

CHAPTER THREE

PATTERNS OF RELATIONS AMONG THE FOUR POWERS: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter three analyses Cold War foreign policy trends of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. It puts the Cold War relations of these powers into historical perspective. It examines historical patterns of relationships of the four powers in the light of their respective foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War era. The discussion deals with the nature of quadrilateral relations and attitudes each power held toward others during the Cold War era. The inquiries in this chapter focus on whether, in retrospect, the relationships among these powers in the Asia-Pacific region were co-operative, hostile, or otherwise. The analysis is precise and only includes major turning points of relations among the four powers, as the aim is to observe the factors, internal and external, that influenced foreign policies in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo during the Cold War.

3.1 Cold War: The Causes

Walter Lippmann coined the term “Cold War”¹ to explain the post-World War II international relations dominated by the United States and Soviet Union. Perhaps Lippmann had the following assumptions in mind: (1) the international system is bipolar, (2) there exists only two superpowers, (3) the relationship between the superpowers is confrontational, hostile, and adverse, and (4) that this state of affairs would continue to disturb foreign policy-makers of both camps and shape their foreign policies for decades until one leg of the international system perishes, either peacefully or by violent means.

Perhaps Lippmann was right. One needs to ponder over questions such as: (1) what were the main causes of the Cold War?; (2) when did it begin?; (3) what is the yardstick against which the status “superpower” is measured?; (4) was such a hostile state of affairs essentially ideological, political, or economic in nature?; and (5) what are the “hot spots” that brought the superpower hostility over promoting their hidden agendas into the open? A brief examination of these questions will provide the base for superpower foreign policy directions that shaped world events for about forty-six years.

Three categories of actors, namely, (1) core actors, (2) secondary actors, and (3) subordinate actors emerged in the concluding days of World War II and continued to exist throughout the Cold War era. The core actors are called superpowers. The secondary actors are known as medium or regional powers, while subordinate actors are called small or national powers. However, the last category is comprised of

powers aligned with either superpower. The secondary actors are those powers who defined their interests in a regional context. This kind of actors existed both in Asia and Europe. For the sake of analysis, the Asian powers of China and Japan fall within this category. Both China and Japan used two different instruments of influence during the Cold War. China's instrument of influence was military while Japan's was solely economic. Superpowers were also known as strategic powers. The essential characteristic of a superpower or strategic power is that it defined its interests in global terms. Moreover, military and not economic power constituted the hallmark of their supremacy. Both the United States and Soviet Union had defined their interests in global terms and attained unrivalled strategic parity, thus attaining superpower or strategic power status. If military capability and not economic power constituted the essential element of such a status, then it would suffice to proceed with the argument below. In the Cold War era the military capabilities of both the United States and Soviet Union were constantly upgraded. Above all, both possessed first strike and mutual assured destruction (MAD) capabilities. Military or strategic parity raised, both in Washington and Moscow, the notion of living under constant threat from the other. Therefore, according to the argument above, both the United States and Soviet Union were superpowers.² However, it is noteworthy that China was never a strategic power. When writers speak of a strategic triangle to include China, they consider China so, not because it had attained strategic parity with the United States and the Soviet Union, but because of the shifting strategic balance dictated by its Cold War security concerns. However, this assumption is examined later in this chapter.

During World War II, the United States, Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain formed a military alliance, known as grand alliance, against the defiant axis powers of Germany and Japan. The United States and Soviet Union cooperated in defeating the axis powers. However, according to Ulam, the grand alliance was an odd partnership. According to Walter Lafeber, the US-USSR cooperation during the World War II was a coincidence of national interests or, as one might call it, a marriage of convenience. After the defeat of the axis powers, the United States and Soviet Union developed disagreement over issues vital to their national interests, which resulted in mistrust and adversarial relations between the two powers.

The advocates of the idealist and realist schools of thought in international relations consider national interests and not ideology as the main cause of superpower frictions. National interests over which the superpowers clashed include the search for consumer markets and access to raw materials to sustain the industrial base at home.³ However, Lafeber argues that the struggle as such for commerce had begun before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. He traces its origin from the 19th century. His analysis suggests that the root of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was not ideological. Ideology provided a mere justification. It also suggests that the conflict of interests between the two nations existed long before World War II. Therefore, it only entered into a new phase in the concluding days of World War II.⁴ The struggle at once became open and it turned into a competition for leadership and influence between the United States and the Soviet Union and not United States and Germany or Japan.

As early as the nineteenth century, Manchuria in Asia and the whole of Europe were identified as consumer markets by policy-makers in Washington. In Manchuria, Japan and the Soviet Union were perceived to pose threats to American interests while in Europe, Germany and the Soviet Union posed similar concerns to the United States. In contrast, the Americans were perceived by the Soviets as aliens and threats to their national interests both in Asia and Europe. In order to protect American interests abroad, the United States intended to stay engaged militarily in Asia and Europe while the Soviets wanted American troops out of both continents. Therefore, in addition to commerce, the presence of the American troops in Europe after World War II also became a foreign policy concern in Moscow. Security concerns of the motherland constituted the new element of national interests of the Soviet Union. Lafeber believes that political and economic security of motherland Russia and not World Revolution based on Marxist-Leninist philosophy topped Stalin's concerns. Nevertheless, at the root of Moscow's security concerns lies the assumption that the Soviet leaders especially Stalin had accumulated "mistrust" about the West, particularly the United States.⁵ The analysis below examines the above assumption.

Basically, four factors contributed to Stalin's mistrust of the United States. First, the United States and Great Britain rejected Stalin's proposal that the Western Powers open a second front against Germany either in France or Finland. The Americans silently preferred the Soviets and Germans to destroy each other. Even the Soviet Union feared the possibility of a separate peace treaty between the Western Powers and Germany while the latter was at war with Moscow.⁶ Second, Stalin

believed that the United States used atomic bombs against Japan as leverage against the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The type of socio-political structure China should possess constituted the third element of mistrust. Stalin wanted a divided China. He wanted neither Mao Tse-tung nor Chiang Kai-shek to control the whole of China, as it could pose a threat to Soviet security. The United States wanted a United China under a Mao-Chiang coalition with Chiang having greater influence.⁷ Fourth and the most important, was the controversy between the Soviet Union and the United States over the type of political system East European States should adopt. Most scholars consider this last reason as the real basis for open conflict between the United States and Soviet Union. Indeed, the issue of what type of political systems East European states should possess was used by the superpowers to contain each other's influence in Europe.

Related to this last factor is the fact that the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met on four occasions during World War II: Cairo (November, 1943), Tehran (1943), Yalta (February, 1945), and Potsdam (1945) to discuss the future of Europe in particular and international affairs in general. The United States wanted a stable Europe, as it had vital national interests in the continent. Towards that end, the then American President Franklin Roosevelt proposed a four-power arrangement comprising the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and China (not France) to jointly police Europe. Later the United States withdrew its four-power policing mechanism proposal, which led to the Soviet annexation of East Europe. In the war against Germany, the Soviet Union had occupied the East European Nations of Finland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, the Balkan States, and Poland with the

influence in Eastern Europe. Stalin's aim was to remove Western influence on its borders to protect his motherland as well as to gain access to raw materials needed for the reconstruction of the Soviet economy. The United States refused to accept Stalin's proposal.

