CHAPTER TWO
FOREIGN POLICY STRUCTURES: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter two examines the theoretical framework of foreign policy structures. It examines foreign policy structures on two levels: internal and external. The internal and external foreign policy structures are classified into direct and indirect categories. Nevertheless, the foreign policy structures identified under each respective category are not exhaustive. They do not include all the factors that exert influence on national decision-makers, as the aim is to identify the potential post-Cold War foreign policy structures of four major powers--the United States, Japan, China, and Russia--in the Asia-Pacific region. Prior to the examination of structures of foreign policy, the term foreign policy is defined as the understanding of foreign policy structures requires the knowledge of what foreign policy means. However, investigation of the subject through scholarly writings of academics informs the discussion in this chapter.

2.1   Literature Review

Foreign policy as an academic subject is very young. A systematic and conceptual history of foreign policy analysis appears to have begun as early as the 1960s. The literature on foreign policy is broadly classified into three categories: (1) works aimed at theoretical and conceptual analysis of foreign policy, (2) studies analysing the theoretical framework of foreign policy of a specific nation, and (3) researches concerned with the foreign policy trends or directions of one or more states. However, breakthrough in the field occurred when James Rosenau compiled two valuables works. Rosenau in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: 1967) presents scholarly approaches to this subject. They collectively focus on the domestic sources of foreign policy. The major contribution of works such as this is the emphasis it lays on structures other than governmental institutions on the national level in shaping national foreign policies. There also exists, Rosenau concluded, non-governmental sources such as idiosyncratic variables, personality, regime type, attitudes, and so on that systematically, however indirectly, influence a nation's foreign policies. Rosenau's work on domestic sources of foreign policy is known as pre-theory stage in foreign policy.

In *Comparing Foreign Polices* (USA: 1974), Rosenau presented works that indicated a departure from pre-theory to more systematic approaches in foreign policy analysis. These approaches, in addition to domestic structures, focused on: (1) external structures of foreign policy, and (2) methodology of research in foreign policy analysis. The approaches collectively focus on comparative study of foreign policy. The comparative method of research in the study of foreign policy emphasises comparison of

common properties of national foreign policy such as personality, attitude, national interests, decisions, power status, etc. across national borders. The aim is to develop a conceptual framework of national patterns of behaviour. This work by Rosenau is an attempt at theory building.

Howard H. Lenter in *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach* (USA: 1974) introduced a new dimension to foreign policy analysis. Lenter concentrates on the actual formulation of foreign policy. He analyses how foreign policy is made. He also discusses the dynamics and processes of foreign policy such as actors, situations, conditions, internal and external determinants of foreign policy, the international environment, and so on. Unfortunately, not much work of this nature is available on the subject. Works of such nature are examples of the first category.

A recent contribution to the subject is the work by John Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner. Spanier and Uslaner in *How American Foreign Policy is Made* (USA: 1978) focuses only on domestic structures of American foreign policy. Their work enhanced the conceptual framework developed by Rosenau and others. Spanier and Uslaner identified domestic structures or what they called "circles of power" in the American political system. Moreover, they also developed a hierarchy of influences of domestic structures on foreign policy outcomes. However, James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, in *Foreign Policy Making and The American Political System* (USA: 1983), jointly provide a wider perspective to Spanier's and Uslaner's work. The outstanding feature of endeavour by Nathan and Oliver is that it presents a very comprehensive account of internal structures

of American foreign policy. Of similar nature are *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decision-making in China* (USA: 1997) by Lu Ning and *China's Political System: Modernisation and Tradition* (London: 1996) by June Teufel Dreyer. The works by Lu and Dreyer, though not exclusive, provide sufficient inroads into the internal foreign policy structures of the Chinese political system. Despite the fact that the Chinese political system is unique and different from Western democratic political systems in many ways, these studies reveal that the foreign policy structures of China are comparable to those of Western democracies such as the United States. These works are valuable as they help the student of foreign policy in conducting a comparative study of a similar nature. This is not to suggest that *Foreign Policy Analysis* (London: 1971) by Richard L. Merritt, and *Principle of Foreign Policy* (Oxford: 1979) by Roy E. Jones are of little significance as they also provide valuable insights into the conceptual approach to the wide range of foreign policy issues. Works of this nature are examples of the second category of studies on the subject.

Seweryn Bialer in *Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy* (London: 1988) discusses how the two nations influence each other's behaviour. Reinhard Drifte in *Japan's Foreign Policy* (London: 1990) focuses on Japan's foreign policy patterns and its influence on the international system and vice versa. Bernard K. Gordon, in *New Directions for American Policy in Asia* (New York: 1990) looks at the United States' national interests and foreign policy trends in Asia and the constraints imposed on American foreign policy options by Japan, China and Russia. Wolf Mendl in *Japan's Asia Policy: Regional Security and Global Interests* (London: 1995) examines Japan's

interests in Asia and on the international level as well. It is noteworthy that Mendl investigates Japan's historical dimension of its Asian interests first. Then, he explains the interests Japanese perceive for their nation in the post-Cold War international system. Literature of this nature is concerned with the actual foreign policy patterns of one or more states. This type of essays is generally lacking in conceptual analysis of foreign policies of the respective states. Works of this nature are abundant. However, works of this sort are essential for theory building and conceptualisation, as they provide the raw materials for theory building. Works of this nature are examples of the third category of essays on the subject. Therefore, the above-mentioned studies are valuable sources to this research in addition to other sources such as newspapers, journals, and official documents used in this study

This research, therefore, aims at identifying some major foreign policy structures, internal and external, of the four major powers in the Asia-Pacific region after the Cold War. The justification for this study largely stems from the fact that the post-Cold War era is a relatively recent epoch in international relations, fraught as it is, with uncertainty. Attempting a conceptual approach to the subject under investigation will hopefully clarify if not remove some of the hurdles faced by analysts in projecting foreign trends and behaviour of these four major powers. As such, this study hopes to make a contribution, even if small, to the systematic analysis of the internal and external structures and sources influencing foreign policy formulation of the major powers after the Cold War.

2.2   Foreign Policy Structures

In the original pre-theory, Rosenau discussed sources of influence upon foreign policy behaviour which originate within a nation's borders as well as environmental influences beyond its borders.[1] Therefore, there exists a cluster of elements a nation has to take into consideration which shape the course and patterns of national foreign policy behaviour. Although every single element exerts some degree of influence upon national foreign policy at varied intervals, none is exclusively a sufficient determinant. The complex of elements that exert influence on national foreign policy is collectively called "foreign policy structures". Therefore, "foreign policy structures" are elements that influence or persuade foreign policy makers to adopt a certain course of action.

"Foreign policy structures" are of two kinds: internal and external (see Appendix One). However, the question whether internal or external structures exert potential pressures on foreign policy is debatable. David Moore attempted to resolve this problem. Moore divides both internal and external structures into dependent and independent variables. When independent variables of either internal or external structures are strong, the respective category of "foreign policy structures" shapes foreign policy patterns.[2] The problem still remains. The field lacks mechanisms for identifying which and what category of independent variables exert more pressures. Hence one may only be able to observe that there exists a close correlation between the independent variables of both categories of foreign policy structures.

