Peaceful and Harmonious Multi-Cultural and Multi-Faith Society: The Indonesian Experience."⁷⁸

World Peace Forum, conducted by Muhammadiyah, is a biennial international forum that focuses on building peace and harmony from practical perspective. To this date, WPF has conducted five international conferences in 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2014. WPF aims at, among other, developing a robust dialogue about various issues concerning identity, multiculturalism, and democracy. In addition, this forum attempts to formulate the embodiment of the concept of One Humanity, One Destiny, One Responsibility as a basic philosophy of multiculturalism.

⁷⁸ "Speech of KH Hasyim Muzadi at the High Level Conference on Interfaith Cooperation for Peace," Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website, 25 September 2006, <http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/pidato/lainnya/Pages/%C3%A2-Moderation-As-The-Pillar-Of-A-Peaceful-And-Harmonious-Multi-Cultural-And-Multi-Faith-Society-The-I.aspx>

The involvement of these two biggest Islamic organizations in the agendas of foreign policy has been symbolically beneficial for Indonesia: to cultivate public support and increase government's leverage by getting informal consensus from prominent and respected Islamic scholars, intellectuals, and leaders at national level. Adding to that, it helped the government to secure Islamic world's recognition of Indonesia as the benevolent Muslim country that project Islam as *Rahmatan Lil Alamin* and promote peace based on sacred religious creeds. It conspicuously helped revive Indonesia's image away from being hub of radical movements and towards a peace loving country.

4.4. Summary of Chapter

The main focus of this chapter is to present some major Yudhoyono's foreign policies, especially those related to the Muslim concerns. It was specifically aimed to argue that there are some changes in terms of both approach and intensity of Indonesian foreign policy compared to the previous administrations. As Indonesia entered the turbulent years following *reformasi* that tarnished Indonesia's reputation at the global level, President Yudhoyono resorted to use foreign policy as his important instrument to restore Indonesia's image. Thus, he has been determined to elevate the status of Indonesian foreign policy to a higher level of activism. In doing so, Yudhoyono needed to use available national assets as a vehicle to be present at the global discussion: an asset that is truly a reflection of Indonesia's character. Two main assets used by the then administration: peaceful democratic transition, and Islam.

Indonesia's both peaceful transition from autocratic rule, and successful convening of democratic election has provided Indonesia with confidence to be actively involved in global discussion. With the jargon of peace-maker, confidence-builder, problem-solver, and bridge-builder, Indonesia attempted to be an integral part of

dynamic international relations. In this case, Indonesia contributed to some of pressing global issues, hosted international meetings, and be part of epicentrum of global political discussion in the Security Council. Indonesia' increasing presence, however, needs to be put in the context of dictum of *bebas aktif*. Thus, it relies heavily on the use of soft power, rather than hard power. It also attempts to be in neutral position by not taking any military pacts and leaning towards particular country.

Consequently, Indonesia needs to be touching the issues that are commonly discussed at the global forum, such as democracy and human rights. In this context, some of initiatives have been formulated by Indonesia's diplomatic machine, such as convening Bali Democracy Forum. In the case of human rights, Indonesia has been not reluctant to be in the discussion. Moreover, Yudhoyono encouraged the institutionalization of human rights effort within ASEAN, and integrated with the human rights regimes.

Yudhoyono's approach towards Islam as manifested in his foreign policy towards the Muslim concerns has been somewhat different from previous administrations. Rather than becoming liability, Islam has been transformed to be an asset. Yudhoyono clearly projected Indonesia's international image, that Indonesia is the Muslim majority country that embrace tolerant and moderate character of Islam. In dealing with other countries, either with majority Muslim population or not, Indonesia has been consistently used this identity, especially in the case of interfaith dialogue. Moreover, Indonesia's international identity has been more salient when dealing with Western countries.

Such identity injected Indonesia's spirit to take some policies in solving some of the pressing challenges faced by contemporary *ummah*. Indonesia has been actively involved in reducing the issue of *Islamophobia*, reducing the internal conflict within the

ummah, minority Muslim, and most importantly, struggle over the independence of Palestine.

Being the country with Muslim majority population compelled Indonesia to be closer with the cradle of Islam, Middle East region. Thus, Yudhoyono reset the “business as usual” approach towards the Middle East. This region needs to be looked as an important partner for Indonesia. Historically, the Middle East countries are the first countries that supported Indonesia’s independence. This region also hosts thousands of Indonesian students. These facts represent the political importance of Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, for Indonesia. In order to restructure Indonesia’s posture in the region, Yudhoyono put four pillars of bilateral relations: Peaceful Region, Prosperous Region, Home-Grown Democratic Values, and Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone. Therefore, in early January 2014, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia signed Defense Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Within this agreement, some crucial issues, such as intelligence

Such international identity has been strengthened and legitimized by Yudhoyono’s decision to engage religious organizations, such as *Nahdatul ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*. The involvement, in both formulation and execution, indicated the broadening foreign policy actors during Yudhoyono’s term. And in doing so, the government was able to cultivate wider political support from at national base, and at the same time increased Indonesia’s credentials in empowering civil society’s role in public policy.

The main critic directed towards the idea of change is the notion of superficiality, in a sense that Yudhoyono’s foreign policy towards Muslim concern is just a lip service, showing no indication on importance of Islam or Muslim in his policy. Superficiality is closely related to the ideational changes, real motivation, and hidden

intention. This question is not easily addressed, especially when dealing with approaching state's policy from state – society dynamics, rather than idiosyncrasy. In spite of that, putting much focus on ideational changes (leader's real intention and motivation) could lead us to miss some pivotal indicators of behavioral change (actual policy) taking place in state's external policy. For the change to be truly observable empirically, what foreign policy authorities uttered should be complemented by actual deeds, and vice versa. What leaders delivered in public speeches in formal audiences could be simply interpreted as lip service, artificial gesture. Therefore, ideas need to be in tandem with deeds. For that, this chapter attempted to present twofold: the ideational aspects of Indonesian foreign policy towards Muslim concern through Yudhoyono's speeches that indicate "lean towards" Muslim and Islam terminologies; and the actual conduct of Indonesian foreign policy as reflected in many Yudhoyono's policies that put high concern on *ummatic* issues and attempted to considerably accommodate Indonesian Muslim aspiration.

However, another essential question to this research remains, relating to the reason for Yudhoyono administration's choice to resort to Islam in projecting Indonesian active foreign policy. This puzzle will be analyzed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM

5.1. Introduction of Chapter

As has been elaborated earlier, Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration has been using “Islamic” identity, and translated into many foreign policies, especially with regard to the Muslim concerns. This dissertation argues that such a change occurred as a consequence of twofold: the increasing importance of Islam in domestic politics in Indonesia, and the increasing level of state’s confidence towards Islam, both of which eventually allow Islamic nuance to be present in Indonesian foreign policy. State has gradually lifted barriers that once blocked the participation of Islam in politics, which consequently lead to the creation of relatively harmonious and positive relations between state and Islam. This process has enabled Islam to make inroads to Indonesian foreign policy, either peacefully in form of state’s voluntary action to incorporate Muslim aspiration into the state policies, or dialectically in form of pressure from Muslim communities to exert their influence.

Such dialectic relations have been a response towards the rise of peaceful political Islam in Indonesian politics. In this regard, there are two interrelated matters. First, with the loosening grip of government towards political participation, Islamist groups, through Islamic political parties, rose to the domestic political scene, and actively participated in the government coalition. Islam transformed into one of the significant political forces that need to be calculated by the ruling government. Considering that foreign policy is one of the tools used by government to either broaden political support, or secure domestic political legitimacy, the presence of “Islamic” taste in foreign policy seemed like a natural choice. Adding to that, substantial change in constitution provided wider political avenue for non-government actors, including

parliament, civil society, to partake actively in the decision making process, very much different from the earlier political environment. Foreign policy making process has been democratized to include and allow the participation of third actors. Foreign policy has not become an elitist, in a sense being dominated by state executives. In this regards, Islam contributed in shaping, though not act as the sole factor, the outcome of foreign policy.

Second, Islam has been present in Indonesian politics, especially after *reformasi*, in the soft format, as indicated by loyalty to *Pancasila* and the abandoning the idea of Islamic state establishment. Despite the fact that there are some Islamist groups still consider the establishment of Islamic state and full implementation of *sharīah* as the ultimate agenda, the majority however have refocused their attention to other substantial and practical issues, relevant to the contemporary political system adopted by Indonesia. This new format of political Islam has removed the obstacles and fear of relations between Islam and state that existed in previous administrations, increased the level of state's confidence towards Islam, and eventually encouraged state to incorporate Islam into Indonesian foreign policy. The use of international identity that relates to Islamic terminologies, among others, indicates such increasing confidence. The overt animosity between state and Islam, which existed in previous administrations, was among others due to the fear towards the Islamist groups' demand to fully implement *sharīah*, challenging *Pancasila*, and rejecting the concept of democracy, provided the government the ample reasons for not allowing Islam to be present in foreign policy, or showing significant gesture of leaning towards it.

This line of argument has been consistent with the concept of "foreign policy begins at home." Some could argue that, the increasing "Islamic presence" in Indonesian foreign policy as indicated by positive responds towards Muslim concerns during Yudhoyono, has been due to the rise of Islamic discourse in the international

relations recently, and especially following the 9/11. However, while this argument holds some true, it could be repudiated by presenting the fact that in early 1980, the discussion within International relations discourse had been occupied by Muslim and Islam themes, as a natural consequence of Iran revolution. But still, Indonesian foreign policy was showing no particular interest in claiming to be the Muslim country as its identity.

Therefore, based on this argument, the reminder of this chapter proceeds to present the rise of peaceful political Islam in Indonesia and its relations to Indonesian foreign policy. First, it will depict how Islam, in forms of political parties, participated substantially and procedurally in the democratic system, secured significant seat in the parliament though do not dominate, and even build coalition with the ruling government. At the social context, Yudhoyono chose to entertain the Islamic social organizations, rather than curbing its development, and put it under government strict censorship. Marshaled together, Islam turned to be significant political player in Indonesian domestic politics, and turned to be the means of pressure towards the government. It will also depict the democratization of foreign policy decision making, which enable such pressure to be calculated seriously by the executives. Some policy cases will also be presented. In order to further explain the argument, two policy cases will be presented, the Nuclear Iran and Rohingya.

Second, it will talk about the moderation of Islamic mobilization and movements from “rigid” platform to softer version of agendas. One of the most significant indicators is the voluntary reception of most Islamic political parties and social organizations to the concept of *Pancasila*, the then burning issue that increase political tension between state and Islam. Such moderation made government voluntarily use Islam as international identity, and bring it to the international agendas,

indicating the increasing level of state's confidence on Islam. This section will be presented in the next chapter.

5.2. Rise of Political Islam in Indonesian Domestic Politics

Reformasi was considered as the hallmark of new era of country transition from authoritarian rule to democratic consolidation. The process of democratization went through fundamental changes of state relations with the society and state power, which involved changes in constitutions, political process, power structure, and state institutions.

Many political observers suggested different explanations on the factors contributed to the fall of Soeharto. Some analysts pointed to the mass movement, including student activities, as the prime cause of political instability in the country, contributing the downfall of Soeharto, while others suggested that political repression and betrayal of military faction in the country led the regime to crumble. Externally, the continuing Asian economic crisis, which influenced the fundamental economy of Indonesia, was considered the prime factor behind the *reformasi* of 1998.¹ Porter, however, was slightly different from those analyses. He argued that Soeharto's decision to court the interests of Muslim community by incorporating them into political system in the late 1990s had enacted the political element of Muslim community. As a consequence, political expectations of Muslim community were high, and political interests were mobilized in the context of widening 'pro-democracy and pro-change' opposition, and consequently leading to the forced resignation of Soeharto. As noted by Porter, between March and May 1998, Muslim students from different universities

¹ There are four hypotheses of framework, interrelated, to explain the fall of Soeharto. First, in-out explanation, that it was Soeharto himself decided to resign (personal). Second, out-in, in which external influences played role in Soeharto's resignation. Third, bottom-up, that Soeharto was forced to leave office due to grass roots increasing demand. Last, top-down explanation that argue that political game at the elite level contributed to Soeharto's decision to terminate his presidential term. See Zainal Abidin Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto* (Jakarta: Pustaka LP3ES, 2003), 6.

established cross-campus networks and initiated massive protest actions against Soeharto.²

Apart from the prime cause of *reformasi*, which is not the focus of this research, Soeharto resorted to the leading figures of Islamic scholars during his final moments of resignation. When Soeharto decided to step down from his presidency, he asked nine prominent Muslim figures, consisting of *Ulamas*, and Islamic scholars, called *Komite Reformasi*³ to accompany him during the process of transfer of power, and to provide advice for the best mechanism to step down from the presidency. In the brief recommendation drafted by *Komite Reformasi*, it is said that four options were proposed for Soeharto to leave the office, including the direct transfer to Vice President BJ Habibie, the option that finally taken by the President. Soeharto's decision to involve those prominent figures was understood as Soeharto's perception on Islam as having significant role in the process of power transition and to deescalate the increasing public discontent.

5.2.1. Removal of Political Obstacles

The departure of Soeharto from the presidency in May 1998 had directed the country to the new path of orientation. The process of liberalization and relaxation on political activities helped Indonesian people to unravel the New Order and put it to the end. It had overturned the political situation and parallel to this, the public euphoria on political activities was almost everywhere. The political relaxation was marked by the abolishment of Law No. 3/1985 that limit the number of political parties, and by the adoption of three important laws that provide the window of opportunity for the creation

² Donald J. Porter, *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 1-4.

³ The Committee consisted of KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (representative of *Nahdlatul Ulama*), KH Ali Yafie (representative of *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*), KH Cholil Baidowi, Malik Fadjar (representative of *Muhammadiyah*), Sumarsono, Nur Cholis Madjid (Muslim scholar), Achmad Bagdja, Muhammad Ainun Najib (Writer on political, and socio-cultural aspects of Islam), and Yusril Iha Mahendra (Law Expert and the chairman of PBB).

of almost limitless political institutions. These laws are Law No. 2/1999 on Political Parties, Law No. 3/1999 on General Election, and Law No. 4/1999 on DPR and MPR, including seat composition in each institutions. The spirit of the abovementioned laws was to lift the political restriction enacted by New Order. Some of important points made in the laws were for instance the freedom of political association, the representation of people in the DPR and MPR, and the establishment of independent commission to hold and oversee the election.⁴

Within only six months, from May to October of 1998, Indonesia witnessed the birth of 181 political parties. In this respect, the mode of relationship between state and Islam took a new beginning as well. More than anything else, the overt animosity or hostility as well as mutual suspicion between Islam and state had been greatly reduced by the introduction of democracy to the country. It also served as the fertilizer to the reemergence of politic of symbolism, legalism and identity, but it was not exclusively to Islam. Evidence of this new pattern was the increasing of political parties with religious platform. Out of 181, it was noted that 45, nearly one third, were identified as Islamic political parties.⁵

However, this number declined, since only 20 Islamic political parties were eligible to participate in 1999 election. Out of 20, only five major Islamic political parties that is still registered in the Commission of General Election up to now, and participated in the election of 2014, namely PPP, PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa / National Awakening Party*), PAN (*Partai Amanat Nasional / National Mandate Party*) PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera / Just and Prosperous Party*), and PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang / Crescent Party*).

⁴ Louay Abdalbaki, "Democratization in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 2 (2008), 158.

⁵ Bachtiar Effendy, "Islam and the State in Indonesian Experience," *Islam and Civilizational Renewal* 2, no. 1 (2010), 131.

PPP, PKS, and PBB are the political parties that explicitly refer Islam as their basis of the organization. PPP, the oldest Islamic political parties, was originally the fusion of four Islamic political parties in 1973: PNU, Parmusi, PSII, and Perti.⁶ PKS was established soon after the collapse of Soeharto, in 1998. It was named *Partai Keadilan*, before it was changed to PKS. The seed of the party was the student movements at the universities under LDK (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus / University Student's Body for Islamic Predication*). PBB, founded in 1998, claimed to be the next generation of *Masjumi*. The party was supported largely by DDII, founded by Muhammad Natsir. The other two parties, PKB and PAN, based their political organizations on *Pancasila*, rather than Islam. They claimed to be pluralist political parties and the membership is open to all Indonesian people regardless their religious belief. However, both parties are still dependent upon Islamic community for their support. The founders of PKB and PAN, AbdurrahmanWahid, and Amin Rais respectively, were ex-chairmen of the two biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, NU and *Muhammadiyah*. Despite their denial to be linked with the two organizations, they derive vote support from the two organizations. Yaakub described these parties as “informal” Islamic political parties.⁷

In general, during the absence of systematic political pressure from the government, the performance of Islamic political parties have been progressing compared to one in previous regimes. Many suggested the weak performance of Islamic political parties since they compared to (1) what has been achieved in 1955 (about 44 percent), long before the marginalization of Islam, and (2) the achievement of nationalist parties, especially PDIP that secured 34 percent of total votes.

⁶ For more on the history of the establishment of the party, see Sudarnoto Hakim A, “The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan: The Political Journey of Islam under Indonesia’s New Order (1973 - 1987)” (McGill University, 1993).

⁷ Ahmad Nizar Yaakub, “Malaysia and Indonesia: A Study of Foreign Policies with Special Reference to Bilateral Relations” (University of Western Australia, 2009), 196.