The question of who should control Poland--pro-Western Polish or pro-Moscow Poles--dominated the Yalta Summit. The United States suggested that the pro-Western Polish government in exile should control Poland. However, Stalin preferred only pro-Soviet Polish, known as Moscow Poles, to take control of the government in Poland. The superpowers failed to reach an agreement at the Yalta Summit.⁸ Eventually, Moscow Poles trained in Moscow overthrew the pro-Western Polish government and replaced it with a pro-Soviet government in Poland. The United States linked Poland to its post-World War II national interests in Europe. With this, the superpower rivalry entered a new phase: open confrontation. As mentioned earlier, the post-World War II national interests of the United States were a replica of its pre-war national interests. Economists in Washington predicted depression in the United States. Preventive measures re-emphasised search for markets and access to raw materials. Europe was identified as such as an attractive market. This required a democratic, free, and an open Europe. Soviet influence would result in a closed economic bloc. The Soviet influence had to be curtailed, as it would pose a threat to American economic interests. This issue was linked to Poland. The controversy on the surface appeared to be disagreement over the type of political system Poland should possess. However, containing each other's influence in Europe and establishing their spheres of influence there was the hidden agenda promoted by the superpowers.⁹

When Stalin for security reasons began to tighten his grip on Eastern Europe by imposing Soviet style communist political systems, policy-makers in Washington and London became weary of the situation. Winston Churchill of Britain called for US-British cooperation. The Soviet Union viewed Churchill's proposal with concern. A new era in superpower relations termed by Lippmann as "Cold War" commenced. The two sides adopted a strategy of measures and counter-measures to contain each other's influence not only in Europe but the whole world. Both sides galvanised resources and energy to upgrade their strategic capabilities and find allies and spheres of influence.

It is interesting to note at this juncture that the superpower rivalry that apparently began in Europe during World War II was soon globalised. The superpowers designed strategies to ensure access to consumer markets and raw materials as well as to pre-empt the influence of the other in Asia, Europe, Latin America, and Africa. The spillover of superpower rivalry to Asia involved China and Japan. Both superpowers vied for alliance with China and Japan. Alliance by either superpower with China and Japan would naturally threaten the other's interests.

3.2 US-USSR Cold War Strategies of Mutual Containment

This part of the study concentrates on the US-USSR Cold War strategies of mutual containment. The strategy of measure-counter-measure means the foreign policy responses of the superpowers in the struggle to promote their respective national interests. Two types of strategies topped the foreign policy goals of the superpowers: (1) arms race and (2) the search for clients or spheres of influence around the globe.

However, ideology was used by both superpowers to provide adequate justification in promoting their respective goals. This section examines the Cold War strategies of the superpowers at three levels: (1) the Old Cold War (the first two decades of the Cold War era from 1947-1967), (2) Détente or Cold Peace (1967-1975), and (3) the New Cold War (1975 until the Soviet disintegration in 1991).

3.2.1 The Old Cold War

The Old Cold War refers to the first two decades of superpower rivalry after the official declaration of the Cold War by the Western Powers. Britain's then Premier Winston Churchill viewed Soviet grip on East European nations as an attempt at "capitalist encirclement". Churchill perceived Soviet East European policy as a policy of Iron Fence or Iron Curtain against Capitalism. Churchill in "The Sinews of Peace" address in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946 used the term "Iron Curtain"¹⁰. His speech implied the existence of an imaginary line in Europe separating Western Europe dominated by the Western powers from Eastern Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. This imaginary line later became the demarcation line between the so-called capitalist camp and communist camp in Europe. To Churchill, this imaginary line meant that East European states were subjected to a police state and a command economy and hence, deprived of the right of self-determination and the free market economic system as advocated by capitalist ideology.¹¹ Churchill officially declared the birth of the Cold War. He called for US-Britain cooperation to demolish the Iron Curtain and contain spillover of the Soviet System to other parts of Europe. Policy-makers in Washington silently agreed with Churchill. They were contemplating an American policy response to protect markets needed for US businesses at home. The Truman Doctrine was

America's response to Soviet actions in Europe. However, the American policy response had to be properly justified. President Truman used issues of capitalist encirclement, self-determination, and democracy to justify US military and economic commitments in Europe. The Truman Doctrine was based on the central concept of US "preponderance" or "dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of strength". The natural outcome was the arms race.¹² The Soviet Union, as discussed later, adopted the policy of strategic parity as its official anti-American response.

President Truman appealed to Congress to support his anti-Communist policy. The Truman Doctrine stated that the world order of capitalism and democracy is threatened by communism. America, he held, must save the world order. The Truman Doctrine at once turned the superpower adversary into an ideological rivalry. It also signalled the official declaration of the Cold War by the United States.¹³ Indeed, the Truman Doctrine was announced when Stalin demanded access to the Mediterranean and Bosphorous, which was under the control of the Turkish government in the Black Sea. President Truman and Premier Churchill rejected Stalin's proposal. In fact, the Truman Doctrine had originally been initiated to provide financial and military aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from falling under Soviet control. Stalin's demand as such was part¹⁴ of Soviet strategy of expansion of Communist influence in Europe. The United States did not want expansion of Soviet influence beyond the East European borders. It seems that the United States had virtually come to terms with the status quo in East Europe and accepted the imaginary line of the Iron Curtain.

With the official declaration of the Cold War by the United States, the Soviet Union embarked on a counter-measure policy. Throughout the Old Cold War, the Soviet counter-measures were both confrontational and competitive. Stalin's policies fall within the first category, whereas policies of the post-Stalin Soviet leaders fall within the second category. However, the aim of both categories of policies was to persistently counter American influence and threats posed to Soviet global interests. Ideology, politics, military, and economic instruments were applied by policy-makers in Moscow to achieve this objective of Soviet foreign policy. Although ideology was greatly emphasised by Stalin, it did not constitute a vital Soviet national interest. Moreover, in post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy, his successors would set aside ideology when it did not achieve the desired objective. The weak link of the Soviet Union's policy instruments was economic. Hence, diplomacy or political assertiveness and militarism dominated the Soviet Union's anti-American foreign policy.¹⁵

According to Lafeber, the irony of the Truman Doctrine was that it provided for a mechanism to hide problems within the American political system and to attribute them to external factors. Lafeber believes that such a tactic was necessary, as Americans could not fully understand or sufficiently appreciate America's dependence on world trade and markets. The President could not secure domestic support for his foreign policy by mere references to America's economic problems. However, Americans could easily comprehend anti-communism. Therefore, the President used anti-Communist sentiments to galvanize domestic support for his anti-Communist crusade.¹⁶

The Truman Doctrine constituted the core of American anti-Soviet response. It became the guiding principle of American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. At the heart of the Truman Doctrine lay the policy of containment. George Kennan, the then State Department aide, coined the term “containment” to give direction to American foreign policy. The doctrine became an ideological shield behind which the United States marched to rebuild the Western political-economic system and counter the radical left. From that time onward, any threat could easily be explained as communist inspired.¹⁷

Both economic and military interests spearheaded the United States anti-Soviet policies inspired by the Truman Doctrine. Economically, the United States through the Marshall Plan wanted to revive European economies in order to prevent their collapse as predicted by the Soviets. The military dimension of the Truman Doctrine included both internal policy initiatives and the creation of a counter-force to the Soviet presence everywhere in different geopolitical points. The pronouncement of the National Security Act (NSA) was among the internal policy initiatives. NSA resulted in (1) the creation of the Defence Department, (2) statutory establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (3) the formation of the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president, and (4) establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to collate and evaluate intelligence activities. An example of external counter-force initiatives was the alliance diplomacy around the globe. In Europe, it included the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and revival of West Germany. In Asia, it included the creation of security arrangements such as SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, and US-Japan alliance.