Moreover, there exists a great deal of confusion and ambiguity among scholars regarding identification of foreign policy structures. In addition, new structures are identified and added to the list of the hierarchy of influences exerted on foreign policy. Therefore, in this chapter an attempt is made to examine only a few essential internal and external foreign policy structures. The aim is to identify the internal and external structures of four major powers: the United States, Japan, China, and Russia.

However, prior to the examination of internal and external structures of foreign policy, a discussion on definition of foreign policy and national interests is in order. Without understanding the nature of foreign policy and the role of national interests in foreign policy formulation, the study of foreign policy structures as such is meaningless. In fact, national interest provides direction to foreign policy. Foreign policy structures come into play only after the national interests are defined and strategies are designed to achieve them.

2.3   Foreign Policy: Definitions

Definitions of foreign policy are as myriad as opinions held by individual scholars. Each scholar defines foreign policy according to his own perspective or understanding of world affairs. James Rosenau formulated a definition that is both systematic and consistent. According to Rosenau, foreign policy is an "adaptive behaviour"[3]. Before discussing Rosenau's definition a few definitions given by scholars are discussed. Hendrieder defined foreign policy as a "more or less co-ordinated strategy with which institutionally designated decision–makers manipulate the international

environment". [4] Attar Chand considered foreign policy as a "structure in which diverse elements of diplomacy, military, and economy [are geared] to safeguard a country's national interests in a system of interdependent nation states". According to Chand, a national interest provides direction and serves as an inbuilt corrective process, which provides consistency to foreign policy over a long time. [5]

Foreign policy is also viewed as decisions more in terms of response to the external environment and less in terms of initiation by the internal environment or the national government. [6] However, Rosenau and others do not subscribe to the above hypothesis. Patrick J. McGowan picks up on Rosenau's notion of foreign policy as an adaptive process and concludes that two-fold effects could be observed on foreign policy: (1) changes within the environment and (2) changes that occur within the structures of actor. [7] Environment means international system while "structures of actor" refers to the internal structures of foreign policy of a national government. According to Rosenau, every society is comprised of four essential structures, namely (1) polity, (2) economy, (3) social structure, and (4) physical base. [8]

The definitions above commonly maintain that foreign policy formulations are goal-seeking and goal-oriented. However, they diverge as to the nature of foreign policy formulations in pursuit of the defined goals. Hendrieder's definition focuses on foreign policy as proactive or initiating behaviour. His definition does not imply foreign policy as reaction to deter the undesired disturbances in the environment. This definition is restrictive and narrow in scope. However, the view that foreign policy is both initiation

(i.e. proactive) and response (i.e. reaction) may widen the scope of foreign policy formulations. It fails to be comprehensive, as it focuses on foreign policy more as a reactive behaviour and less as a proactive or initiating behaviour. The inbuilt flaw of this definition is that the response is to internal stimuli modifying the external environment.[9] Foreign policy is not a reaction, therefore, to the external environment. In the final analysis, it indicates the influence of internal structures on foreign policy while ignoring the pressures exerted on foreign policy-making from the external environment such as the international system or the role of superpowers. Rosenau tends to maintain the balance between foreign policy as "initiative behaviour" and foreign policy as "responsive behaviour". By maintaining such a balance, he also argues that both internal structures and external structures affect foreign policy. Therefore, Rosenau's definition is briefly discussed below.

Rosenau's definition consists of two elements: (1) "adaptive" and (2) "behaviour". Stuart defined "behaviour" as a sequence of outputs or policy formulations generated by a subsystem (i.e. actor) towards the environment. Outputs can be either response to environmental shock i.e. undesirable changes in the environment caused by another subsystem or initiation aimed at achieving a desired goal.[10] The outputs, whether response or initiation, are authoritative. The authoritative outputs are also adaptive. Therefore "adaptive" implies a three-fold meaning: (1) initiating action aimed at a desired goal, (2) providing a response to preserve a desired goal from effects of environmental shocks, and (3) benefiting from the opportunity, provided by other actors, favourable to a

desired goal.[11] In fact in instances of initiation and response, foreign policy-makers tend to cope with the environment.

To interpret "adaptive" as coping with the environment and benefiting from it in favour of the desired goal means to exclude compromise as one of its meaning. Therefore, adaptive does not mean compromise and accommodation because the adaptive behaviour as such involves ultimate goals or what is better known as national interests. A deeper look into Rosenau's thought reveals the fact that there exist certain structures vital to the survival of the society. Accordingly, he called them "essential social structures". According to him, foreign policy is mal-adaptive if it failed to preserve the essential social structures: (1) life and property (i.e. boundary of society), (2) political system, (3) economic system, (4) cultural system, and (5) social integrity and unity. "Mal-adaptive" is, therefore, destructive as the decision-maker could neither cope with the environment nor benefited from the favourable conditions within the environment.[12]

At this juncture it is necessary to note that while the concept "adaptive" does not allow room for compromise on ultimate goals, it does permit flexibility and necessary adjustment in the policy formulation. According to Stuart an adaptive system is one that manages to change either itself or its environment in such a way to get along with the environment in order to achieve the desired goals. Getting along with the environment implies flexibility necessary to attainment of ultimate goals. Thus, in the final analysis, adaptive behaviour means fulfilment of national interests through formulation of authoritative decisions or policies with subsystem interacting with system, by all means.[13]

Rosenau's definition reveals that foreign policy in pursuit of national interests is the interplay of national system and international environment. Therefore, the foreign policy-maker, while designing policy aimed at desired goals, is influenced by the factors from within the national system as well as the international system. The internal or external forces that exert pressures on foreign policy-makers are conceptualised as foreign policy structures. Therefore, this chapter, after discussing national interests, elaborates on the theoretical framework of foreign policy structures.

2.4 National Interests

A national interest is defined as a generalised category of purpose or critical values that provide direction to foreign policy formulation. However, a generalised category of critical values as such is judgmental. Critical values are values fundamental to a nation's global role. Statesmen struggle to protect them. Hence they are uncompromisable. However, policy-makers outline or list these values in order of priority according to the role and status they ascribe to their country.[14]

International relations theorists used different terms to describe national interests. According to Rosenau, national interests mean "essential social structures". According to Hans Morgenthau, national interests are "causes" or motive forces that oblige foreign policy-makers to adopt a certain course of action. However, others used terms like "social values", "true concerns", "public good" or "core values" to describe national interests. Yet, Kaplan viewed national interests in terms of "national needs".[15]Despite the

multiplicity of terms, scholars argue that national interests provide a theoretical and analytical base for state behaviour or foreign policy. They also subscribe to the view that national interests make the exercise of generalisation about state behaviour possible. This in turn also makes foreign policy predictable and consistent.[16] In a nutshell, national interest is a tool for taxonomy of foreign policy to enable characterisations such as hegemonic, friendly, confrontational, imperial, etc.

However, the plurality of terms used to describe national interests gives another dimension to the analysis. Some may court the idea that the different terms used to describe national interests have been interpreted differently. For instance, Hans Morgenthau viewed "quest for power" as the main cause or source of national foreign policy. On the contrary, Kaplan maintained that states formulate foreign policies in pursuit of national needs.[17] Indeed, power theorists would argue that the state could satisfy its needs and wants only through maximum use of power. In this way, power and needs become one. They are part and parcel or two sides of the same coin, which leads to the discussion below.

