

**NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF *MEMRI'S* ENGLISH
TRANSLATIONS OF ARABIC EDITORIALS ON *DAESH***

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**NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF *MEMRI'S* ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF
ARABIC EDITORIALS ON *DAESH***

ABSTRACT

The translation of political media narratives is a complex process wherein translation is regarded as a part of intercultural communication, and hence, translators are deemed competent in both the source and the target languages. The outcome of translation is shaped by the translators' ideological, cultural, political and social knowledge and agenda (Valdeón, 2007). This study discusses the dynamic role of the translators in promoting certain ideologies and political agendas by presenting stories through the lens of an ideologically-laden meta-narrative. It compares the representation of '*Daesh*' in the narratives of Arabic editorials with their English translations which are published online by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). MEMRI is a Washington-based think tank and a pro-Israeli organisation, widely cited by Western, especially the US, leading media outlets. Original data consists of 46 Arabic editorials and their 25 English translations were collected for the purpose of this study. The study adopts the interdisciplinary narrative theory-informed analysis elaborated in Baker (2006) as its theoretical framework in order to analyse and explain the different embedded ideologies, values and cultures in the translations of the Arabic media editorials into English. In this context, narrative is a framework that seeks to legitimise, normalise and justify certain actions to the public. According to narrative theory, translators are considered as decisive participants in building knowledge as well as constructing political and social realities. The findings of this study suggest that narrativity features, selective appropriation in particular, are significant tools in the reconstruction of reality in translation. Through translation, MEMRI draws upon the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' in furthering its ideologically-laden agenda of

terrorist Arabs and Muslims by publishing selective and decontextualized excerpts and reframed concepts such as *Daesh* (داعش), *Jihad* (جهاد), and *Jizya* (جزية). MEMRI reframes the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* at three different levels; paratextual, contextual and textual. At the paratextual level, MEMRI is found to reframe the Arabic original narratives through titles, introductions (prefaces), images and their captions, in-text headings (internal titles), and endnotes and glossaries. At the contextual level, MEMRI reframes the thematic and episodic, and the temporal and spatial settings of the original narratives as well as the argumentative relationality; the construction of arguments. At the textual level, MEMRI re-framings of the original narratives are of two types: selective appropriation that includes omission and addition, and lexical and grammatical choices that includes lexical choice, grammatical shift and reorganisation of materials. Therefore, this study significantly draws attention to the critical role of translators and translation agencies in legitimising ideologically-reconstructed narratives in translation. It also highlights the impact of the value-laden reframing in negotiating the semantic and syntactic structures of the source narratives. It seeks the awareness of the public of the different rival circulated narratives by the media.

Keywords: *Daesh*, media narrative, MEMRI, translation, the War on Terror

**ANALISA NARATIF *MEMRI* TERJEMAHAN BAHASA INGGERIS BAGI
EDITORIAL BAHASA ARAB MENGENAI *DAESH***

ABSTRAK

Penterjemahan naratif media politik merupakan satu proses yang kompleks di mana terjemahan dianggap sebagai sebahagian daripada komunikasi antara budaya, dan oleh itu, para penterjemah disifatkan sebagai fasih dalam kedua- dua bahasa sumber dan sasaran. Hasil penterjemahan dibentuk oleh ideologi, budaya, politik, dan pengetahuan sosial dan agenda para penterjemah (Valdeón, 2007). Kajian ini membincangkan peranan dinamik para penterjemah dalam mempromosikan ideologi tertentu dan agenda- agenda politik dengan memaparkan cerita- cerita melalui kanta yang sarat dengan ideologi dan meta- naratif. Ianya membandingkan representasi '*Daesh*' dalam editorial naratif Arab dengan terjemahan bahasa Inggerisnya yang diterbitkan atas talian oleh Institut Penyelidikan Media Timur Tengah (MEMRI). MEMRI terdiri daripada para pemikir yang berpusat di Washington dan sebuah organisasi pro- Israel, dirujuk secara meluas oleh Barat, terutama sekali Amerika Syarikat, outlet media utama. Data asal mengandungi 46 editorial Arab dan 25 terjemahan bahasa Inggerisnya dikumpulkan bagi tujuan kajian ini. Kajian ini mengambil analisis interdisipliner teori- maklumat naratif yang dihuraikan dalam Baker (2006) sebagai kerangka teori kajian bagi menganalisa dan menerangkan berlainan ideologi tersirat, nilai- nilai dan budaya dalam penterjemahan oleh media editorial Arab kepada bahasa Inggeris. Dalam konteks ini, naratif merupakan kerangka yang bertujuan untuk mengesahkan, menormalisasikan dan menjustifikasikan tindakan tertentu kepada umum. Menurut teori naratif, para penterjemah dianggap sebagai peserta berpengaruh dalam pembinaan pengetahuan dan juga membina realiti politik dan sosial. Hasil penemuan bagi kajian ini mencadangkan bahawa ciri- ciri naratif, pengagihan selektif khususnya, adalah alatan yang penting dalam pembinaan realiti dalam terjemahan. Melalui terjemahan, MEMRI mengambil

kira meta- naratif oleh Peperangan ke atas Keganasan dalam melanjutkan agenda yang sarat dengan ideologi mengenai pengganas Arab dan Muslim dengan menerbitkan petikan- petikan yang selektif dan dekontekstual serta konsep- konsep rangka semula seperti *Daesh* (داعش), *Jihad* (جهاد), and *Jizya* (جزية). MEMRI merangka semula naratif Arab berkenaan *Daesh* melalui tiga peringkat; paratekstual, kontekstual, dan tekstual. Di peringkat paratekstual, MEMRI didapati merangka semula naratif Arab asal melalui tajuk, pengenalan (pendahuluan) imej- imej dan deskripsinya, tajuk dalam teks (tajuk dalaman) nota akhir dan senarai istilah. Di peringkat kontekstual, MEMRI merangka semula tematik dan peristiwa, serta tempoh masa dan ruang persekitaran bagi naratif asal dan juga hubung kait penghujahan; pembinaan hujah. Di peringkat tekstual, perangkaan semula naratif asal oleh MEMRI adalah berdasarkan dua bentuk pengelasan: pengagihan selektif yang mengandungi kesilapan dan penambahan, serta pilihan leksikal dan tatabahasa yang mengandungi pilihan leksikal, perubahan tatabahasa dan organisasi semula bahan- bahan. Oleh itu, kajian ini amat mengambil kira peranan kritikal para penterjemah dan agensi- agensi penterjemahan dalam mengesahkan naratif binaan ideologi dalam terjemahan. Ia juga menonjolkan kesan bagi perangkaan semula nilai yang sarat dalam perundingan struktur semantik dan sintaksis bagi naratif asal. Ia memupuk kesedaran umum berkenaan berlainan naratif pesaing yang diedarkan melalui media.

Kata kunci: *Daesh*, naratif media, MEMRI, terjemahan, Peperangan ke atas Keganasan

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LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS

aka	:	also known as
DAESH	:	<i>ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah fī 'l-'Irāq wa-sh-Shām</i>
ISIS	:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
MEMRI	:	The Middle East Media Research Institute
NA	:	Narrative Analysis
NT	:	Narrative Theory
SD	:	Special Dispatch
SL	:	Source Language
ST	:	Source Text
TL	:	Target Language
TT	:	Target Text

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The 'War on Terror' is a 21st century theme that drives on-going global conflicts and according to its adherents, is central to global security. Within the context of the War on Terror, this study seeks to identify the features of narrativity used in reconstructing reality of the narratives in question by drawing upon narrative theory as elaborated in Baker (2006). This study further explains how features of narrativity are reframed to coincide with certain institutional narratives. Such reframing is meant to have an effect on readers to subscribe to the intended narrative while rejecting other possible narratives. This study analyses narratives on *Daesh* in Arabic editorial articles and the translations of these articles that are published online by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).

This first chapter provides a background of the study's topic including the current wars in the Middle East and the rise of terrorist groups, namely *Daesh*. This chapter also discusses the problems and the significance of the research, establishes the research objectives and questions, and concludes with a note on terminology and a summary of the main topics.

1.1 Background of the Study

Terror attacks and military conflicts have become one of the world's primary concerns. These concerns are due to the phenomenon that terror attacks and military conflicts are no longer localised and can potentially affect every nation. Conflict can be political, economic, religious, social and even academic, and has become the norm due to differences among individuals and/or groups. Thus, those who belong to both poles of a conflict seek to legitimise events and actions through narrations of stories that represent

both points of views and in such a way that both goals are supported (Baker, 2006). Therefore, translation as a means of communication enables those who are at both poles of a conflict to achieve their goals by using narrations of various stories targeted to the international sector.

Translation, in this regard, is an accessible (re)framing device that inserts particular ideological loadings in the (re)construction and (re)negotiation of the source narrative (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). It is assumed that when one looks at the source text with different intentions and from different perspectives, different interpretations of the text will arise. Accordingly, different translators produce differently translated texts and different readers of the same translated text suggest different interpretations (Ietcu-Fairclough, 2008). A translator is thus a text producer albeit one who can produce a text that is different from the original and that is based on a set of assumptions and judgments on the cognitive environment of the target text user and culture (Hatim & Mason, 1997). However, such assumptions and judgments represented in the translator's systematic linguistic choices are considered as social and ideological settings of the text production and reception.

The 'War on Terror' offers a prime example of international conflict where translation is "central to the ability of all parties to legitimize their version of events" (Baker, 2006, p. 2). In the present day, the narrative of the 'War on Terror' is:

"Aggressively sustained and promoted through a myriad of channels across the entire world [...] that cuts across geographical and national boundaries and directly impacts the lives of every one of us, in every sector of society." (Baker, 2006, p. 45).

It is suggested that framing the War on Terror narrative led to the imprisonment of Al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony for seven years in Spain for his alleged links with Al-Qaeda. Alony was first arrested in September 2003 by the Spanish police under suspicion of being affiliated with Al-Qaeda. This suspicion was partly based on Alony's ability to interview Al-Qaeda's then leader, Osama Bin Laden, a month after 11 September 2001, and also due to his coverage of both wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In an attempt to establish connections between Alony and Al-Qaeda, the Spanish police employed de-contextualized and ideologically framed excerpts from Alony's conversations. As Taibi and Martin elaborated:

“Alony and his co-defendants' indictments were based at least partially on tapped conversations, which were inadequately translated [...] were framed in a manner that served the case of the prosecution in the context of the 'War on Terror'.” (2012, p. 78).

Additionally, the media has a great influence over audiences such that much more belief is placed in the media than ever before (Zhang, 2011). Accordingly, Bielsa and Bassnett argue that, “translation is of the utmost importance in the news agencies and that it is inseparable from other journalistic practices that intervene in the production of news” (2009, p. 56). However, it is very likely that most readers of foreign news on the Internet and printed newspapers are unaware of the major role that translation plays in mass media news reporting (Schäffner & Bassnett, 2010). Therefore, the aim of this study is to shed light on the role of translators and translation agencies of international media outlets in inserting their own perspectives and agendas into the target text. More specifically, this study analyses the narratives on *Daesh* (also known as ISIS, ISIL and IS) in the Arabic editorials and their ideologically motivated English translations published online by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI).

1.2 The Contemporary Civil Wars in the Middle East and the Establishment of *Daesh*

The contemporary civil wars happening in the Middle East and North Africa (also known as: the Arab Uprisings and the Arab Spring) are both violent and non-violent protests and demonstrations that started in Tunisia on 17 December 2010 aiming to overthrow the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (Cottle, 2011). Very soon after, the uprising spread to other Arabian countries, mainly: Egypt on 25 January 2011 that resulted in the overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime; Libya on 17 February 2011 that resulted in the overthrow of the Muammar Gaddafi regime and an ongoing civil war; Yemen on 14 January 2011 that resulted in the overthrow of the Ali Abdullah Saleh regime and an ongoing civil war; Syria on 15 March 2011 that resulted in the killings of hundreds of thousands people and an ongoing war among the conflict parties; and Bahrain on 14 February 2011 that was ended by the intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces (Dalacoura, 2012). In addition to the main civil wars that took place in the aforementioned countries of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, large street demonstrations took place in Oman on 17 January 2011, Morocco on 20 February 2011, Kuwait on 19 February 2011, Jordan on 14 January 2011, Iraq on 12 February 2011 and Algeria on 29 December 2010. These street demonstrations resulted mainly in governmental changes. In addition to these major demonstrations, minor protests also took place in Saudi Arabia on 11 March 2011. Social media outlets, namely Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and blogs, played a significant role in coordinating, expanding and managing these demonstrations and protests (Pace & Cavatorta, 2012). The civil wars, demonstrations and protests were all created by the local people who refused the tyrannical regimes and the unsatisfactory economic and social situations they were living in. No major foreign intervention was reported in these conflicts except in the Syrian case, the main research site of this thesis.

1.2.1 The Syrian Civil War

The Syrian Civil War is one of the earliest Arab uprisings in modern times. It started as a minor protest on 15 March 2011 in the southern city of Daraa that demanded the government to enhance the national economy and politics. Thereafter, protesters sought the overthrow of the Bashar Al-Assad regime. Protests developed into a nationwide civil war due to the regime's severe response (Dalacoura, 2012). Subsequently and quickly, the war grew into an armed conflict that currently includes regional and international armed organisations and players. The conflict parties at the local level include: the regime of Bashar Al-Assad (the government), *Daesh*, *Al-Nusra* Front, the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Democratic Forces (Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016). At the regional level, the participants in the Syrian conflict are Hezbollah, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. At the international level, the intervenors are mainly the USA, France, Russia, the UK, Canada and Australia (McInnis, 2016).



Figure 1.1: Syria on the World Map

The on-going Syrian Civil War is also the most influential civil war in modern times at the local, regional and international levels. The conflict resulted in the world's highest death toll, recording a minimum of 15,000 deaths for the year of 2012 (Themnér & Wallenstein, 2013). On 30 August 2016, the death toll reached 450,000, including

50,000 children, (I am Syria website)¹ and the total number of Syrian refugees in the neighbouring countries reached 4.8 million on 16 August 2016 (the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)².

The Syrian conflict is central to world security since it not only includes regional and international players, but additionally, the military organisation *Daesh* has extended its activities and terrorist attacks into the international sector. This has included Tunisia attacks on 18 March 2015 at the National Museum and against a tourist resort on 26 June 2015 that resulted in the deaths of 60 people who were mostly European tourists, the attacks in France on 13 November 2015 in Paris, the attack on 14 July 2016 in Nice that resulted in the deaths of 214 people, and the Belgium bombings on 22 March 2016 in Brussels that resulted in the deaths of 30 people (The New York Times, 2016)³.

1.2.2 *Daesh*: Its history and ideology

In these contemporary times, the translations, reports and stories on *Daesh* illustrate serious examples of the various ideological viewpoints of media outlets regarding the so-called 'reality'. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or its most preferred original Arabic acronym *Daesh* (داعش) (that disconnects the group from any link to Islam and furthermore, points to the absence of state constituents as I argue in my analysis), is a military group that emerged as an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq in 2004. It was first called Al-Qaeda in Iraq under the leadership of the Jordanian Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi organized to fight the American occupation in Iraq (Welby, 2014). After six military groups unified in 2006, the group changed its name to the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq. In the same year, Al-Zarqawi was killed and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi was nominated as the leader of the group. The organisation then changed its name to the

¹ <http://www.iamsyria.org/death-tolls.html> [accessed 30 August 2016]

² <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php> [accessed 30 August 2016]

³ http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/03/25/world/map-isis-attacks-around-the-world.html?_r=0 [published 16 July 2016, accessed 29 August 2016]

Islamic State of Iraq. In 2010, Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi was killed which then led to Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi's assuming leadership. As the Syrian Civil War in 2011 erupted, the group extended its activities to cover Syria under the name Al-Nusra Front (جبهة النصرة). In 2013, the group announced the emergence of the Al-Nusra Front resulting in the formation of *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (Daesh)*, which literally means the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. However, in 2014 the Al-Nusra Front announced its dissociation from the group. In the same year, Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of a Caliphate, thus changing the group name to the *al-Dawla al-Islamiya* (literally meaning the Islamic State) and, allowing the group to extend its activities worldwide. The international sector and Muslims across the world have criticised the group for its violent attacks and executions (McCabe, 2016). The United Nations, the European Union and many countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia have even designated the organisation as a terrorist organisation. Among several extreme violent attacks and executions, the group's attacks in Paris in November 2015 resulted in the killing of 130 people (McCabe, 2016), and the execution by burning to death of the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh in January 2015.

With regard to the ideology of *Daesh*, one cannot assess their ideology without the intervention of one's ideology and agenda. However, most Arab and Western officials, journalists, politicians and scholars classify *Daesh* as a '*jihadi/takfiri*' organisation (Wood, 2015; Pourhamzavi, 2015; Gelvin, 2015; Al-Rawi, 2016). The term '*jihadi*' in this perspective refers to "Muslims who wage war against those they perceive to be the enemies of Islam" (Gelvin, 2015, p. 136). The term '*takfiri*' refers to "Muslims who pronounce others who claim to be part of the Islamic community to be, in fact, non-Muslims" (Gelvin, 2015, p. 136). Others identify *Daesh*'s ideology as

'*Jihadi-Salafism*' (in short: '*jihadism*') deriving its ideology from the 'school of Islamic political thought' that "is predicated on an extremist and minoritarian reading of Islamic scripture that is also textually rigorous, deeply rooted in a premodern theological tradition, and extensively elaborated by a recognized cadre of religious authorities" (Bunzel, 2015, p. 7; Stern & Berger, 2015; Crooke, 2015; Yassin-Kassab & Al-Shami, 2016; Hammond, 2016). The term '*Wahhabism*' is also used to describe the ideology of *Daesh* (Butt, 2015; Edwards, 2015; ben Lazreg, 2016; Determann, 2016). *Wahhabism* refers to an Islamic reform movement established by the Islamic preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the 18th century in Arabia calling for the purity of Islam and restoring the 'golden age' when Islam was superior and denying any *bida'* (harmful innovations) (Valentine, 2015). These scholarly-defined and ideological-laden terms overlap at some points and replace each other at times. The term '*jihadism*' is used interchangeably with 'violent extremism' and 'Islamism' which replaced 'fundamentalism' (Sedgwick, 2015). Therefore, *Daesh* derived its ideology from Al-Qaeda adopting the Islamic principles of life (i.e. *Sharia*; Islamic law) generated from the Quran and the Hadith in all life aspects including the banking and finance system, social communication, the people's obedience to leadership, the ruling system, the penal system and the national defence strategies and policy against foreign attacks. Additionally, both Al-Qaeda and *Daesh* believe, as all Muslims, in *Jihad* (fighting against the aggressors of a Muslim country) as understood in Islam, and that is of a different interpretation from the English understanding that links *Jihad* to terror and violence (for the detailed argument see the analysis of '*Jihad*' in the following chapters). The most defining distinction in both Al-Qaeda and *Daesh* ideology is the call for '*Global Jihad*'; in the sense that if there is any attack against any Muslim country, all Muslims including those in other countries, including non-Muslim countries, must travel to that Muslim country and help to defeat the foreign attackers

(Choucai, 2014)⁴. However, although both Al-Qaeda and *Daesh* share the same beliefs in Sharia law, each group differs in its interpretation (i.e. *Fiqh*), which is the main conflict point between the two groups.

1.2.2.1 The geographical coverage of *Daesh*

The geographical coverage of *Daesh* varies across time depending on the status of the anti-*Daesh* operations. However, its activities reached the international sector when it declared itself a worldwide Caliphate on 29 June 2014 (Bunzel, 2015). *Daesh* started its activities in Iraq to stand against the US-led occupation of Iraq. It then extended its activities to cover Syria soon after the start of the Syrian civil conflict in 2011. As of mid-2015, *Daesh* controlled 50% of Syria including the city of Deir al-Zour and the Al-Raqqah province, the *Daesh* headquarter. In early 2015, *Daesh* also controlled 40% of Iraq including the areas of Kirkuk, Diyala Province, Saladin, Al-Anbar and Nineveh. However, by the end of 2015, *Daesh* was defeated in some areas in Syria and Iraq reducing its controlled areas by 14% - 30 %; by 20% in Syria including the border city of Tell Abyad while *Daesh* lost 40% of its controlled areas in Iraq including two strategic cities: Ramadi and Tikrit (Al Alam News, 2016)⁵.




Figure 1.2: The Geographical Coverage of *Daesh* – as of 9 February 2016 adopted from Alalam.ir

⁴ <http://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/files/isi/2014/11/2014112361054982947.html> [accessed 6 September 2016]

⁵ <http://en.alalam.ir/news/1787749> [published 9 February 2016, accessed 8 September 2016]

Moreover, *Daesh* has significant activities and presence in Libya. The group began its presence in Libya as early as 2011 in the city of Sirte during the Libyan uprising against Gaddafi's regime (Fitzgerald & Toaldo, 2015). The organisational form of *Daesh* in Libya started to appear in 2014 in the town of Derna with several Libyan fighters who returned from Syria. As of late 2014, *Daesh* controlled areas covering the three provinces of Fezzan, Tripoli, and Barqa (Fitzgerald & Toaldo, 2015). In 2015, *Daesh* lost many areas including its headquarters in Derna and Sirte (Dalaa, 2016)⁶. *Daesh* is also present in other countries but in different forms. There are forty military groups located in twenty countries including the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tunisia and Algeria that have expressed their loyalty to *Daesh* (Al Alam News, 2016)⁵. In addition to these groups, several individuals support *Daesh* in Western countries including France, Belgium and Germany. These supporters are the ones who perform attacks on *Daesh*'s behalf in some Western countries as punishment and retribution for their involvement with the anti-*Daesh* coalition in Iraq and Syria (Engel, 2015).

1.2.2.2 *Daesh* and world security

As of 25 July 2016, 143 attacks have been carried out worldwide by *Daesh* and its supporters in 29 countries other than Syria and Iraq that have resulted in the deaths of 2,043 people (CNN, 2016)⁷. *Daesh* had been given a little attention since its emergence from Al-Qaeda. However, in 2014 *Daesh* appeared on the international scene after it controlled large areas in Syria and Iraq and announced itself a worldwide Caliphate that threatens world security at both the regional and international levels (Manciulli, 2015).

At the regional level, *Daesh* triggered instability in the countries of Lebanon, Jordan,

⁶ <http://aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A3%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%86%D8%B8%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B9%D8%B4-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%AA%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%84-%D8%B2%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A/638397> [published 31 August 2016, accessed 8 September 2016]

⁷ <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/17/world/mapping-isis-attacks-around-the-world/> [published 1 September 2016, accessed 11 September 2016]

Egypt, Turkey and Cyprus resulting from the displacement of millions of Syrians and Iraqis who fled *Daesh*'s killings to these countries. These affected countries and neighbouring countries, including the countries in the Arabian Gulf and in North Africa, faced serious threats of attack by *Daesh*. *Daesh* also aims to control all of the regional countries, including Europe by 2020, as a recent released map shows (see below).



Figure 1.3: *Daesh*'s map by 2020 adopted from the Mirror Online⁸

At the international level, threats from *Daesh* involve two sources: direct attacks and foreign fighters. The direct attacks have been discussed under section 1.2.1 The Syrian Civil War in this thesis. Since the establishment of *Daesh*, foreign fighters have been a main cornerstone in the structure of *Daesh* which has been an ordeal for threatened counties and governments, especially Western states. This ordeal is caused by increasing numbers of foreign fighters who travel from around the world to participate in the fighting in Syria and who receive military and ideological training. These foreign fighters are like ticking time bombs upon their return to their countries especially in Europe where citizenship in a European country allows individuals the freedom to travel within the Union and many other countries (Manciulli, 2015). The estimated number of foreign fighters who have travelled to Syria since 2011 varies from

⁸ <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/isis-unveils-chilling-new-map-6224227> [published 9 August 2015, accessed 14 September 2016]

source to source, but is approximately 30,000 to 40,000 fighters from 100 countries (Russia Today, 2016)⁹. The top ten countries that foreign fighters originate from are Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Jordan, Turkey, France, Morocco, Lebanon, Egypt and Germany respectively (The Telegraph, 2016)¹⁰. *Daesh*'s recruitment machine depends largely on the Internet, namely social media (Baxter & Davidson, 2016).

1.2.2.3 *Daesh* and the media

As a result of the technological revolution and the emergence of the Internet, many newspapers and magazines worldwide went bankrupt and closed due to large revenue losses from advertisers that favoured the Internet. The surviving newspapers, radio and TV stations started to consider news as a 'commodity' to overcome the financial crisis. Therefore, in understanding news as a product, what is reported and how it is reported follow business judgments (Nacos et al., 2011). Reporting terror attacks and threats are the ultimate business for news agencies to attract an audience of societies targeted by news agencies, since narratives of terroristic violence contain grief, panic, fear, shock, tragedy and drama.

Since its emergence, *Daesh* has largely employed technology, mainly the Internet and social media networks, in its operations of recruiting foreign fighters, marketing itself, communicating and directing support worldwide and expanding its virtual network to cover the globe. *Daesh* as represented in its 'Ministry of Information', promotes a different image of itself as a role model of wealth and justice for an 'Islamic State' through its Twitter and Facebook accounts, *Dabiq Magazine* in English and French, short films, Al-Bayan FM and its TV channel Khilafa.

⁹ <https://www.rt.com/usa/345269-40000-foreign-terrorists-syria/> [published 3 June 2016, accessed 15 September 2016]

¹⁰ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/29/iraq-and-syria-how-many-foreign-fighters-are-fighting-for-isil/> [published 24 March 2016, accessed 15 September 2016]

The international media has started to focus coverage on *Daesh* in June 2014 when the number of foreign fighters had significantly increased and several beheading videos were broadcasted (Zhang & Hellmueller, 2016). *Daesh* has been described and reported differently by local, regional and international media in accordance with the ideology and institutional policy of the media outlets. In a recent study, 56% of the international media reported *Daesh* as a ‘state’, 45% as a ‘terrorist organisation’, 10% as ‘religious fanatics/sectarians’, 7% as ‘insurgents’, 6% as ‘a murderer’, 5% as ‘a global threat’, 1% as ‘lunatics’, and 1% as ‘an emanation of true Islam/personification of the ‘religion of war’ (Davydov et al., 2016).

1.3 The Meta-Narrative of the War on Terror and the Narrative of Extremist Islam

The so-called ‘War on Terror’ was declared by former US president George W. Bush in 2001 soon after the 9/11 attacks in New York City. Bush explained that, “[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated” (The Guardian, 2001)¹¹. Therefore, the main features of the ‘War on Terror’ are timeless and global in addition to the emergence of a new language, a language of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. The ‘War on Terror’ has had several critics commenting on the ‘War on Terror’ as “an ideology of fear and repression that creates enemies and promotes violence rather than mitigating acts of terror and strengthening security” (The Global Policy Forum, 2016)¹². The ‘War on Terror’ agenda includes worldwide military operations, new security measures and new sanctions lists to prevent the financing of ‘terrorism’ and that is subject to US terms, conditions and definitions. The Bush administration enforced the classic narrative of a nation at war mapping the particularities of 9/11 and America’s response.

¹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13> [published 21 September 2001, accessed 19 September 2016]

¹² <https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism.html> [accessed 19 September 2016]

The classic narrative is of a general script that involves a template guiding the narration and the understanding of the narrative. In other words, “[t]he generic script of a nation at war provides a ready-made cultural framework to aid in both telling and interpreting the Narrative” (Hodges, 2011, p. 20). However, there are neglected alternative templates and scripts that do not consider the event of 9/11 as an act of war but as an act of terror, therefore framing the event according to formulations of criminal acts. The metaphorical use of the word ‘war’ is ideologically driven. The official US response to the 9/11 was the military invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq justified in televised speeches delivered by Bush within the ‘War on Terror’ framework. The 9/11 event was significantly linked to Islam rather than individual Muslim acts, which then led to the linking of terror and Islam. This linkage is clearly seen in Bush’s speeches; for example, in his speech dated 6 October 2005 Bush states, “[t]he *murderous ideology of the Islamic radicals* is the great challenge of our new century” (cited in Hodges, 2011, p. 38, emphasis added). The term ‘Islamic radicals’ is similar to ‘Islamic extremism’ ‘Islamofascism’ and ‘militant Jihadism’ used in Bush’s speeches. These large terms that extend the ‘War on Terror’ refer not only to Al-Qaeda, but to other groups such as Hezbollah and other Islamic organisations that have no connection to the 9/11. To sustain the notion of ‘Islamic extremism’ in the meta-narrative of the War on Terror, “the West is perpetuating images of violence and extremism among Muslims – and downplaying all evidence of moderate Islam – in order to gain support for attacks on Islam and Muslims” (O’Gorman, 2015, p. 114). The War on Terror narrative, “like that of the Cold War, may remain potent for a relatively short period of time, compared to Islam for instance, but its impact on the daily lives of people across the world lends it the kind of power and sense of inescapability that justifies its treatment as a meta-narrative” (Baker, 2010, p. 351).

1.4 Statement of the Problem

Jakobson discussed that “[l]anguages differ essentially in what they must convey and not in what they may convey” (1959, p. 236). The problem of the present study relies on the understanding of Valdeón’s (2007, p. 100) statement:

“It is assumed that translation is an act of intercultural communication, where the translator holds the knowledge of both the source text (ST) and the target text (TT) cultural, social and political contexts. The translator interprets the ST according to his/her cultural, social and political background which may be ideologically shaped. Hence, the analysis of the ST and the TT often deals with foregrounding the connections between linguistic, translational and ideological components in political texts”.

Accordingly, there is a clear engagement of the translator’s social, cultural, ideological and political views in the outcome of the translation. The translator’s work involves not only changing words with his or her equivalences/correspondences in the target text, but also gives these words their cultural, ideological and political content. Translations of narratives may shape readership knowledge and opinion. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2, there is a gap in the literature that discusses the political import in narratives within Translation Studies in the context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. Therefore, the aim of this study is to investigate the possible reframing which may take place in the process of translating the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* into English.

1.5 Research Objectives

This research aims to reveal the strategies that enable MEMRI to reconstruct reality through reframing narratives and featuring *Daesh* in its English translations of the Arabic editorials of the contemporary civil war in the Middle East that help to sustain the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’.

This main objective can be divided into the following sub-objectives:

1. To examine the framing of the acts carried out by *Daesh* in the source narratives of the Arabic editorial articles,
2. To examine the reframing of the acts carried out by *Daesh* in MEMRI's translations,
3. To determine the translation strategies applied by MEMRI in reframing the source narratives in the context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East,
4. To analyse how reframing narratives on *Daesh* in MEMRI's translations operates as an instrument of mind in the reconstruction of reality in the context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East,
5. To investigate the extent of reframing the Arabic editorial articles on the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East in sustaining and furthering the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror',
6. To examine the role of translation in the context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East.

1.6 Research Questions

The main question that this study seeks to answer is:

How does the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) utilise translation as a tool of reframing narratives on acts of 'terror' carried out by *Daesh* in order to

reconstruct reality and promote the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' in the context of the contemporary civil war in the Middle East?

This main question is further delineated into sub-questions as in the following:

1. How are the acts carried out by *Daesh* framed in the source narratives of Arabic editorial articles?
2. How are the acts carried out by *Daesh* reframed in MEMRI's translations?
3. What are the strategies applied by MEMRI in reframing the narratives on *Daesh* in its translations?
4. How does reframing narratives on *Daesh* in MEMRI's translations operate as an instrument of mind in the reconstruction of reality?
5. To what extent are the translations of Arabic editorial articles employed to sustain and further the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'?
6. How does translation play a central role in legitimising narratives in conflict zones in the context of the contemporary civil war in the Middle East?

1.7 Significance of the Study

This study is of great importance not only to the field of Translation Studies but also to other fields including Critical Discourse Analysis, Mass Media and Communications, Political Science and Sociology. The merging of Narrative Analysis (NA) with

Translation Studies (TS) is an emerging sub-discipline in contemporary Linguistics. This is also considered pioneering work in the field of Translation Studies. Applying Narrative Analysis theory to reveal the true ideological and social factors influencing and affecting news media reports has a great deal of value where mass media is considered a prime source of information for the public. Therefore, it is hoped that this study of the translations of the ‘other obverse’ (the West including the US and Israel) media offers a better understanding in terms of ideology, culture, power relations and perspectives of the East, especially the Arab world. Moreover, it is expected that this research will make a contribution to the existing knowledge and awareness of the role of news media translation in the ideological West-East conflict. Finally, the researcher focuses on the awareness of readers, especially Arabs as well as Arab mass media that is ideologically different from that of Western circulated narratives on the contemporary civil wars in the Middle East.

1.8 Notes on Terminology

For the purpose of this study, the notions of reality, instrument of mind, frame/framing and narratives are defined as follows.

- Reality of narratives adopted in this study shall be interpreted as the reality reported in the source text regardless of any disagreement in other media and that its “acceptability is governed by convention and ‘narrative necessity’ rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness” (Bruner, 1991, p. 4).
- Instrument of mind refers to narrative as a tool employed to achieve certain effects on the readership’s opinion and reaction.

- Following the definition of Baker (2006), frames “are structures of anticipation, strategic moves that are consciously initiated in order to present a narrative in a certain light.” (p. 167).
- Framing refers to “an active process of signification by means of which we consciously participate in the construction of reality.” (p. 167).
- Narrative “is the principal and inescapable mode by which we experience the world. Narratives are the stories we tell ourselves and other people about the world(s) in which we live. These stories are constructed – not discovered – by us in the course of making sense of reality, and they guide our behaviour and our interaction with others. In this sense, the terms ‘narrative’ and ‘story’ can be used interchangeably” (Baker, 2006, p. 169).

Moreover, for the purpose of this study, all provided examples were originated by the researcher unless otherwise stated. It also worth noting that the transliterations provided for the Arabic source texts throughout this thesis are the researcher’s and have been verified by Dr. Kais Kadhim, an Arab native and a Senior Lecturer of Translation Studies. Additionally, this study was also enriched through discussions with and feedback from other lecturers, colleagues and friends.

1.9 Thesis Organisation

This thesis consists of eight chapters. **Chapter 1: Introduction** introduces the research topic to the reader and establishes the ground of this thesis. This chapter discusses and connects the various research topic elements including the conflict in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular, and the emergence of *Daesh* and its ideology and

global impact. The first chapter further provides the research problem, objectives, questions and significance, and also offers a note on the adopted terminology and provides a brief layout of the organisation of the thesis. **Chapter 2: Narrative, Framing and the Media across Academic Disciplines** offers a critical review of related studies on the notions of ‘narrative’ and ‘framing’ in various academic fields and their emergence in the field of Translation Studies, with special focus on studies on the news reporting of the Middle East conflict. This chapter also discusses related topics, namely translation in news media and on the Internet. **Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework: Narrative Theory** provides a detailed discussion of Baker’s notion of narrative, its importance, types and features. This chapter also presents a discussion on the notion of ‘framing’ and how it plays a significant role in the reconstruction of reality in the target narrative within the context of the international conflict. Further, this chapter establishes a model of assessing narratives in translation. **Chapter 4: Research Methodology** explains the data collection procedures of both the source and the target text. This chapter justifies the selection of The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) as the primary source for translated texts and also provides a background of MEMRI, including its staff, projects, ideology, code of conduct, supports, critics, quality of translation and impact at the local and international levels. **Chapter 5: Paratextual Framing** analyses the translations of titles, introductions, headings, images and endnotes in MEMRI’s translated editorials on *Daesh*. This chapter compares both the Arabic source text with the English translations published by MEMRI, highlighting the different narrativity features applied and discussing the different frames in the light of the War on Terror. **Chapter 6: Contextual Framing** analyses the thematic and episodic framings, the temporal and spatial framings, and the relational framings found in both the Arabic source editorials and the MEMRI’s English translations. This chapter compares the impact of framing and reframing on the overall meaning, context and

structure of the text. **Chapter 7: Textual Framing** analyses the effects of reorganising material, addition, omission, lexical choice and grammatical shifts on the source text message. The seventh chapter also discusses the weight of the choice of terms and labels for events, places and people. **Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion** outlines the current thesis. It then places the findings of this thesis against findings in the literature. This final chapter also answers the research questions and offers remarks for further studies.

1.10 Summary

This first chapter briefly introduced the main concern of the research by discussing the role of translation in a given conflict, where translation mediates the battle and reflects the ideologically oriented loadings and relations of power. Chapter one also highlighted the possibility of translation in reframing conflict narratives that in turn results in shifts of power. The contemporary civil wars in the Middle East with special attention to the Syrian Civil War were then introduced because of its huge impact on the regional and international arena. An overview of the establishment of *Daesh*, its history, ideology, geographical coverage, impact on world security and the role of media in this conflict were offered. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the link between the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ and the narrative of ‘Extremist Islam’. This chapter further illustrated the statement of the problem, research objectives, questions, significance of the study and also discussed some notes on the definition of terms as adopted in this study. Chapter one discussed the organisation of the current thesis explaining the contents of each chapter.

The following chapter discusses the literature on the notions of narrative and framing and illustrates how media translations play a significant role in the constitution of reality.

CHAPTER 2: NARRATIVE, FRAMING AND THE MEDIA ACROSS ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES

2.1 Introduction

The debate of what language is and what the function of language is had been raised since Plato and Aristotle era yet this debate is still expanding until our present time (Dixon, 1965). The expansion of the language debate is caused by the different perspectives of various sub-academic disciplines which joined such debate. For example, linguists discuss language from a pure linguistic point of view yet sociologists regard language as a social act, etc. Moreover, language is defined by the Online Oxford Dictionary as the way of communication among people in spoken (parole) or written (langue) using conventional and structured words. However, language is regarded as a “system of arbitrary vocal signs” (Brinton, 2000, p. 3), yet it is a vehicle that transmits thoughts through its communicative and narrative functions (ibid). Furthermore, language functions as a way of communication and culture transmission (Sapir, 1921; Hockett, 1958; Crystal, 1989; Robins, 1990; Poole, 1999). Accordingly, a language is a medium of communication for a certain society and it shapes a significant part of its culture. Therefore, it is assumed that language has power in shaping people’s thoughts and changing minds, thus building new worlds whereas culture is embedded in its cornerstone. Consequently, Fox (2007, p. 82) discussed that:

“What we know is that language can and does influence us. Language is a powerful tool. When used in a positive way, it can inspire people. When used negatively, it can hurt. But when it becomes a part of a culture and is simply mindless, that is, when we speak the words without understanding their impact, it is dangerous.... When we awaken to the fact that this kind of language has seeped into our culture and is now actually driving our attitudes and beliefs, we can begin to change our language to shape a new culture”.

Likewise, Pennycook (1994, p.146) discussed that in our modern era, “battles were to be fought for people’s minds and in which language and culture were to play an

ever greater role”. Moreover, any text is considered ambiguous. Dictionaries are unable to define language yet only the reader involved who analyses language based on his own culture and knowledge and the text social settings (Edelman, 1985). Furthermore, languages are designed and employed through a template in order to meet the interests of various group of people (Alexander, 2011). Languages are also planned by governments, whether they declare it or not, in a detailed way defining how and where to use a language(s) (ibid). Nevertheless, political language produces the beliefs of who are the ‘good-guys’ and who are the ‘bad-guys’. In other words, through presenting a deep analysis of speeches, history and events, political language evokes the concept of allies and enemies and angle and evil (Edelman, 1974). Additionally, it makes people’s minds perplexed and moves them to a society which is full of intimidation. This special language is seen clearly in the speech of the Former US President George W. Bush after the event of 11 September: “America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terror” (cited in Bielsa & Hughes, 2009, p. 120). Nevertheless, different groups of people demonstrate different ideologies which are considered as a set of beliefs by other groups; such beliefs represent the cultural base where groups differ and conflict (van Dijk, 2001). Political groups represent their ideologies and cultural beliefs through text and talk in order to persuade thus influence the others. Similarly, modern democratic societies employ the power of persuasion and manipulation through discourse and communication rather than force such as military operations, economic sanctions and threats (van Dijk, 1996). Finally, it is worth mentioning that a communicative event (language) starts with a mental (cognitive) process where one defines, based on his own interpretation of the event, the goals, aims, functions, knowledge, beliefs, information, and language shall be conveyed and employed. Such interpretation leads to communicative conflicts (van Dijk, 1999, 2001).

2.2 The Notion of Narrative across Academic Disciplines

2.2.1 The literary perspective on narratives

Labov and Waletzky's (1967) *Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience* is a pioneer work on the narrative theory in which they offer an analytical tool of oral stories internal structure, microstructure in van Dijk's terms. Their idea on narratives is built upon the understanding of the evolvment of remembered past experiences into series of events which in turn structure the story primary sequence. Their understanding of narrative is "one method of recapitulating past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which actually occurred" (1967, p. 20). Their model aimed at revealing the story settings, formation and evaluation, summarised in the answers of what, when, where, who, how, why and so what, and identifying the associated framing devices. However, their narrative stand of *perspective shifts* and *repetition* as evaluative tools may lead to neglect the fact that those tools also serve as "structural units in verbalizing, understanding and remembering narratives" (Norrick, 2000, p. 41). Among the important narrativity features discussed in their work is *temporality* which grounds the understanding of any narrative, it corresponds to a large extent with Somers and Gibson's (1994) and Bruner's (1991) understanding of *temporality*, *narrative diachronicity* in other term.

White's (1980/1987) *The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality* discussed how narratives realise their value as a method of reality representation in historical discourse. To him, narratives are a representative form of events that constructed to be real, and a way of transforming knowing into telling. Narratives are a universal tool that transmits human experiences and cultures of an agreed reality. Narratives '*objectivity*' is realised in the nonappearance of all of the narrator references. Imaginary, fictional, events are not problematic in narrativisation, he claimed, rather the

real events are, since they are difficult to represent in a story format. He emphasised on the importance of discovering the 'truth' of 'real story' behind/within the events represented in the form of 'historical records'. In historical discourse, the value of narrativity which represents real events is granted by the wish to have full, integrated, coherent and finished story of a given event.

Bal's (1985, 1997, 2009) *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* provided an early structured tool to narratives in its literary context paving the way to more systematic analysis and review. In her book, she offered a model of narrative explaining its methods and techniques, and their transmission and reception. To her, narratives are categorised under three main titles: Text (words), Story (aspects), and Fabula (elements). In Text, she focused on the distinction among the narrator, actor and focalizer, and the levels of narration. In Fabula, she broke down the story according to its elements' functionality into events, actors, actants, location, and time. In Story, she discussed the aspects: direction, ordering, distance, possibilities, and focalization. Bal's concept of Focalization may correspond to some extent to Baker's notion of positioning; however, Bal's Focalization is more explicit in the sense it determines the way narrative elements and aspects function, and represents the significance of certain aspects. She argued that focalization is "the most important, most penetrating, and most subtle means of manipulation. Analyses of newspaper reports which aim at revealing the hidden ideology embedded in such reports should involve focalization in their investigation, and not restrict themselves to so-called content analysis, i.e. the semantic analysis of content" (Bal, 2009, p. 176). In other words, Focalization frames the role of readers and their way in approaching and understanding a narrative which in turn can be used to manipulate the original story. Exemplifying the application of narrative

techniques, she discussed anticipation, span, rhythm, achrony, frequency, pause, suspense and predictability.

Norrick's (2000) *Conversational Narrative: Storytelling in Everyday Talk* presented an extended narrative framework of Labov and Waletzky (1967) in which he included the analysis of the narratives external structure, macro-structure in his term, and the relation between both internal and external structure of a narrative. He emphasised on the importance of *formulaicity* and *repetition* in constructing and developing the overall skeleton of narrative. In the conversational context, he proposed the *immediate retelling* approach of a single story as a means of measurement and evaluation of the narrative success. He argued that the "Comparison of two renditions of a story in separate contexts revealed the range of permutations and paraphrases a teller may produce to match the story with diverse topics and audience responses" (2000, p. 198). In translation context, this is applicable for the comparison of the original narrative and its translation. His definition of narrative is merely *a story* in its literary sense distinguishing it from *conversation* and *dialogue* rather than Baker's "a meta-code that cuts across and underpins all modes of communication" (2006, p. 9). He further argued:

"familiar stories are tellable under different circumstances than original stories. The tellability of familiar stories depends not on their newsworthy content, but on the dynamics of the narrative event itself, since familiar story content offers the opportunity for co-narration. Co-narration throws into relief the negotiated character of conversational storytelling, and it illustrates how narration balances memory and context to generate a coherent, understandable performance." (p. 199).

His argument agrees largely with Baker's understanding of how public and meta-narratives operate as 'an instrument of mind'. Moreover, at the conversational context, he found that conversationalists may make use and manipulate developing and existing narratives in order to support and further theirs. To him, narrators add abstracts

and prefaces to their narratives to signal the expected response to the audience (see Hoey's (2001) exhaustive framework of signalling devices). Contrary to the focus of Labov and Waletzky (1967) on ontological narratives (narratives of the self), Norrick emphasised on the importance of collaborative narratives in revealing cultural values, individual positions and interpersonal information, and in influencing the public opinion.

On the implications of narrative theory in its literary context, Altman's (2008) *A Theory of Narrative* presented an in-depth analysis on the narrative of political life considering the Former US President Bush narrative on 11 September. He argued that Bush made use of the event of 11 September to enforce the narrative of us, the US and its allies from one side, and them, "Iraq, Iran, North Korea and "terrorists" everywhere" (p. 337) from the other side, which in turn apply the non-differentiable image and strategy toward 'terrorists'. Therefore, Bush was able to attack Iraq represented in Saddam Hussein by associating (through relationality) Saddam to King Nebuchadnezzar who was reported as the evil who sieged and destroyed '*Jerusalem*'. Relationality here plays an effective role in deceiving the world of the very fact of the total different stories and characters settings. Implementing this strategic narrative, Bush succeeded in winning the US opposition to his side, and enforcing the universality of dual-focus narrative tradition. '*Suspects of terrorism*' and '*terrorists*', in Bush view, are unable to undergo the normal US justice system and to be prisoned in Guantanamo Bay where no human rights are reserved. He furthered that "The assumptions that drive Bush's actions—and the government's prose—are determined by a set of texts and a system of narrative that are fundamentally dual-focus in nature." (p. 338).

2.2.2 The psycholinguistic perspective on narrative

van Dijk's (1976) *Philosophy of Action and Theory of Narrative* dissimilarly to Baker's notion on narratives theory that considers "people's behaviour is ultimately guided by the stories they come to believe about the events in which they are embedded" (2006, p. 3), he argued that "not all action descriptions would traditionally be called narratives: a psychological or sociological description of behavior and social interaction of individuals or groups is rarely characterized as a narrative" (p. 289). To him, narratives are "only one (empirical) type of discourse" (p. 290). Similarly to Gerrig's (2011) notion on *reader's preferences*, he discussed that one undergoes a complex mental process in *acting* including *thinking* e.g. understanding a narrative. This complex mental process involves several main factors such as *preferences*, *wishes* and *wants* which are set by *motives*, *character features*, *likings* and *desires*, together with reader's *beliefs* and *knowledge*. *Temporal linearity*, he furthered, is the ordering principle that defines discourse, narratives in our term. However, this sequential linearity, which agrees with Labov and Waletzky's (1967), and Pym's (2016), is in contrary to Baker's (2006) notion of *temporal ordering* in which temporality is selective and nonlinear, a tool to embed ideologies in narratives. Narratives, he argued, are not to be told to anybody in any situation, they rather "be told only to those hearers which we know rather well and of which we like to receive (and are likely to receive) interest and positive evaluation, or of which we do want to influence positively the future courses of action or interaction (co-operation)" (p. 312). Therefore, the question of translating narratives to unintended audience arises.

Bruner's (1991) *The Narrative Construction of Reality* discussed that narratives are traditional form of organising human happenings and experiences, culturally transmittable, and limited by one's surrounding environment and network. Narratives,

he furthered, are “a version of reality whose acceptability is governed by convention and "narrative necessity" rather than by empirical verification and logical requiredness, although ironically we have no compunction about calling stories true or false” (pp. 4-5). Narratives, as he argued, are not merely a representative form of reality, it is, rather, a constitutive. The dynamic concern, he claimed, therefore, “is not how narrative as text is constructed, but rather how it operates as *an instrument of mind in the construction of reality*” (pp. 5-6, emphasis added). This claim is what this study challenges and tests its applicability through its in-depth analysis. To support his claim, he proposed ten narrativity features as follows: (1) *Narrative diachronicity, temporality* as adopted in this study, is the temporal sequence of an event, sequencing clauses in which Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) limited their notion of temporality to, is only one way of representing diachronicity. Temporal synecdoche, flash-forwards and flashbacks are also devices of representing the sequenced durativity of narrative. (2) *Particularity* is the reference to conventional particularities/specifics of a story such as flowers in romantic stories. These particularities largely achieve their effectiveness through their embeddedness in generic types of stories. The missing particularities in a storyline are easily detected and restored. (3) *Intentional state entailment* argues that one’s state of intention does not explain the causes of acting/doing certain things, it rather provides us with the reasons behind thus it helps us to interpret and understand why one did so. In narrative, intentional state does not completely control the course of events; one may do anything, they only reflect one’s perception and feeling toward certain situations. (4) *Hermeneutic composability, relationality* as adopted in this study, this feature is of great importance to the analysis herein since it explains how the expressed meaning in a text may be excerpted thus vary when interpreting the inter-relationships of components. Since no method of measurement of what a text surely means, *hermeneutic composability* may provide a comprehensive image of a text with consideration to its

components and their inter-relationships. Contextually, interpretation of the expressed meaning in a text and what a text may mean encounter two main issues namely intention and background knowledge. While *Intention* questions the stance of the narrator and hearer, *background knowledge* questions the background knowledge of the narrator and hearer in interpreting a narrative in different textual registers. (5) *Canonicity and breach*, which *normativeness* is attached to as a single feature adopted in this study, breaching of canonicity is an innovative conventional form of narrative that provides unnoticed side of humanity by looking at things from unusual perspective. Such breach of canonicity offers a significant tool of evaluation for the existing ordinary narratives. (6) *Referentiality*, the generated problem of *hermeneutic composability* in considering the sense of a text as a whole, alters the referentiality, thus the functionality, of its parts. The truth in a narrative is assessed by its realism rather than its referentiality which enables narratives to constitute ‘reality’ rather than referring to it as in the case of fictional stories. (7) *Genericness* is of genre such as travel saga, tragedy, black comedy, romance and so on. Genres help the hearer as well as the narrator himself to limit the possible interpreting, hermeneutic, of a narrative. Genres realise their effectiveness through the use of language in certain ways; they are, to say, a way of telling. Translating this form of telling is a challenge in which this genre does not exist in the target culture which in turn “requires a fresh literary-linguistic invention” (p. 14). Genres play a significant role in guiding, to say framing, thoughts and minds besides their function as a representative form of human experiences. (8) *Normativeness*, the normativeness of a narrative is a tool of legitimacy. The normativeness form changes over time to fit the new settings of narratives. It is rather a mean of containing human plights than solving them. (9) *Context sensitivity and negotiability*, with the help of *hermeneutic composability* in limiting possible interpretations and with the contextual complexity of *intention* and *background knowledge*, a story may interpret differently

leading to several versions of a single story. Context, therefore, is negotiable between the author and the reader. This negotiation results to a mutual agreement between the author and the reader on understanding the assigned context and ideas to a narrative.

(10) *Narrative accrual* is the accumulative coincidence of different, and may similar, narratives into a single story to achieve particular effectiveness. This process is supported by a sort of verification tool which, as Bruner argued, limited by the intentional state. The reasoning of the new coincided story may create a new genre, history or culture. This process of coincidence of self/shared happenings and experiences is a tool in the hands of individuals, groups, schools, families and institutions in converting past ordinary events into privileged ones with special intention to serve a particular purpose. In a word, it grants *weight* to happenings. The significant role of this feature, which one shall consider in analysing a narrative, in addition to the linking of dissimilar narratives and giving weight and privileging some narratives over others, it, eventually, enforces the interpretation of a narrative to future 'similar' narratives regardless its degree of similarity and applicability. This feature of narrativity grants its global market by what Bruner call, *bogus historical-causal entailment* and *coherence by contemporaneity*. The strategy of *bogus historical-causal entailment* is built upon the desire of connecting and relating events to each other without any obvious certain causal linkage, it is rather built upon a myth. It claims the causality of a given event over another. The *coherence by contemporaneity* strategy claims that events take place at the same period of time are related regardless having or not any 'real' connection. Conventionally, the constant (re)construction of past happenings produces canonicity which offers a tool of breach measurement and its interpretation. Bruner concluded that human knowledge and experience are structured by culturally supporting devices. He furthered that the expression of human mind depends on culturally

symbolic system. The effectiveness of a culture over narratives relies on the shared domains such as social beliefs, skills and linguistic exchange ability among its people.

Singer's (2004) *Narrative Identity and Meaning Making Across the Adult Lifespan: An Introduction* presented a psychological perspective on narratives identity in the development of personality. To him, narratives are a tool employed by persons in order to sustain and develop purpose and personal unity sounding of their lives. In other words, through narratives, persons as social entities as well as unique individuals make meaning of their life experiences taking into accounts their culture, class, ethnicity, gender and life stage. These narratives are one's identity to the self and to the world across lifespan. Singer argued that scholars from various academic disciplines working on narratives and applying different methods concluded to a common ground. He furthered that scholars place narratives at the centre of identity formation. In this regard, he claimed that scholars present mainly descriptive accounts of narrative identity and personality on the expenses of explanatory accounts. He elaborated that scholars pay more attention on the cognitive and conscious factors than on the unconscious and irrational factors which constitute the identity of individuals and their behaviour. This in turn brings a serious limitation to the scientific study of narratives identity and to narratives research in general. The application of information-processing paradigm is another common ground shared by the contemporary narratives scholars in which they follow a systematic analysis on the role of cognitive factors in memory encoding, storage and retrieval. Similarly to Fisher's (1987) narrative paradigm, Singer argued that people transform their life experiences into narratives to guide and justify their actions, raise their spirits and to influence others. He added that narrativity self-relevance is employed to grant insightfulness to one's values, nature and goals. The overall knowledge resulted from narratives reasoning (autobiographical reasoning)

produces the temporal, causal and coherence to one's narrative identity. In understanding narrative identity, scholars share the interest in a lifespan development approach. Scholars study the ability and the involved factors in constructing narratives across one's life phases and trace the cognitive changes in the context of social interaction and maturation starting from childhood growing to adulthood and ending by elderlyhood. In so doing, scholars examine the impact of the sociocultural context in shaping the raw personal experiences into a fashionable narrative. The acknowledgement of sociocultural factors, mainly sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, race, class and gender, in the construction of narrative identity, therefore, is another common ground shared by scholars. Narratives, as Singer argued, are "inevitably created to meet the demands of social roles and historical-cultural niches; they force us to ask about their audience and how their construction seeks to answer certain problems raised by the various subgroups to which we belong" (2004, p. 444). The application of mix methods (qualitative and quantitative) in studying narrative identity is another shared practice among scholars. The various employed methods are meant to build a linkage between narrative identity and other significant factors that affect its construction. Singer concluded that the self-defining narratives constructed and narrated by the self and the others enable people to come to know about themselves and the world.

Gerrig's (2011) *Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Readers' Narrative Experiences* in Olson's *Current Trends in Narratology* focused on the different cognitive processes in understanding and involving in a narrative. He attempted to highlight the difference between the conscious and unconscious process in enriching the reader's narrative experiences. To him, conscious process is represented in the reader's awareness and efforts to involve in a narrative while unconscious process goes without

the reader's awareness and efforts. He argued that the key element of reader's understanding of a narrative is basically his long-term general knowledge. This process is usually unconscious, which some scholars call it *schemas* that reader employs to assess moment-by-moment text experience. *Exemplar* is another account in reading a text in which it compares a novel object to reader's similar experience, stored memories. A reader is to consciously engage his knowledge in inferring a new experience. He discussed that readers build their judgments based on a set of *norms*. He claimed that reader's knowledge and norms are constructed in the moment rather than pre-stored as static schemas. Reader's preferences, as he discussed, is also a key factor in reading a narrative and understanding the text. In other words, a reader cognitive process of a text takes into account his preferences to the desirable meaning. Similarly, however, to Baker's (2006) notion of *resonance*, he argued that resonance is unconscious cognitive process that associates the earlier/past mentions with the contemporary and, therefore, affects the narrative experience. He furthered that "Thus, resonance functions to disentangle and unify temporally disparate elements of the text (i.e., with respect to the order in which the reader experiences them) into a coherent representation" (p. 50). While he emphasised that resonance merely serves as a running general memory in narrative context, he claimed that authors are privileged with resonance thus are able to spread their ideas along the text. This in turn arises the question of resonance possible sustainability in translation.