With the Cold War officially declared, it was intensified when the United States announced the following two decisions: (1) the United States announced that its forces would stay in Europe, as well as revive and remilitarize West Germany; (2) the United States demanded the mandate to control atomic weapons until an international organisation for arms control under the auspices of the United Nations was created. The United States would then pass the mandate to this newly created body. This meant that the United States should have the right of inspection of atomic weapon in the Soviet Union as well. On the contrary, the Soviets suggested destruction of the nuclear weapon, cessation of its production, and agreement of all powers not to use it. Only after that should its control be discussed.¹⁸

When the Soviet demand for access to the Bosphorous was rejected, the United States feared military retaliation by Moscow. In response to the Truman Doctrine, Stalin pondered over what could constitute the official policy of the Soviet Union if it had to provide counter-measures to protect Soviet interests in the world. The main purpose of the policy of counter-measure to Soviet policy-makers was to ensure that the principle of coexistence was observed. This meant that the Soviet Union needed to adopt a strategy in dealing with the Western menace in a manner that averts a major nuclear war, but at the same time enables Moscow to incite and justify wars of liberation in areas vital to Soviet interests.¹⁹ Strategic parity was formulated as the official Soviet policy. Policy-makers believed that strategic parity would remove the notion that the United States could treat or deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength or preponderance. The definition of strategic parity in Soviet foreign policy

formulation was broad enough to include parity not only with the United States, but all those nations that may join forces against the Soviet Union. Moscow sought parity with all potential enemies such as France, Britain, China, and the United States. This policy line continued to guide Soviet foreign policy-makers. It was reversed only when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985.²⁰

It is interesting to note that a drastic shift associated with the strategy of “preponderance” in Soviet foreign policy thinking occurred at two levels: firstly, Moscow adopted a policy of isolationism and secrecy, and secondly, it pursued a policy of expansionism. Isolationism was defined as closure to Western innovations and purging the entire system of pro-Western individuals and literature. Secrecy meant that exposure of any information to the West was tantamount to acts of betrayal of the motherland. Expansionism was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was a self-designated global police. Its tight grip over the East European Nations was a natural outcome of its power. By virtue of the same fact, the Soviet Union had the right to establish its military bases everywhere around the globe as part of its policing function. Hence, all these measures were deemed critical to the policy of strategic parity.²¹

Policy-makers in the United States observed Soviet policy of strategic parity with great concern. The President and his White House advisers had reached a conclusion that the US needed to deal with Stalin according to the principle of preponderance or position of strength. The United States should be the sole strategic power. If the United States remained the only possessor of nuclear weapons, it could easily draw concessions from the Soviet leaders. In order to prevent acquisition or

proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States proposed in 1948 that the inspection of all atomic production be put under its control until the United Nations created such an institution to monitor nuclear weapons. Obviously, the Soviet leader objected, proposing instead the destruction of atomic arsenals. The United States was not prepared to accept Stalin's proposal. In 1955, the issue of nuclear disarmament resurfaced for the second time. This time again, the US wanted to inspect nuclear sites in Moscow until the creation of an international body. Moscow considered such a proposal as a direct infringement of its sovereignty. This controversy continued until the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1963.²²

In addition to strategic parity, the Soviet Union, in response to the Truman Doctrine, initiated the formation of (1) the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (COMECON), (2) International Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM), and (3) the Warsaw Pact. COMECON was the Soviet equivalent of the Marshall Plan while the Warsaw Pact was the military counterpart to NATO. The Soviet response was justified on the grounds that the American design behind the Truman Doctrine was, according to then Soviet foreign minister Molotov, to create a large standing army to threaten Soviet security and its national interests in Europe.²³

However, the first test of the Truman Doctrine came in Asia and not in Europe. This time the threat posed by China was much more than the one posed by the Soviet Union. In 1949, the indigenous communists led by Mao defeated the pro-US nationalist movement led by Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, pro-Soviet North Korea invaded pro-US

South Korea.²⁴ The American President must live up to his responsibility. He committed American troops in Korea.

When the United States decided to revive Japan to curb the USSR's influence in the Asian Far East, Stalin inspired the Korean conflict presumably with intention of preventing the re-emergence of Japan, as well as threats posed by American military bases in that country²⁵. During the war against Japan, the southern zone of the Korean Peninsula was under the control of American forces while the northern zone was under Soviet control. Both powers withdrew their forces from their respective zones as they had promised. Both agreed on a unified Korea. However, they disagreed on who was to rule the Korean Peninsula--Kim Sung Il from the North or Syngman Rhee from the South. On 26 June 1950, North Korea, with apparent Soviet backing, attacked and invaded South Korea, thus triggering the 3-year Korean War from 1950-1953.

In its bid to attain strategic parity, the Soviet Union tested its first atom bomb in 1949. With Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, the US lost its nuclear monopoly. As the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, Moscow's attitude towards international affairs also changed. Before possession of nuclear weapons, the Soviet leaders rejected reunification as well as remilitarization of United Germany as proposed by the United States. When the United States expressed its decision to rearm West Germany, the Soviet Union supported the creation of Communist East Germany. Moreover, NATO was also seen as a threat if militarised West Germany were to acquire membership in the Washington-sponsored military organisation. However, when the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons, its fear as such faded away and its

attitude toward international affairs changed. Moscow did not object to West Germany's NATO membership in 1954. In fact, post-Stalin Soviet leaders suggested reunification of East and West Germany. They also agreed that the United Germany could remilitarize. However, prior to a full-fledged reunification, a provisional government comprising representatives from both sides (East and West Germany) should be formed. The provisional government and not occupation powers should oversee an all-German election. However, the Soviet proposal as such was categorically rejected by the Western powers.²⁶

A turning point came in 1953 when Stalin died. Khrushchev replaced him and embarked on the de-Stalinisation of Russia's foreign policy. Before his death, Stalin, in 1953, created a new institution, the Presidium of the Soviet Union. The Presidium was to be constituted by members of the Politburo with the leader of the Communist Party as its chairman. The lower rank members of the Communist Party elect the members and the chairman of the Presidium. The Presidium reviewed the following aspects of Stalin's foreign policy: (1) the Presidium abandoned the notion of treating Yugoslavia's Marshall Tito and Turkey as enemies, and (2) the Presidium also reviewed the pattern of relations within the Communist bloc as well as Sino-Soviet relations. They preferred to stop continuous use of terror and police methods in satellites and exploitation in favour of the Soviet economy. Communist parties in the satellite states were to be given more autonomy and living conditions were to be improved. Stalin's successors developed quite flexible attitudes towards the United States. However, under Khrushchev, Russia shifted its Stalin-era strategy. Moscow began to support

revolutionaries in the Third World states to overthrow the status quo. This resulted in the Eisenhower Doctrine with its corollary doctrine of massive retaliation.²⁷

Despite the fact that there existed flashpoints of conflict such as the Korean war, the prospects of armed confrontation between the superpowers did not seem imminent during Truman's administration. However, armed confrontation between the superpowers became imminent when President Eisenhower, Truman's successor, entered the White House. Eisenhower believed communism was the number one enemy. He also agreed with his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, that the policy of containment was insufficient to combat the Soviet threat. Dulles proposed containment to be reinforced with short or limited wars supported by propaganda and psychological warfare. But President Eisenhower went a step further and spoke of what was termed by Dulles as "massive retaliation". Eisenhower concluded that the Soviet Union must be crushed even if the United States had to risk the use of the hydrogen bomb. This constituted the core of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Eisenhower-Dulles approach was based on the assumption that there existed revolutionary and nationalist movements. Eisenhower called these movements "grey areas". According to him, the Soviet Union exploited these "grey areas" in the Third World. The Soviet Union supported these revolutionary and nationalist movements to change the status quo that favoured the United States. President Eisenhower did not rule out the possibility of use of weapons of mass destruction or massive retaliation if the situation over the "grey areas" deteriorated.²⁸ It is interesting to observe that the New Look Policy introduced the Doctrine of Massive Retaliation.