The multiplicity of terms used to describe national interests indicates that its content is composed of more than one element. Subjectivists and not objectivists subscribe to this position. Objectivists are those who believe that national interest (singular) is permanent, unchanging, and composed of one element: national power. Objectives other than national power do not constitute elements of national interest because a nation's entire life and survival depends on the amount of power it possesses.

Kaplan's view that the more power a nation has, the more secure its life is, has been regarded as if it constituted the eternal law of nature rather than a prescription for action within a particular international system of action.[18] Power, in the strict sense of the term, means a concrete physical entity of military establishment (i.e. military hardware, military software, armed personnel, etc.). Therefore, national interest requires a nation to augment its military capabilities. The status of a nation in world politics is contingent on the military power it possesses.

In contrast, subjectivists consider national interests(plural) as something changing according to time and space. Therefore, many, and not only one, elements constitute its content. Hence, "national interests" is a generic term that includes other values besides power. Moreover, aggrandisement of military equipment or military hardware by a nation need not be the supreme national objective. Hence, anything that directs a nation to enact a certain policy is considered as national objective.[19] Subjectivists cite the following examples in support of their argument. For instance, Rosenau identified four elements of national interests. Patrick McGowan in analysing Rosenau's four "essential social structures" invented another element to make Rosenau's categories five. C. O. Lenche and Abdul A. Said identified five elements of national interests. The Rosenau-McGowan categories more or less are in congruence with those identified by Lenche-Said. Morgenthau's conception of power is broad enough to include all other elements such as economy, politics, etc. [20]

The arguments advanced by both, objetivists and subjectivists have two-fold implications: (1) every nation possesses certain objectives that are many in number and permanent, and (2) as these objectives are permanent, the order of priority of the formulated list of objectives is not permanent. Redefinition of priorities becomes necessary because a change in the environment or international system leads to a change in a nation's needs. For instance, when a dangerous foe is removed, the security concerns of that given nation may shift from purely military or arms race to other concerns. It is precisely the changing nature of order of priority in the formulated list of national interests that causes different national actors to have different national interests in a given international system.[21] This view is congruent with the post-Cold War international structure. It makes national interest an ever-relevant tool of analysis. It was a tool that directed foreign policy during the Cold War era, and it is also a tool that will provide guidance for foreign policy formulation after the Cold War. But this also implies that in any given international system, conflict is normal as the priorities of states differ. It is within this context that scholars consider every state's national interests as unique and peculiar. What makes it peculiar is the perception of those concerned with the outline or formulation of national interests and ordering these numerous interests in terms of priority.[22] It is the construction of national interests that would either favour preservation of the status quo or adjustment of the system. When the state defines its national interests, it also defines its role. If the critical values or conditions necessary for a state to receive adequate fulfilment are present, the state will be satisfied with the existing situation and tries to preserve the status quo. Hence, the state's foreign policy is status quo-oriented. When critical values are not given adequate treatment, the state will work toward a

favourable modification of the international system in line with its interests. In this context, the state's foreign policy becomes revisionist.[23]

Finally, Lenche and Said have examined the relationship between national interests, goals and objectives. In the Lenche-Said analysis "national interests" is a long-term purpose, "goal" is a short-term purpose, while "objective" is the immediate purpose to achieve gains from a specific or given situation. Within any single policy situation the relations of the national interests, the postulated goals, and the selected objectives are largely the function of different time spans of analysis. National interests have an implication of perpetuity or ultimacy; a nation's interests will presumably keep the state involved in the problem forever or at least as long as the political system endures. A goal is set in terms of the maximum time span that can be anticipated analytically. Any drastic change, however, would require the selection of a new goal more in harmony with the nature of the problem. An objective is immediate or short range in its time component, while the state of affairs that is the target of state action is attainable in terms of the forces operative at the moment of decision.[24]

2.5   External Structures of Foreign Policy

The external structures of foreign policy in this study include the international system, international law, and technology. International organisations and multinationals, though international actors, are excluded. It is argued that states are the most important foreign policy actors. Only states initiate policies and respond to policies initiated by other nations. Therefore, whether a state possesses membership of an international

organisation, or some states collectively use international organisation to adopt a policy line towards a member state is not important for this study. Decisions of international organisations could be enforced on small powers. However, international organisation is ineffective in instances in which the interests of major powers are adversely affected. Therefore, power rank and not membership of a nation in an international organisation determines its role in international affairs.

2.5.1   International System

Foreign policies are initiated either to promote crucial values or to provide response to actions of other states to protect national interests. However, over the past three centuries, states' actions and reactions as such have become patterned and regular. The term "international system" was coined to define such regular and patterned state behaviour. Therefore, international system is about patterns of behaviour among states characterised by sufficient regularities that make relations among them predictable.[25]According to the dominant view, states are the constituent elements of the international system. Moreover, states are the primary if not the sole actors on the international plane. At the offset, it is necessary to differentiate between the international system and international or external environment of foreign policy. The international environment is broad enough to include elements other than international system such as multinationals, international organisations, international law, etc.

According to Rosenau, the assumption that the international system is composed of states as the primary if not the sole actors, implies two factors, namely, (1) the

structure of the international system, and (2) the nature of the international system are relevant to this study (see Appendix One). They both influence foreign policy perceptions of policy makers in the foreign ministries of respective states.[26] Examination of the structure and the nature of the international system, therefore, will enable us to identify the centres of power in the post-Cold War international system. It will also enable us to identify the kind of international system bequeathed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In other words, it addresses the issue of whether or not the collapse of the Soviet System resulted in systemic transformation.

The structure of the international system refers to the pattern of distribution of power among states. States are legally equal but politically unequal. They are equal in the selection of goals, adoption of actions and strategies but absolutely unequal in competence for attaining the selected goals. Therefore, the distribution of power among states is unequal or proportionate to the capabilities possessed by each state. When distribution of power is the criteria, the structure of the international system consists of three categories of states: **great powers or superpowers, regional or medium powers and national or small powers. Great** powers are those few states whose capabilities are sufficiently large to permit them to establish and implement a totality of interests. A great power asserts the political right to interfere and be consulted in the resolution of any issues anywhere in the world at any given time. A **medium power** is treated with a modest degree of formal difference by **great powers**, as it is not expected like **great powers** to participate in any issue anywhere in the world. However, it is expected to restrict its concerns (interests) and involvement to matters geographically or politically

closer to its borders. A **small power** is permitted an interest in opposition to their large type. Its interests should not conflict with the interests of a **major or medium power**. The conditions of its political activity are imposed upon it by the decisions of more powerful states. A **small power** could always behave in accordance with consultation or in the way that is not detrimental to the interests of the **major or medium power**.[27]

According to pre-World War II literature on the international system, the United States, the Soviet Union, Austria, Japan, Italy and Great Britain were the first-rank powers. In the post-World War II international system, the number of first-rank powers was substantially reduced to two: the United States and the Soviet Union. While Japan, Germany and Italy were reduced to small power rank in the first decades of the Cold War, some powers like China attained second-rank power status. However, opinions differ on the power rank of major players in the post-Cold War international system. Some international relations theorists maintain that the post-Cold War international system is unipolar with the number of first-rank powers reduced to one: the United States. However, others argue that the post-Cold War international system is multipolar: the number of aspirant first-rank powers has increased. At the bottom of the distribution of power mechanism that ranks states according to their capabilities lies the idea of what constitutes the criteria of determining state capability. Putting it differently, are states in the post-Cold War era classified on the basis of geopolitical or geoeconomic considerations?