2.2.3 The communication and the media perspectives on narrative

Fisher's (1987) *Human communication as narration: Toward a philosophy of reason, value, and action* offered a narrative paradigm that proposed answers to the following four questions "How do people come to believe and act on the basis of communicative experiences?, What is the nature of reason and rationality in these experiences?, What is

the role of values in human decision making and action?, and How can reason and values be assessed?” (p. xi). Fisher discussed that values play a significant role in constituting reality, truth and knowledge; however, this fact was denied in general in past and present theories of human communication and logic. This denial led to the unquestionability and superiority of technical discourse over poetic and rhetoric discourse. He, therefore, argued that the assignment of this superiority shall be questioned and examined. To so doing, he proposed (1) readdressing of humans as *Homo narrans*; (2) reconsidering of all human communication forms as stories that are the representation of events shaped by character, culture and history; (3) the consideration of marked discursal forms as “good reasons” in which value-laden and values assure the acting and believing in particular ways; and (4) human communication is assessed by the narrative logic that is accessible and applicable by all humans. This narrative logic is built on the two principles namely fidelity and coherence. The provided narrative paradigm is constructed upon the understanding of (1) humans as storytellers; (2) “good reasons” guide the communication and decision-making of humans which differ in pattern among genres and situations; (3) matters of social forces, character, culture, biography and history rule the making and application of good reasons; (4) the awareness of the public of the assessment tools *narrative probability* (coherence) and *narrative fidelity* (the matching between the truth in one’s experience and in those of the past) determine rationality; and (5) persons choose their story pattern from a set in order to have a progressive life. The term *paradigm* refers to a “representation designed to formalize the structure of a component of experience and to direct understanding and inquiry into the nature and functions of that experience—in this instance, the experience of human communication” (Fisher, 1987, p. 59). The provided rational-world paradigm assumed that (1) humans are rational beings by nature; (2) argument (inferential structures of discourse) governs the human

communication and decision-making; (3) the making of argument depends on the dictates of different situations – public, legislative, scientific, legal, and so on; (4) rationality is ruled by argumentative ability, subject-matter knowledge and the application skill in the given realms; and (5) appropriate analysis and application of reason (rational argument) are able to solve life’s logical problems. Narrative rationality (rhetorical logic) consists of probability (coherence) and fidelity (truthfulness and reliability). While probability focuses on the coherence of a story as a whole, fidelity focuses on the story individuated elements. Probability of a narrative is assessed in three dimensions: (1) its structural/argumentative coherence; (2) its material coherence (external consistency; the comparison to other stories and the examination of the inclusion of all facts, arguments and relevant issues); and (3) its characterological coherence (reliability of characters; the assessment of characters’ trustworthy and values presented in their actions and decisions). Fidelity is assessed by the “logic of good reasons”. The “logic of good reasons” is an evaluative tool combines analysing and assessing means. Logic in “logic of good reasons” refers to a “systematic set of procedures that will aid in the analysis and assessment of elements of reasoning in rhetorical interactions.” (Fisher, 1987, p. 106). Good reasons in “logic of good reasons” refers to “*those elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communion that can be considered rhetorical.*” (Fisher, 1987, p. 107, emphasis in original). The logic of reasons is of five components: (1) *facts*; the examination of statements claimed to be facts are indeed facts through the confirmation of a reliable competent source; (2) *relevance*; the examination of relevant facts in terms of omission, addition, alternation, manipulation and decontextualisation; (3) *consequence*; the assessment of difference reasoning patterns by informal logic standards; (4) *consistency* is the assessment of relevant arguments by individuals to the decision-making proposed in the message; and (5) *transcendent issue*; the examination

of the message against the direct addressing of the ‘real’ issue(s) which should be addressed in the case. These five components of the logic of reasons, in turn, transform into the five questions of the logic of *good* reasons as Fisher put them:

“(1) What are the implicit and explicit values embedded in a message?; (2) Are the values appropriate to the nature of the decision that the message bears upon?; (3) What would be the effects of adhering to the values—for one’s concept of oneself, for one’s behavior, for one’s relationships with others and society; and to the process of rhetorical transaction?; (4) Are the values confirmed or validated in one’s personal experience, in the lives or statements of others whom one admires and respects, and in a conception of the best audience that one can conceive?; and (5) Even if a prima-facie case exists or a burden of proof has been established, are the values the message offers those that, in the estimation of the critic, constitute the ideal basis for human conduct?” (1987, p. 109).

Moreover, Selznick’s (2008) *Global Television: Co-Producing Culture* emphasised on the role of television in informing the public and shaping their views through the narratives of documentaries. She argued that multinational co-production of globalised documentaries promotes specific framed knowledge. She furthered that it was expected from television to “modernizing “undeveloped” nations” and to gather “the Free World around pro-American ideologies” (p. 148). She also questioned the objectivity of “objective” documentaries claiming that these documentaries are of hidden agendas thus bias requesting the institutions behind these documentaries to reveal the true purpose behind producing these documentaries. Despite the questionable “objectivity” of the presented scientific and historical documentaries, she also argued that these documentaries, at least, present the Western conceptualisation of the world in terms of what is good and what is bad, and what is possible and what is not. To her, what is so important here is the way these documentary producers transform claims into knowledge through the mixture of images, sounds and words. She concluded, after the analysis of two case studies of the narratives of *The Nazis: A Warning from History* aired on The History Channel and *Jesus: The Complete Story* aired on The Discovery

Channel, that in order to win the global audience, blames of horrific acts were only assigned to acceptable “bad guys”.

2.2.4 The sociological perspective on narrative

Another model of narrativity properties was proposed and developed by Professors of Sociology at the University of Michigan: Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson over the 1990s. Somers (1992, 1994, 1997) and Somers and Gibson (1994) argued that reframed narrativity has four fundamental features fit most accurately in the social science context: (1) temporality, sequence and place (spatiality); (2) selective appropriation; (3) causal emplotment; and (4) relationality of parts. To them, narrativity does not interpret isolated events (phenomena) in part by assigning them to categories; it rather relates them to other events in the series. Somers furthered that “narratives are constellations of *relationships* (connected parts) embedded in *time and space*, constituted by what I call *causal emplotment*” (1992, p. 601). That is to say, events are interpreted through a larger picture by considering past events of the same series and paying attention to their temporal and spatial relationships. The nexus of parts to a social network renders the interpretation of a phenomenon. Emplotment transforms events, therefore, into episodes with a sequential order. The importance of independent instances is granted by their causal emplotment rather than their sequential order. In narrativity, causal emplotment explains the reason behind a framed story line of given events and challenges their plot against the ‘actual’ happenings revealing the ways and conditions in which a narrative is framed. The temporality and sequences of a plot of a given event are what make a story understandable rather than categorisation. Because the plot enables the relativity to other events, plot serves as the logic of events. The significant of emplotment in understanding narratives is realised in the provided network of relationships that allow us to distinguish between narratives and other types of discourse such as *Annales* and

chronicle. The *evaluative criteria* provided by narrativity permits the drawing of lexical and qualitative distinctions “among the infinite variety of events, experiences, characters, institutional promises, and social factors that impinge on our lives” (Somers, 1992, p. 602). To reach this end, a set of essential values and principles (hyper-goods) is put against the narrative. Themes of narratives determine their structural make-up, the prioritising criteria of events, and the rendered meaning. Therefore, plots are thematically-driven. Somers and Gibson classified narratives under four categories; ontological, public, conceptual and metanarrativity. *Ontological narratives* are the representative of the self, one’s identity and one’s status in society. Through narratives, one makes sense of his live. Individuals act, and do not, according to their understanding of their positions in given narratives. The four narrativity features are applicable to ontological narratives, as to other types of narratives, thus it has no fixed template; rather it modifies based on time and spatial relationships. Ontological narratives are interpersonal and social narrated by individuals who “tailor "reality" to fit their stories” (Somers, 1992, p. 604) and that they are transformable over time to public narratives through the narrativity feature relationality. *Public, cultural, and institutional narratives* are the narratives circulated by the public, larger than an individual, at the institutional level such as family, workplace, organisation, religious place, government and the media. Those narratives heavily impact on the ontological narratives and lead to identity shifts in order to comply with the institution. *Conceptual/analytic/sociological narrativity* is the elaborated explanations and concepts constructed in the academia. Conceptual narratives are central to the institution-building and social actions. They are significant in building social reality through an explanatory series of episodes. *Metanarrativity* (master-narratives) is the advanced level of public and conceptual narratives which gain more credibility and resonance over time. Individuals choose their narrativity pattern from a repertoire of stories which is always culturally and historically

specific. However, “the particular plots that give meanings to those narratives cannot be determined in advance” (Somers, 1992, p. 608). *Narrative identity* and *relational setting* are the central concepts in the works of Somers and Gibson elaborated to solve the problems and limitations of the past studies on identity formation. They permit the reconceptualisation of the subject-object characterisation in the contemporary social theory. Somers and Gibson (1994) argued that narrative identity

“builds from the premise that narrativity and relationality are conditions of social being, social consciousness, social action, institutions, structures, even society itself--that is, the self and the purposes of self are constructed and reconstructed in the context of internal and external relations of *time* and *place* and *power* that are constantly in flux. That social identities are constituted through narrativity, social action is guided by narrativity, and social processes and interactions--both institutional and interpersonal--are narratively mediated provides a way of understanding the recursive presence of particular identities that are, nonetheless, not universal.” (pp. 34-35).

Relational setting refers to “a pattern of relationships among institutions, public narratives, and social practices.” (Somers & Gibson, 1994, p. 41)

2.2.5 The religious perspective on narrative

Halverson, Goodall and Corman’s (2011) *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism* discussed the construction and impact of extremist ideologically-laden narratives by Muslims across ages. Narratives are central to what they call “war of ideas” in order to understand the operational procedures and, therefore, be able to countering the extremist Islamist narratives. In this sense, narratives are influential repository that frames actions and identifies cultures. To them narrative is a “*coherent system of interrelated and sequentially organized stories that share a common rhetorical desire to resolve a conflict by establishing audience expectations according to the known trajectories of its literary and rhetorical form.*” (p. 14, emphasis in original). They argued that Quranic narratives rely on a non-linearity account in contrary to the Bible which adopts linearity

as a base. Moreover, translations of Quran are discouraged, as they claimed, since the words of God are absolute in Arabic. Translations of Quran, therefore, are indeed interpretations of its meaning rather than translations. In this sense, the hermeneutics of Quran allows the proposal of different conflicting ideas and the construction of various contested narratives. The authors emphasised on the importance of Quranic commentaries (*Hadith* and *Tafsir*) as an integral share in understanding the narratives of Quran. However, they warned from the inserted sectarian (ideologically and value-laden) viewpoints in the Quranic commentaries. To clarify the term “Islamist extremists”, the authors provided the following definition to what the term refers to “those political actors who seek to impose an Islamist ideology through physical intimidation, coercion, and revolutionary violence against any state or civilian targets that do not share the same vision of the “true” path of Islam, which is typically ultraconservative or puritanical in nature.” (p. 6). In this regard, the authors excluded Islamists who achieve their ideologies in political and social participation away from any violence. The authors further made a pragmatic distinction among *stories*, *narratives* and *master narratives* in order to serve the purpose of their paradigm. A story is “a particular sequence of related events that are situated in the past and recounted for rhetorical/ideological purposes.” (p. 13, emphasis in original). A narrative is a systematic collection of stories. Master narrative as defined by the authors is “a transhistorical narrative that is deeply embedded in a particular culture.” (p. 14, emphasis in original). Narratives of Islamist extremism including of Al-Qaeda gain their potential propagation through their internal reasoning coherence for their target audience thus their narratives go compelling and undoubtable. The dominant contemporary extremist narrative ground is governed by thirteen master narratives. These master narratives are: The Pharaoh (the story of a tyrant of ancient Egypt who disobeyed the orders of God thus punished and preserved in-body as a warn for future

people), The *Jahiliyyah* (the story of pre-Islam era of the Arabia pagan of polytheism, ignorance, and barbarism who were defeated by the believers), The Battle of *Badr* (the story of the victory of unwell-equipped and little-number army of early Muslims over the well-equipped and large-number army of unbelievers of Mecca in realising God's help through His angels), The Hypocrites (the story of the threat aroused against Islam by a claimed-believe group in Medina who wished and waited the defeat of Muslims in Mecca conflict), The Battle of *Khaybar* (the story of the defeat of Jewish tribes who broke the agreement with early Muslims), The Battle of Karbala (the story of the martyrdom of Imam Husain the son of Ali Bin Talib in the battle against the tyrant Yazid bin Muawiyah over the ruling of Muslims, this battle is significant in the political Islam and a conflict point between the two main denominations the Sunni and the Shi'ite), The *Mahdi* (the Shi'ite narrative: the story of the final of twelve Imams who will reappear in order to realise justice and peace on Earth before the Last Day, the Sunni narrative: the story of a righteous believer who will guide the world at the end of time), The Infidel Invaders (the story of the occupation of Muslim lands and holy sites by the Western Christians over ages), *Shaytan's* Handiwork (the story of the forbidden Hell-leading Satan deeds mainly alcohol and gambling on Muslims), 1924 (the story of the termination of Ottoman Caliphate and the establishment of Turkey by the Jewish Ataturk to weaken the power of Muslims), The *Nakba* (the story of the occupation of Muslims land of Palestine and the establishment of Israel on that land), and Seventy-Two Virgins (the story of the rewarding of the righteous martyrs in Heaven by giving them twelve Houris (companions)). The authors, moreover, consider humans, by nature, as storytellers similarly to Fisher's notion of *homo narrans*. The human tendency over the notions of 'the good' and 'the bad (evil)' is reflect in human communications which in turn represent human relationships. This very notion creates narrative coherence and paves the way to preferred future actions. Master narratives, however, are culturally,

historically and socially dependent. In other words, master narratives are not universal rhetoric, what sounds right in a culture might sound bizarre in another. The main features of master narratives, as the authors argued, are story forms (patterns) and archetypes. Story forms are employed in conflict context in which symbolic actions are required in order to satisfy the desire behind this conflict. The effectiveness of story forms relies on the understanding of the way abstract ideas of social order and myth operate as informative and persuasive tools. Within the Islamist extreme context, the desire to restore the Caliphate, the application of Sharia law and the exile of ‘Crusaders’ are the key persuasive particularities in the symbolic story forms. Archetypes are “*standard characters that one might expect to find in a story.*” (p. 21, emphasis in original). The significance of archetypes is realised in the ability of encapsulating an entire story form. The use of the label ‘Crusader’ in Islamist extreme narratives evokes particular story form and archetype. In so doing, archetypes invoke an exhaustive interrelated master narrative. The image of the American and allied forces in Afghanistan and Iraq is distorted and any narrative of the good work they did is aborted. Similar to the Former US President George Bush’s “you’re either with us, or against us” and “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists”, Islamist extremists divide the world into two; believers and the others (infidels) in order to legitimise their ‘holy war’ narrative. In adapting Betz’s (2008) notion of vertical integration, the authors illustrated the methods in which a master narrative motivates emotional responses and proposes certain archetypes and story forms within its rhetorical vision. In so doing, the authors argued that Islamist extremists are of different groups yet they share three main goals summarised in the 3Rs. The 3Rs are: (1) Resist: confront any foreign invasion and intervention in any Muslim country especially of the US and its allies including the within Muslims; (2) Rebuke: challenge the pro-foreign leaders (the tyrants) of Muslim countries who oppress their people to weaken the power of Muslims and strengthen the

foreign power; and (3) Renew: restore the well-established Muslim civilisation and caliphate. Moreover, master narratives are not strategic in themselves rather the constituted rhetorical vision emerged from these master narratives is. In other words, master narratives are broad themes while rhetorical vision is their contextualisation that works to realise specific goals in logical and emotional way by proposing an intended course of action at an intended time. In this regard, the master narrative of Pharaoh invokes the story form of conflict with God (deity) and the archetypes of tyrant, deity and prophet. The master narrative of Jahiliyyah invokes the story form of deliverance and the archetypes of deity, prophet, martyr and pagan. The master narrative of the Battle of *Badr* invokes the story form of deliverance and the archetypes of prophet, pagan and champion. The master narrative of Hypocrites invokes the story form of ruse and the archetypes of imposter and prophet. The master narrative of the Battle of *Khaybar* invokes the story form of betrayal and the archetypes of traitor, trickster and prophet. The master narrative of the Battle of Karbala invokes the story form of noble sacrifice and the archetypes of martyr, tyrant and imposter. The master narrative of *Shaytan's* handiwork invokes the story form of ruse and the archetypes of trickster, deity and prophet. The master narrative of Seventy-two virgins invokes the story form of noble sacrifice and the archetypes of martyr, imposter and crusader. The master narrative of Mahdi invokes the story form of deliverance and the archetypes of saviour and imposter. The master narrative of Crusader invokes the story form of invasion and the archetypes of crusader/coloniser and champion. The master narrative of Tatar invokes the story form of invasion and the archetypes of barbarian, imposter, champion and sage. The master narrative of 1924 invokes the story form of ruse and the archetypes of imposter and traitor. The master narrative of *Nakba* invokes the story form of deliverance and the archetypes of crusader/coloniser and martyr. Importantly, the Islamist extremists make use of the story forms the noble sacrifice and deliverance

in the same argument to present the logic in urging the public to fight (jihad) the enemies. In this context, '*jihad*' leads to one of the two win-win situations. Either the fighter will die in the path of God (be a martyr thus enjoys afterlife Heaven) or he/she will be the liberator who ends the oppression. The incomplete deliverance stories in the Mahdi, *Nakba* and modern *Jahiliyyah* (in Qutb's term) master narratives invokes a rhetorical vision represented in the anticipation of a rescuer to appear. In several master narratives, archetypes serve two functions primary and supplementary (explanatory) in which both are necessary in integrating the rhetorical vision. Furthermore, Islamist extremists strategically use master narratives to achieve their goals depending on a set of three-type arguments (observational arguments, in Smith et al.'s (1991) term): (1) argument from sign; (2) argument from analogy (similar to hermeneutic composability in Bruner's (1991) and relationality in Somers and Gibson's (1994)); and (3) argument from parallel case. Despite the degree of certainty in regard to the nature of compared things and the features of the target for each type, the three types work cognitively similarly. Therefore, Islamist extremists used the master narrative of Pharaoh to demonstrate their fight against irreligious tyrant corrupted rules (internal enemies) and irreligious foreign (external) enemies in order to achieve the second goal i.e. Rebuke. In so doing, an analogy is illustrated at the one hand between Pharaoh and the enemies and on the other hand between God's agent Prophet Moses and the extremists. In achieving the Islamist extremist goal of Renew, an analogy is drawn between master narrative of *Jahiliyyah* and what Qutb's call the Contemporary *Jahiliyyah* in reflecting the current Muslims situation of ignorance. The master narrative of the Battle of *Badr* draws an analogy at levels. It associates the call of Prophet Muhammad for detach of Muslims from their tribes in favour of *Ummah* (Islamic nation) and the call of Islamist extremists of Muslims across nations to detach from their nationalities in favour of *Ummah*. This argument serves both the goal of Resist and Restore. The other drawn analogy is

between *Badr*'s victorious Muslims of little equipment and number and of those of Islamist extremists. The master narrative of Hypocrites draws an analogy between the hypocrites in early Islam time and of today's who passively act and behave toward the Islamist extremists. This association serves the Rebuke goal and invokes an unpleasant perspective against unsupportive individuals and entities. The master narrative of the Battle of Karbala draws an analogy between the heroic sacrifice of Husayn and his supporters and today's Shi'ites in their war against enemies mainly the Sunnis. This rhetorical effect serves the Resist goal. The master narrative of the *Mahdi* builds analogy between the Saviour Mahdi and Islamists extreme leaders namely the Grand Ayatollah of Iran Shi'ites. In this case, the Restore goal is served. The master narrative of Crusader and Tatar draws an analogy between the invasion of Christian Crusaders and Tatars and other invasion against Islamic countries (*Ummah*) across time including the US and its allies in the contemporary time. In so doing, the Resist goal is achieved. The master narrative of the *Shaytan*'s Handiwork establishes an analogy between Satan and corrupted individuals and entities in both Muslim and non-Muslim worlds as in the case of the Ayatollah Khomeini call of the United States as the "Great Satan". This master narrative is a supporting and serves the three Rs goals: the Resist, the Rebuke and the Restore. The master narrative of 1924 paves the similarity between the 'secret Jew' Ataturk the destroyer of the Ottoman Caliphate and enemies of Islam including the US and Israel and their allies. In this context, both the Rebuke and Resist goals are served. As an incomplete master narrative, Islamist extremists urge the public to involve in the deliverance mission either by participation or by providing logistic support. The master narrative of the *Nakba* draws on the analogy of the failure of Muslims in protecting Palestine against the Israeli invasion and the current failure of Muslims in protecting other Muslim countries against the foreign attacks as in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. The *Nakba* master narrative as an incomplete deliverance story

serves the Resist goal by reminding Muslims of the catastrophic consequences of the failure in unity against the enemies and the need of a hero who the Islamist extremist claim to be. The master narrative of the Seventy-Two Virgins implicitly establishes an analogy among Muslim sacrifices across eras. The strategic use of this master narrative normalises the extremists' violent actions against others and justifies the willingness of martyrdom by having a better afterlife. Nevertheless, since these master narratives and their strategic use realised in the rhetorical vision are well-established and embedded in the target culture, countering them is a challenge of a little revenue. In so doing, the authors provided five bases of strategic countering of the master narratives by Islamist extremists: avoiding reinforcement, contesting analogies, decompressing time, deconstructing binaries and recasting archetypes.

2.2.6 The discursal perspective of narrative

Norman Fairclough's (1992) *Discourse and Social Change* is an interdisciplinary theoretical framework for language analysis in which politics and sociology beside linguistics shape its terminology and paradigm. In his terminology, discourse referred to language use and represented in a form of social practice in oppose to the Saussurean who regarded it as a complete individual activity. In this context, discourse is a mode of social representation and action. The relationship between social structure and discourse is dialectical in which social structure is an effect and condition of social practice. Therefore, discourse is constituted and shaped by social structure at all levels. Nevertheless, discourse is in itself socially constitutive which plays a significant role in "constituting and constructing the world in meaning" (p. 64). Discourse, therefore, is a key element in the construction of social identity including subject position (identity function), social relationships (relational function) and the system of belief and knowledge (ideational function). This, to a large extent, corresponds with the notion of

narrative as elaborated in Bruner (1991), Somers and Gibson (1994) and Baker (2006). Social practice can be presented in ideological, cultural, political and economic orientations and that discourse can be involved in any without them being reducible to discourse. As a political practice, discourse initiates, maintains and sways power relations. Political practice is the site of struggle over power. As an ideological practice, discourse normalises, naturalises, maintains and sways different positions of power relations. Ideological practice thus is the inferior category with respect to the political practice. Order of discourse is often experienced in a contradictory way depending on the understanding of its elements by different social classes and groups. Departing from this very point of conflict, political and ideological investments are emerged to the scene. In understanding the production process and interpretation of a discourse, members' resources are inevitably involved. Members' resources are social settings embedded in the production of text (in line with Halliday's (1978) definition of text; spoken as well as written language). Discourse, as Fairclough argued, is an analytical tool of three dimensions: (1) text as a linguistic object, (2) discursive practice including the production, consumption, and distribution of knowledge, and (3) social practice including the power and system of power relations, and ideology and hegemony. These three layers correlate and interdetermine each other. Ideology, therefore, does not fully control the text, its production and interpretation, rather other sociolinguistic elements and sources are involved. Intertextuality is the concrete concept that Fairclough was making use of in his analytical framework of analysing language. Intertextuality was set to analyse how texts are influentially related to each other. One's texts, both spoken and written accounts, are explicitly and implicitly filled with others' utterances at different degrees and competing with one's own-ness to varying extent. One's awareness of this very fact is individually varying. Within these utterances of the others, framed expressions and evaluative tools are imbedded. One reemphasises, reworks and

assimilates others' accounts in his narrative. In other words, discourse is built upon and shaped by the ones of the past thus one may anticipate and even shape the future discourse with the help of the texts from the past (historicity, 'metanarratives' in Somers and Gibson's (1994) term, and 'master narratives' in Halverson et al.'s (2011)). Such process is called texts' productivity which is socially constrained and governed by relations of power. Presuppositions are significant methods of ideological insertion and manipulation of people's thoughts which are difficult to challenge. Presuppositions are what the text producer takes for granted based on past texts and experiences. Coherence as an evaluative concept is a feature enacted by interpreters of a text (including its producer) upon the text rather than it is a feature of the text itself. The coherent degree of a text, therefore, varies from an interpreter to another.

2.2.7 The functional perspective on narrative

From another perspective on narrative evaluation in translation, House (2015) *Translation quality assessment: past and present* offered a revised evaluative model of hers (1977, 1997) taking into consideration the latest emerging issues and developments in translation studies. This elaborated model is built upon the understanding of translation as a cognitive process as well as a "social, cross-linguistic and cross-cultural practice" (p. 1). Thus translation is a linguistic task and that equivalence is its core measurement tool. Equivalence, House explains, is not about identity or sameness, but rather it is about "approximately equal value" regardless any inevitable changes due to differences among languages. House's model largely integrates English as lingua franca and globalisation, which includes translation as an inseparable part, in its conceptualisation and application. The assessment of translation in House's model follows a functional perspective including the Hallidayan where the textual account is analysed based on text/language and Register which includes Field, Tenor and Mode.

She also integrates ‘frame’, ‘discourse world’ and ‘Genre’ to further the clarity of her conceptual framework. The developed model sets the ‘Participation’ parameter under Tenor, adds the ‘Connectivity’ parameter to measure cohesion and coherence, and emerges ‘Corpus Studies’ parameter to evaluate Genre-related issues. The model also takes into consideration the difference between the ‘scholarly’ generated analysis and results and the ‘social’ judgment. It argues that the analysis and results offered in the academia establish the grounds of the social assessment. In addition to the influencing factors of translation quality such as the translator, the text to be translated and the translator’s subjectivity in interpreting the text, there are other non-linguistic factors intervene in the quality including the publishing policy and market, and the target audience as well as the reason behind the translation. Nevertheless, although House (2015) considers social dimensions in its conceptual framework, it opts to make use of the functional-linguistic approach in its analysis and application. The current study, therefore, opts to follow Fisher’s paradigm to assess the narratives under study arguing that social judgment includes linguistic evaluation. Finally, it can be said that House (2015) is an exhaustive reading in translation quality assessment and a contemporary attempt to illustrate a model of her own.

The next section discusses the notion of Framing in different academic fields at the theoretical level with its possible applications.

2.3 The Notion of Framing across Academic Disciplines

2.3.1 The psychological perspective on framing

Bateson’s (1972) *Steps to an ecology of mind* is considered a pioneer work on Framing in an attempt to understand verbal communication among societies exemplifying his framework on the communication of monkeys. In his framework, there are three levels

of abstract verbal communications: “first, the denotative level (i.e., referential level); second, the metalinguistic level (i.e., the subject of communication is language); and third, the metacommunicative level (i.e., communication regarding the intention and goal of an interaction)” (Kim, 2013, p. 1). Framing is said to take place in the level of metacommunication realized in a “spatial and temporal bounding of a set of interactive messages [...] the messages have a special and peculiar relationship to a more concrete or basic reality.” (Bateson, 1972, p. 197). In other words, frames are those signalling devices that the participants of an interaction signal to each other in order to convey certain messages including the intention behind this interaction which in turn ensures accurate interpretation and coherent narrative. To Bateson, these frames, therefore, construct the interaction and guide our actions and reactions toward it. Such understandings of the effectiveness and aftereffect of framing agree to large extent with Baker’s (2006) discussion on narratives and framing and are of the concern of this study in its attempt to investigate the ‘ideologically-motivated’ interpretations of the signalling devices i.e. frames.

Moreover, Goffman’s (1974) *Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience* is an elaboration of Bateson’s notion on Framing (of a situation). To Goffman, a frame is a set of “principles of organization” or “schemata of interpretation” which offer the context for interpreting the communication thus enables one or group to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” social events and happenings and in turn governing meanings, experiences and actions. In other words, frames construct experiences and define and identify social interactions and participants’ involvements and relations in such. Frames are cultural-laden, in analysing frames one should look at the cultural roots and meanings of these frames. In understanding framing as a dynamic process, this framework furthered the framing analysis by adding the notions ‘keying’

and 'footing'. Keying is a patterned change of a frame into another, a transformation, in order to maintain resonance. Footing represents and realizes the perspectives of participants' social role relations in frames, Baker's positioning and Bal's Focalization. The footing process may result in a shift of frame, a context. The notions of 'keying' and 'footing' are significant to the expansion of a frame; however, any alternation of their particularities in translation may result on frame shift which could lead to a different interpretation of the communication under translation.

However, Tannen's (1993) *Framing in discourse* emphasised on the idea that 'expectations', a product of one's past experiences are central to framing analysis. Thus she identifies frames as 'structures of expectations' adding that "on the basis of one's experience of the world in a given culture, one organizes knowledge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and relationships regarding new information, events, and experiences" (p. 16). To illustrate her framework, Tannen investigates the oral narratives of women's retelling of certain events. Her findings establish that the speaker's expectations are realized in the retelling of narratives under 16 categories: addition, omission, incorrect statements, moral judgment, interpretation, evaluative language, inference, generalization, inexact statements, modals, contrastive connectives, negatives, hedges, backtrack, false start and repetition. Tannen's framework is set for cognitive frame rather than Bateson's and Goffman's interactive frame. Tannen's cognitive frame is dynamic depending on one's experiences in a specific time and place.

The notions of cognitive frame and interactive frame were discussed in Baker (2006) and considered dynamic and cultural-dependant. The notions of audience's expectations and preferences were also included in Baker's framework including the

Tannen's 16 categories of framing under the three main categories: paratextual, contextual and textual framings. Thus, this study considers the literature in its analysis and understanding of the research data and follows Baker's (2006) in structuring its theoretical and conceptual frameworks.

Wendland's (2010) *Framing the Frames: A Theoretical Framework for the Cognitive Notion of "Frames of Reference"* defined frames as a cognitive schema that contains a set of parameters for understanding and interpreting experiences by the public. They aim at influencing the public views by providing manipulated version of 'reality' in which they offer a judgment for further action(s). In so doing, frames feature some particularities of an event/happening over others to direct the audience to the preferred settings of interpretation (perception). Carefully selected terminologies for a given frame serve the media and official institutions in preserving the resonance of their perspectives toward public-concerned issues. Frame of reference is achieved when non-centralised information is placed at clause-initial position. It functions as an introducer and attention-seeker of an emerging interest in the narrative. Frames are dynamic and situational-adaptable constructs that interrelated through appropriateness, relevance and salience depending on the interpersonal background of the narrative interpreter. These frames' features are mainly achieved through ten mini frames i.e. time (temporality; represented in flash-forwards, flashbacks or chronological sequence), place (spatiality; the narrative site (scene)), substantive (persons or entities; interrelated through relationships either by role or attribution), event (eventive; the story backbone), quality (interrelated attributions and propositional states), social (interpersonal and sociocultural relationships including of religions, ethnics and economics), logical (a proposition or a simple sentence that represents associated relationships or cause-effect linkages), speech act (locutionary; interrelated through embeddedness, affirmation,

contradiction, elaboration or simple addition), prior text (textually; interrelated through echo, allusion or citation), and genre (a discourse category; interrelated evoking their origin linguistic and sociocultural features and norms). Furthermore, in their efforts to translate the ST especially of the Bible into the target audience, translators examine the ST frames with consideration to its situational configuration based on the assumption of the principle of relevance. Then they produce a cognitive situation that conveys the ST overt and covert meanings that, in turn, help to achieve full understanding. Then translators employ some discourse analysis techniques in order to ensure the interactive and progressive processes of text interpretation by the target audience (implied author-audience). After that, translators reconstruct the ST frames in order to fit the general cognitive configuration of the target language and culture. In so doing, the ST frames are amended and corrected through employing paratextual resources from the target sociocultural consensus. This process provides the target audience with the necessary conceptual framework that helps in fully interpret and make sense of the TT frames as well as preserving the ST message. Importantly, in order to match the inherently present scenarios in interpretations produced by the target audience with the ones intended by the ST author to his primary audience, translators are to benefit from the features of the TT and its supplementary paratext including footnotes, section headings, illustrations, format and typography. Scenarios' aesthetic appeal and rhetorical impact that represent the implicit connotative-emotive values of a frame are to be taken into account in the translation process. Moreover, four cognitive spaces are involved in the (re)framing process i.e. target and source spaces (the inputs) and generic and blended spaces (the consequences).

2.3.2 The media and communication perspectives on framing

Pan and Kosicki's (1993) *Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse* proposed an emerging analytical perspective of political news media discourse that aimed to uncover the methods of its framing by politicians and advocacy groups. They argued that such kind of discourse is the outcome of a sociocognitive process that includes sources (ST, in the case of translation), journalists (translators, in the case of translation) and audience with defined social position and within a shared culture (TT, in the case of translation). In so doing, news texts are considered as "a system of organized signifying elements that both indicate the advocacy of certain ideas and provide devices to encourage certain kinds of audience processing of the texts." (pp. 55-56). In other words, news media frame is a norm of journalistic professional and an intellectual strategy in transforming (encoding, interpreting and retrieving) information. Therefore, framing is regarded as both: (1) a device of formulating and operating news discourse and (2) a property of the discourse itself. The operation of initiating a news discourse starts with the journalistic interest in an issue or event (meeting the level of news-worthy) which was performed by a source. At this stage, sources, journalists and audience are involved in formulating, transforming and acting upon the news discourse according to their social positions. The shared believes of the society where the operation takes place establishes the general boundaries of the news discourse operational sphere. News texts are central to this operation in which they deliver the processed meaning rather than the intended. News texts are produced by writers and reporters and amended by editors in accordance with the working theories, norms and expected audience reaction. Expected audience reaction is measured by the interpretation of lexical and structural properties of the text and relating them to those of the past (experiences). In a news story, a theme is the connector of various semantic elements that build its overall coherence. Both news writers and readers benefit from the

functional relations among the story elements which were established by the theme to direct the interpretation of the story into the desirable direction. However, the intended message imbedded in the structural paradigm of a story functions effectively in framing the audience interpretation. A theme, therefore, is a frame. A story theme is the site of possible framing and manipulation. In news discourse, there are four main framing devices within the structural paradigm: syntactical, rhetorical, thematic and script. Syntactical structures are the systematic formulation of sentences from words and phrases. This formulation does not offer much information. Rather, it indicates the discourse genre. The formulation is of sequential organisation that starts with the headline follows by the lead then the episode then the background and ends with the closure. The sequential order of various organising elements depends on their power. The headline functions as a signalling device, while a lead grants the story its newsworthiness. The headline and the lead are the most important and powerful framing devices within the syntactical structure. Script structures are the organisation of the story components. Traditionally, these components are answers of the 5 Ws: who, what, when, where and why and 1 H: how. The script of the 5 Ws and 1 H grants the story its independency and completeness. Thematic structures are the representation of logical or causal-empirical relations in reporting a set of events and actions assuming to relate to a topic or an issue under the investigation. In order to support such hypothesis, sources were quoted, events were cited and proposals were suggested. Rhetorical structures are the intended effects represented in the writer's stylistic choices. Rhetorical devices may appear in various forms including visual images, depictions, catchphrases, exemplars and metaphors. The rhetorical claim that news agencies report factual information and that news is a reflection of reality, is used by journalists to increase their believability. Moreover, lexical choice represented in labelling and wording plays an effective role in the overall understanding and interpreting of news texts. Labelling reveals the writer

cognitive ideologically-based categorisation. In the context of news discourse, labelling thus is seen as a remarkable framing device.

Scheufele's (1999) *Framing as a Theory of Media Effects* offered an integrated framing model in media communication analysis in seeking to overcome the operational problems resulted from the lack of a wide-range agreed conceptual framework in framing analysis that led to minimise the comparability of methods and findings. He discussed that researches on framing are of two categories; (1) researches that examine the framing types (media vs. individual) and (2) researches that examine the framing operation (independent vs. dependant variables). Through framing, mass media, as he argued, constructs social reality. In so doing, mass media effectively frames the references in political communication to direct the audience to the preferred interpretation and response relating to current important public events. Media frames are a greatly unacknowledged norm in journalism; however, it significantly organises the world of journalists who report it and the public who rely on these reports. Media frames are imbedded devices in media discourse that guide the recipients' understanding by featuring certain issues and providing framed definitions, labels, evaluations and recommendations. Individual frames are the stored past experiences in the audience's mind that assist the processing and understanding of the current happenings and the prediction of the future. Moreover, researches on framing that focused on dependent variables studied the position of different factors in the production and modification of frames including ideological, individual, institutional, social and journalistic variables. Researches on framing that focused on independent variables, however, studied the effects of framing including the association of individual frames and his role, position and effect on the political scene. In media discourse, framing a given subject matter may be shaped by the journalists' political and

ideological orientation, journalistic practices, pressure of advocacy groups, institutional policy, and social values and norms (culture). The process model of framing proposed in this study includes links between media and individual frames (journalists as audience), individual-level effects of framing, frame settings and frame building. Frame building is built upon three sources: journalist-centred (their writing style, attitude and ideology), selection of frames (institutional policy and standards) and external sources (advocacy groups, authorities and politicians). Frame setting is of two stages: transforming the object salience and transforming the attribute salience. This process includes both conscious and unconscious factors i.e. accessibility of frames and perceived importance. Individual-level effects of framing include the cognitive variables, attitude, behaviour and attributes of responsibilities. The links between media frames and individual-level variables (journalists as audience) evokes that journalists are similarly influenced (susceptible) by media effects.

Norris et al. (2003) *Framing Terrorism* discussed the media frames in reporting and interpreting the Al-Qaeda's terrorist 11 September attacks against the United States. In framing news, media selects, grants weight and excludes events or aspects of events in order to compose "a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events" (p. 4). In structuring the storyline of a journalistic article, media relies on credible sources and familiar patterns (frames) to constitute reality and transform the governing interpretations. Moreover, in the context of a one-sided communicator (a dominant field of one actor of the conflict), journalists are unaware of the impact of their news frames believing that they report 'facts'. 'Episodic' frames are employed in the interpretation of mass media reporting of political conflicts -rather than 'thematic' frames- to offer more comprehensive understanding of the factors contribute to the subject matter. In mass media, 'economic' and 'conflict' frames tend to streamline the narrative of complicated

happenings. Traditional frames of terrorist narrative offer an effective ready-made interpretation to current and future terrorist acts since they invoke well-established social reality. The theoretical framework developed in this study takes into account the major role of mass media in framing terrorist acts in news and that the public understanding of these acts rely largely, if not completely, on the framed news. In a wide sense, frames are subtle devices to leaders in simplifying and responding to social events, to journalists in briefing news by recalling similar past experiences from the culturally-specific reservoirs, and to the public in understanding and evaluating emerging events and phenomena. However, news frames, conventionally, do not offer a complete account of all particularities of a terrorist act. They, rather, retain some ruling puzzles that trigger the preferred interpretation. Frames, when the international affairs is concerned, serve as an agenda-setting by prioritising events as international matter, as a cognitive priming by identifying and explaining the threat, and as an evaluative tool by suggesting resolutions. News frames are shaped largely by three factors: the agreed facts on the terrorist acts, the interpretations of these acts by officials, and the weights of dissident groups. The framing model developed herein proposed links among news frames, public opinion, public policy agenda, real world indicators, personal experiences and interpersonal communications (*ontological narrative* in Somers & Gibson's 1994), and public reactions. It argued that news frames impact public opinion with regard to the learned information about a terrorist act, the identification of issue and its key players, and the public understanding of the future terrorist threats. This impact increases in the case of a one-sided communicator. In addition to news frames, personal experiences and interpersonal communications shape the public opinion. Public opinion is said to affect the public policy agenda. News frames are also claimed in this model to directly and indirectly influence the public policy agenda together with the official response to terrorist acts. Public reaction, therefore, is motivated by

conventional news frames, principally where one actor of the conflict dominates the societal identity and culture. Nevertheless, in the context of the 11 September event, Bush administration adopted the frame of the 'war on terrorism' in its efforts in identifying its 'friends' and 'enemies' globally and in justifying its hostility against Afghanistan, Iraq and North Korea. The emerging frame of the globally-recognised 'war on terrorism' provides an exhaustive framework that applicable to any 'conflict' or 'terror act' taking place anywhere at the international arena based on the US foreign policy terms and interpretations. The frame of the 'war on terrorism' functions mentally by associating disparate leaders (characters), events and facts. It also serves as an evaluative tool by identifying victims and perpetrators, and assigning blames.

Fairhurst's (2010) *The Power of Framing: Creating the Language of Leadership* employed frame analysis and methods to build an original paradigm that set for non-traditional audience in an attempt to direct the scholarly focus on framing from how frames are constructed and interrelated in shaping social 'reality', 'identity' and 'relations of power' to frames as a device of enabling anyone especially in the business realm to fashion leadership by interaction and talk. In considering framing as a reality constructor, there are mainly six rules in framing reality in leadership communication i.e. context control, situation definition, ethics application, uncertainty interpretation, response designation, and spontaneity control. However, people differ in their communication styles which in turn makes the framing process either more or less easy/successful. Chiefly, people fall in one of the three communication styles: expressive, strategic or conventional. Each of these styles encounters some framing issues. In considering framing as a skill, core framing tasks (essential communication necessities), mental models (one's cognitive model including global awareness, sociocultural identity and values, and vision and mission for the future), and cultural

Discourses (one's in-depth understanding of the setting of his own cultural discourse as well as of other discourses involved in the communication) are the main conceptual framework. Framing as a science argues that the conscious process of framing is very significant and effective for its successfulness. Framing as an art argues that naturally-gifted communicators are conscious users of language, as well as linguistics thus their frames are largely successful. Reaching the maximum effect of framing is highly realised in the case of a set of interrelated frames. In this context, frames of believability realise the communicator's credibility; frames of simplification realise the communicator's accuracy; frames of metaphor realise the narrative's liveliness; and master frames realise a ready-made narrative structure. Framing as an emotion argues that frames achieve a higher degree of effectiveness when a situation is strongly emotionally-charged. Framing, in this sense, is not limited to verbal methods but it also covers body language. In controlling their emotions, leaders can make use of the two techniques: reframing and priming for spontaneity. Framing as ethics argues that one may make use of institutional code of ethics to manifest his morality to the target audience and in turn to shape a new set of sociocultural ethics. This moral positioning serves as a salient justification device.

2.3.3 The political perspective on framing

King and Wells' (2009) *Framing the Iraq War Endgame: War's Denouement in an Age of Terror* discussed the framing strategies employed by Bush's administration in the official narrative of the 'War on Terror' in justifying its invasion of Iraq and the consequently taken actions in this regard. Frames as defined here are "central organizing ideas that make sense of relevant events or situations and weave them into a basic narrative or storyline" (p. 6). Frames function as meaning organisers highlighting some situational information and dismissing others. Frames, therefore, are not neutral.

The process of framing includes the selection, weighting and association of desired parts of information then moulding them into a rational narrative. In so doing, frames provide definition to a particular situation discussing its problematic conditions and effects, followed by analysis of causes, then assessment of the morality of its key players, concluding by recommendation of some improvements and treatments. An exhaustive political frame constructs a morality narrative about a political figure or situation distinguishing the right from the wrong and the good from the bad then concisely informs what actions/response should be taken and why. It provides answers for anticipated serious questions on its validity. It also limits the audience's perspective on any issue through providing a close-ended range of interpretations. It further offers a version of 'reality' what believed to be 'true' taking over the job of cognitive process. Large resonance and cultural relevance as well as coherence are the main factors to sustain a political framed narrative. Frame contests are the case when there are competing narratives of a given issue. This framework of frames was well-invested by Bush's administration in its narrative of the 'War on Terror'. In so doing, Bush's administration story of 11 September presented the killing of the few thousands (about 3 thousands) civilians as an 'unjustified act of war' (the issue), performed by a group of terrorists who opposes democracy and freedom (the cause), this group of terrorists presents the evil while the US and its citizens present the innocent part (the victims, the moral assessment), and that the US is left with no option but to launch a global war against this group of terrorists and other terrorists who present a threat on the US security and its citizens (the treatment). While Bush's administration carefully framed the narrative of Iraq attack, it did not provide any frames to the completion of mission and the assessment of its victory.

Butler's (2012) *Selling a 'Just' War: Framing, Legitimacy, and US Military Intervention* examined the methods and extent of applying the 'just war narrative' in selling the war to the local audience illustrating on the Gulf war (the US-led attacks against Iraq in 1990–1991), Kosovo war (by the NATO in 1999) and Afghanistan war (the US-led invasion in 2001). Framing aims at advancing the public perception toward a given issue and increasing the general agreement on its ultimate proposed solution. In so doing, one should test the settings i.e. timings and circumstances in which a narrative is considered legitimate and that narrative expresses fidelity within the American context of a 'just war' narrative. Further, one should examine the general standards of the societal narratives in which a 'just war' frame is set in order to assess its applicability as an instrument of mind in the hands of politicians. Frames, therefore, provide information about the degree of interaction between societies and decisions by foreign policymakers. Researches on framing should focus on the study of framing effects more than framing process and content in order to draw a larger picture of the scene thus reach to a better understanding of the framing mechanism and significance. Frames are an advance level of schema set for certain interactions in which they represent as interpretive devices and parameters. In realising their broad reasoning, frames build upon existing schema of the same locative context. Cumulatively, frames function as knowledge producers extract from life experiences and that social and psychological processes besides other factors shape such production. Functions of frames are classified under three main categories: diagnostic (problem identification and causes attribution), prognostic (solution(s) proposition), and motivational (action-engagement rationality). Framing process contains a set of associated processes mainly articulation (packaging experiences and event) and amplification (weighting some issues and events over others). These processes work together to ensure the audience's minimal cognitive process. These processes also help in structuring as well as

preserving the resonance and significance of a narrative across times. The contested and cascading natures of frames do not only provide a meaning-rendered version of reality but also a challenge to other potential threatening frames. In evaluating frames application, the considerations of (1) credibility (of architects i.e. leaders, of message/content) in terms of internal consistency of ideas, values, beliefs and claims, and empirical support, (2) salience; in terms of centrality of a frame's values, ideas, claims and beliefs to the ones of the target audience, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity, and (3) dynamism; the manipulation extent of a frame's message/content performed by the architects and represented in flexibility/rigidity and inclusivity/exclusivity of a frame, are examined. Frames, moreover, qualify the title 'master frame' when they offer advance level of credibility and salience as well as flexibility for future revision and amendment. However, 'inducing frames' are the ones of sufficient degrees of credibility, salience and dynamism but easy challengeable by other frames. 'Discordant frames' are the ones who failed to reach particular level of credibility, salience and dynamism.

2.3.4 The social perspective on framing

Ziegler et al. (eds.) (2015)¹³ *Framing Excessive Violence: Discourse and Dynamics* argued that effectively framing excessive violent happenings by normalising and rationalising such helps to "define the performance of violence as a social practice as unnecessary." (p. 2). Social actors, therefore, enjoy the very norm of their absence. Violence is seen as an integral part of societies across times at both individual and institutional levels that framed in symbols and practices in accordance with social norms. Successful social framing of excessive violence heavily relies on the presentation of a cohesive narrative of happenings. The production of such narrative is

¹³ Reviewed in Hijjo (2017).

built mainly upon the institutional narratives including of the media and the government with extent margin of personal narratives within the understanding of persons as social actors. Retrospectively media frames of excessive violence significantly contribute to order of society. In this respect, mass media sets the frames of a given narrative of individually or institutionally excessive violent acts in order, therefore, to (re)assimilate them within the symbolic order of society. The perpetrators' perspectives and strategies are of importance in revealing the framed narratives which represent their identities, definitions and motivations toward excessive violence. However, the lack of cultural framing and visual reference prevent the public exposure of torture narratives. The authors proposed an analytical model of framing 'excessive violence' which consists of two layers; micro-context (personal and interpersonal level) and macro-context (societal and cultural level). Framing as a concrete concept understood in this model refers to the temporal context that represents the rational paradigms set within narratives of violence. It is, to some extent, flexible, situational, internally sequential in reasoning and repetitive in form athwart various researches. The nature of framing as a bi-directional and an interactively negotiable allows "the strategic rendering of discourse positions: that is to say, for propaganda." (p. 6). Framing, however, is culturally-specific and referential which represents and constructs world experiences in a narrative form rather than a stereotype.

The next section discusses the application of framing in online news media offering examples from the current conflicts in the Middle East.

2.4 Online News Media in the Context of the Middle East Conflict

It is the era of technology in which the number of Internet users is growing rapidly. The latest estimate of the number of the world Internet users on 30 June 2012 is

2,405,518,376¹⁴ which shows a great increase by 566.4% since 2000 as shown in Table 2.1:

Table 2.1: World Internet Usage and Population Statistics as of 30 June 2012

WORLD INTERNET USAGE AND POPULATION STATISTICS June 30, 2012						
World Regions	Population (2012 Est.)	Internet Users Dec. 31, 2000	Internet Users Latest Data	Penetration (% Population)	Growth 2000-2012	Users % of Table
Africa	1,073,380,925	4,514,400	167,335,676	15.6 %	3,606.7 %	7.0 %
Asia	3,922,066,987	114,304,000	1,076,681,059	27.5 %	841.9 %	44.8 %
Europe	820,918,446	105,096,093	518,512,109	63.2 %	393.4 %	21.5 %
Middle East	223,608,203	3,284,800	90,000,455	40.2 %	2,639.9 %	3.7 %
North America	348,280,154	108,096,800	273,785,413	78.6 %	153.3 %	11.4 %
Latin America / Caribbean	593,688,638	18,068,919	254,915,745	42.9 %	1,310.8 %	10.6 %
Oceania / Australia	35,903,569	7,620,480	24,287,919	67.6 %	218.7 %	1.0 %
WORLD TOTAL	7,017,846,922	360,985,492	2,405,518,376	34.3 %	566.4 %	100.0 %

Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
Basis: 2,405,518,376 Internet users on June 30, 2012
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Nevertheless, the latest statistics of Internet users by language shows that English is on the top by 565,004,126 users. Yet the number of users of Arabic increased to reach the top one in growth by 2,501.2% as shown in Table 2.2¹⁵:

Table 2.2: Top Ten Languages Used in the Web

Top Ten Languages Used in the Web (Number of Internet Users by Language)					
TOP TEN LANGUAGES IN THE INTERNET	Internet Users by Language	Internet Penetration by Language	Growth in Internet (2000 - 2011)	Internet Users % of Total	World Population for this Language (2011 Estimate)
English	565,004,126	43.4 %	301.4 %	26.8 %	1,302,275,670
Chinese	509,965,013	37.2 %	1,478.7 %	24.2 %	1,372,226,042
Spanish	164,968,742	39.0 %	807.4 %	7.8 %	423,085,806
Japanese	99,182,000	78.4 %	110.7 %	4.7 %	126,475,664
Portuguese	82,586,600	32.5 %	990.1 %	3.9 %	253,947,594
German	75,422,674	79.5 %	174.1 %	3.6 %	94,842,656
Arabic	65,365,400	18.8 %	2,501.2 %	3.3 %	347,002,991
French	59,779,525	17.2 %	398.2 %	3.0 %	347,932,305
Russian	59,700,000	42.8 %	1,825.8 %	3.0 %	139,390,205
Korean	39,440,000	55.2 %	107.1 %	2.0 %	71,393,343
TOP 10 LANGUAGES	1,615,957,333	36.4 %	421.2 %	82.2 %	4,442,056,069
Rest of the Languages	350,557,483	14.6 %	588.5 %	17.8 %	2,403,553,891
WORLD TOTAL	2,099,926,965	30.3 %	481.7 %	100.0 %	6,930,055,154

Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm
Estimated Internet users are 1,966,514,816 on June 30, 2010
Copyright © 2000 - 2010, Miniwatts Marketing Group

Moreover, according to Lawrence and Giles (1999), the World Wide Web (Internet) contains over 800 million pages. Additionally, users adopt the Internet as a

¹⁴ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm> [accessed 9 June 2014]

¹⁵ <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.htm> [accessed 9 June 2014]

medium of communications faster than any ever medium in the history (Arens, 2001). Kerschbaumer (2000) discussed that Radio took over 30 years to achieve 50 million listeners but it took Internet 5 years to reach 50 million users. Flavián and Gurrea (2008) explained that the low cost and the fast speed in accessing the news and information online around the clock are the major factors in the shift of readership from printed newspapers to online websites. Therefore, the number of readers of printed newspapers is decreased. Thus many newspapers went online and built their Internet versions (Bush & Gilbert, 2002). Many studies found that newspapers' websites are among the most suffered and visited (Consoli, 1997; Levins, 1998; Kaye & Johnson, 2004; Flavián & Gurrea, 2008). Moreover, translation is the medium of information transference among countries and across linguistics borders (Schäffner, 2004). However, most of the readers of foreign news in websites and newspapers are very likely unaware of the major role translation plays in mass media news reporting (Schäffner & Bassnett, 2010). The power of the language is realised through the media. The message of the media has a great influence over the audience who has much more belief in it than ever (Zhang, 2011). Accordingly, Bassnett and Bielsa (2009, p. 56) argued that:

“News agencies can be viewed as vast translation agencies, structurally designed to achieve fast and reliable translations of large amounts of information. It will maintain that translation is of the utmost importance in the news agencies and that it is inseparable from other journalistic practices that intervene in the production of news.”

De Vreese's (2007) *No News Is Bad News! The Role of the Media and News Framing in Embedding Europe* discussed mass media as a middle agent between the public and politics. Political journalism practice has undertaken three developing stages. Firstly, it was developed from issue reporting to strategic then to reflexive. In this stage, politician and public-concerned issues were dominators of the scene and journalists

were widely neutral. Secondly, the media redirected the focus on politics considering it as a game and engaging itself in this game through journalists as political experts and exercising strategic framing. Thirdly, the current stage, the media practices manipulation through its coverage performance, powerful impact on politicians as well as the public opinion, framing political actors, and marginality of policy issues and other public concerns. Within the European context, the study of the media role necessitates the consideration of other factors including fear of immigration, perception of cultural threat, subscription to the national identity, political-ideological preferences, social-demographic characteristics, satisfaction with the government, economic situation, and cognitive mobilisation. However, the less the public knows about the issue, the greater is the media impact. In other words, the impact of the media is relatively increasing with the fewer public's experiences about the problem under coverage.

Schäffner's (2012) *Rethinking Transediting* discussed the notion of 'transediting' in journalism practices. She argues that Stetting (1989) is a pioneer study of the editing carried out in translation as a practice without having any explicate ideological assumptions. To her, transediting is another term of "cultural and situational adaptations" which are required to meet the target audience's expectation and culture. Thus transediting includes converting values from the ST to the TT, adding explanations for the ST cultural-based references and omitting what sounds irrelevant in the TT culture. Transediting, she furthers, also contains improving the style, grammar and cohesion of the TT as well as correcting any errors found in the ST. The transediting process, as the author argues, is guided by the editors' and the translators' interpretation of the source text and their assumed response by the target audience. The term transediting is differently labelled by other scholars e.g. alternation, adaptation,

shift, framing, change. She stated that the literature reveals a clear involvement of ideology in transediting. However, the term ‘transediting’ is absent in any interview with journalists nor it is declared by the media that considers transediting an integral part of journalistic tasks. Journalists rather than translators, the author argues, are the ones who chiefly carry out the translations in the media under the claim that those journalists are more familiar with the journalistic practices and norms of news reports and production. Therefore, identifying the source text, target text and authorship is a challenge in most cases in news translation thus some scholars call it a ‘collective effort’. Finally, Schäffner concludes that transediting in its broad sense is found to be used in news translation for political and ideological settings.

Valdeón’s (2015) *Fifteen years of journalistic translation research and more* is an exhaustive discussion on journalistic translation research in the past fifteen years. He argues that journalistic translation as a subfield of translation studies has contributed to the birth and survival of journalism as well as being an indispensable practice of independence movements in the Americas and news agencies. He furthers that interest in news translation starts with the wars taking place in different areas of Europe and is increasingly seen after 1980s in Europe where ‘transediting’ is introduced by Stetting (1989). War news which depended largely on translation was “often used to project negative images of the Other” (p. 637). However, the crucial role of translation in news production is largely overlooked in news translation research. Nevertheless, to refer to the copying and editing processes of already published reports by other media agencies, the term ‘plagiarized’ was used in the past, yet, the author argues, the practice is still of the core news production today. In this regard, it is worth noting that recently newspapers, news channels and outlets have started to depend essentially on large corporations rather than their own foreign correspondents who were rationalised due to

the economic crisis and shortage of funding (which increases the impact of such corporations e.g. MEMRI). Finally, the author concludes that the absence of agreed terminology across languages and disciplines including ‘translation studies’ generates a challenge to the social sciences research in furthering the discussion on such issues.