Yet the Eisenhower administration responded passively to Soviet advancement in the arms race. For instance, the Soviets produced space satellites and introduced intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The Eisenhower administration even did not propose any major increase in the US defence budget, as it did not perceive Soviet advancement as posing a real danger. However, the notion of superpower engagement in massive retaliation and nuclear warfare was put aside once and for all after the Cuban missile crisis. The installation of nuclear warheads in Cuba in 1962 by the Soviet Union seemed to have paved the way for the superpowers to review their policies on arms race regimes. Subsequently, a new turning point was reached when the two superpowers agreed to sign the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963 as well as agreed to the establishment of a hotline to avoid any untoward incident. Nevertheless, this partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was the first attempt at arms limitation by the superpowers.²⁹

Perhaps President John F. Kennedy who succeeded Eisenhower misjudged his predecessor's Doctrine of Massive Retaliation. At the beginning of his tenure, President Kennedy rigorously increased the defence budget. Soon the "perception shift" that occurred within the Kennedy administration prevented him from lavish military expenditure. The perception shift within the Kennedy administration could be attributed to developments in arms control, i. e. negotiating the existence of mutual awareness between the superpowers that a gain through war is a myth. However, the United States should not be challenged in areas vital to its interests. Kennedy warned that wars of liberation in areas vital to American interests could not be fought. Therefore, it was within the context of a perception shift that President Kennedy

committed American soldiers in South Vietnam to teach China a lesson that the US would not tolerate a challenge by anyone in areas of vital American interests.³⁰

In the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, the Johnson Doctrine, proclaimed by President Johnson, Kennedy's successor, shaped the American anti-Soviet Cold War policy. The Johnson Doctrine emphasised that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of communist regimes in the Western Hemisphere or Latin America. The United States was prepared to take actions of all kinds including military. The Johnson administration marked the end of the Old Cold War. Superpower relations entered a new phase of détente or reduction of tension between the two superpowers by the end of the 1960s.

3.2.2 Détente or Cold Peace

In the late 1960s, the superpowers began to review their confrontational policies. The policy review as such was directly linked to economic troubles faced at home by both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, the Soviet economy had amassed more difficulties than that of the United States. But what both superpowers shared in common was the notion that confrontation through arms race was no longer desirable. In the struggle for strategic parity, the Soviet Union managed to attain that status by 1968. In the process the Soviets had exhausted their economic base as they had invested heavily in the military industry. Thus, policy-makers in Washington came to terms with the reality that containment, from a strategic viewpoint was to be substituted with negotiation, as the Soviet Union was also strong strategically. However, negotiation and economic assistance were considered the right

policy substitutes as the Soviet economy was in trouble. Attitudinal change on both sides resulted in what came to be known as *détente* or normalisation. Superpower rivalry, therefore, entered a new phase.³¹

Détente did not mean withdrawal or retreat from the US-Soviet conflict. It implied lessening of military and political conflict. *Détente* is defined as a frame of mind or an environment conducive to cooperation, and minimising the risk of superpower confrontation and armed conflict while maintaining some degree of competition. However, the foreign policy behaviour of the superpowers indicate that *détente* was doomed to fail from the start. Both sides viewed it with suspicion and considered it as part of the overall strategy of containing each other. Therefore, it is not fair to state that the Soviets sacrificed *détente* through the Brezhnev Doctrine or Americans sacrificed it by giving the mandate to Jimmy Carter.³² This is precisely why some scholars such as Lafeber considered the superpower rapprochement as Cold Peace or New Containment.

When Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, in a 1967 speech proposed a less confrontational attitude, President Nixon's administration welcomed the idea. Henry Kissinger, Nixon's National Security Adviser, supported the idea of change of strategy in dealing with the Soviet menace, as he and Nixon had inherited the bulk of problems in the US-Soviet relationship. The new strategy aimed to contain the Soviet Union through negotiations, economic assistance, non-proliferation, and not by arms race. This new American strategy developed into what came to be known as the

Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine attempted to establish a “New Deal” with the Soviet Union.³³

The New Deal policy had two aspects: (1) it emphasised normalisation and not confrontation with both the Soviet Union and Communist China, and (2) it offered economic assistance to the troubled Soviet economy. The intention was not to save the falling Soviet system but to contain its influence in areas of vital interests. The New Deal policy emphasised normalisation with the Soviet Union more than with China. Hence, due to the emphasis on US-USSR normalisation, the Nixon Doctrine was translated into the “New Containment Policy”. The concrete achievement of the New Containment Policy was the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or arms control regimes better known as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and II or Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and II.³⁴

During the heyday of détente, two decisive incidents occurred, one each in the United States and the Soviet Union. In the early 1970s, the disclosure of the Watergate scandal forced President Nixon to resign to avoid impeachment by the Congress. In those same years, political upheavals in Czechoslovakia threatened communism in that Soviet client state. As usual, the Soviet leaders contemplated its repercussions in global terms. The political developments in Czechoslovakia led to the formulation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which permitted the Soviet Union to intervene to save another socialist nation from “world imperialism” and to preserve the “indivisible” socialist system or bloc. Brezhnev’s doctrine of socialist sovereignty was invoked to justify Moscow’s intervention in Czechoslovakia.³⁵

Gerald Ford succeeded President Nixon in 1974. Ford followed the footsteps of the Nixon-Kissinger New Deal Policy. He even travelled to Moscow to negotiate the preparatory outline of the second phase of the arms control regime better known as Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) II. By then, the presidential election in the United States was approaching. To the dismay of many policy-makers, the Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter, blew the New Deal Policy out of proportion in his bid for the presidency. The New Deal Policy proved fatal for Republican, despite Kissinger's emphatic statement that détente was something which he had already forgotten.³⁶

In the 1976 presidential election, Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter attacked détente as a betrayal of America's global responsibility as a self-designated protector of individual liberties around the globe. The domestic debate on foreign policy issues had tremendous impact on the US-USSR hostility. With Carter in the White House, a remarkable decade of achievements and normalisation came to an end. The old chapter in the US-USSR confrontation had opened anew. The decade that followed was known as the era of the New Cold War. However, one must bear in mind that the détente was not the result of American influence on Soviet policy-makers. Moscow was forced by its own economic difficulties towards normalisation. The Americans merely capitalised on Soviet weaknesses and, after a decade, the US-USSR hostility apparently was resumed.³⁷

3.2.3 The New Cold War

This time frame refers mainly to American administrations that were in power since 1976 and until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This phase of US-USSR hostile relations began with President Jimmy Carter, and continued throughout President Reagan's administration until the Cold War was officially declared over during President George Bush's presidency. Bush proclaimed a new policy to direct American post-Cold War foreign policy: the New World Order. However, the American response came when the Soviet Union had disintegrated.

The American presidents that followed President Ford viewed managing the Soviet threat through détente as a failure. The question then was whether a better approach could be devised. President Carter, Reagan, and George Bush were to provide quite different answers to this question. However, they seemed to forget that the Soviet Union was facing economic difficulties. Brezhnev as well as his successors, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev, acknowledged as well as attempted to solve the problem.³⁸ Policy-makers in the Carter-Reagan administrations, intentionally or unintentionally, did not take Soviet economic weaknesses into consideration. They viewed the Soviet Union as a strategic menace and neglected its economic problems, which implied that the United States should revert to its policy of preponderance that dealt with the USSR from a position of strength, and not containing it economically. Therefore, two new doctrines were introduced by the United States to confront the Soviet Union: the Carter Doctrine and the Reagan Doctrine. The former advocated American unilateral intervention if the Soviets threatened Western interests in the

Persian Gulf Region. The Reagan Doctrine emphasised defence of freedom and democracy as the mission of the United States. The two doctrines which resulted in a substantial increase in the defence budget, emphasised different strategies to carry out the American mission. Nevertheless, the arms race topped the American policy agenda advocated by the Carter-Reagan doctrines.³⁹ The above argument explains the fact that during the Carter-Reagan administrations, the Cold War not only was revived, it had reached its peak.