In the pre-World War II and Cold War international system (1947-1991), geopolitics constituted the criteria of distribution of power or classification of states into superpowers, medium powers and small powers. When the focus is on geopolitics, all elements of national power are geared to augment a nation's military capacity. Factors such as geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, diplomacy, national character, national morale, regime type, technological innovation, etc. were considered essential elements of national power. But it was a nation's military "preparedness" that gave these factors actual importance. Therefore, national military establishment in terms of quantity and quality of armed forces and weapons of all kinds topped the elements of national power.[28]

However, towards the end of the 1980s, the argument that military power topped the elements of national power became outdated. Geoeconomics replaced geopolitics as the criteria of distribution of power. Economic warehouse and not military powerhouse determines a nation's status on the world map. State capabilities are measured in terms of industrial capability, productive capability, technological know–how, innovations, skills, markets, investment capacity, volume of trade, etc. A nation must be competitive in all factors of industrial capacity. In a nutshell, the power of a nation depends on its industrial capacity and the latter depends on the factors mentioned above. Therefore, "it is inevitable that the leading industrial nations should be identical with the great powers, and a change in industrial rank, for better or worse, should be accompanied or followed by a corresponding change in hierarchy of power."[29]

It is interesting to note that Hans Morgenthau who believes in geostrategy and not geoeconomy as the basis of national power also ranks nations according to their industrial capacity. He says Great Britain was the most powerful nation when it had no industrial equal. France, as a power in comparison with Germany after World War I, declined partly because of industrial backwardness. The Soviet Union became the actual great power when it entered the rank of foremost industrial powers in the 1930s and became the rival of the United States when Moscow acquired in the 1950s the industrial capacity of waging nuclear war.[30] One could argue that geostrategy and geoeconomy are the by–products of industrialisation. Therefore, when reference is made to geostrategy, industrialisation means concentration on heavy industries and production of war implements. When reference is made to geoeconomy, industrialisation means concentration on light industries and production of consumer goods. The former swallows up national wealth while the latter contributes to national wealth. Obviously, economic considerations have gained in importance in shaping inter–state relations. This does not imply that the role played by military capability in inter-state relations has declined altogether. Military power will remain, as always has been the case, an essential element of national power. The trend in recent years is the use by states of their economic capabilities as an effective foreign policy instrument along with military capability.

The structure of the international system enables us to better understand the nature of the international system. Classification of states into great, medium and small powers is an essential step toward identifying the states that define the pattern of relations on a global scale. Therefore, the nature of the international system is closely tied to the issue

of who constitute the centre of power, or who defines the pattern of relations on the international plane. Thus, the international system is one-state dominant or unipolar if the pattern of relations is defined by one most powerful state. It is two-state dominant or bipolar if the pattern of relations is defined by two states possessing identical status. It is multi-state dominant or multi-polar if the pattern of relations is defined by many powers. A multi-state dominant system is identical to a balance of power system. Great powers define patterns of relations on a global scale, medium powers define patterns of relations on a regional level or in restricted spheres mostly close to home, and small powers behave according to the patterns of relations defined by the great powers.

It is relevant to observe that the international system is a semi-organised anarchy as it lacks a controlling moral consensus. The pattern of relations are not defined on the basis of a socially sanctioned code of behaviour that prohibits certain actions as destructive, while permitting others as socially essential. Moreover, it also lacks institutional structures entrusted to enforce a moral code of behaviour.[31] For the following reasons: (a) the sovereign and independent states are constituent elements of the international system: each state defines its national interest in a peculiar way; (b) the patterns of behaviour of the system are defined by the dominant members in the absence of a centralised structure of conduct of relations; (c) the international institutions are adhered to only if they reinforce or support national interests of dominant members; and (d) the stability, modification, or transformation of the system depends on the stability, modification, and transformation in the roles played by the dominant states of the system[32] as systemic transformation affects both structure and nature of the international

system. States constantly adjust or modify the roles they play on the international plane. However, when modification occurs in roles played by the dominant states or aspirant dominant members, systemic transformation takes place. Scholars and analysts are then tasked with the job of determining the type of international system that has emerged.

The Cold War bipolar international system began to experience transformation when the former Soviet Union began to review its great power role. Accompanying this was the shift in perception of aspirant great powers of roles they could play on a global or regional scale. The first phase of systemic transformation was complete when the Soviet system disintegrated altogether. The post-Cold War international system type, unipolar or multipolar, can be identified if we manage to identify the centres of power or powers that define patterns of relations on a global or regional scale. In this study, four powers–the United States, China, Japan and Russia–are identified as capable of playing an active role in the international relations of post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. However, the task of ranking them into power categories is discussed in the chapters on respective powers, as it requires discussion of their respective national interests and capabilities. Therefore, we turn next to the type of international system that is taking shape in the post-Cold War era.

Opinions vary as to whether the post-Cold War international system type is unipolar or identical to a balance of power situation. Inis L. Claude alludes to the idea that the balance of power mechanism, however in different forms, was a working international system throughout the twentieth century including the post-Cold War era. On the contrary, Morton Kaplan subscribes to the idea that the bipolar system i. e. the

operative international system of the Cold War era, is being transformed into either a balance of power situation or a hierarchical international system. According to Kaplan, a hierarchical system is identical to a unipolar system. Claude uses two terms, namely, (1) "preponderance" and (2) "equilibrium" to define a situation similar to Kaplan's hierarchical system. Moreover, Claude uses "equilibrium" and "preponderance" identical to Kaplan's understanding of the balance of power situation and hierarchical international system respectively. In the final analysis, the type of post-Cold War international system advocated by Kaplan and Claude is a characteristic either of a balance situation (equilibrium) or hierarchical (unipolar or preponderant) international system.[33]

According to Claude, the balance of power system operates in two forms: equilibrium and preponderance. In the former situation the essential powers are approximately equal and none is a winner. However, he does not state the number of essential actors. Kaplan maintains the number of essential actors at five. According to Kaplan, alliance shift and alliance formation occurs among the major or essential powers. Therefore, Kaplan does not regard the Cold War era as a balance of power situation, as neither systemic transformation has produced the numbers of powers required nor alliances have been formed to create a balance of power situation suggested by Kaplan. Claude says that the Cold War situation was, in most essential respects, a balance of power system. "Basic similarities are to be found: the competitive manipulation of the polar powers, the development of their rival alliance structures, and the pace of arms race identify the present system (i.e. Cold War system) as a variant of the balance system." However, Claude tends to overlook the essential rules of the balance of power system[34].