Therefore, translation practice of the West international news media differs from the one of developing countries in terms of the influenced social contexts and the imbedded ideologies (Zhang, 2011). For example, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)¹⁶ provided English subtitle of an Arabic conversation of a host of a children program on Al-Aqsa TV (Hamas TV) and her guests as the following (cited in Baker, 2010, p. 2):

Host Saraa, a young girl: “Sanabel, what will you do for the sake of the Al-Aqsa Mosque? How will you sacrifice your soul for the sake of Al-Aqsa? What will you do?”

Sanabel, young girl on phone: “I will shoot.”

Farfour, a Mickey Mouse character in a tuxedo: “Sanabel, what should we do if we want to liberate...”

Sanabel: “We want to fight.”

Farfour: “We got that. What else?”

Saraa: “We want to...”

Sanabel: “We will annihilate the Jews.”

Saraa: “We are defending Al-Aqsa with our souls and our blood, aren’t we, Sanabel?”

Sanabel: “I will commit martyrdom.”

However, Baker (2010) argued, as a native of Arabic language and a Professor of Translation Studies, that the English subtitle provided by MEMRI is ideologically-derived and far from the truth. She explained that Sanabel said “*I’m going to draw a picture.*” not as MEMRI claimed “*I will shoot.*”, also Sanabel said “*We want to resist.*” not as MEMRI claimed “*We want to fight.*”, also she said “*The Jews are shooting us.*” not as MEMRI claimed “*We will annihilate the Jews.*” and finally she said “*I will become a martyr*” not as MEMRI claimed “*I will commit martyrdom.*”.

¹⁶ The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) <http://www.memri.org/about-memri.html>, is concerned particularly in the Middle East (Arab world) issues through their media. MEMRI claims that it is the language bridge between the East and the West through providing translations in different language largely in English of the Middle East languages mainly Arabic.

Consequently, this example reveals the ideological target of MEMRI in promoting the concept of the “Palestinians; the terrorists” and “Israelis; the victims” through translation to the world. Furthermore, Schäffner and Bassnett (2010) discussed that news media omits, adds, amends and re-narrates any news and embeds it with its own ideology based on its goals and interests (institutional policies). They also argued that such edit is possible only through translation yet the news media does not declare that the news is translated. Similarly, the Lebanese Ministry of Information discussed on its website how news media mistranslated the speech of John Kerry the then United States Secretary of State during his visit to Beirut on 4 June 2014. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Information website¹⁷, Lebanese mass media reported and translated Kerry’s speech according to their interest and ideology through manipulating some information and dropping others. Several Lebanese TV channels and newspapers mistranslated Kerry’s hope of electing a new Lebanese president who “has full authority” (“رئيس يتمتع بالسلطة (أو الصلاحيات) الكاملة”) to a new Lebanese president who “is powerful” (“برئيس قوي”). Moreover, the Lebanese Ministry of Information website reported that some TV channels and newspapers dropped the word “Iran” (إيران) in its translation of Kerry’s request to Russia, Iran and Hezbollah to put efforts to stop the war in Syria.

2.5 Review of Related Studies

This study represents the bridge and fills the gap between translation studies from one hand and other academic disciplines including Philosophy, Sociology, Communication and Mass Media, Political Science, Cultural Studies and Semiotics on the other hand. Therefore, the literature of this study contains researches that have been conducted within the aforementioned academic disciplines where Translation Studies is concern.

¹⁷ <http://www.nna-leb.gov.lb/ar/show-news/99144/> [Published 6 June 2014, accessed 15 June 2014]

Al-Sharif (2009) offered an in-depth analysis of MEMRI's English translations of the Arabic narratives on the Palestinian women in general and the mothers of the Palestinian martyrs in particular. Through the application of narrative theory as elaborated in Baker (2006), Al-Sharif aimed at determining the translation strategies used by MEMRI in reconstructing the Arabic narratives and in turn promoting dominant negative narratives of Palestine and Palestinian women in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although Al-Sharif's arguments were well supported from the literature, she failed to illustrate the narrativity features of relationality in her analysis that would explain how the 'good reasons' constituted in the Arabic and Islamic terms, that were left without translation by MEMRI, established the negative connotations in the target language within the meta-narrative of the War on Terror. Nevertheless, Al-Sharif succeeded in applying Baker (2006) on a variety of data types including text, image and video clip at the paratextual, contextual and textual levels of framing.

Montgomery (2009) investigated the role of lexicalisation of the 'War on Terror' in mass media reports that shapes the public discourse and in turn the public policy. In other words, Montgomery examines the US and the British news language after the 11 September attacks and how they legitimate the 'war' on 'terror' which he considered them equally as political violence. The argument made by the author that "since 9/11 there has been a repetitive working and reworking of how the semantic contours of political violence are lexicalized, a process in which two words – war and terror – have been particularly salient." (p. 117) disregards the significant role played by translation in the lexicalisation process. However, his work substantially illustrated the narrative position encouraged by the governmental policy in news language to elaborate the meta narrative of the War on Terror, and how language plays an effective role in justifying the 'war' on 'terror' through lexical choice which invites the awareness of the public

and scholars for further examination of the embedded ideologically selected words in news narratives.

Zhang (2011) employed an integrated framework of globalisation, translation, mass media and discourse analysis in examining the translation strategies applied by China CCTV-News in translating local news for the English-speaking audience. Although the results illustrate an in-depth linguistic analysis on the translated texts including the analysis of grammatical modifications, prioritisation and coherence, choice of lexis, synthesis and selections (omission), adaption, and thematic and schematic structures, the analysis is limited to randomly selected news from 5th June 2010 to 13th June 2010 which were not justified nor followed a thematic pattern. The poorly supported results by the research data and the literature establish, however, significant arguments including the extensive influence of social context and the translators' ideology in shaping the outcome of translation. The researcher failed to explain the results in the context of the meta-narrative of the War on Terror that influence "the news translators of CCTV-NEWS [to] used modification strategies at all textual levels in order to suit target English-speaking audiences' interest and knowledge" (p. 2).

Buckle (2011) investigated the elaboration of the rhetorical sounding of the 'metaframe' of the War on Terror in the American TV shows and films that incorporate fiction-based narratives of the War on Terror to help constituting 'reality' developed in the real narratives of the War on Terror. The main argument made in this study claimed that the narrative of the War on Terror "manifests itself in multiple interconnected narrative forms, and these forms both transcode and affect its politics." (p. 2). The analysis provided illustrates how different filmmakers produce differently structured-

plot of the War on Terror which, the researcher explained, results from the difficulty of fully understanding contemporary conflicts. The researcher's claim that current wars in the Middle East and North Africa "have largely resisted being assimilated into its metaframe, with 'War on Terror' replaced by 'Arab Spring'" (p. 298) is proven wrong over time especially after the emergence of *Daesh* and the International Coalition against *Daesh*. While this research offered an exhaustive account on the War on Terror narrative, it overlooked the vital role of translation in transmitting the message to the global audience.

Sinibaldi (2012) established an extensive analysis of the rewritings and translations carried during the Fascism era over the 1920s and the 1930s of the foreign literature books for children. Through these works, the Fascism regime aimed to enhance its image and to reframe 'reality'. The main claim illustrated in this study is that rewritings and translations were not only reflecting dominant narratives of Fascism ideology, but also are sites for "negotiation, allowing different, and sometimes conflicting narratives and discourses to be identified and fruitfully examined." (p. 3). Throughout the analysis of the four case studies undertaken in this research, the researcher successfully explained that some translators have a tendency to challenge and undermine the Fascism dominant ideologically-constructed narrative by means of lexical connotations as informed by the various circulated narrative inside and outside the country. Nevertheless, although the research examined the various factors that influence the production of translation including ideology, culture, identity and national policy, the relationality to the notion of a meta-narrative for propaganda e.g. the 'War on Terror' was neglected.

Taibi and Martin (2012) examined the political and ideological stands of translators in mediating conflicts exemplifying with the case of Al-Jazeera reporter, Taysir Alony who was associated to terror within the frames of the War on Terror narrative. The authors argued that the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' "manages to construct a narrative that serves its interests – either through indoctrinated translators or blatant manipulation." (p. 77). This argument was extensively supported by several analysed extracts from the court hearings and tap records. The results showed that despite the fact that the Spanish legal system guarantees an interpreter to detainees, the qualifications of such are not specified which permitted unprofessional interpretations. Although the authors succeeded in relating the case to the meta-narrative of the War on Terror, they disregarded the discussion of the elaboration of such especially the role of mass media.

Al-Hejin (2012) exemplified the application of three methodological models which proposed to bridge the gap between the academic fields Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis for the study of media news translation. The three suggested models regard translation as a re-writing, an intertextual chain, and multiple versions respectively. The results showed that BBC translators reframed the Arabic narratives of the Saudi Women interviewees to illustrate a distorted image of Muslim women. The author exhaustively supported his proposed approach –which he elaborated in brief-with citations; however, he failed to clearly illustrate its application on the case study undertaken by him. The provided analysis is merely comparative. The fact that this study tackled a serious limitation in the study of the translators' ideology in reframing the narratives under analysis, it neglected several factors including identifying the applied translation strategies, examining the role of institutional policy, and the relating of the findings to the meta-narrative of the War on Terror.

Brännlund et al. (2013) researched the role of translation of narratives across-different cultures. The authors aimed at identifying the aftereffect of reframing as well as the effectiveness of power relations in translating across cultural narratives. Through the several culturally-based conducted interviews, the authors compared the ontological narrative accounts of the interviewees with those of their societies. They claimed that applying an autoethnographic approach helps the investigation of the construction of various culturally-based translations. They further argued that translation is a site of negotiating power relations by means of linguistic choices and language advantage when the interviewees themselves are the translators for their own accounts that in turn reshape the resulting narratives. In other words, due to language competence, the multilingual interviewees translated their own narratives differently from the originals. The research data is seemingly sufficient; however, the number provided extracts is insufficient to support the elaborated arguments and results, although well supported by the literature. The researchers did not relate the interviewees personal narrative to those circulated in the media nor related meta-narratives.

Mansourabadi and Karimnia (2013) examined the lexical choices made in the two Persian translations of the English novel *A Thousand Splendid Suns*. The authors aimed to establish the role of ideology in reframing the original narrative in the two translations which may realise in the translators' lexical choice. The results, which are built upon the application of Fairclough's (1989), showed that the percentage of the two translations to each other and to the original is high. In other words, the findings established that the two Persian translations convey the same embedded ideology in the original English novel. In this regard, the authors explained that the shared culture and environment, among other factors, of the two translators and the source author constructed the same ideological stand for them which was reflected in the similarity of

conveying the ideologically-shaped constructs. Their claim that “ideology influences literary translations less than political or religious translations” (p.785) was not supported neither by the literature nor by a large corpus-based study. Moreover, the authors overlooked the influence of the related dominant narratives in the media and the narrative of the War on Terror in the outcome of the two translations.

Al-Hejin (2015) studied the ideologically-laden narratives published online by the BBC News on Muslim women. The researcher aimed to identify the semantic macrostructures affiliated to Muslim women and to determine the discursive strategies used in the representation of ‘*hijab*’ and in turn affecting Muslim women. He claimed that in the West, Islamophobia is responsible of the increasing negative image on Islam and Muslims. The findings illustrated that BBC News selectively publishes narratives on Muslim women which mainly include those of conflict and war which in turn evokes an image of negative news. In this regard, BBC News mainly reports on the female suicide bombers to illustrate the negative image and to construct the identity of Muslim women. The selected news for coverage by the BBC News merely represents 33% of the overall populations of Muslim majority countries. The findings showed also that BBC News tends to use word ‘*hijab*’ (veil) generally to describe both the cover of face and that of headscarf misleading the audience of the difference between the two. The author offered an exhaustive account on BBC News narratives on Muslim women; however, he failed to discuss the findings within the context of the meta-narrative of the War on Terror.

Table 2.3 in the next page offers an outline of the literature highlighting the research gap.

Table 2.3: The Researcher’s Literature Review Outline

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
Al Sharif (2009)	Translation Studies	Determine the translation strategies used by the Middle East Media Research Institute in constructing and promoting dominant narratives of Palestine and Palestinian women in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.	MEMRI’s translated articles on Palestinian women and mothers from October 2000 to October 2007	Baker’s (2006) Narrative theory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - MEMRI’s translations are in favour of Israel within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. - MEMRI’s translations use various narrativity features mainly selective appropriation in order to elaborate a narrative of ‘dehumanize’ Palestinian women and mothers. - MEMRI’s translations reframed the original text in order to be in line with the meta-narrative of the War on Terror. - MEMRI’s translations weight heavily the religious particularities to elaborate a bad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In-depth linguistic analysis was not carried. - Lacks and in-depth analysis of the role played by mass media in sustaining the meta-narrative of the War on Terror. - The examination of the applicability of Narrative theory in a larger context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East was not carried. - The political impact of translation in the context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East was not discussed.

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
Montgomery (2009)	Journalism	Investigate the role of lexical shaping of meanings of the political violence in normalizing the usage of terms 'war' and 'terror' of the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' to the public.	News texts over the period of six years (10 January 2002 to 10 January 2008) from the US in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and from the British broadsheet press over the intervening period through the search on LexisNexis.	Montgomery's (2005) 'The Discourse of War after 9/11'	<p>picture of Islam and Muslims rather than narrating the original conflict over resources and territory.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The government policy encourages the shape of the pattering 'war' and 'terror' in media news in order to achieve an intended effect on the readership. - A critical discourse analysis is required in studying media news in order to reveal the truth behind the deployment of certain politically-laden terms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The role of translation was not discussed in normalizing the narrative of the 'War of Terror' to the public. - No translation theory was applied. - The notions of 'narrative' and 'conflict' were not addressed. - The role of '11/9' narrative in sustaining the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' was not highlighted.
Zhang (2011)	Media Communication and Studies	Investigate the role of translation in the international mass media news of CCTV English.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CCTV's English news translations and their Chinese source texts. - Three telephone interviews and one online interview with staff of CCTV News. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - van Dijk's (1988) News as Discourse - Interview 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CCTV News adopted modification strategies at all discursal levels to comply with the audiences' knowledge. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No translation theory was applied; instead the researcher applied a CDA theory. - No translation strategies/procedures

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Translators' ideology and culture play a significant role and it is reflected clearly in their translations of the domestic Chinese CCTV News to the international news through English CCTV. - Studying the translation of international mass media is a useful tool which provides better understanding of the global power relation to the developing countries. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - were identified. - The political import was not highlighted clearly. - The notions 'narrative' and 'conflict' were not addressed. - The meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' was not discussed.
Buckle (2011)	Theatre, Film and Television Studies	Examine the ways and reasons behind featuring the War of Terror narrative in film and television and structuring it in particular ways.	TV shows, fiction text and films including: 24 (TV series), <i>Stop Loss</i> (film, 2008), <i>Over There</i> (American drama series, 2005), <i>The War Tapes</i> (film, 2006) and articles published by <i>The Guardian</i> in 2011 on the 'Arab Spring'.	Coyne's (2008) <i>Hollywood Goes to Washington: American Politics on Screen</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The American TV shows, films and fictions drawn on the event of 11/9 are ideologically shaped and elaborated in ways to support the development of the narrative of the War on Terror. - Filmmakers apply various strategies in 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The role of translation was not discussed. - The role of mass media was not discussed in-depth.

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
Sinibaldi (2012)	Translation Studies	Explain how the translation of children books during Fascism was a point for negotiation, permitting different, and conflicting narratives to be identified and effectively examined.	The rewritings of the novel <i>Pinocchio</i> , two Italian translations of <i>Alice in Wonderland</i> appeared in the 1930s, Italian translation of the American comics during the 1930s and the translation of the book series ' <i>La Scala d'Oro</i> '.	Interdisciplinary theoretical framework including Translation Studies, Children's Literature, and studies on Fascism.	<p>narrating the War on Terror due to the difficulty of narrating an ongoing conflict.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conflicting narratives in the rewritings and translations of children books during Fascism reflects the conflict in policies and ideologies among the different agencies involved in the work. - Rewriting and translation are significant tools in elaborating the propaganda of Fascism through reframing and manipulating the origin. - Fascism failed in having a complete control over children's experience of the literature due to the existence of alternative narratives from the inside and the outside. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A linkage between the control of translations of children's book during the Fascism time and the control the mass media in the present time was not suggested. - The meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' was not discussed. - The examination of the applicability of Narrative theory in a larger context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East was not carried.

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
Taibi and Martin (2012)	Translation Studies	Examine the role of translators in situations of ideological or political conflict with reference to the prison of Al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony.	Video recordings of part of the trial (twenty-two tracks lasting thirteen hours and nine minutes), documents including a few pages from the indictment provided by Alony's defence, one expert statement provided in court by Dr. Beatriz Molina and Spanish media reports covering Alony's case.	Descriptive comparison	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Translators were not complying with the translation codes of ethics. - The case texts and testimonies were reframed through selective appropriation and causal emplotment in order to serve the narrative of the 'War on Terror'. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The study is limited to the case of the Al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony. - The role of mass media in spreading the narrative of the 'War on Terror' was not discussed.
Al-Hejin (2012)	Critical Discourse Analysis	Investigate the extent in which textual transformations in the translation process may be ideologically motivated in the context of BBC translations of news on Muslim Saudi women.	Seven spoken discourse from a workshop conducted in 2005 by BBC Arabic with seven Saudi women aged 17-27 and their transcriptions. And BBC article in Arabic on the event and its translation in BBC English.	Fairclough's (1992, 1995, 2003)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The role of translation in recontextualize the source discourse is not recognised. - BBC recontextualizes the discourse on Muslim Saudi women through, mainly, selective appropriation in order to distort their image internationally. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No translation theory was applied. - The notions of 'narrative' and 'conflict' were not addressed. - The linkage between the 'War on Terror' and recontextualizing and manipulating the origin discourse was not discussed.
Brännlund et al. (2013)	Translation Studies, Culture Studies	Determine the complexity of translating meaning among cultures.	20 in-depth semi-structured interviews in Slovenia, 24 interviews with women's NGO activists in Morocco, and interviews with women in	Narrative approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The position and personal experience of a researcher guide the way of narrating others' narratives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The notions 'conflict' and 'framing' were not addressed. - No linkage between

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
			Kashmir.		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Personal narratives can be sustained and further by the help of narrative theory. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> the ‘War on terror’ narrative and personal narratives of the study participants. - The political import in translation of the narratives was not highlighted. - The role of mass media in sustaining/challenging narratives was not discussed.
Mansourabadi and Karimnia (2013)	Translation Studies	Compare the ideologically-laden narrative of the English novel <i>A Thousand Splendid Suns</i> and its two Persian translations.	21 chapters from Hosseini’s (2007) English novel <i>A Thousand Splendid Suns</i> and their two Persian translations by Ghebrai, and Ganji and Soleimanzade.	Fairclough’s (1989) Language and Power.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Both Persian translations and the origin novel present the same ideologically-laden narrative. - The similarity of ideology represented in lexical choice between the source narrative and its two translations suggests the subscription of the translators to the source ideology. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No translation theory was applied in the study analysis. - The political import in translation of the narratives was not highlighted. - The notions ‘conflict’ and ‘framing’ were not addressed. - No linkage between the narrative under study and a meta-narrative of the same genre.

Study	Field of the Study	Objectives	Corpus	Methodology	Relevant Findings	Gap
Al-Hejin (2015)	Critical Discourse Analysis	Investigate the way BBC News represents Muslim women in its articles.	A purpose-built corpus includes 1.9 million words in 3269 articles of BBC News website using the PC-based software WordSmith (Scott, 2010).	Methods from discourse-historical, socio-cognitive, and sociosemantic approaches to critical discourse studies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The representation of Muslim women is restricted at the regional coverage. - The Muslim women image is associated widely to conflict and crime discourse. - The misuse of hijab in the representation of Muslim women without its relevance to the discourse in question. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The role of translation in recontextualizing the discourse of Muslim women in BBC was not discussed. - The linkage between the 'War on Terror' and recontextualizing and manipulating the discourse of Muslim women was not addressed.

As shown in Table 2.3, the literature either discussed the topic under study from a pure Translation Studies perspective as in the works of Al Sharif (2009), Sinibaldi (2012), Taibi and Martin (2012) and Brännlund et al. (2013), or from a pure Discourse Analysis perspective as in the works of Zhang (2011), Al-Hejin (2012), Mansourabadi and Karimnia (2013) and Al-Hejin (2015), or from a pure Journalism and Media Studies perspective as in the works of Montgomery (2009) and Buckle (2011). Nevertheless, this research considers the impacts and implications of various academic perspectives where the research objectives are concerned. Therefore, it fills the gap in the literature considering various disciplines centralised by Translation Studies in its analysis in the context of the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'.

2.6 Summary

This chapter explored the notion ‘narrative’ across a number of academic fields including the literary perspective as in the works of Labov and Waletzky (1967), White (1980/1987), Bal (1985, 1997, 2009), Norrick (2000) and Altman (2008); the psycholinguistic perspective as in the works of van Dijk (1976), Bruner (1991), Singer (2004) and Gerrig (2011); the communication and the media perspective as in the works of Fisher (1987) and Selznick (2008); the sociological perspective as in the works of Somers (1992, 1994, 1997) and Somers and Gibson (1994); the religious perspective as in the work of Halverson, Goodall and Corman (2011); discursal perspective as in the work of Fairclough (1992); and functional perspective as in the work of House (2015). The notion ‘framing’ was also discussed spotting lights on the works of Bateson (1972), Goffman (1974), Tannen (1993), Pan and Kosicki (1993), Scheufele (1999), Norris et al. (2003), King and Wells (2009), Fairhurst (2010) and Wendland (2010), Butler (2012) and Ziegler et al. (eds.) (2015), in which all these studies considers framing as a theoretical framework functions to influence the target audience through constructing of ‘reality’. The crucial role of the media in transforming social reality and knowledge and affecting the public as well as policy makers was explained. A set of related previous studies was tabulated in order to accessibly define the gap that this study attempts to fill.

While this study benefits from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks offered in the literature in its understanding of the notions ‘narrative’ and ‘framing’, it opts to adopt Baker (2006) due to its nature and strength as discussed in Chapter Three.

The next chapter discusses the research theoretical framework as adopted from Baker (2006).

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NARRATIVE THEORY

3.1 Introduction

According to the Oxford Dictionary, narrative is “[a] spoken or written account of connected events; a story”¹⁸. Generally, scholars agree with this definition, adding that narrative is a story of events that we experience, which changes and develops over time; it has a beginning, plot and an end with temporal and causal sequences (Polkinghorne, 1988; Denzin, 1989; Abbs & Richardson, 1990; Graesser et al., 1991; Champion, 1997; Wennerstrom, 2001). Bruner (1991) emphasised that narrative is a way of giving meaning to a story, while Whitebrook (2001) noted that narratives allow us to understand one’s political view, ideology and identity. Narrative also explains how news stories change people’s behaviour rather than social factors such as race, colour, and gender (Baker, 2006). Narratives, therefore, “play a significant role in constructing and maintaining identities” (Brännlund, et al., 2013, p. 74). In this regard, Baker (2007, p. 151) argued that “it is our belief in these stories that guide our actions in the real world”.

Narrative represents an important means of representing, mediating, sustaining, and generating conflict in all aspects of social organisations (Briggs, 1996). In this thesis, the concept ‘narrative’ is used in its broader sense, in that it is not only applicable to public and individual stories, but also corresponds to the ‘myths’ in Barthes (1972) and the ‘discourse’ in Foucault ([1980] 1984) in addition to its applicability to the public and individual stories. The narrative theory (NT) comes to explain a story ‘phenomena’ in translation studies (TS). Narrative is considered as the bridge between translation studies and other disciplines such as Linguistics, Sociology, Philosophy, Cultural Studies, Semiotics, and Political Science (Thawabteh, 2012).

¹⁸ <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/narrative> [accessed 18 June 2016]

Furthermore, Baker (2005) argued that through narrative, translators are considered as decisive participants in building the knowledge and the political and social reality. Likewise, Bruner (1991) discussed that the way narrative works in order to convey a certain ideologically-loaded message is far from the actual text message. For example, there is a vast gap between the two narratives of what the Palestinians call '*Nakba*' ('the catastrophe'; the Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1948) and Israelis call 'the establishment of the state of Israel'. In the Palestinian narrative of *Nakba*, Palestinians narrate that *Nakba* is the time when Israel occupied Palestine thus Palestinians lost their homeland and became refugees. From the Palestinian narrative point of view on *Nakba*, Israel is responsible of the anger, sadness, suffers and diaspora of Palestinians for expulsing Palestinians, occupying their land, and seizing their freedom which cause the long-term conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Therefore, Palestinians demand 'the right of return' to their homeland what is called now 'Israel'! However, from the Israeli narrative point of view, Israelis consider the Palestinian catastrophe as a happy event when 'the contract between God and his own' 'chosen people' (Israelis) had been realised by returning them (the chosen people) to the 'Promised Land' (Palestine) which they claimed that it is a "land without people for people without land" (Thawabteh, 2012, p. 217; see also Abdel Jawad, 2006; Lynfield, 2001). Nevertheless, the stronger party always writes the history (Pappé, 1999). As discussed earlier in the present study, translation is a powerful communicative tool in connecting mass media, culture diversity and language barriers. Israel widely promotes its narrative though translation in global mass media. Therefore, Israel, the stronger party, through its power and control of the global mass media has successfully promulgated and broadcasted its narrative to the globe while the Palestinians are engaged in the struggle to free Palestine (Thawabteh, 2012).

Beyond the confines of literature and fiction, narrative as an academic investigative tool has been observed to gain wider application over the last century leading up to the current century (Harding, 2012). The notion of narratives—as elaborated within the field of Translation Studies—is built upon the understanding of narratives as the representative and structural make-up of all communications rather than its linguistic narrow concept of “an optional mode of communication” (Baker, 2006, p. 8). The approach of Baker (2006) is built upon the ideas of Fisher (1987), Bruner (1991), Somers and Gibson (1994) and Somers (1992, 1994, 1997) in which narrative is posited as a powerful mode of communication representing how people organise their ways of life. Narrative Analysis argues that rather than explaining how texts are constructed, the narrative is the tool of the mind used to construct reality. As applied in all textual genres including technical and scientific texts, narratives enable us to approach and understand the social world and thus, build our social identity; this is because narratives are concerned mainly with justifying and legitimising actions through the normalisation, categorisation, and constitution of social reality.

3.2 The Effectiveness of Narrative

Narratives are mainly concerned in justifying and legitimising actions. Narratives achieve their effectiveness through:

1. **Normalising:** presenting a narrative which is not questionable (considered as a regulation/norm/standard) might begin as a scientific yet it slowly builds our consciousness thus it exists in the life’s episodes such as the narrative of Darwin.

Translation, in this regards, is an effective tool in promoting and naturalising narratives to the public and to the *Other* especially of the war zone. For example, Israel

has to translate its Hebrew/English pronouncement of war against Gaza to Arabic in order to deliver its message to the Palestinians¹⁹.

2. **Objectiveness:** through offering an ‘*objective*’ narrative, tellers/writers claim *objectivity* for their narratives and that they are far away from *subjectivity* and the intervention of personal imaginations, opinions, feelings, ideas and interpretations. In other words, the presented narrative is claimed to be a truth, the event as is, that is undoubtable of individual/institutional biasesness. The effectiveness of objectivity is widely implied in media news reporting. Media news reporting claims the coverage of events without any interposition neglecting the fact that the coverage is triggered by their *lens*. At this level the narrative is an *individual cognitive reality* which may become a *social reality* upon its acceptance from some audience. The more acceptance of a narrative, the universally a truth is. The notion of ‘*objectivity*’ itself, however, is subjective. The objectiveness of a narrative is measured and verified by *coherence* (see Meister, 2003; Trahar, 2013; Newell, 2015).

Objectiveness in translation is realised in the ‘objectivity’ of the translator/translation agency. Translators and translation agencies claim to be neutral and detached in their translations. The belief of the objectivity of translators and translation agencies by the public grants their translations their objectiveness (further discussion on objectivity in translation, see Shen, 1988; Baker, 2010).

3. **Categorising:** narratives categorise people and nations into superiors and inferiors and categorise the world into first (developed), second (developing) and third (undeveloped) which in return reflect on the public’s social reality and understanding of

¹⁹ <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/middle-east-unrest/israel-drops-leaflets-warning-northern-gaza-airstrikes-n154571> [published 13 July 2014, accessed 27 August 2017]

the world. Further, this categorisation leads us to the notion of dominance. The dominated party (the 2nd and 3rd world) adopts the terms of the dominant (the 1st world; the West) of issues such as democracy and human rights in order to compete and defeat the dominant party in its own narrative. Accordingly, the dominant party has to legitimise the discourse of the dominated party in order to win the dominated ordinary people as in the case of the US-led invasion against Iraq in 2003.

4. **Constituting reality:** narratives are not only a method of demonstrating reality but also constituting it. A narrative gives happenings and events their believability under the assumption that they are verified by reference to some reality. Consequently, it is admitted that there is no narrative demonstrates the uncontestable, absolute and ultimate truth of a given event(s). However, it is necessary to admit that events happen in actual time and space thus are verifiable by variety of ways that shall be always extendable and exposed to improvement and re-evaluation.

Moreover, narratives are politically imported. The political import of narratives appears in the awareness of the public of the fact that accepting a narrative means rejecting the *Other* narratives of the given happening or event. Some narratives continue for hundreds of years. Both individuals and groups build their narratives based on the past narratives to demonstrate a comprehensive narrative. Accordingly, the continuous narration of the past narratives controls and guides individuals to the target political and social order thus interprets the happenings in light of those of the past. For example, the narrative of the Holocaust that led to the creation of Israel on the Palestinian territories by force in 1948. Israel continues narrating the old narrative of the Holocaust again and again in order to justifying its occupation of Palestine and their aggressive actions against Palestinians (Nossek, 1994). Further, the political import realises when people

refuse a resolution of conflict proposed in the narrative of the *Other* thus isolating themselves from the *Other*. Interpreting and translation are the powerful tool of realising the political import of narratives when the concerned conflict is discussed internationally. The translation of a narrative or retelling it is eventually embedded with the translator/reteller's personal narrative and the new settings.

3.3 Types of Narratives

Narratives are categorised under four types: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narratives as explained hereinafter:

1. Ontological Narratives (narratives of the self)

Ontological narratives are “personal stories we tell ourselves about our place in the world and about our own personal history” (Baker, 2006, p. 28). Ontological narratives aim to constitute and make sense of our lives. However, it is difficult to retell or translate one's narrative because it relies on the local linguistic and cultural settings (collective narratives). Ontological narratives are influenced and guided by (1) shared (collective) narratives (stories which are retold by other members of the society for long time), and (2) individuals with whom we interact. Such influence occurs by several means including television, cinema, literature, professional association, educational establishments and others. This influence, consequently, shapes our behaviour and determines our position from different narratives. In return, ontological narratives guide the way we think and act. Therefore, influence takes place on a two-way basis.

2. Public Narratives

Public narratives are “stories elaborated by and circulating among social and institutional formations larger than the individual, such as the family, religious or

educational institution, political or activist group, the media, and the nation” (Baker, 2006, p. 33). Moreover, public narratives depend on translation for its survival by spreading them across languages and geographical boundaries. Accordingly, translators and interpreters are centre to public narratives at times, loading these narratives with certain agendas and ideologies representing their loyalty of either internal or external affiliations. They ensure that the message behind the narrative that they subscribe to is received by all members of the community including recent migrants. By so doing, translators and interpreters are moving public narratives forward under shared narratives (meta-narratives). It is worth noting that translators and interpreters are either playing this role of disseminating public narratives through translation in order to gain wider followers at both national and international levels or to put such narratives in challenge against the international audience who may interpret these narratives differently. Nevertheless, there are “some (student) translators volunteer to translate such texts in order to gain experience in the field, without being particularly committed to the narratives promoted by the groups in question” (Baker, 2006, p. 37).

3. Conceptual Narratives (disciplinary narratives)

Conceptual narratives are “the stories and explanations that scholars in any field elaborate for themselves and others about their object of inquiry” (Baker, 2006, p. 39).

Conceptual narratives created within the academia either agree with public narratives at times thus sustain them for a long-term or disagree with such thus invade them leading to new shaped public narratives.

4. Meta-Narratives (master narratives)

To qualify as a meta-narrative, “a narrative is required to have considerable temporal and geographical spread, as well as a sense of inevitability or inescapability” (Baker,

2006, p. 168). There is no solid line between meta and public narratives, a public narrative may be an early stage of a meta narrative at time. However, politics and economics, mainly, are factors that help a public narrative to evolve into a meta-narrative. Other factors include institutionalisation, media, power and other well-established meta-narratives. Such transformation from a public to a meta-narrative is not possible without the direct participation of interpreters and translators. Meta-narratives are not limited to a certain set of events and the events of a meta-narrative are heavily weighted according to the target audience set of culture and understanding, such as fear, dangerous and goodness. Meta-narratives are timeless frames that signal to endless situations, problems, suggested solutions but open-ended episode. Among the long-stand meta-narratives that continue to echo in the minds of many are the religious and political narratives of the past.

3.4 Features of Narrativity

According to Baker, narratives have four core features; temporality, selective appropriation, causal emplotment and relationality that were discussed in brief in the works of Somers and Gibson (1994) and Somers (1992, 1994, 1997). In addition to the four core features, another four features of narrativity were adapted from Bruner (1991) namely: particularity, genericness, normativeness/canonicity and breach, and narrative accrual. These eight features overlap with or complete each other at times.

1. Temporality: ‘diachronicity’ in Bruner’s term, means that elements of narratives are ordered in sequence, whether temporally or spatially, and placed in a way which gives certain meaning; therefore, narratives are irreducibly durative. Temporality is considered as an essential embedded part in narratives rather than an independent layer. Time and space in narratives are historical-make framed by the social environment

rather than objective realities. Therefore, the way elements of narratives are ordered establishes links and relations that turn a set of isolated events into a coherent narrative. In other words, temporal and spatial configurations of a narrative guide its interpretation by the audience and any change in the temporal and spatial configurations will inevitably lead to a change in the interpretation of that narrative. Narratives are usually ordered chronologically defining past and present episodes and leading to a moral end, a projected aspiration, that defines our future behaviour and actions. Temporality also considers ones as contemporary players of the past. Thus one can legitimise the present narrative relying on the well-established historicity ones. In translation, temporality is framed by “selecting a particular text and embedding it in a temporal and spatial context that accentuates the narrative it depicts and encourages us to establish links between it and current narratives that touch our lives, even though the events of the source narrative may be set within a very different temporal and spatial framework.” (Baker, 2006, p. 112). Translators and interpreters do not need to intervene in the text itself to achieve the temporality feature effectiveness.

2. The feature relationality: Bruner’s *hermeneutic composability*, indicates that isolated events do not make sense in narrativity but they should be regarded as events in a series thus interpreted in the context of other well-established narratives. Relationality has a direct impact on translation since relationality does not allow a straightforward importation of elements of a given narrative when the target narrative does not share particular concepts. Accordingly, both the source and target narratives are unavoidably reconstituted. Relationality works both as a restriction and as a resource for expanding new narratives. In the process of translating a narrative, relationality is used “to inject a target text or discourse with implicit meanings derived from the way a particular item functions in the public or meta-narratives circulating in the target context, thus

obscuring or downplaying its relational load in the source environment” (Baker, 2006, p. 66). For example, retaining concepts, though they have English equivalences, such as *Jihad*, *Sharia* and *Fatwa* in English translations of the Arabic source narratives reveals the translators’ intention of reconstruction of the source narrative by such ideologically-loaded concepts in the target society; the West. Moreover, in translation, framing relationality is realised in repositioning of participants. Participants of any communication establish their relation to each other and to the ones outside the immediate narrative. Therefore, any change in their positions will inevitably change the narrative interpretation. Translators can actively reposition participants thus reframe the source narrative in glossaries, footnotes, prefaces and introductions. Such paratextual commentaries allow translators to effectively intervene within the text and constitute a narrative that meets with their agenda. A good example of repositioning participants in paratextual commentaries in translation is MEMRI’s translations of featured editorial articles in Arab media. MEMRI provides paratextual commentaries to all of its translations mainly in the form of introduction and footnotes. MEMRI reframes in its introduction the source text settings, even they are not included in the source text, including the reason behind the source text, the author/institute behind the source text, the relation of the source text to any other events took place at any period of time and a summary that highlights the main ideas of the source text. This introduction serves as the main ground for MEMRI to reposition participants of the elaborated source narrative.

3. The narrativity feature causal emplotment: it explains why an event took place thus it gives us the moral sense to interpret events on light of related events. Causal emplotment, in opposite to relationality, values independent events and disregard their categorisation and chronicle order. Causal emplotment is represented in the agreement

of two or more individuals on a set of narratives while they disagree in its interpretation. In translation studies, framing causal emplotment is significant allowing the translator/interpreter to move the events into different set of moral narratives thus to guide the audience's action in a different way than the one intended by the source text author. By framing the cause of an event or a series of events, the real cause becomes the consequence and the consequence becomes the cause. Causal emplotment weighs heavily some narratives than others without taking into consideration their details which can turn such weight up-down. For example, the narrative of 11 September, an event lasted an hour and claimed some thousand lives, was weighted heavily while the narrative of Vietnam war, a war lasted nearly 20 years and killed some million people and left nations to suffer for further tens of years, was not. This weighting of different elements of instances and narratives, including characters, "can be changed in translation to produce a different pattern of causal emplotment." (Baker, 2006, p. 69). Weighting in translation can be presented and granted in the form of addition, omission, repetition, change the events' order, lexical choice and shift.

4. Selective appropriation: this feature refers to the selection of certain events and elements to construct a narrative in a way that conveys a particular message. The selection of appropriate events in the construction of a narrative is thematically driven. Within selective appropriation, undesirable experiences/details are excluded while others are privileged. Moreover, some events are excluded in full since they are seen less significant than others based on one's position in time and space and to other public and meta-narratives. Selective appropriation is a conscious or subconscious process with immediate effect on the world. Psychological specialists are employed in the process of selecting a set of narratives in order to assure most effectiveness. A related example of selective appropriation is MEMRI's translations of selected articles from the

Arabic media as Harris (2003) argues “MEMRI engages in the practice of publishing selective and decontextualized excerpts of the Arabic press in ways that can present opponents of [Israel’s] occupation as religious extremists or anti-Semites”²⁰. Furthermore, values are a significant factor in the process of selective appropriation. Translators, interpreters and corporations feature certain values while they neglect others according to their values and principles that they subscribe to “even if from our particular narrative vantage point we might consider it wrong or even reprehensible” (Baker, 2006, p. 76). In framing narratives in translation, addition and omission are considered among the main tools of selective appropriation applied to encode the source narrative to meet the translators’ agenda such as the omission and addition taking place in translations by “MEMRI to elaborate a narrative of a specific cultural group as extremist, dangerous or criminal” (Baker, 2006, p. 114).

5. Particularity: this feature refers to specifics such as names, settings and characters of people and events embedded in an extended framework of a storyline to realise certain meaning and import. Nevertheless, a narrative’s skeletal matches a universal canon thus categorised under a given type of stories and that gives a narrative its translatability. In translation, motifs of a source narrative, mostly, are adapted in order to fill in a culturally popular storyline. Particularities then can be filled in by translators and interpreters when missed or left implicit based on the general framework a narrative belongs. However, framing particularities of a narrative by filling in then embedding this narrative within a certain universal storyline is mainly realised by translators and interpreters across cultures and nations. Framing of particularities in translation guides the audience to a different interpretation than of the source leading to legitimise particular actions relying on the consciousness of the target audience of a well-

²⁰ <https://www.counterpunch.org/2003/01/15/a-note-on-memri-and-translations/> [published 15 January 2003, accessed 27 August 2017]

established storyline. Storylines work in some societies and contexts more efficiently than in others due to their credibility, subscription and resonance on individuals and groups. Accordingly, storylines are historically and culturally particular. Nevertheless, the well-established storylines can be challenged and subverted to deliver new values and messages. In the present day, familiar narratives are undermined through comic media shows.

6. Genericness: of genres is a recognisable type of literary and non-literary narratives such as tragedy, comedy, travel saga, satire, documentaries, academic articles, editorials and others. The way genres are told is of great importance since “genres encode participant roles and power relations” (Baker, 2006, p. 86). In translation, to overcome the problem of translating the way of telling of a genre when it does not exist in the target culture and language, “a fresh literary-linguistic intervention” (Bruner, 1991, p. 14) is required. Every genre has its own convention of telling. Such convention guides the way of interpreting a genre. The way of telling signals thus encourages the audiences to recall their experience of such genre and to have some expectations. For example, starting a genre with ‘Once upon a time’ would signal to the audience that the genre is a fiction; however, it is not necessary. Signal devices attached to specific genre and trigger a set of expectation can be in lexical, syntactic, structural and even visual patterns. Some signal devices are culturally particular. Therefore, in translation, signal devices of a genre are translated in light of the embedded context and agenda by either retaining or subverting them. Moreover, genre conventions are parodied to undermine a current governing public narrative and its associated prominent figures. Manipulating the way of telling by filling the narrative in different genre than the original plays a significant role in the elaboration process of a mock narrative that challenge the current. Furthermore, genres including translation are often controlled by

those in power to serve their interest by imposing conditions on the types of genres to be wrote/translated and the way in which they shall be narrated or translated.

7. Normativeness, canonicity and breach: as a single feature of narrativity, it means that narratives including the ones of breaching canonicity shall be driven from normative storylines in order to be intelligible. Thus one should know the rules of narrativity in challenging a hegemony narrative and those in power by selecting and following a pattern from the dominant cultural stock to achieve its effectiveness. Further, resonance and illegibility of normative storylines differ over time and across cultures. Therefore, in translation, preserving the embedded breach of canonicity in a narrative yet in different form that follows the target storyline preserves the source narrative resonance and credibility. Framing normativeness through breach of canonicity motivates the audience to act and define his roles and position toward the narrative in question.

8. Narrative accrual: it is “the outcome of repeated exposure to a set of related narratives, ultimately leading to the shaping of a culture, tradition, or history” (Baker, 2006, p. 101). Narrative accrual is represented in the imposition of bogus historical-causal entailment and coherence by contemporaneity. The imposition of bogus historical-causal entailment claims that the cause of an event/action is motivated by a given event. Nevertheless, the fact, there is no confirmed link between these two events such as the holocaust committed by Hitler and the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Coherence by contemporaneity claims that two events are associated only because they took place at the same time. For example, the courtesy visit by the Former President of Egypt Mohamed Morsi to Pakistan was associated in the Arabic media²¹ to the

²¹ <https://www.radiosawa.com/a/morsi-to-meet-with-Pakistani-counterpart/220262.html> [published 18 March 2013, accessed 27 August 2017]

earthquake that hit Pakistan at the same time on 18 March 2013 in order to draw a bad luck character of Morsi. Over time, narrative accrual gains currency thus constructs history and guides behaviour of some societies leading cultures to accommodate such narrative and interpret stories on its light. The media plays a leading role in the process of gaining currency by narrative accrual through repeated exposure to our consciousness. Narrative accrual permits the wide spread of meta-narratives such as the War on Terror and Democracy even though they are undermined and criticised by some groups.

3.5 Framing Narratives in Translation

After discussing the eight features of narrativity, how they work and how they are framed in translation, I discuss now, following Baker (2006), other strategies of framing narrative in translation to realise particular message and agenda. Translators, ethically, are expected to transmit the encoded ideologies of the source narrative into the target one. However, some translators position themselves to challenge and undermine the narrative in question. Thus translators apply various strategies explicitly and implicitly to direct the source narrative in the desirable path. Framing narratives provides translators with these different strategies to re-encode the source narrative. Framing is “an active strategy that implies agency and by means of which we consciously participate in the construction of reality” (Baker, 2006, p. 106). The two parties of a conflict frame a set of events differently resulting in frame ambiguity. Frame ambiguity is the conflict of two parties over the interpretation of a set of events that either legitimise or challenge their competing narratives. Therefore, frame ambiguity is a norm and a daily life event that guides the production of text and translation. For example, the Palestinians’ second uprising (*intifada*) in 2000 against the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories is interpreted by the Palestinians as a response to the then Israeli

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon raid with the Israeli occupation forces in Al-Aqsa Mosque and his announcement that Al-Aqsa Mosque will be under the Israeli control forever in addition to the failure of the peace process due to the intransigence of the Israelis and the continuous of building Israeli settlements on the Palestinian land. Nevertheless, it is interpreted by the Israelis as a response to the Palestinian violence and the failure of the Camp David peace process due to the disagreement created by the Palestinians. Therefore, this conflict on interpreting the second *intifada* leads to frame ambiguity among the global public and media that either adopt the Palestinian narrative thus reject the Israeli or adopt the Israeli narrative thus reject the Palestinian. However, this frame ambiguity is limited by the context it is embedded in and such limitation is called frame space. Frame space enables the assessment of the linguistic, for translators, and non-linguistic, for interpreters, behaviour since translators and interpreters work within the frame space. However, frame space does not work in the case of temporal and spatial framing that avoid the direct intervention in the text itself. Moreover, additions, omissions and rewordings can be used as strategies to overcome frame space and to enable translators to bring the source narrative to be in line with their own.

3.5.1 Framing by labelling

Labelling in the sense elaborated here means “any discursive process that involves using a lexical item, term or phrase to identify a person, place, group, event or any other key element in a narrative” (Baker, 2006, p. 122). Framing by labelling is a norm in situations of observable conflicts that manipulates reality and directs the audience to a desirable interpretation. The labelling of ‘genetically modified food’ as ‘food biotechnology’ provides a mask that hides the truth and guides the target group to have a positive understanding thus buying the genetically modified food. Similarly, ‘rationalisation’ is the mask of ‘firing lots of employees’ and ‘The State of Israel’ is the

mask of ‘the Occupied Palestinian Territories’. Names and titles matter and consider as powerful means of framing in the context of culturally, politically and socially derived narratives. Names determine one’s position of a conflict, accepting a name means rejecting a rival. Naming the body of water that is located between Iran to the northeast and the Arabian Peninsula to the southwest *Persian Gulf* reflects the narrator’s position in Iran’s favour and rejecting the Arab’s narrative of ‘Arabian Gulf’. The dispute over the name of the gulf has been for years and has brought to the United Nation (see: United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names Working, Paper No. 61, 23rd Session, Vienna, 28 March – 4 April 2006). Another significant example reflecting framing by labelling in translation are the suggested translations of the military group ‘داعش) الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام’ (transliteration: *ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al Iraq wa al Sham (Daesh)*). Some translate it as ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL), others translate it as ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) and ‘Islamic State’ (IS) after the group declaration of the creation a caliphate in June 2014. However, foreign politicians and media agencies started to adopt the Arabic acronym ‘*Daesh*’ that detaches the group name from Islam the religion of peace. The group ‘*Daesh*’ (a term of a negative sense in Arabic) “has threatened to 'cut out the tongues' of anyone it hears using the term.”²² France and Britain, among others, have officially adopted the translation ‘*Daesh*’ as the UK Prime Minister David Cameron explains “Frankly, this evil death cult is neither a true representation of Islam, nor is it a state.”²³ Therefore, translating *Daesh* as ISIS, ISIL or IS positions the translator in favour of the military group and/or elaborating a narrative that connects terror to Islam. Titles of books, films and novels are also framed in translation to signal to the narrative constituted by the translator. Ernest Hemingway’s (1952) *the Old Man and the Sea* was translated to Arabic by several translators among them Dr Ali Al Qasimi (2013) and Dr Gabriel

²² <http://www.forces.net/news/tri-service/why-does-islamic-state-hate-being-called-daesh> [published 18 November 2015, accessed 27 August 2017]

²³ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277> [published 2 December 2015, accessed 27 August 2017]

Wahba (1998). While Wahba translated the title to the Arabic ‘العجوز والبحر’ (*al-agooz wa al-bahar*), Qasimi translated it to ‘الشيخ والبحر’ (*al-sheikh wa al-bahar*). Both ‘*al-agooz*’ and ‘*al-sheikh*’ are lexical equivalence to ‘the old man’. However, in the context of Hemingway’s *the Old Man and the Sea*, the Arabic ‘العجوز’ (*al-agooz*) in Wahba’s translation signals to a weak and very old character that is not capable to stand against the strong sea waves. Thus Wahba’s narrative challenges the source and guides the readership to a different interpretation of the story. Conversely, Qasimi’s ‘الشيخ’ (*al-sheikh*) refers to a wise, strong and skilful character. Moreover, the translation of the title of Driss Chraïbi’s (1995) French fiction *L’Homme du Livre* (literally: The Man of the Book) to Nadia Benabid’s (1998) English *Muhammad* (the Prophet Muhammad) directs the readership interpretation of the book from a fictional work to a biography. The frame by labelling in the English title also determines the book content and suggests a story of the Prophet Muhammad while the source did not limit the book to the Prophet Muhammad and has included stories of other Prophets namely Jesus, Moses and Joseph.

3.6 Assessing Narratives

In assessing narratives, one cannot objectively observe and interpret a narrative since we all inevitably are involved and take a position in the narrative in question whether we tend to support/believe and subscribe in this story or that. However, there are guidelines that help to assess a narrative namely; coherence (probability) and fidelity. Coherence of a narrative is realised in the internal consistency and integrity of that narrative. In other words, coherence represents how the elements of a narrative are well-structured and make sense at both semantic and syntactic levels. A narrative is considered structurally (argumently) coherent when the flow of events is not in contradictory in terms of form and reasoning (logic). Coherent inconsistency results

from the various choices which the translators make and that in turn “inevitably has an impact on the way readers and hearers assess the structural coherence of the narrative(s) elaborated in the text or utterance” (Baker, 2006, p. 146). Narratives do not hang in space and they are not isolated social particularities thus they are assessed based on how these narratives support or challenge other established narratives. This assessment is called material coherence. The credibility of a narrative main characters and participants including narrators and translators grants its reliability which in return establishes the narrative characterological coherence. In considering a character as a trustworthy, one would overlook any lapses in reasoning and vice versa a non-trustworthy character would be questioned and looked doubtful even his story is ‘true’. Therefore, a narrative of the Former President of the US George W. Bush is expected to be believed and subscribed to in the West while a narrative of Saddam Hussein the Former President of Iraq is expected to be questioned and doubted. *Sleeper effect* is a psychological term refers to the effectiveness of a questioned narrative at the long term. Sleeper effect argues that the audience at the long term will remember and subscribe to the narrative that they have doubted at the short term after forgetting who its presenter was. Sleeper effect evokes the importance of a narrative than its narrator and the necessity of remembering the source of a narrative in question. Moreover, narratives are assessed by its fidelity through assessing its reasoning (logic) and values. The reasoning of a narrative is represented in five points; confirming the facts presented in the narrative, confirming that no associated facts have been excluded or distorted in the narrative, applying standards from informal logic, assessing the arguments presented in the narrative, and assessing the weight of the issues discussed in the narrative. Values (good reasons) are a tool in assessing a narrative through five dimensions; fact, relevance, consequence, consistency and transcendent issue or values. To further elaborate, Fact is the identification of the embedded implicit and explicit values in a narrative. Relevance

stands for the relevance of values proposed, misrepresented, distorted or omitted in a narrative to the intended message that this narrative conveys. Consequence discusses the further effectiveness, at both self and society levels, when one subscribes to a set of values in a given narrative. Consistency assessment is the question of the values consistency to the one's personal experience of the world. The assessment of transcendent values in a given narrative is the most challenging among the other values since these values are the ones “we live by and can override any other consideration in assessing a narrative” (Baker, 2006, p. 154).

Figure 3.1 is the researcher's outline of Narrative Theory as elaborated in Baker (2006). It also represents the data analysis framework of the current study.




Figure 3.1: The Researcher's Outline of Narrative Theory

3.7 Strength of Baker's Narrative Theory

Narrative theory acknowledges that stories of events which embed particular people who believe in them, guide their behaviour. It states that narratives are dynamic thus it cannot be simplified into a set of fixed stories that one chooses from. It discusses that narratives are changeable over time as people expose to a new set of stories; therefore, they possess a vantage property or a possibility of changeability. It permits scholars to observe how translation features set narratives through text and time. It deals with narratives across all modes and genres. It has the ability to treat individual text and the set of narratives contains such text. It motivates researchers to look beyond the narrow boundaries of a narrative. It allows scholars to gather and analyse a narrative that it is constructed from various sources such as text and other non-verbal components. It encourages the public to determine their positions in and from a narrative. In narrative theory, narratives are not only realised through textual material but also through a variety of other media including cartoon and videos.

3.8 Review of Baker's Narrative Theory

Since its publication in 2006, Baker's narrative theory was reviewed and criticised by a number of scholars. Min (2007) argues that Baker succeeded to ground her narrative theory through its application on wide-range corpus-based examples from various fields and by using contemporary illustrations. She furthered that Baker provided a comprehensive literature on the notions 'narrative' and 'framing' as elaborated in the field of Sociology. She also considered Baker's work as a pioneer in Translation Studies which is evolved from the fields of Sociology, History and Intercultural Studies.

Moreover, Guldin (2013) discussed that Baker's theory is a critical revised combination of the literary and sociological perspective of narrative. He stated that

Baker's theory of narrativity provided an in-depth analysis on the active role of the translators with especial attention to the war zones. To him, Baker's theory allows the revealing of the hidden agenda and ideologies imbedded in a given translation. The narrativity features adapted in Baker's theory, he furthered, were able to explain independent instances as well as a series of narratives and the narrative of a given event and its relationship to other narratives.

Furthermore, House (2016) reviewed Baker's narrative approach in a neutral descriptive language arguing that Baker sets narrative in the core of her approach distinguishing it from other existing notions and terms in social sciences. The author discusses that Baker's approach considers translation as a form of renarrative which has no direct access to reality other than what is narrated in stories about ourselves and the world surrounding us. Narrative approached is argued to assume that application on variety of media that exceeds the convention of *langue* and *parole*. House explains that although narratives as set in Baker (2006) have no "objectively delineable borders", narrative approach has elaborated categories, typologies and conceptual tools to assist the analysis. Finally, House discusses that Baker's narrative theory makes use of the social research e.g. Bruner (1991) and Somers (1992) in adapting categories of narrativity features.

However, Matyas (2010) criticised that Baker's theory was principally built upon the understanding of narratives within their political, social and cultural settings rather than their textual linguistic grounds. He suggested the inclusion of textual elements which found to be a key in the political manipulation as an essential analytical tool in the narrative theory. He also, however, discussed that Baker's set of narrativity features namely relationality, selective appropriation, temporality and causal

emplotment are dynamic framers of the reception of narratives and capable of revealing the political manipulations especially in selling wars to the public. He furthered that Baker's multidisciplinary theory is an exemplary for the translation studies researches in related to the interrelations among ideology, politics and power.

Robinson (2011) dedicated his chapter 6 to discuss Baker's (2006) *Translation and Conflict: A Narrative Account* suggesting that the title of Baker's (2006) is a misnomer. For him, Baker's title suggests that the book is a research in translation studies in which translation is a participant in a given conflict, especially political, and narrative theory is merely its analytical tool. He argued that Baker's (2006) is an introductory floor of narrative theory as an analytical tool in the investigation of the contemporary political conflict illustrating her model on translation as well as non-translation examples. He, similarly, argued that Baker's work largely focuses on grounding the theoretical framework rather than its application which would lead to an in-depth textual analysis. He insisted that his comments on Baker's (2006) are not a criticism but rather an orientation.

Furthermore, Pym (2016) criticism of Baker's (2006) is of three points i.e. (1) Baker's assumption of narratives as a single form of communication excluding other forms of *dialogue*, (2) the lack of *linearity* in Baker's definition of narrative, and (3) Baker silence on the problematic narrator's *voice* and *position*. He elaborated that Baker limited the understanding of all types of communication into narratives and granted them the features of inescapability and unquestionability. Thus he questioned the understanding of the understanding. He further questioned Baker's sense of 'ultimately' in her "Scientific theories and reports are narratives in the sense that they are *ultimately* 'stories'" (2006, p. 10) arguing from a linearity perspective that scientific experiments

are more than ultimate narrative. The reframing of Goffman's (1981) terms into Baker's narratives is another question posed by Pym. He claimed that Baker reframed Goffman's terms of participants' role, voice and position in conversations into her narratives which do not largely corresponded to Goffman's model. He also discussed that narratives are merely a part of communicative exchange and dialogue, and that ideologically-charged narratives are open for discussion. He furthered that Baker's narrative theory is of no empirical measurement. He suggested further studies and applications to be conducted on Baker's (2006) in order to test and challenge its empiricism.