Carter's foreign policy advisers held two opinions about the US-USSR relationship. Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, subscribed to the idea that the principle of MAD (mutual assured destruction) should guide US foreign policy. He condemned the détente and arms control regimes of SALT I and II. He believed the superpowers would survive the nuclear exchange. On the contrary, Carter's Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance and Vance's chief adviser, Marshall Schulman, proposed the principle of "soft linkage" as the governing principle of American foreign policy. The principle of "soft linkage" emphasised negotiation and provision of assistance to the ailing Soviet economy. In return, the Soviets should set their human rights record right. The advocates of the "soft linkage" principle were pinning their hopes on within the system modernisers--young and middle class technicians and professionals--who would work with the West and act as a check on older neo-Stalinists. Ultimately, "MAD" prevailed over "soft linkage" to guide American foreign policy during the Carter administration. In fact, the US Senate rejected the SALT II treaty signed by President Carter and President Brezhnev in 1979.⁴⁰

The Reagan Doctrine, like its predecessors, also had two dimensions. First, under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the Reagan administration developed the Star Wars project: a space based computer-controlled defence that had the capacity to shoot down nuclear missiles before reaching their targets. Second, the strategy of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) was also outlined. Instead of Vietnam-type wars in which the US committed large troops, LICs used small, specially trained counterinsurgency forces (native or US) that through political action or guerrilla-type warfare over a long period of time could wear down opponents.⁴¹ The American support of the Afghan Mujahiddeen in the struggle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was an example of US support for right-wing revolutionaries. The Afghan Mujahiddeen engaged the Soviet troops in guerrilla warfare until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The Afghan Mujahiddeen underwent organised counter-insurgency training to win the war against the USSR.

The American administrations neglected Soviet concerns about their economy. They also could not identify individuals who needed sympathisers to redirect the Soviet economic base from a command economy to the Western style free-market economy. In the midst of economic troubles faced by the Soviet Union, Gorbachev came to power to save the Soviet system. Defence budget cuts and economic reform topped his agenda. Gorbachev's policy was accommodative at best in contrast to that of his predecessors. Unfortunately, this was what the American administrators failed to come

to terms with. By the time they realised, it was too late, as the momentum of disintegration of the Soviet system became irresistible as well as irreversible.

Gorbachev abolished the Brezhnev Doctrine. Communist-dominated East European states were given freedom to adopt a political system of their own choice. For instance, the USSR allowed the formation of non-communist parties in the East European countries such as Poland. In addition, Gorbachev worked hard for the reunification of the two Germanys as well as made unprecedented unilateral concessions in the realm of arms control, a full account of which is beyond the preview of this study⁴². Gorbachev also abandoned Soviet commitments in different parts of the world. He began to normalise ties with Cold War enemies such as China and Japan. He also launched a campaign to improve ties with Western Europe. Trips to Bonn, Paris and London created the "Gorby Fever". He called for USSR's membership in the newly formed European common home i.e. European Union (EU). Through this new policy of accommodation, he wanted to break through the Iron Curtain and link the Soviet Union with the rich community of Europe. All these policies were intended to revive the Soviet economy. Military power was displaced by strictly economic considerations in Soviet foreign policy thinking.⁴³

It is interesting to observe that US foreign policy-makers could not provide a quick response to the socio-political transformation the Soviet Union was experiencing. However, when the Soviet System was undergoing drastic changes, George Bush assumed the US presidency in January 1989. Bush adopted a policy of "status quo-plus" towards Gorbachev's Soviet Union. The United States expected the status quo to

prevail in Europe and did not expect the Soviet Union disintegrate. However, it did not support Moscow financially, which could have prevented the collapse of the Soviet System. In addition, Bush even did not give Moscow the most-favoured nation status, which could have strengthened Moscow economically through trade.

Eventually, the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991. The Soviet system began to crumble, partly due to Gorbachev and partly due to the indifferent attitude adopted by the United States towards developments in the Soviet Union. Bush's status quo-plus policy was doomed to fail. American foreign policy appeared directionless. Containment was meant right from the start to dissolve the Soviet System. When the time came, American policy-makers were not ready for it. In order to provide direction to the US post-Cold War foreign policy, Bush introduced the New World Order as the official foreign policy guide. Its ingredients were not fully developed but were left for scholars to debate as to what could constitute its principle elements. Russia was recognised as the Successor State to the Soviet Union with Boris Yeltsin as its president. In 1992, Bush and Yeltsin met to declare an end to the Cold War.⁴⁴

3.3 China and Japan in the Context of Cold War Superpower Relations

The confrontation between the superpowers was global. The major areas of conflict included Europe, the Western Hemisphere (i.e. Latin America, North America, and Central America), Asia (i.e. Middle East, Southeast Asia, Far East, etc.), and Africa. In Asia, the "adversary" involved both China and Japan along with other small powers. According to Barnett, the United States, China, and Japan informally belonged to the same alliance right from the very outset of the Cold War. It was just a matter of

time that China joined the US-Japan anti-Soviet campaign.⁴⁵ Barnett's argument is relevant: the role played by China and Japan in shaping Cold War developments shifts the focus of superpower adversary to Asia-Pacific. As such a brief analysis of superpowers relations vis-à-vis China and Japan during the Cold War is in order.

As discussed elsewhere, the superpower rivalry was a global phenomenon. The United States and the Soviet Union needed to protect their interests in Asia-Pacific. They viewed the Asia-Pacific region with great concern. It was then predicted that the economic dynamism of the region would contribute to the economic recovery and progress needed by both Washington and Moscow. In addition, the Asia-Pacific region was strategically significant to both superpowers.⁴⁶ Therefore, the campaign to search for allies invariably involved establishing friendly relations with China and Japan. The question in policy-making circles both in Washington and Moscow was whether the elites in Tokyo and Beijing would agree to their self-appointed regional security managership. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union were suspicious about either of these Asian powers. For instance, the Soviet Union saw both China and Japan as potential threats. However, Moscow believed that superpower control over China and Japan would ultimately diminish the threats posed by the US to the Soviet Union. The United States viewed China as an enemy more than the Soviet Union vis-à-vis its interests in Asia. Despite the existence of negative images about China and Japan in Washington and Moscow, they sought normalisation and friendship with them--a strategy that is intelligible only in the context of superpower rivalry during the Cold War.

In 1952 the United States and Japan signed a peace treaty known as the San Francisco Treaty. The treaty brought the United States and Japan into military alignment and cooperation. Upon the formal declaration of the Cold War in Europe, the United States designed a containment strategy inspired by the Truman Doctrine. In search of allies in Asia, Washington chose to revive Japan. Japan had formed one leg of the axis powers along with Germany during World War II. The Grand Alliance comprising the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain, was formed to counter the axis powers. Both Germany and Japan were defeated. Japan came under the American mandate. When Washington decided to revive Japan, it also decided to restore its sovereignty. General Douglas MacArthur, the American Head of Government in Japan, was asked to write a new constitution for Japan. This new constitution is known as the post-War Japanese Peace Constitution.⁴⁷

When Stalin triggered the Korean War in June 1950, he believed that if the entire Korean Peninsula was transformed into a Soviet satellite, it could serve as a useful weapon in countering US influence, besides increasing Soviet leverage in the region. Surprisingly, when the United States committed its troops under the United Nations Security Council mandate, Stalin pretended that the Korean War was none of Soviet business. China committed its volunteers in Korea against the United States. China complained that Stalin even did not provide its volunteers with up-to-date equipment. Moreover, the Korean War impelled the United States to sign a defence treaty with Japan known as the US-Japan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.⁴⁸