Fair comparison needs to be presented by looking at Islamic political parties' votes in 1997 (22.43%), 1992 (17.01%), 1987 (15.97 %), 1982 (27.78%), and 1977 (29.29%). In the 1999 election, for instance, the vote of five Islamic political parties combined was 33.7 percent, above all percentage achieved during New Order.⁸ In 2004 election, they were able to increase the vote but felt considerably in the next 2009 election. Some analysts relate the phenomenon with the decline of political Islam. However, as will be elaborated in the end of this chapter, the decreasing quantity of seats doesn't necessary mean its decline.

Table 5.1. Results of the 1999, 2004, and 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Indonesia

No	Party	Seats (1999)	Seats (2004)	Seats (2009)
1	PPP	59	58	38
2	PKB	51	52	28
3	PAN	35	53	46
4	PK*	7	45	57
5	PBB	13	11	-
6	PBR	-	14	-
7	PNU	5	-	-
TOTAL		170 (33.7 %)	233 (42%)	169 (30%)

Source: KPU Website, 2014

* From 2004 onwards, the name PK was changed to PKS

5.2.2. Decreasing Influence of Political Islam?

It is premature to arrive at the conclusion that the weak performance of Islamic political parties in the election indicates the decreasing aspiration of political Islam. In this case, Baswedan opined that many scholars have rarely associated Golkar with Islam, and defined it as secular, nationalist, and pluralistic party, similar to PDIP. However, he further argued that close scrutiny on both the party's response towards Islamic aspiration, and party recruitment and leadership, it was suffice to put Golkar in the secular blocs yet inclusive to Islam-aspired agendas. Ideologically, functionaries within the Golkar saw Pancasila as compatible to Islam, and as such, the main agenda was the development of Muslim society, rather than Islamic state. The political machine of

⁸ Anies Rasyied Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," *Asian Survey* 44, no. 5 (2004), 681.

Golkar, since late 1980s, had been dominated by two important institutions: (1) HMI members, the student organization that closely linked to the ideas of the *Masjumi*, and (2) ICMI, the organizations created by Soeharto as part of political maneuver to attract Muslim community. It was common pattern that HMI activists and ICMI members would enter either Golkar or PPP, and some of them even became the elites within the party, Akbar Tandjung for instance. The 1999 election results have shown that 83% of Golkar members were trained in *pesantren* (Islamic Boarding Schools), and some of them joined HMI.⁹

The influence of political Islam in Indonesia's domestic politics has gradually gained growth. Despite political Islam has been somewhat decreasing in terms of number of seats in central parliament, its substantive influence has been salient in its political move and the product of constitution. Here, two events would be elaborated: *Poros Tengah* (Central Axis) and the *Perda Shari'ah* (*Shari'ah*-based bylaws).

Poros Tengah

The idea of *Poros Tengah* (Central Axis) was originally drawn by DR. Bambang Sudibyo, Head of Economic Affairs of PAN during the regular discussion in the PAN Headquarter. It was further explored by Amin Rais and other leaders of Islamic parties such as Hamzah Haz, Zarkasih Nur, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, Hatta Rajasa in late July 1999. Through several meetings, they agreed to form Central Axis consisting of PPP (58 seats), PKB (51 seats), PAN (34 seats), PBB (13 seats), PK (7 seats), PNU (5 seats), PKU and PSII (one seat each) in parliament and promoted Abdurrahmad Wahid's candidacy for the next President. The emergence of Central Axis

⁹ In making his case, Baswedan made comparison between Golkar and PDIP. The former was called secular-inclusive, while the latter as secular-exclusive. PDIP was ideologically unwelcome to idea of Islam within the concept of nation-state. In addition to that, the membership of PDIP was largely made up of National Student Movement of Indonesia (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, GMNI), closely linked to PNI. In 1973, PNI was merged with other nationalist, secular, and Christian parties to form PDI. Baswedan, "Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and Future Trajectory," 676.

was motivated by the deadlock of discussion in General Session of MPR in 1999, where two big powers, PDIP and Golkar, each nominated for presidential candidate. Due to the absence of single majority in the DPR, either PDIP or Golkar could not formally name the candidate without support from Islamic parties. Here lied the significance and bargaining power of central axis. Adding to that, the candidates proposed by PDIP and Golkar were politically calculated not acceptable to the wider public. Megawati, proposed by PDIP, received strong rejection mainly from Islamic community for gender reason, while Habibie, proposed by Golkar, were considered part of New Order.¹⁰ Adding to that, as explained by Amin Rais, the emergence of Central Axis was also motivated by the fact that PDI-Perjuangan, the winner of 1999 election with more than 33% of total vote, was dominated by Christian elites. Amin wanted Muslim nominee for the President considering the demographic composition of Indonesia.¹¹

Perda *Sharī'ah*

In some of Indonesian provinces, local governments have been deliberately formulated *Perda Sharī'ah* (*Sharī'ah* -based bylaws) and adopted it as local district regulations. Those areas are, for instance, Pamekasan Madura (East Java), Maros, Sinjai, Bulukamba, Gowa (South Sulawesi), Cianjur, garut, Tasikmalaya, Indramayu (West Java), Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan), Padang (West Sumatra), and Aceh. The policy of greater *Otonomi Daerah* (regional autonomy) has provided the district administrators to implement regionally-based legislation linked to religious teachings. Interestingly, the increasing number of *Perda Syariah* in regional districts concurs with the rejection of the formalization of Islamic law at the national level. The *Perda Syariah* implemented in those districts can be categorized into three main themes: First, public

¹⁰ Amir, *Peta Islam Politik Pasca-Soeharto*, 249-265.

¹¹ Amin Rais referred to the fact that PDI-P appointed more than 40% of its parliament members from Christian, while majority of PDI-P voters, eventhough mainly from *abangan*, were Muslims. In 1999 election, the parliament members were appointed by the party rather than directly elected by voters.

order and social problems such as prostitution, gambling, and alcohol consumption; Second, religious skills and obligations such as reading the Quran, and paying zakat; Third, religious symbolism such as wearing Muslim clothing. According to Bush, up to 2007, it has been noted about 78 *Perda Syariah* has been adopted in 52 districts and municipalities.¹²

The *Perda Sharī'ah* created rejection at the parliament. In June 2006, led by Constant Ponggawa from Christian-based Party of PDS (*Partai Damai Sejahtera / Prosperous Peace Party*), 56 parliament member submitted a petition to President Yudhoyono, requesting him to scrap the *Perda Sharī'ah* through Presidential Decree. The petition argued that the *Perda Sharī'ah* implementation were unconstitutional, not in line with the spirit of *Pancasila*, and could lead to national disintegration. Law experts such as Ryaas Rasyid, and Denny Indrayana were among those who opposed the regulation.¹³

However, this petition was countered by 134 parliament members by submitting formal objection. The support for *Perda Sharī'ah* was led by heads of Islamic faction in the Parliament from PPP, PAN, and PKS. They argued that the implementation was formally accepted since it was passed by DPRD (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – Regional Legislatives*), and substantially effective means in curbing gambling, alcoholism, and prostitution. Adding to that, Islam could serve as source of law, and its position is equal to Roman Law and Common Law, the two sources of law commonly referred in Indonesia legal system.

The debate, which ended with “agree in disagreement” was significant for a number of reasons. First, it was indicative to the emergence of public discourse on the issue of Nationalist vs Islamist, though not necessarily interpreted as the increasing of

¹² Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?,” in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 176.

¹³ “Legislators Take Stand against Sharia Laws,” *The Jakarta Post*, 14 June 2004, 2; “Govt Told to Act Fast against Sharia Laws,” *The Jakarta Post*, 16 June 2006, 2.

radicalism or fundamentalism of Islam but rather as the increasing consciousness from political elites to express the Islamic identity in public spaces. Second, closer look at *Perda Sharī'ah* will reveal that most of Governors and Mayors who stipulated the regulation are from nationalist party such as Golkar. It means that the drawing the strict line between nationalist and Islam could no longer possible. What is obvious from the previous debate that Islam as a factor of influence embedded in the Indonesian political system could no longer be overlooked.¹⁴

5.2.3. Involvement of Islam in the Political System

During the presidency of Yudhoyono, Islam has found its place in the public sphere, not only political, but also economic, and socio-cultural. Yudhoyono decided to not intervene in Muslim community's mounting demand to articulate their Islamic identity within public institutions. At the political level, Islamic parties have been seen as the decisive partner in the Yudhoyono administration. Williams argued that the ability of Yudhoyono to achieve national stability during years of transition was due to, in part, his appeal to Islamic forces which tend to rise.¹⁵

Islamic political parties continued to play significant role in the formal domestic politics as demonstrated in the presidential election of 2004 and 2009. During the ten-year of SBY presidency, Islamic political parties became part of the government, and formed the substantial support for the ruling coalition in the parliament.

¹⁴ Latest survey conducted by Pew Research Center, a US-based research center revealed that more than 70% of Indonesian Muslim in favor of *Syaria* Law. The survey that included 1880 respondents from 19 districts caused stir among Indonesian people. Many scholars, including Azyumardi Azra, questioned the consistency of survey method and casted the motive behind the release. However, the survey needs to be understood from wider perspective. *Syariah* doesn't indicate the sign of society's approval for strict legal system. Rather, *Syariah* could carry general meaning to the society, including justice and fairness. Literally, *Syariah* means way or path, but contemporary use has been identical to Islamic law. This survey needs to be read with this caveat. Interesting note to this survey is that the growing awareness among society about Islamic expression in public life. For the survey result, see James Bell, "The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society," Religion and Public Life (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, April 2013). For the public comment see "Seven in 10 Indonesian Muslims Want Sharia Law: Pew Study," *The Jakarta Post*, 2 May 2013, 2.

¹⁵ Mark S Williams, "Yudhoyono's Third Way: Muslim Democracy, National Stability, End Economic Development in Indonesia," in *Indonesia's Ascent: Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order*, ed. Christopher B. Roberts, Ahmad Habir, and Leonard C. Sebastian (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 69-70.

In the first presidential election of 2004, there were five pairs of candidate.¹⁶ PDIP and Golkar, being confident about the result of election, put forward their candidates without developing political coalition. Each submitted Megawati and Wiranto respectively. SBY, in order to run for presidency, needed support from other political parties and together form the coalition. *Partai Demokrat* (PD, Democratic Party) only secured 7.46% of total vote, claiming 55 seats in the DPR. His running mate, Jusuf Kalla, was not fully backed up by Golkar since the party had appointed Wiranto as the presidential candidate. The pair then relied on small party such as PBB (2.62 percent). PAN and PKS named Amien Rais as the candidate, while PKB supported Abdurrahman Wahid (though failed in health test of Election Committee). As was widely expected, SBY won the first round of election with 33.6 percent, and Megawati placed the second with 26.2 percent.¹⁷


In the runoff election, each eligible candidate formed coalition. Megawati, together with Golkar, PPP, and PDS developed alliances called *Koalisi Kebangsaan* (Nationhood Coalition). SBY, leading in many polls conducted by surveys, worked to strengthen the political base by explicitly inviting Islamic political parties in the coalition called *Koalisi Kerakyatan* (People's Coalition), which PKS and PBB formally joined. Two other parties - PAN, and PKB - despite announcing their neutral position, were seem to lean towards SBY. Their political position became clearer in the DPR by aligning with the *Koalisi Kerakyatan*. The result of election was that SBY won the popularity by landslide with 60.62 percent of total votes. SBY's teaming up with Islamic political parties was further strengthened in the DPR, helped the ruling government to administer the country with full support from the parliament. With totaling of 288 seats after PPP, PKB, and PAN entered the coalition, *Koalisi*

¹⁶ The five pairs of candidate were: (1) Wiranto – Solahuddin Wahid; (2) Megawati – Hasyim Muzadi; (3) Amien Rais – Siswono; (4) SBY – Jusuf Kalla; (5) Hamzah Haz – Agum Gumelar.

¹⁷ "The Carter Center 2004 Indonesian Election Report," Special Report Series (The Carter Center, 2005), <https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2161.pdf>, 50-59.

Kerakyatan commanded a legislative majority and controlled key legislative positions, whereas *Koalisi Kebangsaan* had only 262 seats. The Golkar's shifted position after the appointment of Jusuf Kalla as the chairman of the party further bolstered SBY's power.¹⁸ (See figure 5.2.)


Figure 5.2. Distribution of parliamentary seats according to Opposition – Ruling Parties



Source: Author, 2015

Within the *Koalisi Kerakyatan*, the totaling seat of Islamic political parties (219 seats) in the parliament was more than nationalist parties (183 seats), meaning that coalition relied on the substantial vote of Islamic parties' constituents. (See figure 5.3.).

Figure 5.3. Distribution of Parties within the *Koalisi Kerakyatan*



Source: Author, 2015

¹⁸ Ibid, 61-68.

The pattern of coalition in 2009 election was slightly different from 2004 except for the support of Islamic political parties. The result of 2009 legislative election had surprised many since *Partai Demokrat* (PD), Yudhoyono's political vehicle to enter the election, secured more than 20 percent, leaving Golkar (14.4 percent) and PDIP (14 percent), two relatively experienced parties, in the second and third position respectively. The PD's achievement presented Yudhoyono more options to pick up the running mate for presidential candidate, whom he chose Budiono, a non-party professional figure. The coalition building in 2009 was easier since the communication had been intensive in the past five years of governance. Chairmen of PKS, PAN, PKB announced their allegiance to SBY in the coalition. PPP, which was divided into two factions, eventually voted for SBY. There was only one round of presidential election in 2009 since SBY – Budiono successfully won the landslide victory, more than 60 percent of total vote.

As in the case of 2004, the teamwork of coalition continued in the parliament. Despite winning 20 percent of DPR seats, PD was in weak position without proper political communication with other parties. Therefore, Yudhoyono and the chairman of political parties in coalition agreed to establish *Setgab Parpol Koalisi* (*Sekretariat Gabungan Partai Politik Koalisi* /Joint Secretariat of Coalition of Political Parties), and signed "agreement of coalition" consisted of eight points on the rule of game and code of ethics within the coalition. As part of "informal" agreement, several ministerial positions were allocated for Islamic political parties: four ministerial positions for PKS, three positions for PAN, two positions for PKB, and one for PPP. Without support of parliament, the government would face tremendous obstacles in passing the decisions as obvious in the case of bailout of Bank Century, and cutting the fuel subsidy, in which some parties were in opposition towards the government's position. These two cases absorbed much of government's attention. In the first case, for instance, PKS and

Golkar in 2009 questioned the government's authorization to pour financial support for Bank Century. This thorny issue was considered a major blow for the government since the DPR seemingly intended to convene impeachment hearings. In the case of cutting subsidy, as the DPR was not fully in favor of the policy, SBY decided to delay the policy.

Therefore, Yudhoyono's first political move after winning the 2004 election and 2009 was political consolidation with the political parties in the DPR. It became his political *fatsoen*, regardless his landslide victory claiming more than 60 percent of total votes in the 2004 and 2009 election respectively. In his first presidential statement on October 20th, 2004 before the MPR, Yudhoyono made clear that his priority is the unity of the country, very much like what Soeharto prioritized when assumed presidency. He named his new cabinet as *Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu* (United Indonesia Cabinet) within two consecutive terms. In order to continue his predecessors in consolidating the democracy that has become the ground for the nationhood and statecraft, Yudhoyono said, "My administration will do our utmost to establish clean and good governance, which is responsive towards the public's needs and aspirations."¹⁹

The approach, however, is different from Soeharto's. Rather than eliminating the opposing voices, President Yudhoyono chose to involve different groups and accommodate various opinions -- a political move that later on being criticized by many. Soempono, for example, called the President as "*terlalu banyak pertimbangan*" (too much consideration/timid) in crafting public policy.²⁰

Power-sharing arrangements, therefore, have been the main tenor of Yudhoyono administration. Sebastian explained that Yudhoyono administration had been forced to subscribe to such arrangement since the results of the April 5th, 2004

¹⁹ "Speech By President Of The Republic Of Indonesia At The State Palace," National Library Website, 20 October 2004, <http://sby.kepustakaan-presiden.pnri.go.id/index.php/pidato/2004/10/20/258.html>

²⁰ Femi Adi Soempeno, *Indonesia Memilih*, Cetakan 1 (Baciro, Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2009), 81.

general election have been indecisive, and there was no dominating party.²¹ Such political coalition, however, rather than being a permanent, it was a loose alliance, guided by common un-binding principals. It means there is no absolute control over the coalition. Political management on the coalition became the necessary ingredient of the Yudhoyono administration. On the issue of increasing fuel price, for example, PKS party, despite its position as the coalition member of government, echoed its disagreement on the government's decision. With regard to foreign policy, PBB, together with PKS, objected the government's reluctance to formally recognize the newly independent Kosovo.

All in all, in both elections, from political calculation, the above explanation presented the case that despite the fact that Indonesia adopted presidential system of government, the reliance on other political parties, in this case Islamic political parties, constituted major consideration in successfully running the country. For President Yudhoyono, winning the presidential election should be paralleled with winning the majority in parliament in order to deliver without major parliamentary obstacles.

5.3. Parliament: Check and Balances System

Interestingly, the increased participation of Islamic political parties through political channels was paralleled with the broadened mandate given to the parliament, enabling Islam to possibly interact in the process and shape the contour of Indonesian foreign policy.