Accordingly, this study comes as a direct response to the criticism proposed by Matyas (2010), Robinson (2011) and Pym (2016) on the applicability and testing of Baker's (2006) theoretical framework using text corpus i.e. translated editorials on the contemporary political conflict and civil wars in the Middle East. In this regard, the researcher proposes the research conceptual framework as illustrated in Figure 3.2 representing the phases of transforming a narrative through translation.




Figure 3.2: The Researcher’s Representation of Conceptual Framework

Figure 3.2 outlines the journey of an event/action starting from the moment it takes place up to the moment it is received and interpreted by the target text reader, which goes through three main stages: (1) the production of the source text; (2) the production of the target text; and (3) the reception of the event/action by the target audience. The fact that an event took place is usually indisputable. However, the reception—understanding and interpretation—of that event varies from one to another based on one’s past experiences of similar narratives, culture, set of beliefs, ideological agenda and policy in the case of an institution i.e. the Arabic-speaking media in this study. This reception of the event is then ideologically redirected by writers and news agencies to construct the source text represented in the careful choice of vocabularies, labels of places, individuals and events, organisation of events, glossary, interpretation of events,

participant positioning, weighting of events, and the settings of temporal and spatial frames of events. Similarly, the text is received and interpreted by readers including translators and translation agencies that ideologically (re)construct, (re)frame, and (re)negotiate the source narrative in their translations (the target text). These translations are received and interpreted by the target language readers that usually have no access to the source text due to the language gap²⁴, and which translation agencies—MEMRI in the case of this study—voluntarily promise to bridge free of charge. An end has not yet come to the journey of the event. It still undergoes the target reader's reception and own interpretation based on one's past experiences of similar narratives, culture, set of beliefs, ideological agenda and institutional policy.

For the purpose of this study and due to the difficulty in obtaining access to the events sites where the STs are produced, and the difficulty to interview and test the perceptions of the TT target audience since I currently reside in Malaysia, the research conceptual framework is limited to the production of the target text.

3.9 Summary

Drawing on Baker (2006), this chapter discussed the notion of narrative, its definitions, effectiveness, political import and types. It also discussed the eight features of narrativity as proposed by Somers and Gibson (1994), Somers (1992, 1994, 1997) and Bruner (1991) and were elaborated by Baker (2006). This chapter explained how narratives are (re)framed in translation in the reconstruction of reality and how one can assess a translated narrative comparing to its original. Finally, this chapter presented both supporting reviews and critics of Baker's (2006) highlighting its strength and shortcomings.

²⁴ In accordance with its slogan as it appears on its website: '*Bridging the Language Gap*'.

The next chapter provides exhaustive information on the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), the publisher of the translations under analysis in this research. It also establishes the data collection and analysis procedures.

University of Malaya

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides an outline of the research data obtained from MEMRI's website, as a prominent research institution in the West which promised to bridge the language gap and to translate news and editorials from, mainly, the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia media to the Western audience. This research focuses on the translations of editorials on *Daesh* selected and translated by MEMRI covering the period from the establishment of *Daesh* on 8 April 2013 until 8 April 2016. This chapter begins with background information on MEMRI, its establishment, founders, agenda and both supporting and criticising views. After that, a detailed explanation of the research methodology applied in collecting and selecting the research data is followed. This research applies a qualitative methodology where Narrative Theory of Baker (2006) is employed in order to reveal the embedded value-laden aspects in mass media news translations which tend to affect the public view on the current globalised Middle East conflict.

4.2 The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI)

The Middle East Media Research Institute, MEMRI in short, was set up in February 1998 as a non-profit, nonpartisan, independent and tax-exempt organisation by Yigal Carmon and Meyrav Wurmser²⁵. Having Washington, DC, as its headquarter, MEMRI also has several branch offices in a number of world capitals including Berlin, Tokyo, Jerusalem and Baghdad²⁶ while London, Moscow and Ankara offices were closed due to financial constrains (Fathi, 2011). MEMRI was not well-known at the time of its initiation until the failure of the Camp David negotiation in July 2002 and the 11/9

²⁵ <http://www.wrmea.org/2007-april/meyrav-wurmser-the-neocons-den-mother.html> [accessed 3 October 2016]

²⁶ The office is not publicly identifiable due to the current situation in Iraq.

attack in the US. At the early time of its establishment, MEMRI's role was limited to the translations of the Arab media, other projects were not launched yet²⁷. The reason behind its establishment as its Founder Yigal Carmon claimed: following these significant junctures in the contemporary history, “[p]eople started understanding that there is something wrong, something strange, and they wanted to know what it is”²⁷. In other words, claiming exposure of anti-Semitism broadcasting in the Arab media, MEMRI aims at informing the US officials in particular and the Western audience in general over the “[s]tories that have a serious impact on Arab public opinion, but that go unnoticed in the Western world because they are written in Arabic”²⁷. It seeks to reveal the Arabs and Muslims “double face” essentially regarding the on-going Israeli-Palestinian issue, the American support, its peace efforts and the West image in Arabs and Muslims minds (Fathi, 2011). It also intends to educating the Western audience about the economic developments and social and cultural setting and transformation of the Arabs and Muslims in addition to delivering the liberal voice of the East to the West (Al-Sharif, 2009). This is well reflected in MEMRI's slogan “bridging the language gap” between the West and East. To so doing, MEMRI distributes translations of selected articles from Arabic, Turkish, Farsi, Hindi, Dari and Urdu-Pashtu media in, mainly, English but also Hebrew, Spanish, French, Polish and Japanese at no charge²⁸. Therefore, however, MEMRI's real slogan is “bridging the language gap, translating the East to the West”.

4.2.1 MEMRI's founders and staff

MEMRI hires 80 employees worldwide from different social levels, races, religions and ethnics to carry out its translations, analyses and reports from the Arab and Islamic media and languages²⁸. Several of MEMRI's founders, staff, directors and advisors are

²⁷ http://www.jerusalemsummit.org/eng/razdel.php?id=18&article_id=82 [accessed 3 October 2016]

²⁸ <http://www.memri.org/about-memri.html> [accessed 3 October 2016]

currently, or were, working with the Israeli intelligence agency, CIA and FBI (Al-Sharif, 2009). **Yigal Carmon**, as appears on MEMRI's website, is the Founder and President of MEMRI who worked as "Chief Counterterrorism Advisor to Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak Shamir"²⁸. He is an Israeli national with Colonel rank and served in the Israeli intelligence agency (*Mossad*) for 22 years (Whitaker, 2002). **Meyrav Wurmser**, whose profile was deleted from MEMRI's website and archive, is the Co-Founder and Former Executive Director of MEMRI and an Israeli national who is also the Former²⁹ Director of the Centre for Middle East Policy at the Hudson Institute based in Washington, DC which conducting researches on "The War on Terror and the Future of Islam" (Fathi, 2011). She is a researcher and scholar of the Middle East studies with a Doctorate degree from George Washington University in Washington, DC and a Former Lecturer of Political Science at the U.S. Naval Academy and Johns Hopkins University³⁰. David Wurmser, her husband, served as an Adviser of the Middle East affairs to the US Vice President Dick Cheney (2001-2009)³⁰. MEMRI's Vice President, as appears on MEMRI's website, **Alberto M. Fernandez**, is the US Ambassador who served under different capacities in Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt, Guatemala, Nicaragua, the United Arab Emirates, and the Dominican Republic²⁸. He is also the Former US State Department's Coordinator for the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (from 2012 to 2015) and speaks fluent Spanish and Arabic²⁸. **Steven Stalinsky** is MEMRI's Executive Director who holds BA in Religious Studies and MA in Middle Eastern Studies, and he is a PhD Candidate in Homeland Security Studies²⁸. **Menahem Milson** is an Israeli Professor Emeritus of Arabic Literature at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem³¹ and the Chairman of MEMRI²⁸. He holds a Doctoral degree from Harvard University in 1964³¹. He served in the Israeli intelligence agency

²⁹ <http://hudson.org/experts/450-meyrav-wurmser> [accessed 7 October 2016]

³⁰ <http://www.wrmea.org/2007-april/meyrav-wurmser-the-neocons-den-mother.html> [accessed 7 October 2016]

³¹ http://www.huji.ac.il/dataj/controller/ihoker/MOP-STAFF_LINK?sno=420545 [accessed 7 October 2016]

(*Mossad*) with Colonel rank and was a Former Paratrooper in the Israeli Defence - Occupation- Forces³². Several Arabs and Israelis regard Menahem Milson as “an extremist, the man who is preparing annexation”³³. MEMRI’s Director of South Asia Studies is the British **Tufail Ahmad** of the Indian origin. He holds two MAs in War Studies and Social Systems from King's College London and Jawaharlal Nehru University respectively, in addition to his graduation from the Indian Institute of Mass Communication with a Post-Graduate Diploma in Journalism²⁸. For eight years, he served as a BBC Urdu Correspondent for Pakistan before evolving as an "Islamic expert", writing what pleases the Islamophobes³⁴. His research interests include religious, cultural and political issues and “jihadist movements” in Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan. **Nimrod Raphaeli** is a US citizen of Iraqi origin and MEMRI’s Editor of Economic Blog and a Senior Analyst with a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in the field of Development Planning²⁸. From 1969 to 2000, he was working at the World Bank and he was the translator of the ‘Oil for Food’ project terms and conditions in Iraq and a good help in the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Creative Chaos in Iraq since then²⁸. **Mirza A. B. Baig** is MEMRI’s Senior Analyst who monitors Hindi and Urdu online and printed media as part of MEMRI’s project of South Asia Studies. He holds a Diploma in Journalism, two MAs in English Literature and in Urdu and a Doctoral degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University. He worked at BBC Urdu, BBC Hindi and All India Radio²⁸. MEMRI’s Director of Reform project **Mansour Al-Hadj** received his MA in Law from the International University of Africa, Sudan in 2003. He worked as a Senior Reporter at the Arabic website of AAFAQ Magazine which focuses on the human rights and the reforming in the Middle East.

³² <https://mosaicmagazine.com/author/menahem-milson/> [accessed 7 October 2016]

³³ <http://www.nytimes.com/1982/04/29/opinion/foreign-affairs-how-to-grow-horns.html> [accessed 9 October 2016]

³⁴ <http://www.dailyo.in/politics/tufail-ahmad-islamophobia-urdu-press-milli-gazette-indian-muslims/story/1/11790.html> [accessed 9 October 2016]

Moreover, MEMRI's Board of Directors as stated on MEMRI's website is chaired by **Oliver "Buck" Revell** who served at FBI as Executive Assistant Director focuses on Terrorism investigation. MEMRI's Board of Directors Member **Steve Emerson** is a 'terrorism expert' and the Founder and Executive Director of The Investigative Project which focuses on "Islamic terrorist and extremist groups"³⁵. **Jeffrey Kaufman** is a Member of MEMRI's Board of Directors and a Lawyer with a B.A. from the University of Maryland and J.D. in Law from George Mason University³⁶. MEMRI's Member of Board of Directors **Robert Reilly** is the Chairman of the Committee for Western Civilization at the Claremont Institute²⁸, a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and the Former Director of the US government-funded news broadcasting the Voice of America³⁷. During the George W. Bush administration, he served at the U.S. Secretary of Defence as the Senior Advisor for Information Strategy and lectured at the National Defence University³⁸. He is the author of the 2014 published book *The Closing of the Muslim Mind: How Intellectual Suicide Created the Modern Islamist Crisis* in which he criticises Islam claiming that Islam is the cause behind the terrorist ideology against the West and the cause of the underdevelopment in the Muslim world³⁹. **Michael Mukasey** is MEMRI's Member of Board of Directors and the Former US Attorney General from 2007 to 2009 and Former Judge at the Southern District of New York²⁸. He holds B.A. from Columbia College and LL.B. from Yale Law School⁴⁰. During his work as the US Attorney General, he chaired the trials of several cases in relation to the 11/9 event and the 'War on Terror' including the "trial of Omar Abdel Rahman (the "Blind Sheik") and nine other defendants"⁴⁰. He was accused, among other former-Bush Administration Lawyers, of violating the *NY Rules of Professional Conduct* and breaching the US Law by a

³⁵ <http://www.investigativeproject.org/about.php> [accessed 9 October 2016]

³⁶ <http://mg-ip.com/professionals/jeffrey-h-kaufman/> [accessed 9 October 2016]

³⁷ <http://isibooks.org/author/index/books/id/625> [accessed 9 October 2016]

³⁸ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/05/robert-r-reilly-homosexuality-_n_5268524.html [accessed 9 October 2016]

³⁹ <http://isibooks.org/the-closing-of-the-muslim-mind.html> [accessed 9 October 2016]

⁴⁰ <http://www.debevoise.com/michaelmukasey> [accessed 9 October 2016]

coalition of advocacy groups called Velvet Revolution⁴¹. In the filed complaint, Velvet Revolution stated that:

“Michael B. Mukasey breached his legal duty and violated the *NY Rules of Professional Conduct* by his lack of moral clarity and ethically compromising political expediency on questions regarding “enhanced” interrogation techniques (amounting to torture), a program carried out by U.S. authorities after September 11th 2001 that resulted in clear violations of U.S. and international law”⁴².

Moreover, MEMRI’s Member of Board of Directors **Reid Morden** is the Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada and Former Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)²⁸. He holds an Honorary Doctor of Laws and a degree in History and Political Science from Dalhousie University⁴³.

MEMRI’s Board of Advisors²⁸ includes academics such as Bernard Lewis, Stephen J. Trachtenberg, Dorothy Denning, Herb London, Deborah Lipstadt, Josef Joffe, Khaleel Mohammed, Alan Dershowitz, Mort Zuckerman, Christopher DeMuth, Anne Speckhard, Yehuda Bauer, Norman Podhoretz, Magdi Khalil and Faraj Sarkouhi, and politicians of both the US and Israeli government including Jose Maria Aznar, Donald Rumsfeld (“Rumsfeld led the military planning and execution of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq”⁴⁴), John Bolton, John Ashcroft, Ehud Barak (Barak is responsible for the killing of thousands of Palestinians and faces war crime lawsuits⁴⁵ that filed against him in different countries⁴⁶), Irwin Cotler, William Bennett, Paul Bremer, Katrina Lantos Swett, Alfred Moses, Stuart Eizenstat, Natan Sharansky and Jana Hybaskova, and militaries and intelligence agencies of both the US and Israel including Michael V. Hayden, Keith Alexander, James Woolsey, Chin Ho Lee and Peter Hoekstra.

⁴¹ http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/us/19detain.html?_r=1&hp [accessed 9 October 2016]

⁴² A copy of the complaint can be found at http://www.velvetrevolution.us/torture_lawyers/index.php

⁴³ <http://nsip3.com/ourteam/> [accessed 9 October 2016]

⁴⁴ http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/ciencia/ciencia_industrybigpharma139.htm [accessed 10 October 2016]

⁴⁵ <http://www.globalresearch.ca/how-a-high-dollar-speech-sends-former-israeli-prime-minister-ehud-barak-to-us-federal-court-on-claims-of-war-crimes/5484521> [accessed 10 October 2016]

⁴⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/29/ehud-barak-war-crimes-israel> [accessed 10 October 2016]

Observer of profiles of MEMRI's staff, directors and advisors would notice that all of them are specialised on terrorism in Arab and Muslim countries and 'Islamic terrorist movements'. The majority of them worked at intelligence agencies and militaries in the US and Israel. Therefore, contrary to MEMRI's slogan of being a free-of-charge translation provider and a transmitter of the East political, ideological, intellectual, social, cultural, and religious trends to the West; however, the profiles suggest that MEMRI is a private intelligence agency which aims to build a connection between Arabs and Muslims from one side and terrorism from the other side.

4.2.2 MEMRI's main projects

MEMRI translates, monitors, analyses, reports, broadcasts and archives various materials including editorials, Facebook and Twitter posts, audio and video clips, Radio and TV programmes, website contents, textbooks, religious sermons, image captions and cartoons²⁸. It publishes emails and faxes its translations and analysis to, primarily, the US policy-makers namely legislature, government, military and intelligence agencies, in addition to journalists, academics and the public in general. In this regard, MEMRI states:

“On a daily basis, MEMRI assists and lends support to all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, including over 200 different units, in carrying out the *War on Terror* (emphasis added). MEMRI continues to support members of academia on a daily basis. To date, over 500 college and universities, in the United States and worldwide, have utilized MEMRI material”²⁸.

MEMRI claims that several prominent media outlets both printed and visual in the US and elsewhere worldwide cite its translations and analyses (for the list, see Appendix B).

MEMRI's publications are grouped under the following series: "Inquiry and Analysis series" which represents MEMRI's analysis based on the Middle Eastern media, "Special Dispatch series" which represents MEMRI's 'original' translations of selected Middle Eastern media and "Special Reports" which represents MEMRI's in-Depth studies of the Middle East subjects under question. MEMRI elaborates:

"MEMRI allows easy access to its archives of over 6,000 reports from its Special Dispatch series, Inquiry & Analysis series, and MEMRI TV Project, on all subjects and countries, including nearly 16,000 minutes of translated material from the MEMRI TV Project. There are also over 30,000 individual blog entries available in the archives, as MEMRI adds over 10,000 entries annually to its blogs. The MEMRI TV Project maintains the world's largest archives of translated clips from the Arab and Muslim world"²⁸.

MEMRI's publications are classified under seven main projects. These projects are: The Jihad and Terrorism Project, The Reform Project, The Antisemitism Documentation Project, The Arab and Iranian TV Monitoring Project, The South Asia Studies Project, The MEMRI 9/11 Documentation Project, and The Iran Studies Project²⁸. MEMRI's project of Jihad and Terrorism (JTTM) focuses on the activities of "Islamist organizations" and "Islamist ideology" which consider a threat to the West, on MEMRI's terms. This project watches groups and individuals who motivate the public Muslims for 'martyrdom' and 'jihad' in the media, schools and religious places. It is available online at <http://www.memrijttm.org/>. The project of The Reform is concerned mainly on the attempts of reformation of the Muslim and Arab countries by oppositions and reformists, highlighting the difficulties and challenges that these attempts face. In this regard, MEMRI is considering itself as a vehicle of reformations by delivering the reformists' voice to their respective audience and to the West encouraging them to support these attempts. This project is available online at <http://www.memri.org/democratization-and-reform-in-the-arab-and-muslim-world.html>. The project of the The Antisemitism Documentation reports and documents the 'hate'

broadcasts against the ‘Jews’, ‘Israelis’, ‘Zionists’ and ‘the Holocaust’ in the Muslim and Arab media. This project is, according to MEMRI²⁸, the “largest archive in the world of translated material from the Middle East from the past decade”. This project is available online at www.memri.org/media-archives-antisemitism-holocaust-denial.html. The project of The Arab and Iranian TV Monitoring monitors the Arab and Muslim television reporting and translating thousands of their materials leading MEMRI to be top one worldwide archive in this respect. The audience of this project is more than 2 million from 197 different countries worldwide. MEMRI monitors 77 TV channels around the clock⁴⁷, some materials of these channels were selectively translated by MEMRI (Al-Sharif, 2009). For the list of these channels, please see Appendix C. This project is available online at <http://www.memritv.org/>. The project of The South Asia Studies was established in January 2008 under the name “the Urdu-Pashtu Media Project” shedding lights on Afghanistan and Pakistan; however, it was expanded in 2010 to cover other South Asian countries. It provides in-depth analysis of cultural, political, religious and economic trends in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. It also tracks the evolving ‘terrorism’ in South Asia that impacts on the security of the international arena. This project is available online at www.memri.org/south-asia-studies-project.html. The project of The 9/11 Documentation is assigned to the ideological roots behind the event of 9/11. The project contains various types of materials including printed, aired and electronic from Islamic and Arab media on the event of 11/9. The project archives all the speeches and statements delivered by Al-Qaeda, its leaders, affiliated groups, supporters and the participants, executors, of the 11/9 event. It also reports on the conspiracy theories and the responsibility of 11/9 in the Muslim and Arab media and official statements. The project is available online at <http://www.memritv.org/subject/en/97.htm>. The project of The Iran Studies is dedicated to daily monitoring, studying and translating Iran officials and media. MEMRI reports

⁴⁷ http://www.memritv.org/content/en/tv_channels.htm [accessed 4 October 2016]

selected materials including the Iran nuclear program, the Iranian presidential speeches, the Iranian military capacity and growth, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In addition, the project monitors the human rights, democracy, women rights and reformists. This project is available online at <http://www.memri.org/iranian-news.html>.

However, other projects were canceled or renamed. The project of MEMRI Blog, available at <http://www.thememriblog.org/>, was initiated by MEMRI in December 2007 (Al-Sharif, 2009). However, the blog is no longer active as it appears on its website “The MEMRI Blog you are trying to access has been archived”⁴⁸. The project aimed for providing brief news from Turkish, Persian, Urdu and Arabic sources. Moreover, the ‘Israel Project’ was initiated by MEMRI in 1998 aiming to cover the Hebrew media but it, interestingly, was found that only few materials were translated from the Hebrew media. Therefore, MEMRI had canceled the project citing “personnel and financial restraints” as the closure reasons and claiming that “80% of the Israeli media may be found online in English” (Fathi, 2011, p. 169). In addition to publishing various projects of different aims and settings, MEMRI publishes books such as “*The schools of Ba'athism: A study of Syrian schoolbooks*”⁴⁹ in 2000 by MEMRI Co-founder Meyrav Wurmser and “*Narrating Palestinian nationalism: A study of the new Palestinian textbooks*”⁵⁰ in 2002 by Goetz Nordbruch.

4.2.3 Impact of MEMRI

In addition to its citations by various leading media agencies worldwide, as discussed in section 4.2.2, MEMRI is the primary source of information and news for politicians, businessmen, policy-makers and militaries worldwide with more reliance by the US

⁴⁸ <http://www.thememriblog.org/> [accessed 4 October 2016]

⁴⁹ <https://www.amazon.com/schools-Baathism-study-Syrian-schoolbooks/dp/0967848008> [accessed 4 October 2016]

⁵⁰ <https://www.amazon.com/Narrating-Palestinian-nationalism-study-textbooks/dp/0967848016> [accessed 4 October 2016]

administration²⁸. Through its free-of-charge translations, MEMRI's work has significant impact on both the West and the East with major loading on the Arab and Muslim countries. In this regard, Jaap Van Wesel's article titled "*MEMRI Games. Media translation psyches Arabs*"⁵¹ illustrates the significant impact of MEMRI on Arab leaders in which he cites an Arab Minister of Information stating "We have to be careful with our words, otherwise we'll end up being published by MEMRI". Wesel also explained how MEMRI was behind the closure of the official think tank of the Arab League "Zayed International Center for Coordination and Follow Up" on 27 August 2003. The late United Arab Emirates president Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahyan ordered to close the centre after it had been criticised by MEMRI claiming it as a "a platform for hate propaganda" and "anti-Semitic and anti-American". As for its impact on the US administration, "MEMRI research on Al-Qaradhawi was instrumental in the U.S. ban"⁵². Moreover, MEMRI has lectured and briefed governmental and private sectors worldwide as Al Sharif (2009, p. 105) explained:

"Since September 11, 2001, MEMRI has given lectures on Capitol Hill, at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Library of Congress, the State Department, the NYPD's counterterrorism unit, and others... The lecture series is also active in Europe. MEMRI staff has briefed governing bodies, including the Czech Republic Senate; the E. U. Parliament; the German Foreign Office; the Swedish Parliament; NATO affiliated NGOs; the French authority for audio-visual broadcasting; the Russian Ministry of Interior; the British Parliament; and many others".

4.2.4 MEMRI's translation quality

MEMRI provides free of charge translations to various bodies and entities at different levels worldwide; however, the quality of MEMRI's translations has not been widely studied. To the best of my knowledge, only Baker (2006, 2010) and Al-Sharif (2009) are the only in-depth analyses conducted on MEMRI's translations. The studies

⁵¹ http://www.jerusalemsummit.org/eng/razdel.php?id=18&article_id=82 [Published by The Jerusalem Report on 28 December 2003, accessed 10 October 2016]

⁵² <http://www.memri.org/report/en/print3466.htm> [accessed 10 October 2016]

concluded that the quality of MEMRI's translations is doubtful as Baker (2010, p.18) explained "MEMRI does not have to mistranslate to promote negative perceptions of Arabs and Muslims. The nature of narrativity [mainly selective appropriation] is such that much more subtle devices can be used to achieve such ends...[to reveal such one has] to look beyond the semantics of discourse and attempt to understand the narrative mechanisms by which neoconservative organisations [MEMRI] continue to manipulate our perception of reality". Al-Sharif (2009, p. 227) furthered that MEMRI "makes use of numerous framing mechanisms such as bracketed additions and carefully worded titles and summary introductions which serve to embed the events and views outlined in the translated text within the larger narrative of terrorism". Furthermore, according to Professor Norman G. Finkelstein, cited in Lawrence Swaim's "*MEMRI is 'propaganda machine,' expert says*"⁵³, MEMRI extracts "things out of context in order to do personal and political harm to people they don't like...I think it's a reliable assumption that anything MEMRI translates from the Middle East is going to be *unreliable*" (emphasis added). Another significant dispute on MEMRI's quality of translation was made by Juan Cole, Professor of History at the University of Michigan, in his article titled "*Osama Threatening Red States?*"⁵⁴ arguing that MEMRI mistranslated Osama Bin Laden's 'ولاية' (*wilaya*) to 'state' as of 'province' rather than the intended meaning of 'government/administration' suggesting MEMRI dependency on "a surface reference to modern standard Arabic". Ali Alarabi of CNN provided another example of the intended mistranslation by MEMRI as he explained in his article titled "*How MEMRI fooled the U.S Media with its Mickey Mouse Translation*"⁵⁵. MEMRI mistranslated a children program on Hamas TV in which it translated the Arabic of "The Jews are shooting us" to its English "we will annihilate the Jews", the Arabic "we want to *resist* [Israeli occupation]" to its English "we want to *fight*" and the Arabic "I'll be a martyr"

⁵³ https://www.radioislam.org/islam/english/jewishp/internet/memri_propaganda_machine.htm [accessed 10 October 2016]

⁵⁴ <http://www.antiwar.com/cole/?articleid=3898> [Published at Anti War on 3 November 2004, accessed 11 October 2016]

⁵⁵ <https://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/2007/05/371431.html> [Published on INDYMEDIA on 24 May 2007, accessed 10 October 2016]

to its English “I will commit martyrdom” (emphasis added). Alarabi concluded “In my professional opinion, MEMRI’s “translation” is not credible and flat out forgery”. It is worth noting that MEMRI does not provide the names, numbers and backgrounds of its translators nor the procedures and methods applied in translation. I have sent MEMRI an email of enquiry in this regard on 3 August 2016 but with no reply until this moment.

4.2.5 MEMRI’s funding and support

MEMRI, as it claims, is an independent and non-profit entity which accepts no funds from governments. MEMRI’s main source of fund, therefore, is the private donors both individuals and entities in which some of them were revealed by MEMRI such as Koret Foundation, Cohen Foundation, Schusterman Foundation, Randolph Foundation, the Meyerhoff Foundation and the Shoah Foundation. However, among the other funders of MEMRI which were revealed by the Media Transparency is the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation which is one of the US “largest and most influential right-wing foundations” in contrary of MEMRI’s claim that most of the donors are “centre/centre-left foundations” (Fathi, 2011, p. 169-170). The Right Web also revealed some of MEMRI’s top donors between the years 1999 and 2009 as follows: The Klarman Family Foundation, The Shillman Foundation, The Harold Grinspoon Foundation, Diane & Howard Wohl Family Foundation, The Paul Singer Family Foundation, The Middle East Forum, Abramowitz Family Foundation, Jewish Federation of Greater Washington, The Marcus Foundation, Milken Family Foundation, Lowell Milken Family Foundation, Y&S Nazarian Family Foundation, The Irving I. Moskowitz Foundation, Adelson Family Foundation, Friends of the College of Judea and Samaria, Inc, Jewish Communal Fund, Becker Foundation c/o Jewish Committee Foundation, and The Donors Capital Fund. Moreover, in 2011, the Office of the U.S. Department of State of International Religious Freedom in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights

and Labor granted USD 200 thousands to MEMRI to run “a project that documents anti-Semitism, Holocaust denial and Holocaust glorification in the Middle East”⁵⁶.

According to MEMRI’s tax record⁵⁷, its annual operational budget was USD 2 million in 2001 which increased to USD 5 million in 2009 followed by a decrease to USD 4.5 million in 2010. As for the tax year of July 2014 to June 2015, MEMRI’s budget, as stated in its latest available financial statement (Form 990), is USD 5.6 million with total expenses of USD 4.857 million⁵⁸. These USD 5.6 million were spent mainly on MEMRI’s staff salaries and benefits with USD 1.4 million, fundraising fee and expenses with USD 0.5 million, website maintenance and security provided by an ‘independence contractor’ Netstrategies Digital Marketing LLC with USD 290 thousands, and more interestingly on ‘translation services’ provided by an ‘independence contractor’ Israeli company Yesodot Shalom which is based in Jerusalem with USD 2.590 million. A quick search on Yesodot Shalom revealed that the company is MEMRI’s office in Israel⁵⁹ and the registered owner of memri.org.il⁶⁰. MEMRI’s financial statement is doubtful by other independent journalists and transparency organisations (Fathi, 2011).

MEMRI has received several complements on its work from media, academia, think tanks and counterterrorism agencies. Among these complements which some of them were published on MEMRI’s website⁶¹ are the Lt. Col., Multi-National Force in Iraq “Your assistance has been absolutely invaluable”, the Professor Bernard Lewis, Princeton University “MEMRI is the single most important development in Middle East Studies in the past 25 years”, the Thomas Friedman of the New York Times “message

⁵⁶ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/170397.htm> [accessed 13 October 2016]

⁵⁷ <http://www2.guidestar.org/profile/52-2068483> [accessed 12 October 2016]

⁵⁸ http://www.memri.org/docs/MEMRI_FS_Public_2015.pdf [accessed 12 October 2016]

⁵⁹ http://www.dunsguide.com/Research_RD/B-533918207_Yesodot_Shalom [accessed 12 October 2016]

⁶⁰ <https://who.is/whois/memri.org.il> [accessed 12 October 2016]

⁶¹ <http://www.memri.org/assistingamerica/quotes.html> [accessed 14 October 2016]

to the extremists: you are free to say what you want, but we are free to listen, to let the whole world know what you are saying and to protect every free society from hate spreaders like you. Words matter”⁶², the U.S. Treasury Department, Intelligence Branch “Your material is the best I've seen so far. You can bet my troops appreciate as much as I do”, the National Journal “If your Arabic, Farsi, and Hebrew are a little rusty, this site's translations offer a unique window into the Mideast press”, the Washington Post Pulitzer Prize Columnist Charles Krauthammer “For anyone interested in what is really happening in the Middle East – what the Arab world is saying to itself – MEMRI is utterly indispensable. It should be read daily by scholars, journalists and policymakers with any interest in this part of the world”, the United States Representative Gary Ackerman “Thanks to MEMRI, we can see what our enemies are saying, how they see the world, and how they see us. This open source of intelligence is invaluable”, and the Richard Holbrooke, Former Ambassador to the U.N. and current Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan:

"MEMRI allows an audience far beyond the Arabic-speaking world to observe the wide variety of Arab voices speaking through the media, schoolbooks, and pulpits to their own people. What one hears is often astonishing, sometimes frightening, and always important. Most importantly, it includes the newly-emerging liberal voices of reform and hope, as well as disturbing echoes of ancient hatreds. Without the valuable research of MEMRI, the non-Arabic speaking world would not have this indispensable window."

4.2.6 MEMRI critics

MEMRI has also received critics on its translations and analyses from academics, journalists, think tanks and politicians accusing it of (re)framing the Arabs and Muslims image in a negative way⁶³. The ‘selectivity’ and ‘decontextualisation’ carried out by MEMRI of certain materials from the Arab and Muslim media have been a critique by several authors and organisations in the East as well as in the West. In his article titled

⁶² http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/22/opinion/giving-the-hatemongers-no-place-to-hide.html?_r=0 [accessed 14 October 2016]

⁶³ http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/Middle_East_Media_Research_Institute/#_ednref4 [accessed 14 October 2016]

“A Note on MEMRI and Translations”⁶⁴ published on Counter Punch on 15 January 2003, Leah Harris explained that “publishing selective and decontextualized excerpts... is a misleading practice and can serve to misrepresent individual journalists and the character of the Arabic press as a whole”. Lawrence Swaim of the InFocus further discussed the selectivity and the inaccuracy of MEMRI’s translations, providing several examples, in his articles titled “MEMRI is ‘propaganda machine,’ expert says”⁵³ in which he stated “it [MEMRI] is also a dangerous, highly sophisticated propaganda operation, disseminating hate and disinformation on an unprecedented worldwide basis”. Brian Whitaker of the Guardian is one of the first journalists to question the selectivity of MEMRI in his article “Selective Memri”⁶⁵, published on 12 August 2002, he argued “the stories selected by Memri for translation follow a familiar pattern: either they reflect badly on the character of Arabs or they in some way further the political agenda of Israel”. Professor As'ad Abu-Khalil of the California State University also explained that “Arab public opinion, based on MEMRI's releases, is reduced or caricatured to either Bin Laden fans or Bush fans, while Arab public opinion is mostly a fan of neither people”⁶⁶. Nevertheless, as Fathi (2011) explained, MEMRI uses “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs)” in order to threaten its critics as in the cases of Professor Juan Cole of the University of Michigan, the German magazine *inamo*, Brian Whitaker of the Guardian, the then-Mayor of London Ken Livingstone, and herself, Dr. Schirin Fathi of Hamburg university.

4.3 Research Corpus

This study employs the narrative theory-informed analysis of Baker (2006) to reveal the embedded value-laden loadings in mass media translations, which tend to affect the public view on the current globalised Middle Eastern conflict. A corpus is developed

⁶⁴ <http://www.counterpunch.org/2003/01/15/a-note-on-memri-and-translations/> [accessed 10 October 2016]

⁶⁵ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/12/worlddispatch.brianwhitaker> [accessed 14 October 2016]

⁶⁶ http://angryarab.blogspot.my/2005_09_01_archive.html [accessed 14 October 2016]

specifically for this study, which consists of 46 Arabic political editorials on *Daesh* (about 60 pages) and their English translations in 25 articles (about 47 pages), which have been translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). The difference in the number of source texts and target texts is due to MEMRI's practice where several source texts are combined in translations under the same title: mostly between three to five, but some translations contain more than seven source editorial articles in a single translated article. The focus of this study is principally on the textual articles of translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh*. The English target texts were collected manually from MEMRI's archive⁶⁷. These translated articles are taken from the 'Special Dispatch' section⁶⁸ on MEMRI's main webpage, published between 2013 and 2016, covering the period of the establishment of *Daesh* on 8 April 2013 up to the present day i.e. 8 April 2016, while Arab civil war is on its top dilemma and the humanitarian crisis in Syria is more complicated and unpredictable than ever.

The twenty five dispatches published online by MEMRI consist of extracts from nineteen Arabic newspapers and two websites as follows: Al-Hayat Newspaper (London) quoted 8 times, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Newspaper (London) quoted 5 times, Al-Quds Al-Arabi Newspaper (London) quoted 2 times, Elaph Newspaper (London) quoted 1 time, Raialyoum Newspaper (London) quoted 1 time, Al-Madina Newspaper (Saudi Arabia) quoted 2 times, Al-Riyadh Newspaper (Saudi Arabia) quoted 5 times, Al-Watan Newspaper (Saudi Arabia) quoted 2 times, Al-Jazirah Newspaper (Saudi Arabia) quoted 1 time, Al-Sharq Newspaper (Saudi Arabia) quoted 1 time, Al-Akhbar Newspaper (Iraq) quoted 1 time, Al-Mada Newspaper (Iraq) quoted 1 time, Al-Ghad Newspaper (Jordan) quoted 1 time, Al-Rai Newspaper (Jordan) quoted 3 times, Assabeel Newspaper (Jordan) quoted 1 time, Al-Dustour Newspaper (Jordan) quoted 2

⁶⁷ http://www.memri.org/more_reports/en_archive [accessed 23 December 2015]

⁶⁸ <https://www.memri.org/categories/special-dispatch> [Where MEMRI publishes original translations of Middle Eastern media and distributes them, free of charge, by fax and email, accessed 28 March 2017]

times, Elwatan Newspaper (Egypt) quoted 2 times, Al-Tahrir Newspaper (Egypt) quoted 1 time, Al-Watan Newspaper (Qatar) quoted 2 times, Al-Rai Mediagroup (Kuwait) quoted 1 time, All4Syria Online News (Syria) quoted 1 time, and Dr. Ahmed Al-Raissouni Website (Morocco) quoted 1 time. A list of the Arabic source editorials and their English translations is set in Appendix A.

It is worth noting that MEMRI's dispatches provide only the date of publication of the Arabic source articles rather than establishing the source links and the extracted passage(s). Further, the titles of the Arabic source articles and the authors' names are not indicated in some dispatches which make the search for the source articles a time-consuming and exhausting task.

4.3.1 Justification of the selected research corpus

According to MEMRI's website, MEMRI is concerned particularly in the Middle East (the Arab world) issues through their media. MEMRI claims that it is the language bridge between the East and the West through providing translations in different languages largely in English of the Middle East languages mainly Arabic. MEMRI translates various types of materials including textual, visual and acoustic from different Arab and Muslim media such as TV programmes, newspapers, radio programmes, school textbooks, magazines and public speeches. Furthermore, MEMRI's materials are "used extensively by government bodies and legislatures; militaries – both U.S. and foreign; media; academia; and the public at large. On a daily basis, MEMRI assists and lends support to all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, including over 200 different units, in carrying out the War on Terror. MEMRI continues to support members of academia on a daily basis. To date, over 500 college and universities, in the United

States and worldwide, have utilized MEMRI material”²⁸. For further details on the wide and worrying impact of MEMRI, see section 4.2.3.

This research is limited to the translations of textual materials rather than cartoons and video clips. This choice is grounded based on the criticism of Baker (2006) as discussed earlier in chapter two in which scholars requested the testing of the applicability of Baker (2006) through its application on a text corpus. Moreover, the choice also considers the time-consuming process of transcribing video and audio materials and their translations. Nevertheless, these materials are suggested for future studies on MEMRI’s translations.

4.4 Data Analysis

The data analysis of this study covers the primary types of framing, namely: paratextual framing, contextual framing, and textual framing. The analysis of paratextual (supplementary information to the main text) framing discusses the analysis of titles, introductions, headings, images and endnotes. The analysis of contextual framing contains the analysis of the features of narrativity: thematic and episodic, temporal and spatial, and relationality. The analysis of textual framing involves the analysis of addition, omission, lexical choice, grammatical shifts, and reorganising of materials. Figure 3.1 illustrated earlier, represents the researcher’s outlines of the data analysis procedure. This model provides the researcher with the necessary definitions for narrative analysis bearing in mind the political import and effectiveness of the narrative. It then identifies the type of narrative i.e. the public media narratives in this study. After that, it considers the features of narrativity that can also be employed as a framing device. Here, framing devices are categorised under three main categories: paratextual, contextual, and textual in which each category has sub-categories, as illustrated in

Figure 3.1. The last step in the data analysis is the assessment of the narrative in question i.e. *Daesh* narratives in MEMRI's English translations.

4.5 Summary

This chapter provided an in-depth discussion on The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), the source of the research data. It shed light on MEMRI's establishment in February 1998 by the Former Colonel at the Israeli intelligence agency Yigal Carmon and the Israeli Meyrav Wurmser the author of "*Can Israel Survive Post Zionism?*"⁶⁹. MEMRI's Headquarter is located in Washington, DC with branch offices in Berlin, Tokyo, Jerusalem and Baghdad while its offices in London, Moscow and Ankara were closed. MEMRI's announced objective is to "bridging the language gap"; however, as discussed in this chapter, MEMRI aims to distort the image of Arabs and Muslims. MEMRI translates from, mainly, Arabic but also from Turkish, Farsi, Hindi, Dari and Urdu-Pashtu media to, mainly, English but also to Hebrew, Spanish, French, Polish and Japanese at no charge. Moreover, this chapter presented an overview on the main projects run by MEMRI namely: The Jihad and Terrorism Project, The Reform Project, The Antisemitism Documentation Project, The Arab and Iranian TV Monitoring Project, The South Asia Studies Project, The MEMRI 9/11 Documentation Project, and The Iran Studies Project in which MEMRI extensively monitors the Arab and Muslim media. After that, the vast and worrying impact of MEMRI on the public and the governmental institutions in the US and elsewhere worldwide were discussed providing that MEMRI is the primary source of information for the US government in its 'War on Terror'. MEMRI's translation quality, according to scholars and politicians, is inaccurate and selectivity as provided in several examples in section 4.2.4. MEMRI does not reveal the profiles of its translators nor the 80 staff working at its different

⁶⁹ <http://www.meforum.org/469/can-israel-survive-post-zionism> [accessed 14 October 2016]

offices; however, the few revealed names of its founders, staff, directors and advisors are currently, or were, working with the Israeli intelligence agency, CIA and FBI. Furthermore, this chapter quoted several complements as well as critics from media, academia, think tank and governments on MEMRI's words and works including its translations and analyses. After that, this chapter discussed the procedures taken in collecting the current research data followed by the procedures and coding applied in analysing the research data based on Baker (2006) theoretical framework of Narrative Analysis.

The next chapter analyses the paratextual framings found in MEMRI's English translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh*.

CHAPTER 5: PARATEXTUAL FRAMING⁷⁰

5.1 Introduction

Having discussed the notions of ‘narrative’ and ‘framing’ in chapter two and the narrative theory in chapter three as emerged in the field of translation studies by Professor Mona Baker (2006), this chapter analyses the framing devices and strategies employed by MEMRI’s translators at the paratextual level. In the context of this study, these strategies and devices aim at undermining or underlining some particularities of current rival narratives globally circulated about the military ‘terrorist’ group *Daesh*.

In 1987, the term ‘paratext’ was introduced by the French literary theorist, Gerard Genette, to refer to a set of supplementary information to the main text such as the authors’ names, the work titles, prefaces, and illustrations (Genette, [1987] 1997). Genette locatively unfolded paratext into *peritext* and *epitext* with accordance to their distance to the main text. Paratext functions as an introduction to the main text to ensure its presence, reception, and consumption by the target audience (Marine-Roig, 2017). However, while Genette considered paratext as additional elements to the text, Gray (2015) argued that paratext is an important, central, constitutive, and integral part of the main text. The power of paratextual elements is realised in their ability to frame sources through (re)positioning the reader and creating expectations (Baker, 2006; Al-Sharif, 2009; Azariah, 2011; Marine-Roig, 2017). In other words, they largely control the reader’s complete reading experience of the text chiefly his interpretation and reaction. However, according to Wolf (2006), there are two kinds of paratextual materials i.e. ‘authorised’ (intracompositional) and ‘unauthorised’ (extracompositional). Authorised paratextual materials are those framing devices of the author of the original text.

⁷⁰ A large portion of this chapter has been published in Hijjo & Kaur (2017a).

Unauthorised paratextual materials are those framing devices added to the framed original text by others including translators.

In the following sections of this chapter as well as in chapters six and seven, the ‘unauthorised’ framing devices which do not appear –exist– in the original text are analysed and discussed. The paratextual materials analysed and discussed in this chapter include titles, introductions (prefaces), headings and subtitles, images and captions, and endnotes and glossaries. It is worth noting that these materials are not necessarily the sole work of translators, editors as well as publishers are involved to fulfil their interest and agenda.

5.2 Titles

Titles of textual works are the first to read and based on them one makes decision to continue or not to continue reading the full article. They serve as signal devices of the content of the whole text. They also guide the readers’ understanding of the story. Some readers –due to the lack of sufficient time or to some other reasons– limit their readings to titles in order to receive the message of the full text. That is to say that some readers keep up with news, articles or books only by their titles. News headlines have great impacts on “people’s behaviour and if something catches the person’s attention; it will be more easily remembered” (Marine-Roig, 2017, p. 183). In other words, titles are highly influential by playing a crucial role in forming a pre-reading image of the text to come. In the context of this study, translation of titles is a two-way process of the projected and perceived messages of the original text that includes the translator’s reproduction of perceived messages and their transmission to the target reader. In translation, since there is no absolute bias-free translation, titles are often the first site of reframing –manipulating– the original narrative and signal devices of a new

ideologically-positioned narrative particularly within the context of translations of editorials on matters of conflicts of interest; the (inter)national conflict in the Middle East and the War on Terror, for this study. The following are patterns of MEMRI's translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* exemplifying how translation of titles is used to negotiate the original narratives.

Special Dispatch No. 5575; Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda

MEMRI's Special Dispatch No. 5575 (see appendix A, 1:TT) translates the title of the Arabic source text “لا بد من «عنوان آخر» و «أمن» للراغبين بالجهاد في سورية” (literally, [there] should be ‘another address’ and ‘security’ for the ones willing to fight in Syria) into the English “*Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda*”. On the one hand, the Arabic title suggests that there are two problems faced by the individuals who are seeking to fight in Syria. The suggested problems in the Arabic title are (1) there is a need to replace the current guide (recruitment group) with another, (2) the safety of these individuals should be guaranteed. On the other hand, the English title is completely at odds with the original. The author's nationality ‘Saudi’—which only appears as a footnote at the end of the Arabic article—is added to the title of the English article. Furthermore, the Arabic title is interpreted in a different way than the one suggested in the source. The English title proposes that the *Saudi journalist*, as a representative of intellectual Arabs, Muslims and more particularly the elite (Pro-USA), supports the civil war in Syria and encourages individuals to join it as understood in ‘*is not wrong*’; in addition, it suggests that *Al-Qaeda* is misleading these individuals to its advantage as understood in ‘*twisted*’. Interestingly and more significantly, ‘Al-Qaeda’ does not appear in the Arabic title and is only mentioned five times in a single paragraph of a six-paragraph article. This framing by labelling in the translation of the article's title signals to a different

narrative than of the source thus leading the target audience to a framed interpretation of the text. Featuring ‘Al-Qaeda’ in the English title evokes and grants more weight to the meta-narrative of ‘Jihad and Terror’ to which MEMRI devotes a large fund under “The Jihad and Terrorism Project” as it appears on its website and discussed in **Section 4.2.2** herein. MEMRI’s narrative invites readers to believe that terrorism is a product which is solely served and operated by Muslims based on the Islamic teachings and that other beliefs, religions, races or individuality do not correlate to any terrorist behaviour and do not equate to acts of terror neglecting the facts of the US terrorist war against Vietnam, the terrorist Israeli occupation of Palestine, the 10 February 2015 killing of three Muslim Syrians in their home in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States by the terrorist Christian US-citizen Craig Stephen Hicks⁷¹, among many others. To promote this narrative of terrorist Islam and Muslims, the Arabic word ‘جهاد’ [transliteration: *jihad*, translation: *fight*] is left without being translated in MEMRI’s English title. Nevertheless, as a Muslim and a native speaker of the Arabic language, I argue that the Arabic ‘*jihad*’ in this context refers to ‘fighting’ since Muslims are fighting each other in Syria, and thus the notion of ‘*jihad*’ (based upon the theological meaning) does not fit in this case (for further discussion see the explanation on the usage of ‘*jihad*’ under section 6.4 Relationality).

Similarly, the same analysis applies on MEMRI’s translations of the Arabic titles: (1) “خطة تجميد التحول السوري” (literally: Freezing plan of the Syrian transformation) into its English “*Syrian Journalist: The De Mistura Plan – A Death Blow To Assad's Opponents*” in Special Dispatch No. 5896, (2) “فواز تلو: لأنني ضد الإرهاب (Je_suis_Syria)” (literally: Fawaz Tello: Because I am against terror (Je_suis_Syria)) into the English “*Syrian Oppositionist: The West Calls Syrian Rebels Terrorists – But They Are Victims*

⁷¹ <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/02/students-murdered-university-north-carolina-campus-150211093231033.html> [published 12 February 2015, accessed 20 March 2017]

Of ISIS And Assad Terrorism” in Special Dispatch No. 6241, (3) “*حين ينهار العراق*” (Literally: As Iraq Collapses) into the English “*'Al-Hayat' Editor Ghassan Charbel: While The Rest Of The World Is Watching The World Cup, We Are Watching The Collapse Of Iraq*” in Special Dispatch No. 5771, (4) “*زمن الجيوش الصغيرة*” (Literally: Era of small armies) into the English “*'Al-Hayat' Editor: We Live In An Age When Small Armies Make Large Changes*” in Special Dispatch No.5889, (5) “*انه ايرهابنا.. ونحن*” (Literally: It is our terror... and we are responsible!) into the English “*Editor Of Iraqi Daily: The Arabs And Muslims Must Acknowledge Their Direct Responsibility For The Terror Sweeping The World*” in Special Dispatch No. 6221, (6), “*11 سبتمبر لم يحصل بعد!*” (Literally: 11 September has not yet happened!) into the English “*Arab Liberal: Had The Muslims Learned From 9/11, ISIS Would Never Have Happened*” in Special Dispatch No. 5846, (7) “*انس محمود الشيخ مظهر: لماذا لا يعلن الجهاد على داعش؟ العلمانيون؟ والكفار اكثر غيرة على الاسلام من شيوخه*” (Literally: Anas Mahmoud Al-Sheikh Madhar: Why not declare fight against Daesh? Secularists and unbelievers are more jealous for Islam than its leaders) into the English “*Iraqi Columnist: Why Aren't Muslim Clerics Calling For Jihad Against ISIS?*” in Special Dispatch No. 6159, (8) “*تساعة الحرب على الظلام*” (Literally: War time against darkness) into the English “*'Al-Hayat' Editor: The World Must Launch World War Against Terror; Arab, Muslim World Must Examine Itself*” in Special Dispatch No. 6217, (9) “*الإعدام حرقاً.. عقوبة إسلامية*” (Literally: Death by fire.. an Islamic punishment) into the English “*Egyptian Writer: Muslim History Is Rife With ISIS-Style Executions; Adopting Enlightenment Is The Only Weapon Against Such Brutality*” in Special Dispatch No. 6144, (10) “*مسلسل القتل*” (Literally: Killing series) into the English “*Former Imam Of Mecca's Grand Mosque: There Is No Escaping Reform To Bring Islam Back To Its Path Of Tolerance*” in Special Dispatch No. 6063, (11) “*الشرح والبيان لحرب العدوان والشيطان*” (Literally: Explanation and clarification of the war against aggression and Satan) into the English “*Senior Sunni Cleric: Both ISIS And The*

Fight Against It Serve The Interests Of The West And The Shi'ite Regimes” in Special Dispatch No. 6059, and (12) “هل فعلاً ليس للإرهاب دين” (Literally: Is terror really has no religion) into the English “*Iraqi Journalist Comes Out Against Claim That ISIS Has Nothing To Do With Islam*” in Special Dispatch No. 6288.

Special Dispatch No. 5718; Jordanian Press Criticizes Extremism In Syria

In MEMRI’s Special Dispatch No. 5718 (see appendix A, 2:TT), three Arabic editorials titled: “.. الجزية على المسيحي والقتل للمسلم” (literally: *Jizya* on Christian and killing for Muslim..!), “داعش والجزية” (literally: *Daesh* and *Jizya*) and “من أي تربة: «الإسلام المسلح»: من أي تربة” (literally: This ‘armed Islam’ from what soil [it] sprung??) were translated into a single article by MEMRI titled: ‘*Jordanian Press Criticizes Extremism In Syria*’. The MEMRI title signals a completely different story than of the originals. Meanwhile, the first two Arabic titles discuss *Daesh*’s announcement of requesting *Jizya* (financial contributions) from non-Muslims who live under its control and the third title discusses the environment from which members of ‘Islamic’ armed groups in Syria are raised. However, the MEMRI title indicates a general journalistic criticism on general extremism taking place in Syria. The first article was published online on the Jordanian *Al-Rai* while the second and third articles were published online on the Jordanian *Addustour*. However, the MEMRI title generalises the opinion of the three editorial articles from the two newspapers to “*Jordanian Press*” ignoring the fact that there are at least 19 Jordanian online newspapers⁷² with different stances. In addition, the MEMRI title generalises and summarises the current situation and daily life in the noun ‘*Extremism*’ which indicates that extremism is a norm in Syria. ‘Extremism’, in MEMRI title, is vague. That is to say that the undefined noun refers to a general state rather than a specific aspect (requesting *jizya* from non-Muslims living under *Daesh*

⁷² <http://www.onlinenewspapers.com/jordan.htm> [accessed 9 March 2016]

controlled territories) as understood in the Arabic titles. Moreover, as Professor Adrienne Lehrer put it: “Finally, many -ist/-ism terms can be used to insult.” (1988, p. 182). She elaborated that:

“Thus the current new meaning of -ism is 'the unjust and unjustified belief of superiority of one group (of persons or things) and the corresponding inferiority of another group of other groups'. The connotation is decidedly negative in that the doctrine is to be judged pernicious and/or immoral. The meaning of -ist applies to anyone who holds the doctrine, and the -ist term is also negative and used as a term of reprobation.” (p. 183).

In other words, the -ist and -ism terms are semantically-laden and serve as an accusation that a group or an individual is ‘superiority in doctrine’, which in turn leads to a rejection and conflict with the ‘inferiors’. This argument of the negativity feature of the suffixes -ist and -ism is supported and discussed in Taboada et al. (2017) ‘*On Being Negative*’. Moreover, in the case of ‘extremism’ “it was the whole word, not the suffix alone, that had the negative connotation at this earlier stage” (Lehrer, 1988, p. 182). In addition, to support its narrative, MEMRI added a locative feature i.e. Syria to its title in order to evoke the image of the ‘bloody conflict’ in the readers’ minds. The locative feature of Syria is not only absent in the Arabic titles, but also in the main text. The three Arabic editorials are chiefly concern about the acts of *Daesh* rather than its geographical settings.

Similarly, the same analysis applies on MEMRI’s translations of the Arabic titles: (1) “سلاسل الماضي” (Literally: past chains) and “هل الإرهاب نبتة سلفية؟” (Literally: Is terror an ancestral plant?) into its English “*Senior Saudi Salafite Cleric: 'ISIS Is A True Product Of Salafism'*” in Special Dispatch No. 5872, (2) “الشركة المساهمة للحرب على داعش” (Literally: Joint stock company for war against *Daesh*) and “حملة صليبية جديدة!” (Literally: New crusade!) into the English “*Al-Jazeera TV Host Ahmed Mansour: Anti-ISIS Coalition Is 'A Crusade In A New Guise'*” in Special Dispatch No. 5855, (3) “خيارات مصر”

"المحدودة ان سيطرت داعش على ليبيا!" (Literally: The limited options of Egypt in case *Daesh* controlled Libya!) and "داعش ليبيا.. والخطر الأكبر على مصر" (Literally: *Daesh* in Libya.. And the great danger toward Egypt) into the English "*Egyptian Columnists: Egypt Needs To Fight ISIS In Libya – Unilaterally If Necessary*" in Special Dispatch No. 6239, (4) "إحراق الطيار الأردني سيشعل فتيل النهاية" (Literally: Burning the Jordanian pilot will light the end wick), "استمرار داعش وصمة عار في جبين الإنسانية" (Literally: The remaining of *Daesh* is a smirch on humanity forehead) and "الغارات الجوية لا تكفي للقضاء على داعش" (Literally: Air strikes are not enough to end *Daesh*) into the English "*Saudi Press Calls For Ground Campaign Against ISIS*" in Special Dispatch No. 5970, (5) "الرمادي وخطر" (Literally: Ramadi and the danger of the collapse of America on Saudi Arabia and Jordan), "المستفيدون من سقوط الرمادي" (Literally: Beneficiaries of the collapse of Ramadi) and "نبل المنطقة كلها برميل من بارود" (Literally: But the whole region is a barrel of gunpowder) into the English "*Saudi, Qatari Press: U.S. To Blame For ISIS Capturing Al-Ramadi*" in Special Dispatch No. 6067, (6) "ويلات حرب" (Literally: War woes and peace disappointments), "لقاءات الدوحة.. ملفات ساخنة" (Literally: Doha meetings.. Hot files and necessary solutions), "حلف ضد" (Literally: Doha meetings.. Hot files and necessary solutions), "نحو حلول ضرورية" (Literally: Doha meetings.. Hot files and necessary solutions), "«داعش» أم لإجل إنقاذ الأسد؟" (Literally: A coalition against "*Daesh*" or to save Assad?), "ماذا تعني عودة" (Literally: Let Syrians decide their future), and "«لنقرر السوريون مستقبلهم»" (Literally: Let Syrians decide their future), and "«الروس؟»" (Literally: What does Russian return mean?) into the English "*Articles In Saudi Press Reject Russian Initiative For Regional Alliance With Assad Regime To Fight Terrorism, Stress: Political Solution In Syria – The Only Way To Deal with Terrorism*" in Special Dispatch No. 6124, (7) "الحساب مفتوح معكم.. أيها القتل" (Literally: The reckoning is open with you.. oh killers), "أردني أصيل" (Literally: Original Jordanian) and "معاذ ايقونة" (Literally: Muath is a Jordanian icon) into the English "*Jordanian Press Reacts To ISIS Execution Of Jordanian Pilot: 'Now All Jordanians Feel Need For Vengeance'*" in Special Dispatch No. 5955, and (8) "«داعش» ليست «كوكا كولا»" (Literally: *Daesh* is

not Coca Cola), “«صناعة الكذب: أميركا أسست «داعش»» (Literally: The industry of lies: America established «*Daesh*»!), “حان الوقت لبحر الأمريكان» (Literally: It is time to defeat the Americans), “لمن صنع داعش؟» (Literally: Who made *Daesh*?), “هل أن داعش صناعة؟» (Literally: Is that *Daesh* an American made with distinction?!), and “هل «!أميركية بامتياز؟» (Literally: Is *Daesh* an American made?!), into the English “*Conspiracy Theories In Saudi Government Press: The U.S. Established ISIS To Further Its Own Aims In The Region*” in Special Dispatch No. 5911.