In the instance of preponderance, Claude says, the patterns of relations are defined by one superior power. The system in which a superior power acts like a self-designated global police, according to Kaplan, is hierarchical and hence, unipolar. In Kaplan's categories, systemic transformation takes place when elements of the system do not abide by the rules of the system. In bipolar rivalry, one bloc may not abide by the rules of the system; the other bloc will, as a result of war, or passively, surrender to the other. A unipolar system, therefore, is created.[35]

According to the above argument, the post-Cold War international system is both uinpolar and a balance system. Geostrategically, the United States acts as a preponderant power. Geoeconomically, many centres of economic power in the post-Cold War international system tend to create an economic balance of power situation. However, it is difficult, on the facts, to conclude whether the post-Cold War international system is unipolar or based on a balance of economic power as uncertainty prevails in international affairs. The actors do not abide by the rules of the system. For instance, the United States is slow in initiating policies to deter aggression for reasons unknown. Moreover, none of the economic giants have either cooperated or allied against the deviant state to provide answers to insurmountable economic problems faced by the world community. Therefore, the trend in the post-Cold War international system is that the United States may remain a preponderant power. However, regional powers could impose restraints on its actions and behaviour around the globe. The United States would like to be consulted in arrangements of any kind anywhere but it has to acknowledge the presence of regional economic powers such as Japan in the Asia-Pacific region and Germany in Europe. It

may also enter into cooperative enterprise with some regional powers to persuade others into a similar form of cooperation. However, the likelihood of cooperation in diverse sectors of economy is gloomier than other spheres (i.e. security) of inter-state relations. The US-Japan and US-EU economic frictions support the aforesaid assumption. The United States may act as an essential actor in all international affairs, but may encounter difficulties and constraints from the regional powers. This trend may continue to operate at least for the near future.

In the Asia-Pacific rim, the United States has to stay engaged with China, Japan and Russia. These states could be ranked as regional powers. Each of these four powers has peculiar interests in Asia Pacific, which are discussed latter in this study in the respective chapters on each power. The foreign policies of each respective nation would be formulated to attain those interests crucial to national power. It is necessary to observe that foreign policy-makers in formulating policies in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow are reciprocally influenced by each other. For instance, the foreign policy-makers in the United States take into account the reactions, interests, and attitudes of Japan, China, and Russia when formulating America's Asia-Pacific policy. In addition, foreign policy-makers in Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, and Moscow also take into account the role of small powers in the Asia-Pacific region in their Asia-Pacific policy formulations. For instance, the small powers enable the major powers in the region to gain support for a specific policy option. Therefore, for the sake of analysis, the pressure exerted by the international system on the foreign policies of these four powers is divided into two categories: (1) pressure exerted directly by these powers on each other's foreign

policy and (2) pressure exerted by the small powers on the behaviour of these major powers.

2.5.2 International law

International law refers to that body of rules and principles intended to regulate relations among sovereign states.[36]The issue before us in this discussion is not to examine the content or sources of international law. The aim is to analyse whether international law influences state behaviour and foreign policies. The relevant question, therefore, in the realm of foreign policy formulation is whether policy makers in the foreign ministries of sovereign states adhere to or neglect altogether the provisions of international law. International relations theorists have presented two-fold arguments in this regard. First, history is full of evidence and examples of both effectiveness and inefficacy of international law vis-à-vis foreign policy formulations. Second, in line with the argument advanced in this thesis, is the absence in international law of any limitation upon the foreign policies of individual nations coupled with the positive duty not to interfere in the conduct of the foreign affairs of other nations.[37]The proponents of the second viewpoint reduce the role of international law in foreign policies to virtually nothing. This category of scholars concentrate on the nature of international law in support of the view advanced by them. While the proponents of the first and contending view share similar concerns regarding the nature of international law, nevertheless, the message they convey to their opponents is that the positive achievements of international law, at least in some aspects of international affairs, must not be neglected. They cite some concrete examples to support the view advanced by them.

To be sure, there are frequent violations of international law, most notably those serious breaches that are reported on front pages of newspapers, such as the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran and various acts of violent aggression. While people tend to notice these conspicuous failures of international law, they neglect to notice the ordinary workings of international law in the everyday life of the international system. The fact is that, if one takes into account the myriad treaties and customary rules of international law that exist today, it can be said that most states obey most of the rules most of the time. In other words, international law gets enforced in its own way.[38]

The effectiveness of sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa, imposition of the blockade against the Soviet Union during the Cuban missile crisis, collective action under the auspices of the United Nations against North Korea in 1953 and Iraq in 1990, are but a few instances in which foreign policy makers have submitted to the natural force of international law.

Hans Morgenthau is the forerunner of the reductionist school in international relations. According to him, two factors contribute to the ineffectiveness and inefficacy of international law vis-à-vis foreign policy. First, international law is essentially a "decentralised legal system". It lacks a centralised mechanism in all its three basic functional components: legislation, adjudication, and enforcement.[39] Second, pursuit of national interests is central to a nation's foreign policy. Therefore, nations adhere to international law if it enables them to achieve national interests. According to Morgenthau, the existence of identical or complementary interests among nations is, therefore, a pre-requisite for the existence of international law. Morgenthau believes it constitutes the "lifeblood" of international law.[40]

Don C. Piper in "Foreign Policy and International Law", advances a similar argument. However, his argument is different from Morgenthau in that Piper believes foreign policy-makers always remained within the limits defined by international law. Piper examined concrete situations. Piper's analysis is presented hypothetically to show that international law influences foreign policies. Piper, like Morgenthau, holds that foreign policy-makers give priority to the maintenance of national security or attainment of national interests. However, they always wish or rather try to remain within the limits defined by international law. According to him states' options are restricted in choosing a course of action in instances where international legal rules are precise and provide specific behavioural guidance. Moreover, states invoke international law to provide justification for their actions. They also unilaterally interpret vague and ambiguous provisions of international law to justify policies enacted in pursuit of national interests.[41]

Morgenthau, in refuting the view advanced by Piper, says it is axiomatic that international law lacks a central body endowed with the responsibility to legislate new rules, adjudicate disputes, and enforce its provisions. International law, therefore, remains decentralised at best. It is the sovereign states who are individually legislators, creators of tribunals as well as sheriffs or policemen of their own accord. States give concrete meaning to legal provisions in line with their own national interests.[42]

In addition, Morgenthau says, the distribution of power or what he calls balance of power mechanism reinforces this deficiency of international law. According to him power is distributed unevenly. When the great powers violate the law that they have

themselves created together with the small powers, they exacerbate the situation and thereby discredit the role of international law. International law then becomes a tool used selectively and discriminately. This, in the final analysis, Morgenthau concludes, is tantamount to an absence of international law. Hence, the dominant interests of a few rules the many in the name of international law.[43] According to him two attempts were made to create a centralised enforcement mechanism, which could make international law relevant to foreign policy, namely, (1) treaties of guarantee, that is, a treaty between two or more parties to be guaranteed by a powerful sovereign state and (2) collective security as provided by the covenant of the League of Nations or its successor organisation: the United Nation's Charter.[44] However, both attempts have failed.