Tokyo's decision to enter into a military alliance with the United States was based on two factors: (1) national security and (2) business interests at home and abroad. Both of these factors required Japan to align itself with a power that could provide economic assistance as well as protect Japan's security. The United States was the obvious candidate. In fact, the Japanese feared the outbreak of internal warfare instigated by China. The Japanese also assumed that the United States could best substitute Japan's military weakness, besides serving as its protector.⁴⁹

The United States, by deciding to revive Japan, also wanted to deter China's threat to its interests. All post-War American presidents, particularly President Kennedy foresaw the possibility of war with China more than the Soviet Union. President Kennedy believed that nuclear war in the Asia-Pacific between the US and USSR was a remote possibility, but he could not help in the believing possibility of war with China. He believed China might think of conventional war to make gains and undermine American interests in Asia. According to him, it was China which sent its volunteers to cross the border into North Korea to battle against American soldiers. Again, it was on this pretext that Kennedy, as discussed elsewhere, committed American troops to protect tin and rubber that were needed by the United States in South Vietnam.⁵⁰ However, the view that the US intervened in Vietnam to protect its economic interests is debatable and not shared by most international relations scholars. K. S. Nathan believes that three factors impelled the US administration to intervene in Vietnam: (1) security, (2) military, and (3) ideology. According to him, the US administration decided to intervene in Vietnam in order to check the rise of Chinese Communism everywhere in Asia.⁵¹

The American President must have also pondered over the way the United States had treated Mao Tse-tung. During World War II, China was ruled by the Kuomintang or nationalists. The native nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek were engaged in civil war with indigenous communists led by Mao Tse-tung. Both the United States and the Soviet Union supported the nationalists. The reasons why Stalin supported Chiang and not Mao are discussed later. Moreover, when the indigenous communists took control in Beijing and substituted the nationalists, the United States continued to assist the nationalists who fled and formed a government in Formosa (Taiwan). The United States pursued a one-China policy until Sino-US normalisation in the 1970s. The China that the United States recognised was the government in Taiwan and not in Beijing. In addition, American troops were deployed in Japan and in the islands around Japan. During the Korean War years and the communist seizure of power in Beijing, the United States had stationed its seventh fleet in the Straits of Taiwan. Moreover, the US continued to send advisers and pour economic assistance to sustain Taiwan against Mainland China.

The Soviet threat and the Chinese menace brought the United States and Japan into military alliance. The alliance was viewed as intimate to the extent that most scholars identified Japan's post-war foreign policy with that of the United States. While it is true that Japan followed America's lead in world affairs in security matters, Japan nevertheless began to show independence in foreign policy in the economic realm. When Japan's economy was showing signs of going global, it began to behave differently. For instance, in April 1966, without prior notice to the United States, Japan

initiated the first ministerial Conference on Economic Development of Southeast Asian States in Tokyo.⁵²

As discussed elsewhere, the Soviet Union designed a policy to destroy the US-Japan alliance. As part of its drive to remove Japan from the United States' umbrella, the Soviet Union proposed establishing economic relations with Japan. However, Japan persistently linked business to territorial problems which are still awaiting settlement. Two theories help explain efforts toward Soviet-Japan normalisation of relations. The first is known as "iriguchiron" or "entrance theory" while the second is known as "deguchiron" or "exit theory". The former adopted by Japan, emphasised on linking politics to normalisation of Soviet-Japan relations. Settlement of territorial disputes should precede rapprochement. The latter, adopted by the Soviet Union, emphasised that economic integration will ultimately lead to settlement of disputes of all kinds, including territorial disputes.⁵³

In the Cairo Summit, the leaders from the United States, China, and Great Britain met to design a strategy for the defeat of Japan and its post-defeat treatment. The leaders decided on an unconditional surrender of Japan. Japan should be stripped of all islands seized or occupied by it. In addition Manchuria, Taiwan, and Descadores Islands were to be returned to China. A few days later, Stalin joined the three leaders this time in Tehran. At the Tehran Summit, Stalin agreed to the decision of the Big Three but also claimed Kuriles Islands. President Roosevelt concurred with the claims made by Stalin in a summit in Yalta. The leaders of the Big Four met again in Potsdam and issued an ultimatum of surrender to Japan. The Japanese had no idea of the Yalta

secret agreement. They only knew about the Cairo Summit.⁵⁴ The Japanese held that the Kuriles were not included, as Japan did not occupy it through violence. Moreover, the Japanese considered Soviet control of the Kuriles as an act of aggression as the Soviets joined the war against Japan despite the Neutrality Treaty between Moscow and Tokyo signed on 13 April 1941. Moreover, Japan had not given its consent in Yalta and was not party to the Yalta Agreement.⁵⁵

The dispute over the Kuriles Islands has been a stumbling block in USSR-Japan normalisation until today. The Japanese governments throughout have held that settlement of territorial disputes was a precondition to normalisation of relations. Negotiations held in 1955-1959, 1973, 1976, and 1978 produced no concrete results. However, a breakthrough occurred when Gorbachev in 1988 privately acknowledged to Nakasone the existence of territorial problems between the USSR and Japan. Gorbachev intended to resolve the issue, but before committing the USSR into some decision, he wanted to create a security environment conducive to Soviet interests in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, he proposed multilateral consultations for freezing and lowering the level of air and naval power in the region. The Kurile Islands were vital to the Soviet Union, as it provided Moscow with a strategic link and position to protect its interests in the Asia-Pacific. It would enhance the image of the Soviet Union as a Pacific power that should be consulted on issues affecting the Asia-Pacific region. However, Japan overlooked Soviet security concerns about the presence of US troops on Japanese territory, as well as the relevance of the American factor to Soviet national security.⁵⁶

Despite Gorbachev's private acknowledgement, Japan did not provide financial assistance to the USSR, which prevented the latter from making concessions regarding the territorial problem. Gorbachev believed economic assistance would eventually lead to settlement of territorial disputes. As Japan always linked economic assistance to resolution of the territorial dispute, it remains unsettled even after the Cold War. The dispute has been discussed by post-Soviet leaders and will continue to dominate post-Cold War Russo-Japanese relations. However, according to Wolf Mendl the real reason for Japan's disinterest in USSR-Japan rapprochement or normalisation is the absence of concrete economic interests in the Kuriles and not territorial disputes. The territorial dispute was used as a scapegoat only. Had the Soviet Union been an attractive business opportunity, the Japanese government would have adopted either the Sino-Japanese formula or Korean-Japanese formula. In both instances, the territorial disputes were set aside in favour of larger economic interests.⁵⁷

If Barnett were right in stating that China informally belonged to the US-Japan alliance against the Soviet Union, then why did Mao pursue the policy of "lean on one side" when he defeated Chiang's nationalist government? A deeper look into China's Cold War foreign policy directions reveals that, in contrast to Japan, China pursued an independent foreign policy, as it did not identify itself with either superpower. Chinese leaders developed quite a distinct worldview, which was not inspired, however, by Mao's version of communism. In other words, ideology may not have played any role in shaping the Chinese worldview. This in turn could suggest that Chinese foreign policy was not guided by ideology, and ideology used to take precedence where

national interests were not in jeopardy. Indeed, as was the case with the Soviet Union, ideology served as a useful tool to promote China's national interests.