Special Dispatch No. 5912; Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It Weakened The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists

Another example that illustrates MEMRI’s reframing of Arabic editorial titles is its Special Dispatch No. 5912 (see appendix A, 3:TT). In this dispatch, MEMRI translates an article of interview of the prominent Syrian opposition figure Michel Kilo with *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* Newspaper. *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* Newspaper titled its interview article as “المعارض السوري ميشيل كيلو في حوار شامل: الولايات المتحدة لعبت دورا رئيسيا في إضعاف التيار المعتدل “داخل الثورة السورية” (literally: The Syrian opponent Michel Kilo in an inclusive interview: the United States played a chief role in weakening the middle stream in the Syrian uprising”. However, MEMRI’s translation of the Arabic title is “*Syrian Oppositionist Harshly Criticizes U.S.: It Weakened The Moderate Opposition, Strengthened The Extremists*”. While the Arabic title suggests that the article is about an interview with Michel Kilo a well-known Syrian opposition figure discussing the role of the United States in the on-going conflict in Syria among other topics, MEMRI’s title does not establish the interview and replaces the ‘discussion on the United States role’ in Syria with ‘harsh criticism’. The signalled narrative in MEMRI’s title is that a Syrian opposition figure (*oppositionist* – with the suffix –ist to apply a negative connotation as discussed in the previous example) *harshly* (a negative adverb to modify the succeeding verb) *criticizes* (a verb of negative sense) the United States for *weakened* (a simple past

tense verb which indicates achieved action is in contrary to the source Arabic “*played a chief role*” which indicates an involvement/participation rather than doing the full action) *the Moderate Opposition* (unlike the source Arabic ‘*the middle stream in the Syrian uprising*’, the ‘*Syrian uprising*’ was replaced by ‘*opposition*’) and that the United States equally *Strengthened The Extremists* (this very last phrase was not stated in anyway in the source Arabic title, this addition comes to complete the reframed narrative in MEMRI signal, here also we notice the use of –ist suffix in ‘*extremists*’ as a negative device in the MEMRI series). Moreover, a reframing of position is found in repositioning Michel Kilo from being an interviewee in the Arabic title to be the author/narrator in the MEMRI’s title.

Similarly, the same analysis applies on MEMRI’s translations of the Arabic titles: (1) “*مثال الألوسي ل الراي: أريد ان أرى العلم العراقي يرفرف فوق سفارة في إسرائيل*” (Literally: Mithal al-Alusi to al-Rai: I want to see the Iraqi flag flutters on an embassy in Israel) into its English “*Iraqi Ummah Party Leader Mithal Al-Alusi: ISIS Is An Arab-Muslim Creation; I Long For Peace With Israel*” in Special Dispatch No. 6117, and (2) “*نص رسالة المقدسي للبغدادي حول الكساسبة*” (Literally: the full text of al-Maqdisi’s letter to Al-Bagdadi about Al-Kasasbeh) into the English “*Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi's Efforts To Arrange Prisoner Exchange Deal To Free Jordanian Pilot*” in Special Dispatch No. 5969.

Furthermore, it is significant that the MEMRI translated titles are in a complete reframe than the originals. As Al-Sharif put it “all the texts translated by MEMRI have different titles from their original” (2009, p. 77). It is also found that while most –if not all- Arabic editorials employ titles (by definition), MEMRI makes use of the informative function of headlines in the sense that writers of Arabic editorials employ

attractive titles seeking to trigger readers to read their full articles –literary genre-, MEMRI employ headlines that self-stand as a whole story and in turn do not really attract readers. In other words, MEMRI translates the Arabic titles which meant to attract the reader’s attention and follow a phrase structure into its headlines which consider as a summary of the full story and follow a sentence structure.

5.3 Introductions (Prefaces)

An introduction or a preface generally refers to the entry materials of a book or a lengthy article as in the academia rather than editorials. According to the Chicago Manual Style Edition 16 (2010), an introduction is, more specifically, about the content of a book/article. It provides a brief on the covered subjects and it at times sets the terminological concepts that are used throughout the book/article. An introduction also discusses the way a book is read and used by general readers, teachers and students. However, a preface is about the work as a work (either a book or an article). It briefly explains the motives behind writing this work; the story of the work. Prefaces function as sites of the author’s credibility establishment. For the purpose of this thesis, both introduction and preface refer to the text set before the main text and function to “*ensure that the text is read properly*” (Genette, [1987] 1997, p. 197, emphasis in original). In translation studies, introductions and prefaces, among other paratextual materials, are useful additional introductory sites in the hands of translators for reframing original narratives by guiding the reader’s interpretation of the whole narrative and repositioning “themselves, their readers and other participants in time and space” (Baker, 2006, p. 133).

The norm of editorials is to begin the article with an introductory paragraph of a line or two to signal to the reader the discussion to come. In the current research data, all of the Arabic editorials have no special section for introductions/prefaces; rather,

they are part of the main text. Only articles of interviews tend to discuss the content of the interview in its introductory paragraph. However, MEMRI allocates a special section generally of one or two paragraphs, but it can be also up to six paragraphs as in its Special Dispatch No. 5969 and up to eight as in its Special Dispatch No. 6124 to introduce the translation to come. MEMRI signals the end of the preface and the beginning of its translation by “The following are excerpts from...”, “The following are translated excerpts from...” or “Below are excerpts from...” (see Appendix A: MEMRI’s Translation: Sample 1 and 2).

Special Dispatch No. 6288; Iraqi Journalist Comes Out Against Claim That ISIS Has Nothing To Do With Islam

For example, in its Special Dispatch No. 6288 (see appendix A, 24:TT), MEMRI introduced its translation of the Arabic editorial “هل فعلاً ليس للإرهاب دين” (Literally: Is terror really has no religion) with the following paragraph:

“In an article titled "Does Terror Truly Have No Religion?" in the pro-Iranian Iraqi newspaper Al-Akhbar, Iraqi journalist Fadel Boula came out against the claim, which is frequently heard in the Arab world and outside it, that the terror of the Islamic State (ISIS) and its ilk is completely unrelated to Islam. He pointed out that these terror organizations are motivated by an extremist Salafi ideology and claim that their atrocities represent Allah's will and directives”.

While the Arabic preface only indicates the publication date and the author’s name, MEMRI’s preface provides the article title “*“Does Terror Truly Have No Religion?”*”, the name of newspaper “Al-Akhbar” and its assumed affiliation “*pro-Iranian*”, its nationality “*Iraqi newspaper*”, the nationality of the author “*Iraqi journalist*”, his name “*Fadel Boula*”, the article summary “*Iraqi journalist Fadel Boula came out against the claim, which is frequently heard in the Arab world and outside it, that the terror of the Islamic State (ISIS) and its ilk is completely unrelated to Islam.*”, the assumed main argument “*He pointed out that these terror organizations are motivated by an extremist*

Salafi ideology and claim that their atrocities represent Allah's will and directives”.

MEMRI preface reframes the original source text by adding supplementary information that does not exist in the original. It can be argued here that this insertion is ideologically laden as it carries information that has ideological values. It also repositioned the participants of the original narrative the original and main author Fadel Boula becomes the subject of the translated text, while MEMRI becomes the author – rather than the translation agency– of the new text, and the readers of Fadel Boula become the readers of MEMRI, reading about Fadel Boula who is an Iraqi journalist at a pro-Iranian newspaper.

Special Dispatch No. 5969; Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi's Efforts To Arrange Prisoner Exchange Deal To Free Jordanian Pilot

Another example that illustrates MEMRI's reframing of the Arabic source text by preface addition is its Special Dispatch No. 5969 (see appendix A, 19:TT). In this Dispatch, MEMRI prefaces its English translation of a letter article of a Jordanian "Salafi-doctrine leader" Al-Maqdisi to the leader of *Daesh* about an exchange deal between the *Daesh*-prisoned Jordanian pilot Al-Kasasbeh with the Jordanian-prisoned *Daesh*-affiliated Al-Rishawi. The Arabic source article prefaces the letter with the following two sentences.

"السبيل - نشرت حسابات على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي تابعة لسلفين جهاديين , اليوم السبت , رسالة قالوا إنها موجهة من منظر التيار السلفي الجهادي عصام البرقاوي الملقب بابي محمد المقدسي الى "أمير" تنظيم الدولة ابو بكر البغدادي".

[Literal translation: Al-Sabil – Some accounts on social networking sites that belong to the Salafi-doctrine fighters published, today Saturday, a letter that they said it was directed by the Salafi-doctrine fighting stream theorist Isam Al-Barqawi nicknamed Abo Muhammad Al-Maqdisi, to the "Emir" (leader) of the state organisation Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.]

"وبحسب الرسالة , التي يتضح انها ارسلت اثناء مفاوضات الاردن مع التنظيم للافراج عن الطيار معاذ الكساسبة , طالب المقدسي من البغدادي بمبادلة الطيار بالسجينة ساجدة الريشاوي".

[Literal translation: According to the letter, which seems to have been sent during Jordan's negotiations with the organisation to release the pilot Muath

Al-Kasasbeh, Al-Maqdisi asked Al-Baghdadi to exchange the pilot with the prisoner Sajida Al-Rishawi.]

However, MEMRI's preface is of six paragraphs. The first paragraph is an addition –it does not exist in the original preface either explicitly or implicitly– that introduces the current efforts made by the Jordan authorities to incite the public opinion against *Daesh* after its execution of the Jordanian pilot by setting free the anti-*Daesh* "Islamic thinker" Al-Maqdisi. The second paragraph cites an interview of Al-Maqdisi elsewhere with the Jordan state television channel. In the interview, according to MEMRI's narrative, Al-Maqdisi criticises *Daesh* of burning Al-Kasasbeh to death and willingly losing the opportunity to free Al-Rishawi from the Jordanian prison. The third paragraph begins with "*It should be noted*", a signal to readers that the following is serious and should be taken into account in the process of interpreting this narrative, citing four of its reports and a Twitter account. The fourth paragraph discusses the settings of the translated letter adding information that does not appear in the Arabic source article such as the timing factor of releasing the letter "*After his release, a Jordanian daily published a letter*" as another support to MEMRI's elaborating narrative. The fifth paragraph outlines the main arguments of the Al-Maqdisi's letter to Al-Baghdadi. The sixth paragraph emphasises the first paragraph by rephrasing it. Both the first and the sixth paragraphs are MEMRI's own analysis and interpretation of the reasons behind releasing the letter to the media thus the public "*The publication of the letter can be viewed as...*". It is found that MEMRI replaced the original preface to the letter by its own inserting its own ideologically-laden analysis and interpretation of such.

Special Dispatch No. 6124; Articles In Saudi Press Reject Russian Initiative For Regional Alliance With Assad Regime To Fight Terrorism, Stress: Political Solution In Syria – The Only Way To Deal with Terrorism

In its Special Dispatch No. 6124 (see appendix A, 22:TT), MEMRI prefaces the compiled English translations of five preface-less Arabic editorials on, mainly, the current Russian involvement in the Syrian conflict with eight lengthy paragraphs (more than a full page comparing with only a two-page translated article). While, the first paragraph establishes the settings of the Arabic editorials providing information of the discussed event and its main topics “*On August 3, 2015, a series of meetings took place in the Qatari capital Doha...*”, the second paragraph offers information of pre-event – the situation that led to the event– citing sources elsewhere “*In recent weeks, Russia has intensified its previously low-key efforts to arrive at a solution for the Syria crisis...*”. The third paragraph is MEMRI’s own interpretation of the current Russian’s efforts signalled by “***It appears that the background to Russia's renewal and intensification of its efforts...***”. In the fourth preface paragraph, MEMRI elaborates on its interpretation and understanding of the reasons behind the Russian’s efforts to end *Daesh* in Syria, to save Al-Assad regime, which was signalled by “***In effect, the Russian initiative is another link in the chain of Russia's political efforts...***”. In its fifth paragraph of preface: “***Arab media outlets, both those close to the Assad regime and those close to Saudi Arabia, expressed...***”, MEMRI shifts to discuss what the Arab media outlets wrote about the event citing several “*often conflicting*” sources elsewhere. The sixth paragraph: “***However, these hopes were dashed. The statements of the foreign ministers...***”, begins to discuss the event itself –the Russian-US-GCC Doha meeting– and its outcomes as understood by MEMRI illustrated in “***The lack of ... indicates...***” citing sources elsewhere to support its narrative. The seventh paragraph: “***At a joint press conference with his Qatari counterpart, Lavrov declared that...***” elaborates on the outcome of the event citing a Russian media outlet elsewhere to recentralise and

support MEMRI's narrative of the War on Terror (*Daesh*): "*He **added** that his country is providing military and technical aid to the Syrian government in the struggle against the [ISIS] threat...*". The eighth paragraph concludes MEMRI's preface with a signal to the Arabic editorials to come: "*However, in recent days the Saudi press has published **articles that could indicate** the kingdom's policy on the matter.*". The last sentence of the last preface paragraph concludes the five editorials and evaluates them with regard to *Daesh* and the War on Terror as in "***These articles** have maintained that a political solution to the Syria crisis takes precedence over fighting **ISIS** – which contradicts the Russian initiative discussed at Doha.*".

5.4 Headings: In-text titles

Headings within the body of the text, in-text titles, intertitles or internal titles, are titles that make more sense to the involved reader rather than the table of content browser. In contrast to the main title, a heading is by no means an absolute requirement, at least to the existence of the text. Headings, therefore, are paratextual material employed by the author in order to thematically divide a text into sections for better readings. A unitary text thus contains no headings. In other words, in collections of texts, a heading is a necessity "for in these works their absence could easily cause the text to be mistaken at first for one continuous narrative" (Genette, [1987] 1997, p. 297). However, in a unitary work, a heading is avoided. In translation studies, the addition of headings (intertitles as Genette [1987] 1997, prefers to call them) are significant framing devices.

In this regard, MEMRI extensively utilises the addition of headings in its translations to grant coherence to its narrative as well as to create a strong link among its different components, directing the reader to its intended reading. MEMRI's addition of headings is of three types. The first type is the addition of headings to its translation

of several source articles in a single translated article. In this case, MEMRI adds a heading to the translations of every article included. This heading which serves as the title of the translated article follows MEMRI's practice of translating titles as explained in section **5.2 Titles** in which MEMRI's translations of titles are in a complete different of the original. This type is found in its Special Dispatches No. 5718, 5872, 6239, 5970, 6067, 6124, 5955 and 5911. The second type of addition of headings is MEMRI's addition of headings to its translation of a single original article that has no headings. This type is found in its Special Dispatches No. 5912, 5896, 6117, 5880, 5846 and 6159. The third type of addition of headings is the addition of headings in articles that contain the translations of several original articles and then the translation of one article is sub-headed as in MEMRI's Special Dispatch No. 5855.

Special Dispatch No. 5911; Conspiracy Theories In Saudi Government Press: The U.S. Established ISIS To Further Its Own Aims In The Region

As an example of the first type of addition of headings, MEMRI's Special Dispatch No. 5911 (see appendix A, 25:TT) is discussed as follows. In this Special Dispatch, MEMRI compiles the translations of six Arabic original articles, each translated article was preceded by a heading and the whole text was given a title. The headings are as follows (bold type is reproduced from the original):

- 1. Saudi Columnist: ISIS Fighters Are Mercenaries Of The U.S. Who Serve U.S. Aims**
- 2. Article On Saudi Website: U.S. Created ISIS To Harm Sunnis And Ensure Flow Of Oil To The West**
- 3. Saudi Writer: ISIS's Creation Aimed At Shifting International Terror Threat From U.S. To Iraq**
- 4. Saudi Journalist: Even If ISIS Is A Foreign Plot, Fighting It Is Up To Us**
- 5. Former Iraqi Ambassador To U.S.: The Claim That The U.S. Established ISIS Is Patently False**
- 6. Saudi Columnist: We, Not The U.S., Created ISIS**

Examining MEMRI's narrative as presented in its headings which differ from the chronological order of the original articles, reveals an ideologically-laden narrative. It suggests that the Saudi media earlier claim that *Daesh* is a US product as in “*U.S. Created ISIS*” is now proven wrong by other Saudi journalists and that *Daesh* as a ‘terror group’ is an Islamic and Arabian product as understood in the last headings “*We, Not The U.S., Created ISIS*”.

MEMRI's six headings are suggested to correspond to the Arabic articles' titles which are:

1. “*من صنع داعش؟!!*” (Literally: Who made *Daesh*?!)
2. “*هل أن داعش صناعة اميركية بامتياز؟!*” (Literally: Is that *Daesh* an American made with distinction?!)
3. “*هل داعش صناعة أمريكية؟!*” (Literally: Is *Daesh* an American made?!)
4. “*حان الوقت لدحر الأمريكان*” (Literally: It is time to defeat the Americans)
5. “*«صناعة الكذب: أميركا أسست «داعش»!*” (Literally: The industry of lies: America established «*Daesh*»!)
6. “*«داعش» ليست «كوكا كولا»!*” (Literally: *Daesh* is not Coca Cola)

The Arabic narrative presented in the six titles suggests that the Saudi media is merely questioning the possibility of *Daesh* being a US product. It does not offer any claims as suggested in MEMRI's headings. The Arabic titles come in a question form which invites the reader to read the article to find the answer. In contrast, MEMRI's headings come in a statement form that provides framed answers to the Arabic titles thus discourage the reader to read the full text.

Special Dispatch No. 5872; Senior Saudi Salafi Cleric: 'ISIS Is A True Product Of Salafism'

Another example that illustrates this type of MEMRI's addition of headings is its Special Dispatch No. 5872 (see appendix A, 8:TT). In this Dispatch titled "*Senior Saudi Salafi Cleric: 'ISIS Is A True Product Of Salafism'*", MEMRI compiles the translations of two Arabic articles "هل الإرهاب نبتة سلفية؟" (Literally: Is terror an ancestral plant?) and "سلاسل الماضي" (Literally: Past chains), which do not have any headings, of the same author Sheikh Aadel Al-Kalbani. In addition to the main title, MEMRI offers two headings in which each precedes the translation of one Arabic source article, as follows (bold type is reproduced from the original):

1. **"ISIS Is A True Product Of Salafism And We Must Deal With It With Full Transparency"**
2. **"We Remain Trapped In The Dungeons Of The Very Distant Past"; We Should 'Rely On The Past As A Foundation' For Building The Present And Future, Not Destroying Them**

The narrative elaborated in MEMRI's added headings suggests two thoughts. The first is that *Daesh* (MEMRI's ISIS) is a creation of *Salafism* –with the negative –ism– as in "**ISIS Is A True Product Of Salafism**". *Daesh*, nevertheless, is not spelled-out in any of the two Arabic source texts. It is noticed that MEMRI uses direct quotes as its headings. However, the first direct quote represented in the first heading does not exist in the source text and that it grants a negative reference to Islam and Muslims. In this regard, Al-Sharif explains:

"Direct quotes are a particularly persuasive device that is widely used in the media to give the impression that the narrator (media outlet, or in this case MEMRI) is reliable. MEMRI highlights the 'extremism' of Arab intellectuals by using [negative] quotes attributed to them as headings for selected excerpts." (2009, p. 195).

The other suggested thought in MEMRI's narrative is that Muslims have to make a good use of their past in building a 'better' present and future. The second direct quote represented in MEMRI's second heading exists largely in the Arabic source text

and that it grants a positive statement to Islam and Muslims. In this regard, Al-Sharif argues that this is a typical pattern where MEMRI is concerned as it often includes “minor positive references here and there to indicate that its coverage is balanced. The cosmetic, occasional, one-off positive narration of some aspect of the Arab World serves as the exception that proves the rule.” (2009, p. 195).

Special Dispatch No. 5846; Arab Liberal: Had The Muslims Learned From 9/11, ISIS Would Never Have Happened

A significant example illustrates the second type of addition of headings is MEMRI’s Special Dispatch No. 5846 (see appendix A, 12:TT). In this SD titled “*Arab Liberal: Had The Muslims Learned From 9/11, ISIS Would Never Have Happened*”, MEMRI provides translation for an Arabic article written by Hashem Saleh titled “*11 سبتمبر لم يحصل بعد!*” (Literally: 11 September has not yet happened!). While the original Arabic article does not provide any headings, MEMRI’s translation provides four headings as follows (bold type is reproduced from the original):

- 1. The Events Of 9/11 Did Not Lead To A Renaissance In Muslim Thought**
- 2. ISIS – A Direct Continuation Of 9/11**
- 3. Those Who Oppose A Change Of Religious Thought And Curricula Are Still The Majority Among Us**
- 4. Support For ISIS And Takfir Is Widespread – Because Of Our Backwards Education**

MEMRI’s narrative as represented in its addition of headings suggests that Islam and education in the Muslim Arab world are out-of-date and that the event of 11 September and *Daesh* are the result of such. MEMRI’s addition of headings to its translation of a one-page article is ideologically-motivated. These headings are decontextualized from the original source text and only represent MEMRI’s framed interpretation of the text which offers manipulated thoughts that the author of the source

text did not claim. For instance, the last heading added by MEMRI: “**Support For *ISIS* And Takfir Is *Widespread* – Because Of *Our* Backwards Education**” (italics added) is meant to title the translation of the last two paragraphs in the Arabic source article which MEMRI divided them for some questionable reasons into five paragraphs in its translation. In this heading, MEMRI features *Daesh* –*ISIS*– which only appears once in the original text translated under this heading. It also makes an ideologically choice of word decision in translating ‘عالمية’ (*Global*) as ‘*Widespread*’. It also adds ‘*Our*’ which refers to Muslims and Arabs to the *Backwards Education* in order to build a strong association between Muslims and Arabs from one side and backwards education from the other side.

Special Dispatch No. 5855; Al-Jazeera TV Host Ahmed Mansour: Anti-ISIS Coalition Is 'A Crusade In A New Guise'

Furthermore, MEMRI’s Special Dispatch No. 5855 (see Appendix A, 11:TT) exemplifies the third type of MEMRI’s added headings. In this Dispatch titled “*Al-Jazeera TV Host Ahmed Mansour: Anti-ISIS Coalition Is 'A Crusade In A New Guise'*”, MEMRI compiles the translations of two Arabic articles “حملة صليبية جديدة!” (Literally: New crusade!) and “الشركة المساهمة للحرب على داعش” (Literally: Joint stock company for war against *Daesh*). MEMRI’s headings not only come as internal titles for each article but also to divide the one article into sections as in its translation of the first article (bold type is reproduced from the original):

- 1. *ISIS – A New Enemy Created By The West After The Taliban, Al-Qaeda, And Saddam Hussein***
- 2. *The Long Term Goal – Redrawing Regional Borders***
- 3. *We Anticipate Massacres Like The U.S.'s Nuclear Bombs On Japan***

MEMRI’s narrative as represented in its three added headings suggests that *Daesh* is a West product that aims to re-divide regional Arab countries committing a massacre

similar to the US atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first heading: **“ISIS – A New Enemy Created By The West After The Taliban, Al-Qaeda, And Saddam Hussein”** titles the translations of the first three paragraphs of the first Arabic article. While the source text does mention this thought, its main argument is how the propaganda of the British media on *Daesh* produces hate against Muslims in Europe who are an essential part of the West society. MEMRI’s heading that features *Daesh* rather than the increasing West production of hate against Muslims, therefore, reframes the original narrative and message to a negative ideologically-motivated narrative on Muslims. The second added heading by MEMRI: **“The Long Term Goal – Redrawing Regional Borders”** is misleading the reader by omitting the subject ‘whose goal?!’ leaving the reader to the anticipated assumption ‘*Daesh*’ rather than the ‘West’ as indicated in the original narrative. The third added heading by MEMRI: **“We Anticipate Massacres Like The U.S.’s Nuclear Bombs On Japan”** indicates that the following translations are about an anticipated massacre which is similar to the one of the United States. The anticipated massacres are, however, committed by the United States rather than comparing to it as indicated in the Arabic source text. The main argument of the source narrative is that the participants of the US-coalition against *Daesh* joined merely for their own interests in the war profits leaving the Arab countries under attack in a situation of disorder.

5.5 Images and Captions

In our contemporary times, images have become essential to document events and to illustrate and summarise ideas and texts. Images grant more power on the public opinion and become an effective persuasive device of communications across languages. The selected images appear in the media news participate largely in shaping the audience’s react to a news story. As Bill Nicholas puts it:

“[i]mages... contribute to our sense of who we are and to our everyday engagement with the world around us. What these signs never announce is that they are most fundamentally the *signifiers of ideology*.... After all, seeing is believing, and how we see ourselves and the world around us is often how we believe ourselves and the world to be.” (1981, p. 3, cited in Silverblatt et al. 2015, p. 68, emphasis added).

Images represent the current state of the illustrated particularities in a given time rather than a dynamic narrative as suggested by the media. In other words, “photos only capture an instant, which may not represent the reality occurring before and after the shot was taken.” (Silverblatt, 2013, p. 220). Images’ interpretation is, therefore, framed which in turn may distort and/or eliminate significant elements in a narrative thus manipulates its understanding.

In translation studies, images including maps, cartoons and pictures and their captions are visual framing devices (Kim, 2017). For example, while the Arabic source authors of the narratives under study do not insert any images/photos in their articles except their profile photos in some cases, MEMRI extensively inserts images and photos in its translations of these articles.

Special Dispatch No. 5575; Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda

MEMRI’s Special Dispatch No. 5575 (see appendix A, 1:TT) illustrates clearly how MEMRI employs images as one of its framing devices in series. MEMRI’s Dispatch titled “*Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda*” translates the Arabic article titled ‘ لا بد من «عنوان آخر» و «أمن» ‘ (literally, [there] should be ‘another address’ and ‘security’ for whom willing to fight in Syria) which I have discussed how MEMRI framed its title under section **5.2 Titles**. MEMRI, after its preface and before its translation, adds two

photos of the author taken from sources elsewhere since the original article does not have any images. Below are the two added photos by MEMRI:



Jamal Khashoggi (image: Esharh.net, June 20, 2009)



Khashoggi in Afghanistan in 1989 (image: Sabq, Saudi Arabia, July 23, 2009)

While the first photo was, seemingly, taken recently and shows the author in his Saudi traditional costume illustrating a typical Saudi intellectual character, the second photo was taken in 1989 as stated in MEMRI's caption "*Khashoggi in Afghanistan in 1989*" illustrating a fighter –*Jihadi*, in MEMRI's term– with a Kalashnikov which reflects MEMRI's intended framed interpretation, as discussed earlier in its framing of the title, that the author as representative of Saudi intellectuals is not only supporting "terrorism" but also participating in it. In inserting these two photos, MEMRI employs the narrativity features temporality and spatiality to suggest certain meanings to its order of photos and to establish a connection between the author's past [background] and present [ideas and thoughts]. The author's photo with Kalashnikov which MEMRI states was taken in Afghanistan does not show the author in any military conflict site either in Afghanistan or elsewhere which leads one to question the reliability of the photo and its caption that may go unnoticeable to the reader.

Special Dispatch No. 5718; Jordanian Press Criticizes Extremism In Syria

MEMRI's Special Dispatch No. 5718 (see appendix A, 2:TT) is another example that explains how MEMRI makes use of added images to frame the Arabic narrative under study. In this Dispatch titled '*Jordanian Press Criticizes Extremism In Syria*', MEMRI compiles the translations of three Arabic editorials “!.. الجزية على المسيحي والقتل للمسلم” (literally: *Jizya* on Christian and killing for Muslim..!), “داعش والجزية” (literally: *Daesh* and *Jizya*) and “هذا «الإسلام المسلح»: من أي تربة خرج؟؟” (literally: This ‘armed Islam’ from what soil [it] sprung??). This Dispatch was also discussed under section **5.2 Titles**. In elaborating its framed narrative represented in its framed title and preface as discussed earlier, MEMRI inserts the following image with its caption:



Al-Raqqa church used by ISIS as its headquarters (image: Al-Quds AL-Arabi, London, December 3, 2013)

The added image shows a building written in Arabic on the right side of its front wall “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” and “The Office of Call”, Al-Raqqa State” on its left side. This added image does not appear in any of the three Arabic articles that were translated in this Dispatch. Instead, each source article includes only a photo of its author. The caption of MEMRI's added image “*Al-Raqqa church used by ISIS as its headquarters*” comes to elaborate its narrative of negative image of Muslims who are

represented by *Daesh* that took a place of worship like a Church away from Christians in order to use it as an office for its call [to Islam]. This, in turn, encourages the hate of Christians against Muslims worldwide and suggests similar reactions by Christians, that is to say, to attack Muslims Mosques. The intended value-laden interpretation of this image and its caption serves strongly its framed translations to come that suggest an injustice situation of Christians committed by *Daesh* by imposing ‘poll-tax’ – rather than *Jyziya*.

Special Dispatch No. 5855; Al-Jazeera TV Host Ahmed Mansour: Anti-ISIS Coalition Is 'A Crusade In A New Guise'

Another example of MEMRI’s insertion of images as a tool in series to frame the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* is its Special Dispatch No. 5855 (see appendix A, 11:TT).

In this Dispatch titled “*Al-Jazeera TV Host Ahmed Mansour: Anti-ISIS Coalition Is 'A Crusade In A New Guise'*”, MEMRI complies the translations of the two articles “الشركة المساهمة للحرب على داعش” (Literally: Joint stock company for war against *Daesh*) and “حملة صليبية جديدة!” (Literally: New crusade!). It was discussed earlier under section 5.4

Headings: In-text titles. At the end of its translation, MEMRI inserts the following image which does not appear in any of the two source articles:



Uncle Sam in the coils of the ISIS snake that it created (Image: Al-Watan, Qatar, September 28, 2014)

The image shows a snake in a rocket shape with “Made in USA” in its tail and “*Daesh*” in its head coils an Uncle Sam character. This image unexpectedly does not follow MEMRI’s norm of inserting large-size images despite the fact that the image was published online by *Al-Watan* Newspaper under its caricature section in clearer and

larger size with no caption. The insertion of the image at the end of its translations aims to distracting the understanding of the translated source narrative since both the narrative represented in the source articles (the propaganda of the British media against *Daesh* and Muslims and the international interest behind the U.S-led collation against *Daesh*) and the narrative suggested in this image (*Daesh*; a USA-made is turned over its creator which evokes conspiracy theories) vary significantly.

Other examples of MEMRI's extensive use of images as framing devices and as credibility and believability donors are found in its translations in Special Dispatch No. 5896 where MEMRI adds a photo of De Mistura in the conflict site, Special Dispatch No. 5912 where MEMRI changes the source author's photo, Special Dispatch No. 6241 where MEMRI changes the source author's photo, Special Dispatch No. 5771 where MEMRI changes the source author's photo, Special Dispatch No. 6239 where MEMRI adds a photo with caption *An ISIS military parade in Sirte, Libya*, Special Dispatch No. 6067 where MEMRI adds a photo with caption *ISIS fighters in Ramadi (image: thenewkhalij.com, June 4, 201)*) and Special Dispatch No. 5955 where MEMRI adds a photo with caption "We are all Mu'adh" (Source: Al-Ghad, Jordan, February 4, 2015).

The images added in the paratext of MEMRI's translations function to undermine Arabic public narratives of distinct cultures. This conclusion is exhaustively discussed in Baker (2006, 2010) and Al-Sharif (2009). Similarly, Al-Herthani argued that: "Thus, images constitute an important paratextual device that can be employed by translators and/or mediators to locate a text within a specific narrative. The importance of images in translated texts lies in their ability to frame the target text, and to orient the process of reading before it starts." (2009, p. 64).

5.6 Endnotes and Glossaries

Endnotes, footnotes and glossaries are paratextual materials that allow the author to further explain and support his argument in order to ensure the audience understanding as intended. These materials are usually placed at the end of the page and called footnotes, or at the end of the document and called endnotes or glossaries. They usually offer ‘framed’ definitions and links to materials outside the immediate text to support their point of view. In translation studies, endnotes, footnotes and glossaries give voice to translators and translation agencies by allocating a space where they can comment and express their views on the topic under translation. Translators and translation agencies, therefore, either support or challenge the source narrative. Providing links to original sources is a persuasive tool and a trust-gainer device. MEMRI, however, does not provide links to the original texts which in turn questions its creditability. Rather, it provides links to other materials elsewhere. In translating works of professional writers as in the case of the Arabic editorials under study, MEMRI’s addition of paratextual materials including endnotes prevents the fluency of reading as Karamcheti elaborated on the effect of endnotes as follows:

“If readers wish to know that fuller explanation immediately, they must turn to the endnotes, surely a more disrupting interpolation than footnotes. If readers choose the "fluent" reading offered by this translation, they can read without knowledge, for the sound or for the contextual sense. Thus, this particular translation offers either the fluent reading or the stumbling one, the reading with cognitive holes.” (1995, p. 191)... “By setting up alternative ways of speaking, of telling the story on the same page, excessive translation distances the reader from the narrative, focusing instead on the fact of translation.” (1995, p. 192).

While the Arabic editorials tend not to have any endnotes or glossaries rather than the author’s name and designation, MEMRI’s translations have several endnotes. MEMRI’s endnotes can reach up to 15 as in its Special Dispatch No. 6124 where only five endnotes cite the original sources and ten cite sources elsewhere. MEMRI’s endnotes include links to sources elsewhere including to its own other articles, the

publisher's name and country and the publishing date of the source texts, definitions of terms and concepts, its own ideologically-framed interpretations/comments of a narrative, and additional information on the source narrative either by citing sources elsewhere, or otherwise.

Special Dispatches No. 6221: Editor Of Iraqi Daily: The Arabs And Muslims Must Acknowledge Their Direct Responsibility For The Terror Sweeping The World

For example, in MEMRI's Special Dispatches No. 6221 (see appendix A, 10:TT) and No. 5872 (see appendix A, 8:TT), the Arabic indefinite word 'خوارج' (transliteration: *khawarij*, translation: outliers/rebel) was left without translation, but the definition article 'the' was added in its endnote in an Englishnisation attempt. MEMRI endnotes '*khawarij*' in the first Dispatch as "*The Khawarij broke away from the forces of Caliph 'Ali bin Abu Taleb and formed Islam's first religious opposition group.*" and as "*Derogatory term referring to a rebel cult in early Islam that split off from the army of Ali ibn Abi Talib at the Battle of Siffin in 657.*" (Italics added) in its second Dispatch. In its endnotes, MEMRI defines the Arabic '*khawarij*' as a group of armed Muslims who have shared religious beliefs that oppose the 'traditional school of Islam'. This group, according to MEMRI's narrative, was formed at the time of Caliph Ali bin Taleb. The Arabic '*khawarij*', however, was used differently across times, according to Awaji (2001, Chapter three: a Study on Outliers), (1) at the time of Prophet Muhammad: it was called after an individual Muslim who refused to obey the Prophet's directions, (2) at the time of Caliph Othman bin Affan: some Muslims attempted to kill the Caliph and steal his money, (3) at the time of Caliph Ali bin Taleb: it was called after some Muslim who disagreed with the Caliph, (4) after the time of Caliph Ali bin Taleb to the end of the Ottomani Caliphate: it is called after any Muslim or group of Muslims who ideologically disagree with the ruler of the Muslim Caliphate, and (5) in the contemporary time: it is called after any individual or group of Muslims who oppose the

government and not necessary having shared ideological beliefs –i.e. the opposition. The Arabic ‘*khawarij*’, therefore, is used to describe individual acts of some Muslims rather than a doctrine. However, MEMRI uses this word in order to insert its sectarian agenda that categorises Muslims and divides them into groups which in turn promotes hate among Muslims and reflects a negative image of Muslims in the West eyes.

Special Dispatch No. 5969; Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi's Efforts To Arrange Prisoner Exchange Deal To Free Jordanian Pilot

Examples of MEMRI’s endnote citing sources elsewhere including its own are found in its Special Dispatches No. 5969, 6144, 5872, 5896 and 5718. More significant example is MEMRI’s own ‘framed’ interpretation added to its endnote number 5 of Special Dispatch No. 5969 (see appendix A, 19:TT): “*Al-Maqdisi deliberately refrains from using the name "Islamic State" or the title "Caliph" in addressing Al-Baghdadi. This underscores that he views the Islamic State as an organization rather than an actual caliphate.*” (Italics added). While the Arabic source article does not provide such ‘direct’ interpretation, MEMRI’s ideologically-framed interpretation may or may not be accurate. Rather, it is meant to direct the reader interpretation of the narrative under translation by signalling that Al-Maqdisi does not acknowledge ‘Al-Baghdadi’ and his ‘State’ which reflects more conflict.

Special Dispatches No. 5575: Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda

MEMRI also adds further information on topics and persons in its endnotes without relying on any source as in its Special Dispatches No. 5896, 6144 and 5575 where MEMRI defines *Daesh* as follows:

“ISIS is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – an organization established in April 2013 when the head of the Al-Qaeda affiliate Islamic State of Iraq, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, announced that his organization was expanding its activity to Syria. The organization champions extremist Salafi ideology and global jihad. It has established itself as one of the most powerful and

influential forces in Syria thanks to thousands of foreign fighters who have joined its ranks. It sees itself as the nucleus of the future caliphate and insists that all fighters and organizations in Syria come together under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi, whom they consider the legitimate leader of the entire Muslim nation.”

The above definition illustrates MEMRI’s ideological framing of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh*. Firstly, it does not cite any source of information – the definition, thus, its own. Secondly, it does not indicate the original Arabic name ‘*Daesh*’ which was used by the author of the source text. Thirdly, it evokes the negative meta-narrative of ‘*jihad* and terrorism’ as presented in its association “*the Al-Qaeda affiliate Islamic State of Iraq*” and “*extremist Salafi ideology and global jihad*”. Fourthly, and most importantly, is MEMRI’s association between *Daesh* and Islam to distort the image of Islam as in its “*ISIS is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria*” and “*the legitimate leader of the entire Muslim nation*”.

5.7 Summary

This chapter offered an in-depth paratextual analysis of the provided extra-textual materials by MEMRI to its translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh*. These paratextual materials include titles, introductions (prefaces), headings and subtitles, images and captions, and endnotes and glossaries. This chapter illustrated how MEMRI frames the source narratives through the application of paratextual materials which are an episode in its framing series.

The next chapter discusses the thematic and episodic framings, the temporal and spatial framings, and the relationality framings found in both the Arabic source editorials and the English translations published online by MEMRI. It compares the impact of framing and reframing on the overall meaning and structure of the text.

CHAPTER 6: CONTEXTUAL FRAMING⁷³

6.1 Introduction

The notion of ‘context’ refers to the necessary elements required in understanding a word, a text or part of. The word ‘context’ is produced from the Latin ‘*contextus*’ of the meaning “connection, coherence” (Meibauer, 2012). Context as a resource is “something that we selectively and strategically construct as we engage in any act of communication, including the act of translation” (Baker, 2006b, p. 332). Context is largely essential to determine the ‘intended’ meanings of words and texts as in the English word ‘call’: (verb: give a name vs. make a phone call vs. shout vs. noun: a phone call vs. an invitation vs. a sound)⁷⁴. For example, Arabic editorials are meant to the Arabic-speaking audience. MEMRI’s English translations of these editorials are meant to the English-speaking audience. The difference in the target audience suggests that what makes sense in the Arabic context may not be understood in the English translations due to several factors including, mainly, cultural, religious, political (ideological), social, linguistic and educational backgrounds. In other words, in discussing value-charged concepts and texts, political, ideological, cultural and religious similarities and differences between the source and target texts should be examined. The importance of identifying the contexts of both the source and the target texts is well explained by Eugene Nida in his Preface to *Contexts in Translating*:

“For a number of years I have been increasingly interested in the role of contexts in understanding and translating texts, because failure to consider the contexts of a text is largely responsible for the most serious mistakes in comprehending and reproducing the meaning of a discourse” (2001, p. ix).

The “specificity of context” is “essential to the very existence of meaning” (Davis, 2001, pp. 2-3) “where context is understood as temporal, spatial, historical, and

⁷³ A large portion of this chapter has been published in Hijjo & Kaur (2017b).

⁷⁴ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/call> [accessed 7 April 2017]

linguistic in nature” (Tymoczko, 2007, p. 47) and illustrates the ideological goals and positions of participants. In this regard, Baker’s (2006) narrative-informed theory allows the analysis of these significant settings of a text and its translation that empower authors and translators with effective (re)framing devices.

Contextual framings are context-based framings that take place in space outside the immediate text, the narrative under study, “and ‘implicitly’ function as background for determining recipients’ interpretation of a situation” (Al-Sharif, 2009, p. 66). These frames surround certain narratives and effectively shape their meanings and impacts. The difference in contexts between the source and the target texts does not only result from differences in cultural, historical, political, ideological, religious and educational backgrounds but also from the gap in time between the writing and publication of a text and those of its translation as Baker elaborates:

“With the passage of time, a literary or scholarly text will have accumulated critical response and resonances, and both it and its translation(s) will be read and interpreted in a different context—politically, culturally, socially, aesthetically.” (2006b, p. 332).

There are mainly three types of contextual framings: (1) thematic and episodic framings which are represented in the author/translator’s choice of whether to embed or not particular information, events and happenings in a given text (selection vs. de-selection), (2) temporal and spatial framings which are represented in the author/translator’s re-contextualization of particular information, events and happenings in a given text which in turn invites the audience to establish links among information and happenings thus redirect the interpretation of the whole narrative, and (3) relationality which overlaps with the first two types at points of selectivity, and it is also represented in the author’s adoption/borrowing of a source word, along with its contextual settings, into the target text thus reframing the source context.

6.2 Thematic and Episodic Framings

Thematic framings, following Baker (2006), refer to the coverage of an issue or event in a broader context rather than the presentation of a particular case (e.g. poverty vs. a given poor family). In other words, they are the zoom out picture. This type of framing largely cites sources especially interviews and analyses by experts and provides statistics on the subject-matter. It is represented in public narratives. Thematic framings appeal to the governmental policy and suggest future planning. They may be used by policy makers to frame the public opinion on a given subject-matter aiming to sway policy results (Crow & Lawlor, 2016). Episodic framings, on the other hand, refer to the coverage of an issue or event through a particular case (e.g. a given poor family vs. poverty). In other words, they are the zoom in picture. This type of framing relies more on the personal experiences and individual accounts rather than its general state. It is represented in personal narratives. Episodic framings attract the attention of human rights and activists and invite urgent actions. In this regard, human rights organisations may prompt an individual case in order to impose certain views or agendas on governments.

In the context of the media and terrorism, recent studies found that the media employs both thematic and episodic framings in their attempts to encourage undesirable stereotypes and military actions (Falkheimer & Olsson, 2015). The choice of the media of one contextual framing type rather than the other is largely “driven by ideology and prejudice” (Edelman, 1993, p. 232). For example, in its Special Dispatches, MEMRI attempts to utilise the contextual thematic framings of titles (as discussed earlier in section **5.2 Titles**) to broadening the individual cases. In other words, MEMRI employs thematic framings in its translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* in order to build links among irrelevant issues in terms of causes and effects such as refugees, terrorism,

democracy, poverty and education in the Arab and Muslim worlds. The titles of MEMRI's Special Dispatches under analysis: **“Saudi Journalist”**, **“Jordanian Press”**, **“Syrian Oppositionist”**, **“Syrian Journalist”**, **“Iraqi Ummah Party Leader”**, **“Al-Hayat' Editor”**, **“Senior Saudi Salafi Cleric”**, **“Editor Of Iraqi Daily”**, **“Al-Jazeera TV Host”**, **“Arab Liberal”**, **“Iraqi Columnist”**, **“Egyptian Columnists”**, **“Egyptian Writer”**, **“Former Imam Of Mecca's Grand Mosque”**, **“Senior Sunni Cleric”**, **“Saudi Press”**, **“Saudi, Qatari Press”**, **“Articles In Saudi Press”**, **“Iraqi Journalist”**, and **“Conspiracy Theories In Saudi Government Press”** indicate general, national and institutional, views rather than personal views as the case of using the author's name. The generalisations serve two functions: either negative image of the author(s) or the author'(s)' subject-matter (*Daesh*, Arabs, Islam and Muslims). The only exception was MEMRI's title **“Sheikh Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi's Efforts To Arrange Prisoner Exchange Deal To Free Jordanian Pilot”** in which MEMRI uses the subject's name instead of his nationality or religious affiliation. This usage of the subject's name is meant by MEMRI to avoid the generalisation of the positive narrative represented in ‘the subject's good efforts to free the Jordanian pilot’ to others i.e. Arabs and Muslims.

Furthermore, titles are the initial framing devices that signal to the reframed narrative to come as Baker argued: “The use of titles to reframe narratives in translation is often accompanied by subtle shifts in the texts themselves, in line with the narrative position signalled in the new title.” (2006a. p. 130).

The following examples illustrate MEMRI's attempts of re-contextualizing and decontextualizing the Arabic narratives on *Daesh*.

Special Dispatch No. 5955; “Jordanian Press Reacts To ISIS Execution Of Jordanian Pilot: 'Now All Jordanians Feel Need For Vengeance’”

Table 6.1: Contextual Analysis of MEMRI’s SD 5955

Item	MEMRI’s Translations (thematic)	Arabic editorials (episodic)
Titles	“Jordanian Press ”	“الحساب مفتوح معكم.. أيها القتل” (Literally: The reckoning is open with you.. oh killers), “أردني أصيل” (Literally: Original Jordanian) and “معاد ايقونة أردنية” (Literally: Muath is a Jordanian icon)
Introductions/ Prefaces	- “ <i>the Jordanian public</i> ” - “ <i>In an official statement, Jordanian King Abdullah</i> ” - “ <i>all Jordanian men and women</i> ” - “ <i>the Jordanian press</i> ” - “ <i>all-out war against ISIS</i> ”	No introductions/prefaces
Image and Captures	“ <i>We are all Mu'adh</i> ”	No images and captures
Text	- Selected excerpts. - Muath – 8 times. - ISIS .	- Full text. - Muath – 21 times. - killers, criminal gang, terrorists.
Headings	- “ Editorial In Official Jordanian Daily: We Will Not Be Silent And Will Not Rest Until We Have Vengeance ” “ Former Jordanian Minister: No Room For Mercy With ISIS; Execute All Its Members Who Were Sentenced To Death ” - “ ‘Al-Ghad' Editor: Mu'adh's Death Will Only Strengthen The Jordanian Front ”	No headings
Endnotes	References to Arabic source texts including an additional source elsewhere than the original texts.	No references

In this Special Dispatch (see appendix A, 23:TT), MEMRI shifts from the episodic framing of the Arabic source texts into the thematic framing. The selected excerpts that MEMRI translated in this dispatch are mainly read as public and official

agreement on the revenge from *Daesh*. However, the source texts constitute that the main focus is on the case of the killing of Muath Al-Kassasba and its negative impact on the Jordanians' feelings. By selecting some passages to translate rather than others, MEMRI reframed the Arabic source texts from episodic framing that shows sympathy with Muath to thematic framing that seeks to illustrate general agreement by the Jordanian public and officials on the revenge from *Daesh*. Muath was indicated directly by name in the Arabic source texts 21 times (see appendix A, 23:ST); however, he was indicated in MEMRI's translations 8 times only. The extensive repetition of the name 'Muath' in the Arabic source narratives grants more weight to the individual and earns more sympathy as a humanity case. MEMRI's reduction of this large repetition of the name 'Muath' grants the case less sympathy and steers the case to be a representative of official public policy and planning. The contextual reframing made here by MEMRI is well established in its preface where it cites official sources: "*In an official statement, Jordanian King Abdullah*", and expresses public agreements: "*shocked the Jordanian public*", and "*The following day's editorials and columns in the Jordanian press... Many called for all-out war against ISIS*". In addition to the general preface placed before the translations, MEMRI introduces each translation of the selected passages of each of the three Arabic source articles with a sentence (see the translations of the first and third articles) or a paragraph (see the translation of the second article) as follows.

Extract 1.

"In its editorial, the **official** Jordanian daily *Al-Rai* threatened **ISIS**, warning that its members would pay a heavy **price** wherever they were, and adding that the **Jordanians** are now **united** around their **regime**".

While the Arabic source article threatens '*the killers*' of Muath Al-Kassasba, it does not name *Daesh* (ISIS) as indicated in MEMRI's introduction.

Extract 2.

“Samih Al-Ma'aita, head of the **official** *Al-Rai* daily's board of directors and former Jordanian communications **minister**, stressed that **Jordanians** were entitled to demand the blood of **ISIS** activists in **revenge** for the murder of *the pilot*, and called for executing **terrorists** condemned to death in Jordan so that **ISIS** could taste the pain that they had inflicted on the **Jordanians**”.

This MEMRI's introduction names *Daesh* (ISIS) twice, while *Daesh* was not named in the Arabic source article. Muath Al-Kassasba the subject of the Arabic source article was not called by his name, MEMRI rather calls him “*the pilot*” in an attempt to shift the readers' attention from Muath to *Daesh*.

Extract 3.

“Jumana Ghunaimat, **editor-in-chief** of the Jordanian daily *Al-Ghad*, also called for **executing** the **terrorists** incarcerated in Jordan, and **emphasized** that *the pilot's death* had **united the Jordanian public** and given **all Jordanians** the right to demand **revenge**”.

In the Arabic source article, the emphasis is on the inhumanely killing of Muath Al-Kassasba rather than MEMRI's emphasis on the unity of Jordanian on revenge.

It is noticed that MEMRI's introductions zooms out from the focus picture of the humanitarian case of burning to death the Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kassasba to an ideologically-framed bigger picture that illustrates an agreement status of the Jordanian official and public on taking a quick reaction by revenging from *Daesh* and executing its prisoners in the Jordan.

Table 6.2: Contextual Analysis of MEMRI’s SD 6067

Item	MEMRI’s Translations (thematic)	Arabic editorials (episodic)
Titles	“ Saudi, Qatari Press: U.S. To Blame For ISIS Capturing Al-Ramadi ”	<p>“الرمادي وخطر الانهيار الأمريكي على السعودية والأردن” (Literally: Ramadi and the danger of the collapse of America on Saudi Arabia and Jordan),</p> <p>“المستفيدون من سقوط الرمادي” (Literally: Beneficiaries of the collapse of Ramadi), and</p> <p>“نيل المنطقة كلها برميل من بارود” (Literally: But the whole region is a barrel of gunpowder)</p>
Introductions/Prefaces	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “<i>airstrikes by the U.S.-led international coalition</i>” - “<i>the Islamic State (ISIS) won another strategic victory</i>” - “<i>the American efforts to sign a nuclear agreement with Iran in the near future</i>” - “<i>causes Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to fear</i>” 	No introductions/prefaces
Image and Captures	<i>ISIS fighters in Ramadi</i> (image: <i>thenewkhalij.com, June 4, 2015</i>)	No images and captures
Text	Selected excerpts	Full text
Headings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 'Al-Quds Al-Arabi': The Fall Of Al-Ramadi Has Proven That Continuing To Rely On The U.S. Is Suicidal - “Former 'Al-Sharq Al-Awsat' Editor: U.S. Has Given Iran Free Reign In Iraq” - “'Al-Hayat' Columnist: U.S. Recognises Iranian Role In Iraq” 	No headings
Endnotes	Three references to the Arabic source texts	No references

The narrative reported in MEMRI's translation depends largely on thematic framings in contrast to the original Arabic authors who episodically frame their narratives. MEMRI's thematic framings begin with its titles as discussed in section **5.2 Titles**. In SD 6067 title (see appendix A, 21:TT), a thematic framing is illustrated in the generalisation of the three editorials as "**Saudi, Qatari Press**". According to this SD, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* is "the London-based **Qatari** daily", *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* is "the London-based **Saudi** daily" and *Al-Hayat* is "the London-based **Saudi** daily". However, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* is "an **independent pan-Arab** daily newspaper"⁷⁵, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* is "the world's premier **pan-Arab** daily newspaper"⁷⁶, and *Al-Hayat* is "the world's **independent** political **pan-Arab** daily newspaper"⁷⁷. It is noticed then that none of these newspapers acknowledge being a Saudi or Qatari. They rather emphasise of being pan-Arab and independent. MEMRI, therefore, attempts to convey a different message than the original by steering the attention from the fall of Al-Ramadi city under *Daesh's* control to the Saudi and Qatari official views as claimed to be represented in these three articles. Al-Ramadi is thus placed last word in MEMRI's title. MEMRI continues applying its thematic framing in its general introduction to the translations to come. It started by illustrating a wider picture of the scene: "**despite airstrikes by the U.S.-led international coalition, the Islamic State (ISIS) won another strategic victory when it captured the city of Al-Ramadi, the capital of Al-Anbar governorate, which is home to a Sunni majority**". MEMRI also challenges the Arabic narratives especially when the U.S. is accused and calls the readers to thematically read its narrative as follows: "Al-Quds Al-Arabi **claimed** that the reason for ISIS's appearance in Iraq was the country's **occupation by the U.S.**", "The reason for this, he **claimed**, was **the U.S.'s hesitance**", and "Al-Hayat, **claimed** that Iraq faces a dual danger from ISIS and from Iran, which seeks to take it over with **American backing**".

⁷⁵ http://www.alquds.co.uk/?page_id=521704 [accessed 18 April 2017]

⁷⁶ <http://english.aawsat.com/about-us> [accessed 18 April 2017]

⁷⁷ <http://www.alhayat.com/AboutWebsite> [accessed 18 April 2017]

In the context of thematic and episodic framings, MEMRI's overall delivery of its translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* tends to apply thematic framing by adding extra details from external sources, calling readers to doubt the Arabic narratives under translation, and decontextualizing the Arabic narrative through its selectivity of the passages to translate. This thematic framing aims to shift the readers' attention and links the happenings to larger narratives: the 'War on Terror' and 'Jihad and Terrorism' which were not linked in the original narratives.

6.3 Temporal and Spatial Framings

The narrativity features temporality and spatiality have been discussed in brief under the section **3.4 Features of Narrativity**. Here I elaborate more on the way these two features are framed in a given narrative giving examples from MEMRI's translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh*. Temporality -of time- and spatiality -of space- are integrated parts rather than independent features. They are significant framing devices of context that operate without the translators' direct intervention in the text. The sequence of narrative elements either temporally or spatially represents its contextual framing that guides the audience to the preferred interpretation. This type of contextual framings is constructed by selecting a story or a part of from a particular context in a given time and space, and relocating it in new settings of a different time and place. Following Baker's (2006), this study understands that the sequence of placing elements of narratives is more significant in the presentation of temporality than the correct order of chronological 'real' time of events. In this sense, spatiality is an integrated feature within temporality. Temporality achieves its framing effects through the insertion of some events in "a sequential context and in a specific temporal and spatial configuration that renders them intelligible" (Baker, 2006, p. 51). For examples, MEMRI employs (de)selective translation of particular articles, passages and sentences, and assembles its

(de)selective translations of several articles which are usually of a different storyline in achieving temporality effects as follows.