The process has been different from previous arrangement. The personality of leaders had influenced much on what foreign policy would be issued. Soekarno's decision to "*Ganyang Malaysia*", and the Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations on January 20th, 1965 despite persistent dissent from military provides clear

²¹ Leonard C Sebastian, "The Paradox of Indonesian Democracy," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 26, no. 2 (August 2004), 256.

example of how significant the leader's influence on foreign policy decisions. Despite consistent pressure and dissent from Muslim community to the Soekarnos' leaning towards Communist Party, the new world axis consisting of countries that were cons to the western countries, namely "The Jakarta – Phnom Penh – Hanoi – Beijing – Pyongyang axis" was created and announced.

Prior to the Act No. 24/2000 on the International Treaties, the authority to make international agreements was defined in the Article 11 of the 1945 Constitution. It is stated that the President has the authority to conclude treaties with the approval of the House of Representatives. The Article No. 11 of 1945 Constitution, however, requires a further explanation of how the treaty can be approved, applied and become a law in Indonesia. For that, Soekarno wrote Presidential Letter No. 2826 / HK / 1960, dated 22 August, 1960 (attached), which stated that the President has the mandate to interpret what type of agreements need to be consulted to the Parliament. This Presidential letter has been the regulating guide in the process of ratification of the treaty for many years to come ever since. The ratification of the treaty, according to the President's letter, can be done through legislation or presidential decree, depending on the materials and substance delivered in the international treaties. At the practical level, however, the President's Letter has provided the executive with extra authority.²²

During the Soeharto administration, the case is almost the same. The sole decisive power of foreign policy lies in the top of executive arms. Anwar said:

"Throughout the New Order period, most strategic decisions were made by the executive dominated by President Suharto at the top supported by the military-bureaucratic elites. No other power centres existed, and while the House of Representatives (DPR) had the sole power to ratify treaties and was supposed to be consulted on major policies, the DPR for the most part acted as a rubber stamp for the government".²³

²² Lita Arijati et al., "Kemungkinan Perjanjian Internasional Di 'Judicial Review' kan," *Jurnal Konstitusi* 3, no. 1 (2006), 183.

²³ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "The Impact of Domestic and Asian Regional Changes on Indonesian Foreign Policy," *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2010, 128.

The strict censorship on media, with the tame DPR, complicated the situation, making the issue of foreign policy “inaccessible” and insulated from the grass-root levels and the actors outside the government. In addition to that, as Suryadinata argued that foreign policy making process was delegated to the military and smaller share to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which the military overshadowed the function of Ministry in formulating and implementing foreign policy.²⁴

President Suharto managed to control the People’s Assembly by establishing three-lane of the power consisting of ABRI (military) – Golkar (Party) – KORPRI (Civil Servants Corps). These three powers within the Assembly were under the direct rule of Soeharto. He was the Commander Supreme of Armed Forces, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Golkar, and Head of Government. Thus, although the President should be held accountable before the Assembly, essentially however, Soeharto was in control of later. With such political infrastructure, Soeharto indeed successfully cemented his power for over 30 years and managed to deliver progress during his presidency and create “effective” government. Simultaneously, however, the Assembly has lost its essential power in monitoring the course of government. The check and balances mechanism were almost absent during those years.

The idea that Soeharto was the “sole” architect of Indonesian foreign policy was put forward by many political scholars. As stated by Emerson, almost every single critical decision, domestic or foreign issues, in the New Order history was made by Soeharto himself.²⁵ As explained by Yudi Latif, techno-bureaucratic model, one that cut the long process of bargaining and arguing among various political institutions and interest groups, had dominated the policy making process. This was due to government imposition of political mechanism and infrastructure.²⁶ As argued by MacIntyre, the

²⁴ Suryadinata, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership*, 45 - 46.

²⁵ Emmerson, *Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition*, 47.

²⁶ Yudi Latif, *Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 336.

policy making process in time of Soeharto was heavily state-centered, with the constrained role of extra-state actors in (foreign) policy formulation. The regime applied inclusionary strategy by partially accommodating community participation in the process dominated by the state, and exclusionary one by stipulating political repression to deny the role of society in wider political community.²⁷

One of significant achievements after *reformasi* was the amendment of the constitution. During 1999 – 2002, the 1945 Constitution had been amended four times.²⁸ The task mandated to the MPR was to amend the 1945 Constitution with two main principles: enhanced participation of public and limiting the arbitrary power of executive and military. It was a consensus that the changes would be only on the body of constitution, not on its highly historic preamble, and that the presidential system of government will remain the only option.

The amendment provided the parliament with the immunity to the Government's intervention. The amendment of 1945 constitution was mainly to create a "balance of power" within the three branches of nation-state (Executive, Legislative, and Judicative) by enhancing the constitutional role of DPR, limiting the power of executive, creating constructive interaction between government and DPR. These amendments will have significant influence on the further interaction between Government and parliament in formulating and implementing public policies.

²⁷ Anak Agung Banyu Perwita, "Islam's 'Symbolic Politics' in Indonesia," *An International Journal of Philosophy and Religion* 22, no. 3 (2006), 756.

²⁸ The first amendment was made in the 19th of October, 1999. Nine articles had been changed. The dominant goal of the first amendment was to limit the presidential power by: (1) reducing the power of President's co-legislative to only submit the bill to the DPR. The approval to the bill is subject to DPR, (2) reducing the presidential term of office to just two non-renewable five-year terms, (3) limiting the President's authority in providing clemency, in which President should consult to relevant bodies such as DPR, Mahkamah Agung/MA (Supreme Court), and Kejaksaan Agung (Attorney General). These particular changes have broadened the power of legislative, transforming the unique mode of presidential mode of government, enabling legislative to have constraining and determinative voice. Twenty four articles were amended in MPR's meeting on 18th August, 2000. The new constitution in this phase provided broader authority for DPR in terms of checks and balances. Particularly in the article 20A, three main functions were granted to DPR namely legislation, budgeting, and oversight. This new article has provided the DPR with political tool to "interrogate" the government's policy. The focus of third amendment, held on 9th of November, 2001, was on building institutional architecture for the presidency such as the Presidential direct election, and the constitutional grounds to impeach President. In this third amendment, the President's power to dissolve the DPR was negated. This article was inspired by the chaotic situation after President Abdurrahman Wahid issued the Presidential Decree on June, 2001 to dissolve the DPR. The fourth amendment's focus was on establishing new mechanism of MPR membership. It consists of DPR members and DPD members. Therefore, the military and police representatives were removed in the MPR membership. This new article is in line with the new spirit of "Kembali Ke Barak" (Military backs to barrack), to avoid further involvement of military in the domestic politics. This amendment would have political impact on foreign policy, as many retired military officers, who assumed strategic position in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will be no longer possible.

With regard to foreign policy, the intervention of parliament could be implemented into three particular contexts. First, parliament could be playing role through legislative rights, especially with regard to ratification of some international treaties and agreement. For instance, when Indonesia and Singapore concluded Treaty for the Extradition of Fugitives in 2007, the Indonesian parliament refused to ratify it since the treaty came with another agreement, which was Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA). Parliament saw that DCA had not served Indonesia's national interests, and only benefited Singapore.

Third, it could also play in broader political role through approval of budget, post agenda meeting, and other regular meetings. For instance, the First Commission of Indonesian Parliament in its meeting with the government on September 17th, 2014, appreciated the achievements made by the diplomatic mission of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this regard, the Commission supported the additional budget for the ministry especially in the field of public diplomacy, in which Interfaith Dialogue and Soft Power activities are handled and developed. (See Appendix F) When the SBY administration attempted to cut all ministerial budgets in return for stopping fuel subsidies, the parliament rejected if the Minister for Foreign Affairs's budget were to be included in the list since the cutting would impair the ability of Ministry to implement eight areas of priority in diplomacy, in which interfaith dialogue was among the list.²⁹ In the working meeting on 21 September 2006, the First Commission appreciated the initiative taken by the MOFA to involve all elements of nation in the diplomacy called total diplomacy. (See Appendix G) Member of First Commission within the Parliament, Tantowi Yahya,

²⁹ When DR Marty Natalegawa assumed the position of Minister, he laid down eight priority for diplomacy: (1) Economic diplomacy, (2) Solution for the Middle East, (3) Interfaith Dialogue, (4) Green Energy, (5) Global Economic Cooperation, (6) Global Health, (7) Climate Change, and (8) Healthy Bilateral Cooperation. See "Delapan Misi dan Empat Peran Khusus Diplomat Indonesia," *Tabloid Diplomasi*, 2010, 13.

supported the project of interfaith dialogue taken by the SBY administration and hope to be held on regular basis with the partnering countries around the globe.³⁰

Third, it could exercise the rights of control through several means such as right of inquiry and petition. In this case, the case of Nuclear Iran could provide vivid example. The case, together with the case of Rohingya, will be elaborated in this chapter.

5.4. Case in a Point: Nuclear Iran and Rohingya

5.4.1. Nuclear Iran

Nuclear Iran issue provides clear example of the influence of political Islam in shaping Indonesian foreign policy. Soon after its election as non-permanent member of Security Council, Indonesia has been involved in several major decisions in addressing the common security issue, including the nuclear Iran program. It has been noted that, in responding towards the Iran's uranium enrichment operation, the UN had issued four rounds of sanctions, adopted in five UNSC resolutions. The first resolution (no 1696) was adopted in July 2006 at 5500th meeting, calling on Iran to comply with the terms stipulated in Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The resolution was motivated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report in February and April 2006, noting that IAEA was unable to conclude the nature of nuclear program in Iran.³¹

Following that, Iran's failure to show necessary compliance towards the resolution made way for the UNSC to impose the first round of sanction towards the Islamic country. Late December 2006, the resolution 1737 was adopted unanimously by all Security Council state members. There were two main elements within the resolution; first, calling on every states to block the export and import of "sensitive

³⁰ Tantowi Yahya, "Mengemas Interfaith Dialogue Dalam Diplomasi," *Tabloid Diplomasi*, 2010, 18.

³¹ "Resolution 1696 (2006)" (United Nations Security Council, July 31, 2006).

nuclear materials and equipment; second, freezing the assets of persons and entities that involved in the nuclear activities.³²

Unfortunately, as Iran resumed her non-cooperative behavior and continued to fail in meeting the requirements of the IAEA board of governors, the Council further drafted new tougher resolution aimed at further tightening the level of punishment and widening the scope of sanction. In resolution 1747 adopted on March 24, 2007, the Security Council called upon all states to halt arm sale with Iran and to restrain from granting any financial support and loans for Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes. The Council also demanded Iran to comply with the resolution within 60 days after being adopted.³³ Within this particular resolution, Indonesia participated in formulating the final document of resolution. The resolution was adopted unanimously, as all 15 member of Security Council, including Indonesia voted for the resolution.

According to government explanation, Indonesia's main position was to support any nuclear program pursued by any states, including Iran, as long as for peaceful purposes. At the same time, however, Indonesia believed that Iran had not met yet the standard requirement of transparency laid out by IAEA. Iran had not cooperated fully with the atomic agency to grant it flexible room to supervise the progress of nuclear program. Therefore, Indonesia saw it was a matter of urgency to push Iran towards compliant behavior, and it was done through imposing economic sanctions.

Indonesia's decision to vote for the resolution that added weight of sanction to the Islamic Republic of Iran was received with great disappointment among Muslim community. Two biggest Muslim organizations, *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdlatul Ulama*,

³² "Resolution 1737 (2006)" (United Nations Security Council, December 23, 2006).

³³ "Resolution 1747 (2007)" (United Nations Security Council, March 24, 2007).

shared the same view on the matter. Other Islamic organizations joined as well the public choir, criticizing the Yudhoyono administration.

The rejection of Muslim community towards the resolution and government's decision to support it, in a nutshell, could be summarized into several points. First, the position of Indonesia as non-permanent member had been regarded as political representation of Muslim majority country and Asian interest within the Security Council. Therefore, such strategic position should be translated vividly within the decision taken by Indonesia. Second, the widening sanctions against the Islamic republic of Iran were considered the main agenda of major powers, especially the United States. The Indonesian public mood was not in favor of the US after its invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq. It was felt that UNSC resolution was part of strategic agenda to put US troops in the Iran territory, like what happened in Afghanistan. Third, the resolution was seen as violation towards the long held doctrine of *Bebas Aktif*. In this regards, Indonesian diplomatic machine was considered unable to resist the major power's pressure to support the resolution. Last, the absence of prior consultation to the public had contributed to the political reverberation at home, especially in deciding those policies that were considered sensitive for the common public emotion.³⁴

The national survey conducted by Research and Development of Kompas Newspaper succinctly revealed the public mood towards the resolution 1747. The survey mapped that more than half of the respondents, about 50.4 percent, disagreed with the Indonesia's diplomatic decision to vote for, while 43.9 percent expressed their agreement. The survey also specified that the opponents were mostly (1) voters of Islamic political parties (PKS, PKB, and PAN), and nationalist parties (PD and Golkar) (2) Muslims. In terms of policy choices, most of the respondents believed that the

³⁴ Another example of sensitive issue for Indonesian public is the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel. The idea of diplomatic opening was put forward by President Abdurrahman Wahid. It was rejected by most of Muslim communities and political parties, arguing that such a policy would violate the Indonesian basic constitution. In that case, it could lead to the impeachment of a person from presidency.

Yudhoyono administration had in fact other alternative policy choices other than supporting the resolution. About 33.2 percent preferred that Indonesia should abstain from the voting, and 26.7 percent supported Indonesia to vote against the resolution. Adding to that, according to the survey, most of respondents opined that Indonesia's support was due to lack of diplomatic capabilities in dealing with major powers. About 67.2 percent expressed their opinion that Indonesia's diplomatic clout was weak and unable to position itself with equal footing with other countries.³⁵

Toto Suryaningtyas further argued that the resolution on Iran and Indonesia's policy were responded seriously by domestic public due to, among others, religious sensitivity, in which the resolution was deemed as part of clash of civilization. As history puts it, UN resolution could be one step before any military intervention occurred like what happened in Afghanistan.³⁶

At the political level, the pressure was more intense. Soon after the resolution was adopted, many political elites, especially from Islamic Political Parties voiced their dissatisfaction towards the decision. The disappointment over government's decision came also from nationalist elite party. Permadi, from PDIP, questioned the valid information behind Indonesia's vote for imposing more sanction to Iran. He asked whether the information that Iran did develop nuclear program for military purposes and not for peaceful purposes came from internal findings or just came from US information. He further compared to what happened few years ago, when the Bush Administration used invalid information [that Saddam possessed weapon mass destruction] to attack Iraq.³⁷

Just few days after the adoption, First Commission of DPR summoned Minister Wirajuda to probe into government's decision on March 29, 2007. As the objection and

³⁵ Toto Suryaningtyas, "Tersedak Dalam Jebakan Resolusi PBB," *Kompas*, April 1, 2007.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ "Dukung Resolusi DK PBB, Indonesia Hanya Mengekor," Detik Website, March 30, 2007, <http://news.detik.com/berita/760777/dukung-resolusi-dk-pbb-indonesia-hanya-mengekor>

disagreement clamored the course of the meeting, it was held until midnight and with national coverage. The meeting concluded with four important points. First, the Commission was disappointed over the Indonesia's favor for the resolution. Second, the resolution was deemed injustice for Iran, created no space for further dialogue, and possibly would lead to further escalation of conflict within the already unstable region. Third, the Commission urged the government to consistently stand up the right for peaceful purposes of nuclear power, especially for the NPT signatories. Fourth, the Commission urged the government to provide exhaustive explanation to the public for its decision on the issue.³⁸

Within this heated political atmosphere, some political elites, mainly from Islamic political parties, initiated the interpellation right to inquiry Yudhoyono administration's decision to vote for the resolution. The interpellation, which would be called later on as "Iran Interpellation", was initially drafted by "Gus" Effendy Choiri, (PKB), Ali Mochtar Ngabalin (PBB), Abdillah Toha (PAN), Yuddy Chrisnandi (Golkar), and Sidarto Danusubroto (PDI-P). For interpellation to be brought to the Plenary Assembly, it needs at least only 13 members of DPR. Interestingly, about 274 signed the initiative. All party caucus, except Democrat Party and Prosperous and Peace Party, the only Christian Party in the DPR, supported it.³⁹ According to Effendy Choirie, Iran interpellation was quickly endorsed by the DPR and considered the fastest in the history of DPR.⁴⁰

The plenary assembly was held on May 15, 2007, and headed by DPR member from PKB, Muhaimin Iskandar. The meeting resulted in two main points. First, there were seven main questions, posed by the representative of proponents of Iran interpellation, should be responded by the government. (see table 6.1) Second, since the

³⁸ Komisi I DPR RI, "Laporan Singkat Komisi I DPR RI Dengan Menlu RI," March 29, 2007.

³⁹ During DPR session 2004 – 2009, there were three interpellation initiatives proposed by members of DPR. Only Iran interpellation was accepted to be discussed on the plenary assembly.

⁴⁰ Effendy Choirie, "Sanksi DK PBB Terhadap Iran: Perangkap Perang Energi," Koran Tempo, April 2, 2007.

explanation from Minister Wirajuda was rejected by First Commission overseeing international affairs on March 29, the plenary agreed to call the President himself to provide comprehensive explanation on the matter. On the same day, the Head of DPR issued official letter explaining that parliament would use right of interpellation to inquiry the government decision on resolution. Within the *Badan Musyawarah* (Consultative Body) meeting on May 24, 2007, the parliament agreed to summon President on June 5, 2007 to answer the posed questions.