The Chinese worldview contained three elements: the First World comprised of the United States and the Soviet Union, the Second World comprised of all developing states excluding the US and the Soviet Union, and the Third World comprised of all underdeveloped nations. Accordingly, the First World was imperialistic and hegemonistic, in search of spheres of influence around the world. China identified itself with the Third World, not because China was as backward as the Third World nations but because both China and the underdeveloped nations were against hegemonism.⁵⁸

This worldview as such was geared towards providing direction to Chinese foreign policy. The objective was two-fold: (1) security, and (2) assertion of leadership. Ideology was relevant only if it served the above two objectives. Hence, China's Cold War foreign policy was influenced or dominated by "realpolitik" more than ideology.⁵⁹ In line with the objectives outlined above, analysis of China's relations with the superpowers is in order. It was the security imperative that forced China in 1949 to proclaim the "lean on one side" policy. Equally, the shift of alliance from the Soviet camp to the Western camp in 1972 was imminent as dictated by its security concerns.

According to Barnett, when Mao took over power in Beijing in 1949, he proclaimed the "lean on one side" policy. This means that the Soviet leadership had been taken for granted. Mao signed a military alliance with the USSR and stressed on the unity of outlook, purpose and interests between the two communist states. Based on

the 14 February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, a decade of cooperation in military, economic, scientific, and educational aspects followed. However, China was neither accepted as a member of COMECON or the Warsaw Pact.⁶⁰

Soon a decade of friendship and cooperation was clouded by personality conflicts and past memories. Mao remembered Stalin's shabby treatment of native Chinese Communists. He also remembered Soviet cooperation with nationalists against the Communists. Moreover, Mao believed that Stalin's actions were to preserve Soviets business interests in Manchuria. In addition, the USSR wanted China to drop Taiwan from its list of priorities. Because of Taiwan, the USSR refused to provide China with military aid and nuclear facilities, as it will drag the USSR into confrontation with the United States. Above all, Stalin wanted the Chinese communists to adhere to the Soviet interpretation of Communism. Stalin wanted Mao to be replaced by someone else as he practised communism according to his own interpretation against Moscow's will. China advocated a revolutionary foreign policy, rejected détente, and condemned the US-USSR 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT). As the relationship deteriorated, the two communist powers rivalled each other almost everywhere around the world. A decade of cooperation gradually developed into a decade of hostility. By 1960, the Sino-Soviet relationship had collapsed.⁶¹

China also viewed the US as an unreliable partner. Hence China adopted the "Dual Adversary Policy"⁶² of confronting both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet leg of the Dual Adversary Policy was known as the policy of Strategic

Assertiveness i.e. being tough with the Soviet Union compared to the United States. China remained firm in rejecting any peace initiatives from Moscow. The Soviet Union deployed troops on the 4500-mile border with China to force Beijing to accommodate Russia's interests.⁶³

Another term used by scholars to explain the rivalry between the three powers was "Strategic Triangle". However, the Strategic Triangle was dismantled or ceased to exist when China abandoned its policy of Dual Adversary. China could no longer hide its strategic weakness. Ultimately it entered into alliance with the United States. In addition to neutralising the Soviet threat, China by its rapprochement with the United States also wanted to prevent Japan's re-emergence as a military power. Such an odd alliance between the two opposed ideological powers was due to the security threat posed by the Soviet Union on its border. Soon Kissinger, Nixon's Secretary of State, found himself in China to pave the way for President Nixon's visit to Beijing. Normalisation with China was part of the détente policy initiated by the United States to contain Communist influence around the globe. China committed itself to the odd partnership on the principle of necessity. Absent the Soviet threat on its border, China would have remained firm in its pursuit of the policy of Dual Adversary or Strategic Triangle. This decade of Sino-Soviet hostility continued until Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao in 1979.⁶⁴

With Deng in power, the Chinese policy underwent a dramatic shift in priorities. To Deng, modernisation of China and its economic development had to be given precedence over strategic considerations. This shift in China paralleled reforms initiated

by President Gorbachev. The two leaders on both sides of the border worked out normalisation of relations. Nevertheless, normalisation had been outlined in 1982 by Brezhnev in his Tashkent speech. Brezhnev approved of China as a socialist state and considered its claims on Taiwan as legitimate. In addition, the USSR accepted the Chinese demand to withdraw its forces from the Chinese border, and Afghanistan.⁶⁵

When the Soviet System disintegrated, China became concerned about what Deng called “democratic containment”. Whatever anxiety and apprehension China had about capitalism, it remained the task of the Chinese leader to protect the Maoist version of Socialism amidst major changes in the post-Cold War era.

3.4 China-Japan Cold War Relations

Pre-World War II Japan was an ambitious Empire that controlled most parts of Mainland China, Taiwan, and the Koreas. Historical proximity in philosophy, culture, religion, art, and political institutions was another common character shared by both Asian powers. Some have argued that the Japanese had borrowed Chinese religious values, political institutions, and literal philosophy.⁶⁶ However, cultural proximity had little impact on the new generation in Japan. Having close contact with the West, post-World War II Japanese wanted to grow in the image of the West. Aggressive westernization of Japan kept Japanese a world apart from China. After World War II, the followers of Confucianism were bitter enemies. The degree of hostility between China and Japan could be seen in the fact that Beijing and Tokyo allied with the other's enemy. Japan sought military partnership with the United States while China proclaimed the “lean on one side” policy towards the Soviet Union.

Although China and Japan developed unfriendly attitudes after World War II, nevertheless they cooperated with one another, as their respective national interests required such cooperation. However, the two Asian powers communicated unofficially despite geographical proximity and cultural affinity. Through rapprochement with Japan, China wanted to isolate Japan from the United States, gain recognition, and above all, procure Japanese technology needed for modernisation of its economy. On the other hand, to proceed with the modernisation of its economy, Japan needed stability at home and in the region. Stability in China was necessary for stability in the region. Moreover, China was identified as an attractive and huge market for Japanese goods.⁶⁷ It is necessary to point out here that in the 1960s Japan's foreign policy was characterised as economic foreign policy, which meant that Japan began to establish its economic hegemony vis-à-vis China and the Soviet Union.

During the first two decades of the Cold War (1950-1970), Sino-Japanese relations remained unofficial. China was hostile to the United States. However, the centrality of Japan to Chinese national interests led Beijing to adopt what Oslan Lawrence termed as "Peoples' Diplomacy" or "Cultural Diplomacy". The aim of "Peoples' Diplomacy" was to encourage the business community and intellectuals in Japan to exert pressure on the Japanese government to change its China policy. The policy bore fruits, and Japanese society was divided by then into pro-Peking and anti-Peking/pro-Washington.⁶⁸

In the initial years of the Cold War, Japan remained in the enemy's camp i. e. the United States. Japan pursued a Two-China policy: instead of Peking, Japan recognised the government in Taipei as the government *de jure* of China. There did not exist diplomatic relations between Beijing and Tokyo. However, the mounting pressures caused by the policy of Peoples' Diplomacy became irresistible in Japan. In 1954, Hatoyama replaced Yoshida as the Japanese Premier. The new leader proposed the Two-China policy: the Mainland (i.e. Beijing) and the Island (i.e. Taipei). By 1957, Peoples' Diplomacy paid off substantially and public opinion was largely in favour of recognition of Beijing as the government *de jure* of China.⁶⁹ But Japan only yielded to China's demand in the 1970s after Tokyo accepted China's position on Taiwan. Japan recognised the Peoples' Republic of China in Beijing as the sole legal government in China and severed diplomatic relations with Taipei only after the United States normalised relations with China.⁷⁰

Experts on Japanese foreign policy have examined Sino-Japanese relations within a pure economic framework.⁷¹ They observe that the two nations had non-formal relations for two decades, but cooperated on the basis of the Doctrine of Necessity. However, it is noteworthy that Japan always viewed its relations with China from the vantage point of economic benefits. In 1978, China and Japan signed a Long Term Trade Agreement (LTTA). The treaty viewed the two economies as complementary and promised the transfer of Japanese technology to China. China needed Japanese technological know-how for its aggressive modernisation policy. In the same year the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT) was signed between China and Japan. As a result, Japan became an established trade partner of China.⁷² Interestingly,