Special Dispatch No. 6239; Egyptian Columnists: Egypt Needs To Fight ISIS In Libya – Unilaterally If Necessary

Table 6.3: Contextual Analysis of MEMRI'S SD 6239

Item	Source Narrative 1	Source Narrative 2	MEMRI's Narrative
Events	1. Increasing pressures on <i>Daesh</i> in Iraq and Syria.	As of ST 1.	As of ST 1.
	2. <i>Daesh</i> attempts to control Libya.	As of ST 1.	As of ST 1.
	3. <i>Daesh</i> fully controls the Libyan city of Sirte.	As of ST 1.	As of ST 1.
	4. <i>Daesh</i> is trying to control the Libyan city of Ajdabiya.	As of ST 1, the city of Benghazi.	As of ST 1.
	5. United Nation warns the international community of <i>Daesh's</i> attempts in controlling Libya.	-	As of ST 1.
	6. Egypt warns the international community of the dangerous situation in Libya.	-	As of ST 1.
	7. France Minister of Defence warns the Europeans of <i>Daesh</i> in Libya.	-	Deselected.
	8. Europeans limited their military response in Libya.	As of ST1.	As of ST 1.
	9. Western and American refusal of arming the Haftar,	As of ST1.	As of ST 1.

Item	Source Narrative 1	Source Narrative 2	MEMRI's Narrative
	<p>the authorised Libyan commander of army.</p> <p>10. Call for official Egyptian strategic planning of defence against <i>Daesh</i> in Libya.</p>	As of ST1.	As of ST 1.
Justification	<p>1. Russian attacks against <i>Daesh</i> in Syria and Iraq.</p> <p>2. (a) To use Libya as a base of its attacks against Egypt and other neighbouring countries of north Africa and Mediterranean Europe, as well as it's the best alternative to be its headquarter.</p> <p>(b) <i>Daesh</i> was encouraged to control Libya by the unstable situation raised after the NATO's ending of Al-Gadhafi's ruling in 2011 that left Libya to the vandalism of some military gangs.</p> <p>3. (a) Sirte is a strategic city designed by Al-Gadhafi in a hope to be the capital for the African Union after the hope of Arabian Union faded.</p> <p>(b) Sirte has the port and the largest air base as well as convention centres which were built by Al-Gadhafi as the potential capital of</p>	<p>As of ST1.</p> <p>As of ST1.</p> <p>As of ST1.</p> <p>As of ST1, the city of Benghazi.</p> <p>-</p>	<p>Deselected.</p> <p>As of ST1.</p> <p>Deselected.</p> <p>Deselected.</p> <p>Deselected.</p>

Item	Source Narrative 1	Source Narrative 2	MEMRI's Narrative
	the African Union.		
	4. Ajdabiya is Libya's largest petroleum resource. <i>Daesh</i> lost 75% of its petroleum in Syria due to the Russian attacks which was sold in the black markets of Turkey.	-	Deselected.
	5. 800 fighters of <i>Daesh</i> have reached Libya to enhance the military attempts in controlling Ajdabiya.	-	Deselected.
	6. <i>Daesh</i> 's increasing power in Libya threatens the security of Egypt including <i>Daesh</i> 's attempts to control Sinai.	-	Deselected.
	7. There is high possibility of <i>Daesh</i> establishing a terrorist base in Libya.	-	Deselected.
	8. To give support to the United Nation Envoy efforts in structuring a Libyan unity government.	As of ST1.	As of ST1.
	9. Implicitly, to preserve <i>Daesh</i> in Libya.	As of ST1.	Deselected.
	10. <i>Daesh</i> possible attacks against Egypt and controlling Sinai from Libya.	As of ST1.	As of ST1.

In supporting its narrative as signalled in its title “Egyptian *Columnists*” rather than MEMRI’s norm of generalisation as “*Press*” that elaborated in the first

introductory paragraph: “...*two columnists for the Egyptian daily Al-Watan have called for Egypt to launch a preemptive **offensive** against the Islamic State (ISIS) in Libya...*” (italics in original, bold added), and in the second introductory paragraph where it cites a source⁷⁸ elsewhere not included in the originals: “...*the Fatwa Monitoring Observatory... has recently issued a report **warning** of the influx of foreign ISIS fighters to the city of Sirte in Libya. The report likewise **warned** of ISIS expansion in Libya and its use as a base for attacks on neighboring countries*” (italics in original, bold added), MEMRI deselects a large text to translate in the two original articles and the other supporting citation elsewhere. These deselected texts function as temporal configuration of the text, and their de-selection illustrates a different causal-effect relationship (causal emplotment) than what suggested in the originals by reframing the morality of the source narratives. In this SD (see appendix A, 14:TT), MEMRI deselects extensively any justification of action against *Daesh* in Libya including its potential and serious threat represented in the connections with Boko Haram in Africa and Ansar Al-Maqdis in Sinai and Gaza. MEMRI also deselects the text of the European intervention in this story as well as the story of Al-Gadhafi who tried to establish the Arabian Union and the African Union which faded by the NATO attack against Al-Gadhafi regime in 2011 leaving Libya to the control of some gangs. MEMRI also deselects *Daesh*'s major intention of controlling the petroleum in Libya as well as the Russian role in eliminating *Daesh* power in Syria and Iraq. Through this major de-selection of justification of events, MEMRI attempts to reframe the temporal configuration of the Arabic narratives illustrating that the call of the two columnists does not represent the official view in Egypt and that any action against *Daesh* in Libya is ‘*offensive*’ and baseless.

⁷⁸ <http://aawsat.com/home/article/518506/> [accessed 23 April 2017]

Special Dispatch No. 5970; Saudi Press Calls For Ground Campaign Against ISIS

Another example that illustrates temporal and spatial framing is MEMRI's Special Dispatch No. 5970 (see appendix A, 20:TT). In this SD, MEMRI compiles selective translations of four Arabic editorials. The following sequence follows MEMRI's presentation.

Source narrative 1 (SN 1):

The first selectively translated Arabic editorial titled “استمرار داعش وصمة عار في جبين الإنسانية” (Literally: The remaining of *Daesh* is a smirch on humanity forehead) was published on 4 February 2015 (see appendix A, 20:ST-1). The editorial states (translated by the researcher):

“The execution of the Jordanian pilot by burning to death is inhumane, unreligious and unethical, and it **is merely an episode** in *Daesh* series that claimed to apply Islamic law but its crimes are at variance proof. Therefore, it is necessary to eliminate *Daesh* at all levels. **The remaining of *Daesh* represents a serious danger that requires the confrontation of *Daesh* and suing its supports at the international courts as well as the requirement of the United Nation to find ways to eliminate the organisation.** It is also necessary to locate a ground military force particularly in Syria to remove all causes of *Daesh* establishment”.

SN1 as narrated by MEMRI:

“An editorial published in the **government** daily *Al-Sharq* on February 4, 2015, **one day after the burning of the Jordanian pilot**, stated that this event was "further proof of the need to eliminate this organization [ISIS], militarily and ideologically." It also stated that "placing **troops on the ground**, especially in Syria, has now become a pressing necessity, in order to eliminate [ISIS] along with all the elements that caused it to emerge and to spread.””

MEMRI's SD states that this editorial represents the **government** of Saudi Arabia a member of the international coalition to counter *Daesh*, as suggested in its introductory paragraph. However, the daily *Al-Sharq* is not a government daily⁷⁹.

⁷⁹ <http://www.alsharq.net.sa/2017/03/18/1660009> [accessed 25 April 2017]

MEMRI also selected only two sentences out of five to translate in an attempt to reframe the Arabic narrative into its own: ‘*Daesh* burned the Jordanian pilot to death thus the Saudi government calls upon a ground forces to eliminate *Daesh*’, rather than **“the remaining of *Daesh* represents a serious danger that requires the confrontation of *Daesh* and suing its supports at the international courts as well as the requirement of the United Nation to find ways to eliminate the organisation”**. To further reframe the temporal configuration of the Arabic editorial, MEMRI states: “An editorial published in the government daily Al-Sharq on February 4, 2015, **one day after the burning of the Jordanian pilot**, stated that...”.

Source narrative 2 (SN 2):

The second selectively translated Arabic editorial titled: “*الغارات الجوية لا تكفي للقضاء على داعش*” (Literally: Air strikes are not enough to end *Daesh*) was published on 10 February 2015 (see appendix A, 20:ST-2) states that (translated by the researcher):

“The international coalition to counter *Daesh* performed nine airstrikes against *Daesh*, and that in a response to the killing of its pilot, the Jordanian forces alone performed 56 air raids against *Daesh* **killing tens of *Daesh* members and destroying their weapon stores**. The international coalition announced its supports to **the Iraqi forces ground attack against *Daesh***. However, the **Syrian regime refuses any intervention by foreign forces in Syria** believing that the elimination of *Daesh* means the end of the illegitimate regime and the reveal of its crimes. The problem of *Daesh* is unsolvable but with military ground intervention that is in parallel to the airstrikes. **This thought was perceived by the international coalition realised in its support to the Iraqi forces**. Since *Daesh* members hide among the civilians who the international coalition avoids to strike. The Syrian regime attracted extremist and terrorist organisations that are against all including the international community and neighbouring countries and that are too difficult to eliminate due to **the failure of reaching real solutions to eliminate these organisations on the ground”**.

SN2 as narrated by MEMRI:

“An editorial published **one week later**, on February 10, in the **government** daily Al-Watan, also complained that the numerous airstrikes against ISIS were ineffective and **called for boots on the ground**: “The predicament of ISIS's presence and expansion

cannot be solved without **a military ground intervention**, accompanied by ongoing airstrikes... ISIS members have managed to infiltrate cities and regions and hide among the residents of the areas they control. **Airstrikes alone are useless in eliminating this organisation**, since the coalition tries to avoid [harming] unarmed civilians in these areas, and [therefore] makes do with attacking key [ISIS] targets. **That is not enough in a war of this sort...**”

It is noticed that MEMRI seeks to reframe the temporal configuration of the Arabic editorial by deselecting the following parts: “the Jordanian forces alone performed 56 **air raids** against Daesh **killing tens of Daesh members and destroying their weapon stores.**”, “The international coalition announced its supports to **the Iraqi forces ground attack against Daesh**”, and “the **Syrian regime refuses any intervention by foreign forces in Syria** believing that the elimination of Daesh means the end of the illegitimate regime”. These deselected parts set the Arabic narrative in a temporality of an average success of the air strikes as understood in the killing of tens of *Daesh* members by the Jordanian air forces, in the existing of a ground attack against *Daesh*, and in the rejection of such by the Syrian regime. MEMRI’s narrative, on the other hand, suggests a strong links between the calling of a ground attack –which already exists- and the burning to death of the Jordanian pilot as stated in its framed temporal settings: “An editorial published **one week later**”, and compiled under the subheading: “**Saudi Editorials: Airstrikes Alone Are Ineffective, A Ground Campaign Is Necessary**” (emphasis added).

Source narrative 3 (SN 3):

The third selectively quoted Arab editorial titled: “*We need Arab boots on the ground to defeat ISIS*” (see appendix A, 20:ST-3) was published in English on 10 February 2015. A large part of the editorial was paraphrased by MEMRI omitting *certain* events. The sequence of events of the Arab editorial that represents its temporal configuration,

therefore, was reframed in MEMRI's translation. Here is an excerpt of the original narrative followed by its reframed version in MEMRI's translation.

“After the burning alive of Jordanian fighter pilot Moaz Al-Kasasbeh by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), **a strong response**— international in nature, but Arab at its core—is needed, not as retaliation for this abominable crime, but to finally defeat ISIS and rein in the other evil forces wreaking havoc in Syria and Iraq, namely Bashar Al-Assad and Iran.

Months ago I wrote in this paper that the fight against ISIS was at heart a Sunni one, and I believe recent events now prove this to be true. There are a number of reasons as to why I conceive this as a Sunni battle. **One is that the lack of a prominent Sunni presence fighting ISIS will leave the door open for Iran and sect-based militias to fill the vacuum in Syria and Iraq. This will seriously threaten the unity of these countries, helping Assad to turn Syria into a country of militias, or bringing about more Nuri Al-Maliki-style sectarian politics in Iraq—or a scenario in either country along the lines of the Houthi takeover of Yemen.**

The international anti-ISIS coalition now needs to shift gear and put Arab boots on the ground in Syria and Iraq, bolstering these forces with aerial bombardment. This is the only way to contain and eventually destroy ISIS”.

SN3 as narrated by MEMRI:

“Some Arab writers presented more detailed proposals for **a ground campaign** against ISIS. For example, Tariq Alhomayed, formerly the editor of the London-based Saudi daily *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* and now a columnist for the daily, wrote that the war against ISIS must be a Sunni Arab one, and called to form **a coalition of Sunni Arab ground troops** to fight this organization in Syria and Iraq. He added that the war must be aimed not only at eliminating this organization but also at preventing Iran and Bashar Al-Assad from taking over the areas from which ISIS is expelled.

After establishing a connection between the Arab editorials call for a ground troops and the burning to death of the Jordanian pilot in its introductory and translations of SN1 and SN2, MEMRI disregarded the SN3: **“After the burning alive of Jordanian fighter pilot Moaz Al-Kasasbeh** by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a strong response— international in nature, but Arab at its core—is needed”. This negligence illustrates MEMRI's intention behind the translations under analysis i.e. a mandatory and public and official request of **“a ground campaign against ISIS [(in) Syria]”**. It is also noticed that MEMRI's reframed temporal configuration removes the reason behind the call for the Sunni Arab ground troops that is the fearing of **“more Nuri Al-Maliki-**

style sectarian politics in Iraq—or a scenario in either country along the lines of the Houthi takeover of Yemen”. This temporal reframing of the events of the original narrative shifts in turn the sequence of events. This shift is represented as follows.

Table 6.4: Contextual Analysis of MEMRI’s SD 5970

SN3	SN3 as narrated in MEMRI
<p>1. “The burning alive of Jordanian fighter pilot”.</p> <p>2. A suggestion for “a strong response — international in nature, but Arab at its core”.</p> <p>3. A serious threat by Iran and Bashar Al-Assad of sectarian scenario in Syria following the Iraqi and Yemeni.</p> <p>“seriously threaten the unity of these countries... bringing about more Nuri Al-Maliki-style sectarian politics in Iraq—or a scenario in either country along the lines of the Houthi takeover of Yemen”.</p> <p>4. A suggestion of “a prominent Sunni presence fighting ISIS”</p> <p>5. The necessity of “containing and eventually destroying Daesh.</p> <p>6. A suggestion to “put Arab boots on the ground in Syria and Iraq”.</p>	<p>1. “The war against ISIS must be a Sunni Arab one”.</p> <p>2. “And called to form a coalition of Sunni Arab ground troops to fight this organization in Syria and Iraq”.</p> <p>3. “Eliminating this organization [Daesh] but [and] also at preventing Iran and Bashar Al-Assad from taking over”.</p>

Source narrative 4 (SN 4):

The fourth selectively translated Arabic editorial titled “احراق الطيار الأردني سيشغل فتيل ”*النهيابة* (Literally: Burning the Jordanian pilot will light the end wick) (see appendix A, 20:ST-) was published on 6 February 2015. Similar to the SN3, MEMRI eliminated some events of the Arabic original narrative and reframed its temporal configuration by re-sequencing its events as follows.

Table 6.5: Further Contextual Analysis of MEMRI’s SD 5970

SN4	SN4 as narrated by MEMRI	Changes
<p>1. “The killing of the Jordanian pilot by <i>Daesh</i>”.</p> <p>2. “The international coalition against <i>Daesh</i>... achieved so little”.</p> <p>3. “<i>Daesh</i> is a threat on Islam, Muslims and mankind”.</p> <p>4. “airstrikes alone are insufficient... similar to the liberation of Kuwait”.</p> <p>5. “the American does not acknowledge such... instead it supports the Iraqi army that is unable to achieve this difficult mission [eliminating <i>Daesh</i>]”.</p> <p>6. “The Kurdish army... may contribute in a solution and confrontation on the ground... but the case is greater... The Syrian opposition... is one reason of enabling <i>Daesh</i>...”.</p> <p>7. “There is no solution but a ground confrontation...”.</p>	<p>1. “called to form a coalition of armies similar to the one formed in 1990 to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait”.</p> <p>2. “the war against ISIS must take place not only in Syria and Iraq but also in Egypt, Libya and Yemen”.</p> <p>3. “criticized Obama's plan to rely primarily on the Iraqi army to defeat ISIS”.</p> <p>4. “The international coalition against ISIS and its ilk...very few achievements on the ground”.</p> <p>5. “ISIS is a threat not only to Islam and the Muslims but to all of mankind”.</p> <p>6. “Clearly, airstrikes alone are insufficient, and there is no choice... but to fight [ISIS] on the ground with a coalition of armies, like the coalition that liberated Kuwait”.</p> <p>7. “But the Americans, who are leading the [present] coalition, do not want to recognize this... Instead, he [the American] is trying to support the Iraqi military, arm it and train it...looking for a political solution... But clearly, the Iraqi army, which is fragmented and exhausted”.</p>	<p>1. Omission of SN4-1.</p> <p>2. Re-sequence of the SN4-2 into MEMRI-4.</p> <p>3. Re-sequence of the SN4-3 into MEMRI-5.</p> <p>4. Re-sequence of the SN4-4 into MEMRI-1 and 6.</p> <p>5. Re-sequence of the SN4-5 into MEMRI-3 and 7.</p> <p>6. Omission of SN4-6.</p> <p>7. Re-sequence of the SN4-7 into MEMRI- 2 and 8.</p>

SN4	SN4 as narrated by MEMRI	Changes
<p>8. The Jordanian example of confronting the extremist ideologies and groups in Jordan.</p> <p>9. In conclusion, this crime [burning to death of the Jordanian pilot by <i>Daesh</i>] is a strategic turning point that requires a [military] ground confrontation eliminating its ideological and financial resources.</p>	<p>8. "There is no solution but a ground war, not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and in every place where the Salafi-jihadi movement is present and its culture has spread".</p> <p>-</p>	<p>8. Omission of SN4-8.</p> <p>9. Omission of SN4-9.</p>

It is noticed that MEMRI attempts to eliminate any part of the narrative that signals or proposes to any alternatives of a military ground intervention in Syria such as the Jordanian example in uniting against the ideology of *Daesh* in Jordan, the support of Kurdish army against *Daesh* and/or the elimination of the ideological and financial supports to *Daesh*. This attempt in turn explains the intention behind MEMRI's temporal reframing of the Arabic narrative.

In re-sequencing the events of the original articles, MEMRI employs the tactic of salience in which it "mak[es] a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences" (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

To further demonstrate the significance of temporality here, consider the effect of placing the shared storyline of the four original editorials at once and compare it with their translations published by MEMRI. In this case, a different narrative would emerge resulting from the temporal framing of the sequence of events as follows.

A. The Shared Storyline of the Four Original Editorials:

1. *Daesh* burned to death the Jordanian pilot.
2. *Daesh* does not represent Islam and Muslim and it is a terrorist group that threatens the world.
3. There is a necessity to eliminate *Daesh* at military, ideological and financial levels.
4. The international coalition against *Daesh* does so little in eliminating *Daesh*.
5. The airstrikes are not enough alone to eliminate *Daesh*.
6. A ground operation is suggested to support the efforts of eliminating *Daesh*.
7. A rejection of this suggestion by Obama's administration and the Syrian regime.
8. There is already a ground operation against *Daesh* by the Iraqi Army, the Kurdish army and the Syrian opposition with limited success.
9. A military ground operation would not be effective without the elimination of *Daesh's* ideology, culture and financial resources not only in Syria but elsewhere.

B. MEMRI's Storyline in its Translations of the Four Editorials:

1. "ISIS's execution of the Jordanian pilot".
2. "Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have **questioned** the effectiveness of **airstrikes** in defeating this organization".
3. "articles in the Saudi press, which **attacked** the coalition's policy and called upon it to dispatch **ground** forces".
4. "Some articles also **slammed** the Middle East policy of U.S. President Barack Obama".
5. "the need to eliminate this organization [ISIS], militarily and ideologically".
6. "funding and arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA)".
7. "ISIS is a threat not only to Islam and the Muslims but to all of mankind".
8. "U.S. President Obama... is trying to support the Iraqi military".
9. "There is no solution but a ground war, not only in Syria and Iraq, but also in Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and in every place where the Salafi-jihadi movement is present and its culture has spread...".

It is noticed that MEMRI places additional events as in points 2, 3 and 4 in a temporal reframing attempt of the originals as understood in "questioned, attacked and slammed". The effectiveness of airstrikes and the need to a ground operation were prioritised in MEMRI's narrative and placed in points 2 and 3 while they are placed in points 5 and 6 of the original.

6.4 Relationality

The narrativity feature of relationality, Bruner's (1991) 'hermeneutic composability', was earlier defined and briefly discussed in **section 3.4** under the discussion of Baker's (2006) features of narrativity and in **section 2.2** under the discussion of Bruner's (1991) narrative approach. Here I illustrate more on how framing of relationality is significant in attempting to renegotiate and reconstruct the original narrative providing examples from MEMRI's translations of the Arabic editorials.

Contemporary, newspapers and TV channels among other media outlets are employed as sites not only for negotiating ideologically-loaded political concepts and views but also for negotiating and assessing socially, culturally and religiously-loaded terminologies. Following the examples of 'racism' and 'discrimination', circulated narratives of Islam and Muslims and their relations to terrorism are marketed by some media outlets and undermined by others (Leavitt, et al., 2015; Kroon, et al., 2018). In their efforts to undermine or market this idea, media outlets draw their narratives largely through the narrativity feature of relationality. Recalling the functionality of relationality as discussed by Baker (2006), relationality is used "to inject a target text or discourse with implicit meanings derived from the way a particular item functions in the public or meta-narratives circulating in the target context, thus obscuring or downplaying its relational load in the source environment" (p.66). In translating Islamic concepts, relationality is mainly drawn through the borrowing of the ST term in the TT. Two issues, therefore, emerge in leaving the value-laden terms of the ST without translation. These issues are the background knowledge of the reader of the ST versus of the TT, and the intention of using such terms by the original author versus the translator. In other words, as Friedman put it: a text is "a site for negotiating meanings that might well function both regressively and progressively, *depending on who is doing*

the reading and for what purpose” (1995, p. 27, italics added). A significant example that illustrates the effectiveness of framing relationality in translation is presented in MEMRI’s borrowing of the Arabic word ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*) in its translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh*. In the context of the current research data, the Arabic word ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*) was left without translation in MEMRI’s SD Nos. 5575, 5718, 6159, 5969, 5970, 6288 and 5911.

Special Dispatch No. 5575; Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda

The notion of ‘*jihad*’ as presented in the original Arabic narrative titled ‘لا بد من «عنوان» و «أمن» للراغبين بالجهاد في سورية» ([there] should be ‘another address’ and ‘security’ for the ones willing to **fight** in Syria) (see appendix A, 1:ST) differs from its English translation published by MEMRI titled: ‘*Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda*’ (see appendix A, 1:TT). MEMRI adopts the Arabic word ‘*Jihad*’ in its translation as an equivalent suggesting that both the Arabic and the English semantic sense of ‘*jihad*’ is the same, although *jihad* has several meanings depending on the context including struggling and striving. According to the Oxford Dictionary, ‘*Jihad*’ is defined as “(among Muslims) a war or struggle against unbelievers”⁸⁰. However, according to the Islamic Supreme Council of America, the Arabic word ‘*Jihad*’ is not an equivalent to the English ‘war’, which has the Arabic equivalent ‘الحرب’ (al-harb). The Council further explains that “*Jihad* is not a violent concept” and “*Jihad* is not a declaration of war against other religions”. The Council elaborates as follows⁸¹:

“In a religious sense, as described by the Quran and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (s), "*jihad*" has many meanings. It can refer to internal as well as external efforts to be a good Muslims or believer, as well as working to

⁸⁰ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/jihad> (accessed 23 February 2016)

⁸¹ <http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9> (accessed 23 February 2016)

inform people about the faith of Islam. If military *jihad* is required to protect the faith against others, it can be performed using anything from legal, diplomatic and economic to political means. If there is no peaceful alternative, Islam also allows the use of force, but there are strict rules of engagement. Innocents - such as women, children, or invalids - must never be harmed, and any peaceful overtures from the enemy must be accepted”.

Nevertheless, the well-established meta-narrative on ‘*Jihad*’ across nations especially in the West, links the concept ‘*jihad*’ to ‘terror acts’ by individual Muslims as seen in the definition of ‘Jihad’ by the Oxford Dictionary and MEMRI’s project “Jihad and Terrorism (JTTM)⁸²”. This narrative promotes a completely different narrative of the concept ‘*Jihad*’ based on the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (Baker, 2010). Accordingly, the English concept ‘Jihad’ is not the equivalent of the Arabic ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*) and is actually a misleading concept. By utilising the narrativity feature of relationality, MEMRI reconstitutes the source narrative by the ideologically-loaded concept of ‘*jihad*’ in the target society i.e. the West for whom its translations are dedicated to.

Special Dispatch No. 6159; Iraqi Columnist: Why Aren't Muslim Clerics Calling For Jihad Against ISIS?

Another example of the strategic use of framing through relationality in MEMRI’s translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* is its borrowing of the Arabic “شَيْخ” (*sheikh*) as in its SD Nos. 5575, 5846, 5872, 5969, 6063, 6159 and 6288. MEMRI attempts to suggest links between the Arabic word ‘شَيْخ’ (*sheikh*) and what it calls ‘Islamist/Salafi-extremists’ such as its SD Nos. 5575, 5846 and 5872. In addition, MEMRI also attempts to draw a relation between the Arabic word ‘*sheikh*’ and ‘terrorists’ represented in *Daesh*’s leader Abu-Baker Al-Baghdadi in SD No. 5969 “the honorable **Sheikh** Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, Emir of **the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria**” and Al-Qaeda then leader Osama Bin Laden in SD No. 6288 “It was the Saudi

⁸² <https://www.memri.org/jttm> [MEMRI’s project of Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, accessed 29 March 2017]

sheikh Osama bin Laden who laid the cornerstone for the first [terror] cell, which he named **Al-Qaeda**.” The Arabic word ‘*sheikh*’ was not defined and/or explained in any of MEMRI’s translations under analysis, rather it was left ambiguously without translation. In the Arabic dictionary, ‘*sheikh*’, plural ‘*شيوخ sheiukh*’, means “a venerable old man. A man above fifty years of age. A man of authority” (Al-Khudrawi, 2004, p. 281) and ‘*sheikh fani*’ is translated to “very old man” (Alkhuli, 1989, p. 61). ‘*Shaykh*’, ‘*Sheikh*’ or ‘*Sheik*’ (شيخ), according to the Glossary of Islamic terms in Arabic⁸³ of The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), is:

“A honorific term in the Arabic language that literally means "elder". It is commonly used to designate an elder of a tribe, a revered wise man, or an Islamic scholar. It also refers to a person when they have completed their undergraduate university studies in Islamic studies and are trained in giving lectures”.

Shaykh (plural: *shuyukh*) is a general term that is called for “someone who is over fifty, or the patriarch of the tribe or family, a title of respect” (Bewley, 1998, p.21).

Sheikh, therefore, as an honour title especially for ruling family members in the Arabian Gulf countries is commonly preferred to be transliterated rather than translated following other titles such as Dato, Datuk, Dato Seri, among others⁸⁴, in Malaysia, Hári and Datu, among others⁸⁵, in the Philippines, and Sir and Dame/Lady, among others⁸⁶, in England. However, *sheikh* when refers to an elder man over fifty is suggested to be translated into ‘old’, as discussed earlier in section **3.5.1 Framing by labelling**, in the translation of Ernest Hemingway’s (1952) *the Old Man and the Sea*. The Arabic *sheikh* is also suggested by the Oxford English Dictionary⁸⁷ to be translated into ‘senior’ or

⁸³ http://www.iman.co.nz/glossary_of_islamic_terms_in_arabic.php [accessed 29 April 2017]

⁸⁴ https://darswiki.bsp.ox.ac.uk/index.php?title=Malaysian_Honours_Titles [accessed 30 April 2017]

⁸⁵ https://www.know.cf/enciclopedia/tab/en/Filipino_styles_and_honorifics/77a44fbcaac742a77a9d5a4e1b49d5df5db1a5d0 [accessed 30 April 2017]

⁸⁶ <http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/HnrSystem.html> [accessed 30 April 2017]

⁸⁷ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/sheikh> [accessed 30 April 2017]

‘leader’ when it refers to a man with degree in Islamic studies in the Muslim community as well as to a patriarch of the tribe or family.

In the Arabic article under analysis, the Arabic word ‘شيخ’ (*sheikh*) is used in its plural form ‘شيوخ’ (*sheiukh*) in a genitive case to the word ‘Islam’ suggesting the meaning ‘leaders of Islam’ as follows: “العلمانيون والكفار اكثر غيرة على الاسلام من شيوخه” (Secularists and non-believers of Islam are more zealous for *Islam* than *its leaders*), “نرى ان شيوخ الاسلام ورجالاته يعيشون حالة من الهدوء النفسي” (we notice that *leaders of Islam* and its men live in a state of psychological calmness), “ما يدعو للاستغراب هو ان بعضا” (what is surprising is that some of *leaders of Islam*), “وما يدعو للاستغراب” (what also is surprising is that part of *those leaders*), and “فاما” (either *leaders of the religion of Islam* and its preachers are coward). In MEMRI’s translation under analysis, the Arabic word ‘*sheiukh*’ was left without translation suggesting that the Arabic ‘*sheiukh*’ has only one meaning and it is largely and correctly understood by the English-speaking. In addition, similarly to the Arabic ‘*jihad*’, MEMRI attempts to grant a negative sense to the Arabic/Islamic term ‘*sheiukh*’ by leaving it intentionally without translation. MEMRI neutralises its attempts by adding the definition article ‘the’ and the plural marker ‘s’ to the Arabic ‘*sheikh*’ as follows: “Secularists and Infidels Are More Zealous for Islam than **the Sheikhs**”, “we see **Islam's sheikhs** and clerics living in enviable peace”, “It is strange that some of the '**sheikhs of Islam**'”, “It is also strange that some **sheikhs**”, and “One – **the sheikhs** and preachers **of Islam** are cowards”.

6.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have explained the notion of ‘context’ and its significant function as a configuration set by the author for the text or part of in order to construct the overall

meaning as well as its particularities and directing its interpretation. In other words, context plays a vital role in avoiding any ambiguity for text interpretation as I illustrated in the example of the English word ‘call’. In the process of translating a given text within a defined context into another language and target audience, the context is more likely to alter which in turn “requires a fresh literary-linguistic invention” (Bruner, 1991, p. 14). Context is a dependent variable governed by several factors including culture, politics, religion, education and ideology of a particular group of people, a society. These factors represent the thematic and episodic settings of a narrative. The passage of time between the publication of the source text and its translation is also a significant factor in the reconstruction of the source context since different elements emerge to the scene. This factor represents the temporality of a narrative. Relationality, moreover, represents another factor in framing context by suggesting relations between un-explicitly related elements of the narrative. In the context of the translations under analysis, MEMRI systematically reframes the contextual configuration of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* through the use of different contextual framing strategies. Among these various framing devices of context are its generalisation of one to few opinions as public and official, selecting and deselecting certain text or part of to translate, adding information that do not exist in the original, providing biographic information about the author and subjects of the source narrative, omission of some events, and adopting a value-loaded term from a context and inject it in a totally different context. The power of these reframing devices of context lies on the fact that they do not need to intervene in the immediate text thus the translation would seem neutral at first glance.

The next chapter discusses another episode of MEMRI’s reframing of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* at the textual level.

CHAPTER 7: TEXTUAL FRAMING

7.1 Introduction

In chapters 5 and 6, I have discussed both the paratextual and contextual framings respectively illustrating how these framings are significant in reconstructing and renegotiating the source narratives and in turn promoting framed interpretation of these narratives. This chapter tackles textual framings in the context of the current globalised ideologically-laden conflict of the ‘War on Terror’. Textual framing, or linguistic framing, is the clear direct intervention of translators in the text. The most common strategies used in textual framing are addition, omission, reorganisation of materials, grammatical shifts and lexical choice (Al-Sharif, 2009). These strategies illustrate the evident involvement of translators that are traceable in the text itself.

In mass media, translation of conflict narratives tend to involve “a great deal of reframing and textual manipulation” (Wu, 2017, p. 13) employing various textual framing tactics. Baker (2006) offers a model of framing strategies (see Figure 3.1) to assist the textual analysis of rival narratives. Drawing on Baker (2006), the analysis of textual framing is categorised under two main headings: Selective Appropriation of Textual Materials, and Lexical and Grammatical Choices. Under Selective Appropriation of Textual Materials, I discuss the framing strategies of ‘addition’ including ‘bracketed addition’ of words and phrases, and ‘omission’ (de-selection) of particular source materials. Lexical and Grammatical Choices is divided into three sub-headings: lexical choice which includes labelling, rival systems of naming and titles, grammatical shifts including shifts in functions and tenses, and reorganisation of materials.

7.2 Selective Appropriation of Textual Materials

In Chapter 6, I have discussed MEMRI's selective appropriation of large texts (higher-level patterns of selectivity) including paragraphs and complete articles to whether included or excluded them in the translation and how in turn such selectivity significantly re-contextualises the source text. Here, I focus more on the lower-level patterns of selectivity represented in the 'addition' and 'omission' within the word and phrase levels.

7.2.1 Addition

In translation, due to difference in semantic and syntactic particularities among languages, addition is a strategy used to add an essential element, mostly a word, to the text establishing a compatibility with the semantic and syntactic structures of the target language. Addition is also another tool for framing the source narrative that translators apply in order to realise certain agendas and effects on the target audience. MEMRI's translations employ addition, bracketed addition in particular, extensively which tend to affect the readership experience and invites one to understand that Arabic is an ambiguous and/or incomprehensive language that requires such massive addition by the translator. Examples are as follows.

Special Dispatch No. 5575; Saudi Journalist: The Notion Of Jihad In Syria Is Not Wrong, But Has Been Twisted By Al-Qaeda

In its translation of SD 5575, MEMRI added 33 supplementary information and explanatories within the text. These additional aspects are: '[forces]', '[still]', '[necessarily]', [themselves], '[i.e. set off for jihad in Syria]', '[sites]', '[even though]', '[the new jihadis]', '[the mujahideen money]', '[then]', '[The Pulpit of Monotheism

and Jihad']', '[to join the jihad in Syria]', '[permission from his parents]', '[are considered]', '[i.e., a struggle against an occupier]', '[to join]', '[the need]', '[more]', '[in this context]', '[in Syria]', '[recalls]', '[his uncle]', '[the youth's]', '[to jihad]', '[or]', '[the lead]', '[which operates]', '[in Syria]', '[against Assad]', '[This experiment]', '[certainly]', '[and]' and '[officially]'. Such intensive use of the pattern addition achieves the narrativity feature selective appropriation of textual material that helps the elaboration of particular aspects of the target narrative encoded in the source text.

For example, MEMRI's bracketed addition of the phrase [the mujahideen money] in "Some advise him to donate **[the mujahideen money]**, since they do not need more men." supports MEMRI's narrative of 'terrorist Islam and Muslims' as seen in the use of the Islamic Arabic concept (مجاهدين) '*mujahideen*' (those who perform '*jihad*' - *fighters*) which in turn evokes and furthers MEMRI's narrative of '*jihad* and terror'. The original Arabic narrative states that: "البعض ينصحه بالتبرع لهم فهم ليسوا بحاجة" (literally: Some [people] advise him to donate **to them** since they are not in need of more men,) (emphasis added). In the source text, the type of donation is not specified, it can be in money, goods or other forms yet MEMRI's bracketed addition specifies this as money. While the source text used the pronoun "لهم" (them) to identify the target receiver of this donation, MEMRI's bracketed addition identifies the receiver as [the mujahideen]. The pronoun 'them' in the Arabic text refers to the suffering Syrian people; the children, elderly, men and women rather than MEMRI's 'the mujahideen' ('of jihad', the fighters). The following is the Arabic extract that contains the pronoun "هم" (them) and its referred noun phrase, and its English translation published by MEMRI.

ST Extract:

"قبل الإجابة عن ذلك لنتعرف إلى هؤلاء الجهاديين الجدد. إنهم شباب في أوائل العشرينات وحتى دون ذلك، لا يزالون على مقاعد الدراسة، يعيشون وسط أبوين وإخوة من كل الطبقات الاجتماعية، عاديون، وليس بالضرورة أن يكونوا شديدي التدين، ولا تتم تصرفاتهم عما ينوون فعله، بل هم لم يتوقعوا ما أقدموا عليه، ولكنهم يتعرضون لامتحان قاس منذ عامين ونصف، وهم يشهدون على شاشات القنوات الإخبارية المعروفة، ويسمعون في المجالس، ويتابعون في وسائل الإعلام الاجتماعي، **الفضائع التي ترتكب في سورية ضد شبان مثلهم، وشابات مثل أخواتهم، ونساء ورجال محترمين مثل والديهم**، ثم يتابعون تصريحات المسؤولين العرب والأجانب التي تندد بهذه الجرائم ولكن لا توقفها، والمؤتمرات التي تعقد، والمبعوث الأممي الأخضر الإبراهيمي الذي يصرح هنا وهناك، والرئيس الأميركي أوباما الذي يتخلى عن معاقبة بشار الأسد في آخر لحظة بعدما تجاوز الخط الأحمر الذي رسمه بنفسه، وهو استخدام السلاح الكيماوي، ففعل بشار ذلك، وقتل نحو ألفي سوري كثير من أطفال في سن إخوانهم الصغار، وسمعوا دعاء جداتهم على بشار فقالوا في أنفسهم: «لا بد من أن نفعل شيئاً آخر مع الدعاء»."

"ينذكرون ما سمعوه من معلمهم عن فضل الجهاد، فيسترجعون الحديث الشريف: «من مات ولم يغز أو يحدث به نفسه، مات على شعبة من شعب النفاق». أحدهم يمد يده إلى جهاز «الأيباد» الذي أهدته إياه والدته قبل أسابيع، ويكتب في صفحة «غوغل»: «أرغب باللاحق في الجهاد في سورية»، فتمتلئ الصفحة التالية بالإجابات، ويمضي ساعة يقرأ الردود في «إجابات غوغل»، **البعض ينصحه بالتبرع لهم فهم ليسوا بحاجة للرجال**، وآخر يقول له: سافر إلى تركيا ثم توجه نحو إحدى المدن الجنوبية وابتحث عن السوريين هناك فستجد من يدلك".

TT Extract:

"Before answering this, we must acquaint ourselves with these new jihadis. They are normative young people in their early twenties or even younger, still in high school, from all social classes, who are [still] living with parents and siblings. They are not necessarily devout, and their behavior does not [necessarily] betray their intentions. Moreover, they [themselves] do not expect to do what they do [i.e. set off for jihad in Syria]".

"For the last two and a half years they have been undergoing a harsh trial: On news channels, in meetings, and on social networking [sites] they encounter **the horrors being committed in Syria against youths like them, against young women like their sisters, and against honorable men and women like their parents**. They also follow statements by Arab and foreign officials who condemn these crimes but do not stop them. They follow the summits, they follow U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, who makes statements here and there, and U.S. president Obama, who forewent punishing Bashar Al-Assad at the last minute [even though] the latter crossed the red line that Obama himself had set, namely the use of chemical weapons. Bashar did this and killed some 2,000 Syrians, most of them children at the age of [the new jihadis'] younger siblings. They hear their grandmothers curse Bashar **and say to themselves: 'We must do something in addition to cursing.'**"

"They remember what they heard from their teachers about the virtues of jihad, and repeat the hadith: 'He who dies without embarking on jihad or even considering it in his heart dies while in a state of hypocrisy.' One of them reaches for the iPad that his mother gave him several weeks ago and types into Google: 'I want to join the jihad in Syria.' The page fills with responses, and he spends an hour reading them. **Some advise him to donate [the mujahideen money], since they do not need more men**. Someone else says: Go to Turkey and travel to one of the southern cities, [then] find some Syrians there and look for a guide."

The Arabic word 'تبرع' (donate) supports this finding since 'donate' means mainly "give (money or goods) for a good cause, for example to a charity"⁸⁸ rather than limiting donation to money and considering fighting and killing as a good cause as suggested in MEMRI's translation. Further support of this argument is clearly constructed in various Arabic media narratives including Al-Jazeera channel⁸⁹, Okaz newspaper⁹⁰, and Al-Arabiya channel⁹¹ that report on the Saudi people campaign to help the suffering displaced (refugees) Syrian people by donating money and goods. They also state that the donations include food, medicine, mobile hospitals and refugee camps.

Special Dispatch No. 5718; Jordanian Press Criticizes Extremism In Syria

In SD 5718 (see appendix A, 2:TT), MEMRI added 42 brackets adding words and phrases that did not exist in the original narrative. These additional words and phrases are of two types: (1) grammatical, due to the sentence structure differences between Arabic and English, and (2) value-laden, due to the value-laden differences between the ones of the original and MEMRI's. The additional grammatical bracketed words and phrases include: [issuing], [confined to leveling], [situation] and [what happened in]. These words and phrases seem to serve an inevitable completion of the English sentence structure to make the sentence grammatically and semantically correct. However, this inevitable completion of words and phrases in the English translation was used by MEMRI in favour of its narrative. For example, consider the bracketed addition of [issuing] in MEMRI's translation: "An extremist is one who covers up his ignorance or incompetence *by [issuing] a fatwa* that is merely a personal or self-serving interpretation of the [Islamic] text..." (emphasis added). MEMRI's bracketed addition of

⁸⁸ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/donate> [accessed 8 June 2017]

⁸⁹ <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/12/30/74> [accessed 8 June 2017]

⁹⁰ <http://okaz.com.sa/article/1517612> [accessed 8 June 2017]

⁹¹ <http://www.alarabiya.net/ar/saudi-today/2016/12/30> [accessed 8 June 2017]

[issuing] suggests that the extremist is the one who issues the fatwa. Nevertheless, the original article states that “ المتطرف شخص أو جهة تغطي جهلها أو عجز قدراتها بالفتوى أو الغطاء ” (emphasis added) (literally: An extremist is a person or a body [that] covers its ignorance and incapability *by an [issued] fatwa* or Divine cover although it is not more than a personal and self-interest interpretation of the text). The original Arabic text suggests that an extremist uses the fatwa rather than issuing it. The additional value-laden bracketed words and phrases include: [even], [tax], [stemming from], [meant to be], [it is meant to be], [charity tax], [But], [only], [The jizya], [imposed upon], [it is said], [Koran 2:256], [if], [ISIS'], [organization], [Islamic], [imposed the commandment of], [wal-Mi'raj – the Prophet Muhammad's Night Journey to Jerusalem and ascent to heaven], [Islamic], [narrow], [even], [to Assad's tyrannical regime], [only], [these oppressive regimes], [so], [just], [distortion], [themselves], [more], [become ensnared], [at the cost of], [than the regime's], [using it as], [of these fighters also], [only], [the detention camp] and [in Syria]. These value-laden words and phrases seem to serve merely as an explanatory addition, yet they reframe the original narrative in question. For example, the addition of the bracket [the detention camp] in MEMRI's English translation: “Will chaos such as [what happened in] Tora Bora in Afghanistan be repeated here, or will it be a story like *[the detention camp]* in Guantanamo?!” (emphasis added) reframes the Arabic elaborated narrative of the disreputable and inhumane Guantanamo prison to MEMRI's narrative of a detention camp for terrorists. The original Arabic narrative states that: “ هل سيتكرر معهم نموذج ” (تارابورا) الافغانية ام قصة (غوانتانامو) (literally, Will they repeat the Afghanistan model of (Tora Bora) or the story of (*Guantanamo*)? The addition of *[the detention camp]* to Guantanamo, therefore, evokes the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ launched by the U.S. President Georg Bush in 2001 after the event of 11 September.

Furthermore, there is an un-labelled bracketed addition in MEMRI's translation SD 5718 realised in the addition of '[these regimes]' in MEMRI's "The success *[these regimes]* have enjoyed is temporary and will not last forever." (emphasis added). The original Arabic is "إن النجاح الذي حققته هذه الأنظمة المستبدة هو نجاح مؤقت، ولن يستمر الى الأبد" (emphasis added) (literally, 'The success which *these tyrannical regimes* has achieved is a temporary success and will not last forever') (emphasis added). MEMRI's bracketed addition of '[these regimes]' suggests that this phrase does not exist in the original when it actually does.

7.2.2 Omission

Omission, or de-selection, of source materials is another framing strategy used by the translators in elaborating certain narratives. It is realised at lower-level patterns of selectivity in omitting words and phrases. It functions to eliminate a context or a cause which in turn reconstructs the source narrative and provides a framed salient alternative that achieves the ideological aim behind omission. In the context of the narratives on *Daesh* under analysis, MEMRI omits textual materials that serve as explanatory of the disassociation of Islam from terror and the ones offer the real reasons and motives behind the terrorist acts carried by *Daesh* and its alike. The following examples illustrate the ideological selective appropriation of omission in MEMRI's English translations under question.

Special Dispatch No. 6241; Syrian Oppositionist: The West Calls Syrian Rebels Terrorists – But They Are Victims Of ISIS And Assad Terrorism

In MEMRI's SD 6241 (see appendix A, 5:TT), the following materials of the Arabic source text were omitted. The first omitted text of the first source paragraph is "وعندما يحصل ذلك يجب عدم تحويل الموضوع إلى دفاع شخصي للبراءة من تهمة دعم الإرهاب، والجواب المنطقي" (literally: And "المختصر القاطع المستنكر والهجومى: وما علاقتنا كداعمين للثورة أو كمسلمين بالإرهاب؟")

when this happens, [we] must not change the topic to a self-defence to free from the accusation of supporting terrorism. The logical brief firm condemnable confronting answer: what is the relation between us as pro-revolution and as Muslims, and terrorism?). This omitted sentence clearly presents the source author's explanation and distinction between the Syrian revolution and Muslims from one hand and terrorism from the other hand. MEMRI's omission suggests that this clear distinction conflicts and challenges its ideological agenda of linking Arabs and Muslims to terrorism. The second omission is the omission of the source phrase: "الدائم كفكر ودين وانتماء" (literally: the permanent as a thought and a religion and a belonging) which was replaced in MEMRI's English translation by three dots (...) as follows: "This implied accusation that the Syrian revolution has been ISIS-ized, and the accusations of terrorism against Islam in general and putting [Islam] perpetually on the defendant's bench... until proven innocent, is [the product of] twisted logic...". However, the original Arabic narrative is read as: "إن هذا الاتهام الضمني بدعشة الثورة السورية واتهام الإسلام بشكل عام بالإرهاب ووضع موضع " **...المتهم الدائم كفكر ودين وانتماء حتى يثبت براءته، هو منطق أعوج** " (omitted phrase bolded) (literally: This accusation of *Daeshised* the Syrian revolution and the accusation of Islam in general and placing it in the position of the **permanent** accused **as a thought and a religion and a belonging** until it proves innocent, is a serpentine logic...). This omission of the Arabic phrase: "الدائم كفكر ودين وانتماء" (literally: the permanent as a thought and a religion and a belonging) is an attempt to eliminate the fact that Islam, as the source text explains, is first of all a school of thought and invitation of mind contemplation, rather than ignorance, and a way of life, rather than death, and an identity, rather than a rogue as reframed in MEMRI's English translation. The third omission in this translation is the omission of some sentences of the second source paragraph in which the source author lists the crimes and terrorist acts which were supported or carried out by the modern Western governments.

The omitted text is: “وهي من تحمل وصمة العار لمذبحة البوسنة التي حدثت برعاية كنسية شرقية وسياسية غربية، وهي الحكومات التي دعمت كل أنظمة الاستبداد في الشرق ولا زالت تسكت عن جرائمها، وهي التي أنتجت فكراً قومياً متطرفاً أشعل الحروب الأوروبية البينية وقتل مئات الملايين منهم، فكر قومي وطائفي نشر الكراهية واضطهد اليهودي في أوروبا والمسيحي المختلف والآخر عبر البحار”

(literally, and they [Western governments] who borne the stigma of the massacre of Bosnia, which took place under the auspices of the Eastern-European and Western political Church. And they are the governments that supported all regimes of despotism in the East and still remain silent about their crimes. They are who produced an extremist nationalist thought that ignited the European wars and killed hundreds of millions of them, a nationalist and racist thought that spread the hate and persecuted the Jew in Europe and the different Christians and the other overseas.).

The source author’s argument -that although Western Christian governments practice and support terrorism, Arabs and Muslims do not accuse Christianity as a religion for these crimes- was reframed in MEMRI’s English translation through the omission of the source author’s exhaustive list of Western governments terrorist acts. The fourth omission is the omission of the third source paragraph in which the source author continued listing the other religions terrorist acts against Muslims as follows:

“لا أنسى جرائم الرهبان البوذيين” “الوديعين” في بورما بحق الروهينغا، وكثير من الهندوس في الهند وكشمير وما فعلوه بالمسلمين عند تقسيم الهند، ولا ننسى إرهاب “السيخ” بحق المسلمين والهندوس والانتحاريين الذين جندهم في سيريلانكا.”

(literally, I do not forget the crimes of Buddhist monks “the innocent” in Burma against the Rohingya, and many Hindus in India and Kashmir and what they did to Muslims when dividing India, and we do not forget the "Sikh" terrorism against the Muslims and Hindus and the suicide bombers whom they recruited in Sri Lanka.).

This omission eliminates the source argument of the fact that terrorism is historically practiced by others against Muslims, which MEMRI attempts to prove vice versa. The fifth omission is realised in the omission of a large text of the source fourth paragraph that explains why Muslims do not accuse other religions of the terrorist acts against Muslims as follows:

"فكل الأديان في جوهرها تدعو لسلام الإنسان وخيره، وكلها دون استثناء تحمل نصوصاً يفسرها أتباعها بطرق مختلفة، وكلها دون استثناء جرى تفسيرها أحياناً قليلة أو كثيرة بطريقة عدوانية منتجة للإرهاب والقمع والاضطهاد الفكري والعقائدي والطبقي والقومي، وكثير من رجال الكنيسة "الغربيين خاصة" كانوا سباقين في هذا السلوك العدواني وقد بدؤوا باضطهاد المخالف بينهم كما حصل عندما اضطهدت كنيسة روما كنيسة الاسكندرية وأتباعها في ما يسمونه فتنة "أريوس"، ولم تصبح الكنيسة "وديعاً" وقادتها (بمعظمهم وأنا لا أعمم) يسبلون عيونهم تواضعاً

وسلاماً لإيمانهم بأن المسيحية دين السلام (وهي كذلك ككل الأديان)، بل لأنه جرى تكبييلهم من قبل المجتمعات الديمقراطية الغربية العلمانية التي خاضت معركة مريرة لاقتلاع مخالف المؤسسة الكنسية المتوحشة لتجبرها على تصنع التواضع والتفوق رغم أنفها. "

(literally, Because all religions in its essence call for the peace and goodness of human, and they all without exception carrying texts interpret by their followers in different ways, all without exception have been interpreted a few or a lot of times in an aggressive manner that produces terrorism, suppression, and intellectual, ideological, class and national persecution. Many of the church's men "Westerners in particular" were the pioneers in this aggressive behaviour and they began with the persecution of the opposer among themselves, as happened when the Church of Rome persecuted the Church of Alexandria and its followers, of the so-called "Arius" temptation. And the church did not become "innocent" and its leaders (most of them and I do not generalise) twinkle their eyes of modesty and peacefulness to their belief that Christianity is a religion of peace, (and it is indeed [a religion of peace] as all religions), but because they were handcuffed by the secular Western democratic societies that fought a bitter battle to uproot the tentacles of the savage church institution to force it to make humility and to confined despite their noses.).

The omitted text presents the Arabic source text author's understanding and perspective that religions, including Islam, do not call or urge for terror, but it is those some followers, the so-called religious leaders in particular, who twist the text to achieve their personal agenda in the name of religion, an effective method to justify terror and manipulate people. This in turn suggests that MEMRI's practice of twisting 'reality' by reframing the original texts as found in its English translations under analysis is of no difference to those who misuse religion to realise their ideologically-loaded agenda that prompts hate rather than peace across nations, cultures and religions.

The sixth omitted text is realised in the omission of a large text of the source fifth paragraph in which the source author presents his solidarity with the victims of the terrorist acts that took place everywhere in the world listing some of those that happened in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine by the United States, Israel, Iran, Al-Qaeda and the U.S.-supported Arabian regimes. The omitted text is as follows:

"تماماً كما تضامنت وحرزنت بشدة للجرائم بحق الكرد في حلبجة والأنفال وسط رخصة للقتل عبر صمت غربي، وتضامنت مع الفلسطينيين على طول مأساتهم في فلسطين ولبنان وأينما اضطهدوا وبكيت بحرقة يوم سقطوا في مجازر صبرا وشاتيلا ولم تكن مجزرة حماة قبلها ببعيدة، وتضامنت مع انتفاضة العراقيين في كل مرة وُندت فيها بتواطئ غربي ليحاصر العراق وتسرق ثروته في أكبر فساد دولي عرفه التاريخ، وتضامنت مع شيعة العراق عندما

كان الزرقاوي يقتلهم في حفلات الزفاف والحسينيات، وتضامنت مع سنة العراق عندما اضهدهم وتكالب عليهم الاحتلال الأمريكي والعراقي العميل للإيراني وتنظيم الزرقاوي الإرهابي، ثم عندما سُحِق تحرك عشائر السنة العراقيين السلمي، وتضامنت مع شيعة لبنان عندما مسحت إسرائيل مناطقهم من على الخارطة، وتضامنت مع كل اللبنانيين والعراقيين الذين فروا من حروب بلادهم إلى بلدي سوريا".

(literally, Just as I expressed solidarity and strongly sadden for the crimes against the Kurds in Halabja and Al-Anfal by a license to kill through western silence. And I showed solidarity with the Palestinians along their tragedy in Palestine, Lebanon, and wherever they got persecuted. And I wept bitterly on the day they [Palestinians] killed in the massacres of Sabra and Shatila, and the massacre of Hama was not then far in time. And I presented solidarity with the Iraqi uprising every time it is killed with western complicity in order to besieging Iraq and stealing its fortune in the largest international corruption in history. And I expressed solidarity with the Iraqi Shiites when Al-Zarqawi was killing them in the wedding parties and Hussainiyat. And I showed solidarity with Iraqi Sunnis when they were persecuted and tore on by the U.S. occupation and the Iraqi spy for the Iranian and Al-Zarqawi terrorist organisation, and then when it crushed, the Iraqi Sunnis civilian clans reacted. And I presented solidarity with the Lebanese Shiites when Israel wiped their areas off the map. And I expressed solidarity with all Lebanese and Iraqis who fled their countries' wars to my country Syria.).

This ideologically-driven selective appropriation by omission suggests that MEMRI attempts to eliminate the accusation of terrorism against the U.S. and Israel for their many massacres against Palestinians, Iraqis and Lebanese. This attempt tends to legalise the 'War on Terror' by suggesting that it is a war of civilisation and peacefulness against terrorism rather than the fact that it is a terrorist war against another terrorist.

The seventh omission is the omission of the Arabic source phrase of the seventh source paragraph: “إلا إذا أتبعنا تضامني مع ضحايا داعش الغربيين بتوجيه الاتهام لكثير من العالم بدعمه” (emphasis added) (literally, unless I followed my solidarity with *Daesh*'s western victims by directing the accusation to many of the world for its indirect support for **a larger and more brutal terrorism than *Daesh* terrorism** against us and them). MEMRI's translation of this phrase was three dots (...) and a bracketed addition [The West supports this terrorism] as follows “because we Syrians are the greatest victims of terrorism in the 20th century,

perhaps in all of history... [The West supports this terrorism] by supporting, or being silent in light of, the crimes committed against us in Syria". This omission eliminates the author's voice that argues that **most of the world governments**, the Western in particular, are accused with indirect support of terrorism, **this supported terrorism is greater and more brutal than Daesh's terrorism** against Arabs and Westerns. This omission suggests that MEMRI attempts to hide any accusation of terrorism to Westerns that is found greater than *Daesh's* in order to maintain *Daesh's* terrorism salient thus further the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'.

The eighth omission is the omission of a large text of the source eighth paragraph, as follows.

"إنها" الإنسانية الانتقائية" كما وصفها ابني في مقالٍ منذ فترة، وعندما تكون الإنسانية انتقائية ويصبح الدم والمعاناة بورصة في سوق السياسات الدولية، عندها يفقد شعار الحرب على الإرهاب معناه وتتحول الحرب على الإرهاب إلى متاجرة بدماء الضحايا بل حرباً إرهابية من نوع آخر، وهذا ما يحصل في سوريا والعراق وفي بلاد الربيع العربي خاصة حيث سُحقت فيها الحقوق والإنسانية من أجل أهداف سياسية تحت شعار "الحرب على الإرهاب"، لكل ذلك ولأنني أتضامن بشكل حقيقي مع ضحايا الإرهاب في فرنسا بدوافع أخلاقية وإنسانية وإسلامية، كما أفهم إسلامي كمعظم المسلمين، وبعيداً عن النفاق والاستخدام السياسي الرخيص.