What could be drawn from the above societal resentment and political process is that public and parliament had created “early warning system” for the government in taking sensitive matter at the international forum. Both societal narration of critics and long process of Iran interpellation within the parliament had made the Yudhoyono administration poured much of its energy in countering the public narration and satiating political machination of DPR.

Against this backdrop, Yudhoyono changed its position in the next resolution. the UNSC passed the resolution 1803 on March 2008. It was supported by all member countries, except Indonesia. The decision of Yudhyono administration to abstain in the UNSC Resolution 1803 received positively by public. Public survey revealed that more than half of respondents, about 63 percent, expressed their agreement with the decision. About 35 percent disagreed the decision to abstain from further sanctions against Iran.

Such a decision to vote abstain was understandable by looking at the standoff between the government and public in the issue. In fact, Indonesia’s seemingly changing position was shown earlier than that. There were series popular policies taken by Yudhoyono administration that could be understood as gesture to appease domestic political discontent.

First, Indonesia rejected the proposal drafted by France to condemn President Ahmadenijad after his statement to wipe Israel from the world map. Later on, in 2009,

Indonesia also abstained on the draft resolution that denounced Israel aggression. Indonesia argued that the draft resolution was less strong. Second, Vice President Jusuf Kalla on his working visit to attend OIC Summit met the President Ahamdenijad to explain the rationale behind the decision taken by Indonesia. Third, on June 18 – 19, 2007, President Yudhoyono assigned Presidential Special Envoy Alwi Shihab to visit Iran. His visit was to deliver President's letter to President Ahmadenijad, informing that Indonesia would like to reinvigorate the long standing relations between two countries. In the letter, it was also reiterated that Indonesia clarified his decision on the resolution, asking Iran to understand Indonesia's position. Despite that, Indonesia would like to stand behind Iran for peaceful purposes of nuclear program.

5.4.2. Rohingya

The prolonged conflict in Rakhine State, of which Rohingya Muslims were the primary victims, aroused solidarity across the Muslim countries, such as Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Reactions from Indonesian Muslims varied from public statements at various occasions and meetings to peaceful and angry demonstrations, and even some Muslim organizations had sent solidarity missions to the site of conflict. All of which are mainly to show their sympathy and solidarity with the victims of conflict.

Responding to the conflict, Indonesian Muslim organizations comprising of DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia*), FUI (*Forum Umat Islam / The Islamic Ummah Forum*), *Jamaah Muslim Hizbullah*, FPI (*Front Pembela Islam / Islamic Defenders Front*), JAT (*Jamaah Anshar Tauhid*), *Hilal Ahmar Society*, MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia / Indonesia Mujahedeen Council*), and MER-C (*Medical Emergency Rescue Committee*) gathered on July 2, 2012, and officially issued a joint statement condemning the Government of Myanmar and expressed their belief that what

happened in the neighboring region was a systematic ethnic cleansing.⁴¹ MUI Chairman, KH Maruf Amin, one of the most outspoken Indonesia's Muslim leaders, described the conflict as "*pembantaian masa*" (genocide) and clearly categorized the issue within the list of religious conflicts. In his statement, the Chairman of MUI was disappointed with the inadequate response from the international community to address the conflict, and therefore asked the government of Indonesia to avail itself of diplomatic clout to bring up the burning issue to the UN Security Council and further send peacekeeping missions to the ground of conflict.⁴² Almost similar to that, Secretary General of PPP, Romahurmuzy condemned the Myanmar Government for taking insufficient measures to put the conflict to an end, and further described it as *pembantaian etnis* (ethnic genocide). The party, as he said, had observed that the humanitarian crisis in the region had been in alarming situation.⁴³ Wartiah, regional head of PPP, also stressed her dissatisfaction with the silent position taken by international community towards Rohingya people, and sensed Indonesia's ambiguous decision to be involved in the matter at the first place.⁴⁴

A quiet different perspective of critique submitted by the Head of *Muhammadiyah*, Din Syamsuddin, who focused on Indonesia's irresolute position on the issue, describing Yudhoyono administration as "*lembek*" (timid). Conveying same message but with more moderate statement, Head of Executive of *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Slamet Effendy urged the government of Indonesia, as the biggest Muslim country in

⁴¹ "Ormas Islam Nyatakan Telah Terjadi Pembersihan Etnis Muslim di Myanmar," Arrahmah *Website*, 3rd July 2012, <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2012/07/03/21381-ormas-islam-nyatakan-telah-terjadi-pembersihan-etnis-muslim-di-myanmar.html>

⁴² "MUI: Tragedi Muslim Rohingya Berlatar Belakang Agama, Stop Genocide!," VOA-Islam *Website*, 26th July 2012, <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2012/07/26/20007/muitragedi-muslim-rohingya-berlatar-belakang-agama-stop-genocide/#sthash.XdtJUvwn.dpbs>

⁴³ "Indonesia Didesak Selesaikan Masalah Rohingya," Tempo *Website*, 29th July 2012, <http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/07/29/118419936/Indonesia-Didesak-Selesaikan-Masalah-Rohingya>

⁴⁴ DR. Hj. Wartiah (Regional Head of PPP), interview with the Author, March 15, 2016.

ASEAN, to show its solidarity by taking a clear and firm stance on the graving situation in Myanmar.⁴⁵

The hard tone of message was delivered by some Muslim organizations namely FPI, MMI, and HTI. During the rally, for instance they were calling on *Jihad* for all Muslims in Indonesia. It was argued that the atrocities happening in Rakhine state were considered an *asbab* (reasons) for all Indonesian Muslims to proclaim *jihad* to help their Rohingya Muslim brothers. The head of FPI, Habib Rizieq, promised to send militia to Myanmar if the Government of Indonesia was not incapable and showed no sign of aggressiveness in intervening the issue. Those organizations even further demanded Yudhoyono administration to send military officers to the site of conflict and to cut diplomatic relations with Myanmar.⁴⁶


In addition to the public statements, it has been noted also, that beginning from early July of 2012, almost more than 20 massive demonstrations were being organized across the country by mostly Islamic organizations such as *Muhammadiyah*, *Nahdlatul Ulama*, HMI, KAMMI, HTI, FPI, and FUI. Islamic political parties such as PKS, PPP, PKB, and PAN also took part in mobilizing their constituents to show solidarity and sympathy towards their brother Muslims in Myanmar.

Those protests were attended by hundreds of participants. Mostly, the demonstrations were held in the vicinity of Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta. Similar demonstrations in other big cities such as Aceh, Surabaya, Medan, and Yogyakarta were also attended by many participants who for the most part were registered students at different universities (see table 5.4).

⁴⁵ "Din Syamsuddin : Soal Rohingya, Saya Tak Mau Diadu-Adu," VOA Islam Website, 14th May 2014, <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/indonesiana/2014/05/14/30357/din-syamsuddin-soal-rohingya-saya-tak-mau-diaduadu/>

⁴⁶ "Habib Rizieq Syihab: Solusi kaum muslimin Rohingya adalah jihad!" Arrahmah Website, 1st May 2013, <http://www.arahmah.com/news/2013/05/01/habib-rizieq-syihab-solusi-kaum-muslimin-rohingya-adalah-jihad.html#sthash.4sbAE28W.dpuf>

Table 5.4. Distribution of places of demonstrations attended and or organized by Muslim organizations (July 2012 – April 2013).



Source: Author from various newspapers, 2015


The wave of demonstration intensified during July – August of 2012 –soon after the outbreak of violence - and continued to take place in the early of 2013. Some of these demonstrations, especially that staged by FPI, caused traffic jam and some turned into riot that left police officers and protesters injured and several public properties damaged. The table showed that while demonstration concentrated in Jakarta, it was widespread as well in other big cities. It indicated that the issue has attracted attention at the national level.

Massive news reports on the issue that highlight the despairing image of Muslims Rohingya also contributed in building up public sentiments. Metro TV and TV One, the two biggest national media, used terminology like “tragedy” and “killing” of Rohingya Muslims to capture what happened in the region. Online media such as Arrahmah.com, continuously uploaded articles and news on the suffering of Muslims in Myanmar. The media also focused on the idle position of SBY administration to handle

the issue.⁴⁷ Online media *Arrahmah* for instance, in the period between July 4 and August 4 has uploaded 35 Rohingya news on the website, almost one in each day.

Despite different views, what can be drawn from those protests is that the tone of message delivered during the rally has been almost identical in two ways. First, the Government of Indonesia should condemn the human tragedy that claimed mostly the lives of Rohingya Muslims. Second, the Government of Indonesia were demanded to take real action to put pressure on Myanmar Government beyond merely diplomatic statement. In addition to that, most of protesters based their demands on the ground of *Ummah* solidarity, that as the biggest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia has human responsibility to be involved in solving the conflict. (see table 5.5)

Table 5.5. Demands on Rohingya Issue voiced by some Muslim Organizations (July 2012 – April 2013)



Source: Author from various newspapers, 2015

At the political level, PKS was considered one of the most active political parties that voice concern over *Rohingya* people. It started with organizing cadres, sympathizers, and supporters to attend public demonstration on August 12, 2012, in

⁴⁷ It is worth noting that most of national media in the last two years of SBY presidency constantly criticize the policies formulated by the President. The media has been using burning public issues to question government's indecisive decisions on public matters and portray him as incapable. Despite being awarded as "Friends of Media", in front of Indonesian Journalist Association on September 2014, SBY told that during his presidency, the press tends to be cynical and shows no sign of friendship to him. See Setkab, "10 Tahun Sering Dikritik, Presiden SBY Berharap Pers Juga Kritis Pada Jokowi," retrieved on September 2nd, 2015, <http://setkab.go.id/10-tahun-sering-dikritik-presiden-sby-berharap-pers-juga-kritis-pada-jokowi/>.

Bundaran HI, Jakarta.⁴⁸ As in the case of other demonstration organized by PKS, it was attended by hundreds of participants and went smoothly with no anarchy reported. Besides, PKS also gathered support from DPR to intervene the issue. Few weeks before, on July 28, 2012, Head of BKSAP and parliament member of PKS, Surahman Hidayat, issued a recommendation to the Head of Parliament for urging the government of Myanmar to stop the atrocities in Rakhine state.⁴⁹ BKSAP also send formal letter to Aung San Suu Kyi, asking her personally to influence politically the Myanmar's approach to solve the conflict.⁵⁰ On October 10, 2012, DPR through First Commission headed by PKS member Mahfudz Sidiq officially summoned Minister Marty Natalegawa for working meeting. The priority agenda was to hear Government of Indonesia's diplomatic measures in addressing the international matter, regional conflict, including Myanmar, and world economic order.⁵¹ It was done amid the increasing public voices of hesitation towards the steps taken by the government.

Secretary of PKB fraction, Hanif Dhakiri, on behalf of PKB demanded the Yudhoyono administration to act swiftly in the corridor of diplomatic measures to address the issue. The tragedy, according to PKB, was considered systematic destruction towards minority.⁵² Almost similar tone was delivered by PKS Fraction Secretary, Abdul Hakim who stated that "Indonesia as the [informal] leader of ASEAN, rather than only issuing statement of condemnation, should have done more in helping Rohingya people."⁵³ In this regards, therefore, PKS dispatched two diplomatic missions

⁴⁸ "Sore ini, PKS Unjuk Rasa Peduli Rohingya," *Hidayatullah Website*, 12 August 2012, <http://www.hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/read/2012/08/12/61681/sore-ini-pks-unjuk-rasa-peduli-rohingya.html>

⁴⁹ "Soal Rohingya, Ketua DPR Surati Parlemen Myanmar," *Detik Website*, 30 July 2012, <http://news.detik.com/berita/1978342/soal-rohingya-ketua-dpr-surati-parlemen-myanmar>

⁵⁰ "DPR Minta Pengaruh Aung San Suu Kyi Akhiri Kekerasan Etnis Rohingya," *DPR Website*, 7 August 2012, <http://www.dpr.go.id/berita/detail/id/4283>

⁵¹ Marzuki Alie, "Kegiatan DPR RI Minggu Ketiga Oktober 2012," *Buletin Parlemenaria*, 2012, 3; "Paparan Menlu RI Pada Rapat Kerja antara Komisi I DPR RI dengan Menlu RI, Rabu 10 Oktober 2012," *Kemlu Website*, 10 October 2012, <http://portal.kemlu.go.id/Pages/SpeechTranscriptionDisplay.aspx?Name1=Pidato&Name2=Menteri&IDP=781&l=id>

⁵² "FPKB Desak Pemerintah Sikapi Pembantaian Rohingya," *PKB Website*, 29 July 2012, <http://dpp.pkb.or.id/fpkb-desak-pemerintah-sikapi-pembantaian-rohingya>

⁵³ "PKS: Pemerintah Belum Memadai Sikapi Rohingya," *Antara Website*, 3 August 2012, <http://www.antaralampung.com/berita/263839/pks-pemerintah-belum-memadai-sikapi-rohingya>

to Rohingya, in August and September 2012. In the first mission that was headed by Hidayat Nur Wahid and three other members of DPR from PKS, the delegation met Head of Myanmar House of Representative and Minister of Social Affairs.⁵⁴ In the second mission headed by Abdul Hakim, the focus was to distribute humanitarian aid to the people of Rohingya.⁵⁵

The pressure of Muslim community towards the Yudhoyono administration was felt from the decision making process that was reflected in three areas: information process within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consultation with Muslim community, and continuous communication of high-rank officials within the Yudhoyono administration.

First, the daily briefing and media report, provided by Media and Information Unit within the Ministry Secretariat as requested by Minister of Foreign Affairs, indicated that substantial part of report was allocated for Rohingya issue. In an interview with Gilang Gumilar Eka, diplomatic staff at the Secretariat for the Minister, he told that during July – December 2012, the issue of Rohingya became the main “headline” for the unit’s report to the Minister Marty. The unit prepared almost every day for the Minister any related documents on Rohingya in anticipation of door stop interview.⁵⁶ Eka further said that he was demanded to map the demands voiced in every public demonstrations by mostly Muslim organizations. He said that:

Rohingya issue is one of the burning issues that exhausted all of us in the secretariat. Any updates from pertinent offices such as Myanmar embassy in Jakarta or Indonesian Embassy in Myanmar should be informed to the Minister immediately at any time. The Minister wanted to be informed directly. It was so because it had become national headline and captured public attention.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ “Perjuangkan Nasib Rohingya, 4 Anggota DPR Terbang ke Myanmar,” *Republika Website*, 22 August 2012, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/tragedi-rohingya/12/08/22/m94ibp-perjuangkan-nasib-rohingya-4-anggota-dpr-terbang-ke-myanmar>

⁵⁵ “PKS Kirim Delegasi Kedua ke Rohingya,” *Republika Website*, 10 September 2012, <http://www.republika.co.id/berita/internasional/tragedi-rohingya/12/09/10/ma5379-pks-kirim-delegasi-kedua-ke-rohingya>

⁵⁶ Door stop interview is informal surprise interview by journalists with the Minister on various topics when Minister enters or exits building. Most of the questions asked by journalists are random and related the current burning issue.

⁵⁷ Gilang Gumilar Eka, (Political Staff at Bureau of Minister), interview with the author, January 15, 2015.

Adding to that, the policy memo briefing provided by Directorate of East Asia and Pacific indicated that the increasing amount of public demonstration especially from Muslim community needed to be handled carefully and in consultation with pertinent stakeholders. The heated situation at Myanmar had made its impact on domestic environment.⁵⁸ The intensity of pressure was also voiced by Darius Erlangga, diplomatic staff at Directorate for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. He explained that the increasing media coverage on Rohingya had made intense communication within Ministry key holders in addressing the issue properly.⁵⁹

Second, the ministry conducted informal consultation with some Islamic organizations to capture the public aspiration. On August 3, 2012, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* headed by chairman KH. Maruf Amin met Minister Marty Natalegawa in Pejambon. During the meeting, Minister Marty admitted that Indonesia has been in dilemmatic situation. Indonesia's diplomatic steps at international level, especially in the Human Rights Commission of United Nations and Third Committee of UN met the challenge since Indonesia's rank in human rights record has been disappointing. International community has noted some clashes and human right abuses in Indonesia.⁶⁰ For example, religious conflict between Sunni – Shiah that took place in Madura and Ahmadiyah had displaced many people and made them living in temporary shelters. International community took note on issues and urged Indonesia to take reconciliatory approach.

During the consultation, MUI Chairman also urged the government to take real action by suggesting the government to provide humanitarian assistance for Rohingya people. MUI viewed that the action taken by government had been only issuing

⁵⁸ "Latar Belakang Informasi Isu Konflik Komunal Di Rakhine State."

⁵⁹ Darius Erlangga, (Political Staff at Directorate for East Asia and Pacific Affairs), Interview with the Author, January 15, 2015.