Japan never adopted the theory of “irriguchiron” or entrance theory as an official policy to guide its relations with China. It was the theory of “deguchiron” or exit theory that guided Japan's China policy. Japan never linked its economic relations, as it did persistently with the Soviet Union, to politics or territorial disputes. Barnett maintained that both nations exercised restraint with respect to hot spots of conflict such as in Northeast Asia (Senkaku Islands, ocean resources, Korea and Taiwan).⁷³

However the relations between China and Japan became tense in the 1980s. The reasons cited are China's technological deficiency and infrastructural weaknesses. Tokyo does not want China's products to penetrate the Japanese market. Japan adopted a selective approach to the transfer of technology to Beijing, transferring only the technology that benefits Japan, not China. Japan is disinterested in the proper transfer of technology to China. Chinese intellectuals and media in the 1980s speculated that Japan wanted China to be its huge consumer market and not a production base. Japan only provided loans to those Chinese projects which served Tokyo's long-term interests. At the root of all these lies the notion that Japan wants to encourage China's dependency on its technology. In this way, Japan could maintain its economic hegemony by not strengthening the weak links of China namely, transportation, production, competitiveness of export products, etc.⁷⁴

Since its association with the “Rich Man's Club” in 1963, Japan began to use its economic miracle to enhance its international position and prestige. Under the guise of international responsibility, Japanese investment, technology transfer, and financial aid policies were actually hegemonistic in nature. Chinese leaders did not lose sight of

Japanese intentions in their relations with Japan. Perhaps this explains the reasons for China turning to the United States and European nations for technology as any other sovereign nation.⁷⁵

In addition to economic hegemonism, there also exists the danger of Japan becoming a strategic power--a factor that is worrisome to policy-makers in China. When the United States and Japan signed a communiqué in 1969 and agreed on the return of Okinawa to Japan, the communiqué hinted at Japan's remilitarization in collaboration with the United States. China did not reject the US-Japan defence pact. It did not support it either. China maintained that for reasons of self-defence, Japan needed US support. US forces in the region were not offensive but defensive i.e. to defend American interests. In the 1980s Japan began to perceive a reorientation of its role in the Asia-Pacific Region. Scholars expressed Japan's perception in terms of "Japan Returns to the Region", "Abandoning its Western Allies", "Integration and Regional Dependency on Japan" etc. China was particularly concerned about Japan's remilitarization. China had made it clear that it will not tolerate a Japan that is superior and dictates its terms to China. Japan, according to Chinese official circles, should avoid pre-war images of Sino-Japanese relations. What is more interesting is that China does not want to see a breakdown of US-Japan military cooperation as such a development could signal Japan's remilitarization. Therefore, China was never in favour of improvement in Japan's defence capabilities, as it will bring instability to the region.⁷⁶ Therefore, it all depends on individual scholars to forecast the trends in post-Cold War Sino-Japan relations within the context of regional stability, as they deem fit. However, this thesis attempts to identify some major post-Cold War foreign policy

trends of these four powers in Asia-Pacific in the ensuing chapters in the light of the discussion presented in this chapter.

 ENDNOTES

1. Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-67*, (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 418-419.
2. Mike Bowker, *Russia Foreign Policy and the End of Cold War*, (USA/England: Dartmouth, 1997), pp. 64-67.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-248.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-251.
5. Adam B. Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-340. See also Bowker, *op. cit.*, pp. 10-21.
6. Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War-1945-1992*, (USA: Mac Graw-Hill Inc, 1993), pp. 5-8. See also Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-340.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-27, 38-49. Note: Mao Tse-tung was the leader of native Communists in China. Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the nationalist government in China during World War II. The two leaders engaged in a war of attrition to gain control over the whole of China. The former received nominal support from the Soviet Union, while the latter was strongly supported by the United States.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-13.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 10-21.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-27.
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13. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-49.
14. Andrzej Korbanski and Francis Fukuyama, (eds.) *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, (USA: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 51-52. See also Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-419.
15. Galia Golan, "The Soviet Union In The Middle East After Thirty Years", in Korbanski, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-179.
16. Lafeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-58.

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17. *Ibid.*
 18. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-73.
 19. Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 554-546.
 20. *Ibid.*
 21. *Ibid.*, pp. 508-509.
 22. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-115, 173-175.
 23. Bowker, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-70.
 24. Lafeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-115, 173-175.
 25. For more information about Stalin's role in the Korean War, see Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-531.
 26. Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 464-470, 505, 566-567.
 27. *Ibid.*, pp. 436-450.
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 29. *Ibid.*, pp. 227-235.
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 31. Lafeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-277.
 32. *Ibid.*
 33. *Ibid.*
 34. *Ibid.*
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 36. *Ibid.*, pp. 820-290.
 37. *Ibid.*, see also Golan, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-206.
 38. *Ibid.*

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39. *Ibid.*, pp. 302-310. For full details of the military budget and defence expenditure of the United States during the administrations of President Carter and President Reagan, see *ibid.*, pp. 286-328.
 40. Bowker, *op. cit.*, pp. 248-249.
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 48. Ulam, *op. cit.*, pp. 526-531.
 49. Lawrence Oslan, *Japan in Post War Asia*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp. 180-215, 135-136.
 50. Lafeber, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-235.
 51. K. S. Nathan is Professor of International Relations in the Department of History, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His views regarding US intervention in Vietnam were revealed in a discourse on the subject under discussion, as he supervises this thesis. He gave me permission to quote his ideas on the issue.
 52. For details, see Oslan, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-157.
 53. Hasegawa Tsyoshi, "Soviet-Japanese Relations in the 1990s", in *Special Report 1991 on Japan and The United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World*, (USA: Brassey's (US) Inc., 1991), p. 63.
 54. For more information about the territorial disputes between the two nations, see Nimmo, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-75.

55. Wolf Mendl, "Stuck in a Mould: The Relationship between Japan and The Soviet Union", in Kathleen Newland (ed.), *The International Relations of Japan*, (London: Millennium Publishing Group, 1990), pp. 180-185.
56. Laura Newby, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Chinese Perspective*, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 196-197. For more information on the absence of Japan's economic interests in the Soviet Union, see also pp. 170-200 of the same reference. See also Nimmo, *op. cit.*, 30-31, 65-71, 87-92, and Hasegawa, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-65.
57. Mendl, *op. cit.*, p. 174.
58. How did the Chinese leadership view and predict the change? For more information on this question, see Doak Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.
60. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-25.
61. Chi Su, "The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy", in Robert S. Ross (ed.), *China, The United States and The Soviet Union*, (USA: East Gate Book, 1993), pp. 42-43, 45-46.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45, 99-101.
65. Gorbachev outlined his 10-point proposal for normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations in 1985. For the full text of his speech, see Chi Su, *ibid.*, pp. 53-54. See also Herbert J. Eluson, "Soviet-Chinese Relations: The Experience of Two Decades", in Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94, 101-110.
66. Oslan, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-102.
67. *Ibid.*, see also Doak Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-90.
68. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100, also see Lawrence Oslan, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-89.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 110-113.

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71. Scholars such as Walter Arnold, Reinhard Drifte and Doak Barnett are examples of those who viewed Japanese foreign policy as directed by economic factors.
 72. Walter Arnold, "Political and Economic Influences in Japan's Relations with China Since 1978", in Newby, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-126.
 73. Barnett, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-141.
 74. Newby, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-10, 37. For more details on trade relations between China and Japan, see also pp. 6-47 of the same reference.
 75. *Ibid.*
 76. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-75.