(literally: It is "selective humanity" as my son has described in an article some time ago. When humanity is selective and blood and suffering become a bourse in the international policy market, the slogan of the 'war on terror' loses its meaning and the 'war on terror' turns into trafficking in the blood of victims, and even a terrorist war from another type. This is what is happening in Syria, Iraq, and in the Arab Spring countries, especially where rights and humanity were crushed for political purposes under the slogan of the "war on terror". For all this, and because I am truly solidarity with the victims of terrorism in France by moral, human and Islamic motives "as I understand my Islam as the majority of Muslims" away from hypocrisy and cheap political use.).

This large text was translated by MEMRI as three dots (...): "This is 'selective humaneness'...". This large omission supports the earlier finding that MEMRI systematically and intentionally attempts to eliminate the doubts and questions of the source narrative on the 'reality' of the U.S.-lead the 'War on Terror', and the fact that Islam and Muslim are innocent of any terror, yet few Muslims twist the Text in their

favor which is in turn misused by some including the media e.g. MEMRI to distort the image of Arab, Muslim and Islam.

The ninth omission is the omission of the Arabic phrase at the end of the eighth source paragraph: “ليني عن نفسه حقيقة تصرخ بدعمه لإرهاب أخطر وأكثر وحشية من إرهاب داعش،” “ليني عن نفسه حقيقة” (literally, to defend himself against the truth that cries out for his support for a more dangerous and more brutal terrorism comparing to *Daesh's* terrorism, to defend himself against the title “the supporter of selective humanity terrorism”). The paragraph states:

"لكل ذلك وحتى تنتهي المأساة السورية سأتضامن مع ضحايا الإرهاب العالمي بالطريقة الوحيدة الأكثر صدقاً عبر إعلاني الدائم "Je_suis_Syria"، منتظراً أن يرددها الآخر الغربي خاصة تضامناً معي ليني عن نفسه حقيقة تصرخ بدعمه لإرهاب أخطر وأكثر وحشية من إرهاب داعش، ليني عن نفسه صفة "داعم لإرهاب الإنسانية الانتقائية"."

(literally, For all this [crimes committed or supported by the West against Arabs and Muslims] and until the end of the Syrian tragedy, I will express solidarity with the victims of the international terrorism in the only most honest way through my permanent declaration of "Je_suis_Syria", waiting for the Other, the Westerner in particular, to present solidarity with me, **to defend himself against the truth that cries out for his support for a more dangerous and more brutal terrorism comparing to Daesh terrorism, to defend himself against the title “the supporter of selective humanity terrorism”.**)

This omission is the last episode in this article. It confirms the finding of MEMRI's attempts of neglecting the narratives on the most, comparing to *Daesh's*, significant and effective terrorism practiced by the West governments, mainly the U.S. and Israel, against Arabs and Muslims in general and Syrian, Palestinian, Iraqi and Lebanese in particular, which in turn reframes 'reality' as narrated in the Arabic source editorial.

The overall omission of the textual materials of the source narrative is highlighted in Figure 7.1.

هذه الأيام، وعندما بدأ شخص (عربي خاصة) يطرح الموضوع السوري ينطلق من اتهام ضمني لمحتبه الثورة بدعم الإرهاب مقترحاً دعشة الثورة، أو اتهام ضمني لمحتبه السلم بشكل عام بتأييد الإرهاب فقط لكونه مسلماً، وعندما يحصل ذلك يجب عدم تحويل الموضوع إلى دفاع شخصي الجراءة من تهمة دعم الإرهاب، والجواب المنطقي المنعصر للطاقم المسائلر واليهومي، وما علاقتنا كداعيين للثورة أو كعسكريين بالإرهاب؟

إن هذا الاتهام الضمني دعشة الثورة السورية واتهام الإسلام بشكل عام بالإرهاب ووضعه موضع التهمه فإتمام تفكير ديني واتقاء حتى يثبت برأيه، هو منطق أوح يظفر على السطح كثيراً هذه الأيام بعد أن كان يتخفى سابقاً، لكن الغربي الذي يوجه هذا الاتهام يتجاهل حقائق صارخة تصفه وتدينه وفق هذا المنطق، فحكوماته وتاريخه وكثيثة مثقفة بالعرفم التي ينطبق عليها تعريف الإرهاب، ومع ذلك لا تهمة "كسيمي عربي" بدعم الإرهاب، وللتفكر أن 80% من قذرة التفكاس عبر التاريخ اقترأ والتفكرأ حرية وكرامة الإنسان وحازوا العلم والعلماء والمفكرين والحرية ودعوا الاستبداد في الغرب، وهم من جند أو دعم الحملات الصليبية على الشرق التي قتلت ملايين الأرياء، وهم من بارك محاكم التفتيش بحق المسلمين واليهود في إسبانيا، وهذه الحكومات الحديثة هي من قتلت خمسين مليوناً من الشعوب التي امتصرتها ظملاً ويوحشية، وهي التي قتلت سبعين مليوناً من الغربيين في حروبين عالميتين، وهي من تحمل وصمة القمار لعنينة الفوسنة التي حدثت برعاية كسبية ثورافية وسياسية غربية، وهي الحكومات التي دعمت كل أنظمة الاستبداد في الشرق ولا زالت تستك عن جرائمها، وهي التي أنتجت فقراً قوياً مشرفاً أشعل الحروب الأوروبية الحديثة وقتل مئات الملايين منهم، فكر قومي وطني نشر الفرية واضطهد اليهودي في أوروبا والمسيحي المختلف والأخر عبر البحار.

لا أنسى جرائم الرهبان البوذيين "البرديين" في بورما بحق الروهينغا، وكثير من الجنوس في الهند وكشمير وما فعلوه بالمسلمين عند تقسيم الهند، ولا أنسى إرهاب "المسيح" بحق المسلمين والهندوس والانتاريين الذين جندتهم في سوريا لتكأ.

لكن كل ذلك لم يتبعها يوماً الاتهام دين وأتباعه بالإرهاب، فكل الأديان في جوهرها تدعو لسلم الإنسان وخيره، وكلها دون استثناء تحمل نصوصاً يفسرها أتباعها بطرق مختلفة، وكلها دون استثناء جرى تفسيرها لحياناً قليلة أو كثيرة بطريقة عدوانية منسوبة للإرهاب والضع والاضطهد الفكري والمفكرتي والطلي والقومي، وكثير من رجال الكنيسة "الغربيين خاصة" كانوا يساهون في هذا السلوك العدواني وقد جزوا باضطهد المختلف بينهم كما حصل عندما اضطهدت كنيسة روما كنيسة الإنكليزية وأتباعها في ما يسمونه قذرة "البروس"، ولم تصبح الكنيسة "ربيمة" وفادتها (بمضطهدهم وأنا لا أعلم) يسلمون عوالمهم لوجعاً وسلاماً لإيمانهم بأن المسيحية دين السلم (وهي كذلك ككل الأديان)، بل أنه جرى تكذيبهم من قبل المجتمعات الديموقراطية الغربية العلمانية التي خاضت معركة مبررة لانتلاخ مذهب المؤسسة الكسبية المشوخته لتبصرها على تسليح التواضع والتوقع رشم لها.

نعم، إذا المسلم بشكل عام والسوري بشكل خاص، (وإنما شخصياً)، تضامنت بصندق لا يتفارق سياسي، كسمل وكسوري وكعربي، وتعاملت مع الضماليا الأرياء للإرهاب في فرنسا، وكذلك مع ضماليا الطفرة المدنية الفرنسية، ومع ضماليا نيويورك الأرياء، ومع ضماليا كل إرهاب في العالم، تماماً كما تضامنت وحزمت بشدة الحرع بحق الكرد في حلبجة والأفغان وسطرخصة لقتال عبر صمدت عربي، وتضامنت مع الفلسطينيين على طول مسانئهم في فلسطين ولبنان وإنما اضطهدوا

ويكأ بحرفة يوم سلفوا في مجازر صبرا وشاتيلا ولم تكن مبررة حماة فلها بعبدة، وتضامنت مع القتلعة العربيين في كل مرة وأنت فيها بطواقي عربي ليهاسر لفرعق وتشرقق ثورته في أكبر فساد ثورتي عرفه التاريخ، وتضامنت مع شيعه العراق عندما كان الزرقاوي يظلم في حملات الزقاف والحسينيات، وتضامنت مع سلة فرعق عندما اضطهدت وكتاب عليهم الاحتلال الأمريكي والعرفالي لعميل لآلبرني وتظلم الزرقاوي الإرهابي، ثم عندما شققت تحركه عشرات السنة العربيين المسلمي، وتضامنت مع شيعه لبنان عندما مسست إسرائيل مناطقهم من على الحارطة، وتضامنت مع كل اللدانيين والعرفاليين الذين فرأوا من حروب بانكهم إلى بلدي سوريا، وتضامنت مع الأريبيين الكرد وعن حرب الكويتي والكرد الذين جزوا من أرضهم السورية، ومع المسيحيين والآشوريين والسريان الذين اضطهدتهم داخل في سوريا والعراق، ومع ضماليا داعش من قرهان الغربيين في كل مكان، ولغوا مع الضماليا في باريس.

هذا موقف غالبية عظمى من السوريين المؤيدين للثورة ومنهم تقريبا كل المسلمين السنة في سوريا، حاولوا التصبر عده في مسانئهم عديدة، لكن ذلك لم يكن كافياً ليتضامن الآخرون معنا ولو مرة واحدة وبشكل حقيقي لما يجري لنا في بشنا الجريح القليل سوريا على يد النظام الطلطي الألفوي الذي باعه لحيظه الأبرني الأكثر طمأنية والروسي الدافع حديثاً على خط المدنية، بل إن بعض من تضامنا معهم كانوا هم من يمارسون قننا مؤزعين العلوي مع كل مذمبة بقاء، أما الغرب والوضع الدولي فقد تمثل تضامنتهم بإسراءه على حصارنا لثمان من الفلاص من النظام لتجلس نحن الضمينة على طاولة ولعدة مع القلة الأريبيين وتظلم شرعية لم تكن لهم يوماً منذ نصف قرن، وثبتت احتلالهم سوريا ثم بيعها للآلبرني والروسي الذي باتت شرهه العرب في جريه "ككسبية" على الإرهاب.

نعم داعش عدو لنا كعسكريين وكسوريين خاصة، ولكل العالم، ونحن نعلمها دائماً وجرنا كثورة سورية ضد داعش هي الأبله، فمن نقلت داعش وحننا ولا نقل المدنيين بحمية لصفد داعش، وضماليا في سوريا على يد داعش لكبر بمئات المرات من الضماليا الفرنسيين أو الأمريكيين أو الغربيين على يد داعش، لكن ضماليا من إرهاب السطاح الأندي والإبرني والروسي أكبر بمئات المرات من إرهاب داعش ببقاء، وكبر بالآف المرات من ضماليا الغرب على يد داعش، لذلك لا أجد أي مضطر في كل مرة لإعلان تضامنتي مع ضماليا الإرهاب في العلم تيرة لنفسي من تهمة مسئلة لي كسوري، وصلمر خاصة بالإرهاب، فمن السوريون لكبر ضمينة للإرهاب في القرن العشرين وربما عبر التاريخ، إلا إذا أتيحت تضامنتي مع ضماليا داعش العربيين بتوجيه الاتهام لكثير من العالم بنصه غير المبتسر لإرهاب لكبر وكثير وحشية بكثير من إرهاب داعش ببقا وظهور، بدعهم أو صمدتهم عن جرائم أنظمة ببقا في سوريا هي الوجه الآخر لداعش كالأندي والإبرني والروسي، وبمحابتهم إرهاب غير مسبق تاريخياً عبر حميتهم عملياً لنظام الأندي الطلطي الألفوي.

فيها "الإسبانية الانتقالية" كما وصفها أبنني في مقال منذ فترة، وعندما تكون الإسبانية الثقافية ويصبح الدم والمعادلة بورصة في سوق السبامك الدولية، عندما يقد شعار العرب على الإرهاب معناه وتتول العرب على الإرهاب إلى متاعرة بدماء الضماليا بل حرباً إرهابية من نوع لفر، وهذا ما يحصل في سوريا والعراق وفي بلاد الفربع العربي خاصة حيث شغقت فيها الحفرق والإسبانية من أجل أهداف سياسية تمتد شعار "الحرب على الإرهاب"، لكل ذلك، ولأي تضامن بشكل حقيقي مع ضماليا الإرهاب في فرنسا بدوافع أخلاقية وإنسانية وإسلامية كما فهم إسلامي معظم المسلمين، وبعداً عن الفراق والاستخدام السياسي الفريص، بل أذفع عن نفسي وأرد الاتهامات المسئلة لي كعسلم وسوري وعربي بدعم الإرهاب بينما ألق بوجهه وألق التمن الأكثر على يد الإرهاب قتلا وتشريداً ودماراً واعتقلاً وتعذيباً ومعدلة منذ نصف قرن، لكل ذلك وحتى تنتهي المسألة السورية ملتصقان مع ضماليا الإرهاب العالمي بالطريقة الوحيدة الأكثر صديقاً عبر إعلاني لائق "Je suis Syria"، منتظراً أن يرددها الأخر العربي خاصة تضامناً مما يعني عن نفسه خليفة تصرخ بدعته إرهاب لسطر وكثير وحشية من إرهاب داعش، ليغني عن نفسه صفة "داعم إرهاب الإسبانية الانتقالية".

Figure 7.1: Highlight of the Overall Omitted Source Texts

7.3 Lexical and Grammatical Choices

7.3.1 Lexical choice

Lexical choice is the choosing of words mainly through their integrated semantic and syntactic properties. Speakers of languages tend to carefully study and choose the most appropriate utterance in their spoken and written discourses. Government officials,

journalists, intellectuals, editors and translators, among others, are considerably aware of the impact of lexical choice on the audience's interpretation and response (the selection of evaluative tools and expressions). It enables them "conveying the perspectives they choose on particular occasions." (Clark, 1997, p. 6). The significance of lexical choice lies, therefore, in defining the position of the author, translator and institute toward/against certain issues especially in the case of conflicting politics, values, beliefs and ideologies. In translation, lexical choice grants more weight to the narrative elaborated by the translator and leads to a different structure of the narrativity feature of causal emplotment, which in turn guides the audience to a shaped understanding. For example, using the terms "establishment of the state of Israel" rather than "*Nakba*", "the state of Israel" rather than "the occupied Palestine", and "the Israeli security/defence forces" rather than "the Israeli occupation forces" legitimise the Israeli occupation of Palestine and deny the rights of the Palestinians stated in the United Nation resolutions numbers 194, 242, 446 and 3236 that acknowledge the right of return for the Palestinian refugees, the illegality of the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the illegality of the Israeli settlements on the Palestinian territories, and the right of self-determination for the Palestinians respectively. In this example, the narrativity feature of causal emplotment differs by the different lexical choice made. The selecting of the term '*the Israeli Defence Forces*' rather than '*the Israeli Occupation Forces*' grants legitimacy to the Israeli killing of the Palestinians offering readers with the framed understanding that Israel is merely 'defending' itself rather than the fact that Israel is an illegal entity⁹² and its killing of the Palestinians is denied under the international law. In this context, the media outlets that choose the term "*the Israeli Defence Forces*" describe the Palestinians as 'terrorists' and the Israelis as 'heroes' in all cases (being the killed or being the killer), while the media outlets that choose the term "*the Israeli*

⁹² See the Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967

Occupation Forces” describe the Palestinians as ‘victims’ and the Israelis as ‘offenders’ in all cases.

In the context of the War on Terror and the international coalition against *Daesh*, rival labels and terms of events are applied by different media outlets in ways that make certain narratives salient thus subscribable by the public. The 11 September 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks against the World Trade Center complex and the Pentagon in the United States are regarded as the initiative of today’s meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’. As discussed earlier in **Section 1.3**, the event of 11 September was ideologically labelled by the Bush administration as a ‘terror war’ that requires a ‘war on terror’. The event, however, would be labelled as a criminal act by a group rather than a ‘war’ following the norm as in the cases of the Pan Am 103 Bombing⁹³, the World Trade Center Bombing 1993⁹⁴, the East African Embassy Bombings⁹⁵, and the USS Cole Bombing⁹⁶. As Filicky (2017) put it: “In the case of terrorism, word choice may affect Americans’ attitudes toward Islam.”. Contemporary, the War on Terror is ideologically employed by the media outlets in which ‘terrorist’, ‘extremist’ and ‘Islamists’ are exchangeable terms used to describe any criminal acts carried by individuals affiliated to Islam, rather than any other religion, in an attempt to accuse Islam as a religion, rather than individuals, of these acts (Filicky, 2017). Through the choice of lexical equivalents, the English translations published by MEMRI are found to follow a pattern of associating Islamic concepts such as ‘جهاد’ (*jihad*), ‘جزية’ (*jizya*), ‘مجاهدين’ (*mujahideen*), ‘فتوى’ (*fatwa*) and ‘أمة’ (*ummah*) to ‘terrorism’ and ‘extremism’ as follows.

⁹³ <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/pan-am-103-bombing> [accessed 23 June 2017]

⁹⁴ <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/world-trade-center-bombing-1993> [accessed 23 June 2017]

⁹⁵ <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/east-african-embassy-bombings> [accessed 23 June 2017]

⁹⁶ <https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/uss-cole-bombing> [accessed 23 June 2017]

Special Dispatch No. 5718; Jordanian Press Criticizes Extremism In Syria

In its SD 5718 (see appendix A, 2-TT), MEMRI used parentheses to provide a translation of the Arabic Islamic term of ‘*Jizya*’ as (poll tax). Lexically, the Arabic term ‘جزية’ (*Jizya*) is a singular noun of the plural ‘جزيات’ *Jizyat*, ‘جزى’ *Jiza*, ‘جزاء’ *Jaza*’ and ‘جزى’ *Jizy* of the meanings: 1. land tax, 2. what used to be taken from the people of the Dhimma (non-Muslim citizens of an Islamic state) in return for their protection, 3. a tax imposed by the conqueror on the loser (Omar, 2008). In Islam, the term ‘جزية’ (*Jizya*) refers to a sum of money imposed by an Islamic state on certain of non-Muslims who live and enjoy the Islamic state citizenship rights, facilities and protection against any external attack (Sabiq, 1994). In Islam, *Jizya* is to be taken from free rich mature males of Dhimmi, excluding women, children, elders, slaves, mentally disordered persons, handicapped, the poor, hermits, monks, the ill and the non-Muslims who are not resident in an Islamic state (Sabiq, 1994). However, according to the Oxford Dictionary⁹⁷, ‘poll tax’ means “A tax levied on every adult, *without* reference to their income or resources” (emphasis added). In other words, ‘poll tax’ is a tax imposed on every ‘head’ regardless of the ability to pay and inclusive all genders and ages. In translating the meanings of the Holy Qur’an to English, Shakir (1983) encodes *Jizya* as ‘tax’, Arberry (1996) and Pickthall (1976) render it as ‘tribute’ while Yusuf Ali (1989) transliterates it as ‘*jizyah*’. Therefore, translating the Islamic Arabic term of ‘*Jizya*’ to the English ‘poll tax’ is inaccurate since it recalls the meta-narrative of the failure Western ‘taxation systems’ and associates it to the inhumanity (Abdel-Haleem, 2012). *Jizya* within its Islamic context is understood as a means of tolerance and humanity on non-Muslims who live in an Islamic state. Poll tax within its western context is understood as a strategy of savage governments in order to get more money through all means. MEMRI throughout its translation in question has attempt to normalise its use of ‘poll tax’ as a translation of ‘*Jizya*’ by translating ‘*Jizya*’ as ‘jizya’, ‘the jizya’, ‘jizya

⁹⁷ <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/poll-tax?q=poll+tax> [accessed 11 March 2016]

tax’, ‘jizya [tax] in addition to ‘poll tax’ invoking the idea that these translations are exchangeable and share the same meaning. In this example, two narrativity features are largely employed to achieve the goal behind the translation. The first narrativity feature is relationality in which the nexus between the humanitarian ‘*Jizya*’ with the inhumane ‘poll-tax’ creates a misinterpretation of the Islamic principles as an injustice system. The second narrativity feature is causal emplotment that functions to justify the inhumane acts performed by *Daesh* claiming that these acts are motivated by Islam and its principles. Any attack, therefore, against Muslims (offenders) and Islam (injustice) is legalised.

7.3.1.1 Labelling, rival systems of naming and titles

In section 3.5.1 **Framing by labelling**, various general examples were provided to illustrate the significance and effectiveness of framing by labelling. In the context of the War on Terror, the usage of the term ISIS versus *Daesh* was briefly discussed in that section. The importance of labelling in an attempt to refer to or identify a group is realised in offering a framed interpretation that guide the audience response toward the topic in question. In this section, I elaborate more on how lexical choice by labelling of this group - ISIS versus *Daesh* - identifies the position of the translators toward this debate. Media outlets report news on the group calls itself ‘الدولة الإسلامية في العراق والشام’ (داعش) (transliteration: *ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi al Iraq wa al Sham (Daesh)*) using different labels. Some translate it as the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL), while others translate it as the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS). Currently, some media outlets refer to the group as the ‘Islamic State’ (IS) after the group’s declaration of itself as a caliphate in June 2014. However, some foreign politicians and media outlets recently started to adopt the Arabic acronym ‘*Daesh*’ that detaches the group name from Islam, the religion of peace. *Daesh* is a term of a negative sense in Arabic

that the group “threatened to 'cut out the tongues' of anyone it hears using the term”⁹⁸. The label ISIS evokes two controversial points: 1) the recognition of the group as a state, and 2) the recognition of Islam as its religion that guides its terrorist attacks and extreme ideology. France and Britain, among others, have officially adopted the translation ‘*Daesh*’ taking a political stand that illustrate their position in this debate as the UK then Prime Minister David Cameron explains: “Frankly, this evil death cult is neither a true representation of Islam, nor is it a state”⁹⁹. Labelling *Daesh* as ISIS, ISIL or IS, therefore, positions the translator in favour of the military group and/or elaborating a narrative that connects terror to Islam. In the context of narratives under study, MEMRI adopts the label the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’ in referring to this terrorist group employing the narrativity feature of relationality to further sustain and elaborate the meta-narrative of ‘Islam and Terror’. In its translations to the Arabic narratives on *Daesh*, MEMRI used the term ‘ISIS’ 209 times, the ‘Islamic State’ 4 times, the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ 1 time, and the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’ 1 time, while it did not use the terms ‘ISIL’, ‘IS’ or ‘*Daesh*’. However, the Arabic source narratives used the term ‘*Daesh*’ 258 times, the ‘State Organisation’ 8 times, the ‘Islamic State’ 8 times, the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (*Daesh*) Organisation’ 2 times, ‘Islamic State (*Daesh*)’ 2 time, the ‘Baghdadi State’ 1 time, and the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria’ 1 time. It is worth noting that MEMRI uses the full name: the ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)’ in its paratextual prefaces to the English translations and the short form ‘ISIS’ in its in-texts and titles. MEMRI explains the term ISIS in its SD 5575 (see appendix A,1-TT) as follows:

“**ISIS** is the **Islamic** State of Iraq and Syria – an organization established in April 2013 when the head of the **Al-Qaeda** affiliate **Islamic** State of Iraq, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, announced that his organization was expanding its activity to Syria. The organization champions **extremist Salafi ideology** and **global jihad**. It has established itself as one of the most powerful and influential forces in Syria thanks to thousands of foreign fighters who have joined its ranks. It sees itself as the nucleus of the future **caliphate** and insists

⁹⁸ <http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/what-daesh-mean-isis-threatens-6841468> [published 14 April 2017, accessed 4 September 2017]

⁹⁹ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277> [published 2 December 2015, accessed 28 June 2017]

that all fighters and organizations in Syria come together under the leadership of Al-Baghdadi, whom they consider the legitimate leader of the entire *Muslim nation*" (emphasis added).

In this definition of the term 'ISIS', MEMRI explicitly links the terrorist group to Islam not only by employing the lexical choice of the 'Islamic State' but also by recalling its establishment as Al-Qaeda affiliate that recalls in turn the event of 11 September and the War on Terror. The usage of Al-Qaeda is significant here since it emphasises the claim of the group's 'Islamic' identity by evoking the well-established meta-narrative of Al-Qaeda, a group of Muslims headed by the Saudi Osama bin Laden and that believes in the 'global jihad' as a principle of Islam and follows the Islamic 'extremist *Salafi* ideology'. In addition, the usage of the 'caliphate' and the 'Muslim nation' supports the claim of the group's 'Islamic identity' and expands the War on Terror to include all Muslims all over the world. In other word, MEMRI employs the narrativity feature of relationality to extend the meta-narrative of the War on Terror, the label for 'radical Islamic terrorism'¹⁰⁰ to *Daesh* then it employs the narrativity feature of causal emplotment to justify actions and attacks against Muslims including the intervention in the Syrian civil war and Trump's travel ban of seven Muslim countries¹⁰¹. In this regard, MEMRI's translations of the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* read as follows.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/donald-trump-saudi-arabia-radical-islamic-terrorism-muslims-soften-tone-iran-palestinians-israel-a7748541.html> [published 22 May 2017, accessed 30 June 2017]

¹⁰¹ <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/29/politics/trump-travel-ban-countries/index.html> [updated 6 March 2017, accessed 30 June 2017]

Special Dispatch No. 6117; Iraqi Ummah Party Leader Mithal Al-Alusi: ISIS Is An Arab-Muslim Creation; I Long For Peace With Israel

Extract 1.

ISIS Is A Product Of Extremist Islam, We Must Unite To Fight It

"Q: What is the future of the war against ISIS, which is spreading to Iraq's neighbors and to other countries in the region?"

"A: I am glad to see ISIS spreading to the Gulf states. This might be a shocking statement, but I mean no offense and certainly do not relish the death of anyone, either from the Gulf or from Israel. But we must all understand that ISIS is the disease of this generation, and could continue [to exist] for another 100 years. This crisis is not only Iraq's. We must fight our internal mentality - the mentality of vengeance and nullification of the other [that] created ISIS. the criminal terrorist organization that harms Islam and that committed a criminal terrorist act in Kuwait against our Kuwaiti sons, friends, neighbors, and brothers, and the [terrorist] actions in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and elsewhere. All these are the victims of ISIS. We must understand that this group is a terrorist organization that all must combat. We must all stand on a united front. If we agree to this, [it means] that we agree to a new world, without militias and weapons."

"Q: You have argued that [ISIS] will exist for 100 years. Will this become part of the political reality?"

"A: Terrorism is absolutely not going to end in less than 100 years... What drives a teenager from Europe - the continent of music, culture, art, and liberty - to grow his 'beard' and to adopt views that call for crime, killing, and cruelty, to leave behind happiness and freedom in order to join an exiled barbaric group? There is a global rebel movement that emerged because of a failure of culture, an economic crisis, or a lack of understanding. The propagandists of extremist Islam have exploited this to establish ISIS, and we must fight them by punishing anyone who commits a crime."

"Q: Who created ISIS?"

"A: It is our creation, not a Western or European or Crusader or Jewish or Israeli creation. It is a creation of the Arabs and Muslims, because we have failed to protect our society and have allowed these extremist views -to exist]."

In this extract, MEMRI titles a large part of its translation under what it seems a quotation from the interview of the source text with: **“ISIS Is A Product Of Extremist Islam, We Must Unite To Fight It”**. While MEMRI added heading explicitly accuses Islam of ISIS, the source text author accuses ISIS of harming Islam. The source text clearly states, as translated by MEMRI, that “The *propagandists* of extremist Islam have exploited this to establish ISIS...” which in turn was reframed to MEMRI’s heading.

7.3.2 Grammatical shifts (reporting verbs, voices and tenses)

In translating a text of a given language (ST) into another language (TT), several grammatical shifts are made due to differences in structure between the two languages. These grammatical shifts are classified into optional and obligatory. Translators tend to apply optional grammatical shifts for better soundings in the target language while others apply optional grammatical shifts in order to undermine and renegotiate the source narrative (Hijjo, 2013). The notion of the grammatical shift has been discussed in the works of Vinay and Darbelent (1958 [1995]), Catford (1965), Newmark (1988) and van Leuven-Zwart (1989). In these accounts, grammatical shifts are categorised based on their ranks, levels and functions. Translation shifts, ‘transpositions’ as called in some of these accounts, refer to the change in tense, function, phrasal category, number, part-of-speech and structure. Grammatical shifts may result in simplification, normalisation, explicitation, or abbreviation of the source message as in the case of rank shift (Hansen & Hansen-Schirra, 2012). The grammatical shifts that took place in translating the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* into MEMRI’s English translations under analysis are examined as follows.

Special Dispatch No. 5771; 'Al-Hayat' Editor Ghassan Charbel: While The Rest Of The World Is Watching The World Cup, We Are Watching The Collapse Of Iraq

Extract 1.

ST:

كنا أبناء الجزء الملعون من العالم. يلتفت العالم إلى البرازيل وينقي غارفين في هلوبينا. نتابع التسديدات الدموية لـ «داعش» و «أبو بكر البغدادي». وهزاز سيدك نوري المالكي والبيدار فريته. يتسغل العالم بحروب مخملية تنتهي بكاس. ونتلع نحن انحدارنا من جحيم إلى جحيم. خذنا ننتكك على وقع عصبياتنا العباءة وأعلامنا مبللة بالكراهية والدم. ينهمكون بتكريم الفالزين ونهمك بمواكب التسليح وأمواج اللاجئين.

TT:

"[But] we are the people of the cursed part of the world. As the [rest] of the world watches Brazil, we continue sinking into the abyss, tracking the murderous intensions of ISIS and [its leader] Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the seeing the goal-net of [Iraqi Prime Minister] Nouri Al-Maliki quiver [as ISIS scores against him] and his team collapses. The world is busy with gentle wars that end with a trophy, and we follow our descent from one hell to another. Our maps crumble under the heel of our blind zealotry, and our media wallows in hatred and blood. [The world] is immersed in honoring the winners, while we are immersed in funerals and waves of refugees.

In this extract, a number of grammatical shifts took place in the English translation. The first shift is realised in the translation of the Arabic “*كأننا أبناء الجزء “الملعون من العالم*” (As if we were the sons of the cursed part of the world) into the English “[But] **we are** the people of the cursed part of the world”. The Arabic rhetorical denying statement was reframed into the English affirmative statement. Grammatically, the Arabic sentence functions as a condemnation realised in the tool “*كأن*” (As if) in “*كأننا*” (As if we were). In contrast, the English sentence functions as a positive confirmation realised in “we are” contradicting to the message intended by the source author that “we are not the sons of the cursed part of the world”. The second shift is realised in the change of the function of the Arabic verb “*يشغل*” (preoccupy) in “*يشغل العالم بحروب مخملية*” to the English adjective “busy” in “The world is **busy** with gentle wars”. This shift is an optional class-shift (according to Catford, 1965, see Hijjo, 2013) in which the Arabic verb “*يشغل*” could be translated as “preoccupy” resulting in the following sentence: “The world **preoccupies** [itself] with gentle wars”. While the Arabic verb “*يشغل*” serves the source author message that the world distracts itself with the World Football Cup instead of paying attention to *Daesh*’s attacks against Iraq which seems to fall very soon in *Daesh* military hands, the English adjectives “busy” which would have the Arabic equivalence “*مشغول*” signals to a different ‘reality’. The English adjective “busy” indicates “having a great deal to do”¹⁰² thus does not correspond to the Arabic verb “*يشغل*” (preoccupy) which indicates the opposite in which there is no great deal with watching the World Football Cup over *Daesh*’s killings and bombing in Iraq to the point that Iraq is almost fallen in its hands. The third shift in this passage is also an optional class shift from the Arabic noun “*جحيم*” (hell) in “*ونتابع نحن انحذارنا من جحيم الى*” (and we follow our descent from a hell to a **hell**) to the English pronoun “another” in “and we follow our descent from one hell to **another**.”. Although the English pronoun “another” refers to an additional thing from the same type which has been

¹⁰² <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/busy> [accessed 17 July 2017]

mentioned earlier in the sentence i.e. “a hell”, the repetition in the Arabic source narrative of “a hell” comes to emphasise the tragic situation in Iraq and the dangerous consequences to follow the fall of Iraq. The fourth grammatical shift is realised in a form of reporting verbs from the Arabic “مبلة” (wet) in “وأعلامنا مبلة بالكراهية والدم” (and our flags are **wet** with hatred and blood) to the English “wallows in” in “and our media **wallows in** hatred and blood”. This shift in reporting verbs occurs as a result of mistranslates its subject “أعلامنا” which can read as “our flags” or as “our media” yet any native or skilful user of Arabic can assure the meaning “our flags” not only from the context but also from the Arabic grammar since “أعلامنا” as “our flags” is considered feminine which is reflected in the feminine suffix to the verb “مبلة” while “أعلامنا” as “our media” is considered masculine which would take a masculine form of verb “مبيل”. Moreover, in Arabic, describing “our media is wet with hatred and blood” is structurally awkward and unnatural. The English “wallows in” evokes the image of a large mammal e.g. a pig enjoys itself in a mud or water¹⁰³. Therefore, the shift in reporting verbs here alters the source message that the author sadly reports the negative image of the participation of political parties in Iraq realised in “our flags” in the current conflict, into the English that “the Arabic media” enjoys promoting hate and killings.

Extract 2.

ST:

لنترك الموندنيل لأهله للشعوب الطبيعية التي تعيش في دول طبيعية لدينا مهمات أكثر إلحاحاً. مياراة قاتلة على أرض العراق نتألقها لتخطي حدود أراضيها. ما جرى في الأيام الماضية ليس بسيطاً. إنه انهيار كامل للقوات المسلحة العراقية. أكاد أقول إنه انهيار كامل للعراق. من يصديق أن «داعش» استولت فجأة على ألف البية ومدافع وصواريخ وكميات هائلة من الذخيرة. وإن صاحب القرار في الموصل حالياً ضابط سابق في جيش صدام. وإن سيد المدينة الجديد يعرف بوجود نصف بلون دولار في فرع البنك المركزي فيها. حدث ما كان يصعب تخيله أو تصديقه.

¹⁰³ <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/wallow> [accessed 17 July 2017]

TT:

"Let us leave the World Cup to its people – to normal peoples living in normal countries. We have more pressing matters – a lethal match on Iraqi soil whose results **will spread beyond** its borders. What **has happened** in recent days is no **simple matter**. It is a complete collapse of Iraq's armed forces. I **can go so far as to say** a complete collapse of Iraq. Who **can believe** that ISIS **has** suddenly **taken over** a thousand guns, missiles, tools and massive amounts of ammo, and that the decision-maker in Mosul is a former officer in Saddam's army, [or] that the city's new master knows that there are 500 million dollars in its central bank branch? This is beyond **imagination or belief**."

The first grammatical shift in this extract is an optional structural shift in tense in which the Arabic simple present tense of the verb “تنخطي” (exceeds or crosses) in “مبارة قاتلة على أرض العراق نتائجها تتخطى حدود أراضيها” is shifted into the English verb phrase “will spread beyond” of the simple future tense in “a lethal match on Iraqi soil whose results **will spread beyond** its borders”. The usage of the simple present tense in Arabic signals to the source author’s message that the *Others* i.e. who are preoccupied with the World Football Cup are inevitably affected from the fall of Iraq in *Daesh*’s control. Contrary, the usage of the English simple future indicates that the matter is not more than an assumption which may or may not be proven correct. In addition, the Arabic simple present tense demonstrates a near future while the English simple future tense does not identify the period of future time. The second shift is also a shift in tense from the Arabic simple past “جرى” (happened) in “ما جرى في الأيام الماضية ليس بسيطاً” to the English past perfect “has happened” in “What **has happened** in recent days is no simple matter.”. This tense shift was followed by a subtle change in lexis from the Arabic “الماضية” (past) in “**past** days” into the English “recent” in “**recent** days” in order to justify the use of present perfect tense. Another shift found in this sentence is an optional unit shift from the Arabic adjective “بسيطاً” (simple) into the English noun phrase “simple matter” that does not suggest any reframing of the source message. The third shift in this extract is realised in the shift of the Arabic imperfect verb of proximity “أُكاد” (I almost) in “أُكاد أقول انه انهيار كامل للعراق” (I **almost** say it is a complete collapse of Iraq) into the English modal verb “can go so far” in “I **can go so far** as to say a complete collapse of Iraq.”. The shift in degree between “almost” that indicates

proximity of the verb ‘say’ and “can” that offers ability of the first person ‘I’, the subject. In other words, the Arabic “كان” (almost) shows nearness of saying that Iraq collapses but the English “can” shows the ability of the subject to say that Iraq collapses. The fourth and fifth shifts occur from the Arabic “من يصدق ان ”داعش“ استولت ” (Who **believes** that ‘Daesh’ suddenly **took over** a thousand guns, missiles, tools and massive amounts of ammo) into the English “Who **can believe** that ISIS **has** suddenly **taken over** a thousand guns, missiles, tools and massive amounts of ammo”. The Arabic simple present tense “يصدق” (believes) is shifted into the English verb phrase “can believe” and the Arabic simple past “استولت” (took over) is shifted to the English present perfect “has taken over”. The last shift in this extract is an optional class shift from the Arabic verbs “تخيله أو تصديقه” (imagine it or believe it) in “حدث ما كان يصعب تخيله أو تصديقه” (What was hard to **imagine it or believe it** happened) into the English nouns “imagination or belief” in “This is beyond **imagination or belief**”.

In this extract, it is noticed that shift in tense is widely applied in a direct intervention of MEMRI’s translators in the immediate text which reflects the awareness of the translators of the current conflict in Iraq day by day and constitutes the desire of these translators to convey the experience to the target audience through the use of different tenses i.e. present, present perfect and future.

Extract 3.

ST:

هائتت أصداء في العراق. للمرة الأولى منذ سنوات أشعر بخوفهم الشديد. على العاصمة. وما تبقى من التعاض ووحدة العراق. تكرر تحبير «الإنهيار الكامل» في وصفهم التطورات. استوفني قول سياسي يبينهم إن التقاد العراق من الخارج متعذر. وإن الغارات الأميركية على «داعش» لن تحل المشكلة. هذا إذا حصلت. وإن إيران تترك تملأ مخاطر أي تورط عسكري مباشر لقواتها. والأمر نفسه بالنسبة إلى تركيا. قال السياسي إن الوقت **ينفذ** بسرعة رهيبه. وإن وقف التدهور لا بد أن يبدأ باستقالة المالكي لإفساح المجال أمام حكومة وحدة وطنية **تخمين** الدفاع عن بغداد نفسها ومنع وقوع منبحة كبرى فيها وحولها. حكومة **تشرع** فوراً في إعادة تنظيم القوات المسلحة وتتعاون مع قوات إقليم كردستان وبناء المناطق التي **استباحت** على يد «داعش» وحلفائها. ولفت إلى ما سماه «حقائق جديدة على الأرض في المناطق السنية وكذلك في كركوك التي باتت للمرة الأولى في عهدة قوات البيشمركة وحدها».

TT:

"I phoned **friends of mine** in Iraq. For the first time I **could sense** how afraid they are for the capital, the remaining coexistence and Iraq's unity. When they **described** the developments, the expression 'total collapse' kept coming up. The words of a certain [Iraqi] politician gave me pause: Iraq will not be **rescued** from without, and American attacks on ISIS, if they occur, will not solve the problem. Iran [too] **knows** full well the dangers of direct military intervention by its forces, and so does Turkey. This politician said that time **was fast running out**, and that stopping the deterioration must first include Al-Maliki's resignation in order to enable a unity government that **would ensure** the defense of Baghdad and prevent a grand massacre in and around it. A government that **would immediately start** reorganizing its armed forces and **would cooperate** with forces in Kurdistan and residents of areas whose lives **are threatened** by ISIS and its allies...

In this extract, a number of grammatical shifts took place ranging from class shifts to tense shifts to unit shifts as follows. A shift in unit from the Arabic noun "أصدقاء" (friends) in "هاتفنت أصدقاء في العراق" (I phoned **friends** in Iraq) into the English noun phrase "I phoned **friends of mine** in Iraq" suggests a change in translating the source message. The Arabic indefinite noun "أصدقاء" (friends) offers two meanings either 'friends of the author' or 'people who the author knows through other people, a network'. The second interpretation is more likely the correct one since the source author would say "أصدقائي" (my friends) to refer to 'friends of mine'. In the Arab culture, people from the network tend to be called 'friends' and it is norm that people, especially journalists, call others, whom they do not necessary know but could get their contact numbers, in conflict zones in order to hear the latest news. To support this argument, the author in the followed sentences describes one of these 'friends' as 'a politician' rather than providing his name or saying 'a politician friend of mine'. This does not exist in the English-speaking culture thus it was translated into "friends of mine". But the consequences relay on the narrativity feature of relationality that builds connections between the author and those whom he phoned. Shifts in tense are realised in changing the Arabic simple present "أشعر" (I sense) into the English verb phrase of the past "I could sense", the Arabic simple present "ينفذ بسرعة" (runs out fast) into the English past continuous "was fast running out", the Arabic simple present "تضمن الدفاع" (ensures the defence) into the English verb phrase of past tense "would ensure the defense", the Arabic simple present "تشرع" (starts) into the English verb phrase of past

tense “would immediately start”, and the Arabic simple present “تتعاون” (cooperates) into the English verb phrase of past tense “would cooperate”. In narrating the story under analysis, the source author uses the simple present while MEMRI’s English translation uses forms of past tense in this extract. The usage of the English modals ‘could’ and ‘would’ here instead of the Arabic simple present is to weakening the verbs and applying a low degree of certainty that in turn reflects the translators’ doubt in the happenings. Generally, the usage of past tense in this extract suggests that happenings already took place and that providing assistance or solution to this issue is pointless, and that the application possibility of the suggested solutions by the politician is very low. In other words, MEMRI’s translation undermines the source message and suggests that the issue in question is invalid and the case is hopeless thus let the world enjoys the World Football Cup rather than being concerned about what is happening in Iraq i.e. the high possibility of Iraq to collapse under *Daesh*’s attacks. Further, two class shifts from the Arabic nouns “وصفهم” (description) and “نقاذ” (rescue) into the English verbs “described” and “rescued” respectively suggests the tendency of MEMRI to apply a sense of past to the current happenings. There are also two shifts in reporting verbs from the Arabic “تدرك” (understands) and “استبيحت” (violated) into the English “knows” and “are threatened” respectively. The first shift reconstructs the semantic properties of the Arabic verb “تدرك” (understands) in “وإن إيران تدرك تماماً مخاطر أي تورط عسكري مباشر لقواتها” (And Iran totally **understands** the risk of any direct military involvement of its forces) into the English verb “knows” in “Iran [too] **knows** full well the dangers of direct military intervention by its forces”. The shift from the Arabic “understands” into the English “knows” allows the negotiation of the possibility of Iran to military intervene in Iraq which is firmly rejected by the source author. The second shift occurs in reporting the Arabic verb “استبيحت” (were violated) in “وأبناء المناطق التي استبيحت على يد «داعش»» “و«حلفائها»” (and sons of the areas which **were violated** by ‘*Daesh*’ and its allies) to the

English “are threatened” in “and residents of areas whose lives **are threatened** by ISIS and its allies”. The shift in the semantic characteristics of the Arabic “violated” that refers to ‘the areas’ into the English “are threatened” that refers to ‘the sons/residents’ reflects MEMRI’s intention to draw an image of blood and killing and gives weight to this image over the source image of a general state of violation at all levels including killing of people, controlling, forcing and enforcing daily life, rules and orders, and changing of norms and systems, etc.

7.3.3 Reorganising of materials

Reorganising of materials involves the forward and backward of some textual parts of the source narrative in the target narrative. In other words, what is placed at earlier positions is relegated in later positions of the target narrative and vice versa. In addition, reorganising of textual materials is realised in different forms including ‘omission’ that is in turn reconstructs and renegotiates the original narrative in the target text, see the discussion under sections **6.3 Temporal and Spatial Framings** and **7.2.2 Omission**.

Compiling the translations of excerpts from different articles in a single article that also does not follow the chronological order of publishing date of these articles is also a form of reorganising of materials. Further, the added in-text titles (headings) are a device for reorganising materials as discussed earlier in section **5.4 Headings: In-text titles**. MEMRI largely applies reorganising of materials in its various forms as an effective reframing strategy of the Arabic narratives in order to “suppress, accentuate or elaborate particular aspects of a narrative encoded in the source text or utterance, or aspects of the larger narrative(s) in which it is embedded” (Baker, 2006, p. 114). The following example illustrates MEMRI’s reorganisation of textual narratives on *Daesh* and highlights its reframing effectiveness.

Special Dispatch No. 6124; Articles In Saudi Press Reject Russian Initiative For Regional Alliance With Assad Regime To Fight Terrorism, Stress: Political Solution In Syria – The Only Way To Deal with Terrorism.

Under section **5.3 Introductions (Prefaces)**, SD 6124 provided an example of lengthy supplementary (paratextual) materials to the translation to follow with eight paragraphs of preface. It illustrated how added introductions among other paratextual materials operate as a strategic device of reconstructing and reframing the source text through reorganising, omitting, adding and prioritising some information over other. In this section, SD 6124 offers an example of reorganising materials as a textual reframing device in MEMRI's English translations of the Arabic media narratives on *Daesh*. In SD 6124, MEMRI compiles five different articles. The first article titled "لقاءات الدوحة.. " (Literally: Doha meetings.. Hot files and necessary solutions) that praises the role of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) in finding solutions to the Syrian issue. However, MEMRI's translation omits a large part (the first two paragraphs) of the text which discusses this role and a sentence in the last paragraph that contributes to this end "وعليه , تأتي جهود المملكة لتصب أولا وأخرا في فكرة إنقاذ " (Accordingly, the efforts of the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] come to flow firstly and lastly in the idea of helping the Syrian brothers out of their crisis which was caused by the regime). This omission reorganises the argument of the Arabic editorial from a discussion over the GCC meetings toward a solution to the Syrian issue to MEMRI's rejection of Russian initiative toward a solution to the Syrian issue. Contrary to the first article that does not meet this SD main argument, the second article titled "حلف ضد "داعش" أم لإجل إنقاذ الأسد؟" (Literally: A coalition against "Daesh" or to save Assad?) discusses the Russian role in the Syrian issue and the Russian support to the regime. In order to grant more weight to this notion, MEMRI attempted to start its paragraphs with 'Russia' thus it broke the second paragraph of the Arabic editorial into two. This reorganising of materials resulted into a

certain pattern; “Russia is...”, “[In this initiative] Russia...”, and “What Russia...”. Although the third article titled “*ماذا تعني عودة الروس؟*” (Literally: What does Russian return mean?) discusses the Russian role which is the topic of this SD, it elaborates more on the Libyan and Yemeni cases rather than the Syrian case. Therefore, similarly to the first article, the second and the third paragraphs were completely omitted in MEMRI’s translation. MEMRI also broke the last Arabic paragraph into two, similarly to the second article, in order to start its last paragraph with “If Russia...”. MEMRI’s reorganising of the third Arabic editorial on *Daesh* serves its elaborated narrative in this SD that focuses on the negative image of Russia in the Syrian issue and the War on Terror. The fourth article titled “*ليقرر السوريون مستقبلهم*” (Literally: Let Syrians decide their future) in which the authors provide an in-depth analysis to the Syrian issue and offer some solutions, this article does not name Russia either explicitly or implicitly. A large part (five complete paragraphs) was omitted in MEMRI’s English translation. MEMRI reorganised the original Arabic editorial through its reframing tools including title, preface, heading, omission and compilation in order to deceive the readership of the relationality of the Arabic editorials to the narrative that MEMRI tries to elaborate in this SD. The fifth Arabic editorial titled “*ويلات حرب وخيبات سلام*” (Literally: War woes and peace disappointments) debates the possibility of one party to claim winning the Syrian war providing some solutions. The author, similar to the fourth article, does not involve Russia as a part of this debate in any way. The first and the seventh paragraphs were omitted in MEMRI’s English translation. The fifth and the sixth Arabic paragraphs were connected in a single paragraph in the target text. Although only the second Arabic article discusses and rejects the Russian solutions to the Syrian issue while the other four articles merely suggest their own solutions, MEMRI compiles all the five articles under “*Articles In Saudi Press Reject Russian Initiative For Regional Alliance With Assad Regime To Fight Terrorism, Stress: Political Solution In Syria – The Only Way*”

To Deal with Terrorism". Furthermore, the Arabic articles were re-sequenced in MEMRI's translation regardless their publishing dates as follows. The first article was published on 4 August 2015 and placed first in MEMRI's translation. The second article was published on 3 August 2015 and placed second in MEMRI's translation. The third article was published on 3 August 2015 and placed third in MEMRI's translation. The fourth article was published on 30 July 2015 and placed fourth in MEMRI's translation. The fifth article was published on 3 August 2015 and placed fifth in MEMRI's translation. MEMRI's reordering of articles in its English translation is a tool of reconstructing the original Arabic narratives on *Daesh* through the elaboration of a certain accumulative narrative i.e. *Daesh* is supported by the Syrian regime that is supported by Russia. In other words, MEMRI's narrative in this SD offers the reframed story; Russia is supporting terror.

7.4 Summary

This chapter offered an in-depth analysis of reframing textual materials in MEMRI's English translations to the Arabic editorials on *Daesh*. It started with the discussion of selective appropriation of textual materials as one of the two main devices of textual reframing in translation. Both addition and omission at the structural lower level, i.e. word-phrase, are the most common reframing tools of selective appropriation. Addition is found to be extensively and strategically employed by MEMRI in order to inject the target text with ideologically-laden concepts such as '*jihad*' and '*the mujahideen money*'. Other 'explanatory' and 'grammatical' additions such as of a concept, pronoun or structure are also found to contribute to the narrative under elaboration by MEMRI. Omission or de-selection as a reframing tool of selective appropriation is found to be largely practiced by MEMRI in an attempt to reconstruct and decontextualize the source narratives thus renegotiates their intended messages. By replacing part of the text with

three dots (...), MEMRI escapes the translation of value-loaded and argumentative items in its attempt to reframe the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* employing the narrativity features of relationality and causal emplotment. Lexical and grammatical choices are the other device of reframing of textual materials in translation which includes lexical choice, grammatical shifts and reorganising of materials. Lexical choice is mainly concerned with the semantic characteristic of a word or part of and it includes labels, titles and names of groups, events and places. It clearly shows the position of the translator toward certain rival matters such as translating ‘جزية’ (contribution) into ‘poll-tax’, ‘داعش’ (*Daesh*) into ‘ISIS’ and ‘جهاد’ (fight) into ‘jihad’. Grammatical shifts and the choice of reporting verbs are found not to make a difference if seen as speared cases, rather they should be considered as a pattern that accumulatively contribute to a signalled narrative by MEMRI. Reorganising of materials includes the re-sequencing of chronological order of the Arabic editorials in MEMRI’s presentation, the omission of large parts of the source texts, and the compilation of editorials that differ in message in a single article. The ideological stands of translators represented in their reframed narratives on *Daesh* are better understood if the discussed reframing tools and devices are considered as episodes in a series. In other words, the bigger picture is clearly seen when paratextual, contextual and textual reframing strategies are examined together along with the eight narrativity features.

The next chapter summarises the current thesis. It also provides answers to the research questions and a discussion on the main research results in regard to the results of the literature.

CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

In light of the narrative theory-informed analysis of Baker (2006), this chapter answers the research questions set in Chapter One and provides a discussion on the main research findings in relation to those of the literature. This chapter also offers a summary of this thesis and concludes with suggestions for future accounts, by considering thesis limitations and results.

8.2 Research Summary

This thesis set out to study the widely circulated English translations of the Arabic editorial narratives of the phenomenon *Daesh* and its local, regional and international impact upon the current war in the Middle East and the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’. This thesis also comes as a response to calls of Al-Sharif (2009), Matyas (2010), Robinson (2011) and Pym (2016) for further study and application of the interdisciplinary narrative theory-informed analysis proposed by Baker (2006) that argues for overcoming shortcomings of the narrow, pure linguistic view in revealing the embedded ideological and value laden (re)framings in translation.

Chapter One establishes the nexus between the various research inquiries, i.e. conflict, media, translation and manipulation. The first chapter discusses that translation plays a mediating role between nations that are in conflicts with each other and that translation as a tool in the hands of media agencies, manipulates the narratives under translation. Chapter one also demonstrates that the ‘War on Terror’ narrative dominates the frames set to re-narrate personal narratives in translation such as the case of Al-Jazeera journalist Taysir Alony, that resulted in the ruling that Alony receive seven

years imprisonment. The first chapter then proceeds to provide a background on the contemporary civil wars in the Middle East, in general, and in Syria in particular, the main site of research for this thesis. For some power relations and interests involved in the Syrian case, Syria is the most tragic civil war in the modern Arab world. As of August 2016, the Syrian Civil War resulted in the killings of more than 450,000 people including 50,000 children, 5 million refugees and a general state of anarchy. The Syrian Civil War attracted terrorist groups, most prominently *Daesh* and international intervention under the pretext of the 'War on Terror'. *Daesh* (others prefer to call it: ISIS, ISIL, IS), a military group of Al-Qaeda affiliation in Iraq, emerged in 2004 and was initially called Al-Qaeda under the leadership of the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi with the aim to resist the American occupation of Iraq. However, after several changes in the group's name, leadership and ideology, *Daesh*, which stands for *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham* (*Daesh*, with the literal translation of, 'the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria'), is considered a worldwide security threat after members of the group carried out attacks in several countries outside of Syria and Iraq such as the US, France, the UK, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. The ideology of *Daesh*, is purported to be derived from 'extreme Islam', but that misinterprets and misuses the concept '*jihad*' to globally attack non-Muslims and even Muslims of other sects. *Daesh*, as discussed in the chapter, extensively uses the Internet and social networks in spreading its propaganda in different languages and to different audiences for different reasons, e.g. for recruitment and to threaten others. Local, regional and international media outlets variously describe *Daesh* from their own ideological perspectives as a 'state', 'terrorist organisation', 'religious sectarian', 'global threat' and 'true representation of Islam, Islamist'. Moreover, the first chapter explains how the attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda and *Daesh* were employed to associate the 'War on Terror' narrative with a narrative of 'Extremist Islam'. The chapter discusses former US

President George W. Bush's declaration of 11 September 2001 as a 'terroristic attack' rather than a 'criminal attack', and calling for a 'War on Terror' that established a language of 'us' versus 'them', thus dividing the world into two groups, i.e. the allies and the enemies. Although the 'War on Terror' narrative was criticised for being "an ideology of fear and repression that creates enemies and promotes violence rather than mitigating acts of terror and strengthening security" (The Global Policy Forum, 2016), this narrative successfully gained a large number of subscribers thanks to its "generic script of a nation at war [that] provides a ready-made cultural framework to aid in both telling and interpreting the Narrative" (Hodges, 2011, p. 20). The association of the 'War on Terror' narrative to Islam is well established in US presidential speeches including Bush's speech dated 6 October 2005 where the former US President stated that, "[t]he murderous ideology of the **Islamic radicals** is the great challenge of our new century" (cited in Hodges, 2011, p. 38, emphasis added). The 'War on Terror' narrative is also expressed in current US President Donald Trump's use of "**radical Islamic terrorism**" where he repeatedly urges that, "any politician who wouldn't use those words was too weak or obsessed with political correctness to be president"¹⁰⁴. 'Islamic radicals' is also called 'Islamic extremism', 'Islamofascism', and 'militant Jihadism' elsewhere in the presidential speeches.

As discussed in Chapter One, the current research problem, the chapter discusses, is the injected ideological loadings (reframing) in translation that has resulted from the social, cultural, political and ideological backgrounds of the translators who are inevitably involved in the interpretation and production of translation. In translating political conflict news particularly on the 'War on Terror', the literature shows that the translators tend to undermine and challenge the narratives under translation through

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/donald-trump-saudi-arabia-radical-islamic-terrorism-muslims-soften-tone-iran-palestinians-israel-a7748541.html> [published 22 May 2017, accessed 1 August 2017]

reframing. Furthermore, there is a gap in the literature in studying the case of *Daesh* from an inter-disciplinary approach, i.e. Baker (2006). Therefore, the importance of this study is to inform policymakers and the public of the possible reframing of the various circulated narratives in translation while highlighting the role of the translator and the institution in this reframing. The research objectives set forth in this study are summarised in one general objective: To reveal the strategies that enable MEMRI to reconstruct reality through reframing narratives and featuring *Daesh* in its English translations of the Arabic editorial articles on the contemporary civil war in the Middle East, that helps to sustain the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’. The general research question for this chapter is: How does the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) utilise translation as a tool of reframing the narratives on the terrorist acts of *Deash* in order to reconstruct reality and promote the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ in the context of the contemporary civil war in the Middle East?