⁶⁰ "Marty Natalegawa: Bantuan untuk Rohingya Tidak Cukup Hanya Pernyataan Mengutuk," *RMol* Website, 3 August 2012, <http://www.rmol.co/read/2012/08/03/73455/Marty-Natalegawa:-Bantuan-untuk-Rohingya-Tidak-Cukup-Hanya-Pernyataan-Mengutuk->

statements and garnering support from international community. While at the same time, the people of Rohingya were desperately in need of real help. The meeting resulted in commitment to pass the initiative of humanitarian assistance to the pertinent ministries. Minister Marty also informed MUI that the Government of Indonesia stood ready to provide facilities for any organizations to help Rohingya people.⁶¹

The next day, on 4th August 2012, Directorate of Human Rights under auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in coordination with International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), held interactive dialogue with pertinent stakeholders within the Government (e.g. Human Rights Commission and ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights), representatives from Muslim organizations (*Muhammadiyah*), Muslim Media (Republika) and NGOs. The meeting resulted in urging the Government of Indonesia to take humanitarian actions, in addition to political initiatives, in responding towards the conflict.⁶²

Third, heated tension in the public sentiments has been responded by intense communication at the highest political level. The President Yudhoyono had been continuously apprised of political protests by Minister of Foreign Affairs through direct report or formal letter. It has been noted that at least five reports submitted to the President. Those reports were, among others, intended to provide the President with the brief information on the current situation in Rohingya, International responses toward the issue, intensive domestic reaction, and possible approach to address the issue.⁶³

In mid-August of 2012, several ministers attended *Rapat Terbatas* (Limited Meeting)⁶⁴ in Cikeas led by President Yudhoyono to specifically discuss the issue of Rohingya and its direct challenge to the national security. One of the main agendas in

⁶¹ "MUI datang Menlu minta penjelasan kontribusi pemerintah untuk Rohingya," *Arrahmah Website*, August 3, 2012, <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2012/08/03/22148-mui-datangi-menlu-minta-penjelasan-kontribusi-pemerintah-untuk-rohingya.html>

⁶² "ICIS Galang Solidaritas Rohingya," tabloid *Diplomasi Website*, August 29, 2012, <http://www.tabloiddiplomasi.org/pdf-version/1515-icis-galang-solidaritas-rohingya.html>

⁶³ Gilang Gumilar Eka (Political Staff at Bureau of Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 15 January 2015.

⁶⁴ *Rapat Terbatas* is usually held to discuss burning issue that has direct influence on the society. On August, 2012, for example, *Rapat Terbatas* was held to discuss the issue of conflict between Sunni and Shiah Community in Omben, Sampang, Madura.

the meeting was the preparation for the Press Conference by President aimed at responding the massive demonstration nationwide. Later, on October, during *Rapat Koordinasi Terbatas Bidang Polhukam* (Coordinated Limited Meeting on Politic and Security), the issue of Rohingya and its implication on national security was also discussed.⁶⁵ On December 26th, 2012, President SBY called all pertinent ministers in his palace to discuss possible humanitarian assistance for Myanmar as part of commitment to address Rohingya conflict.⁶⁶

Eventually, the government of Indonesia took boldest steps in responding to the humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar. Bilaterally, Yudhoyono conducted tete a tete meeting and other meetings at the margin of multilateral forums with his counterpart from Myanmar, with the Rohingya as the prioritized agenda. Minister Marty was sent to the site of conflict in early January 2013 to show to the public the seriousness of government. Indonesia poured financial assistance and facilitated the civil society's involvement in sending humanitarian assistance.

5.5. Summary of Chapter

This chapter presented that the increased involvement of Islam at the political level, together with the increasing importance of public voice and parliament in the decision making process, has enabled Muslim voices to be heard and accommodated to certain extent by the government. *Reformasi* has brought changes in several aspects, including political environment. Some barriers, which were imposed by previous regimes to limit political participation of Islam, have been removed. It motivated the birth of Islamic political institutions actively taking part in the democratic system, participating in the democratic election, and even building coalition to rule the government. All of which

⁶⁵ *Rapat Terbatas Polhukam* is usually attended by Ministries under coordination of *Menkopolhukam* (Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law, and Security) such as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Intelligence Agency, and Chief of Police.

⁶⁶ Darius Erlangga (Political Staff at Directorate of East Asia and Pacific, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), interview with the author 15 March 2015.

made Islam as a significant political player. Along with that, the way policy, including foreign policy, is made and implemented has been changing as a consequence of constitutional amendments that mainly changed the relational pattern between government – society – parliament. By virtue of that, it is possible for Islam to have influence on Indonesian foreign policy.

Henceforth, this chapter brought two cases to make argument clearer: Nuclear Iran and Rohingya. In the case of Nuclear Iran, the decision of government to vote for imposing more sanctions (resolution 1747) has been costly, and was welcomed by critics and disagreement amongst public and politicians, mainly from Muslim community. It became one of the reasons for parliament to use *hak angket* (right to inquiry), one political step before impeachment. Henceforth, in the next resolution (1803) rather than consistently pushed Iran to cooperate with IAEA, Indonesia voted abstain. And before that, several policies have been taken to show the shift in Indonesia's approach towards Iran.

In the case of Rohingya, as Indonesia's resolute position to take part in global solution was impaired by ASEAN Way, consistent pressure from public and parliament compelled the government to show significant and real contribution to alleviate the grave situation in the field. After having consultation with the parliament, religious organization, and academician, Indonesia took boldest step to talk bilaterally with Myanmar in providing political solution to the conflict. Adding to that, Indonesia provided financial contribution to help reduce humanitarian catastrophe in the site.

Some argued that this cases, in which Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono accommodated Muslim concerns, did not represent the influence of Islam, but rather reflect the state of fear of Yudhoyono towards the public discontent.⁶⁷ However, the same could be said that both political and social pressures, mainly from

⁶⁷ Interview with Prof. Bachtiar Effendy (Professor at the Islamic State University, Jakarta), November 16th, 2016.

Muslim community, have been successful in creating conditions compelling for the government to carefully listen to their aspirations. In other words, it has a necessary power to be considered.

University of Malaya

CHAPTER SIX : INCREASING CONFIDENCE TOWARDS PEACEFUL

ISLAM

6.1. Introduction of Chapter

This chapter is continuation from previous one. It further argues that the encroaching of Islamic nuance in Indonesian foreign policy has been due to increasing confidence of government towards Islam, which has been seen as national asset. Such perception stems from the fact that Islam has been a fertile ground for democracy to develop, and that political Islam after *reformasi* has been showing moderate approach, abandoning the establishment of Islamic state, and committed to *Pancasila*. All of which contributed to the removal of the overt animosity between state and Islam, once existed in the previous administrations. President Yudhoyono, at the same time, established harmonious relations with Muslim organizations, mainly *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*. Along with that, Ministry for Foreign Affairs launched several internal reforms, an attempt to close the bridge between government and society in terms of foreign policy process. In this case, the government's confidence has enabled it to use "international identity" that is identical to Islam.

6.2. Islam and Democracy

Abdulkaki suggested that Indonesia has been completing the transitional democracy and progressing towards the stage of democratic consolidation. During transitional democracy, several important measures had been introduced, including the constitutional reforms on effective separation of power, enhancement of political participation, and the removal of barriers on freedom of association and speech. The direct legislative and presidential election in 2004 marked the beginning of consolidated democracy according to most of procedural democracy theorists. The democratic

practices of peaceful rotations of power by MPR before 2004 indicated the substantial democracy had been institutionalized as well.¹

The relative smooth transition of political platform required preconditions that lay fundamental foundation of such acceptance in order the transition to succeed. Despite some political scientists, such as Diamond,² suggested that democracy can prevail in any states regardless their previous structural political system and cultural behavior, the denial of the importance of foundational groundwork in which the democracy operates neglected the fact that some countries failed in experimenting the democracy.³ As for the democracy to succeed, Congleton proposed two preconditions: cultural and economic,⁴ while Lipset introduced economic development and political legitimacy as social requisites for democracy.⁵

In connection with those theories, if we were to accept the cultural acceptance, part of which is religious affiliation, towards democracy as the prerequisite of smooth democratic process, we could take the view of Indonesian Islamic attitude towards democracy itself as one of the contributing factors, though not determining, towards the democratization process in the country. There are some theorists that casted doubt about the compatibility of democracy and religion, especially Islam. Barro, for instance, found negative relationship between religious affiliation and democracy and referred to the culture of male and female differences in Muslim culture that influence the gap of

¹ Louay Abdalbaki, "Democratization in Indonesia: From Transition to Consolidation," *Asian Journal of Political Science* 16, no. 2 (2008), 151.

² Larry Diamond, "Can the Whole World Become Democratic? Democracy, Development, and International Policies" (University of California: Center of the Study of Democracy, 2003).

³ Democracy as a system of governance is considered controversial point of departure and it was not feasible and doable for all states at anytime. See, for instances, the recent case of Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Siria, and Yemen, in which the process of political transition to democratic platform ended in unexpected situation.

⁴ Roger D Congleton, "Economic and Cultural Prerequisites for Democracy," in *Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 44.

⁵ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review* 53, no. 1 (1959), 69.

education.⁶ Lakoff made a point that the deficit of democracy in the Arab world, rather than as the result of condition specific to Arab countries, stemmed from the influence of Islamic religious belief.⁷ However, in Indonesian case, as suggested by Webber, Indonesian Islam played significant role in facilitating rather than hindering the democratization process.⁸ According to Hilmy, the successful combination of Islam and democracy served as the prerequisite of democratic achievement in Indonesia.⁹ This view is based on the fact that NU and Muhammadiyah, the two biggest Islamic organizations of more than 70 millions of members, especially at the elite level, accepted and involved actively from early beginning in the process of *reformasi*. Amien Rais (Chairman of Muhammadiyah) and Adburrahman Wahid (Chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama), and Nurcholiz Madjid (Venerated Muslim Scholar) were amongst the active drivers of the democratic process and able to manufacture the democratic discourse on practical bases.¹⁰ Assyaukani also noted the emergence of new Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia in early 1990s has successfully crafted the arguments of compatibility of Islam and democracy.¹¹ Adding to that, Aspinall made a unique argument that Islamism is considered as one of the potential spoilers of democracy. However, the Indonesia's

⁶ Robert J Barro, "Determinants of Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 107, no. 6 (1999), 176-177.

⁷ The article of Lakoff is based on Alfred Stepan's work. In particular, Lakoff attempted to counter the argument built by Stepan who opined that democracy gap is not germane to Islamic belief. In making his case, Lakoff provided the theology of both Sunni and Shhite arguing that God is the only the source of law. Hence, it is blasphemous to belief that law created by people (legislature) can decide what is right and what is wrong. See more Sanford Lakoff, "The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (2004), 133.

⁸ Douglas Webber, "A Consolidated Patrimonial Democracy? Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia" (Singapore: INSEAD, 2005), 8.

⁹ Masdar Hilmy, "Muslims' Approaches to Democracy: Islam and Democracy in Contemporary Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 1, no. 1 (2007), 43.

¹⁰ Hilmy categorized Indonesian Muslim responses towards the concept of democracy into three general concepts: (1) Huwaydiyan approach that viewed democracy as the intrinsic part of Islam; (2) Mawdudian approach introduced the variant of democracy called the Islamic democracy; and (3) Qutbian approach that totally understood democracy as alien concept to Islam.

¹¹ Luthfi Assyaukanie, "Democracy and the Islamic State: Muslim Arguments for Political Change in Indonesia," *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 20 (2004), 39.

ability to absorb Islamism and incorporate it into the process of democracy has made it survive during democratic transition.¹² Aspinall's conclusion indicates the absence, though not completely, of Islamic resistance towards the concept of democracy.

There are several reasons to be considered that Islam has been pivotal in pushing developing the agenda of democracy in Indonesia. First, it was, among others, Muslim leaders and intellectuals who made democracy possible in Indonesia. Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid, both leaders of two biggest Muslim organizations played an instrumental part in challenging the authoritarian rule of Soeharto. Second, the current Islamic political parties, none of them pursue the establishment of Islamic State based on Shariah Law. These parties promote the nation-state based on spirit of nationalism embedded in Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. Islam as an ideology and noble teaching serves as the source of inspiration and action for the state to deliver the best services for the citizens. Third, it is the democracy that provides political avenue and save path for Muslim leaders and politicians to take part in the system. The articulation of interests of Islamic political parties could be possible and guaranteed if the democracy is the only rule of game. It is possible that once the Islamist groups hold the position, they could tilt the direction of the game to the theocratic state. But, any endeavor to end the supremacy of *Pancasila* in Indonesia could ignite strong and heavy reaction, create instability, and eventually prompt the military intervention. This circle of game would only put Islam in unfavorable seat.¹³

6.3. Moderating Position

Along with the increasing tide of Islamic political parties in Indonesia, some analysts observed the new pattern of Islamic movement in Indonesia, marked by its moderating

¹² Edward Aspinall, "The Irony of Success," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 2 (2010), 20.

¹³ Rizal Sukma, "Islam, Democracy, and Foreign Policy in Indonesia" (Seminar on Comparative Experiences Of Democratisation In East Asia and Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 2007), 5 - 6.

position towards the contemporary political system. This mode of movement commenced in the late New Order and began to take clear shape after *reformasi*. Bahtiar Effendy mapped three areas, in which new Islamic movement in Indonesia transforms, namely (1) religious thought, (2) political / bureaucratic, and (3) social transformation. At the domain of religious thinking, Islamic scholars attempt to amalgamate between the fundamentals of theological / Islamic philosophical thought with reality. The core underlying argument put forward relates to the fact that many religious teachings have been partially, or even textually, understood, resulting in a gap between the religious texts with the reality faced by society. For that, it is within this attempt to fill the gap, the scholars have sought the renewal in the field of religion as a whole with bring new Islamic ideas among others, desacralization, indigenization, and re-actualization of the teachings of Islam. Amongst the scholars who proposed these ideas were Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid, Munawwir Sadzali, M. Dawam Rahardjo, and Djohan Effendi.

In the second domain, many Muslim activists have been engaged in political and the government process and gradually became part of the system. One of the salient contribution in this part was the project was "Islamization bureaucracy" at 1980s. The intense suspicion between Islam and state would be deescalated if Muslim scholars and activists take part in the system and further contribute to its advancement. Among those are Dahlan Ranuwihardja, Hartono Mardjono, Akbar Tanjung, Mar'i Muhammad.

While in the third domain, social transformation, Muslim thinkers attempt to refocus their attention from the discourse of state - Islam relations to more practical project such as empowering social-economic community. Their critiques to the government is that the project development carried out by the government only strengthens the state apparatus, benefit a small elite, while the majority of people still mired in poverty and ignorance. They then raises a number of programs aimed at

strengthening communities, especially rural areas, in the economic, social, educational, and so forth. Sudjoko Prasodjo, Adi Sasono, M. Dawam Rahardjo, as well as some exponents Young of *Nahdlatul Ulama* are among those who renew Islamic movement in this domain.¹⁴

Within this separated yet interrelated domain, and consistent with the theory of moderation, almost all of Islamic political parties in Indonesia do moderate, compared to the persistence of political parties in early Indonesia's independence.¹⁵ Evidence to this is the absence of agenda that aim to build Indonesia as an Islamic state. Most of Islamic political parties in Indonesia move towards the median position, despite consistent articulation of Islam in their platform. In the case of PKS, for instance, Tomsa proposed pragmatic reason to gain wider public attention as to explain such moderation in the party. Despite its affect to the party's organizational coherence, the moderation process within the party has altered the party's image from that of a puritanical Islamist party to that of a more open and pluralistic party.¹⁶

According to Tomsa, PKS has been attempting to alter people perception on the party from puritanical to pluralistic. PKS, one of the most well institutionalized Islamic parties, in its early formation, had arguably been abstain in mentioning *Pancasila* in its program. But in 2004, the party did make noteworthy references to *Pancasila*, and further explicitly endorsed it five years later.¹⁷

According to Azra, the acceptance of majority Indonesian Muslim towards Pancasila and the gradual absence of demand towards the establishment of Islamic State has been due to the characteristics of Pancasila. He said, "Since the Indonesian state,

¹⁴ For detail explanation, see Bachtiar Effendy, *Islam Dan Negara: Transformasi Gagasan Dan Praktik Islam Di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Democracy Project, 2011), 148-195.

¹⁵ Moderation theory argued that electoral nature of democracy (gain vote) has pushed parties that once defended radical position to move towards median position.

¹⁶ Dirk Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party," *Political Research Quarterly*, 2012, 486.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 490, 491.

with the *Pancasila* ideology, is already Islamic, there is no strong reason for mainstream Muslims to wish to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state.”¹⁸

The departure of political Islam from changing the constitution to criticizing the state policies had reduced the long history of tension between State and Islam. Eventhough some scholars questioned on the sincerity of such transformation, the general attitude of political Islam has created a sense of confidence for the state to cooperate with political Islam. Throughout its development, in post-Soeharto Indonesia, Islamic political parties have always been part of the ruling regime.

It is true that during the constitutional discussion between 1999 – 2002, some Islamic parties, namely PPP and PBB formally lodge the proposal of the introduction of *sharī’ah* into the constitution through amendment of Article 29, which declares that “The State shall be based upon the belief in the One and Only God.” However, as Hosen argued, the draft proposal of amendment by those parties were not meant to change the fundament of state ideology or to pursue the caliphate system of state, but rather, aimed to have constitutional guarantee to the Muslim’s right to implement *sharī’ah*. PPP and PBB eventually gave up their cause and didn’t block the original formulation of the Article. The final result has shown that most of Indonesian Islam follows the substantive approach towards *sharī’ah*, and begins to leave the formal interpretation.¹⁹

It is also worth noting the changing attitude of two main organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, towards the idea of Islam and State. In general, the organizations have become pluralistic. Compared to their position in 1950 on formal adoption of *sharī’ah* into formal constitution, they no longer sought to such realization. It doesn’t, however,

¹⁸ Azyumardi Azra, “Islam, Indonesia, and Democracy,” *Strategic Review: The Indonesian Journal of Leadership, Policy and World Affairs* 1, no. 1 (August 2011), 76.