2.5.3 Technology

Politically, the principle of sovereign equality constitutes the core of the international system, which emphasises division and separateness. Economically, the maximum social advantage is attainable only in a system emphasising unity, integration, and cooperation. The developments around the globe emphasise the need for unity and joint action more than ever. They also indicate that the world political structure is in transition, requiring major modifications in assumptions and structures of the international system. This creates serious challenges to foreign policy-makers of sovereign states. The effects as such on foreign policy formulations are also the result of advancements in science and technology. The technological revolution has created problems for foreign policy-makers. The traditional understanding of fundamental concepts of international relations is either no longer relevant or need redefinition. The

meanings of concepts such as power, national interests, ends and means, method and strategies, distribution of power and so on, have changed. For instance, the traditional formulation of national interests in terms of security is no longer relevant because with advancements in technology, the meaning of security in terms of maximisation of military hardware has changed with greater emphasis being given to quality rather than quantity of equipment and personnel. Moreover, the economic dimension is given more weight in mutual security consultations. In the final analysis, national priorities are changing rapidly and need reordering and reprioritisation.[45]

The political configuration of the world structure has also changed. Innovations in technology have created what is often called a "global village". Diverse communities around the world have become interdependent in many ways, resulting in the establishment of contacts and communication networking. Therefore, the number of actors and pressures at the global level has increased. In this kind of situation technologically viable nations use technology to create dependency. The transfer of technology to technologically backward nations is made conditional. Moreover, technologically advanced nations only transfer that amount of technology to the backward nations that would keep them in a condition of permanent dependence. Technology is used to advance national prestige and power, with the additional quest of providing leadership at the global level.

Related to the above argument is the question of industrialisation. Many small and underdeveloped nations on the international plane are becoming industrialised. With

access to technology, they have managed to assert themselves and even outpace others in production and distribution. In addition, advanced production techniques have raised the level of productivity. National economies of many nations have been diversified. Small nations have now emerged as competitive players in the global arena. Hence, substantial reordering of production capacity and competitiveness has led to the creation of new powers, leading ultimately to changes in the world power structure. New nations attained the rank of big powers or great powers.

However, at this juncture, it is necessary to note that the hallmark of industrialisation is energy. The technological revolution also brought about revolution in energy, replacing coal, iron, petroleum, etc. as sources of energy with new sources such as nuclear energy. This new source of energy, while reducing dependency also calls for cooperation and coordination of activities, as it is an expensive enterprise. One nation cannot solely bear the cost of research. In any event, with new nations gaining access to energy and technology, the world power structure and assumptions associated with it must inevitably undergo further change.

In addition to industrialisation, technology has also resulted in population explosion through improvement in public healthcare due to developments in modern medicine, decreased infant morality and epidemic diseases. Overpopulated and resource-poor nations cannot feed their citizens and have to seek foreign aid and assistance from surplus nations. Thus, foreign aid and assistance invariably become foreign policy issues in both developed and underdeveloped nations.[46]

The challenges posed by technology to foreign policy-makers are countless. While technology makes the lives of thousands comfortable, it has substantially changed the global scenario. The most dangerous challenge posed by technology is that it can be used as an instrument of hegemonism, thus replacing military power as the instrument of control and manipulation. This trend towards hegemonism arising from technological prowess will continue to dominate foreign policies and international relations in the new millennium.

2.6   Internal Structures of Foreign Policy

A cluster of institutions or structures that originate within a nation's borders also influences national foreign policy formulations. Though the degree of vitality of these institutions in shaping foreign policy patterns varies, foreign policy-makers are nevertheless inclined to take into consideration these structures. Rosenau hypothesised that the potency of some internal foreign policy structures depends on the regime type a nation possesses. According to him, societal structures are more potent in open or democratic regimes while governmental structures are more potent in closed or undemocratic regimes.[47] Rosenau's argument has neglected the fact that in crisis situations, the governmental institutions, in open or closed nations, are more active in shaping foreign policy outcomes. Thus, Theodore J. Lowin observed that the event or situation constitutes the criteria of potency and effectiveness of internal structures on foreign policy.[48] However, the notions of situation or regime type as criteria to measure the potency of a given internal structure of foreign policy is debatable, as it is difficult to

ascertain the category of foreign policy structure exerting potential influence on foreign policy outcomes.

In any event, one cluster of internal structures directly influences foreign policies while the other cluster does so indirectly. Hence, internal structures of foreign policy are divided into two categories: (1) direct and (2) indirect. Rosenau conceptualised both direct and indirect foreign policy structures into "source variables" and "national attributes" respectively. Rosenau's source variables are divided into individual variables and societal variables. Individual variables include personality and attitudes of presidents or prime ministers and foreign policy elite or heads of foreign policy bureaucracies who advice the presidents or prime ministers. Societal variables include political processes such as political parties, pressure groups and public opinion. Rosenau's "national attributes" includes size, level of economic development, and regime type.[49] David Moore added six more to make Rosenau's "national attributes" collectively nine. Moore added governmental stability, religion, elite tenure, population density, urbanism, and institutionalisation.[50] To them, could also be added national technological competitiveness, military or strategic stature of a nation, and level of literacy.

Spanier uses the term "circles of power" to explain direct internal structures to show the different levels of influence on foreign policy outcomes in order of priority. Spanier's "circles of power" are concentric: the closer the structure is to the centre the greater is its influence on foreign policy outcomes. Rosenau and Spanier adopt an identical approach. A modified version of Spanier's "circles of power" is composed of

two major concentric circles. Let us suppose Rosenau's direct or "source variables" and indirect or "national attributes" are identical to Spanier's two major concentric circles. The direct foreign policy structures are located on the inner side of the two major concentric circles while the indirect foreign policy structures are located on the outer side of the two concentric circles (see Appendix One). Then, each sub-category of Rosenau's direct and indirect foreign policy structures constitutes different layers of the two major concentric circles. The closer the layer to the centre, the greater the influence of internal structures on foreign policy outcomes. Hence, Spanier develops a hierarchy of influences exerted by the internal structures on foreign policy. Therefore, a set of structures, each with a different level or degree of influence affects foreign policy outcomes. Individuals or chief executives (i.e. presidents, prime ministers and their chief advisers) constitute the inner-most layer, the societal or political processes constitute the outermost layer, and the governmental agencies and bureaucracies constitute the middle layer of the inner concentric circle or direct internal structures of foreign policy.[51]

Spanier does not discuss the outer concentric circle or indirect internal structures of foreign policy. Moreover, neither Rosenau nor David Moore provides a hierarchy of influences of the indirect structures on foreign policy outcomes. Therefore, this study attempts to provide a hierarchy of influence of indirect structures such as regime type, level of economic development, military stature, size and the level of literacy, as their influence on foreign policy outcomes is obvious and evident. The hierarchy of influence of indirect structures is not discussed here because the level of influence of the indirect structures on foreign policy outcomes varies from state to state. This is due to the fact

that states are ascribed different power status. Therefore, the hierarchy of influences of indirect internal structures of foreign policies on the foreign policy outcomes of the major powers under discussion is provided in the chapters devoted to respective powers. At this juncture, however, a discussion of the direct as well as indirect internal structures of foreign policy is in order.

2.6.1   Direct Internal Foreign Policy Structures

At the core of the Rosenau-Spanier hierarchy of direct internal structures (see Appendix Two) of foreign policy lies the foreign policy elite(individuals in Rosenau's categories of internal structure). When reference is made to foreign policy elite, the focus is on a small group of persons located within the executive branch of government who provide advice to the chief executive on all foreign policy issues. The chief executive is also included. Therefore, foreign policy elite include presidents or prime ministers, ministers for defence and foreign affairs, professional officials, diplomatic representatives abroad and head of the principal foreign policy bureaucracies (departments that have interest in specific foreign policy areas).[52]Foreign policy elites are mostly political appointees selected by the chief executives. Foreign policy elite are active both in crisis and non-crisis situations. However, other structures do not exert much pressure in a crisis situation as the decision processes require fast and secret responses. Still, the influence of the foreign policy elite on foreign policy outcomes is hierarchical. The higher the rank of the elite officer in the organisation, the greater influence he exerts. Thus, the influence of the president or prime minister is greater than

the minister of foreign affairs and both have greater influence than other professional diplomats.