Chapter One then concludes with some notes on the terminologies: ‘reality’, ‘instrument of mind’, ‘frame/framing’ and ‘narratives’. Reality as adopted in this study is what is reported in the source text ‘as is’ regardless of any conflicting opinions elsewhere. In this study, the term ‘instrument of mind’ refers to narratives as methods and sites that generate certain effects on the audience’s interpretation. Frames are strategic signalling devices that are deliberately structured in order to grant a certain presentation to a narrative. Framing is a dynamic structure that we are willingly involved with in the production of reality. The notion of ‘narrative’ as adopted in this study is the chief method through which we experience and exchange experiences of the surrounding world with others; in this sense ‘story’ is a synonym of ‘narrative’.

Chapter Two offers an exhaustive discussion on the notions of ‘narrative’ and ‘framing’ across time periods and literature as well as their involvement in the development of the media and journalism with special reference to the contemporary civil war in the Middle East within the frame of the ‘War on Terror’ narrative. Narrative as a scientific analytical tool varies in consideration and application from one academic field to another, i.e. literary studies, psycholinguistics, journalism, sociology, religious studies and discourse. One of the earlier works on narrative in literary studies was produced by Labov and Waletzky (1967) that set a model of analysing the internal structure of spoken personal narratives with the aim to reveal the settings, formation and evaluation of a narrative. The Labov and Waletzky approach is built upon the idea that people structure what they remember of past experiences into a sequence of events, thus prioritising the narrativity feature of temporality. White’s (1980/1987) model is built upon the idea that narrative is a means of reality representation that transforms knowledge into a tellable story. It aims to reveal the truth of a real story by assessing its coherence, integration and completeness.

Bal (1985, 1997, 2009) provides another pioneering model in narratology that analyses a narrative in three dimensions: Text (words), Story (aspects) and Fabula (elements). The notion of Focalization is argued to occupy a central role in revealing the embedded ideological loadings in a news narrative that frames the roles and understandings of readers, thus reframing the original story. Norrick (2000) is an elaboration of Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) work where Norrick adds the analysis of the external structure of narrative weighting significant factors such as *formulaicity* and *repetition* and emphasises collaborative narratives over personal narratives. Norrick’s approach of *immediate retelling* is set to investigate the (re)framing realised by tellers of the same given event in different contexts. Altman’s (2008) approach in narratology

provides an explanation of the success of the War on Terror narrative that is drawn on the notion of the dual-focus through the enforcement of the language of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and the use of the narrativity feature of relationality in associating ‘them’ to established known terrorists in history.

From a psycholinguistic perspective, van Dijk’s (1976) approach is built upon the idea that narrative is only a type of discourse and that sociological and psychological descriptions do not necessarily evolve into a narrative form. In his approach, the interpretation of a narrative undergoes a complex cognitive process involving some key factors such as *preferences*, *wishes* and *wants*, which are set by *motives*, *character features*, *likings* and *desires*, together with the reader’s *beliefs* and *knowledge*. Temporal linearity is the sequencing order set for this approach that also considers the specificity of the target listener of a given narrative.

Bruner’s (1991) approach is based on the idea that narrative as an instrument of mind operates as a constructor of ‘reality’ that is culturally agreed upon rather than empirically verified. Narrative cognitively works by means of the ten narrativity features: Narrative diachronicity, Particularity, Intentional state entailment, Hermeneutic composability, Canonicity and breach, Referentiality, Genericness, Normativeness, Context sensitivity and negotiability, and Narrative accrual.

Singer (2004) provides another psychological perspective that considers narrative as a means by which people make sense of their lives, that in turn structures their identities before the self and the others across a lifespan. In this approach, narrative aims to guide and justify actions, raise spirits and influence others. The overall

knowledge that results from narrative reasoning produces the temporal, causal and coherence to one's narrative identity.

Gerrig's (2011) approach is drawn upon the idea that the reader's long term general knowledge is an unconscious process central to his interpretation of a narrative, and that *Exemplar* represents the reader's conscious process that together operate in the moment along with the reader's preferences. In interpreting a narrative, the reader's *resonance* also works cognitively at the unconscious level to unify temporally disparate elements of a narrative into a coherent representation thereby granting authors the privilege to disseminate ideas along the text.

Narrative is theorised from a communication studies perspective in the work of Fisher (1987) that takes into consideration the significance of *values* in the constitution of reality, truth and knowledge. Fisher's work also regards people as *Homo narrans* and stories as representative of all events shaped by character, culture and history, by applying *good reason* and assessment through *narrative logic* i.e. fidelity and coherence. From a similar perspective, Selznick (2008) establishes the fact that media production tends to frame the audience's knowledge through the presented narratives, and that the *objectivity* of so-called 'objective' Western documentaries is uncertain since these documentaries aim to gather the Free World around pro-American ideologies. This approach also considers the bias of Western media's evaluation of 'goodness' and 'badness' that assigns horrific acts only to acceptable "bad guys" from Western media's perspective. Furthermore, narrative is theorised in Sociology in the works of Somers (1992, 1994, 1997) and Somers and Gibson (1994) that establish four narrativity features: *Temporality* (including *spatiality*), *selective appropriation*, *causal employment* and *relationality of parts* as a means of (re)framing narratives in a social

science context. In this perspective, narrative is regarded as a constellation of relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space, constituted by causal emplotment, and is categorised under four types: ontological, public, conceptual and metanarrativity. Narrativity in this context refers to a condition of society, structures, institutions, social action and social consciousness in relation to the immediate time, place and power.

Norman Fairclough (1992) provides a CDA perspective on narrative (or *discourse* as labelled in his approach) considering narrative a form of social practice including representation and action and as a key factor in the construction of social identity. Discourse (both spoken and written forms) is an analytical tool of three dimensions: (1) Text as a linguistic object; (2) Discursive practice including the production, consumption, and distribution of knowledge; and (3) Social practice including the power and systems of power relations, ideology and hegemony. These three layers correlate and codetermine each other. As an ideological practice, discourse aims to normalise, naturalise, maintain and sway different positions of power relations.

Religious studies perspectives on narrative are exhaustively discussed in Halverson, Goodall and Corman (2011). This work regards narrative as an influential repository that frames actions, identifies cultures and generates audience expectations. Narrative is central to the “war of ideas” aiming to understand the operational procedures of framing. Within the context of ‘extreme Islamic’ narratives, the approach establishes that the hermeneutics of the Quran allows the proposal of different conflicting ideas and the construction of various contested narratives. These extreme narratives gain wider coverage due to their internal reasoning coherence. These extreme narratives are governed by thirteen master narratives : The Pharaoh, The *Jahiliyyah*, The

Battle of *Badr*, The Hypocrites, The Battle of *Khaybar*, The Battle of *Karbala*, The *Mahdi*, The Infidel Invaders (The Crusader and The Tatar), *Shaytan's* Handiwork, 1924, The *Nakba*, Seventy-Two Virgins. In this approach, humans are storytellers who tend to apply the notion of 'goodness' and 'badness' in assessing other communications and guiding and justifying actions. Master narratives are culturally, historically and socially dependent and draw upon two narrativity features: story forms (patterns) and archetypes.

The second section of Chapter Two discusses the notion of 'framing' across several academic fields including discourse, sociology, media studies and business. Pan and Kosicki's (1993) approach regards narrative as a product framed by available resources, journalists and audience within a shared culture and defined social positions. Framing in this approach is regarded as both a device of formulating and operating news discourse, and a property of the discourse itself. In news discourse, there are four main framing devices within the structural paradigm: syntactical, rhetorical, thematic and script. The expected audience reaction is measured by the interpretation of lexical and structural properties of the text and relating these properties to those of the past (experiences).

The Scheufele's (1999) model establishes framing as a key process in constructing social reality that also controls the audience's understanding and response. Framing as a device in journalism practice is a norm that is largely unacknowledged. Media framing is drawn from three sources: journalist-centred (their writing style, attitude and ideology), selection of frames (institutional policy and standards) and external sources (advocacy groups, authorities and politicians). The Norris et al. (2003) approach argues that in framing narratives, the media selects, grants weight and

excludes events or aspects of events in order to compose a coherent interpretation and evaluation of a given set of events. Media reporting depends on credible sources and familiar patterns (frames) to communicate 'reality'. News frames are shaped largely by three factors: the agreed facts on the happenings, the interpretations of these happenings by officials and the weight of dissident groups.

The King and Wells (2009) model is built upon the consideration of frames as chief organisers of ideas that transfer the meanings of happenings into narratives, and that framing as a process involves selection, weighting and association of desired parts of information. Frames as understood in this model operate by providing definitions to a particular situation by discussing its problematic conditions and effects followed by analysis of causes, then assessment of the morality of its key players, concluding by recommending some improvements and treatments. Butler (2012) provides that framing as a process aims at advancing public perception toward a given issue and increasing general agreement on its ultimate proposed solution. The functions of frames are classified under three main categories: diagnostic (problem identification and causes attribution), prognostic (solution[s] proposition) and motivational (action-engagement rationality). Cumulatively, frames function as knowledge producers that extract from life experiences and that social and psychological processes besides other factors, shape such productions. Three main considerations are included in evaluating frames application: credibility, salience and dynamism. Ziegler et al. (eds.) (2015) established that framing as a concrete concept refers to the temporal context that represents the rational paradigms set within narrative. It is largely bi-directional, culture-specific, flexible, situational and internally sequential in reasoning and repetitive in form. It operates as a device of normalisation and rationalisation of narratives, for propaganda.

Fairhurst (2010) constitutes that framing in leadership communication is a reality constructor governed mainly by six rules: context control, situation definition, ethics application, uncertainty interpretation, response designation and spontaneity control. Framing in this model is considered from various perspectives as a skill, a science, an art, an emotion and an ethic. Wendland (2010) advances that frames are a cognitive schema that contains a set of parameters for understanding and interpreting experiences by the public. Frames aim at influencing the public views by providing manipulated versions of 'reality' in which they offer a judgment for further action(s). In so doing, frames feature some particularities of an event/happening over others to direct the audience to the preferred settings of interpretation (perception).

The last part of Chapter Two offers a tabulation of recent applications of similar approaches from various fields including Translation Studies in works of Al Sharif (2009), Sinibaldi (2012), Taibi and Martin (2012), and Brännlund et al. (2013), Discourse Analysis in the works of Zhang (2011), Al-Hejin (2012), Mansourabadi and Karimnia (2013), and Al-Hejin (2015), and Journalism and Media Studies in the works of Montgomery (2009) and Buckle (2011). The second chapter concludes that there is a lack of literature with an interdisciplinary approach in the study of modern (inter)national conflict in the Middle East where global security is threatened by *Daesh* within the 'War on Terror' narrative.

Chapter Three discusses the notion of 'narrative' and the emergence of narrative theory in translation studies in depth as developed in Baker (2006) and drawing upon the works of Goffman (1981), Bal (1985, 1997, 2009), Fisher (1987), Bruner (1991), Somers (1992, 1994, 1997), and Somers and Gibson (1994). Narrative establishes a form of reality representation and constitution that people subscribe to and that in turn guides

their behaviour known as a story. The effectiveness of narrative is realised in its normalisation, objectiveness, categorisation and constitution of reality. The political import of narrative suggests accepting a narrative while unconsciously rejecting others. There are four types of narratives: ontological, public, conceptual and meta-narrative. In translation, narrative is a reframing (manipulation) device in the hands of the translators in which certain ideological and value loadings are communicated. The conceptual framework developed in this thesis is built upon the idea that an event is framed in a source text that is reframed in the target text and then interpreted by the audience to shape the final image of this event. These steps undergo several factors in the process including ideology, culture, agenda and policy. Moreover, there are eight narrativity features that overlap with or complete each other at times: temporality, selective appropriation, causal emplotment, relationality, particularity, genericness, 'normativeness, canonicity and breach' and narrative accrual. These eight features are potential (re)framing sites in narrativity. Framing as established in this model, is a strategy to explicitly and implicitly re-code the source narrative in an attempt to redirect its message to the desirable understanding: the reconstruction of reality. Framing is of three types: textual, contextual and paratextual in which several tools are employed under each category. The last episode in narrative theory-informed analysis by Baker (2006) is the narrative assessment that is realised in coherence and fidelity. Figure 3.2 outlines Baker (2006) and represents the research analytical framework. The last part of Chapter Three provides critical reviews of Baker (2006) including the perspectives of Min (2007), Guldin (2013), Matyas (2010), Robinson (2011) and Pym (2016).

Chapter Four establishes the adopted research methodology set to investigate the English translations of Arabic editorials on *Daesh* published by the advocacy group called the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). The chapter offers an

exhaustive discussion on MEMRI, which was established in 1998 by Yigal Carmon an Israeli national aiming to translate the Arabic media to the West. MEMRI has several offices across the world including its headquarters in Washington, DC. Currently, MEMRI distributes selected articles translated from Arabic, Turkish, Farsi, Hindi, Dari and Urdu-Pashtu media into mainly English, but also Hebrew, Spanish, French, Polish and Japanese. The chapter also provides comprehensive information on MEMRI's founders, directors, advisors and staff, and concludes that the majority of MEMRI's members are currently, or were, working with the Israeli intelligence agency, the CIA and the FBI within the context of tracking 'Islamic terrorist movements'. Moreover, Chapter Four presents an overview of MEMRI's main projects that monitor the Arab and Muslim media, namely: The Jihad and Terrorism Project, The Reform Project, The Antisemitism Documentation Project, The Arab and Iranian TV Monitoring Project, The South Asia Studies Project, The MEMRI 9/11 Documentation Project, and The Iran Studies Project.

MEMRI has a significant impact on the international media that is demonstrated in its citation by numerous leading media outlets in the US and elsewhere. It is the primary source of information and news for politicians, businessmen, policy-makers and militaries worldwide with more reliance by the US administration especially within the 'War on Terror'. MEMRI's translation quality is doubtful as concluded by Baker (2010) and Al-Sharif (2009) due to its large ideological-framed selectivity, addition and lexical choices. The chapter also cites some compliments and critiques of MEMRI words and works.

Furthermore, Chapter Four establishes the procedures of collecting research data of 46 Arabic written political editorial articles (about 60 pages) on *Daesh* and their

English translations in 25 articles (about 47 pages). The data was collected manually through a search in the MEMRI archives under the ‘Special Dispatch’ section on English translations of Arabic editorials on *Daesh* between 8 April 2013 and 8 April 2016. The justification for data selection is realised in the vast and worrisome impact of MEMRI’s translations as discussed in this thesis. The procedures of data analysis are built upon the understanding that the current research is qualitative, employing interdisciplinary narrative theory-informed analysis in comparing the Arabic source texts to the English translations by MEMRI.

Chapter Five visits one of the main three sites of (re)framing within the narrative theory that operates outside the immediate text: Paratextual framing (a set of supplementary information to the main text). The first tool in paratextual framing is titles, the first to be read and that function as signal devices of the message to demonstrate in the text. Within the context of the research data, the chapter establishes that MEMRI’s English translations of the Arabic titles are of three types: Titles of single articles, titles of compiled articles and titles of interview articles. In terms of titles of single articles, MEMRI as exemplified in its SD 5575 completely reframes the Arabic title by applying a number of strategies: The inclusion of the writer’s name/profession and nationality that function to reposition the communication participant, the constitution of relationality in the use of the Arabic word ‘جهاد’ (transliteration: *jihad*, translation: fight) to inject the target text with specific ideological loadings, and the prioritising of ideas and notions such as ‘Al-Qaeda’ to redirect the source message towards a different interpretation. In translating titles of compiled articles as illustrated in MEMRI’s SD 5718, three Arabic titles were reframed into a single English title through the generalisation realised in ‘Jordanian Press’, and the use of the negative form –ism as in ‘Extremism’. The translation of titles of interview

articles as explained in MEMRI's SD 5912, reframes the original by means of omitting the indication of 'interview', using charged lexical choice, addition and the use of the suffix form -ist to apply negative soundings. The second tool in paratextual framing is introductions (prefaces) in which MEMRI usually provides information in two to six paragraphs about the author, the newspaper, (un)related events and claimed main argument as demonstrated in the analysis of MEMRI's SDs 6288, 5969 and 6124. Headings (in-text titles) is the third tool in paratextual framing that serves either as internal titles when a single translation compiles several texts and/or as thematically divider of a text into sections. In this regard, MEMRI largely adds headings to its translation in order to thematically (versus episodically) reframe the narratives under translation that in turn evokes the narrativity feature of relationality to reinterpret these narratives in a certain way.

Images and their captions are visual devices that are used to illustrate more believability. The fourth tool of paratextual framing offers a framed perspective to the narrative under translation as illustrated in MEMRI's SD 5575 in which an image of the author holding a weapon is added to undermine the source narrative and support MEMRI's framed narrative as signalled in the title and introduction. MEMRI's SD 5718 adds an image of a church turned by *Daesh* into an Islamic office to support the arguments elaborated by MEMRI that *Daesh* is a Muslim representative that attacks Christians in Syria. The chapter concludes with the fifth tool in paratextual framing that are endnotes and glossaries employed by MEMRI further support its elaborated message through providing (unreliable) resources, definitions, explanations and (un)related events.

Chapter Six analyses the second main (re)framing device within narrative theory, the contextual level. Context is derived from the Latin ‘*contextus*’ (nexus, coherence) and refers to the elements required in understanding a text or part of a text. These elements include the ideological, political, cultural and social implications of the text. The significance of understanding the source context invites specification of meaning, thus correctly reproducing meaning in the target text. Contextual framings are not only applied to the main text, but also to the paratext. They are categorised in this study under three headings: Thematic and Episodic Framings, Temporal and Spatial Framings and Relationality Framings. While thematic framings embed a narrative in a wider context targeting long-term government planning and policy, episodic framings are concerned with a particular case seeking immediate action. In the context of the English translations under study, MEMRI tends to make use of thematic framings in order to evoke relationality among its unrelated necessary compilation of narratives that in turn reflects a negative image of Arabs and Muslims. This practice is constituted in its generalisation of authors’ opinions as discussed in the previous chapter. As illustrated in the contextual analysis of MEMRI’s SDs 5955 and 6067, the Arabic editorials employ episodic framing to show sympathy with the special cases such as the burning to death of Muath Al-Kassasba and the collapse of the city of Ramadi. However, MEMRI’s selectivity of passages to translate decontextualizes these editorials and sets them in a thematic framing that features *Daesh* and the ‘War on Terror’. The sixth chapter furthers temporal and spatial framings referring to the time and space configuration of a narrative regardless of any chronological order. They operate without direct intervention in the text through relocation of a value-laden message of a given time and space into a new context. In this regard, MEMRI’s English translations are set in a different temporal and spatial framing than of the Arabic source texts mainly through the application of the narrativity feature of selectivity as exemplified in

MEMRI's SD 6239 and SD 5970. The offered English translations largely deselect (omit) events and re-sequence others that in turn render MEMRI's narrative intelligible. The ideological-driven deselection process functions to manipulate the causal-effect relationship embedded in the source narratives, inviting a different causal emplotment.

The last part of Chapter Six establishes the third contextual framing tool of relationality that establishes connections among events that are not necessarily related. The effectiveness of relationality depends on the borrowing of a ST word into the TT that in turn evokes a completely different story set for a specific context and readership. To explain this, the chapter analyses the borrowing of two Arabic words 'جهاد' (transliteration: *jihad*, translation: fight) and 'شيخ' (transliteration: *sheikh*, translation: senior, leader) illustrating MEMRI's SDs 5575 and 6159 respectively. The Arabic 'jihad' and 'sheikh' were left without translation in MEMRI's English narratives and read differently by the target audience within the relationality of Arabs and Muslims to the 'War on Terror'.

Chapter Seven illustrates textual framings, the third framing device within narrative theory that applies to the immediate text and reflects traceable and direct interventions by the translators. Textual framings are classified under two main headings: Selective Appropriation of Textual Materials that includes addition and omission, and Lexical and Grammatical Choices that includes lexical choice, grammatical shift and reorganisation of materials. The chapter explains that addition is a tool that aims to fill the gap between the source and the target texts by adding a word or a phrase to ensure compatibility at the TL syntactic or semantic paradigm. Addition is also a textual framing tool that injects the target text with elements that sabotage the ideological-based source narratives. In the context of the research data under study,

MEMRI's English translations of Arabic editorials on *Daesh* disturb the reader's experience through massive bracketed additions that attempt to demonstrate distorted images of the Arabic language or its writers. MEMRI's bracketed additions also constitute the reframed value-laden narrative that MEMRI seeks to communicate to the target audience including its massive addition of [ISIS] to any narrative on terrorism. The bracketed addition of [the mujahideen money] in MEMRI's SD 5575 illustrates the ideological insertion which renders the Arabic 'them' of 'the suffering Syrian people' into 'mujahideen' which evokes the meta-narratives of 'Jihad and Terror' and the 'War on Terror'. Moreover, MEMRI also applies omission as a tool of reframing the Arabic source narratives on *Daesh*. Omission in translation functions to eliminate a context or a cause that reconstructs the source narrative and provides a framed salient alternative that achieves the ideological aim behind omission. In the context of the narratives on *Daesh* under analysis, MEMRI omits textual materials that serve as explanatory information regarding the disassociation of Islam from terror and offers the real reasons and motives behind the terrorist acts by *Daesh* and its like as illustrated in the exhaustive analysis of MEMRI's SD 6241. Furthermore, lexical choice is a framing tool that enables writers to establish a comprehensive narrative that guides readers toward the intended interpretation and evaluation of a narrative in order to react accordingly. Lexical choice is realised in the careful selection of words and labels of people, groups, places, terms and titles. The lexical choice made in MEMRI's SD 5718 in translating the Arabic 'الجزية' (transliteration: *jizya*, translation: financial contributions) into the English 'poll-tax' provides an evident example of MEMRI's reframing manipulation of the Arabic narratives to illustrate a misleading account of Islam that reconstructs the causal plotment of the ST that is read differently by the target audience. Furthermore, in this seventh chapter grammatical shifts are shown to be inevitably involved in the process of translation because of the grammatical differences between languages. However, some

translators tend to use grammatical shifts for their ideological position advantage. In this regard, MEMRI as exemplified in the analysis of its SD 5771 employs different types of optional grammatical shifts including unit shift, class shift, structural shift, tense shift and function shift of reporting verbs. These shifts operate as tools in the renegotiation of the semantic properties of source verbs that are then understood differently. The last part of this chapter represents the ideological use of reorganising materials as a tool of textual framing in translation. Reorganising materials includes replacing, omitting, sub-heading and compiling of textual parts. As established in the analysis of MEMRI's SD 6124, the reorganising of materials aims to suppress, accentuate or elaborate framed characteristics of the source text.

8.3 Discussion of Main Findings

This section discusses the research's main findings. It first provides criteria for assessing narratives as adopted from Baker (2006), which is built mainly upon Fisher (1997). This section then compares the current findings with those of the literature by explaining similarities and differences, after which, answers are offered in response to the research questions presented in Chapter One.

8.3.1 Assessing narratives: coherence and fidelity

Assessing narratives in this research draws upon the assumption that narratives do not merely represent reality but also constitute it. One cannot stand outside the narratives and assess them objectively, as Baker explains:

“Needless to say, the analysis is inevitably conducted from my specific narrative location, which means that others applying the same system may come up with a different analysis of the same narrative, and where my analysis might dissuade me from subscribing to a version of the narrative in question theirs could well encourage them to support it.” (2006, p. 141)

However, one's involvement in narratives does not prevent the ability to reason with them. The assessment paradigm is set upon the presentation of our reasons for subscribing or rejecting any given narrative. Good reasons are shaped by one's accumulative cultural, educational and historical experiences and beliefs. Reasons in this regard are value-laden. Narrative assessment is carried out by examining two principles, coherence and fidelity, that together embody good reasons (rationality). Coherence is concerned with narrative consistency and integrity including its internal and external structure make-up and argument, its similarity to other narratives on the same topic and the credibility of characters.

With regard to the structural (or argumentative) coherence within the context of the current research findings, MEMRI's translation is incoherent due to its extensive use of addition, omission and other reframing tools. The choices made by MEMRI's translators such as the use of the Arabic '*jihad*' instead of 'fight' in the context of Muslim-Muslim civil war invites the reader to question MEMRI's narrative since the meta-narrative has limited '*jihad*' to be "a war or struggle against unbelievers"¹⁰⁵. The claim of the value-laden concept '*جهاد*' (*jihad*) is misunderstood in the TT audience context. Moreover, the bracketed addition of '[the *mujahideen* money]' used by MEMRI to explain the Arabic '*بالتبرع لهم*' (by donating to them) evokes inconstancy since the Arabic narrative is concerned mainly with the suffering of Syrian people rather than fighters, and that the Arabic 'donate' appeals to good reasons yet its reframed translation suggests otherwise.

Furthermore, MEMRI appeals to the worldwide audience with the 'good reasons' understanding its principles, goals and aims as it claims:

¹⁰⁵ This definition was offered online by the Oxford Dictionary but it has been changed after several communications with the team.

“MEMRI is committed to giving readers, in both the East and the West, comprehensive access to the primary-source material from the Arab and Muslim world that we translate. For this reason, English is the primary language into which we translate, and our translations into English are the most representative of the body of our work and our research.”¹⁰⁶

“MEMRI: Bridging the Language Gap”¹⁰⁷

“The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) produces original translations of Middle Eastern media and distributes them, free of charge, by fax and email”¹⁰⁷.

“We will automatically receive your tax-deductible gift each month. Monthly gifts provide vital funds that help us continue to Bridge the Language Gap between the Middle East and the West”¹⁰⁸.

While MEMRI claims to adhere to non-profit principles and to provide original translations, inquiries, analyses and special reports free of charge, it urges its audience to donate to “Help to keep this effort going. MEMRI relies solely on donations”. However, this narrative is incoherent since MEMRI undermines its declared principle of non-profit, and trades its work of “The MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM)”¹⁰⁹ (discussed earlier in Chapter Four, please see also section 4.2.5 MEMRI Funding and Support). Additionally, this narrative does not meet MEMRI’s goal of reaching the public audience, MEMRI discusses¹¹⁰ (bold added):

“The goal of MEMRI’s JTTM is to inform government, military, intelligence agencies, and academia, of potential threats to public safety, security, and crucial interests and assets. Subscribers to JTTM will have access to vital information, including exclusive and breaking news and difficult-to-translate content”.

“MEMRI offers tiered subscription plans with varying rates”.

“The JTTM is not intended for media, contractors, or the general public; however, for specific requests please contact the JTTM”.

“For more information about subscription rates and policies, please contact MEMRI by phone at 202-955-9070 or by e-mail: jttmsubs@memri.org”.

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.memri.org/about> [accessed 17 August 2017]

¹⁰⁷ <https://www.memri.org/>

¹⁰⁸ <https://www.memri.org/donate/> [accessed 17 August 2017]

¹⁰⁹ <https://www.memri.org/jttm> [accessed 17 August 2017]

¹¹⁰ <https://www.memri.org/jttm/subscription> [accessed 17 August 2017]

In the context of material coherence and the relation of MEMRI's narratives to other narratives circulated on the same topics, MEMRI's narratives downplay and ignore counter-arguments of selected narratives, attempting to reconstruct and thus renegotiate the source message. MEMRI's SD 6241 (discussed in section 7.2.2) offers two contradicting narratives: MEMRI's English translation and its Arabic source narrative. While MEMRI's narratives associate Islam to terror and promote good reasons for the 'War on Terror', the source narrative denies that Islam is associated with terror and accuses the 'War on Terror' for bad reasons (explanation below).

Source Narrative

هذه الأيام، وعندما يبدأ شخص (غربي خاصة) بطرح الموضوع السوري ينطلق من اتهام ضمني لمحدثه السوري الداعم للثورة بدعم الإرهاب مفترضاً دعشنة الثورة، أو باتهام ضمني لمحدثه المسلم بشكل عام بتأييد الإرهاب فقط لكونه مسلماً، وعندما يحصل ذلك يجب عدم تحويل الموضوع إلى دفاع شخصي للبراءة من تهمة دعم الإرهاب، والجواب المنطقي المختصر القاطع المستنكر والهجومى: وما علاقتنا كداعمين للثورة أو كمسلمين بالإرهاب؟

(These days, when a person (especially Western) starts to talk about the Syrian topic, he begins with an implicit accusation to his pro-revolution Syrian interlocutor of supporting terrorism assuming that the revolution has been *Daesh*-ised. **And when this happens, [we] must not change the topic to self-defence to free from the accusation of supporting terrorism. The logical brief firm condemnable confronting answer [is]: what is the relation between us as pro-revolution and as Muslims, and terrorism?**).

MEMRI Narrative

“These days, when anyone, particularly a Westerner, converses [with a Syrian] on the issue of Syria, he starts from the position of implicitly accusing his pro-revolution Syrian interlocutor of supporting terrorism – based on the assumption that the revolution has been ISIS-ized [i.e. that supporters of the revolution are supporters of ISIS as well], or even [just] because his interlocutor is a Muslim”.

And

Source Narrative

إنها "الإنسانية الانتقائية" كما وصفها ابني في مقال منذ فترة، وعندما تكون الإنسانية انتقائية ويصبح الدم والمعاناة بورصة في سوق السياسات الدولية، عندها يفقد شعار الحرب على الإرهاب معناه وتتحول الحرب على الإرهاب إلى متاجرة بدماء الضحايا بل حرباً إرهابية من نوع آخر، وهذا ما يحصل في سوريا والعراق وفي بلاد الربيع العربي خاصة حيث سُحقت فيها الحقوق والإنسانية من أجل أهداف سياسية تحت شعار "الحرب على الإرهاب"، لكل ذلك ولأنني أتضامن بشكل حقيقي مع ضحايا الإرهاب في فرنسا بدوافع أخلاقية وإنسانية وإسلامية "كما أفهم إسلامي كمعظم المسلمين"، وبعيداً عن النفاق والاستخدام السياسي الرخيص، لن أذاع عن نفسي وأرد الاتهامات المسبقة لي كمسلم وسوري وعربي بدعم الإرهاب بينما أقف بوجهه وأدفع الثمن الأكبر على يد الإرهاب قتلاً وتشريداً ودماراً واعتقالاتاً وتعذيباً ومعاناة منذ نصف قرن، لكل ذلك وحتى تنتهي المأساة السورية سأتضامن مع ضحايا الإرهاب العالمي بالطريقة الوحيدة الأكثر صدقاً عبر إعلاني الدائم "Je_suis_Syria" منتظراً أن يرددها الآخر الغربي خاصة تضامناً معي لينفي عن نفسه حقيقة تصرخ بدعوه لإرهاب أخطر وأكثر وحشية من إرهاب داعش، لينفي عن نفسه صفة "داعم لإرهاب الإنسانية الانتقائية".

(It is "selective humanity" as my son has described in an article some time ago. **When humanity is selective and blood and suffering become a bourse in the international policy market, the slogan of the 'War on Terror' loses its meaning and the 'War on Terror' turns into trafficking in the blood of victims, and even a terrorist war from another type. This is what is happening in Syria, Iraq, and in the Arab Spring countries, especially where rights and humanity were crushed for political purposes under the slogan of the "War on Terror".** For all this and because I am truly solidarity with the victims of terrorism in France by moral, human and Islamic motives "as I understand my Islam as the majority of Muslims" away from hypocrisy and cheap political use. I will not defend myself against the prior accusations about me as a Muslim, a Syrian, and an Arab of supporting terrorism, while I stand against it and pay the greatest price on the hands of terrorism in forms of killing, homelessness, destruction, detention, torture and suffering for half a century. For all this and until the end of the Syrian tragedy, I will express solidarity with the victims of the international terrorism in the only most honest way through my permanent declaration of "Je_suis_Syria", waiting for the Other, the *Westerner* in particular, to present solidarity with me, **to defend himself against the truth that cries out for his support for a more dangerous and more brutal terrorism comparing to Daesh terrorism, to defend himself against the title "the supporter of selective humanity terrorism".**)

MEMRI Narrative

This is 'selective humaneness'...

"I will absolutely not defend myself or answer to the preconceived notions about me as a Muslim, a Syrian, and an Arab supporting terrorism – while [in practice] I stand against it and pay the greatest price for it. This price comes in the form of 50 years of killing, expulsion, destruction, arrests, torture, and suffering inflicted by terrorism.

"In light of all this, and until the Syrian tragedy ends, I will sense solidarity with the victims of global terrorism in the most genuine way, the only sincere way – by repeatedly declaring 'Je Suis Syria,' with the expectation that the other, especially the Westerner, will respond in kind and show solidarity with me."

The highlighted parts in the Arabic source text represent the author's counter-arguments of Western claims that accuse Muslims of terrorism. In turn, these parts also accuse Western societies and governments of committing crimes greater than *Daesh's* under the cover of the 'War on Terror' against Muslims particularly in Syria and other Arab countries. The Arabic narrative, unlike its MEMRI's translation, doubts and questions the good reasons for the 'War on Terror' accusing it of being another terrorist war as the source author explains: "*the slogan of the 'War on Terror' loses its meaning and the 'War on Terror' turns into trafficking in the blood of victims, and even a terrorist war from another type*". These counter-arguments were deleted and overlooked in MEMRI's narrative that in turn questions the coherence of MEMRI's narrative.

Furthermore, the characterological coherence presented in MEMRI's translation is in question under the assumption that reliability of a narrative relies mainly on the credibility of its narrator, main characters and translator. As discussed in the analysis in this thesis, MEMRI largely provides its own definitions and explanations for its translations without relying on any source and also cites its own, other articles thereby inviting the reader to possibly deem MEMRI as untrustworthy (see 4.2.6 MEMRI's Critics). As discussed under 4.2.1 MEMRI's founders and staff, MEMRI's members currently work for, or in the past worked at intelligence agencies, some of who committed crimes. In an attempt to enhance its public image, MEMRI offers to provide some free translations, advertises its involvement in 'good causes' such as helping the US Government in the 'War on Terror' and actively promotes the idea of '*jihad* and terror'. However, this attempt evokes inconsistency since it breaches the ethics of neutrality and professionalism.

The second assessment principle, Fidelity, refers to the logic of good reasons in a given narrative and the value of its values. A value as Fisher explains “is valuable not because it is tied to a reason or is expressed by a reasonable person per se, but because *it makes a pragmatic difference in one’s life and in one’s community*” (1987, p. 111; emphasis in original). The logic of good reasons is assessed by five key elements: facts (embedded values), relevance (appropriation of values to decision-making), consequence (the after-effect of values), consistency (consistency of values to personal experiences) and transcendent issue or values (ultimate values). For Fisher, one’s ultimate values are the most important factor in assessing fidelity. Although this factor is to some extent subjective, it does not prevent the ‘logic’ of good reasons. Therefore, when my analysis discourages me to subscribe to MEMRI’s narrative, others, particularly Westerners, will largely accept these narratives. This acceptance is built primarily on the agreement to MEMRI’s propaganda of good reasons and values typically designed for the Western audience, the US public and government in particular. In this regard, Fisher explains:

“For them, the narrative will be coherent in terms of the logic of good reasons: ‘*relevant* to the good life; *consequential* in advancing moral obligation and civilized relations; *consistent* with their highest experiences ...; and satisfying in regard to the *transcendental issue*; the ideal basis for human conduct” (1987, p. 188; emphasis in original).

Nevertheless, when applying the five elements that constitute fidelity to the translations under study, the following findings are established:

1. Facts. Several values presented in the Arabic source editorials were omitted or distorted in MEMRI’s English translations as discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

2. Relevance. Several relevant ST values were omitted or distorted and several irrelevant values were added by MEMRI to its translations by means of addition to the immediate text and by means of the paratext as discussed in Chapter Five.
3. Sequence. The overall framed Arabic narratives on *Daesh* target a set of audience responses mainly the value of awareness of the ongoing events. Yet, MEMRI's main target value is increasing hate between the West and the East.
4. Consistency. While the values presented in the Arabic editorials meet the Arabic readers' personal experiences, MEMRI's reframed values do not meet Arabic personal experiences.
5. Transcendent issues or values. The ultimate issues for the source authors and their readership are the suffering of the people in the civil war countries, mainly Syria and the misunderstanding of some religious principles. However, MEMRI's ultimate values are the 'War on Terror' and the issue of '*jihad*' as a threat to the world, the West and global security regardless of the suffering of Arabs and Muslims.

8.3.2 Revisiting the literature review

This study set out to investigate the framing strategies that enable MEMRI to reconstruct reality and thus renegotiate the source values and messages in its English translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* that in turn helps to sustain the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror' and associate Islam with terror. The findings of this study agree with Pennycook's statement that in our modern era, "battles were to be fought for people's minds and in which language and culture were to play an ever greater role." (1994, p.146). The findings are largely in line with those of the literature across various academic levels. In this regard, the effective role that the media outlets play in delivering an ideologically framed narrative as discussed in Pan and Kosicki

(1993), Norris et al. (2003), De Vreese (2007), Selznick (2008), Bielsa and Hughes (2009), King and Wells (2009), Scheufele (1999), Zhang (2011), Butler (2012) and Ziegler et al. (eds.) (2015), meets the current finding in which MEMRI extensively and ideologically reframes the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* to meet the ‘War on Terror’ narrative that serves the US agenda.

Narrative is found to constitute reality rather than merely represent it as discussed in the analysis in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, in which MEMRI’s narrative establishes a different reality than what is reported in the original. This finding corresponds to the discussion on ‘reality’ in White (1980/1987), Fisher (1987), Bruner (1991), Norris et al. (2003) and Wendland (2010).

Testing Baker’s (2006) narrative theory as an analytical paradigm for all communications in translation studies shows success in extending the sociological and literary boundaries set for narrative theory. Unlike the paradigms of van Dijk (1976), Labov and Waletzky (1967), White (1980/1987), Bal (1985, 1997, 2009), Norrick (2000), Altman (2008) and Gerrig (2011) that limit the analysis to oral ontological accounts and consider narrative as an optional or one method of assessing all communications, Baker’s (2006) narrative account covers both spoken and written forms in addition to the coverage of all levels of discourse, i.e. paratextual, contextual and textual.

Baker’s claim that narrative is “a meta-code that cuts across and underpins all modes of communication” (2006, p. 9), supported by Fisher’s argument that, “Narration is the context for interpreting and assessing all communication – not a mode of

discourse laid on by a creator's deliberate choice but the shape of knowledge as we first apprehend it" (1987, p. 193), was proven valid in this study.

Baker (2006) argues that narrative operates regardless of its *temporal linearity*. In other words, narrative is selective and nonlinear and is contrary to the discussions of van Dijk (1976) and Labov and Waletzky (1967) and the critics of Pym (2016) who consider linearity as the principle that defines discourse and narratives in our terms. However, the findings of this study support Baker's claim in which MEMRI is found to apply to nonlinear accounts in its English translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* that attempt to ideologically reframe the source text as discussed in Chapters Five, Six and Seven.

The findings of this study also fill a gap in the literature (discussed in Table 2.3): Al-Sharif (2009), Montgomery (2009), Zhang (2011), Buckle (2011), Al-Hejin (2012), Sinibaldi (2012), Taibi and Martin (2012), Brännlund et al. (2013) Mansourabadi and Karimnia (2013) and Al-Hejin (2015). The study bridges the gap through providing an in-depth linguistic analysis of the translations under study, an in-depth analysis of the role played by mass media in sustaining the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror', an exhaustive contemporary platform for the testing of narrative account as developed in translation studies by Baker (2006), a highlight of the political impact of translation in the context of the contemporary value-laden civil war in the Middle East, and an in-depth analysis account of the (re)framing strategies employed in the manipulation of Arabic narratives on *Daesh* that in turn plays a great role in shaping the political language of the West, the US in particular.

8.3.3 Research questions answered

The main research question set for investigation in this study is: How does the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) utilise translation as a tool of reframing the narratives on the ‘terror’ acts of *Daesh* in order to reconstruct the reality and promote the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ in the context of the contemporary civil war in the Middle East?

In order to provide an answer to this question the following sub-questions are proposed:

1. How are the acts carried by *Daesh* framed in the source narratives of the Arabic editorial articles?

In Chapters Five, Six and Seven, the paratextual, contextual and textual analysis provided on the Arabic editorials suggests that the Arabic source authors largely use ‘*Daesh*’ instead of ‘ISIS’ or any other form that links the group to Islam.

Daesh as described in the Arabic editorials is a stray group rather than a state that targets to illustrate a distorted image of Islam.

The acts performed by *Daesh* are condemned by Arabs, Muslims and even by Al-Qaeda.

The Arabic source texts tend to describe the acts carried by *Daesh* as ‘extremist’; however, this ‘extremism’ is to a great extent built upon a distorted ideology, misunderstanding and misinterpretations of the teachings of Islam and is not a true representative of Islam.

The acts carried out by *Daesh* as discussed in the source narratives are first and foremost carried out against Arabs and Muslims rather than a global threat that targets the West or other religions.

2. How are the acts of *Daesh* reframed in MEMRI's translations?

In the 25 English translations offered by MEMRI for the 46 Arabic editorials, '*Daesh*' was not used at all. Instead its literal translation form 'ISIS', is used all the time. This form, which is spelled in full in MEMRI's introductions to its translations as 'the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria', evokes a reframed reality that acknowledges *Daesh* as 'Islamic State' located in Iraq and Syria.

Therefore, *Daesh* is reframed in MEMRI English translations as a true representative of Islam -as an ideology and a doctrine-, that fights to enforce Islamic principles and teachings as stated in the Holy Quran.

The explanations provided by the source authors on the real motivations behind *Daesh*'s ideology that drive its members to carry out terrorist acts are largely reframed by means of omission and decontextualization in MEMRI's English translations. Such reframing of the real motivations leads to associating *Daesh*'s acts to Islam. The noble humanitarian concepts of Islam such as '*jizya*', '*jihad*', '*sheikh*', '*mujahideen*', '*fatwa*' and '*ummah*' are reframed in MEMRI's English translations through linking these concepts to extremist acts carried out by *Daesh*.

The acts carried out by *Daesh* are reframed in MEMRI's English translations to focus on the threat against the West and religions other than Islam, reconstructing the

source Arabic narratives that focus mainly on the negative impacts of the acts carried out by *Daesh* against Muslims and Arabs.

3. What are the strategies applied by MEMRI in reframing the Arabic narratives on *Daesh* in its English translations?

Chapters Five, Six and Seven establish the reframing strategies employed by MEMRI that operate at different levels of the narrative: paratextual, contextual and textual. At the paratextual level, MEMRI employs titles, introductions, headings, images, endnotes and glossaries. At the contextual level, MEMRI employs themes, episodes, temporality, spatiality and relationality. At the textual level, MEMRI employs addition, omission, lexical choice, grammatical shifts and reorganisation of materials. Figure 8.1 below illustrates the usage number of each reframing device.




Figure 8.1: MEMRI's Reframing of the Arabic Narratives on *Daesh*

4. How does reframing narratives on *Daesh* in MEMRI's translations operate as an instrument of mind in the reconstruction of reality?

Chapters Five, Six and Seven analyse the reframing strategies and devices employed by MEMRI in its attempt to reconstruct reality. As explained in these chapters, the reconstruction of reality goes unnoticed to the target reader due to the inability of verification. The extensive use of ambiguous/distorted Islamic and Arabic vocabularies in the target culture evokes a previously stored image in the target minds in order to assist the interpretation of the current narratives. The large use of the term 'terror' rather than 'terrorism' in MEMRI's English translations appeals to target minds regarding the serious global impact of the acts carried by *Daesh* rather than its localised impact. The employment of the negative suffix forms -ist and -ism in 'Islamist', 'Salafist', 'Ba'thist', 'Salafism', 'Arabism' and associating these terms to 'terrorist', 'extremist', 'terrorism' and 'extremism', constitutes a misleading reality in the target mind. In this regard, Baker explains:

“The effects of invoking established meta-narratives, with their own specific histories, to promote new ones can never be predicted, because these histories can release different associations and details in the minds of one's immediate audience as well as the opponents that the evoked meta-narrative is meant to subdue or discredit.” (2006, p. 47)

In other words, the target audience begins to compare past accounts of similar narratives with current accounts within the well-established meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'.

5. To what extent are the translations of Arabic editorial articles on *Daesh* employed to sustain and further the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'?

The analysis offered in Chapters Five, Six and Seven shows that while the Arabic source narratives do not build their arguments in line with the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’, MEMRI’s translations are framed to the advantage of the ‘War on Terror’. MEMRI’s projects, that depend largely on these translations, e.g. ‘The Cyber & Jihad Lab’, ‘Jihad & Terror Threat Monitor’, and ‘Reform in the Muslim World’ among others (see Chapter Four for exhaustive discussion), feed the sustainability of the ‘War on Terror’. MEMRI advances the meta-narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ through associating new Arabic and Islamic terms, vocabularies, persons and entities with terror. The analysis of MEMRI’s English translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* establishes extensive reframing that suggests the large extent of sustaining and furthering the meta-narrative of the War on Terror.

6. How does translation play a central role in legitimizing narratives in conflict zones in the context of the contemporary civil war in the Middle East?

The analysis and discussion provided in chapters Five, Six and Seven suggest that translation legitimises narratives in conflict zones through normalisation and justification. Over a period of time, by means of normalisation effects, certain accounts are legitimised and perceived as incontestable and self-evident. Normalisation effects are drawn upon the reframed narratives. In MEMRI’s English translations in this study, normalisation is generated as an after-effect of reframing. For example, the use of ‘*jihad*’, ‘*jizya*’ and other terms discussed earlier legitimises the ‘War on Terror’ and the US invasion and attacks of Iraq and Syria as well as any other Muslim country. This usage also legitimises the casualties that resulted from the U.S. attacks against civilians in Iraq and Syria. As discussed in 7.3.1.1 Labelling, rival systems of naming and titles,

and US President Trump's travel ban of seven Muslim majority countries is legitimised in translation by different means of reframing, including labelling.

In this regard, media translation plays a vital role in circulating such narratives and generates the narrativity effectiveness of justification and normalisation. The Western media draws extensively on the concepts of '*jihad*' and '*jizya*' as well as other Islamic terms in any discussion on terrorism in Muslim conflict zones. For example, in an article published in the Economist titled "*European jihadists: It ain't half hot here, mum. Why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria and Iraq*"¹¹¹, the concept '*jihad*' is positioned in the centre of this article which discusses the role of European fighters, *jihadists* as the article calls them, who joined *Daesh* in the conflict zones of Syria and Iraq. In its attempt to normalise the use of '*jihad*' and '*jihadists*', the article uses the English 'fight' and 'fighters' as synonyms respectively. In the same article, the Arabic *kuffar* was used and glossed with (unbelievers) in justifying the slaughtering of people that is carried by those '*jihadists*'. The article claims that these '*jihadists*' also "carry out suicide missions" in order to establish the Muslim state "*caliphate*" and observe the Islamic law "*sharia*" which requires non-Muslims "*kuffar*" to pay "*jizya*, a special tax".

The same justification and normalisation processes are noticed in other Western media. The Guardian¹¹² justifies the 'War on Terror' by offering an insight on '*jihad*' stating that, "Crucially, in a traditional jihad, the victorious party has an unspoken right to pillage, rape and loot the conquered population". Moreover, the Independent¹¹³ reports on the controversial understanding of '*jihad*' in the U.S. in which "A Muslim activist" said "**A word of truth** in front of a tyrant ruler or leader, that is the best form

¹¹¹ <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-to-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum> [published 1 September 2014, accessed 6 April 2018]

¹¹² <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/apr/28/afghanistan-mujahideen-taliban> [published 28 April 2011, accessed 6 April 2018]

¹¹³ <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/linda-sarsour-trump-muslim-activist-jihad-conservative-wrath-a7830986.html> [published 8 July 2017, accessed 6 April 2018]

of jihad” and misunderstood by “conservative media outlets [which] accused the activist of urging Muslims to **wage a holy war** against the Trump administration.” (emphasis added).

8.4 Future Trends

1. While the current thesis provides an exhaustive analytical account of Baker (2006), it is limited to the study of public narratives. Therefore, future studies may apply Baker (2006) to investigations of other accounts including personal and conceptual narratives focusing on the way these narratives operate as instruments of minds in the manipulation of reality, and in shaping personal identity, public opinion and institutional policy.

2. The corpus of this study is limited to the translations provided by the media outlet, the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). Thus, future studies may apply the Baker (2006) narrative account to study other leading media outlets. The comparison of the translations of several media outlets of the same materials are recommended and can provide a triangulation tool of verification for the research findings.

3. The language pair in this study is Arabic as source text and English as target text; other language pairs are suggested for the study of the narratives on emerging world threats.

4. The focus of this research was the political narratives circulated worldwide on *Daesh*. Further studies may focus on the widely circulated narratives in other fields including the narratives on global change, poverty, religious conflicts, immigration, unemployment, freedom, and food and water security, for example.

5. The current study targets the awareness of the global audience toward the various circulated narratives on the image of Arabs and Muslims. Other research efforts may build upon this study to investigate the ethical considerations of the translators in other conflict zones where translators are considered critical and dynamic participants by means of undermining and prioritising certain particularities reframing reality. International organisations may set and enforce regulations for journalism and translation professional practices in order to eliminate manipulation and hate, and instead encourage peace and harmony among nations.

6. This study set out to test the narrative account of Baker (2006) and to reveal the possible framing carried out in news translation. Future studies may incorporate other theoretical frameworks including pragmatic-stylistic analysis in attempts to investigate news translations.

8.5 Summary

Chapter Eight provided a conclusion to the research journey that started in February 2014. This chapter summarised the previous seven chapters in which a background is set to introduce the topic under study to the reader discussing the importance of this research and setting the research objectives and questions. This eighth chapter then summarised the main arguments and findings of the literature while highlighting the research gap. This chapter also offered an explanation of the narrative theory-informed account by Baker (2006) and its elaboration in the field of translation studies. After this explanation, the chapter then provided an exhaustive analytical account at the paratextual, contextual and textual levels, investigating the reframing devices and tools used in the manipulation of ‘reality’ in the narratives under study. In addition, this chapter established the assessment of the translations under investigation discussing

how both the ST and the TT accounts differ. The chapter then compared the findings of the current research with those of the literature and answered the research questions set forth in Chapter One. Finally, this final thesis chapter provided suggestions for future investigations based on emerging and current findings.

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LIST OF PUBLICATIONS AND CONFERENCES

1. Hijjo, N. F. M. (2017). Book review: Framing Excessive Violence: Discourse and Dynamics. *Institutions and Economies*, 9(2), 109-111.

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Book Review

Framing Excessive Violence: Discourse and Dynamics by Ziegler, D., Gerster, M., & Krämer, S. (Eds.). Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers, 2015. 263 pp.

Violence is an integral part of societies across times at both individual and institutional levels. It is realized in different forms based on the nature and norms (culturally accepted practices) of the containing (hosting) society. Excessive violence, however, is unpredictable and does not make apparent sense. Acts of excessive violence present a serious risk to social cohesion, threatening stability of a nation. Excessive violence changes the social framing of normality and it exceeds conventional violence. Successful social normalisation of excessive violence relies heavily on the presentation of a cohesive narrative of happenings. Such narrative is built mainly on the institutional narratives of the media and the government with some personal narratives. The chief argument here is how societies effectively normalise and rationalise excessive violent happenings in order to "define the performance of violence as a social practice as unnecessary." (p. 2). Therefore, the public enjoys their daily life without any experience of violence.

The increase in violence in Europe in general, and in Germany in particular, appears to be the main motive behind this exhaustive research. In seeking an understanding of excessive violence in Europe, Ziegler and his colleagues organised an international conference titled 'Unrestrained Violence' in November 2013 at the Institute for Sociology, University of Giessen ("Unrestrained Violence International Conference Programme", n.d.). The case studies presented in this book are an updated version of the papers presented at the conference.

This book is an interdisciplinary research of 12 empirical case studies - from sociology, media studies, psychiatry, legal studies and criminology - in which 'excessive violence' is the central theme tackled from societal and institutional perspectives. It is divided into two sections. The first section contains six chapters and focuses on the 'dynamics of excessive violence'. It argues that excessive violence is not the result of a rational decision-making. Rather, it is the outcome of various contingencies, most importantly the 'situational occurrence' that represents the site of interaction among the actors with an extensive focus on the role of emotions (discussed in the first three case studies), biographical background of the perpetrators (discussed in the fourth case study), the motivational grid represented in the lack of social valuation and self-esteem (discussed in the fifth case study), and

2. Hijjo, N. F. M. & Kaur, S. (2017). The Paratextual Analysis of English Translations of Arabic Media Narratives on *Daesh*. *3L: Southeast Asian Journal of English Language Studies*, 23(3), 21-36.

The Paratextual Analysis of English Translations of Arabic Media Narratives on Daesh

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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the role of media translations in reframing 'reality' and inserting ideologically-loaded concepts to promote certain agendas. It further examines the effectiveness of paratextual (re)framings as a strategic device in the manipulation of 'reality'. It analyses the English translations of the Arabic media narratives on 'Daesh' employing the interdisciplinary approach of Baker (2006) narrative theory-informed. These English translations were published on the website of the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), a Washington-based think tank that is largely quoted by the Western, mainly the US, prominent media outlets. The data collected for the purpose of this study consists of 46 Arabic editorials alongside their 25 English translations. The findings of this research suggest that paratextual devices including titles, introductions, headings, images and their captions, and endnotes and glossaries are significant (re)framing tools that function outside the immediate text. MEMRI is found to successfully reframe the Arabic narratives on 'Daesh' in an attempt to sustain and further the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'. The significance of this study is specifically to draw the awareness of the public of the different rival narratives circulated by the media.

Keywords: Daesh, MEMRI, paratextual (re)framing, terrorism, translation

INTRODUCTION

The terroristic acts carried by 'the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, ISIS' (or most preferably its Arabic acronym *Daesh*) attract much attention from the local, regional and international media as well as the political and governmental agendas worldwide. Because of its threatening impact, *Daesh* has become an international concern represented in 'the International Coalition against Daesh'¹. *Daesh* has its beginnings in 2004 as 'Al-Qaeda in Iraq' following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Welby 2014). It then changed its name several times, in accordance with emerging organisational situations, including 'Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq' and 'the Islamic State in Iraq'². In 2011 with the erupting of the Syrian civil war, the group extended its coverage to Syria under the name 'Al-Nusra Front'. In 2013, both 'the Islamic State in Iraq' and 'Al-Nusra Front' emerged to form *al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham, DAESH* (literally translated as 'the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria', 'ISIS'). In 2014, resulting from ideological conflicts, Al-Nusra Front detached itself from 'ISIS' which then reformed itself as 'the Islamic State, IS' declaring a worldwide caliphate³.

Daesh is responsible for several terroristic acts in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere worldwide killing more than 1,200 people⁴ including the beheading of the two American journalists in 2014, the killing of 130 people in the 2015 Paris attacks, the burning to death of the Jordanian pilot Muath Al-Kassab in January 2015, and the 2015 Ankara bombings that resulted in the death of 103 people⁵, among many others⁶.

Daesh's criminal acts have triggered much Islamophobia and criticism of Islam (Croucher et al 2013) under the claim that *Daesh* is a 'true' representative of Islam and

3. Hijjo, N. F. M., & Kaur, S. (2017b). Recontextualizing Terror: ISIS Narratives in the English Media. *International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies*, 10(2), 49-77.

RECONTEXTUALIZING TERROR: ISIS NARRATIVES IN THE ENGLISH MEDIA

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Drawing upon the interdisciplinary approach of Baker's (2006) narrative theory-informed analysis, this paper analyses the English translations of the Arabic editorials on *Daesh* which were published by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) between the years 2013 and 2016. MEMRI is a Washington-based think tank that is largely quoted by the Western, mainly the US, prominent media outlets. This paper aims to investigate the role of the media in utilising translation as a vehicle of reconstructing and renegotiating the narratives in question. It also examines the effectiveness of contextual framing in altering narratives of the terrorist acts carried by *Daesh (the Islamic State)* which in turn communicates a distort image of Islam and Muslims to the Euro-Mediterranean officials and publics. The findings suggest that contextual framing is an effective device in redirecting the original narratives in media translations that function outside the immediate text. Reframing context is significant linguistic method in inserting particular ideologies and agendas in the target narrative in line with the meta-narrative of the 'War on Terror'. Thus there is a need to translate informatively and innovatively the contexts of unknown phenomena themselves due to the difference in culture of North-South and East-West publics of the Euro-Mediterranean.

Key words: Contextual framing, English media, Euro-Mediterranean, ISIS, Translation



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4. Paper presented at the 8th Asian Translation Tradition Conference at SOAS, University of London, England, July 2017.

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The Ideological Impact

7. Paper presented at the 7th Asian Translation Traditions Conference. Monash University Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, September 2016.

Title: Narrative Analysis of English Translations of Arabic Political Articles:
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