¹⁹ Nadirsyah Hosen, “Religion and the Indonesian Constitution: A Recent Debate,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36, no. 3 (2005), 419.

indicate they are not Islamic organizations. It was the reflection of the intellectual leadership with the organizations that view Muslim aspiration could be accommodated by the state even with the absence of “Islamic” constitution. The focus of agenda has changed from bringing Islam in the state foundation to coloring state policies with Islamic taste.²⁰

In terms of social organization, FPI, the most notable Islamic organization that emerged after *reformasi* in 1999 has shown as well the reorientation in seeing how to deal with modern political system. Many observers categorize the organization as far-right Islamist groups, employing radical means and strategies, endangering democratic environment, and threatening the philosophical foundation of the country, *Pancasila*. It also attempted to implement *sharīah* comprehensively. It has been true to certain extent. However, as the Rizieq Shihab, the grand spiritual leader, argued, it has been misled by many political observers. In its early establishment, the organization had never publicly claimed to challenge and be standing *vis a vis Pancasila*. Its action and activities indeed stem from the understanding of *qurān* and *hadīth*. However, complete denial to *Pancasila* was never been part of the organization’s agendas. The organization’s attempt to implement *Sharīah* will pursued done under rules set up in the constitution.²¹ According to Hashim Muzadi, FPI has been attempting to be moderating in pursuing the organization’s agenda. He personally talked with Rizieq Shihab to advise him to change the organization’s strategy. Instead of using consistently stick in dealing with certain matters, the organization needs to use brain and intellectual capacity.²²

²⁰ However, contrary to the mainstream mode of political transformation, the democratization process in Indonesia has also provided an opportunity for the increasing Islamic organizations that promoted the strict application of *sharī’ah*. Chief among these organizations are *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defender Front), *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI, Indonesian Mujahedeen Council), and *Laskar Jihad* (LJ, Warriors of Jihād).

²¹ Muhammad Rizieq Shihab (Spiritual Leader of Front Pembela Islam), Interview with the Author, Jakarta, November 21st, 2015.

²² K.H. Hashim Muzadi (Ex-Chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama*), Interview with Author, Kuala Lumpur, February 15th, 2016.

Adding to that, the only activity exposed by media has been the outrage carried out by the organizations, while other humanitarian and relief assistance was kept in dark. In addition to that, soon after its establishment, Rizieq Shihab has written standard of procedure to be followed by organization in rallying demonstration. This procedure includes the criteria of dialogue with law enforcement officers, local leaders, and residents.

There is, however, a concern regarding the turning point of moderate Islam in Indonesia following the *reformasi*. The conservative turn, especially during Yudhoyono presidency, was said to be at alarming point with the case of Ahmadiyah and Shiah prosecution, and the increasing use of Islamic terminologies such as *Kafir*, *addaulah Islamiyah*. However, consistent with the idea of democracy, this turn has been the natural consequence of democracy. But looking at the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia, such a conservative turn could not be used as a legitimizing evidence that Islam in Indonesia has been shifting to conservative bloc. It was, I argue, considered the dynamics of Islamic responses towards the democracy.

Such a transformation within the format of Islamic movement, whether it is political, social or cultural, supported the idea that Islam in Indonesia has not been in the opposite edge of democracy. But instead, it put added meaning and uniqueness of democracy in Indonesia. Muslims in Indonesia could exercise their Islamic obligation to the God, participate in the process of nation building, and fulfill their civic responsibility as the citizens simultaneously.²³

6.4. Yudhoyono's Proximity with Islamic Organizations

The relations between Islam and state during the presidency of Yudhoyono has been more accommodative, yet strained to certain extent. New Order sought to restrict Islam

²³ Susilo B Yudhoyono, "The Democratic Instinct in the 21st Century," *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (2010), 10.

to the periphery and marginalized it from political game, but failed to prevent Islamic ideas from resurging as a contender to the modern nation state. Yudhoyono, then, reoriented the policy by acting ‘flexibly’ and ‘pragmatically’ as the guardian of Islamic ideals.

After taking office, realizing the power vested in Islamic organizations, President Yudhoyono came close to Islamic organizations. His political move is understood through his support for programs initiated by the Islamic organizations and his personal attendance in the major events held by those organizations.

The positive gesture of Yudhoyono administration towards Islam was apparent in the policy towards *Madrassahs* and *Pesantren*, which are commonly known as the core base of NU. During ten years of Yudhoyono presidency, the issue of *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) development and Islamic education has been an integral part of the government’s policy. Secretary General of PKB, Hanif Dhakiri, said that:

During 2004 – 2014, the permission to establish Islamic University has been eased by the government. Many programs initiated by *pesantren* and *madrassah* have been supported by the government. It is the concrete support of SBY for the Islamic world in Indonesia.²⁴

The Yudhoyono administration’s easing policy on university permit coincided with the program of *tashwīrul afkār* (the revival of thought) through the establishment of education centers in Indonesia as launched by *Nahdlatul Ulama*. This policy continues to be the priority of the Jokowi administration. In less than one year of his administration, at least 23 Islamic Universities based on NU Organizations have been opened.²⁵

²⁴ “PKB Puji Presiden SBY yang Peduli Dunia Pesantren”, *Detik* Website, retrieved 19 October 2015, <http://news.detik.com/berita/2723220/pkb-puji-presiden-sby-yang-peduli-dunia-pesantren>

²⁵ Vice President Jusuf Kalla officially opened 23 new Islamic Universities in the event of 89th anniversary NU. See <https://www.chanelmuslim.com/berita/23-universitas-nahdhatul-ulama-resmi-mendapat-izin-pemerintah/2562/>

Adding to that, President Yudhoyono has been known for his visit to many *pesantren* in Indonesia. In 2011, he visited a small Pesantren Al Hasanah in Tasikmalaya as part of *Ramadhān* tour. During the visit, he praised the role played by *pesantren* as not only as the center of education, but also as community empowerer. In his speech, Yudhoyono said:

This time, i choose to visit a small scale of Pesantren, so that my ministers could see first hand the very holy duties carried out by this religious institution towards the community. As the government, we will do our part to help Pesantren do its part.²⁶

The visit to a small pesantren in remote region rather than a well established pesantren created wave of praise from *Kiyais* in Java as it has shown the President's care towards the Islamic education. In 2014, just before SBY ended his tenure, thousands of Kiyai in *Gerakan Kiyai Kampung Langit Pitu* held Doa Bersama (joint praying) for Yudhoyono and the Government for the succesful ten years of his presidency and the government's positive position towards the Muslim in Indonesia.²⁷ Artha argued that the Yudhoyono administration has been close to *Pesantren* world since he was raised in the circles of *Pesantren* in East Java.²⁸ It is understandable, therefore, that Chief Executive of NU, Said Aqil Siradj, supported the Yudhoyono administration and said that "we (NU) are behind Mr. President SBY until 2014."²⁹

Unlike with NU, Yudhoyono relation with Muhammadiyah was a complicated one. Muhammadiyah has always been in critical position towards SBY policies.³⁰ One

²⁶ "Presiden: Pesantren Pusat Pendidikan dan Kebajikan," *NU Website*, 19 October 2015, <http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,1-id,33656-lang,id-c,warta-t,Tawadhu-.phpx>

²⁷ "Puluhan Kiai Kampung Kirim Dia untuk Presiden SBY", *Tribun News Website*, 19 October 2015, <http://www.tribunnews.com/regional/2014/10/14/puluhan-kiai-kampung-kirim-doa-untuk-presiden-sby>

²⁸ Arwan Tuti Artha, *Dunia Religius SBY* (Yogyakarta: Best Publisher, 2009), 106-107.

²⁹ "PBNU dan Ormas Islam Dukung SBY Sampai 2014," *Tempo Website*, 21 October 2015, <http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2013/03/14/078467106/pbnu-dan-ormas-islam-dukung-sby-sampai-2014>

³⁰ As Muhammad Shulthoni, regional head of Youth Muhammadiyah organization in Kuala Lumpur, argued that historically Muhammadiyah attempted to be in balancing act when dealing with state. He narrated the story of Buya Hamka who disagreed on the appointment of Moelyadi Djoyomartono,

of the serious tensions between Muhammadiyah and SBY happened in early 2011 following the issuance of “18 Kebohongan Pemerintahan SBY” (18 lies of SBY administration) in Muhammadiyah Headquarter by religious leaders of different faiths.³¹ Fajar Riza Ul Haq, Executive Director of Ma’arif Institute, urged the leaders to adopt 2011 as year of fight against government lies.³² Their statements caused anxiety among elite government officials who held a press conference to counter the statement. Anticipating further instability, the President invited seven religious leaders who issued the statement in an open dialogue forum.³³

Another move by Muhammadiyah that created tension was the policy of “*Jihad Konstitusi*” (Jihad on Constitution), legal steps to review Indonesian laws considered incompatible with the basic values of Indonesian Constitution 1945. So far, four Indonesian laws have been filed by Muhammadiyah for further review and accepted by Constitutional Court of Indonesia. Amongst those cases, Muhammadiyah succeeded in overturning Oil and Gas Law, limiting the authority of government to deal a contract with private companies in the oil and gas sector. As a consequence, *BP Migas* (*Badan Pengelola Minyak dan Gas / Oil and Gas Regulator*), the upstream oil and gas regulator, was dissolved by the court. For the sake of transitional operation, the government established SKK Migas (*Satuan Kerja Khusus Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak*

Muhammadiyah cadre, as Minister for Education by President Soekarno. Buya Hamka believed that this appointment could lead Muhammadiyah near to the center of politics, a political move that could endanger the very dakwah message of Muhammadiyah. Muhammad Shulthoni, (Regional Head of Youth Muhammadiyah Kuala Lumpur), Interview with Author, Kuala Lumpur, April, 2016

³¹ Paul Makugoru, “Menggugat Kejujuran Presiden,” *Reformata*, 2011, 18.

³² “Dituding Bohong, SBY Undang Tokoh Agama,” *Viva News Website*, 5 November 2015, <http://fokus.news.viva.co.id/news/read/199559-dituding-bohong--sby-undang-tokoh-agama>

³³ The seven religious leaders from the country’s five religions are: chair of Indonesia’s second-largest Muslim organization Muhammadiyah Din Syamsuddin, chair of the Communion of Indonesian Churches (PGI) Andreas Yewangoe, head of the Indonesian Council of Bishops (KWI) Martinus Situmorang, senior Indonesian Buddhist monk Sri Pannyavaro Mahathera, Hindu leader I Nyoman Udayana Sangging, Catholic priest Franz Magnis-Suseno and founder of the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP) Djohan Effendi. The meeting was also attended by *Nahdlatul Ulama* chairman Said Agil Siraj, Council of Indonesia Buddhist Communities chair Siti Hartati Murdaya and Indonesian Confucianism High Assembly chair Budi S. Tanuwibowo. See “SBY meets religious leaders over ‘lie’ clash”, *The Jakarta Post Website*, 5 November 2015, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/01/18/sby-meets-religious-leaders-over-%E2%80%98lie%E2%80%99-clash.html>

dan Gas Bumi / Special Task Force for Upstream Oil and Gas Business Activities). Other laws currently under review are 1999 foreign exchange law, the 2007 law on investment and the 2009 law on the electricity sector and also law on water resources. Muhammadiyah has identified, at least 115 laws, mostly on natural resources regulation, seen as detrimental to the interests of public. *Jihad Konstitusi* has alarmed the foreign investor amidst the government's program to attract as many as investors to Indonesia.³⁴ *Jihad Konstitusi* was supported by Din Syamsuddin who believed it as part of *Amar Maruf Nahi Munkar*.³⁵

As explained by Secretary General of Muhammadiyah, DR Abdul Muti, Muhammadiyah relations with the SBY administration have been "loyal but critical", in a sense that the Muhammadiyah always supported the government as long as it served for the public interest. Otherwise, Muhammadiyah had to criticize the government, but not acted as opposition.³⁶ In extreme statement, Dahlan Rais, one of the Chiefs of Muhammadiyah described the relations as the worst ever happened. He argued that during the years of previous presidents, Muhammadiyah have always been involved in the government planning and discussion, but not during Yudhoyono term.³⁷ For instance, in the final years of SBY terms, anticipating the instability as the general election drew near, Yudhoyono held several important talks with military, media, and Islamic circles.³⁸ Within the meeting with Islamic circles, while Muhammadiyah was not in the list, other 13 Islamic organizations were invited including NU, Persis, Al-

³⁴ "Legal 'jihad' against private sector gathers pace in Indonesia," *Reuters Website*, 5 November 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/24/indonesia-investment-idUSL4N0XL2Z920150424#QGxQVLI7FjwqdYX.97>.

³⁵ "Jihad Konstitusi, Jihad Baru Muhammadiyah," *Tempo*, 22 July 2015.

³⁶ Abdul Mu'ti (Secretary General of Muhammadiyah), in a public discussion, IIUM, Kuala Lumpur, 15 September 2015.

³⁷ "Presiden SBY Relasi "Terburuk" Muhammadiyah", *Pikiran Rakyat Website*, 21 October 2015, <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/politik/2014/09/11/296532/presiden-sby-relasi-terburuk-muhammadiyah>

³⁸ "SBY Kumpulkan Ormas Terkait dengan Pemilu 2014," *Seputar Indonesia Website*, 21 October 2015, <http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/727471/12/sby-kumpulkan-ormas-terkait-dengan-pemilu-2014-1363296666>

Irsyad al-Islamiyah, Al-Ittihadiyah, Matlaul Anwar, Ar-Rabithah Al-Alawiyah, Al-Washliyah, Az-Zikra, Syarikat Islam Indonesia, Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia (PITI), IKADI, Perti, dan Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII).

Despite these facts, the relation has been positive as explained formally by Yudhoyono during his speech for the opening of the Mukhtamar Muhammadiyah in 2010. The government considered Muhammadiyah as the partner in achieving national goals for the prosperity of *ummah* and the development of Indonesia.³⁹ He attended the 45th National Congress of Muhammadiyah in Malang, East Java, in July 2005, and urged the close cooperation between the government and the organization in tackling the national issues.⁴⁰ In the 46th Congress, within the same spirit, the Government reiterated its position to have concerted effort with Muhammadiyah in realizing the prosperous Indonesia. Vice Minister Budiono told Muhammadiyah that the government had asked the ministers to actively engage with Muhammadiyah on the issues of national concern. In responding to the government's political signal, the Chairman of Muhammadiyah, Din Syamsuddin told, "This proves that there is no conflict between Muhammadiyah and the government. There cannot be conflict between us as we need one another."⁴¹

Religious Expression: *Majelis Dhikir* Nurussalam

The establishment of *Majelis Dhikir* by SBY coincided with the booming of similar *Majelis Dhikir* at public places across Indonesia, especially following *reformasi*, from Aceh on the northern tip of Indonesia to Mataram in West Nusa Tenggara in the southern Indonesia. Many governors and local leaders in the Indonesian provinces host

³⁹ "SBY: Muhammadiyah Mitra Pemerintah", Viva News Website, retrieved 21st October 2015, nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/162039-sby--muhammadiyah-mitra-pemerintah

⁴⁰ "Susilo wants Muhammadiyah lead morality fight," *The Jakarta Post*, 4th July 2005.

⁴¹ "Indonesian Vice President Urges Cooperation with Muhammadiyah group," *The Jakarta Post*, 9th July 2010.

Majelis Dhikir on regular basis, held in public places such as grand Mosques or main squares. The popularity of the *Majelis Dhikir*, as Hasan argued, is due to its commoditization in a way that shifts religious chanting from Mosques to sound stage, and transforms Islamic dhikir from deep tafakkur into yet another artifact of pop culture. The establishment of *Majelis Dhikir* coincided with the ongoing trends amongst Indonesian community which became more pious and religious, at least as seen from their observable behaviors. Fealy and White observed that following the fall of Soeharto, many Muslim expressed their religiosity through various means, politically, culturally, and economically.⁴²

Majelis Dhikir of Nurussalam needs to be understood as political instrument of SBY, apart from its sacred religious agenda, in mobilizing Muslim community and attracting public votes. Yudhoyono's personal interest on *dhikir* began in 2003, a year before running for election, when he took oath of allegiance (*bai'at*) to the Naqshabandi Sufi Order, witnessed by Naqhsabandi Leader of Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani. Since then, he invited hundreds of Ulama to chant dhikir in his house in Cikeas, especially on Thursday nights. Led by a charismatic Ulama, Habib Abdurrahman al-Habsyi of Kwitang, an Arab descent, the *Majelis Dhikir* of Yudhoyono's network expands to the regional and village levels. Therefore, his *Majelis Dhikir* is not simply a religious ritual. It is also closely related to the political communication and power management. It becomes political venue, in which leaders define their identity through Islamic symbols, and inform that they are not only formal leader but also informal one who directly involved in public activities.⁴³

⁴² Greg Fealy and Sally White, "Introduction," in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 2-3.

⁴³ Noorhaidi Hasan, *The Making of Public Islam Piety, Democracy and Youth in Indonesian Politics* (Yogyakarta: SUKA-Press, 2013), 119-123.