The influence of the foreign policy elite is closely related to the kind of personality traits they possess. Personality traits refer to inherent dispositions of a person collectively known as idiosyncratic variables. Attitudes, beliefs or world-view, and decision making style are three major personality traits of foreign policy elites. Primarily, the attitudes and beliefs of the elite shape their perception of the world. Four other elements influence elite attitudes and beliefs: (1) nationalism, (2) belief in internal control over events or ability to manipulate the situation, (3) cognitive complexity, and (4) dogmatism or thoughts over which the elites are inflexible. However, elite perceptions of the world are reinforced by their decision style which depends on the following six elements: (1) confidence, (2) openness to new information, (3) preference for certain kinds of risks, (4) capacity for postponing decisions without anxiety, (5) rules for adjusting to uncertainty, and (6) ability to compromise as well as ability to search for new information. All these collectively influence a leader's perception of the world and his actions. Based on these idiosyncratic variables individuals are differentiated and national foreign policies are classified.[53]

Rosenberg says that effective foreign policy targets the foreign policy elite of the contending state. He advocates that this should be ranked after national interests in terms of priority as foreign policy objective. He concludes that the Cold War disarmament regimes were the outcome of the change in the attitudes of contending elites about the

international system both in Washington and Moscow. Thus, the trends such as conciliatory, hostile, isolationist, competitive, etc. in foreign policy are shaped and reshaped by the dominant elite on a global scale.[54]

Foreign policy bureaucracy is the second most influential foreign policy cluster of direct internal foreign policy structures. Foreign policy bureaucracies refer to those governmental institutions and informal agencies with vested interests in foreign policy issues. Foreign policy bureaucracies include governmental institutions such as ministries of foreign affairs, defence affairs, finance affairs, etc., and informal institutions such as business community, think tanks, etc. This list of foreign policy bureaucracies is not exhaustive as the number of governmental and non-governmental institutions vary from state to state as well as from one foreign policy issue to another. The foreign ministry tops the hierarchy of foreign policy bureaucracies in terms of influence, as career foreign policy bureaucrats in the foreign ministry are professionals who possess skills in management of national foreign policy and its relation with the outer environment. The foreign ministry filters out the influences of all other bureaucracies of a state and then suggests a policy decision to the head of state or persons concerned with a specific situation. Moreover, they provide information, policy alternatives, technical services, etc.[55]

In addition to the foreign ministry, two other foreign policy bureaucracies that directly influence foreign policy are the military bureaucracy and economic and technical institutions from other ministries and sectors of society. Michael K. O'Leary, in his

discussion of "Bureaucratic Model of Foreign Policy", concludes that the role played by bureaucracies in foreign policy is closely related to the international environment. When the international environment is complex and ambiguous, foreign policy is very much the outcome of the efforts of the professional diplomat, as he possesses the necessary skill. When any nation's environment becomes less ambiguous, the power of decision making gravitates away from professional diplomats. If the ambiguity is reduced through heightened cooperation and integration, the economists and other technicians become more important in foreign policy. If the ambiguity is reduced through heightened hostility and overt conflict with other nations, the military comes to dominate policy formulation. However, professional diplomats in foreign ministries in either situation play a significant role.[56] The aforesaid argument supports the view that the classical understanding that the locus of foreign policy is residual in the foreign ministries only is no longer relevant as other bureaucracies also play significant role in foreign policy-making. In fact, given a foreign policy issue, in certain situations the foreign ministry bureaucracy is often overlooked in the making of a foreign policy decision.

The assumption that underlies the vitality of bureaucracies to foreign policy is that they provide both continuity and consistency to the foreign policy of a nation in view of the fact that they provide policy guidelines and desired goals that could be pursued in both peace and crisis situations. In peace or normal situations, national foreign policy is directed by long-term objectives i.e. national interests while in crisis situations, "default values" would provide direction to national foreign policy. "Default values" are foreign policy objectives generated by foreign policy bureaucrats. They are the provisional

arrangements in which over–commitment is avoided. This may substitute some long-term objective till the crisis is overcome.[57]

Political processes or societal variables constitute the third cluster of internal foreign policy structures that directly influence foreign policy outcomes. This cluster includes political parties, interest groups, public opinion, and legislatures. However, the influence of these structures on foreign policy is issue–oriented. In addition, legislatures are restricted also by the powers provided to them by national constitutions. Moreover, legislatures rarely initiate foreign policies. They mostly become involved when executives initiate one. The involvement of political parties and pressure groups depends on two factors: (1) the interest or stake they have in foreign policy issues, and (2) the degree of experience, knowledge and training their members have in foreign policy. Given the argument above, political parties adopt bipartisan approaches in foreign policy. Each political party advances its own interests and ideology at the expense of other political parties. However, bipartisanship stops if the foreign policy issue involves national interests. This explains the reason for political parties being more active and effective in domestic politics than foreign policies.[58] However, Rosenberg argues that for the interest groups to be effective, they need to identify the ultimate decision-maker and institution to which he may listen.[59] Public opinion will be effective if the foreign policy issue is affecting public life because at this stage, people become aware of foreign policy objective and effects. Otherwise, public opinion is mostly permissive and supportive of foreign policy design due to the public's lack of knowledge and information about

foreign policy. Indeed, lack of knowledge and ignorance of foreign policy is the main reason for disinterest of the masses in foreign policy.[60]

2.6.2 Indirect Foreign Policy Structures

The indirect internal structures of foreign policy influence foreign policy-making as they condition the operation and function of the direct internal structures of foreign policy. In Rosenau's categories, "national attributes" or indirect internal foreign policy structures are three-fold: (1) size, (2) regime type, and (3) level of economic development. Size refers to the material (physical) and non-material (human) resources and the way they are operationalised. Economic development refers to the state of affairs in which a nation has translated its industrial, agricultural, and technological potentials into operative capability. Economic development is measured according to the scales of Gross National Product (GNP), technological competitiveness, productivity and market competitiveness. Regime type refers to the kind of political system the state possesses i.e. whether a national political system is open and democratic or close and directive, and whether the government official is exposed to and held responsible by the values and demands of the citizenry. The regime type is measured according to degree of press freedom.

To Rosenau's categories two more structures which influence foreign policy can be added: (1) national military stature measured on a global scale, and (2) the level of literacy. The former could be measured according to the military presence a state maintains around the globe, quality and quantity of armed forces and war machines, and

strategic effectiveness. The level of education may be measured according to scholarly research produced in various specialisations and the innovative capability within the educated population of a nation (see Appendix One).