6.5. Internal Reform of Ministry of Foreign Affairs

As has been said earlier, the unique character of Islam in Indonesia after *reformasi* has been causing increasing confidence of the government to gradually close the gap. In terms of foreign policy, the relations were further advanced along with the internal reform launched by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which to certain extent, attempted to bridge “Islamic nuance” within the Ministry.

Following the military’s decision to “go back to the barrack”, many strategic positions, previously held by military generals, are currently assumed by civilian or career diplomat trained in the Ministry’s center of education. In the case of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, the position of General Inspector and General Secretary, the two pivotal positions supplying information to the Minister, once generally assumed by military, now has shifted to civilian and mostly to career diplomat. This has allowed Minister Wirajuda to implement his series of comprehensive internal reform under the banner of “*Proses Benah Diri*” (process of Self-improvement), entailing three key elements: (1) organizational restructuring, (2) overseas diplomatic missions restructuring, and (3) development of Diplomatic profession.

Under the spirit of development of diplomatic profession, Kemlu has recruited young diplomats from various academic disciplines. Most of diplomats were graduates from faculties of International relations, political sciences, and economics. Considering that the issue of Islamic concern has been internationally discussed, Minister Wirajuda decided to employ more diplomats with the expertise in the Islamic issues. Therefore, it was under Wirajuda, that most of Islamic State University graduates, like Azhar University, Sjarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University, and Kalijaga Islamic State University, have been accepted in the foreign services. Especially in the year of 2008, the Minister opened recruitment for graduates with *Syariah Islamiyah* background. These young diplomats have been encouraged to establish professional network with

Islamic organizations, including *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah*..⁴⁴ The rationale behind such initiative is that young diplomats should be a constructive bridge between public and the international community (*intermestik*).

The serious effort of Minister Wirajuda in democratizing foreign policy was reflected as well through the selection of his personal staff around him. He created a unit, as part of organizational reforms, that assist him closely, called *Biro Administrasi Menteri* (Bureau of Minister's Administration). The head of unit simultaneously act as Ministry's Spokesperson. Best among junior, mid-career and senior diplomats are recruited. Usually, those who sit in the first and second rank in the diplomatic training will be called to join the unit.

These diplomats have been assigned to work closely with the foreign policy issues related to the parliament and public as appear in the media. At regular basis, they are asked to observe, and analyze the current sentiment of public echoed through the media towards specific foreign policy issues. The issue will be classified from visibly normal case, priority to top priority, and listed orderly in a document called matrix of media brief. The unit will work with relevant directorates and bureaus in the ministry, and supply the appropriated data and insights to the Minister. Most of issues that become top priority are usually related to abuse of Indonesian migrant workers abroad, border dispute with neighboring countries, or Muslim contention towards specific issues (e.g. Rohingya, Palestine, Arab Spring). This unit is also responsible for collecting relevant data when the Minister is summoned by DPR for consultation or public hearing.

It is clear that the creation of such unit is a bureaucratic expression to the importance of public view during foreign policy process. This strategic unit has merits

⁴⁴ For instance, there are two diplomats, namely Achmad Rizal Purnama and Pribadi Setiono were members of Lembaga Hubungan dan Kerjasama Internasional of Muhammadiyah (International cooperation Division of Muhammadiyah).

both in what it collects and in what it provides. On the side of collection, the unit captures the public mood, acts as middleman between public and government. On the side of provision, the unit makes it easier for Minister to grasp wealth of information that shape and reshape the locus, intensity, and form of public sentiment.

To meet the need to improve mutual relationship with the public, the Ministry also made organizational changes by establishing new Directorate General of Information and Public Diplomacy in 2002, charged for building bridge between Ministry and public. Many activities, especially under the Directorate of Public Diplomacy, were created to increase public participation and consultation within foreign policy process.⁴⁵ There are at least three initiatives created for that purpose: (1) Foreign Policy Breakfast, a weekly informal meeting with civil society, organizations, and other interested parties, intended to communicate the trajectory and course of Indonesian foreign policy. The forum that was initiated in 2002, was designed to be two-way communication by opening questions and answers sessions; (2) Pejambon Coffee, a more classy forum, is intended to deliver the achievement and general information on foreign policies. The invitees are usually the DPR members, ambassadors, and public figures, including leaders of Muslim Organizations; (3) Policy Brief, a regular meeting with the local and international journalists. This is to reach the wider public audiences by explaining government's initiatives, policies and responses towards certain issues. In addition to that, it was aimed to raise public awareness on the foreign policies, making them familiar and eventually becoming critical to the government's decision.⁴⁶

The spirit of participatory and inclusive foreign policy is not only reflected through the organizational restructuring and institutional designs, but also through

⁴⁵ This new unit has also informally been charged to create mutual relationship with the Parliament members. Usually, senior diplomat with flexible style and talkative is chosen to assume the position of Director General. Similar task to communicate with parliament is also assigned to Expert Staff on Institutional Relations (Staf Ahli Hubungan Kelembagaan).

⁴⁶ Roy Martin Hasudungan Situmeang (Political Staff at Directorate General of Information and Public Diplomacy), Jakarta, September 16th, 2015.

ideational reform. The redefinition of the concept of diplomacy is another ideational shift that attempts to translate the prevailing democratic values in Indonesian political system. The ministry introduced the concept of “*Diplomasi total*” (Total Diplomacy), and “Multi-track Diplomacy”. The first denotes the involvement of all interested elements and stakeholders of nation into the foreign policy, while the second is aimed at comprehensive approaches – people to people, business to business, and government to government contact – to promote national interest at the international level. Those new concepts, which embrace the idea of inclusivity and participation, have been the conscious reaction to the previous domination of elites in the realm of foreign policy.

In the early August, 2006, for example, Minister Wirajuda welcomed the initiative of KNRP (*Komite Nasional untuk Rakyat Palestina* / National Committee for Palestine People) to provide financial aid and directly distribute to Palestinian people in Gaza. Rather than opposing the idea, Minister Wirajuda believed that such assistance was part of Indonesia’s diplomacy and reflected the idea of people’s diplomacy. In his statement, Minister Wirajuda said that such humanitarian assistance was in line with the Indonesia’s foreign policy that promotes total diplomacy involving all elements of society in the diplomatic activities.⁴⁷

Another concept is the *intermestik*, which means that any endeavor at the international level should be linked to socio-political domestic condition. Wirajuda, the former Minister, explained the concept as the endeavor to bridge the gap between domestic factors and international factors.⁴⁸ In doing so, it necessitates the broader involvement of public. Therefore, the concept is closely linked to citizen diplomacy. By introducing the concept, the ministry attempts to open the “diplomatic window” open to

⁴⁷ “Tim KNRP Bertemu Menlu Sebelum ke Lebanon dan Palestina,” *Antara News Website*, 10 August 2006, <http://www.antaranews.com/berita/39870/tim-knrp-bertemu-menlu-sebelum-ke-lebanon-dan-palestina>

⁴⁸ Hassan Wirajuda, “Kedekatan Alamiah Antara Public Relations Dan Diplomasi,” in *Strategi Public Relations*, by Silih Agung Wasesa (Jakarta, Indonesia: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2006).

the public. The clear implementation of the concept is the interfaith dialogue policy that has become the Ministry's trademark since the early 2000s. Through the initiative, the Ministry conducted several forum and dialogue to bring the international community closer to Indonesian community under the banner of Muslim majority country and Moderate Muslim. The Ministry facilitated the Muslim community to represent their country in the international forum.

Those initiatives are not necessarily meant that policy making process has been overwhelmed by public involvement, but rather to display the level of bureaucratic awareness and responses towards public aspirations. The ultimate architect of policy is still in the hand of executive. As opposed to the previous conduct, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs becomes more open and responsive to public inputs. In some cases, however, some policies are still kept in dark when it relates to the security policy.

It is worth mentioning as well, with regards to the process of foreign policy, the extent of public opinion in influencing the policies decided by the government.⁴⁹ During Yudhoyono's presidency, the position of President's spokesperson on International affairs was created. To what extent the government will be responsible to the aspirations depends much on the nature of issue. The more salience the issue, the more government pays attention to it. With the increasing of freedom of media, foreign policy issues, once was considered insignificant for public, gradually become popular and debated by many analysts. Some of the issues relating to Indonesian foreign policy that have always become the highlight in the media and being voiced by Islamic political parties and Muslim organizations are the issue of Muslim concerns and Muslim countries.

⁴⁹ During the New Order, the Government restricted the freedom of expression. The mass media – magazine, newspapers, and television program, did not have the courage to voice opinions contrary to the government's political stance. In 1983, the Government issued the *Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers* (SIUP, Press Publication Business License). This policy is a continuation of the policy of *Surat Izin Terbit* (SIT, Publication License) issued in 1970. However, the difference laid on the level of sanction given to the owners of the mass media. In SIT policy, if the media is known at odds with the government, then the media would be closed. While in the SIUP policy, the media was not only closed, but the license of the media company would be revoked.

6.6. Summary of Chapter

This chapter provides an argument that the nature of Islam in Indonesia, especially after *reformasi*, has been causing confidence for the government to collaborate with it, and even used it as a valuable asset. Both Islam's peaceful coexistence with the idea of democracy, and its moderating position have removed the obstacles once blocking the proximity between state and Islam. Adding to that, within the spirit of *benah diri*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs gradually realized the importance of Islamic issues within the foreign policy. Hence, it started to advance the relations with the religious organizations, encourage the staff to be actively connected with various social organizations, and recruiting more staff with religious backgrounds.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, KEY FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATION

7.1. Summary

Islam has been undoubtedly an integral part of Indonesia. In terms of number of believers, it ranks the most religion embraced by the majority of population, more than 75% of total Indonesian people. Islam also becomes the sources of inspiration to the establishment of vibrant civil society organizations and political parties, making it assuming significant importance in the history of Indonesia. In spite of that, as some of researchers made it clear, such figure was not reflected well in Indonesian foreign policy, especially before *reformasi*, which tends to set aside Islam in the peripheral role, as can be seen from meager portion allocated to address the challenges of the global *ummah*.

The study by Hein, Leifer, Sukma, Suryadinata, Wicaksana, McMichael concluded limited role of Islam in informing Indonesian foreign policy due to several factors such as: (1) the state of national identity of Indonesia which is not a theocratic; (2) preference of leaders in isolating foreign policy from the influence of religious sentiments; (3) government's perception towards Islam; and (4) national interests that put religion and Islam in peripheral list. The study by Perwita, on the other hand, provided a slightly different conclusion that the extent of influence has been dynamic in different contexts, while Yulyadi preferred to draw positive conclusion by stating that Islam's influence has been increasingly assuming significant position, especially after the establishment of CIDES.

However, foreign policy is not a static process and outcome, as today's world has been constantly experiencing various global turbulences. Iran reoriented its posture by standing *vis a vis* Western bloc, once considered a close ally. Under the domination

of AKP, “Secular” Turkey made a significant shift in its foreign policy by engaging in most of *ummic* issues. The United States reshaped its foreign policy to the Middle East following the 9/11. In this context, Indonesia is no exception.

This dissertation grew out of my observation on two political events taking place in Indonesian political history. First, Indonesia voluntarily came to embrace the democratic system of governance, leading to both ideational change and structural appropriation. Supremacy of law, freedom of speech and assembly become the accepted currency of contemporary Indonesia. Adding to that, various political institutions and civil society organizations made way to the center of political activities, once considered taboo even in the minds of people. Islamists, amidst this substantial change, eyed the opportunity, captured the momentum, and began to actively participate in the democratic game, and interestingly turned to be an important player. Second, Indonesia’s posture has been more active, as indicated by its active involvement in various multilateral forums, and its aggressive “expansion” of importing genuine ideas and lessons learned. Indonesia, as Yudhoyono said, would not be the same at the international level. Indonesia is projected to be problem solver, global player, bridge builder, and having intention that its voice to be considered. His activism in Indonesian foreign policy resonates in every aspects of Indonesia’s foreign outlook, including those related to the Muslim concerns.

These two events combined make a compelling case to be scrutinized in light of further understanding between Yudhoyono’s foreign policy with regards to Muslim concerns and the rise of Islam in Indonesian politics. The central question posed, therefore, why Yudhoyono administration came to embrace active engagement with issues of Muslim concerns. In order to understand this, there are two main tasks need to accomplished: are there any changes, compared to the previous policies, in terms of

posture and outlook of Indonesian foreign policy during Yudhoyono administration? If there is a change, why such change happened?

In order to answer the above academic questions, this research begins with the assumption that foreign policy begins at home, meaning that domestic consideration weights more, compared to the individual and international explanations, in understanding the foreign policy decisions. The approach assumes that state behavior does not respond to the international system. But rather, the former shapes the later. Domestic politics becomes the determining factor of what makes the foreign policy. This model argued that state structure, state-society relationship, state identity, policy principles, domestic decision-making process, bureaucratic politics, internal power struggle are the necessary ingredients in the foreign policy formulation. Domestic politics, in this study, is understood in terms of state – Islam interaction since this focus fits the subject of study: Indonesian foreign policy with regard to Muslim concerns. The influence of Islam, however, is not treated as the major determinant in the policy formulation, but rather to understand to what extent the policy adopts and accommodates the reality within the Indonesian Muslim community.

Three reasons for choosing this level of analysis: (1) the relatively democratic country distributes political power to different actors, each of them interact to seek the best outcome. In other words, there has been no room for domination. This argument denies the possibility of using idiosyncratic explanation, in which personality of leader dominates the decision making process without checks and balances. (2) Islam has been responding the political opportunities by taking part in the system. In this case, democratic government needs to take into consideration and show significant level of responsiveness towards the constituents, which could be reflected, inter alia, in the process and implementation of foreign policy decisions. (3) Indonesia's contemporary politics has been vibrant, and full of dynamic interaction between different parties and

actors, making domestic threat more alarming than external pressure. Thus, coping with domestic necessities seemed a logical choice.

When this study calls the concept of Islam, influence, Muslim concerns, and foreign policy, it does not mean that the latter is considered Islamic or not, according to *sharīah* guidelines or confront it, and whether it is based on *Qurān* and *Sunnah*. This focus of study is different subject. By means of such concepts, this study attempts to portray the level of consideration of Indonesian foreign policy towards the issues that were considered as the contemporary challenges to the *ummah*, domestically or globally. Islam, adding to that, is treated, rather than merely political ideology that inspires people to do necessary acts and chose certain behavior, as political force capable of influencing the process directly or indirectly. The result of this dialectics could be a policy that voluntarily takes favorable position for certain actor, or halfheartedly accommodate the pressure and demands.

Foreign policy has been often described and characterized as “secular”, “profane arena”, thus denying any input and contribution from religious entities. However, this kind of perspective, not only has underestimated the real force of political Islam, but also represented austere academic position amidst the bustling and complex phenomenon of Islam – state relations.

7.2. Key Findings

7.2.1. Islam and Indonesian Foreign Policy Before *Reformasi*

Islam has been playing important role in the history of Indonesia even before the country gained its independence. The *ṣūfī* type of Islam that came to *nusantara* explained the peaceful acceptance by local people and easy entrance of Islam to the region. Islam was dominated mainly by the amalgamation between local traditions and Islamic teachings. The coming of colonialism power to the region has transformed the

religion as an influential force in inspiring struggle against the injustices, mobilizing people to stand for their dignity against the invaders. This transformation, combined with the departure of idea of Islamic reformism into minds of Muslim scholars who studied in the Middle East, resonated and further encouraged the establishment of several assemblies and organizations based on Islamic credentials. It has been noted that, in years before the independence, several organizations emerged such as *Jāmi'at al-Khayr* (officially in 1905), *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (1905), *Sarekat Islam* (1911), *Muhammadiyah* (1912), *al-Irshād* (officially in 1915), and *Persatuan Islam* (1923), *Jong Islamieten Bond* (1925), *Nahdlatul Ulama* (1926), *Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia* (1937). These associations are the reflection of Muslim activities in voicing their concern in different areas towards the future independence of Indonesia.

This significant role assumed by Islam in Indonesian history could not however be translated into political gains after the independence. The heated debate on the constitution, especially with regards to *Djakarta Charter* that ended in the adoption of *Pancasila* marked the first failure of political Islam in modern Indonesia. The struggle to reinsert *Djakarta Charter* resurfaced in the debates within *Konstituante* (1957 – 1959). The effort ended with the deadlock, resulting in the dismissal of *Konstituante*.

Islam, especially in terms of politics, has been further alienated when Soekarno introduced the concept of *Demokrasi Terpimpin*, amalgamated with the dismissal of *Masjumi*, the largest Islamic political parties in Indonesia's history. The image of Islam deteriorated with the alleged involvement of some prominent leaders of *Masjumi* in PRRI. With the full authority rested in president, Soekarno came to announce the concept of NASAKOM, the synthetic notion between three different streams: nationalism, socialism (communism), and religion, which was naturally welcomed by critics and negative reception.

The situation has been almost the same under the leadership of Soeharto, who was determined to bring normalcy and stability in terms of politics and economy to the country after erratic years of previous leader. In pursuing the purpose, Soeharto listed two important players at national level: military and Islam. As Soeharto was a military general, he found no difficulty in controlling the first element. With Islam, the case was different.