2.7   Transformation of Foreign Policy Structures

Foreign policy-making, regardless of the regime type, is concentrated in the hands of a significant few. However, while in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes decision-making is highly centralised and state-controlled, in democratic societies decision-making is society-dominated. In the former, foreign policy reflects the expectation and attitude of the significant few at the top. In the latter, intermediate organisations and societal demands have great influence in foreign policy-making. However, democracy is still an operating political system in the United States and Japan in contrast to the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, which are totalitarian regimes with a highly centralised decision-making apparatus. The foreign policy institutions in the US and Japan also include non-state controlled structures in addition to the governmental institutions. In China the non-state controlled institutions are not effective, as the state rules over their activities, while Russia is an emerging democracy where the non-governmental foreign policy structures tend to have relatively less significant influence.

The United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cold War patterns of relations. According to Lebow, the Soviet Union encountered foreign policy failures,[61] which, according to Synder, were due to the absence of competitive political and economic institutions. The political and economic institutions of the Soviet Union

increasingly became dysfunctional, which prompted Gorbachev and his team of advisers to reform the Soviet System.[62] Gorbachev and his new team of advisers (also known as new thinkers) initiated new institutions, including foreign policy institutions, within the decision-making apparatus in line with their beliefs and attitude.[63] Gorbachev, however, was replacing once first-line foreign policy institutions in Moscow by new ones, which were inspired by Western attitude and values.

While Gorbachev and his new team of advisers were intent to reform the Soviet domestic political structures, the Soviet system, for various reasons collapsed. The Russian Federation replaced it. Systemic transformation, although peaceful and non-violent, affected the existing balance of power in the world. It brought about change in the configuration of power in the Asia-Pacific region as well. The United States, Japan, China, and Russia are actors whose policies shape events in post-Cold War Asia-Pacific. Systemic transformation, though affecting the order of prioritisation of constituent elements of national interests in Washington, Tokyo, Beijing, and Moscow, has not affected domestic foreign policy structures of the United States, Japan, and China. Therefore, the post-Cold War foreign policy structures of these actors are similar to the ones possessed by them during the Cold War. However, when Russia replaced the Soviet Union, it discarded almost all Soviet foreign policy institutions. However, the Soviet foreign policy structures, institutional transformation introduced by Gorbachev, and the foreign policy structures of the Russian Federation, are discussed in chapter seven of this thesis. It is noteworthy that, though Russia's foreign policy structures are becoming pluralistic and non-state controlled in nature, they resemble a top-down policy-making

mechanism in which the president is the central decision-maker. The president of Russia is powerful as he could bypass all other foreign policy structures. This power is given to him by the 1993 Russian Constitution promulgated by the president himself.

ENDNOTES

1. James E. Harf et. al., "Systemic and External Attributes in Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau (ed.) *Comparing Foreign Policies*, (USA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1974), pp. 236-237.

2. David W. Moore, "Governmental and Societal Influences on Foreign policy in Open and Closed Nations", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 172-179.

3. Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.*, p. 4.

4. Stuart J. Thornson, "National Political Adaptation", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 89-92.

5. Attar Chand, *International Relations*, (New Delhi: Anmol, 1992), p. 4.

6. Charles O. Lenche and Abdul A. Said, *Concepts of International Politics*, (London: Princeton Hall Inc. Englwood Chiffs, 1963), pp. 30–34.

7. Patrick J. McGowan, "Adaptive Foreign Policy Behavior: An Empirical Approach", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

8. *Ibid.*

9. Lenche, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-34.

10. Stuart J. Thornson, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

11. McGowan, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

12. Thornson, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

15. Lenche, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5, 23-24. See also Chand, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Relation*, (USA: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 151.

19.   *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

20.   For more details about national interest, see Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-157. See also Lenche, *op. cit.*, pp. 4, 23-24, see also Roy E. Jones, *Principles of Foreign Policy*, (Oxford: Martin Bertson, 1979), pp. 35-40.

21.   Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

22.   The persons concerned with national foreign policy are known as foreign policy elite. This issue is discussed later in this chapter when we discuss internal structures of foreign policy.

23.   Lenche, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-37.

24.   *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 27.

25.   *Ibid.*, pp. 95-103.

26.   Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

27.   Lenche, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-104.

28.   *Ibid.*

29.   *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

30.   Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-23. Categories of international systems outlined by Kaplan is not discussed here. For more information on this issue, see Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-80. Here reference is made only to ideas relevant to our discussion.

31.   For details on this issue, see Inis L. Claude Jr., *Power and International Relations*, (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 1-185.

32.   For more information on hierarchical international system, see Kaplan, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-50.

33.   Claude, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-17, 28, 55-60.

34.   Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

35.   *Ibid.*

36.   Lenche, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

37. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations,* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 300.

38. Frederic S. Pearson & J. Martin Rochester, *International Law: the Global Condition in the Late Twentieth Century*, (USA: McGraw Hill Inc., 1992), p. 319.

39. *Ibid.,* pp. 265-285.

40. *Ibid.,* pp. 265-266.

41. Don C. Piper, "Foreign Policy Outputs and international Law", in Mernitt Richard L. (ed.), *Foreign Policy Analysis,* (London: Lexington Books, 1975), p. 22.

42. Morgenthau, *op. cit.,* pp. 181-182, 267-270.

43. *Ibid.,* pp. 272-282.

44. For more details on the relevant discussion of articles of the UN Charter and Covenant of the League of Nations, see Morgenthau, *op. cit.,* pp. 291-298.

45. Lenche, *op. cit.,* pp. 236-239.

46. *Ibid.,* pp. 242-243.

47. Moore, *op. cit.,* pp. 180-184.

48. Theodore J. Lowin, "Making Democracy Safe for the World by National Politics and Foreign Policy", in James N. Rosenau, *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy,* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 300-305.

49. Gary Hoggard, "Differential Source Coverage in Foreign Policy Analysis", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.,* pp. 121-124.

50. David W. Moore, "National Attitude and Nation Typology", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.,* p. 254.

51. John Spanier & Eric M, Uslaner, *How American Foreign Policy is Made,* (USA: Krieger Publishing Co. Inc. 1978), pp. 54-56.

52. *Ibid.,* p. 20.

53. Herman outlines circumstances in which the personality attribute plays a role in influencing foreign policy. For details, see Margaret G. Herman, "Leader Personality and Foreign Policy: A look at Rosenau's Genotypes", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.,* pp. 202-218.

4.   Milton Rosenberg, "Attitude Change and Foreign Policy in the Cold War Era", in Rosenau(1967), *op. cit.*, pp. 117-129.

5.   Michael K. O'Leary, " Foreign Policy and Bureaucratic Adaptation", in Rosenau(1974), *op. cit.*, pp. 57-59.

6.   For details on bureaucracies other than Foreign Ministry, see *ibid.*, pp. 61-69.

7.   For assumptions of bureaucratic model of Foreign Policy, see *ibid.*, pp. 60-61.

8.   Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

9.   Lester W. Milbrath, " Interest Groups and Foreign Policy", in Rosenau(1967), *op. cit.*, p. 245.

0.   Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

1.   Richard Ned Lebow, "The Search for Accommodation: Gorbachev in Comparative Perspective", in Richard Ned Lebow & Thomas Risse-Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory And The End of The Cold War*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 176-177.

2.   Jack Synder, "Myths of Modernization, The Post-Gorbachev World", in Lebow, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-111.

3.   Rey Koslowski & Friedrch V. Kratochwil, "Understanding Change in International Politics: The Soviet Empire's Demise and the International System", in Lebow, *op. cit.*, p. 128.