He chose to neutralize Islam as the basis for political mobilization by enacting several policies that put Islam under the microscope. The strategy of carrot and stick was used by recording Muslim social interests and subduing Muslim's political impulse. Winning 1971 election became the first priority for the government to advance the grip on socio-political situation in the country. Thus, political maneuver of Muslim elites was domesticated by establishing *Parmusi*, and decided later to unite all Islamic political parties under one platform, PPP, which was not allowed to use Islamic symbols and identities. The plan to marginalize political force encroached to the social organizations by making *Pancasila* mandatory for all organizations with no exception (policy of *azas tunggal*).

How does it relate to Indonesian foreign policy? With the sidelining of Islam from political contestation, Soekarno relatively stood at the apex of policy decisions, including foreign policy. The Islamic influences have been restrained. Developing sense of Islamic identity in Indonesian foreign policy could serve as the basis for Muslim politicians to advance their causes at the global level. Politically close to communist countries, Soekarno was in ideational fight with Natsir, who envisioned Indonesia close to the Western countries. With the banning of *Masjumi* and the introduction of *Demokrasi Terpimpin*, the impulse of political Islam was automatically waned and faded. Soekarno went further announcing axis of power consisting of Jakarta – Phnom Penh - Hanoi – Peking – Pyongyang, which was considered as axis of communism. In

light of this, Soekarno launched policy of *Ganyang Malaysia*. Despite being supported by Indonesian people, some political elites felt that Communist Party was behind the policy, which indicated to the limited consideration paid to the *serumpun* Malay race and commonly embraced religion between Indonesian and Malay people.

However, despite these policies, in some cases, Soekarno used Islam when it advanced and met his visions. In the case of Indonesia's attempt to collect international recognition, Indonesia willingly use Islamic identity to approach Middle East countries. In other cases, in advancing Indonesia's image as new emerging force that fought for anti-imperialism, Indonesia used Islam in its support to Pakistan's struggle over Kashmir.

Under Soeharto, domestic policy on Islam contained international dimension. In order to keep Islam under government's eye, Indonesian foreign policy once again was sterilized from Islamic influence. The process of depoliticizing Islam at domestic level contributed to the meager portion of Indonesian foreign policy addressing the *ummatic* problems. One of the most salient cases is the reluctant Indonesia's position to be full member of the only Islamic organization at the global level, OIC. Muslim community submitted their complaint with regard to unclear Indonesia's stand for Palestine. Indonesia has been involved with the Palestine cause as business as usual, making statement with no structured action initiated to support the Palestine people. Indeed, Indonesia supported PLO as form of political commitment, and recognized it as reliable partner. But the plan to establish PLO office in Jakarta was delayed due to fear of this organization's influence on spreading radical type of Islam.

However, in the final years of Soeharto, the president seemed to alter his political position on Islam. Coming close to Islam, Soeharto established ICMI, Muslim think – tank organization called CIDES, and daily newspaper *Republika*. Personally, he paid visit to Mecca to perform *hajj* (Islamic pilgrimage) in 1991, appointed DR. Quraisy

Shihab as his religious mentor, and began organizing religious sermons and *dhikir* at regular basis in his home at Cendana.

In this context, it is interesting to note that along with such proximity with Islam, Soeharto simultaneously made significant changes in calibrating Indonesian foreign policy, especially those related to the Muslim concerns. In the cause of Palestine, despite consistent rejection from military regarding the establishment of formal office for PLO in 1989, Indonesia concluded *Joint Communiqué* on the Opening of Diplomatic Relations between Indonesia and Palestine, signed by Minister Ali Alatas and Minister Farouq Kaddoumi. This agreement marked the beginning of official office of Palestine to work in Jakarta. Palestine Ambassador handed over credentials to Soeharto later in 1990.

Soeharto's changing political attitude towards Islam actuated the alteration from Indonesia's once reluctant position of being member of OIC to full engagement with the organization in 1991. Indonesia's growing intention to name the OIC within the list of priority was further strengthened by Soeharto's first working visit to Dakar, Senegal to attend the Summit. Moreover, in 1996, Indonesia hosted OIC Ministerial Meeting.

The Indonesian foreign policy has been the extension of domestic policy, which saw Islam as liability. It was a political contestation between Islam and state that dictated the trajectory of Indonesia's external posture. During Soekarno, the contestation between Islamic faction and nationalist faction on one hand, and Islam and communism on the other hands could provide answer to the absence of Islamic taste or Muslim preference in Indonesian foreign policy. During Soeharto, the political competition between Islam and military and government's boldest attempt to bring *Pancasila* as the sole platform brought foreign policy sterile from Islamic expression.

7.2.2. Indonesian Foreign Policy with regards to Muslim Concerns during Yudhoyono Administration

Soon after being elected as the president, in terms of external relations, Yudhoyono faced a daunting task to restore the image of Indonesia at the international arena. It is true to say that Indonesia was commended positively and applauded for its successful transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, which overturned some pessimistic predictions that Indonesia would follow similar fate of Yugoslavia marked by disintegration and separation.

However, various civil conflicts and act of terrorism emerged in different parts of Indonesia, namely Aceh, Maluku, and Bali bombing. Indonesia's national security was at risk. Concurrently, Indonesia's diplomatic machinery went through two major upheavals: East Timor determined to separate from Indonesia and gained its independence, and the US imposed military arms embargo to Indonesian forces. Yudhoyono was demanded to act strategically in responding to such situation. Within this context, the newly elected president decided to bring Indonesian foreign policy to the new level of activism.

With his new definition of *Bebas Aktif* tenet, Yudhoyono constructed foreign policy that is active rather than being reactive towards the issues of global concerns. Indonesia should be a peace maker, connected to all countries in the world, maintaining its policy of neutrality, holding certain international identity, and acting in furtherance of national interests.

Indonesia's democratic achievement granted the Yudhoyono administration the renewed confidence to be involved in various multilateral forums and be discussing global issues of common concerns. Several Yudhoyono's foreign policy attested such confidence. Indonesia has been involved in several traditional and non-traditional

international issues, such as global warming, climate change, human rights, democracy, and holding several international conferences and forums.

Yudhoyono pushed foreign policy to its possible limit. In addition to democratic achievement, Yudhoyono resorted to another strength, equally important, which was Islam. In this regards, Yudhoyono's approach has been different from previous administrations. Rather than seeing Islam as a liability, it was perceived as a considerable asset, capable of equipping Indonesia with necessary tools to speak and act at multilateral forums. How he used it?

First, Yudhoyono constructed international identity, upon which Indonesian foreign policy operates and functions. Stemming from the domestic strengths, this identity reflected the true face of Indonesia. Amongst these international identities was the fact that Indonesia is Muslim majority population marked by the noble values of moderation and toleration. Ever since, Indonesia's diplomatic glossaries have been occupied by some jargons common to the Islamic world, such as *rahmatan lilālamīn*, *ummatan wasaṭan* and *tasāmuh*. This identity has been used during the UN General Assembly. Amidst the global critics to the UN regarding the imbalances of UN Security Council representation, Indonesia used this identity to bargain for permanent seat. In 2008, Minister Wirajuda opined that Security Council needs to capture the global aspiration of Muslim community. It could be achieved through equal distribution of permanent seats in the UNSC by including them in the decision making process. He proposed that Indonesia as the biggest Muslim country fit that criteria.

This identity, even more so, became more active in Indonesia's relations with "non – Muslim countries". The identity surfaced mostly during interfaith dialogue forums, which was initiated mainly to reduce the gap of understanding between Islam and the West. Indonesia created bilateral interfaith dialogue forum with 22 key countries, 77 per cent came from countries of western hemisphere.

Second, this identity encouraged the feeling of determination to be actively involved in the challenges facing the contemporary global *ummah*. Henceforth, Indonesia attempted to be part of global discussion and action to address numerous problems. Four main challenges are identified. Chief among that has been the widespread *Islamophobia*. This attitude grew out of lack of information on the real face of Islam due to several reasons, particularly the partial coverage of media outlets, such as the irresponsible depiction of the most pivotal person in Muslim theological thinking, the prophet Muhammad, by western newspapers. These actions have, most often, used the concept of freedom of speech as the pretext. In dealing with that, Indonesia initiated Global Inter Media Dialogue in 2006. Another problem facing the *ummah* has been the disunity among different factions, leading to their deep immersion in the internal conflict. Sunni – Shiite conflict and Hamas Fatah for instance. Hence, Indonesia rendered help and committed to be a neutral venue for discussion amongst those conflicting factions. Apart from its success, Indonesia has shown its interest and concern towards such *ummatic* problems. With regards to the problem of minority Muslim, such as Rohingya and the Southern Philippines, Indonesia has been actively involved in offering the solution and alleviating the humanitarian sufferings resulting from the conflict. Equally important issue was the Palestine cause. While traditional political efforts, such as voicing the concerns at various multilateral forums, issuing formal statements and adopting numerous resolutions, Indonesia made breakthrough by refocusing its attention to the people of Palestine. In this regard, with the platform of NAASP (New Asia – Africa Strategic Partnership), Indonesia provided capacity building for Palestine people, mostly for civil servants, and police officers, which was considered as the backbone of Palestine state. It was aimed at creating and preparing for the next generation equipped with necessary skills and important merits and capable of

governing themselves in the effective system once the Palestine becomes an independent state.

Third, Indonesia was in an attempt to forge closer bilateral relations with the Middle East countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the cradle of Muslim civilization. Indonesia's relations with the Kingdom has been harmonious and conducted as business as usual with the common target of maintaining diplomatic relations at positive terms. The two countries have been in mutual need as salient in the case of Indonesia migrant workers and pilgrimage. Despite that, there have been rarely found strategic joint communiqué or agreement to solve the issues of common concerns. If a problem occurred, the solution would be on "ad-hoc" basis. The reasons for such distance could be varied. The Kingdom is not a powerful country politically that could dictate the future path of international outlook. In terms of Islamic thoughts, proximity with Saudi could provide wider avenue for the coming of Wahhabi's ideology, which was seen as applying strict interpretation of Islam. Yudhoyono attempted to put an end. He then puts Saudi on the list of priority. It was seen from the number of strategic agreements concluded between the two countries, including that on defense and security cooperation, and on protection of Indonesian domestic workers.

Fourth, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been increasingly aware of the importance of civil society engagement in both formulation and implementation. In the initiative of interfaith dialogue, the government collaborated with Islamic organizations, notably with *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* to advance Indonesia's posture as the bridge builder between Islam and the West. The collaborative efforts have been institutionalized. With support of government, *Nahdlatul Ulama* initiated ICIS, while *Muhammadiyah* created World Peace Forum. In implementing the policy, rather than being dominated by career diplomats, the government invited and gave the chance for

Muslim scholars from those organizations to represent Indonesia to speak at international forum.

7.2.3. Factors Leading to the Changes in Indonesian Foreign Policy with Regards to Muslim Concerns

This dissertation argues that the changing relations between Islam and state following *reformasi* has been playing role in bringing Islamic nuance in Indonesian foreign policy. It is related to two interrelated matters. First, Islam, in terms of politics, has been capturing the democratic momentum by actively engaging the democratic game. Through the lifting political barriers that once prevented Islam from politics, Islam rose to the domestic political scene, participated in the election, secured significant seats in the parliament, and built political coalition with the government. In this case, Islam has transformed to be important political player needed to be calculated by the government. Having in mind that foreign policy is considered one of the ways for the government to either widen political backup, or secure domestic political legitimacy, it seemed like logical option to include “Islamic” nuance in Indonesian foreign policy. Simultaneously, the constitutional amendments have widened the involvement of other actors, including parliament, in policy decision making process including foreign policies, very much different from earlier common practice. Hence, foreign policy was democratized to include and allow the active participation of third actors. Foreign policy has not become an elitist, in a sense being dominated by state executives. In this regards, Islam contributed in shaping, though not act as the sole factor, the outcome of foreign policy. The case of Indonesia’s changing position on Nuclear Iran and Rohingya provided clear example how public voices and parliament redirected foreign policy.

Second, Islam has been present in Indonesian politics, especially after *reformasi*, in the soft format, as indicated by loyalty to *Pancasila* and the abandoning

the idea of Islamic state establishment. Despite the fact that there are some Islamist groups still consider the establishment of Islamic state and full implementation of *sharīah* as the ultimate agenda, the majority however have refocused their attention to other substantial and practical issues, relevant to the contemporary political system adopted by Indonesia. This new format of political Islam has removed the obstacles and fear of relations between Islam and state that existed in previous administrations, increased the level of state's confidence towards Islam, and eventually encouraged state to incorporate Islam into Indonesian foreign policy. The use of international identity that relates to Islamic terminologies, among others, indicates such increasing confidence. The overt animosity between state and Islam, which existed in previous administrations, was among others due to the fear towards the Islamist groups' demand to fully implement *sharīah*, challenging *Pancasila*, and rejecting the concept of democracy, provided the government the ample reasons for not allowing Islam to be present in foreign policy, or showing significant gesture of leaning towards it. This process has enabled Islam to make inroads to Indonesian foreign policy, either peacefully in form of state's voluntary action to incorporate Muslim aspiration into the state policies, or dialectically in form of pressure from Muslim communities to exert their influence.

7.3. Recommendation

There are some suggestions for further research to be done.

1. As this research has been particularly dealing with the issues of Muslim concerns from domestic explanation, there is a need to be specifically focusing on one single issue that intersects across administrations, the case of Palestine for instance by looking at actors involved in this process, or two issues within the same administration, the case of Palestine and Bosnia for instance.

Particularly with the case of Palestine and Bosnia, there is a need to answer why Indonesia's position towards the two cases has been different (supports the independence of Pakistan, but remains silent with the later), despite the pressure from community and parliament are relatively the same?

2. Despite the author prefers the domestic explanation in analyzing the issue of foreign policy, especially in the case of Indonesia, there is also a need to look at the subject from different angles, which is personality of leader or international context. These two approaches will surely enrich the intellectual resources for future reference. Adding to that, with the fast changing situation in the international context that requires quick decision, it seems the personality of leader more useful in understanding the reasons and factors leading to the policy. Hence, the careful selection of cases is extremely important.
3. With the coming of new actors in the field of foreign policy, more policy actors emerge, including some Islamic organizations. Despite foreign policy is still dominated by executive, but the definition of diplomacy has been widened to include parliament, social organizations, and even people. In this context, it is recommended to analyze further these types of diplomacy. For instance, the peace "diplomacy" conducted by *Muhammadiyah* in Southern Philippines, or Parliamentary Diplomacy in cases of Muslim concerns.

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ATTACHMENT A

GLOSSARIES

<i>Abangan / Kejawen</i>	: Syncretic version Islam
<i>Azas Tunggal</i>	: The Sole Foundation
<i>Bebas Aktif</i>	: Doctrine of Independent and Active Foreign Policy
<i>Dalīl</i>	: Reasons
<i>Da'wah</i>	: Islamic preaching
<i>Dārul Islām</i>	: Islamic State
<i>Demokrasi Terpimpin</i>	: Guided Democracy
<i>Dwi fungsi</i>	: Dual Functions
<i>Ganyang Malaysia</i>	: Confront Malaysia
<i>Gerakan Tajdīd</i>	: reformist movement
<i>al-Hadīth</i>	: Prophet's saying
<i>Hak Angket</i>	: Right to Inquiry
<i>Kebangsaan</i>	: Nationalist
<i>Kemenlu</i>	: <i>Kementerian Luar Negeri</i> Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<i>Kitab Kuning</i>	: Islamic traditional literatures
<i>Kyais</i>	: Islamic teachers
<i>Kokar-Mendagri</i>	: <i>Korps Karyawan Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri – Kokar Mendagri</i> Corps of Civil Servants
<i>Konstituante</i>	: Constitutional Assembly of Indonesia
<i>Maṣālih Mursalah</i>	: Public Interests
<i>Orde baru</i>	: Literally means New Order, to indicate specific time when Indonesia was ruled by Soeharto
<i>Pancasila</i>	: Five Pillars
<i>Panitia Sembilan</i>	: Committe of Nine
<i>Pembinaan</i>	: Guidance
<i>Perda Sharī'ah</i>	: <i>Sharī'ah</i> -based bylaws
<i>Permen</i>	: <i>Peraturan Menteri</i> Minister Regulation
<i>Pesantren</i>	: Islamic Boarding School
<i>Piagam Djakarta</i>	: Djakarta Charter
<i>Pidato</i>	: Accountability Speech
<i>Pertanggungjawaban</i>	

<i>Poros Tengah</i>	: Central Axis
<i>al-Qurān</i>	: Islamic holy book
<i>Rahmatan lil ālamīn</i>	: Blessing and prosperity for the universe
<i>Reformasi</i>	: Reformation
<i>Santri</i>	: Devoted Muslim
<i>Sharīa</i>	: Islamic laws
<i>Shūmubu</i>	: <i>Kantor Urusan Agama</i> Office of Religious Affairs
<i>Sekber Golkar</i>	: <i>Sekretariat Bersama Golkar</i> Joint Secretariat of Golkar
<i>Setgab Parpol Koalisi</i>	: <i>Sekretariat Gabungan Partai Politik Koalisi</i> Joint Secretariat of Coalition of Political Parties
<i>ṣūfī</i>	: Mysticism in Islam
<i>Tasāmuh</i>	: Toleration
<i>al-Ukhuwwah al-Islāmiyyah</i>	: Islamic solidarity
<i>Ulamā</i>	: Muslim scholars, preachers
<i>Ummah</i>	: Muslim community
<i>Ummatan wasaṭan</i>	: Moderate Community